PRELIMINARIES
Facts
01 HAGANS v. WISLIZENUS (1920)
Preliminaries | Action v. Special Proceeding
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
1. Judge Wislizenus ordered the appointment of
assessors in a special proceeding case. Hagans
contends that no authority in law exists for the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
Judge Wislizenus argues that the provisions of Act
No. 190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special
proceedings."
2. WON a judge in a “special proceeding” is
authorized under the law to appoint assessors.
3. NO, because Act No. 190 only applies to actions
and not special proceedings. There is a distinction
between an action and special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a
court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as
an application or proceeding to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required, unless the statute expressly so provides.
The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion.
1. (Parties) - The petitioner in this case is Broadwell
Hagans, and the respondent is Judge Adolph
Wislizenus, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
2. (Antecedents) – Judge Wislizenus ordered the
appointment of assessors in a special proceeding
case for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an
administrator or executor for his services and
expenses in the care, management, and settlement
of the estate of a deceased person. Hagans
contends that no authority in law exists for the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Judge
Wislezenus filed a demurrer in response to the
complaint of Hagans against him, arguing that the
provisions of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint
assessors in "special proceedings."
Issue
1. WON a judge in a “special proceeding” is authorized
under the law to appoint assessors.
a. No. Because Act No. 190 only applies to actions
and not special proceedings. There is a
distinction between an action and special
proceeding.
Held
1. WON a judge in a “special proceeding” is authorized
under the law to appoint assessors.
NO. The only provisions of law which could, by any
possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special
proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190. Section
154 provides that “either party to an action may apply in
writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon
the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that
assessors be provided, * * *.”
Upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, a
distinction is made between an "action" and a "special
proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action"
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every
other remedy furnished by law is a “special proceeding.”
An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a
court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the
statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special
proceedings is generally granted upon an application or
motion. Examples of special proceedings are: proceedings
for the appointment of an administrator, guardians or
tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change
the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc.
There is a marked distinction between an “action” and a
“special proceeding.” When Legislature used the word
“action” it did not mean “special proceeding.” Therefore,
there is no law authorizing the appointment of an assessor
in special proceedings. In proceedings like the present the
judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to
appoint assessors.
02 NATCHER VS. CA (2001)
Preliminaries Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Buena
Summary
1. After the death of Graciano’s first wife, the real
property registered in their name was adjudicated
to the latter and their six children extrajudicially.
Thereafter, Graciano got married and sold the
property to his second wife, Natcher. Private
respondents filed a civil case against petitioner
alleging the sale was fraudulent, while also
alleging their legitimes have been impaired.
2. WON RTC in question, in an action for annulment
and reconveyance of title, has jurisdiction over
questions relating to settlement of estate even if
has no jurisdiction over the settlement
proceedings.
3. RTC in question has no jurisdiction because Sec.
2, Rule 90 provides that questions relating to
advancements made by decedent shall be
adjudicated by the court having jurisdiction over
the estate proceedings. The court in question is a
 general court not properly constituted to be a
probate court. The respondents also cannot raise
questions relating to the settlement of the estate
of the decedent in an action for annulment and
reconveyance of title.
Facts:
1. The petitioner in this case is Patricia Natcher, wife
of decedent thru second marriage. Private
respondents are the heirs of decedent Graciano.
2. Graciano and his first wife, Graciana, were
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together
with his six children, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the mentioned real
property. In 1980, Graciano married herein
petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which
TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name.
On 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs. The private respondents filed a civil case
against the petitioner before RTC Manila. They
alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner
Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No.
107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443
and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name
of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
3. Because private respondents raised the questions
relating to the settlement of estate of the decedent
in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of title,
SC ruled the trial court in question has no
jurisdiction because it is a court of general
jurisdiction not properly constituted as a probate
court and has no jurisdiction over the estate
proceedings.
Issue
1. May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of
general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly on questions as to advancement
of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
a. No. Sec. 20, Rule 90 provides that a court
having jurisdiction over estate proceedings
may hear any questions as to advancements
made during the lifetime of decedent. RTC in
question also not probate court.
Held
1. WON the RTC in question, having general jurisdiction,
adjudicate matters relating to settlement of estate in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title.

a. No. Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, questions as to advancement made
or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings; and the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its
general jurisdiction is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue
of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement
made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario
to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
b. There lies a marked distinction between an
action and a special proceeding.
An action is a formal demand of one’s right
in a court of justice in the manner prescribed
by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. “Special proceeding” may
be defined as an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so
provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or
motion. An action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature
of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court. Matters
which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
c. Before any conclusion about the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it
is necessary that the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased
at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it, form
there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and it is only then
can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

03 VDA. DE MANALO v. CA (2001)
Action v. Special Proceeding
Ponente J. De leon, Jr.
Summary
1. Upon the death of their father, herein respondents,
8 of the surviving 11 children, filed a petition with
RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate
of their late father and for appointment of their
brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
Petitioners assert that the petition is actually an
ordinary civil action and the respondents failed to
aver in the petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of
the same family prior to the filing of the petition
pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code. For this
reason, the petition should be dismissed.
2. Issue: Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate an ordinary civil action, thus Rule 16, Sec
1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as
a ground for the dismissal of the petition.
a. NO it is not an ordinary action but a
special proceeding for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person
3. Scrutiny of the Petition for in ILASD of the Estate
belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action.
Petition contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action & so petitioners, as
oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action
and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article
222 of the Civil Code.
Art 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions
based on the term “suit” used in the provision. Suit=
remedy for redress of an injury
Civil Action/Suit Special proceedings
action filed in a court of remedy where
justice, whereby a petitioner seeks to
party sues another for establish a status, right
the enforcement of a or particular fact.
right, or the protection
or redress of a wrong.
The oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued in SP. PROC. No. 92- 63626 for any cause of
action as in fact no defendant was impleaded
therein.
The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their
father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they
can validly exercise their right to participate in the in
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent.
Facts
1. (Parties) Petitioner and respondents are the
children of the deceased.
2. (Antecedents) Troadio Manalo was survived by his
wife, Pilar, and his 11 children. At the time of his
death, he left several real properties in Manila and
a business in Tarlac. Herein respondents, 8 of the
surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila
for the judicial settlement of the estate of their
late father and for appointment of their brother
Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action) Petitioners, the
other children, ask for the dismissal of the petition
on the ground that that a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied. Petitioners
claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626
is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it
contains certain averments which, according to
them, are indicative of its adversarial nature.
Cited pleadings which allegedly makes the petition
look like an ordinary action includes:
a. an answer containing admissions and
denials,
b. special and affirmative defenses and
c. compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral
and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
fees and costs
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the
same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on
the ground that a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with, that is, that the
petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of
the same family prior to the filing of the petition
pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Issue
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil
action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. NO
Held
Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to
justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement
of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch
as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only
to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term “suit”
that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether
at law or in equity.

A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice,

whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein

petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
impleaded therein.
The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the
heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of
the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.
JURISDICTION
01 MANGALIMAN VS. GONZALES (1970)
Jurisdiction
J. Zaldivar
Summary
1. Petitioner, as a minor, received 1/8 undivided share
of Hacienda Evangelista as a legacy from her
father. It was placed under guardianship of her half-
brother Alejandro Jr. by CFI Manila acting as a
probate court. Her share was subsequently levied
and sold for the alleged failure of the estate to pay
for the services of the administrator herein
respondent. Petitioner then filed a petition for
reconveyance before the same probate court.
2. The issue in this case is W/N CFI as a probate court
has jurisdiction?
3. None. The petition for reconveyance has given rise
to a controversy involving rights over a real property
which would require the presentation of evidence
and the determination of legal questions that should
be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction.
Facts
1. Petitioner Loreto Mangaliman was an illegitimate
daughter of Alejandro Gonzales. When her father
died, she was given a legacy of 1/8 undivided
portion of Hacienda Evangelista, but since she was
still a minor then, her share was placed under the
guardianship of her half-brother Alejandro
Gonzales, Jr. Respondent Manuel Gonzales is a
legitimate son of the testator and the administrator
of the estate.
2. Hacienda Evangelista, however, for alleged failure
of the other heirs to pay for the services of the
respondent as administrator of the estate, was
levied upon and subsequently sold by the probate
court. A final deed of sale was issued to the
respondent a year later after the failure of the
petitioner’s guardian to redeem her undivided
share.
3. On April 1962, petitioner already of age, filed a
petition before the same probate court for the
reconveyance of her 1/8 undivided share
contending that respondent had obtained the
subsequent writs of execution through fraud and
misrepresentations. Probate court ruled that the
respondent may not be divested of title under a
probate proceeding but in an independent suit filed
with a competent court. Hence, this appeal by
petitioner.
Issue
Whether the CFI of Manila, as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s petition for
reconveyance. NO
Held
1. Whether the CFI of Manila, as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s petition for
reconveyance. NO
 The CFI, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for reconveyance. The
remedy sought by petitioner for the reconveyance to
her of her share in the Hacienda Evangelista upon the
ground that the same was acquired by respondent
through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be
obtained by a mere petition in the probate proceedings.
The CFI, acting as a probate court, has limited
jurisdiction and can only take cognizance of matters of
probate both testate and intestate. But this should be
understood to comprehend only cases related to those
powers specified by law, and cannot extend to the
adjudication of collateral matters.
The petition for reconveyance has given rise to a
controversy involving rights over a real property which
would require the presentation of evidence and the
determination of legal questions that should be
ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction.
Facts
02 BAYBAYAN V. AQUINO (1987)
Jurisdiction
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
1. In a probate proceeding, certain properties were
adjudicated to the private respondents. Pursuant to
the proceedings, they were to possess the
properties but they found that the petitioners were
claiming ownership over the land. The petitioners
filed a civil case for quieting of title. The judge in the
probate proceeding ordered the petitioners to
amend their complaint in the civil case to exclude a
certain lot that they found to be properly owned by
the respondents. Pursuant to the order issued in the
probate proceeding, the petitioners amended their
complaint but it was incomplete which led the judge
in the civil case to dismiss the case.
2. WON the order to amend the complaint issued in a
different proceeding was valid and legal.
3. Yes. While it may be true that the order to amend
the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was
issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot
ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not
parties in said special proceedings, it appears,
however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court,
when they filed their amended complaint in
accordance with the order of the probate court.
1. Private respondents are the nephews and nieces of
one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in
1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition in the
CFI of Pangasinan for the summary settlement of
the decedent’s estate, the value of which did not
exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the CFI
of Pangasinan. The private court issued an order
adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent
who were ordered to submit a project of partition.
The case is Spec. Proc. No 24-R.

2. The probate court ordered one of the heirs, Eulalia
Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her
co-heirs. A writ of execution and possession were
issued pursuant thereto. When the representatives
of the heirs went to the property, they found that
Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista were there
preventing their access. The respondents filed a
motion to cite them in contempt of court.
3. Petitioners Cipriano Evangelista, Pedro Baybayan,
and the spouses Bartolome, claiming to be the
registered owners of the lost filed a complaint for
quieting of title, damages, and to restrain said
defendants from enforcing the writ of execution.
The case is Civil Case No. 231-R.
4. In the hearing of the motion for contempt, the
identity of the lands involved was brought up so that
the probate court ordered a relocation survey and
commissioned a geodetic engineer. The survey
found that the Petitioners (Cipriano Evangelista etc)
did in fact own the subject properties. Hence, the
court dismissed the contempt charge.
5. The judge ordered the petitioners to amend their
complaint for quieting of title to exclude Lot E.
However, upon filing the Amended Complaint, the
judge found that it did not comply with his order and
he proceeded to dismiss the case without prejudice
to the filing of a proper complaint for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the property in
controversy. Their motion for reconsideration was
denied.
6. The order to amend Civil Case No. 231-R was
issued in the Spec. Proc. No 24-R case (therefore,
it was a different proceeding, the judge of SP 24-R
ordered to amendment in CC 231-R)
7. They now assail the order of the judge that they
failed to comply with. The petitioners contend that
the respondent Judge had no authority under the
law, both substantive and procedural, to issue the
questioned orders because the order to amend the
complaint was issued in, and in connection with
Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners
are not even parties to.
Issue
1. WON the order to amend the complaint in Civil Case
231-R issued in SP No. 24-4 is valid and legal.
a. Yes. The petitioners of the case voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the probate court when the submitted their
amended complaint despite it being
incomplete.
Held
1. WON the order to amend the complain in Civil Case
231-R issued in SP No. 24-4 is valid and legal.
YES. While it may be true that the order to amend the
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein
petitioners who are not parties in said special proceedings,
it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, when they filed their amended complaint in
accordance with the order of the probate court. They
cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial
Judge to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily.
However, the Judge in the Special Proceeding did comit a
grave abuse of discretion in dismissed the complaint filed
by the petitioners for their alleged failure to amend their
complaint to exclude Lot E which the respondent Judge
found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the
probate court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano
Evangelista and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the
respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the
hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify
the order to amend the complaint since the determination
of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge
presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not
final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the
right of an interested party to raise the question of
ownership in a proper action.
03 FERNANDEZ V. MARAVILLA (1964)
Jurisdiction
Ponente J. Barrera
Summary
1. FACTS: Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed a
petition for probate of the will of his deceased wife
Digna Maravilla. Herminio was appointed as special
administrator of Digna’s estate. Petitioners, siblings
of the deceased, opposed the probate of the will
and sought the appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son
of one of petitioners) as special co-administrator of
the estate. The will was denied probate and Eliezar
was appointed as special co-administrator.
Respondent Herminio appealed the decision
denying probate of the will and filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with writ of
preliminary injuction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar as special co-administrator. Consequently,
the CA issued a writ of preliminary injuction.
2. ISSUE: Did the CA have jurisdiction to issue the
subject writ of preliminary injuction? – NO
3. HELD: The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
provides that the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in
which the value in controversy exceeds two
hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and
costs." Note that the proceedings had on the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator are merely incidental to the probate or
testate proceedings of the deceased Digna
Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners'
motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court,
on the ground that the amount therein involved is
within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending resolution. That the Court of Appeals has
no appellate jurisdiction over said testate
proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that
the properties therein involved are valued at
 P362,424.90, as per inventory of the special
administrator.
(Since the CA had no jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings, it likewise had no jurisdiction over the
appointment of a special co-administrator, which is
merely incidental to the probate proceedings)
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case, Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla are the brothers
and sisters of deceased Digna Maravilla. The
respondent, Herminio Maravilla is the husband of
the deceased.
2. (Antecedents) Respondent Herminio Maravilla
fi led with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec.
Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna
Maravilla. In the will the surviving spouse was
named as the universal heir and executor.
3. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother
and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed
an opposition to the probate of the will.
4. On motion of respondent Herminio, which was
opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina
Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him
special administrator of he estate of the deceased.
5. The court rendered a decision denying probate of
the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by
the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another.
6. Petitioners Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla,
filed with the court a petition for appointment of
Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as
special co- administrator to protect their interests,
on the ground that the will, having been denied
probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.
7. Respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal,
appeal bond, and record on appeal, from the
decision denying probate of the will.
8. After a joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar
Lopez as special co- administrator in an order
dictated in open court, to protect the interests of
Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla.
9. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) From this
order, respondent, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. The
Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
10. Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the
Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal
amount in controversy in this case exceeds
P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the
probate case is not on appeal before it.
11. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting
the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by
respondent, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.

Issue
1. WON the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writs of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the
same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
a. No.
Held
1. The CA had no jurisdiction to issue the subject writs.
2. Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, provides that the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which
the value in controversy exceeds two hundred
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and
that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent
to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it
had originally been brought before it."
3. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely
incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the
deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where
petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the amount therein involved
is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings
cannot be doubted, considering that the properties
therein involved are valued at P362,424.90, as per
inventory of the special administrator.
4. The present proceedings under review were for the
annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as
special co- administrator and to restrain the probate
court from removing respondent as a special
administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently, the
amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the
value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that
the value of the estate in dispute is much more than
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no
original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
04 FLORENCIO MANALO V. HONORABLE ISIDRO
PAREDES (1925)
Jurisdiction
Ponente J. Villa-real
Summary
1. Laureana Hidalgo, the legitimate wife of deceased,
Fransisco Villegas, filed an application for letters of
administration of the estate left by her husband,
who according to her application, died intestate. In
the course of said administration, a motion was filed
for the probate of the supposed will of the
deceased. This was filed by Justina Mendieta (the
illegitimate spouse), her children, Lazaro and Daria
(illegitimate children), and Melencio Fule, the
supposed executor of the will. The court ordered the
publication in the newspaper El Debate the
application for probate of the will of the deceased,
setting said application for hearing. At the trial,
Justina was appointed as the guardian ad litem of
 the minors. The legitimate wife entered her
objection, and the court proceeded to hear the
evidence of the parties. In the course of the trial,
Justina submitted to the court a (compromise)
agreement which stated that she withdrew her
application for probate on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to justify said probate.
Thus, she that the will not be allowed for probate,
and the deceased be declared as having died
intestate leaving his legitimate wife, and two
illegitimate children. By an order, the court
approved said agreement and rendered judgment,
disallowing the probate of the will, and ordering the
estate of the deceased be distributed in accordance
with the agreement. From this order no appeal was
taken. Shortly after, Gelico Malihan (supposed first
cousin of deceased) filed with the court a new
application for probate of the same will. A petition
for mandamus was commenced (this case) for the
publication of the deceased’s will and to suspend
certain land registration proceedings (the
illegitimate children were named legatees of the
subject property in the deceased’s will) until the
termination of the probate of the will.
2. WON Gelacio Malihan is bound by the previous
judgment of the court disallowing the probate of the
will of the deceased, and upholding the
compromise agreement between the parties – YES
3. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through
the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order
that may be entered is binding against all of them.
4. Through the publication ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Laguna of the application for the
probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas,
said court acquired jurisdiction over all such
persons as were interested in the supposed will,
including Gelacio Malihan.
Facts
1. This is a proceeding for mandamus commenced
originally in this court by Florencio Manalo, as
guardian of the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta,
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus addressed
to the Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, and the Philippine Food
Co., ordering the publication of the petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased Francisco
Villegas, case No. 4217 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna;
2. Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco
Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna an application for letters of administration
of the estate left by her deceased husband, who,
according to the application, died intestate
3. In the course of said administration and on, Justina
Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta, and
Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor,
through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a
motion with the court, praying for the probate of the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most
of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina
 Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate
wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas
4. The court, on September 3, 1924, ordered the
publication in the newspaper El Debate, of Manila,
of the application of Melecio Fule and of Justina
Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and Daria Mendieta for
the probate of the supposed will of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, setting said application for
hearing.
5. Justina Mendieta, together with her children Lazaro
Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, filed another
application for the probate of the same will through
their attorneys, Messrs. Azada and Veluz (rec. No.
4031, file 1, fol. 199), and on October 13, 1924, the
same attorneys and Attorney Marcelino Lontok, on
behalf of Justina Mendieta and her minor children,
filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for said minors
6. At the trial, the court below appointed Justina
Mendieta, natural mother of said minors, as their
guardian ad litem.
7. Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the
probate of the will and immediately the court
proceeded to hear the evidence of the parties, each
and everyone of the attesting witnesses of the
supposed will.
8. When the case was filed for the continuation of the
trial, Justina Mendieta, for herself and in her
capacity as guardian ad litem of her minor children
Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented
by their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and
Marcial Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana
Hidalgo, represented by her attorney, Mr. J.E.
Blanco, on the other, submitted to the court an
agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that
she withdrew her application for the probate of the
supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the probate of said will
9. consequently, she prayed that said will be held not
allowable to probate and that the deceased died
intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his
legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two
adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta,
and that the property of the deceased be distributed
in accordance with said agreement
10. By an order, the court approved said stipulation
and rendered judgment, holding that the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not
be probated, and awarding to the heirs of the
deceased the estate left by Francisco Villegas
in accordance with said agreement
11. From this order no appeal has been taken.
12. On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who
claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco
Villegas, filed with the court a new application for
the probate of the same supposed will of the
deceased Francisco Villegas
Issue
1. WON Gelacio Malihan is bound by the previous
judgment of the court disallowing the probate of the will
of the deceased, and upholding the compromise
agreement between the parties – YES
Held of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been
1. As may be seen from the facts above stated, the will, committed, and cannot now through the special
the probate of which is applied for in the petition dated remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the
January 7, 1925, is the same one that was the subject proceeding upon a new application for the probate of
of the application of May 5, 1924, and of September 5, the same will in order to compel the respondent judge
1924. The only difference lies in that the first to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section
application was filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this
children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta and remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of
Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, all appeal, or writ of error; especially when the parties
represented by the attorney, Mr. Eusebio M. Lopez; the interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary
second by Justina Mendieta and her minor children provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each
Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by of them taking what pertained to him
the attorneys Messrs. Azada and Veluz; and the third
and last by one Gelacio Malihan who claimed to be first
cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas.
2. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through
the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order
that may be entered is binding against all of them.
3. Through the publication ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Laguna of the application for the
probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas,
said court acquired jurisdiction over all such
persons as were interested in the supposed will,
including Gelacio Malihan.
4. The court having tried said application for probate,
hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of
the said supposed will, all the parties became bound
by said judgment; and
5. if any of them or other persons interested were not
satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy

RULE 72 – SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
01 FERNANDEZ V. MARAVILLA (1964)
Rule 72 | Subject Matter and Applicability of General
Rules
Ponente J. Barrera
Summary
1. Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed a petition for
probate of the will of his deceased wife Digna
Maravilla. Herminio was appointed as special
administrator of Digna’s estate. Petitioners, siblings
of the deceased, opposed the probate of the will
and sought the appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son
of one of petitioners) as special co-administrator of
the estate. The will was denied probate and Eliezar
was appointed as special co-administrator.
Respondent Herminio appealed the decision
denying probate of the will and filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with writ of
preliminary injuction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar as special co-administrator. Petitioners
claim that the CA has no jurisdiction over the case.
On the other hand, one of the contentions of the
respondent is that appeals in special proceedings,
as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section
17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended.
2. Issue: WON the procedure of appeal is the same in
civil actions as in special proceedings.
3. NO. It has never been decided that a special
proceeding is not a "civil case". Section 2, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on
ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
proceedings where they are not inconsistent with,
or when they may serve to supplement the
provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same
in civil actions as in special proceedings.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case, Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla are the brothers
and sisters of deceased Digna Maravilla. The
respondent, Herminio Maravilla is the husband of
the deceased.
2. (Antecedents) – respondent Herminio Maravilla
filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will of his
deceased wife Digna Maravilla. Pedro, Asuncion,
and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the
deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the
probate of the will, on the ground that the will was
not signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one
another. Eventually, the Court denied the probate
of the will and appointed Eliezar Lopez (son of one
of the petitioners) as special co-administrator.
Respondent, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing

Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to
prohibit the probate court from further proceeding
with the petition for the removal of respondent as
special administrator. Petitioners filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the
Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal
amount in controversy in this case exceeds
P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the
probate case is not on appeal before it. On the other
hand, respondent contends that that appeals in
special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary
civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are
not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act,
as amended.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
respondent, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. The
Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the
Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal
amount in controversy in this case exceeds
P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the
probate case is not on appeal before it. The Court
of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs
(certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by
respondent, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.
Issue
1. WON procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings. -- YES
Held
1. Yes, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings. Granting,
arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil
action, it has never been decided that a special
proceeding is not a "civil case" On the other hand,
it has been held that the term "civil case" includes
special proceedings Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on
ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
proceedings where they are not inconsistent with,
or when they may serve to supplement the
provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same
in civil actions as in special proceedings.
(this is the only part about Rule 72)

RULE 73 – VENUE AND PROCESS
01 SALAZAR V. CFI OF LAGUNA (1937)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Imperial
Summary
1. S. Facts: There are two wills in this case presented
by Plaintiff Salazar and respondent Rivera
respectively. Salazar, having possession of a will by
the deceased dated May 13, 1924, filed for the first
probate proceeding that was opposed by Rivera by
presenting, through her counter-petition, a copy of
a later dated will (May 11, 1930). In an MR, Rivera
tried to ask the court to set aside the proceeding
initiated by Salazar. In setting aside Rivera’s MR,
the probate court decided that upon publication, the
hearing for the probate of the two wills will be held
jointly. Salazar filed two MRs but CFI denied it.
Hence, this certiorari proceeding.
2. S.Issue: WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over
the counter-petition by Rivera for probate of 2nd will
despite Rivera’s failure to file her pleading nor pay
the fees to the clerk of court under Sec. 788 of Code
of Civil Pro.
3. S. Held: CFI acquired jurisdiction over the probate
of the second will based on the counter-petition of
Rivera. Salazar’s certiorari is denied. All the (see
held) jurisdictional facts have been complied with
by Rivera. 1st, Capistrano died leaving a will. 2nd,
Capistrano died in the province where the probate
court exercises jurisdiction. Lastly, Rivera indeed
filed the copy of the 2nd will. With regard to non-
payment of fees, the omission of the payment of
fees of clerk of court does not deprive the probate
court of its authority to proceed with the probate of
the 2nd will.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner is Salazar who is the son
of Damiana Capistrano who died in Pagsanjan,
Laguna on Dec. 21, 1936. He initiated the first
probate of the first will dated 1924. Rivera is the
respondent-oppositor and counter-petitioner
pursuing the probate of the 2nd will dated 1930.
2. (Antecedents) – Salazar instituted a spec pro of
probate of 1924 will of the late Capistrano. Rivera
opposed the action fo Salazar and filed a pleading
entitled “Opposition and Counter-Petition”.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – CFI
(probate court) decided that the two wills be jointly
probated. Salazar filed two MRs opposing this.
Hence this certiorari proceeding.
Issue
WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the counter-
petition by Rivera for probate of 2nd will despite Rivera’s
failure to file her pleading nor pay the fees to the clerk of
court under Sec. 788 of Code of Civil Pro.
Held:
Yes. Salazar’s certiorari is denied. All the jurisdictional
facts have been satisfied namely: Court of First Instance

acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by
evidence before it:
(1) That a person has died leaving a will;
(2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in
the province where the court exercises territorial
jurisdiction;
(3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in
the province where the court is situated, and
(4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been
delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof.
The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the
jurisdictional allegations before the court but practice and
jurisprudence have established that they should be made
in the form of an application and filed with the original of
the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in some
courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to
the application, without prejudice to producing the original
thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This
precaution has been adapted by some attorneys to
forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in
certain cases.
The facts alleged and admitted by the parties show that
the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second
will, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts
above-stated. The respondent's counter-petition should, in
this case, be considered as a petition for the probate of the
second will, the original of which was filed by her on July
20, 1937. The omission of the payment of fees of clerk of
court does not deprive the probate court of its authority to
proceed with the probate of the 2nd will.
02 CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS (1984)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
J. Gutierrez
Summary
1. The deceased Adoracion Campos was a citizen
and resident of the USA at the time of her death.
Her sisters filed a petition for reprobate before the
CFI of Manila of a will allegedly executed by the
deceased in the US, which was opposed by their
father, petitioner in this case. The will was admitted
to probate after petitioner supposedly withdrew his
opposition. However, petitioner filed a motion to set
aside/dismiss the order admitting the will to probate
on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition
was secured through fraud. Petitioner also alleged
that CFI Manila lacked jurisdiction because at the
time of the deceased’s death, she was a usual
resident of Cavite, hence CFI of Cavite had
exclusive jurisdiction over the testate case.
2. WON CFI Manila lacked jurisdiction. NO
3. It was proven that the deceased was a citizen and
permanent resident of the US at the time of her
death. Under Rule 73 an inhabitant of a foreign
country shall have his estate settled in the CFI of
any province in which he had estate. Since the
deceased had properties in Manila, the probate
proceedings were correctly filed in CFI Manila.

Facts
1. Petitioner in this case is Polly Cayetano who
substituted Hermogenes Campos, father of
deceased Adoracion Campos. Respondent is
Judge Leonidas of the CFI of Manila.
2. Adoracion Campos was an American citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania USA. She died
in Cavite in 1977. Surviving her were her father,
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters. The father,
being the only compulsory heir, executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication adjudicating unto himself
the ownership of his daughter’s entire estate.
3. The sisters filed a petition for reprobate of a will
before the CFI of Manila allegedly executed by the
deceased during her lifetime and duly probated in
the US. Hermogenes filed an opposition to the
reprobate of the will alleging forgery and that the will
was intrinsically void.
4. However, Hermogenes later filed a Motion to
Dismiss Opposition stating that he was able to
verify the veracity of the will. Thus, respondent
judge admitted the will to probate.
5. Hermogenes later filed a motion to vacate and set
aside or dismiss the order admitting the will under
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that
Judge Leonidas of CFI Manila acquired no
jurisdiction over the testate case because the
testator at the time of his death was a usual resident
of Cavite. Being a “usual resident” of Cavite, the CFI
of Cavite had exclusive jurisdiction.
6. Meanwhile Hermogenes died and his executrix,
Polly Cayetano substituted herself as petitioner in
the instant case.
7. Petitioner Polly Cayetano in this case persists in
seeking to annul the order by respondent judge
admitting the will of Adoracion Campos to probate
on the ground that CFI of Manila lacked jurisdiction
because the deceased at the time of her death was
a “usual resident” of Cavite.
Issue
1. WON CFI of Manila lacked jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings of the will of Adoracion Campos.
a. No.
Held
1. Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that the estate
of the deceased shall be settled in the CFI of the
province in which he resided at the time of his death;
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his estate
shall be settled in the CFI of any province in which he
had estate.
2. The deceased, at the time of her death was a citizen
and resident of Pennsylvania USA and not a “usual
resident” of Cavite. Since she had estate in Manila, the
settlement of her estate was correctly filed in CFI
Manila.

3. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the probate court. It is well settled that
a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the
same jurisdiction.
03 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE KAW SINGCO (ALIAS CO CHI SENG) SY OA
V. CO HO (1943)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Moran
Summary
1. Co Ho seeks a reconsideration of an SC decision
proclaiming that residence does not dictate
jurisdiction, only venue with respect to probate
cases.
2. The issue is whether or not the last place of
residence of the deceased determines jurisdiction.
3. The court held that residence in probate cases only
dictates venue, not jurisdiction. To rule otherwise
would mean that proceedings in a probate case not
filed in the place where decedent last resided would
be nullified if a subsequent oppositor assails validity
of the jurisdiction even if said proceedings have
already been finished.
Facts
1. The petitioner in this case is Sy Oa, the
administratrix of Kaw Singco’s estate, and the
respondent is Co Ho who assails the issue on
jurisdiction.
2. Sy Oa is the administratrix of the intestate estate of
Kaw Singco. During the intestate proceedings, an
opposition is filed by one Co Ho.
3. The latter claims that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter because the proceedings
were not filed in the province where the deceased
last resided.
4. Subsequently, the SC issued a resolution stating
that there is no issue with respect to jurisdiction but
there is merely a question of venue.
5. Oppositor-appellant Co Ho now seeks the
reconsideration of the said resolution.
Issue
1. WON the last place of residence of the deceased is an
element of jurisdiction.
a. No. It merely dictates venue.
Held
1. Erroneous Interpretation of Jurisdiction
a. The interpretation of the Court of Article VIII,
Section 2, no. 3 of the Constitution and Section
138, no. 3 of the Revised Administrative Code in
Reyes v. Diaz and Bernabe v. Vergara is
erroneous.
b. In Reyes v. Diaz, the Court said that the term
jurisdiction refers to the subject-matter only,

unless an exception is clearly intended by
reason of its employment in a broader sense.
2. Residence dictates venue, not jurisdiction.
a. Section 600 of Act no. 190, providing that the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could
not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject
matter because such deals merely with
procedural matters, and as this court has said
time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
b. What would happen if residence dictates
jurisdiction over the subject-matter: A probate
case has been initiated in a CFI of a province
where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors,
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court. The case is about to finished except
for a claim of a creditor who voluntarily filed it
with the same court but on appeal from an
adverse decision, raises for the first time in this
Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court
for lack of the residence of the deceased in the
province. If we consider such question of
residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect
shall be that the whole proceedings will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be
commenced anew before another court of the
same rank in another province.
3. The law on jurisdiction (Act No. 136, Sec. 56, No. 5)
confers upon the CFI jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Since, however, there are many CFIs in the
Philippines, the law of procedure fixes the venue or the
place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the
place of residence of the deceased is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court in the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called “venue.”
04 GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS (1976)
Rule 73 | Rule on Venue and Process
Ponente J. Martin
Summary
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the
CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties
in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she
moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
contending that: 1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3
months before his death as shown by his death certificate
and therefore have an improper venue; and 2) The CFI of

Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition. CFI denied the
motion. CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the
administratix. Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on
appeal by certiorari.
ISSUES:
a. WON venue pertains to jurisdiction in this case as per
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
b. What does “resides” in the Revised Rules of Court Rule
73 Section 1 mean?
HELD:
a. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear
and decide a case base on the merits or the substance of
the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding.
It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be
waived or stipulated. On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules
of Court define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or
a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the
court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes.
It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases
it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
b. “Resides” should be understood as the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. The term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Virginia G. Fule,
the illegitimate sister of the decedent, Amado G. Garcia,
and the respondent is Preciosa B. Garcia, the widow of the
decedent.
2. (Antecedents) – On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed
with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, a
petition for letters of administration, "that on April 26, 1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna,
died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At
the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as
special administratrix over the estate. The motion was
granted.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia, contending that the order appointing Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause
for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G.
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a
special administratrix; therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of

Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due
hearing.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a
"Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition alleging that during
the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of
Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to
the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction and venue,
among other things. However, by July 2, 1973, Judge
Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa
B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of
Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and
admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss
the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or
over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; and (2) venue was improperly laid.
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case
before CFI Laguna, Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence
at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part,
Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of
the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before
his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G.
Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was
a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Laguna.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – On January
30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar
in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their motion for
reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari.
Issue
1. WON venue pertains to jurisdiction in this case as per
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
a. No. Judiciary Act of 1948 confers jurisdiction of
the courts while Rules of Court fixes the place where the
case should be filed.
2. What does “resides” in the Revised Rules of Court Rule
73 Section 1 mean?
Held
1. WON venue and jurisdiction are the same in this
case.
NO. Judiciary Act of 1948 confers jurisdiction of the courts
while Rules of Court fixes the place where the case should

be filed. The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73, specifically
the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality
a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes.“ It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power
or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed
and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There
are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power
to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it
means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties.
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased.
Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as
"venue."
2. What does “resides” in the Revised Rules of Court
Rule 73 Section 1 mean?
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place

of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary.
We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. In the
case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold
that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily
waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed
by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to
assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
05 CUENCO V. COURT OF APPEALS (1973)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Damasco Ty
Summary
1. Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco Died. Cuenco’s
child from his first marriage filed a petition for
letters of administration with the CFI of Cebu
alleging that the decedent died intestate and that
the decedent was a resident of Cebu. A week
later, the petitioner-widow of Cuenco filed a
petition for probate of the decedent’s last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor in the CFI of Quezon
City.
The CFI of Cebu, upon a motion to dismiss of
petitioner-widow, issued an order to defer to the
probate proceedings in the Quezon City court.
This order was not sought to be reconsidered or
set aside by the respondents.
The CFI of Quezon City admitted to probate the
senator’s last will.
The CA annulled the QC CFI order reasoning that
the it is that court whose jurisdiction was first
invoked and which first attached which shall have

jurisdiction over the proceeding.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside all the
orders of the CFI of QC?
3. The CA erred.
Facts
1. The petitioners in this case (Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco) is the widow of the decedent. The private
respondents are the children of the decedent in his
first marriage.
2. Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco Died. Lourdes
Cayetano (daughter from decedent’s first
marriage) filed a petition for letters of
administration with the CFI of Cebu alleging that
the decedent died intestate and that the decedent
was a resident of Cebu. The CFI of Cebu issued
an order stating that the petition was not yet ready
for consideration since the requisite publication of
the notice of hearing is not yet complied with.
Meanwhile, a week after the filing of the Cebu
petition, petitioner Rosa Cuenco filed with the CFI
of Rizal (QC) for the probate of the will of the
decdent. Having learned of the intestate
proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner filed in the
Cebu court an Opposition and a motion to dismiss.
The Cebu court issued an order holding in
abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss
“until after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the
petition for probate of the purported will. This order
was never sought by respondents to be
reconsidered or set aside nor did they challenge
the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in
the appellate courts.
The respondents filed their own motion to dismiss
in the CFI of QC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue claiming that
the residence of the decedent was Cebu, not QC.
The respondent’s motion to dismiss was denied on
the basis that “probate proceedings take
precedence over intestate proceedings.”
The CFI of QC issued an order admitting to
probate the will of the decedent.
The respondents filed a special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the Court of Appeals instead of appealing
from the order admitting the will to probate.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondents holding
that in interpreting Section 1, Rule 73, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and
which first attached shall have exclusive
jurisdiction. Considering that the first proceeding
was filed in CFI Cebu, it follows that CFI Cebu has
exclusive jurisdiction.
Issue
1. Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside all the
orders of the CFI of QC?

a. The CA erred because of wrongful interpretation
of Section 1, Rule 73.
Held
1. Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside all the
orders of the CFI of QC?
YES, it erred. Section 1, Rule 73 provides:
“Section 1 1. Where estate of deceased
persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of the province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
Both the CFI of Cebu and the CFI of QC had jurisdiction.
The residence of the deceased or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. The Rule on venue does not
state that the court with whom the estate or intestate
petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The
Rule precisely and deliberately provides that “the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.”
A fair reading of Section 1, Rule 73, indicates that the
court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to
exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other
courts. Thus, a court may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance,
and instead defer to the second court which has before it
the petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged last will.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. In this case, The
Cebu Court indicated that it would decline to take
cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead
defer to the QC court, unless the latter would make a
negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the
probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over
the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the
same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

06 ONGSINGCO V. TAN (1955)
Rule 73 – Venue and Process
J. Bautista
Summary
Short Facts: Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and
judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared
incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764.
Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa
Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No.
7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the
son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate
of Josefa Tangco.
After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took
possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay
crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate
proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained
from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands
has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the
parties.
Short Issue/s: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to
resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana
Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?
Short Held: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the
question of ownership is one which should be determined
in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and
this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule
is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed
upon in testate or intestate proceedings” or stating the rule
more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
a deceased person but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be
determined in the courts of administrative proceedings”.
Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the
CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the
question of ownership in its capacity as probate court.
Such question has been squarely raised in an action
pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence
that what respondent court merely did was look into the
identity of said properties. This question is necessarily
imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being
interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation
that would separate one from the other.
Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of
ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.
Facts
1. Tasiana Ongsinco is the wife and judicial guardian of
one Francisco de Borja who was declared
incompetent. Francisco de Borja is the surviving
spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled.
Jose de Borja is the son of F.de Borja, who was
appointed administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

F.de Borja, according to petitioner, is the owner of two
parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija,
which he acquired by inheritance from his late father
Marcelo de Borja and as such form part of his separate
properties. As such guardian, petitioner took over from
her husband the possession of said two parcels of land
and commenced the threshing of the palay crop
standing thereon for the benefit of her ward.
Meanwhile, J. de Borja, as administrator of the estate
of Josefa Tangco, filed a motion praying that petitioner
be restrained from threshing the palay on the lands
until the ownership thereof has been definitely
determined either by the court or by agreement of the
parties.
2. A dispute arose as to the ownership of said parcel of
land. On the one hand, petitioner claims that they
belong exclusively to her ward having inherited them
from his late father Marcelo de Borja. While on the
other hand, respondent administrator contends that
they are not the lands adjudicated to the incompetent
by the commissioners on partition. The parties made
several attempts to arrive at an agreement as to the
identity of the disputed lands, but they failed, and as
there was a pressing need of immediately threshing the
crops, petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Nueva
Ecija to determine title and ownership of said lands.
The Nueva Ecija court issued a preliminary injunction
restraining respondent administrator for interfering with
the administration of said properties. Such action
notwithstanding respondent administrator for
interfering with the administration of said properties.
Such action notwithstanding respondent court issued
the 2 orders in question prohibiting petitioner from
continuing possession of said partials of lands. These
orders not only go into the issue of ownership but
render ineffective the writ of injunction issued by the
CFI of Nueva Ecija. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to determine
the dispute in the estate proceedings of ownership of the
late Josefa Tangco considering that the dispute between
the parties involves the ownership of the lands now subject
of an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. NO
HELD:
1. Whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to
determine the dispute in the estate proceedings of
ownership of the late Josefa Tangco considering that
the dispute between the parties involves the ownership
of the lands now subject of an action in the CFI of
Nueva Ecija.
NO. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned
and reiterated in a long line of decisions that, "the question
of ownership of property is one which should be
determined in an ordinary action and not in probate
proceedings, and this whether or not the property is
alleged to belong to the estate". In another case, it was
held that "The general rule is that questions as to title to
property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate
proceedings", or stating the rule more elaborately, "When
questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to
be a part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed


by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any
any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title province in which they have properties. (Eusebio vs.
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such Eusebio)
questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance,
acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first 07 EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO (1956)
instance." Rule 73 | VENUE & PROCESSES
Ponente J. CONCEPCION
2. In the settlement of the estate of a decedent, what is
the applicability of the provision on conferring
concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction? Summary
1. Eugenio filed with CFI Rizal a petition for his
In granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
appointment as the administrator of his father’s
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the
estate which was opposed by the respondents.
Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two
Eugenio claimed that his father resided in QC but the
or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not
respondents claimed that he is domiciled in San
possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the
Fernando, Pampanga. Thus, the case of dismissal.
authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar
2. WON CFI Rizal has authority to appoint an
case had been previously filed before a court to which
administrator of the estate of the deceased
jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be
3. NO. Venue has been improperly laid. The
defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially,
proceedings should have been instituted in
said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents
Pampanga, where the deceased resided for 70
who have properties in several provinces in the
years.
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates
may undertaken before the court of first instance of either
Facts
one of said provinces, not only because said courts then
have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first 1. The petitioner in this case is Eugenio Eusebio
taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other (legitimate child) and the respondents are his half-
courts — but, also, because the statement to this effect in brothers/sisters (illegitimate children)
said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court 2. Eugenio filed with CFI Rizal a petition for his
immediately follows the last part of the next preceding appointment as the administrator of his father’s
sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, estate which was opposed by the respondents.
Eugenio claimed that his father resided in QC but the

respondents claimed that he is domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
3. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the venue has been improperly filed.
Issue
1. WON the decedent was domiciled in San Fernando
Pampanga
2. WON the CFI (Rizal) has authority to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased
Held
1. WON the decedent was domiciled in San Fernando
Pampanga
YES. Up to his death, for 70 years, the deceased has
always been domiciled in SF, Pampanga where he had his
home and properties. There is a presumption that he
retained such domicile in the absence of a satisfactory
proof to the contrary. “A domicile once acquired is retained
until a new domicile is gained.” There was also no proof
that the decedent intended to stay permanently in QC.
(When he was hospitalized after transferring his things to
his house in QC, he never really stayed there). Domicile is
not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for
one’s own health.
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 1 is not applicable
in this case because Rule 2 is the proper rule.
2. WON the CFI (Rizal) has authority to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased
NO. CFI Rizal doesn’t have the authority to appoint an
administrator of the estate of deceased because the venue
was improperly laid. If proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person are instituted in two or
more courts, and the question of venue is raised therein,
the first court which first took cognizance of the case shall
decide the issue. However, if the venue has been
improperly laid, the pending case should be dismissed and
the corresponding proceedings may be initiated in the
proper court (which is the CFI in pampanga).
08 SANDOVAL VS. SANTIAGO
Rule 73 l Venue and Process
Ponente J. Feria
Summary
CFI – Quezon Province – Certiorari case filed against
Judge Santiago as the judge of that branch.
Facts: Petitioner filed a special proceeding in court for the
probate of the will of Marquez in which she was designated
as executor (Petitioner is the sister of deceased) Before
the petitioner was made qualified by the judge to exercise
her powers as designated executor, the three heirs
designated in the will executed an extrajudicial partition of
the property of the deceased. The Partition was not
presented to court for approval.
Petitioner was arguing that there was no need for her to
qualify as executor and file the bond since the heirs
already executed an extra judicial partition of the estate –

which in their mind thought that divested the court of
jurisdiction already.
Issue: w/n the extrajudicial partition had the effect of
terminating the proceeding?
Held: Nope! The Extrajudicial partition was not presented
in court for the corresponding court approval. Mere
execution of the partition does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court to hear the case. Petitioner is still required to
qualify as executor.
Facts
1. Parties: Judge Santiago – Judge that heard the
probate of the will case in CFI Quezon province.
Petitioner – Luz Marquez Sandoval – Sister of
deceased, designated executor in will of Marquez.
2. Antecedents: 1946 – Probate of the will of Daniel
Marquez, Petitioner was designated executor in the will
of the deceased
3. Petitioner was required by the judge to qualify herself
as the executor by filing a bond of 5k.
4. Prior to fulfilling this demand by the judge, the three
heirs executed an Extrajudicial Partition of the estate of
the deceased and entered into possession of their
respective shares WITHOUT APPROVAL AND
AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
5. 1 year later, the judge still required the petitioner to
qualify as the executor by filing the bond of 5k.
Petitioner responded by saying that it was no longer
necessary for her to qualify as such since the heirs had
already executed the extrajudicial partition of the estate
which she thought had already divested the judge of
her jurisdiction and effectively dismissed the
proceeding.
Issue:
WON The extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs had
the effect of terminating the proceeding
Held:
Nope! If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the
deceased was submitted to the court and approved by the
respondent judge after verifying that it does not
prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate
proceedings pending in the court would have been legally
thereby terminated.
An extrajudicial partition of the estate of a deceased by the
heirs becomes a judicial partition after its approval by the
court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of the
estate by the filing of an application for the probate of the
decedent's will; but as the testate proceeding is terminated
in such case without the necessary publication ofnotices
to creditors and other persons interested in the estate
required ina required in a regular judicial administration,
the effect of such judicial partition would be the same as if
it had been effected extrajudicially without the intervention
of the court under the provisions of section1,of Rule 74,
that is, subject to the claims against the distributees by
persons mentioned in sections 4 and 5, of the same rule.
(McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21 Phil., 211.)
Basically, if the extrajudicial partition was not presented in
court to be authorized and approved by the judge, it does
not terminate the proceeding over which the court acquired
exclusive jurisdiction.

09 MANZANERO V. CFI (1935)
Rule 73 | JURISDICTION
J. VILLA-REAL
Facts
1. The petitioner in this case is Bongon, wife of
deceased Esteban Manzanero, and the respondent
is the Court of First Instance of Batangas which
heard and decided the summary settlement
proceedings of the estate of the deceased.
2. When Manzanero died, his brother, Fortunato, filed
with the respondent court a sworn application
stating that the deceased left no property except a
life insurance policy worth P5,000 with Filipinas Life
Assurance Co., that he was owed P50 by his
deceased brother, and that the deceased was
survived by a widow (Bongon). Fortunato also
prayed for the summary settlement of his brother’s
estate.
3. Vacation Judge David was holding judicial sessions
in Lucena, Tayabas at that time so he ordered the
clerk of court of Tayabas to take the evidence in the
case. The case was set for hearing without the
petitioner having appeared to oppose the
application, and on the same day, Judge David
issued an order stating, among other things, that
the evidence presented disclosed that the
deceased was a resident of Santo Tomas,
Batangas, with temporary residence in Tabaco,
Albay, where he was assistant district engineer,
and directing the summary distribution of the sum
of P5,000, after payment of the sum of P500 which
said deceased supposedly owed Fortunato. Judge
David also required the Filipinas Assurance
Company to pay to the heirs of the deceased the
proceeds of his insurance policy.
4. Having been informed that the proceeds of the
policy had been distributed among the heirs of her
deceased husband, the petitioner, filed a motion
praying for the return and delivery to her of the
money.
5. In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner questioned
the jurisdiction of respondent court by reason of the
residence of her husband.
Issue
WON the question of jurisdiction of a court to take
cognizance of a summary settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, by reason of residence, may be raised
by means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
• No
Held
The question of jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance
of a summary settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, by reason of residence, may NOT be raised by
means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"SEC. 603. Jurisdiction, when may be contested . — The
jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the
settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of a person, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
According to the above cited legal provision, the
jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance for the
settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of a person, or of the location case, cannot be
contested except on appeal from the same court or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Nothing in the records of the case shows want of
jurisdiction on the part of the CFI of Batangas.The
communication of the municipal treasurer of Tabaco,
Albay, stating that the deceased Esteban M. Manzanero
appears in the list of registered voters, and the affidavit of
the municipal president thereof stating that the deceased
resided before his death in Tabaco, Albay, do not form part
of the record of the lower court.
It not appearing from the orders of the lower court, as
disclosed by the copies thereof attached to the record of
these certiorari proceedings, that said court lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for
summary settlement by reason of the legal residence of
the deceased, certiorari does not lie, an appeal being
specifically provided in such case by section 603 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
10 BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (1908)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Torres
Summary
1. (Short Facts) MAXIMINO Jalandoni, brother of the
deceased MAXIMO Jalandoni, petitioned that the
administrator Julio Javellana be directed to pay him
the sum of P985. This is because Javellana kept the
P985 (proceeds from the sale of the property of the
testator) which was supposedly be used to pay the
remaining debts of the testator. However, since the
amount of the estate of the testator is more than
enough to cover the debts, MAXIMINO wants to get
already his share in the estate. Javellana said a
separate complaint shall be filed by MAXIMINO.
2. (Short Issue) WON the claim against the estate
should be filed in a separate action or in a special
proceeding? – Special Proceeding
3. (Short Held) Every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or
intestate succession may make must be acted upon
and decided within the same special proceedings,
not in a separate action.
Facts
4. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of MAXIMINO Jalandoni
and the respondent Julio Javellana is the
administrator of the estate of MAXIMO Jalandoni.
MAXIMINO inherited from MAXIMO.

5. (Antecedents) – According to the will of MAXIMO
Jalandoni, one-half of the hacienda "Lantad",
situated in the pueblo of Silay, Occidental Negros,
shall belong to his brother MAXIMINO Jalandoni.
However, such gift was subject to the payment of
certain debts and expenses of the estate, and which
had already been applied to that object. One-half of
said hacienda was sold with the consent of the
Javellana, the sum P985 remaining in the
possession of Javellana. According to MAXIMINO,
administrator Javellana had already received the
products of the hacienda and he is no longer
entitled to retain any portion of the legacy because
with the value of the inheritance, there is more than
what would be required to pay the other debts of the
estate, and the expenses. MAXIMINO died.
Petitioner Benedicto is the administrator of the
estate of MAXIMINO.
6. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Before
MAXIMINO died, he petitioned by a writing dated
August 20, 1906, that Javellana be directed to pay
him the sum of P985 which he held in lieu of the
land donated to MAXIMINO. Javellana, in answer
to the above motion, alleged that it was not proper
to ask, by means of a motion, for the relief that
Maximino Jalandoni claimed, but that a complaint
should have been filed and action brought against
the other legatees, or rather against all the parties
concerned in the estate, and not against the
administrator alone.
Issue
1. WON MAXIMINO’S claim should be filed in the special
proceeding or in a separate action?
a. Special Proceeding.
Held
Any objection to the authentication thereof, and every
demand or claim which any heir, legatee, or party in
interest in a testate or intestate succession may make,
must be acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings not in a separate action and the same judge
having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall
take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when
the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution
and adjudication of the property to the interested parties,
as may be seen in part II of the Code of Civil Procedure,
from section 551 forward.
11 CASIANO V. MALOTO (1977)
Rule 73 | Rule on Venue and Process
Ponente J. Fernandez
Summary
1. Maloto died in Ilo-ilo leaving 4 heirs. They thought
there was no will so they initiated an intestate
proceeding and made an extrajudicial partition.
After 3 years, a document dating 1940 which is the
will surfaced. Two of the heirs apparently got a
bigger share and there are new legacies given to
others like the church. So they filed a MR in the
decision of the RTC regarding the intestate

proceeding. It was denied being filed out of time and
was suggested to file a separate proceeding for
probate of the alleged will. They elevated this in the
SC.
2. WON the decision in SP 1736 (intestate) is a bar to
SP 2176 (probate of will)
3. No, it is not a bar to the institution of a separate
proceeding to determine the validity of the will.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
siblings heirs of Maloto (Casiano and Maloto are
heirs)
2. (Antecedents) – They initiated an intestate
proceeding believing there is no will. They made an
extrajudicial partition and sent it to the clerk of court.
A will then suddenly appeared and since it has
bigger shares for some shares they want it
recognized .
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the resurface of the will, they wanted to fine a MR
in the intestate proceeding for the recognition of the
will.
Issue
1. WON the intestate proceedings can still be opened
and the decision reconsidered due to the existence
of the alleged will and is thus a barrier to recognition
of the will?
a. No. Because The more appropriate remedy
of the petitioners in the premises stated in
the petition is for petitioners to initiate a
separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged with in question
Held
1.WON the intestate proceedings can still be opened and
the decision reconsidered due to the existence of the
alleged will and is thus a barrier to recognition of the will?
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the more appropriate
remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the
petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged with in question. The
intestate proceeding does not bar the institution of the
special proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
12 CUIZON V. HON. RAMOLETE (1984)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Gutierrez, Jr., J
Summary
1. Petitioners, the children of Rufina, the latter being
the half sister of decedent, Irene, owned a salt beds
which they bought from Irene. When Irene died,
Rufina consolidated all the properties of Irene and
conveyed them to Petitioners including the salt
beds. TCTs for the said parcels of land were then
issued in the name of Petitioners. The Administrator
of estate of Irene filed a motion for authority to sell
salt from the salt beds, which was granted by
respondent. Petitioners opposed this arguing that
the probate court had not jurisdiction to issue such
an order.

2. WON the probate court had jurisdiction to issue the
assailed order— No
3. Probate courts can only determine provisionally
whether certain properties may be included in the
inventory of the estate. Registered land must also
be respected following the doctrine of indefeasibility
of a Torrens title.
Facts
1. Petitioners in this case are Francisco, Rosita and
Purificacion Cuizon. Petitioners are the children of
Rufina, the latter being one daughters of decedent,
Marciano Cuizon. Respondent is the presiding
judge of the probate court handling the estate of
Irene (half sister of Rufina).
2. Marciano had several parcels of land located in
Mandaue City which were covered by certificates of
Tax Declaration. He distributed his property
between his 2 children— Rufina and Irene. The land
subject of controversy were the salt beds given to
Irene.
3. Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of
Usufruct involving the salt beds in favor of
Petitioners. (Petitioners were minors, so they were
assisted by their mother, Rufina) At that time, the
sale was not registered since petitioners thought
that it was unnecessary due to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of Irene. The properties left by
decedent to Irene were thereafter registered in the
name of the latter. Irene died shortly thereafter.
4. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina
adjudicated to herself all the property of the
decedent including the salt beds in question. She
executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein
she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale
executed by the late Irene and renounced and
waived whatever rights she may have in the
properties in favor of Petitioners. The deed was
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds and
annotated at the back of the TCT. A new TCT
was subsequently issued in favor of the
Petitioners.
5. During the probate proceedings, the Administrator
filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He
included the salt beds in the inventory.
6. The Administrator then filed a motion asking the
court for authority to sell the salt as they were
already melting. The said motion was granted
and an order was issued.
7. Petitioners opposed this and availed of a restraining
order to stop the Administrator from enforcing the
said order. Petitioners argue that respondent
court, as a court handling only the intestate
proceedings, had neither the authority to
adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest
them of their possession and ownership of the
property in question and hand over the same to
the Administrator.
Issue
1. WON the probate court had jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order divesting the Petitioners of the salt
beds.
a. No. Because a probate court can only
provisionally determine whether a certain
property may be included in the inventory of the

estate. The salt beds were also registered in the
name of petitioners.
Held
1. WON the probate court had jurisdiction to issue the
order authorising the Administrator to sell the salt from
the salt beds in the possession of Petitioners.
NO. A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
A probate court can only determine whether a certain
property should be included in the inventory to be
administered by the administrator.
If there is a dispute, the proper recourse if for the
opposing parties to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims because a
probate court cannot do so.
In the present case, the salt beds were not only claimed
by non-parties to the estate of Irene, but the said lands
were sold 7 years before the death of Irene and was duly
titled in the name of Petitioners (who again were not part
of the intestate proceedings)
Hence, since the salt beds were in the possession of
Petitioners (third parties to the intestate proceedings), and
were covered by a TCT in their name, the probate court
should have denied the motion of the Administrator and
excluded the said lands from the inventory. The probate
court had no authority to deprive such third persons
of their possession and ownership of the property.
13 BERNARDO v. COURT OF APPEALS (1963)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Barrera
Summary
1. Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were
husband and wife. When Capili died, testate
proceedings were instituted. His will was probated
and the heirs were determined to be his widow and
cousins.
Thereafter, Hermogena died and was substituted
by her own collateral relatives. A project of partition
was submitted and was opposed by the wife’s
collateral relatives. They averred that some of the
properties were not his exclusively but of the
conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, the other parties averred that it
is exclusive property by virtue of the deed of
donation executed by the wife during her lifetime,
donating her share in the conjugal property to her
husband. The court found the deed of donation void
and that the properties in dispute were conjugal in
nature.
2. WON the probate court erred in applying the
exception to the general rule that it has no
power to adjudicate title in probate proceedings
3. NO. The court consistently held that as a general
rule, question to title of property cannot be passed
upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except

when one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass
provisionally upon the question without prejudice to
its final determination in a separate action. In this
case, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain properties involved – whether
they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively. Thus, this is a matter properly
within the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Facts
1. The petitioners in this case are the Deogracias
Bernardo (executor of the testate estate of the
deceased Eusebio Capili) and the instituted heirs,
while the respondents are heirs of the late
Hermogena Reyes.
2. Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were
husband and wife. Capili died in 1958 and a testate
proceeding was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. His
will was admitted to probate disposing of his
properties in favor of his widow and his cousin.
3. Hermogena died in 1959. Upon petition of
Bernardo, she was substituted by her collateral
relatives and intestate heirs.
4. The executor then filed a project partition in the
testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of
the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio among
the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena, whose share was allotted to her
collateral relatives aformentioned. These relatives
filed an opposition claiming ½ of the properties
mentioned in the will of Eusebio on the theory that
they belonged not to the latter alone but to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
5. In the memorandum for the executor and the
instituted heirs, it was contended:
a. That the properties disposed of in the will of
Eusebio belonged to him exclusively and not
to the conjugal partnership because
Hermogena had donated to him her half
share of such partnership;
b. That the collateral heirs of Hermogena had
no ‘lawful standing or grounds’ to question
the validity of the donation; and
c. That even assuming that they could question
the validity of the donation; the same must
be litigated not in the estate proceeding but
in a separate civil action.
6. The probate court issued an order declaring the
donation void since it falls under Art 133 of the Civil
Code, which prohibits donations between spouses
during marriage; and it does not comply with the
formalities of a will as required by Art 728 in relation
to Art 805 of the same Code, there being no
attestation clause. In the same order, the court
disapproved both projects of partition.
7. Executor filed a motion for new trial on the ground
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of
Hermogena. Such motion was denied.
8. CA affirmed the decision of the court.
Issue

1. WON the probate court erred in applying the exception
to the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate
title in probate proceedings
a. No. Probate court may pass provisionally upon
the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Held
1. WON the probate court erred in applying the exception
to the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate title
in probate proceedings
NO. The court consistently held that as a general rule,
question to title of property cannot be passed upon on
testate or intestate proceedings, except when one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, in which case the probate court
may pass provisionally upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
It has also been held that when the parties interested are
all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to
the probate court a question as to the title to property, and
when so submitted said probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon. Provided that interests of third persons
are not prejudiced.
In this case, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain properties involved – whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. Thus, this is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal property in order to determine the
state of the decedent which is to be distributed among the
heirs including of course the widow represented by her
collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself
and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third
parties whose rights may be affected. Therefore, the claim
being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator
and consequently it complies with the requirement of the
exception that the parties interested are all heirs claiming
title under the testator.
14 URIARTE v. CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (1970)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Dizon
Summary
1. Facts: Vincent instituted a special proceeding for
settlement of estate in Negros Court. On the next
year, Juan Uriarte commenced an S.P in Manila
Court for the probate of the alleged will. The
proceeding in Negros Court was dismissed.
2. Issue: Which between Negros Court and the Manila
Court is the proper venue of the case
3. The Negros and Manila Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction as these are the places where the
properties of the decedent were found. But, the
Negros Court is the proper venue since it was
where the first special proceeding was filed and
Higinio opposed to the intestate proceedings as he
avers that the decedent left the will. But Vincent

cannot impugn the validity of venue as he is barred
by laches.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Vincent
Uriarte who alleges that he is the natural son of Don
Juan Uriarte. The respondents are Higinio Uriarte
(a nephew of Don Juan), Juan Uriarte Zamacona
and the CFI of Negros Occidental.
2. (Antecedents) – On Nov. 6, 1961, Vincent filed
with CFI of Negros a petition for the settlement of
the estate of Don Juan Uriate y Goite (SP No.
6344). He alleges that as a natural son of the latter,
he was his sole heir, and during the lifetime of Don
Juan, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142
in the same court for the compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. PNB was
appointed as the administrator but failed to qualify.
On Dec. 19, 1961, Higinio, filed an opposition to the
petition alleging that he was a nephew of Don Juan.
He avers that Don Juan executed a Last Will and
Testament in Spain and questioned the capacity of
Vincent to commence the intestate proceeding.
On Aug. 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte, commenced S.P.
No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of the
alleged last will. On the same day, he filed a motion
to dismiss S.P.No. 6344 on the following grounds:
(a) there was a will so there is no legal basis to
proceed with the intestate proceeding, and (b)
Vincent had no legal personality, he not being an
acknowledged natural son.
On April 1963, CFI of Negros dismissed the SP No.
6634 pending before it. Motion for reconsideration
also denied.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Since SP
No. 6634 was dismissed, Vicente sought to
intervene in the case in Manila Court. He alleges
that the proceedings are null since they are not filed
in the proper venue.
Issue
1. Which between Negros Court and the Manila Court is
the proper venue of the case
a. The Negros Court is the proper venue but
Vincent cannot impugn the validity of venue
as he is barred by laches.
Held
1. Which between Negros Court and the Manila Court
is the proper venue
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, CFI have original
exclusive jurisdiction over “all matters of probate,” that is
over, special proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased persons – whether they died testate or
intestate.

The matter of venue is regulated by former Rule 75, Sec.
1 of ROC (now Rule 73, Sec. 1), which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
Since Don Juan is a non-resident alien, it shall be settled
in the CFI in provinces where the deceased left any
property. These CFIs have concurrent jurisdiction.
In the case, both the CFI of Negros and Manila have
concurrent jurisdiction. However, it has been settled that
testate proceedings take precedence over intestate
proceedings.
The facts of the case support that the respondents should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court,
either in a separate S.P or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending SP No. 6344. First, to
avoid expensive administration of justice and unnecessary
multiple litigations. Second, Higinio filed an opposition to
Vicente’s petition for issuance of letters of administration
and the former has already informed the Negros Court that
Don Juan left a will. As he opposed, he had expressly
promised to submit said will for probate.
However, Vicente has waived the right to raise the
objection due to laches. He was well aware of the
existence of the will since Dec. 19, 1961. He was served
with notice of the filing of the petition in Aug. 28, 1962. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that
he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene
and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings
had therein up to that date. The objection against said
proceeding is raised too late.
15 DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO (1939)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
C.J. AVANCEÑA
Summary
1. Plaintiffs and defendants are heirs of Spouses del
Rosario. Plaintiffs instituted this case against
defendants to recover their share in the properties
left by the Spouses. Defendants interposed a
demurrer saying that there is a pending action of the
same parties and issues (basically forum
shopping), which the Court sustained.
2. WON the dismissal of the case was proper.
3. Yes. The pendency of the testamentary
proceedings [in this case, of Florencia] excludes
any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Plaintiffs (Julia del Rosario et. al.) and
Defendants (Antonio del Rosario et. al.) are heirs of
Spouses Ramon del Rosario and Florencia Arcega.
2. (Antecedents) – Spouses Ramon del Rosario
(died 1895) and Florencia Arcega (died 1933) are

husband and wife. Ramon died without a will,
leaving properties of the conjugal partnership worth
P19,000. Florencia administered these properties,
and with the products [fruits] thereof acquired
others. Moreover, after the death of Ramon,
intestate proceedings were not commenced and
the properties were not liquidated until after
Florencia’s death. After the latter’s death,
testamentary proceedings were initiated and are in
progress.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Plaintiff
brought this action to recover their share in the
properties left by Ramon and Florencia, and the
fruits thereof. A demurrer was interposed [by the
defendants] on the ground that there is a pending
action between the same parties and the same
cause of action. The Court sustained the demurrer
and dismissed the case; thus, this appeal.
Issue
1. WON the dismissal of the case was proper
a. Yes. The pendency of the testamentary
proceedings [in this case, of Florencia] excludes
any other proceeding aimed at the same
purpose.
Held
1. WON the dismissal was proper
Yes. Act No. 3176 only amends the former law in the
sense that upon the death of any of the spouses the
community property shall be liquidated in the
testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. But whatever law might be applicable, and
even assuming that it was that prior to Act No. 3176,
the intestate of Ramon del Rosario not having been
commenced upon his death in 1895 until his widow
Florencia Arcega also died in 1933, and the
testamentary proceedings of Florencia Arcega having
been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other
things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with
the deceased Ramon del Rosario should be made, the
pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the
deceased wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at
the same purpose. At any rate, the plaintiffs have a
right to intervene in these proceedings as parties
interested in the liquidation and partition of the conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses Ramon del
Rosario and Florencia Arcega among their heirs.
Note: Short lang talaga yung case.
16 DOLAR V. ROMAN CATHOLIC (1939)
Settlement of Estate upon Dissolution of Marriage
Ponente J. Avancena
Summary
FACTS: Paulino the decedent had a first and second wife
and children on both marriages. He acquired properties
during his lifetime during both marriages. The decedent
died and in his will he stated that a legacy of P8,000 should
be given for the construction of the altar of the church in

Damangas. Upon testate proceedings, since the second
wife and heirs and the church could not reach an
agreement with regards to the partition, the court stated
that the administratrix (Dolar the second wife) should first
take possession of all properties and pay out the legacy in
favor of the church. The heirs appealed this decision of the
court.
ISSUE: Was the court correct in ruling that the
administratrix should first take possession of all properties
and pay out the legacy
HELD: Unless the parties reach an agreement regarding
the partition, all debts and administration expenses shall
first be paid. The conjugal properties of the first marriage
shall first be liquidated to determine property that belongs
to the first wife and to the deceased. The conjugal
properties corresponding to the second marriage shall
likewise be liquidated to determine the properties
belonging to the deceased. The properties corresponding
to the deceased constitute his estate which should be
partitioned among the heirs. There being forced heirs, the
legacy of P8,000 should be taken from the free third only
without touching the legitime. The properties are to be
partitioned three parts, two of which should constitute the
legitime and the other part, from which the legacy is to be
taken from.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
second wife of the decedent, and her heirs,
Respondent is the Roman Catholic Church
2. (Antecedents) – Paulino’s first wife was Margarita
Doctura and second wife Teopista Dolar
(petitioner). He had 5 children in his first marriage
and 4 children in his second marriage. He acquired
certain properties during both his first and second
marriage. He left a will before he died wherein he
sets out all his properties and distributes them
among his widow Dolar and his heirs by both
marriages. He also left a legacy of P8,000 to be
spent for the altar for the church under construction
in the Municipality of Damangas, stating that this be
taken from the fruits of all the properties before they
are partitioned among the heirs.
3. After the commencement of the testate
proceedings and the appointment of Dolar as
administratrix, the latter filed a partition which was
not approved due to oppositions of certain heirs.
The second partition was also denied because it
was disapproved by the church of Damangas. The
court ordered that the administratrix take
possession of all the properties and out of which,
pay the legacy of P8,000 to the church and after
which to submit a new partition. From this Dolar and
the heirs appealed.
4. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Whether
the court was correct in making the administratrix
take possession of all properties and pay the legacy
before partitioning the properties.
Issue
1. WON the court was correct in making the administratrix
first take possession of all properties and pay the
legacy before partitioning the properties.

RULING:
YES. In the light of the foregoing facts and the allegations
of the parties in this instance, we hold that, unless the
widow Teopista Dolar, the heirs of the deceased by his two
marriages, the representatives of the legacy for P8,000,
and the creditors of the state, otherwise come to an
agreement. the partition should be made with the
intervention of all the interested parties according to law.
All the debts and administration expenses shall first be
paid. (Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
The conjugal properties of the first marriage shall be
liquidated so as to determine those corresponding to the
children had with the deceased Margarita Doctura, as her
heirs, and those corresponding to the deceased.
The conjugal properties of the second marriage shall be
liquidated, so as to determine the half corresponding to the
widow Teopista Dolar and the other half corresponding to
the deceased (article 1426 of the Civil Code).
The properties corresponding to the deceased (ie,
acquired during his first and second marriages, constitute
his estate, which should be partitioned among his heirs,
namely, his children by his two marriages and his widow
Teopista Dolar.
There being forced heirs, the legacy of P8,000 should be
taken from the free third only, without touching the
obligatory legitime (article 813 of the Civil Code), and for
this purpose, the properties to be partitioned should first
be divided into three equal parts, two of which constitute
the obligatory legitime, and the other the free third, so as
to determine the properties from which the legacy should
be taken.
The fruits of the properties already received or to be
received shall answer for the legacy with respect to one-
third thereof only, the remaining two-thirds being those of
the heirs (article 813 of the Civil Code). The legal usufruct
of the widow should be taken from the third available for
betterment (article 835 of the Civil Code).
After the partition is made in accordance with the
foregoing, there should be delivered to the heirs the
properties corresponding to them as legitime. As to the
free third, the testator not having disposed of its
ownership, it shall belong to all the forced heirs, in equal
parts, subject to the legacy as to its fruits.
The appealed resolution is modified in accordance with the
foregoing, without special pronouncement as to the cost.
So ordered.
17 ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (1906)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
J. Willard
Summary
1. Spouses Angeles loaned from Respondent
Natividad and gave the title to a land as security.

When the spouses died, Respondent took
possession in anticipation of the payment of debts.
Applicant Alfonso, as administrator, filed a case for
recovery of the land for the purpose of liquidation of
the conjugal partnership and settlement of the
husband’s estate.
2. WON the administrator is entitled to the possession
of a conjugal property in the settlement of the
husband’s estate.
3. Yes. The property is part of the conjugal
partnership. When the partnership is dissolved by
the husband’s death, the partnership’s affairs is
settled in same court and same proceeding for the
settlement of the husband’s estate. It is a necessary
consequence, following this, that the executor or
administrator appointed in the proceeding is entitled
to the custody of the property. It is only after the
partnership’s property has been used to discharge
the obligations of the conjugal partnership that one-
half of the net proceeds is considered the exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is
Hermenegildo Alfonso, the administrator of an
estate, and the respondents are Pedro Natividad
and Silvestre Flores, the possessors of the dispute
land of the estate.
2. (Antecedents) – Spouses Angeles borrowed
money from Pedro Natividad and pledged the title
to a land as security. Both spouses died hence
Natividad took possession of the land.
Spouses Angeles also sold a land to a third person
with a right to repurchase. When the husband died
and before the wife died, the wife repurchased the
land and sold it to Silvestre Flores.
Hermenegildo Alfonso was appointed administrator
of the estate of the husband. He brought an action
against the responsdents for the recovery of
separate parcels of land situated in different
pueblos in Laguna.
Petitioner argues that the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership. The husband’s estate should
therefore be liquidated and settled and the
administrator is entitled to possession for
liquidation. Respondent Natividad argues that it
was the private property of the wife and the
husband had no interest in it.
Issue
1. WON the disputed property belong to the conjugal
partnership. Yes.
2. WON the administrator is entitled to the possession of
a conjugal property in the settlement of the husband’s
estate. Yes.
Held
1. WON the disputed property belong to the conjugal
partnership.

Yes. Although the legal title was with the wife, the husband
appeared and took part in all proceedings, including the
proceedings relating to the judicial possession which was
given to the wife. In the absence of proof that the money
with which the land was bought belonged to the wife, it
must be declared to be conjugal property.
2. WON the administrator is entitled to the possession of
a conjugal property in the settlement of the husband’s
estate.
Yes. The administrator is entitled to the possession of the
conjugal property. It is a necessary consequence of
settling the partnership’s affairs.
The partnership property is used to pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership. When the partnership affairs have
been settled, and all its debts and obligations discharged,
one-half of the net proceeds is then considered as the
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
When a conjugal partnership is dissolved by the death of
the husband it would be extremely difficult to settle his
estate without first settling the partnership affairs.
Therefore, the inventory should first be made and the
partnership affairs settled in the same proceeding and in
the CFI having jurisdiction over the settlement of
husband’s estate.
While the settlement is being made, the executor or
administrator appointed in the proceeding settling the
husband’s estate must be the person who is entitled to the
custody of the property of the conjugal partnership, as a
necessary consequence. This, however, does not deprive
the wife, the surviving partner, of all intervention in the
settlement of the affairs of the partnership. In intestate
estates, she is entitled to be appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate, unless some good reason for not
appointing her is shown.
Here, since the partnership was dissolved by the death of
the husband; that its affairs should be settled in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate; that Petitioner
is the administrator appointed in that proceeding; that the
property in question belonged to the partnership, therefore
Petitioner is entitled to maintain this action.
18 CRUZ, ET AL. V. DE JESUS, ET AL. (1929)
Rule 73 | Rule on Venue and Process
Ponente J. Villareal
Summary
1. Juliana Nabong died, thus dissolving the conjugal
partnership between her and her husband. Plaintiffs
Donato Cruz, et al. filed a complaint for partition of
Juliana’s estate. They filed a motion to amend their
complaint to change the title from PARTITION to
LIQUIDATION AND PARTITION, and to insert a
paragraph stating that the decedent did not leave any
outstanding debt. CFI of Nueva Ecija denied the
motion, stating that the proper action is the testate or
intestate proceeding for settlement of estate where
conjugal property must first be liquidated.

2. The question to determine is whether or not an action
lies for the liquidation and partition of the property of
conjugal partnership dissolved by death of the wife,
without the surviving spouse having inventoried,
liquidated, or partitioned it, and it not appearing that
there is any debt to pay.
3. The Court held that the action for liquidation and
partition will lie. Section 685 of Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 3176 provides that when there are
no debts to pay, the liquidation and partition of the
property of the conjugal partnership dissolved by the
death of one of the spouses, may be made in an
ordinary action instituted for that purpose.
Facts
1. (The case did not sufficiently describe who plaintiffs
and defendants are, but you’ll get the story once you
read the entire digest.)
2. Plaintiffs Cruz, et al. filed a motion to amend their
complaint as follows:
• Change title from “Partition” to “Liquidation and
Partition,” and
• Insert paragraph 5A stating that the decedent Juliana
Nabong left no debt outstanding debt at her death nor
any money or credit payable to the estate and that
lands described in the complaint are free from all liens
and encumbrances.
3. The CFI of Nueva Ecija denied the motion, holding that
the proper action for the partition of property belonging
to a conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of one
of the spouses is the testate or intestate proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse,
wherein said conjugal property must first be liquidated
before the partition is made. Thus, the present appeal.
Issue
WON an action lies for liquidation and partition of the
property of a conjugal partnership dissolved by the death
of the wife, said property having been in the possession of
the surviving spouse for many years, without his having
made any inventory thereof, nor liquidated and partitioned
it, and it not appearing that there is any debt to pay.
Held
Yes.
Section 685 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No. 3176
establishes two methods of liquidating the property of a
conjugal partnership, if the marriage is dissolved by the
death of one of the spouses.
The first is by testate or intestate proceeding according to
whether the deceased died with or without a will. The other
is by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition.
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife,
as in this case, the legal power of management of the
husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed
by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings
instituted to that end if there by any debts to be paid, and
when there is no debt pending, the liquidation and partition
may be made in an ordinary proceeding for that purpose.
Since there are no debts to pay, the action for partition will
lie, because while it is true that it prays for a liquidation of

the property of the conjugal partnership dissolved by the
death of Juliana, said liquidation is implied in the action for
partition.
In sum, when there are no debts to pay, the liquidation and
partition of the property of the conjugal partnership,
dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, may be
made in an ordinary action instituted for that purpose.
19 DE LA RAMA V. DE LA RAMA (1907)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
WILLARD, J.
Summary
1. The CFI rendered a decision decreeing divorce due
to the husband’s adultery, along with other sums
based on the unpaid share of the property
belonging to the conjugal partnership, as well as
support. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court which reversed the decision of the CFI and
dismissed the case. The appellant appealed to the
US Supreme Court which reversed the decision of
the previous court and upheld the decision of the
CFI due to the fact that there were insufficient
evidence to refute the finding of the CFI. The case
was remanded to this court for the division of the
conjugal property. Now, the appellant claims that
the decision of the CFI should be affirmed in its
entirety.
2. WON the decision of the CFI should be affirmed in
its entirety. NO
3. No. The only thing considered by the Supreme
Court of the United States was that part of the
decision of the Court of First Instance which related
to the right of the plaintiff to a divorce. It did not pass
upon the division of the conjugal property. By
remanding the case to this court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the
Supreme Court, it seems to have been the intention
of that court that this court should dispose of the
assignments of error not already of.
4. In an action for divorce, the affairs of the conjugal
partnership, if a decree of divorce is granted, can
be liquidated in the same proceeding.
Facts
1. On July 5, 1902, the CFI of the Province of Iloilo
entered a final judgment, decreeing divorce to the
plaintiff on the ground of the husband’s adultery.
2. The CFI also ruled for the payment of P81, 042.76
as her unpaid share in the property belonging to the
conjugal partnership, and allowance for support for
P3,200.
3. The decision of the CFI was appealed to the
Supreme Court which reversed the decision of the
CFI and dismissed the case. It did not rule on any
other assignment of errors.
4. The decision was then appealed to the US
Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of the
previous court and upheld the decision of the CFI,
and that the other causes be remanded to previous

court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
5. The claim of the appellant now is, however, that the
whole case was finally disposed of by the decision
of the latter court, and that the only thing remaining
for this court as to do is to affirm the judgment of the
Court of First Instance in its entirely.
Issue
1. WON the decision of the CFI should be affirmed in its
entirety. NO
2. WON it is proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal
partnership in divorce proceedings. YES
Held
1. WON the decision of the CFI should be affirmed in
its entirety.
No. When a judgment for the appellant is rendered by
this court based upon one only of several assignments
of error, which judgment is reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States upon a consideration only of
the same assignment of error and the case remanded
to this court for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the opinion of that court, this court has power to
consider and decide and assignments of error made by
the appellant upon his original appeal and not disposed
of either by the decision of this court or of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The only thing considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States was that part of the decision of the Court
of First Instance which related to the right of the plaintiff
to a divorce. It did not pass upon the division of the
conjugal property. Its order was that the case be
remanded to this court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with its opinion.
By remanding the case to this court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the
Supreme Court, it seems to have been the intention of
that court that this court should dispose of the
assignments of error not already of.
2. WON it is proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal
partnership in divorce proceedings. Yes
It was claimed by this defendant, in his brief in his
original appeal to this court in support of this
assignment of error, that it was not proper to settle the
affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce
proceedings, and that no such settlement of a conjugal
partnership could ever be made until there had been a
final judgment ordering the divorce.
In an action for divorce, the affairs of the conjugal
partnership, if a decree of divorce is granted, can
be liquidated in the same proceeding.
The Civil Code states in detail the manner in which the
affairs of a conjugal partnership shall be settled after
the same has been dissolved. Article 1418 provides,
except in certain cases not here important, that an
inventory shall at once be made.
It is thus seen that the conjugal property which is to be
divided when the partnership is dissolved, is

determined not with reference to the income or profits,
which may have been received during the partnership
by the spouses but rather by the amount of the actual
property possessed by them at such dissolution after
making the deductions and payments aforesaid. This
is positively provided by article 1424 of the Civil Code.
An examination of the decision of the Court of First
Instance shows that no attempt was made to comply
with any of these statutory provisions. No inventory of
the partnership property existing at the time of the trial,
at which the liquidation was made, was ever formed.
RULING:
The part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
ordering the divorce, ordering the payment of 3,200
pesos, Mexican currency, by the defendant to the
plaintiff, and the costs of the action, is affirmed. That
part of it ordering the payment by the defendant to the
plaintiff of 81,042.76 pesos, Mexican currency, is set
aside, and the case is remanded to the court below for
the purpose of liquidating in this action the affairs of the
conjugal partnership (considering the same to have
been dissolved on the 5th of July, 1902) in accordance
with the rules laid down in the Civil Code.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
The Supreme Court has no authority under the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions to examine the evidence
adduced during the trial, unless the appellant made a
motion for a new trial in the lower court, basing the same
upon the ground that the findings of fact made by the lower
court were plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence. Granting, however, that the motion in the
present case was sufficient to justify the Supreme Court in
examining the evidence, even then the evidence adduced
during the trial in the lower court does not show a
preponderance against the findings of fact made by the
lower court in its decision.
20 VILLACORTE V. MARIANO 89 PHIL 342 (1951)
Rule 73 | Sec.2 Where estate settled upon dissolution
of marriage
Bengzon, J.
Summary
1. Heirs of Villacorte filed a case against the Calimon
sisters and Macaria claiming that the properties in
possession of the Calimon sisters belonged to
Venancia (2nd wife). The Heirs of Villacorte later on
moved to dismiss the case. Macaria (3rd wife) filed
a counterclaim against the Calimon sisters claiming
that she is entitled to the properties left by Leon
(deceased husband) on the ground that the three
documents previously executed by her were tainted
with deceit and intimidation. These three
documents basically are compromise agreements
whereby Macaria renounced all her rights and
interests over conjugal assets for a certain
consideration. The lower court ruled that the three
documents are valid. Now, Macaria is claiming that
there was an error on the part of lower court to
adjudge the controversy without previously

requiring an inventory and liquidation of their
conjugal properties.
2. WON the lower court erred in requiring an inventory
and liquidation before it makes a decision over the case.
3. NO.
4. It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and
make the liquidation because the parties interested had
already reached a compromise agreement.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
siblings of AAA, and the respondents are the
cousins of AAA
2. (Antecedents) – Leon Calimon had three
marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage with
Ariana Carpio in 1875 gave him four daughters
(Canuta, Tranquilina, Maria and Enriqueta or the
Calimon sisters). A widower in 1898, the next year
he married Venancia Inducil who lived only ten
months thereafter leaving him no child. She had
however a son by previous marriage: Tiburcio
Villacorte. In 1902, Calimon took a third wife,
Macaria Mariano. She bore him no offspring; but
survived him when he passed away in February
1941.
The complaint in this case was filed by the widow
and daughter of Tiburcio Villacorte (heirs of
Tiburcio) who sought the recovery of 38 parcels of
land allegedly in the possession of the four
daughters of Leon.
Heirs of Tiburcio (plaintiff) claimed that the
properties belonged to Venancia Inducil while the
Calimon sisters (defendant) claimed that the lots
were owned exclusively by Leon. Macaria moved to
amend her answer to assert that all the realties had
been acquired during her coverture with Leon and
demanded the recognition of her rights as surviving
spouse. In this connection, she affirmed that thru
deceit and intimidation she had signed three
documents assigning to her co-defendants her
lawful participation in the conjugal assets in
exchange for certain properties alloted to her.
The first document (Exhibit 1) is an agreement
whereby for and consideration of a riceland, a
fishpond and cash in the amount of P2.400,
Macaria renounced in favor of Calimon sisters all
her interest and rights in the estate of the deceased
Leon as well as her participation in the conjugal
partnership with him. It was ratified about a month
after the death of Leon.
The second document (Exhibit 2) showed the
promise of Macaria to give the Calimon sisters a
first option if she should later resolve to alienate the
realty she had obtained by virtue of the first
kasunduan.
The third document (Exhibit 3) embodied the
partition of the Calimon sisters of the properties
assigned to them, which bears the thumbmark of
their stepmother, Macaria.

Before the case was submitted for decision, Heirs
of Tiburcio asked for the dismissal of the case, the
remaining disputants being the Calimon sisters and
Macaria.
The trial court ruled that the three documents were
valid and binding, and that as consequence the
Calimon sisters were entitled to continue
possessing the land and properties assigned to
them.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Macaria
continued the suit initiated by the Heirs of Villacorte
against the Calimon sisters regarding the properties
left by Leon. She claims that it was error for the
lower court to adjudge the controversy upon the
strength of the above mentioned exhibits, without
previously requiring an inventory and liquidation of
the conjugal properties
Issue
WON the lower court erred in not requiring an
inventory and liquidation of the conjugal properties
of the deceased Leon and Macaria.
• NO. It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory
and make the liquidation because the parties
interested had already reached a compromise
agreement.
Held
WON the lower court erred in not requiring an inventory
and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the
deceased Leon and Macaria.
• NO. It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory
and make the liquidation because the parties
interested had already reached a compromise
agreement. And supposing that all those lots were
community property, still the first document (Exhibit
1) governs the rights of the parties. A similar
document of renunciation, by the widow, of her
participation was held valid and binding in Antonio
vs. Aloc. And under the provision of article 1418 of
the Civil Code, inventory shall not be required if,
after the partnership has been dissolved, one of the
spouses of his or her successors shall have
renounced its effects.
21 CALMA V. TANEDO (1938)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente: Avancena J.
Summary
1. Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit
were the owners of the property described in the
complaint, being their conjugal property. They were
indebted to Esperanza Tañedo for a sum of money
which was chargeable against their conjugal
property. The wife, Fausta, eventually died and she
left a will appointing her daughter Maria Calma as
administratix of her properties. Probate
proceedings were commenced and Maria Calma
was appointed as judicial administratix. While the
probate proceedings were pending, Tañedo filed a

complaint for recovery of sums of money against
Eulalio Calma where the court rendered a decision
if favor of Tañedo. In the execution of the judgment,
despite having a third party claim filed by Maria
Calma, the said property was sold.
2. WON complaint can be brought against Eulalio
Calma (husband) for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
property he had with his deceased wife Fausta
Macasaquit
3. NO. The power of Eulalio Calma as the legal
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta
Macasaquit was living had ceased and passed to
the administratrix (Maria Calma) appointed in the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable
against conjugal property, no complaint for its
payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma,
who had already ceased as administrator of the
conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to
be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
Macasaquit.
Facts
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit
were the owners of the property described in the
complaint, being their conjugal property.They were
also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable
against the conjugal property, in the sums of
P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10
percent per annum.
On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died
leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter,
Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties.
Upon the commencement of the corresponding
probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was
appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of
the deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased
Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza
Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint
against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums
of P948.34 and P247.
The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered
judgment for the payment of the sum of money. In
the execution of this judgment, despite the third
party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property
described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of
Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks
that the sale made by the sheriff of the property
described in the complaint be annulled and that the
estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole
and absolute owner thereof.
Issue
WON complaint can be brought against Eulalio Calma
(husband) for the recovery of indebtedness chargeable
against the conjugal property he had with his deceased
wife Fausta Macasaquit

Held
NO.
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in
execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio
Calma for the collection of the indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and
said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta
Macasaquit. The probate proceedings were instituted in
accordance with Act No. 3176:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof shall be paid, in the
testamentary or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse, in accordance with
the provisions of this Code relative to the
administration and liquidation and partition
proceeding, unless the parties, being all of
age and legally capacitated, avail
themselves of the right granted to them by
this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said
community property in order to pay the outstanding debts
and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in
the manner and with the formalities established by this
Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any
sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property
effected without said formalities shall be null and void,
except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor
at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit
having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of
the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to
Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings,
to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same
purpose. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the wife, the legal power of management of the husband
ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the
court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to
that end if there be any debts to be paid.
Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal
administrator of the conjugal property had with his
wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought
against him for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal property, and that
the action should be instituted in the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the
manner provided by law, by filing it first with the
committee on claims.
22 OCAMPO V. POTENCIANO (1951)
Rule 73 | Rule on Venue and Process
Ponente J. Reyes

Summary
1. Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco entered into a
contract to convey a house and lot to Potenciano
and his wife by sale with pacto de retro. Time to
repurchase lapsed; Potenciano had the TCT issued
in the name of him and his wife. Ocampo died and
Potenciano’s wife died. Potenciano gave Paz Yacto
an option to repurchase the property within 5 years.
Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by
tendering to Potenciano payment within the 5
years, but was rejected.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the
mortgage contract was superseded through
novation by the option agreement for the
repurchase of the property mortgaged
3. YES. Potenciano had no authority to enter into that
agreement after the death of his wife. The Court of
Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving
spouse had such authority as de facto administrator
of the conjugal estate. Decisions relied by CA has
become obsolete as the procedure has been
changed by law, which provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either
husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse. Plus the option agreement
was just for an extension of time for payment, the
redemption of which Paz Yatco properly exercised
in due time.
Facts
Issue
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, and
the respondents are the children of Conrado
Potenciano and Rufina Reyes.
2. (Antecedents) – Edilberto Ocampo married to Paz
Yatco executed a deed purporting to convey to his
relative, Conrado Potenciano and his wife by way
of sale with pacto de retro a lot with a house. The
vendees were leasing to Ocampo the house for the
duration of the redemption period for the amount of
12% the purchase price as annual rental. Period for
repurchase was 1 year, extendable to another year.
Several extensions were granted; last extension
period lapsed without repurchase, thus Potenciano
filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit
for the consolidation of title, on the strength which
the register of deeds issued TCT in name of
Potenciano and his wife. Ocampo and Reyes was
dead; Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property within 5 years. Paz Yatco
sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano payment (within the 5 years), but was
rejected.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the tender being rejected, Paz Yatco deposited the
money in court and brought an action in her own
name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to
accept it and to have the title to the property
reinstated in her name and that of her husband.

1. WON the consolidation of title effected by Potenciano
is valid
2. Whether the CA erred in holding that the mortgage
contract was superseded, through novation, by the
option agreement for the repurchase of the property
mortgaged
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the
defendants Potenciano owners of the property
Held
1. No. The pacto de retro sale made by Ocampo was in
reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with
simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the
lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of
one or both them, to consolidate title in themselves over
the property given as security.
2. Yes. Potenciano had no authority to enter into that
agreement after the death of his wife. The Court of
Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had
such authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal
estate. Decisions relied by CA has become obsolete as the
procedure has been changed by law, which provides that
when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either
husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.
The option agreement in question was nothing more than
mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee
debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction
had between them was that of loan with security, or
equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it
was given the form of sale with right to repurchase. It
follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made
the tender of payment and consigned the necessary
amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was
still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their
legal effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from
liability.
3. No. As ownership in the property never passed to their
parents, they acquired nothing.
23 PRADO v. NATIVIDAD (1925)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Villareal
Summary
1. Casimiro Natividad and Maria Prado got married.
Casimiro brought to the marriage some real
properties which he had received from his mother
as his future share in her inheritance. Maria
meanwhile did not bring anything. Maria
subsequently died from pulmonary tuberculosis.
2. Jose Maria Prado, administrator of the estate of
Maria, filed a complaint alleging that Casimiro had
refused to make an liquidation of the estate of the
conjugal partnership and prayed for a liquidation
decree of said partnership, adjudicating to the
plaintiff administrator one-half of the conjugal
property with its products. Casimiro said that the

estate of the conjugal partnership constituted
between him and his deceased wife had already
been liquidated, no conjugal property having been
found to exist, but a loss of P10,000.
3. The lower court held that no residue existed which
should be divided between the husband and the
heirs, and dismissed the complaint.
4. On appeal, the SC held that while the lower court
erred in not taking into account the assessed value
of the estate of the conjugal partnership at the time
of its liquidation, that does not affect the final
decision. The judgment appearing to be in
accordance with the evidence and the law, the
same is hereby affirmed.
Facts
1. Parties – petitioner Jose Maria Prado is the
administrator of the estate of Maria Prado, and the
respondent is the husband/widow Casimiro
Natividad.
2. Antecedents – Casimiro and Natividad got
married, with only Casimiro bringing in properties.
When Maria died, the administrator of her estate
alleged that Casimiro refused to liquidate the
conjugal partnershop and prayed for a liquidation
decree by CFI-Camarines Sur. Casimiro alleged
that the estate of the conjugal partnership
constituted between him and his deceased wife
Maria Prado had already been liquidated.
3. The lower court rendered judgment, holding that no
residue existed which should be divided between
the husband and the heirs, and dismissing the
complaint.
4. Summary of Cause of Action/Issues – Plaintiff
Jose Maria Prado took an appeal on the basis of
the alleged error committed by the court by taking
into account the value of the property of the
conjugal partnership at the time of the acquisition
thereof, and not of its liquidation and the fact of its
having taken into consideration the supposed debt
of P17,428.98.
Issue
1. MAIN ISSUE: Whether the appraisal of the real
property of the conjugal partnership should be based
on the value at the time of the acquisition, and not the
liquidation.
a. No. Appraisal should be based on value at the
time of liquidation.
2. MINOR ISSUE: Whether admission in evidence,
without objection, sufficiently determines the value of
the conjugal property.
a. No.
Held
1. In appraising the real property of the conjugal
partnership, it is NOT the purchase price, but the
market, or default thereof, the assessed value at the
time of the liquidation that must be taken into account.
(Art. 1428 in connection with Art. 1367 of the Civil
Code)
Urban, as well as rural, property has its value in the
market which rises and falls according to the
movement of the population, market, and trade, and it

is not just nor equitable that the conjugal partnership
should not share the advantages or disadvantages that
those fluctuations give to its property.
The appellant contends that the claim in connection
with the debts contracted by Casimiro Natividad for the
expenses of the administration of the property of the
conjugal partnership of the family and the last sickness
and funerals of Maria Prado, should have been filed
with the committee on claims in the intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Maria
Prado. This contention is untenable, because said
debts having been contracted by Casimiro as legal
administrator of the conjugal partnership formed by
virtue of his marriage with Maria Prado, must,
according to law (Art. 1408 of the Civil Code), be
charged to said partnership at the making of the
liquidation thereof and not to the estate of Maria Prado,
inasmuch as she did not personally intervene in
obtaining said loans.
Even if the assessed value of the estate of the conjugal
partnership at the time of the liquidation be taken into
account, its total value (P10,853.40) would not be
sufficient to cover all the expenses incurred by the
administration of said partnership (P17,423.98), and
consequently after the sale of said estate and the
payment of the debts with the proceeds thereof there
would be no residue that might be considered as
conjugal property to be distributed among the heirs of
Maria.
2. The admission in evidence without objection, of the
inventory purporting to set forth the amount and value
of certain property, DOES NOT BIND the trial court to
accept as true the contents of such inventory in a case
wherein the amount and value of the property in
question is at issue, and where other evidence as to its
amount and the value has been submitted. In such
case, the document is admitted for what is worth as
evidence, and it should not be held as conclusive of the
truth of its contents if other evidence of record
disclosed its inaccuracies and its failure correctly to set
forth the value and quantity of the properties in
question.
24 DELA RAMA v. DELA RAMA (1913)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Carson
Summary
1. Husband and Wife divorced, so now Wife is
petitioning for the dissolution and settlement of the
conjugal partnership. Trial Court granted this and
allowed the Wife the sum of PHP 81,042.76 as her
share in the conjugal property, and PHP 3,200 as
alimony. Husband appealed to SC w/c reversed
trial court findings. So Wife appealed to the US
Supreme Court w/c reversed the PH SC findings
and remanded the case to the PH SC for decision
not inconsistent w/ the decision of the US Supreme
Court. Wife then moved that the original judgment

of the trial court be affirmed i.e. that she be allowed
the sum of PHP 81,042.76 as her share in the
conjugal property, and PHP 3,200 as alimony. The
Husband then argued that there was error in fixing
the amount of the half of the alleged conjugal
property.
2. WON the proper procedure as provided by the Civil
Code was followed in the settlement of the affairs of
a conjugal partnership after it has been dissolved.
3. YES. First, an inventory must be made w/c must
include: 1) capital of the husband; 2) dowry of the
wife; 3) bienes parafernales of the wife; and 4) all
the property acquired by the partnership during its
existence. Second, payment must be made in the
ff. order: 1) dowry of the wife; 2) bienes
parafernales of the wife; 3) debts and obligations of
the conjugal partnership; and 4) capital of the
husband. Finally, after all these deductions, what
remains of that estate shall constitute the assets of
the conjugal partnership.
Facts
1. The plaintiff, Agueda Dela Rama (“Wife”) is the wife
of defendant Esteban Dela Rama (“Husband”).
2. The trial court granted the wife’s petition for divorce
(on the ground of her husband’s adultery),
dissolving the conjugal partnership, and allowing
her the sum of PHP 81,042.76 as her share in the
conjugal property, and PHP 3,200 as alimony.
3. Husband appealed to the SC w/c then reversed the
trial court, saying that evidence showed that both
husband and wife had committed adultery and
neither was entitled to divorce. So Wife appealed to
the US Supreme Court w/c then reverse said
decision saying that PH SC should have affirmed
rather than reversed the lower court.
4. When the case was remanded to the PH SC, Wife
moved that the orig. judgment of the trial court be
affirmed (see fact #2).
5. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the Wife’s action, the Husband argued that there
was error in fixing the amount of the half of the
alleged conjugal property at PHP 81,042.76 as it did
not take into account the losses suffered and debts
contracted by the firm, Hijos de I. de la Rama,
wherein the Husband is a manager of.
Issue
1. WON the proper procedure as provided by the Civil
Code was followed in the settlement of the affairs of a
conjugal partnership after it has been dissolved.
a. Yes.
Held
1. WON the proper procedure was followed in the
settlement of the conjugal partnership after its
dissolution
YES. Art. 1418 of the Civil Code provides that after
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory
should first be made. The inventory includes
1) Capital of the husband;
2) Cowry of the wife;
3) Bienes parafernales of the wife; and
4) All the property acquired by the partnership during
its existence.

After this, Art. 1421 provides that payment must be made
in the ff. order:
1) Dowry of the wife;
2) Bienes parafernales of the wife;
3) Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership;
and
4) Capital of the husband.
After these have been deducted from the inventoried
estate, Art. 1424 provides that what remains of that estate
shall constitute the assets of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the conjugal property to be divided when the
partnership is dissolved is determined by the amount of the
actual property possessed by them at such dissolution
after making the said deductions and payments. The SC
held that the findings of the trial court judge are fully
sustained by evidence, and the method adopted in
liquidating the assets of conjugal partnership was
substantially in conformity with the method prescribed the
Code.
25 JOSEFA FULGENCIO v. BENITA GATCHALIAN, ET
AL., (1912)
Rule 73 | Venue and Process
Ponente J. Torres
Summary
1. Josefa Fulgencio is the first wife of Dionisio
Fulgencio, the deceased. Benita Gatchalian is the
second wife of the deceased. Both of them were
appointed adminitratrixes, however, Benita
resigned , eaving Josefa with the job. Pursuant to
her job as administratrix, Josefa demanded
possession of the conjugal properties; however,
Benita et al. refused.
2. WON Benita’s paraphernal properties must be
included in the settlement of the estate?
3. YES. Benita and the deceased’s conjugal
properties owed several debts. The administratrix,
in the fulfillment of her legal duty, has a right to
claim the possession of all the property belonging
to the subject estate, in order that she may make
the required inventory and proceed, with the
authorization of the court, to pay the debts duly
presented to the commissioners of appraisal
appointed in the special proceedings. While Benita
did bring paraphernal properties to the marriage,
once these properties are included among the
property of the conjugal partnership, a demand for
its exclusion on the part of its legitimate owner could
properly be made only after the formation of the
inventory of the property that constitutes the estate
of her deceased husband.
Facts
1. The plaintiff-appellee in this case, Josefa Fulgencio
(Josefa), was the first wife and an appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio
Fulgencio (deceased). Defendant-appellant Benita
Gatchalian (Benita) was the second wife and an

appointed administratrix of the deceased; however,
she resigned as administratrix. The other
defendant-appellants in this case are Petrona
Clavo, Emeteria Cristobal, Leoncia Belen, and
Gabriela Lopez, the latter represented by her
husband, named Paning, were in charge of part of
the estate of the deceased under the care and
direction of defendant-appellant Benita.
2. Josefa and Benita were both appointed co-
administratrixes of the deceased; however, Benita
resigned as administratrix leaving Josefa to be the
sole adminsitratrix.
3. Despite repeated demands as administratrix,
Josefa was not able to acquire possession of all
conjugal private property of the deceased, which
was under the possession of Benita and the other
defendant-appellants.
4. Josefa contends that upon marrying Benita, the
deceased brought 2,500 Mexican currency as
private property and such sum produced several
thousands of pesos and several properties,
including those under Benita’s possession. All
conjugal properties were the possession of the
defendants.
5. Benita contends that the deceased merely brought
a few items to the marriage, amounting only to 100
pesos. On the other hand, she claims that she
(Benita) brought around 12,000 pesos worth of
capital to the marriage. The also claims that the
deceased wasted most of this capital through
gambling, and that consequently, the capital
brought to the marriage was, far from increasing,
was considerably diminished.
6. Due to the refusal of Benita and the other
defendant-appellants in relinquishing possession of
the conjugal properties, despite repeated demands,
Josefa filed the instant case in the RTC of Bacolod
praying that the defendants surrender passion of
the subject properties.
Issue
1. WON Benita’s paraphernal property must be included
in the settlement of the deceased’s estate? .
b. YES. Rule 73 is applicable in this case. (the
case does not specifically mention this rule
though; it’s an old case).
Held
1. Rule 73 is applicable in this case.
YES. Evidence showed that the conjugal partnership
formed between Benita and the deceased owed several
large debts. It is settled that the executrix or administratrix,
in the fulfillment of her duty, has a right to claim the
possession of all the property belonging to the estate of
which she is the judicial administratrix, in order that,
pursuant law, she may make the required inventory and
proceed, with the authorization of the court, to pay the
debts duly presented to the commissioners of appraisal
appointed in the special proceedings.
It is an incontrovertible principle of law that, before
proceeding with the division among the heirs, of the
property left to them by the deceased predecessor in
interest, without prejudice to the rights of the surviving
widow, in relation to her own property which does not form

a part of the conjugal partnership property nor is liable for
the payment of the obligations existing against the
conjugal partnership.
Evidence was introduced to prove that the widow, Benita
Gatchalian, on contracting marriage with the now
deceased Dionisio Fulgencio, brought to the conjugal
partnership, property worth about twelve thousand pesos,
being paraphernalia of the wife's exclusive ownership; but
once included among the property of the conjugal
partnership, a demand for its exclusion on the part of its
legitimate owner could properly be made only after the
formation of the inventory of the property that constitutes
the estate of her deceased husband.
*the case does not specifically mention any Rule 73
provision, but it seems like this is the relevant provision:
Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of
marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. x x x
26 LUKBAN V. REPUBLIC (1956)
Rule 73 | VENUE AND PROCESS
Ponente J. Bautista Angelo
Summary
1. Petitioner married the person who was presumed to
be dead in this case. She is now filing this petition
so that she may be declared as a widow and be
able to contract a subsequent marriage by virtue of
this presumptive death.
2. Will her petition prosper?
3. The petition will not prosper as the same is not
authorized by law. Petitioner cannot be declared as
a widow as such title depends on the fact of the
actual death of one’s spouse. A presumptive death
is merely just a prima facie case of death and could
not be considered as final unless sufficient proof
has been submitted establishing the fact of death.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner, Lourdes Lukban in this case
is the widow of a person who is presumed dead who
is named Francisco Chuidian and the respondent in
this case is the Solicitor General, representing the
Republic, opposing petitioner’s action to declare
her husband to be presumed dead and for the latter
to be declared as having no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage.
2. (Antecedents) – Petitioner married Francisco on
December 10, 1933 and on the 27th of the same
year and month, the two had a big argument
resulting in Francisco leaving Lourdes. Despite
diligent search, the wife was unable to find the
missing husband.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
Petitioner simply wants to be declared a widow of a
husband who is presumed to be dead for the
purpose of contracting another marriage.


Issue
1. WON the petition will prosper.

Held

1. WON the petition will prosper.

NO. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s

husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law. This being unable to
be done, the declaration of one to be a widow because of
a declaration of presumptive death cannot be done as well.
If the fact of death of the husband was sufficiently proven,
the court would not hesitate to declare the wife as a widow
but in this case, the wife was simply using the presumptive
death of her husband as the basis for her being declared
as a widow.

A judicial pronouncement (of the presumptive death of a

spouse), even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only and is disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration.

This case most likely forms a tangent to Section 4 of Rule

73, wherein the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
special proceeding is merely for the purposes of what
happens to the presumptive decedent’s estate, and not
his/her spouse’s declaration as a widow/widower. Do take
note that this case was decided on 1956, and might not
find direct application in the current Rules of Court.

RULE 74 – SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
01 UTULO V. VDA. DE GARCIA (2019)
Rule 74 | Rule on Extrajudicial Settlement/Summary
Settlment of Estates
Ponente J. Imperial
Summary
1. Luz Garcia died intestate leaving only her mother,
Leona Vda. De Garcia (oppositor) and her surviving
spouse, Pablo Utulo (applicant) as her only
compulsory heirs. Pablo Utulo commenced judicial
administration proceedings and sought to be
named as administrator of the deceased. This was
opposed by Leona who alleged inasmuch as the
said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no
occasion for the said judicial administration.
2. ISSUE: WON judicial administration is necessaryin
the instant case.
3. HELD: NO. Although as a general rule, when a
person dies leaving property in the Philippines, his
property should be judicially administered by a
competent court and an administrator should be
appointed in case the deceased left no will or left a
will but failed to appoint an executor, this rule
admits exceptions:
First, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there
are no debts due from the estate, they may agree
in writing to partition the property without instituting
the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Second, if the property left does not exceed six
thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to
proceed with the summary partition and, after
paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance
amongthemselves pursuant to law, without
instituting the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Luz Garcia (decedent) was one of the
three children left by Juan Garcia Sanchez when he
died intestate. Leona Vda de Garcia (oppositor)
was the wife of Juan Garcia Sanchez. Leona, along
with Luz Garcia and Luz’s 2 other siblings were the
sole compulsory heirs of Juan Garcia Sanchez.
Pablo Utulo (applicant) was the husband of Luz
Garcia
2. (Antecedents) – Juan Garcia Sanchez died
intestate leaving 4 compulsory heirs which included
Luz and Leona. Luz married Pablo Utulo and during
the pendency of the administration proceedings of
her father’s estate, Luz died. Her only forced heirs
being her mother and her husband. Pablo then
commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife
stating in his petition that her only heirs were he
himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and
that the only property left by the deceased
consisted in the share due her from the intestate of
her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that

he be named administrator of the property of said
deceased.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) - The
oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the
judicial administration of the property of her
daughter and the appointment of the applicant as
administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the
said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no
occasion for the said judicial administration; but
Issue
1. WON upon the admitted facts the judicial
administration of the property left by the deceased
Luz Garcia lies
Held
1. NO. The general rule is that when a person dies
living property in the Philippine Islands, his property
should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in the
section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one should he fail to name an executor
therein.
This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions
established in the Code of Civil Procedure
According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful
age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator
(extrajudicial settlement). According to the second,
if the property left does not exceed six thousand
pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court,
after the required publications, to proceed with the
summary partition and, after paying all the known
obligations, to partition all the property constituting
the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law,
without instituting the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator. (Summary
Settlement)
There is no weight in the argument adduced
by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as
judicial administrator is necessary so that he may
have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez.
In order to intervene in said intestate and to take
part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of
his deceased wife be instituted — an administration
which will take up time and occasion inconvenience
and unnecessary expenses.
.

02 HERNANDEZ V. ANDAL (1947)
Rule 74 | Summary Settlement of Estates
Ponente J. Tuason
Summary
1. (Short Facts) Plaintiff and her siblings acquired in
common a parcel of land from their father. Portions
of the land were allotted to each of them thru a
verbal partition. Two of the siblings (Maria &
Aquilina) sold their combined portions to defendant
and his wife for P860. After the sale, plaintiff
attempted to repurchase the land for P150. The
defendant refused to sell the property to plaintiff
since he was willing to part with the property only
for a consideration of P860 plus the expenses he
had incurred. During the trial, plaintiff’s counsel
objected to the validity of the parol partition of the
land among the five siblings. The lower court ruled
that said parol evidence of partition was
inadmissible.
2. (Short Issue) Is writing the act that confers legal
validity upon the agreement?
3. (Short Held) No. The requirement that a partition
be put in a public document and registered has, in
our opinion, for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the
last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when, as in this
case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors
are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The plaintiff is Cresencia Hernandez
and the defendant is Zacarias Andal. Maria and
Aquilina Hernandez are intervenors.
2. (Antecedents) – Plaintiff Cresencia Hernandez
and her siblings Maria, Aquilina, Pedro, and Basilia
acquired in common by descent from their father
Lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
The intervenors sold for P860 1800sqm of the
parcel to Zacarias Andal and his wife. The said
portion is equivalent to their combined allotted
shares by virtue of a verbal partition among the five
siblings.
After the sale, plaintiff attempted to repurchase the
land for P150, which according to her is the amount
Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina
Hernandez's shares. It is alleged that Andal refused
to part with the property.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the Andal’s refusal to sell the property, plaintiff filed
a supplemental complaint with the lower court

(neither the court nor the specific action was
mentioned in the case). She alleged that she
announced in open court that she was willing
repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860
and reimburse Andal for his expense; that the said
repurchase was postponed while Andal resold the
land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of
the intervenors. The amount included Andal's
expenses as well as the normal sale price.
Defendant said that he had no objections regarding
plaintiff’s repurchase of the portion of land for P860
plus expenses but he was unwilling to accept P150,
which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his
expenses. He testified that “plaintiff offered to
repurchase the land from him long after he had
bought it, that is when she was about to file her
action.”
When asked whether the land has been the object
of partition among the five co-owner siblings,
plaintiff’s counsel objected on the ground that the
best evidence was the document of partition, and
the objection was sustained.
Defendant’s counsel announced that he had
witnesses ready to prove that a parol partition
among the five brother and sisters had been made.
Plaintiff’s counsel objected asserting that "under the
Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may
not be proved except by means of writing
subscribed by the person against whom the proof is
offered."
Upon this objection, the lower court ruled that under
Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of
Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil
Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible.
Issue
WON Section 1 of Rule 74 is constitutive and not merely
evidential of partition (i.e., Is writing the act that confers
legal validity upon the agreement?) – NO.
Held
Section 1 of Rule 74 is not constitutive but merely
evidential of partition. There are no indications in the
phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative answer
to these questions. It must be noted that where the law
intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in
clear and unequivocal terms.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear
declaration that the public instrument therein required is to
be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent
element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And
this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to
make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties
dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its
registration.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has, in our opinion, for its

purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts
and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It
must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or
the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.
03 TORRES v. TORRES (1964)
Rule 74 | Summary Settlement of Estates
Ponente J. Barrera
Summary
1. Petitioner Alberto Torres, one of the four legitimate
children of the decedent, prayed for the issuance in
his favor of letters of administration in connection
with the properties left by the decedent. The petition
was opposed by another heir, Conchita Torres,
saying that the appointment of an administrator is
unnecessary because the heirs of the deceased
had already entered into an extrajudicial partition
and settlement of the estate.
2. Issue: WON the institution of special
proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate is
necessary?
3. NO. Where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no
necessity for the institution of special proceedings
and the appointment of an administrator for the
seetlement of the estate, because the same can be
effected either extrajudicially or through an ordinary
action for partition.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner Alberto Torres, one of the 4
legitimate children of decedent Paz Siguion Torres;
Respondent Conchita Torres, one of the heirs of the
decedent.
2. (Antecedents) – Petitioner is claiming to be one of
the four legitimate children of Paz Siguion Torres
and prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters of
administration in connection with the properties left
by the decedent (January 4, 1961). Respondent
Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, opposed the
petition stating that an extrajudicial partition and
settlement of the estate has already been entered
and therefore the appointment of an administrator
is unnecessary. (January 27, 1960 – date where an
extrajudicial partition and settlement of estate has
been entered)
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – It
appears that the petition to place the estate under

administration was predicated mainly on the
alleged inability of the heirs to agree on a physical
division of the properties. There was also an alleged
existence of indebtedness and that properties of
considerable value were not included in said
extrajudicial partition.
Issue
WON the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the
estate is necessary? NO.
Held
No. The institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of
estate is no longer necessary. Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the RoC
states that where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age as in the case at bar, there is no
necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of and administrator for the settlement of the
estate because the same can be effected either
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition.
If there is an actual necessity for court intervention as
contended by petitioner, in view of the heirs’ failure to
reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided
physically, the latter, under the Rule, have still the remedy
of an ordinary action for partition.
With regard to the alleged existence of debt, the petitioner
did not specify from whom and in what manner the said
debt was contracted. Bare allegation that there is an
existing debt cannot be considered as concise statement
to constitute a cause of action. Nor does the unverified
statement that there are other properties not included
justify the institution of an administration proceeding
because it can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an
ordinary action of partition.
04 ARCILLAS v. MONTEJO (1968)
Rule 74 | Summary Settlement of Estates
Ponente J. Makalintal
Summary
Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate and with no debts.
Respondents filed a cadastral motion praying for a new
TCT in the name of the heirs (petition #1). Petitioner filed
for the issuance of the letters of administration to prepare
for the final settlement of the estate (petition #2). Petition
#2 was denied and petitioner #1 was given due course on
the ground that Sec. 1 Rule 74 is mandatory, therefore the
heirs are precluded from instituting administration
proceedings if the estate has no debt or obligations and
the deceased left no will and all the heirs are of legal age.
The issue is WON Sec. 1 Rule 74 is mandatory. The court
ruled that it is not mandatory, therefore it does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings even if the estate had no debts or obligation
if they do not desire to resort for good reason to an ordinary
action for partition, gleaned from the repeated use of the
word may which indicates an intention to leave the matter

entirely to the discretion of the heirs. Therefore, petition
#2 was reinstated.
FACTS
(Parties) – The petitioner in this case is the heir Aurelio
Arcillas, and the respondents are the CFI judge Hon.
Gregorio Montejo, and co-heirs Geronimo Arcillas and
Vicente Arcillas.
(Antecedents)
1. Petition #1(Nov 12) by respondents: Geronimo
Arcillas (respondent), one of the heirs of the
deceased Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate,
sought the cancellation of the TCT of Lot No. 276
and prayed for a new TCT in the name of the heirs
claiming that after the death of deceased, 4 other
children of deceased made separate sales in
favor of their co-heir, Vicente Arcillas (cadastral
motion under Section 112 of LRA). Geronimo
Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's
participation in said lot should be accurately
reflected in a new TCT.
2. Petition #2(Nov 16) by petitioner: 5 other children
filed another petition (Special Prceeding No. 632),
praying for issuance of letters of administration in
favor of Aurelio Arcillas (petitioner) preparatory to the
final settlement of the deceased's estate.
3. Petitioner Aurelio opposed Petition #1, arguing that
it should be held in abeyance until Petition #2 is
closed on the ground that the subject matter was
included in the estate of the deceased for which a
petition (Petition #2) for administration had actually
been filed and was awaiting resolution. Montejo
(Respondent Judge) ordered Petition #1 to be held
in abeyance.
4. Geronimo and Vicente (respondents) opposed
Petition #2 arguing that Lot No. 276 was the only
property left by the deceased and the deceased left
no debts, the petition for administration was improper
and views Sec. 1 Rule 74 as mandatory. Aurelio
(petitioner) replied that there were still other
properties of the estate. Petition #2 was denied by
respondent court and gave due course to Petitioner
#1 (in favor of respondents) to obviate spending
uselessly and avoid unnecessary delay in the
partition, that the cadastral motion of Geronimo
(respondent) is the most expedient and proper action
in accordance with Rule 74.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues)
1. Respondent judge denied petitioner #2 on the ground
that Section 1 Rule 74 is mandatory, meaning the heirs
are precluded from instituting administration
proceedings if the estate has no debt or obligations and
the deceased left no will and all the heirs are of legal
age.
2. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with
mandamus and preliminary injunction against the order
denying petition #2.
Issue
1. WON dismissing the administration proceedings
(petitioner #2) under the authority of Rule 74 was
proper? / WON the heirs are precluded from
instituting administration proceedings if the estate
has no debt or obligations and the deceased left no
will and all the heirs are of legal age?
a. No. Section 1 of Rule 74 is not mandatory;
therefore, the heirs are not precluded from
instituting administration proceedings.
2. WON maintaining the cadastral motion under Sec. 112
of LRA (petition #1) was the more proper proceeding?
a. No. They are not authorized to file the said
cadastral motion because there is no unanimity
among the parties, which is a condition in
allowing the said motion.
Held
1. WON WON dismissing the administration proceedings
(petitioner #2) under the authority of Rule 74 was
proper?
NO. Sec.1 Rule 74 of the ROC does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings even if the
estate had no debts or obligation if they do not desire to
resort for good reason to an ordinary action for partition.
Section 1 Rule 74 is not mandatory. It was explained in
Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan that said section is not mandatory
or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the
framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as
was done in other provisions that are mandatory in
character. Note that the word may is used not only once
but in the whole section which indicates an intention to
leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
settlement of the estate, the heirs may not then be rebuffed
in the exercise of their discretion granted merely on the
ground that the expenses usually common in
administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the
estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses
incurred thereafter are consequences which must be
deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs
themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to
complain of these matters.
Other issue:
2. WON maintaining the cadastral motion under Sec. 112
of LRA (petition #1) was the more proper proceeding?
No. The cadastral motion (petition #1) cannot be
sustained as it can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
(Judgment)
Therefore, Special Proceedings No. 632 (petitioner
#2) must be reinstated.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings

instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of

05 ERMAC V. MEDELO (1975)
Rule 74 | Summary Settlement of Estates
J. Barredo
Summary
1. (Short Facts) Sps. Ermac died, leaving behind only
one parcel of land. Their grandson Medelo filed for
the summary settlement of their estate. Judge
Pineda granted this and ordered Medelo to present
the proper project of partition of the lot. Pedro filed
an MR contesting the partition but the court denied
it because the remedy Pedro should’ve availed of
was to file a separate civil action. Pedro did file a
separate civil action but despite this the court still
granted Medelo's project of partition.
2. (Short Issue) WON the court erred in approving the
project partition despite there being a separate civil
action filed by Perdo – NO.
3. (Short Held) Claims that an heir or a third person
have over property belonging to the estate must be
ventilated in a separate civil action. A summary
proceeding is strictly for the settlement of the
estate. It is not the proper venue to determine
ownership over property. But to protect the rights of
the claimants, they should have a notice of lis
pendens annotated on the contested property.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioners = Pedro Armac and his
children; Respondents = Cenon Medelo Judge
Hernando Pineda of CFI Lanao del Norte
2. (Antecedents) – Spouses Ermac and Mariquit
died, leaving behind only one parcel of land (Lot
1327) in Iligan City with a value of P590. Medelo
was one of their grandchildren. He filed a petition
for summary settlement of the estate, which was
subsequently granted by Judge Pineda’s court.
Medelo was then ordered to present the project of
partition of the subject lot. After the decision, Pedro
filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the
subject lot be excluded from the estate of Sps.
Ermac because the lot was owned by him and his
wife.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Pedro’s
motion was denied on the ground that his remedy
was a separate suit. As such, he filed the
corresponding civil action in in the same court.
However, the court approved Medelo’s project of
partition despite Pedro’s objection that there was
now a pending civil case.
Issue
1. WON the court erred in approving the project
partition despite there being a separate civil action
filed by Perdo – NO.
Held
1. Estates should be settled in the least amount of time.
Hence, the rules provide summary proceedings. The
probate court is not the place to resolve adverse
claims of ownership over any property belonging to
the estate. It is not proper to delay the summary
settlement of a deceased person just because an heir
or a third person claims that certain properties do not

belong to the estate but to him. This is because such
claims would unnecessarily lengthen the settlement
process. These claims must instead be ventilated in
an independent civil action. The probate court should
proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no
other legal obstacles to it. Such distribution must
always be subject to the results of the suit (i.e. the
estate proceedings). To protect his rights as the
claimant, Pedro should have the proper annotation of
lis pendens entered.
06 CARREON v. AGCAOILI (1961)
Rule 74 | Rule on Summary Settlement of Estates
Ponente: J. Bautista Angelo
Summary
1. Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon purchased a
land. Later on, Bonifacio died. Celerina adjudicated
to herself the said land, with an annotation that it
was subject to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court. Later on, the subject land was later subject
to an REM. In order to pay for the loan, ½ of the
land was sold to Rufo Agcaoili. Hence, a new TCT
was issued in his name.
2. WoN Rule 74, Section 4 is applicable.
3. No. Since there has been more than two years from
the time that the transfer certificate of title was
issued to Celerina to when the deed of sale was
issued to Agcaoili, the lien mentioned under Rule
74, Section 4 is rendered functus officio already.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are children
of Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon, original owners
of the land in question. The respondents were
buyers of the subject land.
2. (Antecedents) – Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina
Carreon purchased the land subject of this case.
When Bonifacio died, Celerina adjudicated to
herself the land declaring herself as the sole heiress
of her husband for which a transfer certificate was
issued in her name on September 28, 1946 with an
annotation that it was subject to Sec. 4 Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. She then borrowed money from
the PNB secured by a Real Estate Mortgage on ½
of the land. To pay for the loan, ½ was sold to Rufo
Agcaoili, hence, a new TCT was issued in his name.
In February 1955, the children of Celerina sought to
have a deed of sale executed by their mother be
declared as one of mortgage and to recover the ½
tract of land.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
court ruled in favor of Agcaoili. Hence, this appeal
where it was alleged that Agcaoili was a buyer in
bad faith, among others. It must be noted that the
transfer certificate of title issued to Agcaoili included
an annotation that it was subject to Section 4 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (this was carried over
from Celerina’s transfer certificate).
Issue
1. WoN Agcaoili is considered a buyer in good faith.
a. Yes.
2. WoN Rule 74, Section 4 is applicable in this case.

a. No.
Held
1. WoN Agcaoili is considered a buyer in good faith.
Yes. There is no clear proof the Agcaoli knew of any flaw
in the title of Celerina. The mere fact of being a townmate
is not a sufficient basis to conclude that he knew she had
children. It was shown that he rarely came home since he
was an enlisted man in the Phil. Constabulary hence he
cannot be expected to know the relatives and children of
this vendor. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be
established by clear and sufficient evidence. If fraud was
committed, such was perpetrated by Celerina.
2. WoN Rule 74, Section 4 is applicable in this case.
No, Rule 74, Section 4 is inapplicable.
The said Section provides:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall
appear at any time within two years after the settlement
and distribution of an estate in accordance with the
provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that
an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his
lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other
person may compel the settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose
of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the
same time of two years, it shall appear that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid,
or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived
of his lawful participation payable in money, the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or
lawful participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances
require, against the bond provided in the preceding section
or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or
both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged
with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the
full period of two years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of the real estate that may
have been made.
The SC held that the above lien is effective only for a
period of two years. From September 28, 1946, when a
transfer certificate of title was issued to Celerina, to
September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in favor of
Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two years
had elapsed. After the two-year period, such becomes
“functus officio” and it may be cancelled at the instance
of the transferee of the land involved.
07 MCMICKING V. SY CONBIENG (1912)
Rule 74 | Summary Settlement of Estates
Ponente J. Moreland
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose. And

the respondent is the administrator of the estate of
Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco.
2. (Antecedents) –
Margarita Jose died and left properties partly in
Hongkong and partly in the Philippines. Engracio
Palanca was appointed as the administrator of his
estate while Mariano Ocampo became one of
Palanca’s sureties. Palanca, as the administrator took
possession of all the property of said Margarita Jose
amounting in all to around 58,000 Hongkong currency.
Later on, Mariano Ocampo died. And for the settlement
of his estate, Dorotheo Velasco was appointed as
administrator with Pio De la Guardia Barretto as one of
the sureties. Mariano Ocampo left as his surviving heirs
a daughter and three sons, and his estate was settled
through a partition signed by all the parties interested
in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo. Pursuant to
such agreement and order of the court approving the
same, and after all the liabilities under which said
estate lay had been fully paid and satisfied, the said
Doroteo Velasco, as said administrator, delivered to
the devisees and legatees of the said Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, all of the property of said decedent
pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition,
leaving in the hands of said administrator no property
or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said
estate.
Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was removed from office
as administrator of the estate of Margarito Jose, and
plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking, was appointed in his
stead. Palanca was removed from office for refusing to
render an account of the property and funds of the
estate of Margaria Jose and also for failing to deliver
said property and funds to the court or to McMicking as
the successor-administrator. Palanca retained
possession of the property and absconded with the
same and never returned to the Philippines. At the time
of his removal, he was indebted to the estate in the sum
of around P41,000. To recover the indebtedness, Jose
McMicking, as administrator, made an application to
the court for the appointment of commissioners of the
estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of
hearing claims against the estate (remember that
Mariano Ocampo was one of the sureties of Palanca’s
undertaking as administrator). This was approved by
the Court and directed said claim to be paid by Doroteo
Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such
payment (remember that Doroteo was administrator of
Mariano’s estate). However, no payment was made.
And so, McMicking proceeded against Pio de la
Barretto who again to be remembered as one of the
sureties of Doroteo’s undertaking as administrator. Pio
de la Barretto also died and defendant herein, Sy
Conbieng, was the administrator of Pio’s estate.
However, McMicking’s claim was disallowed by the
committee appointed by court to appraise the estate of
Pio. On appeal, the court dismissed the claim and ruled
in favor of the defendant.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Because
of the non-payment by Doroteo Velasco, as
administrator of Mariano Ocampo, of the

indebtedness filed against the estate of Mariano,
McMicking, instead, filed a claim against the estate
Pio de la Barretto (a surety of Doroteo Velasco),
administered by herein defendant Sy Conbieng
Issue
WON McMicking has an enforceable claim against the
estate of Pio de la Barretto?
Held
Ruling: Denied. The Court held: We are of the opinion that
the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance
upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the
deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not
have been liable himself had this action been commenced
against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation,
the surety cannot be. Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of
Mariano Ocampo’s estate, cannot be held liable because
when the persons interested in the estate of Mariano
Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a partition and division of
the property of said estate and the actual partition
followed, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as
administrator. The parties to the partition stood invoking
their rights under section 596 (settlement of intestate
estates, without legal proceedings) and 597. Velasco was
helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties from
taking the property to which they were entitled under the
agreement, it being conceded that they were actually
entitled thereto in law. Those sections were applicable to
the situation and there was nothing that Velasco could do
to prevent the estate from being divided according to their
provisions. In giving his consent to the partition and in
assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court
thereto he did no wrong. Every obligation which lay upon
him had been removed. Nor could there arise against him
any obligation in the future in relation to the same property.
The instant that the partition occurred, in the form and
manner stated, he stood stripped of all responsibility to the
estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He
stood divested o every official duty and obligation, as fully
as before his appointment — as completely as if he had
not been appointed at all. In law, therefore, he was no
longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged.
Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed
can not be held liable for property which by force of law
has been taken from the principal and its ownership and
control turned over to others. Their obligation is that their
principal shall obey the law in the handling and distribution
of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the
estate is legally turned over to those entitled thereto. The
law requires the principal to turn it over to those who bring
themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having
turned over the whole estate under the compelling power
of the law, his obligation ceased. The responsibility of the
sureties ceased at the same time.
RULE 76 – ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF
WILLS
01 FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (2019)
Rule 78 | Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Ponente J. Reyes, J.B.L.
Summary
1. Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the
will of Benedicta de los Reyes. Such petition was
opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court
ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al
appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary
period. They argued that they were entitled to
await the other grounds for opposition (e.g.,
implied revocation) before appealing.
2. Issue: Whether the probate of the will become
final for lack of appeal
3. Ruling: Yes. A probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order
is final and appealable. They do not have to await
the resolution of its other oppositions since the
Rules of Court enumerates six different instances
when appeal may be taken in special proceedings
and that includes allowance of a will.
Facts
1. The petitioners all surnamed Reyes (alleged
intestate heirs) and the respondent is Ismaela
Dimagiba (alleged testamentary heir). Their
particular relation to the deceased is not stated in
the case.
2. Ismaela Dimagiba submitted a petition for the
probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as
the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.
3. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time,
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa
Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar,
Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all
claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed
oppositions to the probate asked.
4. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery,
vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will
by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion
of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the
proponent in 1943 and 1944.
 5. After trial, it was found that the will was genuine
and properly executed. The Court overruled the
claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the
probate of the will, but “reserving unto the parties
the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at
the opportune time.”
6. After receiving further evidence on the issue
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of
sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of
the testamentary heir had revoked the latter the
trial Court resolved against the oppositors and
held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
"unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals.
Issue
1. whether or not the decree of the Court of First
Instance allowing the will to probate had become
final for lack of appeal;
a. YES
2. whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los
Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
a. NO
Held
1. whether or not the decree of the Court of First
Instance allowing the will to probate had
become final for lack of appeal;
a. YES the allowance for probate is final for
lack of appeal within the reglementary
period.
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial
Court’s resolution on the other grounds of their opposition
before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This
contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1,
expressly enumerates six different instances when
appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of
the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had
become final and conclusive.
2. whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de
los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of
the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3,
1944.
 a. NO the will was not impliedly revoked

No, the alleged revocation implied from the execution of

the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir
is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of
whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the
will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there
is no such will and hence there would be nothing to
revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to
bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such,
the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely
the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of
the revoked testament.
02 MERCADO V. SANTOS
03 SUMILANG V. RAMAGOSA
Rule 76
Ponente J. Makalintal
Summary
1. Mariano Sumilag filed a petition for the probate of
the will of Hilarion Ramago, in which he was
instituted as a sole heir.
2. The oppositors (not relatives within the 5th degree
of the deceased, as found by the probate court)
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the will was impliedly revoked when,
after executing the will, the deceased sold the
property to Mariano Sumilag, the instituted heir.
3. The court denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the allegations in the MTD went into
the intrinsic validity of the will, which in a probate
proceeding, is premature.
4. WON in a petition for the probate of a will, the
probate court has the jurisdiction to inquire upon
its intrinsic validity – NO
5. The petition below being for the probate of a will,
the court's area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law
are the only questions presented for the resolution
of the court.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Mariano Sumilag, instituted as sole
heir of the Testate Estate of Hilarion Ramagosa by
the alleged will of the deceased, as petitioner, and
oppositors, who claimed to be the inheritors.
2. (Antecedents) -- Mariano Sumilang filed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will
and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa which
instituted petitioner as sole heir of the testator.
3. oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition
for probate mainly on the ground that "the court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because
the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever
it was really executed by him, was revoked by
implication of law six years before his death."
4. Oppositors alleged that after making the will
Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano
Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land
described therein, so that at the time of the
testator's death the titles to said lands were no
longer in his name.
5. (Cause of action) The court denied the motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the allegations
contained in the motion go to the very intrinsic
value of the will.
Issue
1. WON in a petition for the probate of a will, the probate
court has the jurisdiction to inquire upon its intrinsic
validity – NO
 Held
1. The petition below being for the probate of a will,
the court's area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
2. Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss
petition for probate on the ground that the testator had
impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death,
the lands disposed of therein.
3. True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another.itc-alf The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution.
4. (Unrelated issue) the court also found that the
oppositors have no relationship within the fifth degree
as provided by law, and therefore are totally strangers
to the deceased whose will is under probate. This was
not contested by the oppositors on appeal to the SC.
04 BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (1975)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Aquino
Summary
4. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of his
mother’s notarial will. Such was opposed by his
two sisters (respondents) on the ground that the
will is void due to lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence and preterition of their father, and
improper partition of the conjugal estate. In his
reply, petitioner attached the conformity of his
father to the division of the conjugal estate as well
as his renunciation to his hereditary rights.
Because of this, the lower court set a new hearing
for probate, gave effect to the conformity, and
appointed its branch clerk of court as special
administrator. Soon after, a new lawyer appeared
for petitioner who claims to represent him, his
father, and his other siblings. He moved to convert
the proceedings from testate to intestate on the
ground that the will is void and attached the
conformity of petitioner and his siblings.
Respondents agreed to such motion. In another
motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued. Lower
court agreed to the views of such lawyer,
converted the proceedings and ordered the
issuance of notice to creditors. Petitioners filed an
MR claiming that the lawyer acted without their
consent
5. Issue: Whether the probate court erred in passing
upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring
it void.
6. NO. the trial court acted correctly in passing upon
the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
However, the SC did find that the trial court err
in converting the proceeding to intestate
despite giving effect to the husband’s
conformity. Court said that the conformity of the
father gave the effect of validating the other
provision of the will.
Facts
7. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is the son of
decedent and the respondents are two of the six
legitimate children of decedent
8. (Antecedents) – Petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of his mother’s notarial will. Such was
opposed by his two sisters (respondents) on the
ground that the will is void due to lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence and
preterition of their father, and improper partition of
the conjugal estate. In his reply, petitioner
 attached the conformity of his father to the division
of the conjugal estate as well as his renunciation
to his hereditary rights. Because of this, the lower
court set a new hearing for probate, gave effect to
the conformity, and appointed its branch clerk of
court as special administrator. Soon after, a new
lawyer appeared for petitioner who claims to
represent him, his father, and his other siblings.
He moved to convert the proceedings from testate
to intestate on the ground that the will is void and
attached the conformity of petitioner and his
siblings. Respondents agreed to such motion. In
another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued
ordered the issuance of notice to creditors.
9. The lower court, acting on the motions of the new
lawyer, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
creditors was in order since the parties had agreed
on that point. It adopted their view that the will was
void. It dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will, converted the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding
for hearing.
10. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that their lawyer had no authority to
withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will.
Issue
2. Whether the probate court erred in passing upon
the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it
void.
a. NO
Held
1. We are of the opinion that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established.
The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
2. But the probate court erred in declaring, in its
order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void
and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that
in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to
his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.
3. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in
 the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is
to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil
Code).
4. Subject to the foregoing observations and the
rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and
the partition therein may be given effect if it does
not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would
become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay,
Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be
equitably divided among the children and the
surviving spouse.
5. It should be stressed that by reason of the
surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will
and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his
one-half conjugal share became a part of his
deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the
effect of validating the partition made in paragraph
V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the
rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs.
05 Pastor Jr. v. CA (1983)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Plana
Summary
1. S. Facts: The illegitimate child (Quemada) of
Pastor Sr. (deceased) initiated a probate
proceeding of a holographic will stating that the
deceased conveys a legacy to Quemada 30% of
the 42% of Pastor Sr.’s share from ATLAS (with
royalties). Subsequently the probate court in Cebu
appointed Quemada as special administrator for
the entire estate of Pastor Sr. As a special admin,
Quemada filed a reconveyance of all properties
received by the children of the deceased, Pastor
Jr. (Junior) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), oppositors in
this case. The defense of the children of the
deceased is that they are the owners of the
properties subject of reconveyance in their own
right and not via inheritance. Probate court allowed
the probate and SC denied the MR of the siblings.
There was a delay in the proceeding with the civil
action for reconveyance when the probate court
issued an order of garnishment resolving the
question of ownership for the ATLAS royalties in
favor of Quemada. Oppositors filed an MR w/
probate court halting the transfer and, while the
MR was pending for reso, filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for Prelim. Injunction. Both
were denied by the probate court and CA
respectively.
2. S.Issue: WON the Probate Court resolved with
finality the question of ownership and intrinsic
validity of the will?
3. S. Held: No! The Order sought to be executed by
the assailed Order of execution is the Probate
Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership
of the disputed mining properties. However,
nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a
declaration of ownership of specific properties. On
the contrary, it is manifested therein that
ownership was not resolved. For it confined
itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the
will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it
allowed and approved the holographic will
“with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed subject to
the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
ownership and possession of real and
personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of
ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory,
considering that the issue of ownership was the very
subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was
still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed
implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order
adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
themining properties and royalties, and that, premised on
this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate
Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in
dispute.

Doctrine: Question of ownership = Provisional; only for

the purpose of determining WON the property should be
included in the inventory.

In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue

by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will. As a rule,the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
06 US V. CHIU GUIMCO (1917)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
J. Street
Summary
1. Chiu Guimco, the executor of the estate of his
brother Joaquin Cruz, drew up a petition for
probate of the latter’s will. He also entered into
agreements with the testator’s wives regarding the
distribution of the estate. Chiu Guimco however
never filed the petition in court nor did he take
further action to distribute the testator’s estate.
When asked to produce the will for proper
institution of proceedings, he insisted that the will
was never in his possession. Thus a complaint
under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was filed against him for failure to produce the will
within the time prescribed by law. The CFI of
Misamis found Chiu Guimco guilty and ordered his
imprisonment until he produces the will.
2. WON CFI Manila had authority to order Chiu
Guimco’s imprisonment. NO
3. The penalty of imprisonment under Section 628 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is only applicable
when the court is acting in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over probate proceedings. Since this
case is merely an ordinary criminal prosecution, a
petition for probate needs to be filed first before
Section 628 can apply.
Facts
1. This case is an appeal brought by the accused
Chiu Guimco to reverse the decision of the CFI of
Misamis.
2. The deceased, Joaquin Cruz, is a Chinese
merchant who resided in Misamis. During his
lifetime he executed a will naming therein his
brother, accused Chiu Guimco, as the executor of
his estate.
3. Chiu Guimco appeared before a notary public and
drew up and signed a petition for probate of
Joaquin Cruz’s will. The will itself however has not
presented before the notary public nor was the
petition ever filed in court.
4. Chiu Guimco later entered into an agreement with
the deceased’s wives for the distribution of the
estate but no further action was taken by Chiu
Guimco to actually distribute it.
5. Ramon Contreras, acting in behalf of the
deceased’s second wife, urged Chiu Guimco to
produce the will for the institution of probate
proceedings. Contreras filed a complaint against
 Chiu Guimco after the latter failed to produce the
will.
6. The complaint charged Chiu Guimco under
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
failing to produce the will within the time required
by law. The CFI of Misamis found Chiu Guimco
guilty and imposed a fine of P1,800 and ordered
Chiu Guimco to produce the will within a certain
time. He again failed to do so insisting that it has
never been in his possession. The CFI of Misamis
ordered his confinement in the provincial jail.
7. Chiu Guimco appealed the order of the CFI of
Misamis before the SC.
Issue
1. WON the CFI of Misamis correctly ordered the
imprisonment of Chiu Guimco for his failure to
produce the will under Section 628 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
a. NO. CFI of Misamis did not have the
authority to order his imprisonment.
Held
1. The Code of Civil Procedure provides that if a person
having custody of a will after the death of the testator
neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the
same to the court having jurisdiction after notice by
the court to do so, he may be committed to prison
until he delivers the will.
2. This provision however can only be applied when a
court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
the administration of the estates of deceased persons.
Where no such proceedings have been instituted, the
court should require a petition for the settlement of
estate first before Section 628 can be appropriate.
3. The proceedings in this case is an ordinary criminal
action. The act penalized by Section 628 of the Code
of Civil Procedure is a special statutory offense. The
fact that this penal provision is contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to
enforce the penalty a civil proceeding.
4. The order of the CFI of Misamis ordering Chiu
Guimco’s imprisonment and fine is vacated.
03 Rodriguez v. De Borja (1966)
Rule 75 and 76 | Production of Will, Allowance of Will
Necessary & Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. JBL Reyes
Summary
1. Respondents Pangilinan and Adelaida presented
the will of Fr. Rodriguez to CFI Bulacan on March
4. Petitioners Rodriguez filed an intestate
proceeding of the estate of Fr. Rodriguez on
March 12, 8AM at CFI Rizal, while the
respondents filed for probate of the will on March
12, 11AM at CFI Bulacan. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the testate proceeding in CFI Bulacan,
contending that the fact that the proceeding in CFI
Rizal was filed 3 hours before the one in CFI
Bulacan would mean that the latter court no longer
has jurisdiction.
2. First, the SC ruled that the CFI Bulacan already
had jurisdiction when the will was presented to it
on March 4, so when the respondents filed for
probate on March 12, it is as if the probate petition
was filed on March 4. Second, petitioners cannot
deny even the venue of the petition as Fr.
Rodriguez had properties and died in Bulacan.
Third, the Court recognized the bad faith
committed by the petitioners as they were already
aware of the existence of the will in CFI Bulacan,
yet they still initiated intestate proceedings in CFI
Rizal to prevent the probate of the will. Lastly, it is
a principle of succession that testate proceedings
take preference over intestate.
Facts
1. The petitioners are Angela, Maria, Abelardo and
Antonio, all surnamed Rodriguez.
2. The respondent is Judge Juan De Borja of CFI
Bulacan, and Anatolia Pangilinan and Adelina
Jacalan.
3. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on 1963 in Manila.
4. Afterwards, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan delivered a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez to CFI Bulacan.
Petitioners filed a motion to examine the will,
however, before the court could act on the petition,
the same was withdrawn.
5. An intestate proceeding was initiatedbefore CFI
Rizal by the petitioners, alleging that Fr. Rodriguez
was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal and died
without leaving a will. They prayed that Maria
Rodriguez be appointed as special administratrix
of the estate.
6. Meanwhile, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan filed a petition for probate of the will
delivered by them the last time, alleging that:
a. Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque;
b. He was parish priest of a church in in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from 1930 up to his
death in 1963;
c. He was buried in Paranaque;
d. He left real properties in Rizal, Cavite,
Quezon City and Bulacan.
 7. A motion to dismiss was filed in CFI Bulacan by
the petitioners as they contend that since the
intestate proceedings in CFI Rizal was filed at
March 12, 1963 at 8AM, and the respondents filed
the probate proceedings in CFI Bulacan on 11AM
on the same date, the latter court has no
jurisdiction.
8. On the other hand, respondents contend that CFI
Bulacan has jurisdiction as they were able to
deliver the will on March 4.
9. CFI Bulacan denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of few hours did not entitle
one proceeding preference over the other, and as
early as March 7, petitioners were aware of the
existence of the will deposited in CFI Bulacan, as
they filed a petition to examine the same. Hence,
this writ of certiorari and prohibition.
Issue
1. WON CFI Rizal has jurisdiction because the
intestate proceeding was filed earlier than the
testate one in CFI Bulacan.
Held
1. No. CFI Bulacan is the court that has jurisdiction.
a. CFI Bulacan’s jurisdiction became vested upon
delivery of the will of Fr. Rodriguez on March 4,
even if no petition was filed for its allowance
until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving
the will, and issued the corresponding notices
pursuant to Rule 76, Sec. 3 of the ROC.
i. When a will is delivered to, or a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed in, the
Court having jurisdiction, such Court
shall fix a time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall
cause notice of such time and place to
be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. But no
newspaper publication shall be made
where the petition for probate has been
filed by the testator himself.
b. The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a
will is delivered to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that
the court may act upon the mere deposit of a
decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time
when the will was delivered.
c. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted to CFI Bulacan on March 4 by the
respondents, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in CFI Rizal on March 12, eight
days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable.
d. Petitioners object on another ground. latter court of the precedence awarded it by the
According to them, CFI Bulacan court does not Rules.
have jurisdiction because the decedent was g. The other reason is that intestate succession is
domiciled in Rizal province. However, the SC only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate,
considered Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of since intestacy only takes place in the absence
residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, of a valid operative will. Therefore, as ruled in
Bulacan. Additionally, even if he retained some Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, "only after final
animus revertendi to Rizal, it would not imply decision as to the nullity of testate succession
that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As could an intestate succession be instituted in
ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle the form of pre-established action". The
decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may
courts of first instance, and the domicile of the not thus proceed while the probate of the
testator only affects the venue but not the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
jurisdiction of the Court. Neither party denies h. CFI Bulacan is entitled to priority in the
that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that settlement of the estate in question, and that in
he left personal property in Hagonoy, province refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings,
of Bulacan. said court did not commit any abuse of
e. The estate proceedings having been initiated in discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal
the BCFI Bulacan ahead of any other, that Court that should be discontinued.
court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wrong venue by express provisions of
Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court:
i. The Court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent
shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
f. There are two other reasons that militate
against the success of petitioners. One is that
their commencing intestate proceedings in
Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the
decedent's will to CFI Bulacan, was in bad
faith, patently done with a view to divesting the
08 Teotico v. del Val (1965)
Rule 76 | Rule on Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Bautista Angelo
Summary
FACTS: Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving
properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before
Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Vicente Teotico
filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed
by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of
Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law
and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to
execute the will at the time of its execution and was
executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUES: WON Ana, as adopted child of the decedent’s
sister or illegitimate child of the decedent’s brother, can
oppose the probate of the will?
HELD: NO. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a
person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate,
will or in the property to be affected by either as executor
or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such
as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, Ana has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate either as
heir, executor or administrator because it did not appear
therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in
any portion of the estate. Even if her allegations were
true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the
estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by
law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father and that relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter. Hence, Ana has no right to
intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the
probate proceeding.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Vicente
Teotico, the one who filed the will of the decedent,
Amado G. Garcia, for probate and the respondent is Ana
del Val Chan, the oppositor of the probate of the will.
2. (Antecedents) – Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de
Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2
Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for
the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955
after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix,
filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate
of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was
not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at
the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed
under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The probate
court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. The
probate court also rendered its decision on November 10,
1960, admitting the will to probate.
Issue
WON Ana, as adopted child of the decedent’s sister or
illegitimate child of the decedent’s brother, can oppose
the probate of the will?
-No, only an INTERESTED PARTY can intervene
in the probate proceedings.
Held
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be
allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must
have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been
defined as one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate
like a creditor And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any
interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the
negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the
event that the will is denied probate? Under the terms of
the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she
has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any
property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the
estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would
the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the
estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is
not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to
be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for,
even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because
being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact

that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera
because under our law the relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting
parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly
provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting
parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to

intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this
probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a
quo.
09 FERNANDO V. CRISOSTOMO (1951)
10 Araujo v. Celis (1906)
Rule 76 – Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
J. Mapa
S. Facts: Petitioner Araujo alleges that her mother left a
will leaving al her properties to her husband and when
her husband (father of the petitioner) died intestate, the
petitioner now claims to be the sole proper inheritor of the
estate. However, the will could not be found and claiming
that it was burnt together with the Court of Pototan.
Petitioner then offered instead parol evidence as to the
contents of the will.
S. Issue: WON secondary parol evidence is sufficient to
prove the will?
S. Held: No. The loss of the alleged original will has not
been established. There is nothing to show that at the
time these records were burned by the insurgents it
existed in the court of Pototan. Furthermore, notaries
should have kept a copy of the will.
FACTS:
Rosario Araujo inherited from her mother, Asuncion, the
hacienda known as Pangpang. She subsequently
married Jose Celis, Gregoria’s’ son. Rosario died leaving
no descendants or ascendants, but only collateral
relatives. Such relatives asked that the property inherited
by Rosario from her mother be delivered to them. The
property, however, is held by the Gregoria, who took
possession of the same after the death of her son Jose.
He died a year after the death of Rosario in l889.
The defendant claims that Rosario died leaving a will in
which she bequeathed all of her property to her husband,
Jose, and that the latter having died without a will, she,
therefore, succeeded to all of his property, rights, and
actions, thereby lawfully acquiring all the property that
had formerly belonged to her daughter-in-law. The
problem, however, is that the will could not be found
alleging that insurgents had burned the Court of Pototan
where the will was kept. She instead offered secondary
parol evidence as to its contents. CFI allowed the
evidence over the objection of the collateral relatives of
Rosario and ruled in favor of Gregoria. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether secondary parol evidence is sufficient to prove
Rosario’s will?
HELD:
NO. The loss of the alleged original will has not been
sufficiently established. The principal witness, Calixto
Delgado testified that he had acted as procurador for
Gregoria in an action brought against her by one Jose
involving the hacienda of Pangpang, and that as such
there came into his possession a copy of the will of
Rosario which was introduced in evidence in that action.
However, he likewise testified that he never saw the since 1889 an action to declare this very will null and
original of that will because the same was retained by the void.
notary. He likewise failed to affirm whether the copy in
question was a simple or certified copy. More importantly,
he further testified that the will was signed by two
witnesses only. A will signed by two witnesses only could
not under any circumstances be valid under the law in
force at the time referred to by the witness, and legally
speaking such will could not then have been probated or
recorded.

As to the loss of the will, there is nothing to show that at

the time these records were burned by the insurgents
there existed in the court-house of Pototan the copy of
the will referred to. Moreover, the testimony that all the
notarial records were likewise burned as they were kept
in the same courthouse is inconclusive as the same is
plainly and manifested contrary to the royal decree
concerning the organization of notaries, which provided
that: “Notaries shall keep the protocols and books in the
same building where they live, in their custody, and shall
be responsible therefor.”

Their testimony is absolutely insufficient to establish in a

satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will of Rosario
Darwin, and the court below should not have, therefore,
allowed the secondary evidence introduced by her as to
the contents of the will, particularly in view of the fact that,
as it appears from the record, there had been pending
11 BILLIAN V. SUNTAY (1936)
Rule 73 | VENUE & PROCESSES
Ponente J. AVANCEÑA
Summary
1. Jose Suntay (deceased) died in China and has
allegedly left a will placed in a sealed envelope to
his 2nd wife, Billian. However, the will was thrown
by the defendants (children of Jose with his 1st
wife) and only the envelope was left. The
evidences presented to the court are the envelope
and the true copy of Jose’s will.
2. WON the evidence presented are sufficient to
establish the loss of the will.
3. YES. The envelope was signed by Jose, and the
attesting witnesses. This evidence points to the
loss of the will and justifies the presentation of
secondary evidence as to its contents and whether
the formalities required by law have been satisfied.
However, the case was remanded to the court of
origin to determine whether the formalities
required in executing a will have been complied
with.
Facts
1. The petitioner in this case is Maria Billian, the 2nd
wife of the deceased (Jose Suntay), and the
respondents are the sons of Jose with his 1st wife.
2. Jose Suntay died In Amoy, China. His eldest son
(w/ 1st wife) instituted intestate proceedings in CFI
Mnl. In the same court, 2nd wife Billian presented
the true copy of Jose’s will in a sealed envelope
which was left to her by Jose before the latter died
in China. The will was executed in PH with 3
witnesses. Billian’s atty-in-fact showed the letter to
Jose’s children with the 1st wife but after getting its
contents, they threw its contents. Thus, another
evidence presented is the empty envelope which
contained the will thrown by the defendants. Billian
asks that the children present the will and that she
be appointed as executirx Respondents denied the
allegation.
3. Petition for probate and petition for intestate
proceedings
Issue
1. WON the copy of the will accompanying the petition is
an authentic copy & WON the evidence is sufficient to
establish the loss of the will contained in the
envelope.
a. Yes.
2. WON the will has been executed with all the
formalities required by law.
a. Case was remanded to court of origin.
Held
1. WON the copy of the will accompanying the petition is
an authentic copy & WON the evidence is sufficient to
establish the loss of the will contained in the
envelope.
a. Yes. The evidence is sufficient to establish the
loss of the will. The envelope was signed by
Jose, and the attesting witnesses. This
evidence points to the loss of the will and
justifies the presentation of secondary
evidence as to its contents and whether the
formalities required by law have been satisfied.

2. WON the will has been executed with all the

formalities required by law.
a. Case was remanded to court of origin.
Petitoner’s case was limited to the proof of loss
of the will. The determination of compliance
with the formalities shall be ventilated in the
court of origin.
12 Basa vs. Mercado (1935)
Rule 75 76 l Productio of Will, Allowanc of Will
Necessary; Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente: J. Goddard
Summary
1. Judge Reyes of CFI Pampanga allowed and probated
the will of Ines Basa. The same judge also allowed te
appointment of the administrator and the declaration of
him bing the only heir of the deceased.
Petitioner-appellants assail the ruling on the ground that
the requirements of notice and publications were not
complied with by the judge under section 630 of Code Of
civil Procedure which requires "... and shall cause public
notice thereof to be given by publication in such
newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general
circulation in the province, three weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be
allowed until such notice has been given." the first
publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20,
1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that
month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set
for the hearing.
Issue: w/n the provision of sec 630 of the code of civil
procedure has been complied with
Held: yup! It is held that the language used in section 630
of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three
full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will.
In other words the first publication of the notice need not
be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for
the hearing.
Basically, the appellants were assailing that from the last
date of publication (June 20) they were arguing that there
has to be three weeks from theast date of publication
before the scheduled hearing. (hearing in this case was
June 27,three weeks from date of first publication, June
6) so the whole proceeding was valid and there was no
GAD
Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, allowed and
probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa,
deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge
approved the account of the administrator of the estate,
declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will
and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11,
1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in
which they prayed that said proceedings be reopened
and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the
matter because there was a failure to comply with
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing
prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with in view of the fact that although the trial
judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the
required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to
the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first
publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20,
1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that
month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set
for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial
court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing
Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published,
was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a
will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same,
the court shall appoint a time and place when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the
will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by
publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the
court directs of general circulation in the province, three
weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and
no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given.
At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath,
reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be
published for three full weeks before the date set for the
hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of
the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the
day appointed for the hearing. The record shows that Ing
Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of
the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local
news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published
at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the
publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely
because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil
Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the
largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper
of general circulation.

Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication

be followed pursuant to the sec. 630 of Code of Civil
Procedure?

Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper

considered a newspaper of general circulation?

Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language

used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does
13 De Aranz v. Galing (1988)
Rule 75, 76 | Production of Will, Allowance of Will
Necessary; Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
1. The legatees and devisees of a will were not given
personal notice of the institution of the probate
proceedings of a will hence they were unable to
timely oppose the probate proceedings. However,
the proceedings were published in a newspaper of
general circulation once every 3 weeks. The
petitioners contend that the rules of court dictate
that they must be served personal notices and a
mere publication is not enough to satisfy the
requirement under the law.
2. WON personal notice is required to be given to the
legatees and devises in probate proceedings.
3. Yes. It is clear in Rule 74 that personal service of
notice must done at the residence of the legatees
and devisees if their residences are known.
Facts
1. The petitioners in this case are the legatees and
devisees specified in the petition—the Roxas
family. Private respondents in this case are the
party that filed with the RTC a petition for the
probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-
Pola.
2. The probate court issued an order setting the
petition for a hearing, and said order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks. On the date of the hearing, no opposition
appeared. The hearing was then reset, and on that
new date, the probate court issued an order an
order allowing the receipt of evidence ex-parte for
the probate proceedings because there were no
oppositors to the probate of the will. On the same
day, private respondent presented his evidence
ex-parte and he was appointed executor.
3. Two days later, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order, alleging that they
were named legatees in the will, and no notices
were sent to them. They prayed for a 10 day
period to file their opposition to the probate of the
will. The probate court denied it. Upon filing a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to the CA, it
was subsequently denied.
4. It is the view of petitioners that the CA erred in
holding that personal notice of probate
proceedings to the known legatees and devisees
is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of
a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court of
 Appeals that the requirement of notice on
individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a
matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy
in some instances the requirements of due
process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of
the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a
reversible error for being constitutive of grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue
1. WON personal notice of probate proceedings to
the known legatees and devisees is a jurisdictional
requirement in the probate of a will.
a. Yes. It is clear in Rule 74 that notice of the
time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees
and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence if known.
Held
1. WON personal notice of probate proceedings to the
known legatees and devisees is a jurisdictional
requirement in the probate of a will.
Yes. It is clear in Rule 74 that notice of the time and place
of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be
forwarded to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at their
places of residence if known. But despite such
knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the
notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the
law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere
publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to
all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was
received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines.
14 IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON (1918)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Street
Summary
1. (Short Facts) On February 4, 1916, Emil H.
Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized
citizen of the United States, died in the city of
Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an
estimated amount of P231,800. The will was
written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is
signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead
of three witnesses required by section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of
law generally applicable to wills executed by
inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not
have been proved under section 618. It is,
however, pointed out in the argument submitted in
behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court
made the order of publication, it was apprised of
the fact that the petitioner lived in the United
States and that as daughter and heir she was
necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It
is, therefore, insisted that the court should have
appointed a date for the probate of the will
sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner
to be present either in person or by representation.
2. (Short Issue) WON the proceedings for the
probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow
the will to be probated - YES
3. (Short Held) The proceedings for the probate of
the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain
the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.
Facts
1. On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of
Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a
holographic will, being written in the testator's own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2. A petition was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this
will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of
his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed
in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
"Will made here by alien. A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject,
and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of these
Islands.
3. The will was admitted to probate
4. NOTE: The purpose of the proceeding on behalf of
the petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and
put the estate into intestate administration, thus
preparing the way for the establishment of the
claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of
her father.
5. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
hearing on said application was set for March 6,
1916, and three weeks publication of notice was
ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." It is,
however, pointed out in the argument submitted in
behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court
made the order of publication, it was apprised of
the fact that the petitioner lived in the United
States and that as daughter and heir she was
necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It
is, therefore, insisted that the court should have
appointed a date for the probate of the will
sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner
to be present either in person or by representation.
Issue
1. WON the proceedings for the probate of the will
were regular and that the publication was sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated -
YES.
2. WON the will should be probated in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines – NO.
The will shall be probated in accordance with the law of
the USA since he is a US citizen when he died. Johnson
was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held
1. In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in
the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's
death; and it was impossible, in view of the
distance and means of communication then
existing, for the petitioner to appear and oppose
the probate on the day set for the hearing in
California. It was nevertheless held that publication
in the manner prescribed by statute constituted
due process of law.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in
force in perhaps all of the States of the American Union,
contain no special provision, other than that allowing an
appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of
any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first
instance improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do,
however, have a provision of a general nature authorizing
a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This
provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:
"Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a judgment, ordeor
other proceeding taken against him through his mis take,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided,
That application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken."
The law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might
have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from the
order by which she is supposed to have been injured;
and though the period within which the application should
have been made was short, the remedy was both
possible and practicable.
2. Intimately connected with the question of the
jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which
may be properly discussed at this juncture. This
relates to the interpretation to be placed upon
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
position is taken by the appellant that this section
is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this
connection attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will
made here by an alien and to the further fact that
the word "state" in the body of the section is not
capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636
is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the
United States residing in these Islands.
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of
the opinion that, by the most reasonable interpretation of
the language used in the statute, the words "another
state or country" include the United States and the States
of the American Union, and that the operation of the
statute is not limited to wills of aliens.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore
be taken as showing that, at the time the will was
executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of
probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in
connection with the circumstance that the petition does
not even so much as deny such citizenship but only
asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine
Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the
probate aside for lack of the necessary citizenship on the
part of the testator.
15 In Re Abut vs Abut (1972)

Rule 76 | Rule on Allowance or Disallowance of Wills Issue

Ponente J. Makalintal
Summary
1. Generoso Abut filed with CFI of Misamis Oriental
for the probate of Cipriano Abut. Generoso died so
Gavina filed an amended petition to replace
Generoso. The court denied it as publication is
again required for the amended petition so Court
dismissed the petition.
2. WON the court erred in dismissing the petition due
to the death of Generoso
3. Yes. The court held that the refusal to admit the
amended petition is untenable as jurisdiction is
already there upon filing of original petition and
compliance with section 3 and4 of rule 76. It is an
in rem proceeding so the death wouldn’t change
the fact that people can still file their opposition.
1. WON the dismissal was proper?
a. No. Because it is an in rem proceeding and
that filing and rule 76 sec 3 and 4 has been
complied with
Held
1. WON the dismissal was proper.
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that it is an in rem
proceeding so the death of the original person who filed
for the petition doesn’t matter as the oppositors can still
contest the petition. Jurisdiction once acquired continues
until termination. The filing of personal notices is
procedural and not jurisdictional

Facts

1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case is the sister

of the deceased who filed the petition and that
they are children on the second marriage.
2. (Antecedents) – Generoso filed for the probate
and administration but before hearing started and
after publication he died.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the death of Generoso, Gavina filed an amended
petition which was later on denied by the CFI
16 RODELAS V. ARANZA (1982)
17 GAN v. YAP (1958)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Bengzon
Summary
1. Felicidad Yap died of heart failure in UST Hospital,
leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan and in
Manila. Her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
opposed the probate of the holographic will and
asserted that the deceased had not left any will,
nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
2. WON a holographic will be probated upon the
testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it
and who declare that it was in the handwriting of
the testator
3. NO. The execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by
the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic
will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.
Facts
4. On 1951, Felicidad Yap died of heart failure in
UST Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan and in Manila.
5. On 1952, Fausto Gan (her nephew) initiated these
proceedings in the CFI Manila with a petition for
the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased.
6. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband
Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during
her lifetime.
7. Hon. San Jose refused to probate the alleged will.
8. The will itself was not presented. It was alleged
that sometime before her death, Felicidad
indicated her desire to make a will but did not want
her husband to know about it. Later, she learned
that it could be done without any witnesses
provided the document is entirety in her
handwriting, signed, and dated by her. Thus, she
allegedly made a holographic will in the presence
of her niece and was later read by his relatives.
9. However, this face certain improbabilities such as
that she permitted several people to read her will
when she wanted its contents to be a secret. Thus,
judge refused probate.
Issue
2. WON a holographic will be probated upon the
testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it
and who declare that it was in the handwriting of
the testator
a. No. Holographic wills, which have been lost
or destroyed without intent to revoke,
cannot be probated.
Held

1. WON a holographic will be probated upon the

testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it
and who declare that it was in the handwriting of
the testator

NO. The execution and the contents of a lost or

destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the
only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were
admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner
is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that
it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof
required by Rule 77.

This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be

protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who
shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established
by the three witnesses who depose that they have no
reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator
(Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of
the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art.
693).
18 GAGO v. MAMUYAC (1927)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
1. Facts:.Gago presented a petition for the probate
of the will of Miguel Mamuyac. This was opposed
to by the respondents, alleging that the same has
already been revoked. A witness testified that the
1919 will was in the possession of the testator but
it could not be found after his death.
2. Issue: WON there was a cancellation of the 1919
will
3. Yes. The will was presumptively cancelled or
destroyed as it was shown that the testator had
already access to the will and the same cannot be
found after his death.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner is Francisco Gago who
presented a petition for the probate of the will of
Miguel Mamuyac. The respondents are Cornelio
Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon,
and Catalina Mamuyac.
2. (Antecedents) – The testator Miguel Mamuyac
died on January 2, 1922. Within the same month,
Gago presented to court a will supposed to have
been executed by the testator on July 27, 1918.
The will was not admitted on the ground that the
testator had, on April 16, 1919, executed a new
will and testament. Gago then petitioned for the
probate of the 2nd will which was denied again by
the court on the ground that the same will had
been revoked by the testator as testified by Fenoy
(person who typed the will) and Bejar (to whom a
house and lot in the 1919 Will was sold to).
Another witness also testified that the 1919 will was in the
possession of the testator but could not be found after his
death. The 1919 will presented was found by the lower
courts to be a mere carbon copy of the original.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
respondent then opposed to the probate of the will,
alleging that the same has already been revoked
during the lifetime of Miguel.
Issue
1. WON there was a cancellation of the 1919 will
 Yes. There was a presumption that the will was
cancelled or destroyed.
Held

The law does not require any evidence of the cancellation

or revocation of the will to be preserved. The fact that
such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be
found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to
have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed
that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator.

The force of presumption of the cancellation or revocation

by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or
strong according to the circumstances, is never
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will
was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
19 Aldanese v. Salutillo (1925)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Ostrand
Summary
4. The will of Salome Avila, a resident of Cebu, was
presented for probate by the petitioner in the CFI
of Cebu. All attesting witnesses of the will resided
in Manila. Responded opposed the probate of the
will. Petitioner asked for authorization for the
deposition of the attesting witnesses of the will; it
opposed by respondents and thereafter denied by
the court. Nevertheless, their depositions were
taken and presented in court. The CFI of Cebu
ruled that it was inadmissible in evidence and the
probate was denied.
5. WON the deposition of the attesting witnesses
should be allowed
6. Yes. The attesting witnesses to the will reside
outside the province where the will is offered for
probate. The testimonies may be taken in the form
of a deposition in accordance with section 406 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. However, since the
opponents were not represented during the
deposition, it should be retaken.
Facts
10. Petitioner Vicente Aldanese and his sister
Enriqueta are the voluntary heirs of testratix
Salome Avila. Respondents are the opponents in
the probate of the will.
11. The deceased was a widow and resident of
Sibonga, Cebu, but died in San Juan del Monte,
Rizal. All the attesting witnesses of the will resided
in Manila. Furthermore, deceased left no other
ascendants and descendants – the greater part of
the estate will go to petitioner and his sister.
12. The petition for the probate of the will was
presented in the CFI of Cebu. After due
publication, respondents appeared as opponents
of the will and asked that the hearing be continued
in July. In the mean time, petitioner presented a
motion asking the court to authorize the taking of
the depositions of the witnesses of the will on the
ground that being residents of Manila, said
witnesses were unable to appear personally in the
CFI of Cebu.
13. Judge Recto initially granted the motion, but the
respondents presented a motion asking that the
order authorizing the taking of the deposition be
revoked.
14. The court, Judge Wislizenus presiding, granted the
motion and revoked the order in question on the
ground that it was not sufficiently shown that it was
impossible for the witnesses to appear personally
before the court and therefore, the depositions
would be inadmissible in evidence.
15. The depositions of the witnesses were
nevertheless taken in Manila, the opponents failing
to appear despite notice to their counsel.
 16. When the petition for probate was finally heard, called to testify and produced before an officer
the depositions were presented but ruled out by legally authorized to take their testimony in the
the court for the grounds stated in its order. There form of depositions. The notice required by section
being no other evidence of the execution of the 361, supra, was duly given and the opponents
will, the petition was denied. given the opportunity to be present and to cross-
examine the witnesses. In the circumstances, this
Issue must certainly be considered a sufficient "calling"
of the witnesses and satisfies the law.
3. WON the deposition of the attesting witnesses 3. The depositions in question appear to be in due
should be allowed form and would ordinarily be admissible, but the
a. Yes. The attesting witnesses to the will record indicates that the failure of the opponents to
reside outside the province where the will is be represented at the examination of the
offered for probate. However, since the witnesses was due to the fact that they were
opponents were not represented during the misled by the petitioner's action in seeking special
deposition, it should be retaken. authorization from the court for taking of the
depositions. In the interest of justice were
Held therefore think that deposition should be retaken
and the opponents given another opportunity to
1. In our opinion the court below erred in holding that examine the witnesses.
the depositions in question were inadmissible in
evidence in the probate proceedings. It is true that
the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a
will is contested the attesting witnesses must be
called to prove the will or a showing must be made
that they cannot be had, but that does not
necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily
before the court. It is their testimony which is
needed and not their actual personal presence in
the court room.
2. In the present case, the will was presented for
probate in Cebu; the attesting witnesses were
living in Manila and were beyond the process of
the court for compulsory attendance. They were
Cabang v. Delfinado
Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. TRENT
Summary
1. Facts: The will of the decedent is being questioned
because there has been doubt as to the
truthfulness of such will because it is stated that
the decedent did not know how to read and write.
To prove the will however, only 1 out of 3 of the
subscribing witnesses was called to testify for the
validity of the will.
2. Issue: WON the 1 subscribing witness was enough
to prove the validity and existence of the will
3. Ruling: NO. The rule that no will shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, unless "attested
and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses," is a matter of substantive law and an
element of the will's validity. The rule that the
attesting witnesses must be called to prove a will
for probate is one of preference made so by
statute.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner here is Cabang the wife of
the Decedent and the respondent is Martin
Delfinado son of the Decedent.
2. (Antecedents) – Martin Delfinado, son of
Celestino Delfinado to his first marriage filed an
opposition to the allowance of the will, alleging that
the will was not signed by the deceased, nor by
any other person, in his presence and by his
express direction, and that the attestation does not
comply with law. The case proceeded to trial, the
petitioner presenting as witnesses the widow
Dorotea Cabang, Antonio Flor Mata, and Paciano
Romero, the latter being one of the subscribing
witnesses. The opposition called only one witness,
Martin Delfinado. The petitioner presented a
motion asking that the case be reopened for the
purpose of receiving the testimony of the other two
subscribing witnesses, who were then living in
Manila and Nueva Ecija. No reason whatever
appears in the record why these witnesses were
not present and no question was raised either in
the court below or in this court with reference to
the consideration by the trial court to the testimony
taken upon the first hearing. So it must be
presumed that the petitioner did not desire to
present these two witnesses and that she had no
objection to the consideration of the testimony
already taken.
3. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan,
probating a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of the deceased Celestino
Delfinado.
Issue omitted and the testator signed by mark. The due
execution of the will is still doubtful and concludes that
WON the court erred in admitting the will to probate the proponent did not comply with the provisions of the
without having two of the subscribing witnesses called, law in the presentation of her case.
although they were living within the jurisdiction of the
court, or for not requiring any showing why they were not
produced.

Held

The judgment appealed from is reversed. The rule that no

will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
unless "attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses," is a matter of substantive law and an
element of the will's validity. The rule that the attesting
witnesses must be called to prove a will for probate is
one of preference made so by statute. In proving the
contested will at Tayug only one attestor was presented,
although the record showed that the other two were
living, one in Manila and the other in Nueva Ecija. It was
an error to admit the will to probate without calling all the
attesting witnesses or requiring a showing that they could
not be obtained. This rule of evidence is not to be
confused with rules of quantity. There have been several
reasons given for this rule of preference for the attesting
witnesses, one reason being that the party opposing the
claim of proper execution of the will has a right to the
benefit of cross-examining the attesting witnesses as to
fraud, duress, or other matters of defense. The law
places these witnesses "around the testator to ascertain
and judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing
frauds. The soundness of the rule is well illustrated in the
case under consideration. Here the attesting clause was
21 AVERA v. GARCIA (1921)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Street
Summary
1. Petitioner Avera filed for the probate of a testator’s
will. Respondents Garcia and Rodriguez contested
the valid execution of the will (i.e. the testator’s
incapacity and signatures on the right margin
instead of the left). During the hearing, only one
attesting witness was presented by Petitioner.
However, the sole witness for Respondents failed
to rebut the testimony. Hence, the lower court
admitted to probate the will in question.
2. WON a will can be admitted to probate based on
the proof of one witness despite opposition.
3. No. When a will is contested, all the attesting
witness must be examined. No explanation was
made why the other two witnesses were not
presented.
However, despite this valid ground for disallowing a will,
the judgment of the lower court cannot be reversed. The
point was only raised on appeal although it could have
been raised either during the hearing or the filing of the
motion for new trial with the lower court.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Eutiquia
Avera, the proponent of the probate of the will, and
the respondents are Marino Garcia and Juan
Rodriguez, the oppositors to the probate of the
will.
2. (Antecedents) – Petitioner Avera instituted
proceedings for the probate of the will of Esteban
Garcia. This was contested by Respondents
Garcia and Rodriguez, the latter being the
guardian of minors Garcia.
Petitioner presented one of the attesting witnesses of the
will who testified to the valid execution and capacity of
the testator. The testator corroborated the latter point.
Respondents presented one witness whose testimony
that the testator was debilitated was deemed vague and
indecisive.
3. The trial judge found the testator to be capacitated
and the valid execution of the will, hence it was
admitted to probate. An appeal was taken over this
judgment.
Issue
1. WON a will can be admitted to probate based on
the proof of one witness despite opposition. NO
2. WON a valid ground for disallowance may be
disregarded if only raised on appeal for the first
time. YES
3. WON a will is invalid with the signatures written on
the right margin, not the left. NO
Held
2. WON a will can be admitted to probate based on the
proof of one witness despite opposition.
No. When a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of
the process of the court. In the present case, no
explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of
the attesting witnesses were not produced.
The probable reason maybe because the hearing for the
probate of the will was set two years after it was filed and
no formal contest was entered until the hearing. The
proponent may have repaired to the court with only one
attesting witnesses believing it will not be contested.
However, despite this circumstance, it does not in itself
supply any basis for changing the rule.
3. WON a valid ground for disallowance may be
disregarded if only raised on appeal for the first time.
Yes. Were it not for a fact which was only mentioned on
appeal, the lower court’s decision would have been
reversed because the execution was not proven by a
sufficient number of attesting witnesses. However,
Respondent did not raise this point in the lower court,
either during the hearing or upon filing of the motion for a
new trial.
Appellate tribunals do not permit certain questions to be
raised for the first time in the second instance. First, it
makes the appellate court in effect a court of first
instance as to the point being raised. Second, it trifles
with the administration of justice by concealing from the
trial court and from their opponent the actual point being
relied.
If this court believes that substantial justice has been
done
in the Court of First Instance, and the point relied here
could have been properly presented there, this court will
ignore such question upon appeal. Here, if Respondents
raised the question in the lower court, that court would
have considered such.

4. WON a will is invalid with the signatures written on the

right margin, not the left.

No. It can make no possible difference whether the

names appear on the left or the right margin. The will
contains the necessary signatures on every page.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution

of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud.
When an interpretation already given assures such ends,
any other interpretation that adds more demands must be
disregarded. Here, the deviation is too trivial to invalidate
the instrument.
22 SOLIVIO V. CA
23 Manalo v. Paredes (1925)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Will
VILLA-REAL, J.
Summary
1. Laurena Hidalgo, the surviving spouse of
Francisco Villegas, filed with the CFI an
application for letters of administration of the
estate of her deceased husband who allegedly
died intestate. After a few months, Justina
Medienta filed a motion with the court, praying for
the probate of the supposed will of Francisco
Villegas, wherein most of his property was given
as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's
children and the legitimate wife of the deceased
Francisco Villegas. The court ordered the
petitioners to produce the will, but petitioner
Mendieta admitted that the will being spoken off
was under undue influence. Petitioners filed
another application for probate of the same will,
but entered into an agreement with the surviving
spouse, where petitioner withdrew her application.
On another date, one Gelacio Malihan, who
claimed to be first cousin of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new
application for the probate of the same supposed
will of the deceased Francisco Villegas.
2. WON the new application for probate of
decedent’s supposed will should be granted. No.
3. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through
the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order
that may be entered is binding against all of them.
4. All the parties became bound by said judgment;
and if any of them or other persons interested
were not satisfied with the court's decision, they
had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice
that might have been committed, and cannot now
through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a
review of the proceeding upon a new application
for the probate of the same will in order to compel
the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial
duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; because this remedy, being
extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal.
Facts
4. On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving
spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna an application for
letters of administration of the estate left by her
deceased husband, who, according to the
application, died intestate.
5. On May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, et. al., through
their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a motion
with the court, praying for the probate of the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein
most of his property was given as a legacy to said
 Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the
legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas.
6. On August 8, the attesting witnesses had assured
that the supposed will had not been executed by
decedent Francisco Villegas in accordance with
law.
7. The court ordered the presentation of the
supposed will mentioned. However, Justina
Mendieta stated that she did have any knowledge
of the supposed will mentioned, but stated that she
knew of a will that decedent signed on January 18,
1924, at her request and inducement in order that
her children begotten by him might have a share in
his estate, as said deceased did in fact sign said
will only in my presence and compelled by the
pressure exerted by me and for my aforesaid
children.
8. On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, together
with her children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria
Mendieta, filed another application for the probate
of the same will through their attorneys, Messrs.
Azada and Veluz.
9. When the case was filed on October 24, 1924, for
the continuation of the trial, Justina Mendieta, for
herself and in her capacity as guardian ad litem of
her minor children, on the one hand, and Laureana
Hidalgo, on the other, submitted to the court an
agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that
she withdrew her application for the probate of the
supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the probate of said will, and consequently,
she prayed that said will be held not allowable to
probate and that the deceased died intestate,
without leaving any more heirs than his legitimate
wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous
children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that the
property of the deceased be distributed in
accordance with said agreement.
10. By an order dated October 25, 1924, the court
approved said stipulation and rendered judgment,
holding that the supposed will of Francisco
Villegas could not be probated, and awarding to
the heirs of the deceased the estate left by
Francisco Villegas in accordance with said
agreement. From this order no appeal has been
taken.
11. On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who
claimed to be first cousin of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new
application for the probate of the same supposed
will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
Issue
1. WON the new application for probate of
decedent’s supposed will should be granted. No.
Held
NO. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over
all the persons interested through the publication of the
notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding
against all of them.

All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if

any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied
with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal
to correct any injustice that might have been committed,
and cannot now through the special remedy of
mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a
new application for the probate of the same will in order
to compel the respondent judge to comply with his
ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being
extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of
error (26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when
the parties interested have agreed to disregard the
testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they
pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him
24 RIERA v. PALMAROLI (1919)
Rule 76 | ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF
WILLS
J. STREET
Summary
1. When Juan Pons died in Manila, Petitioner (widow
of Juan) was living in Spain. Thus, she only
learned about the probate proceedings more than
6 months later. She filed a case for the rehearing
of the probate of the will of the deceased
contending that she was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard during the proceedings by
reasons out of her control, but the same was
denied by the CFI because more than 6 months
had passed since the entry of the order of probate.
2. Issue: W/N a rehearing of the probate of a will can
be ordered on the grounds that a party interested
in the estate of the deceased was prevented from
participating and that the will did not adhere the
formalities required by law.
3. NO. The Supreme Court will not entertain a
petition filed under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to set aside a judgment and obtain a
new trial in CFI where the latter court can still grant
relief upon the same state of facts under section
113. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
depends upon the lack of remedy in the CFI.
4. The SC may have the power to set aside any
judgment, order or proceeding under Sec. 113
however under Sec. 513 this power is limited to
granting a new trial upon judgments rendered
upon default. The default intended here can only
arise in contentious litigations where a party has
been impleaded as a defendant and served with
process but fails to appear or to answer.
5. The proceeding to probate a will is NOT a
contentious litigation because nobody is
impleaded or served with process. It is a special
proceeding, and although notice of the application
is published, nobody is bound to appear and no
order for judgment by default is ever entered.
Hence, Sec 513 has no application to the case at
bar involving the probate of a will.
Facts
1. The petitioner in this case is Antonia Riera, the
widow of deceased Juan Pons. At the time of the
death of her husband in Manila, the petitioner was
living in Spain. The respondent is Vicente
Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the
Philippines, who applied for the probate of the
purported will of the deceased.
2. In May 1918, an order was entered admitting the
will of Juan to probate. The will apparently
contained provisions which essentially deprived
the petitioner of any participation in her husband’s
estate. However, because of the distance between
the Spain and Manila, petitioner only learned
about the probate proceedings regarding her
husband’s will a little more than six (6) months
later, on November 1918.
 3. As early as June 1918, petitioner had learned
about her husband’s death, prompting her to send
communications to her lawyers in Manila to look
after her interests in the estate of the deceased.
Upon the belated receipt of said message due to
the means of communication at the time (the
lawyers only received the communication towards
the end of November 1918), the lawyers appeared
in the CFI in behalf of the petitioner to allow the
petitioner to enter opposition. This, however, was
denied by the CFI on the ground that more than
six (6) months had elapsed since the date of the
order of probate.
4. Thus, petitioner brought the case to the Supreme
Court under Section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure praying for the rehearing of the probate
of her husband’s will with the contention that as a
party interested in the estate, she is entitled to be
heard in the probate proceedings. She argued that
the will was not in conformity with the formalities
prescribed by law and that she was prevented
from appearing and contesting the original probate
proceedings because of circumstances over which
she had no control, i.e. the late arrival of
communications and the distance between Spain
and Manila.
Issue
W/N a rehearing of the probate of a will can be ordered
on the grounds that a party interested in the estate of the
deceased was prevented from participating and that the
will did not adhere the formalities required by law.
- NO
Held
1. The relevant provisions of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure are as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a
judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was
taken.
SEC. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a CFI upon
default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a
hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, and the CFI which rendered the judgment
has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists
in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may
present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty
days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have such judgment set aside. . . .
2. The Supreme Court will not entertain a petition
filed under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to set aside a judgment and obtain a
new trial in CFI where the latter court can still grant
relief upon the same state of facts under section
113. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
depends upon the lack of remedy in the CFI.
3. When, however, the CFI has, by the expiration of Instance for relief under section 113. Even
six months, lost the power to relieve from its own assuming that she could have procured the
judgment under section 113, the remedy conceded disallowance of the will by either of those methods,
by section 513 to the Supreme Court may be it is obvious that the impossibility of her thus
resorted to, under the conditions stated in that obtaining relief was due to circumstances peculiar
section; and apart from the restriction that the to this case; and the possibility of occasional
petition shall be filed within sixty days after the hardship cannot affect the validity of our procedure
party aggrieved first learns of the rendition of the for the probate of wills.
judgment, there is no positive limitation as to the 7. The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due
time within which the petition may be filed in the execution, in no way involves the intrinsic validity
Supreme Court. of its provisions. In the case at bar, if it should
4. The SC may have the power to set aside any appear later upon the distribution of the estate of
judgment, order or proceeding under Sec. 113 Juan Pons that any provision in the will is contrary
however under Sec. 513 this power is limited to to law then the law will prevail. The widow can
granting a new trial upon judgments rendered then go to court at the proper juncture and discuss
upon default. The default intended here can only the question of the validity of the will as it affects
arise in contentious litigations where a party has her interests adversely.
been impleaded as a defendant and served with
process but fails to appear or to answer.
5. The proceeding to probate a will is NOT a
contentious litigation because nobody is
impleaded or served with process. It is a special
proceeding, and although notice of the application
is published, nobody is bound to appear and no
order for judgment by default is ever entered.
Hence, Sec 513 has no application to the case at
bar involving the probate of a will.
6. As a result of this decision it cannot be denied
that, without any fault on the part of the petitioner
or her attorneys, she has been deprived not only
of the opportunity of opposing the will and
appealing from the order of probate but also of the
opportunity of applying to the Court of First
25. Manahan v. Manahan (1969)
Rule 76 | Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Imperial, J.
Summary
1. Tiburcia, niece of the decedent, instituted the
special proceedings for the probate of the will of
Donata. Engracia. sister of the decedent, failed to
file an opposition during the pendency of the
proceedings. The trial court admitted the will to
probate. One year and seven months after
Engracia filed a motion for reconsideration
because of the failure of the court to notify her
regarding the proceeding. She also claims the the
court erred in admitting the will because of its
external formalities.
2. WON Engracia is an interested party.
NO. Engracia was not an interested party because she
failed to file an opposition an opposition to the petition for
the probate thereof. Therefore she was not entitled to
notification of the probate of the will and neither had she
right to expect it.
WON the court erred in admitting the will because of its
external formalities.
NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to
probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no
more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and
it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized
by law, except fraud, in any separate of independent
action or proceeding.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Tiburcia Manahan is the niece of the
decedent who instituted the spec pro for the
probate of the will of her auntie while Engracia,
sister of the decedent, was the one opposing the
probate of the will.
2. (Antecedents) – Tiburcia Manahan instituted spec
proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan. Tiburcia is the niece
of the testatrix and was named the executrix in
said will after it was duly probated. One year and
seven months later. the Engracia Manahan filed a
motion for reconsideration and a net trial, praying
that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null
and void ab initio. The trial court denied the
motion.
3. Engracia claims that contrary to the ruling of the
lower court, (1) she was an interested party in the
 testamentary proceedings and, as such, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will; and (2) that the court did not
really probate the will and limited itself to
decreeing its authentication.
Issue
WON Engracia is an interested party. NO.
WON the trial court did not really probate the will. NO
WON the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that
the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with in the execution
thereof.
NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to
probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no
more be raised on appeal.
Held
1. WON Engracia is an interested party.
NO. Engracia was not an interested party because she
failed to file an opposition an opposition to the petition for
the probate thereof. Therefore she was not entitled to
notification of the probate of the will and neither had she
right to expect it. Her allegation that had the status of an
heir being the deceased’s sister, did not confer on her the
right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died
leaving a will in which Engracia has not been instituted
heir. She is not also a forced heir of the deceased
2. WON the trial court did not really probate the will.
NO. The court really decrees the authentication and
probate of the will in question, which is the only
pronouncement of the trial court by the law, in order that
the will may be considered valid and duly executed in
accordance with the law.
In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no
essential difference between the authentication of a will
and the probate thereof. The words authentication and
probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires
is that the competent court declare that in the execution
of the will the essential formalities have been complied
with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is
valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
3. WON the will is null and void ab initio on the ground
that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the
execution thereof.
NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to
probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no
more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and
it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized
by law, except fraud, in any separate of independent
action or proceeding.

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant

herein from successfully maintaining the present action
and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a
testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive
against her
RULE 77 – ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
01 SUNTAY v. SUNTAY (1954)
Rule 77 | Allowance of Will Proved Outside Ph
J. Padilla
Summary
1. Jose Suntay is a Filipino citizen and resident
of the country who died in China. He left real and
personal properties in the Philippines and a house
in China. During his lifetime, he was married twice.
He had 9 children in the first marriage and a child
named Silvino in the second marriage with Maria
Natividad who survived him.
Intestate proceeding was held in the CFI of Bulacan and
Federico (son from the 1st marriage) was named
administrator. Afterwards, the surviving widow filed a
petition in the court for the probate of a last will and
testament claimed to have been executed and assigned
in the Philippines in November 1929. This petition was
denied because of the loss of the RP will and the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss. An
appeal was taken and the SC held the evidence before
the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the CFI of Bulacan for further
proceedings.
In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
liberation, Silvino claimed that he found a will and
testament in Chinese characters executed by his father in
China on 4 January 1931. He also claimed that the same
was filed, recorded and probated in the China. He then
filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4 January 1931.
2. Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China
can still be validly probated in the Philippines –
NO.
3. In this case, it was not proven that the municipal
district court of Amoy, China is a probate court.
The law of China on procedure in the probate or
allowance of wills was also not proven. Absent
these 2 requisites, the will executed in China may
not be probated in this country.
Facts
Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the
Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province,
Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in
the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province,
China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepción, Angel,
Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano and Jose, Jr.
and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had
with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
 In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files,
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
records and documents of his late father a will and
Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by
after hearing letters of administration were issued to
the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was
Apolonio Suntay. After the latted's death Federico C.
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition
in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the
will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of
On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a 1931.
last will and testament claimed to have been executed
and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the Issue
late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of
Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still
the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and
be validly probated in the Philippines – NO.
before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Held
The China will may be probated if the following requisites
are established:
An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate
of the will and this Court held the evidence before the
probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
a) The fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of
court. In the absence of proof that the municipal
Bulacan for further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of
district court of Amoy, China is a probate court and on
the fact that a commission from the probate court was
the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it
issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of
may be presumed that the proceedings in the manner
Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February
of probate or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are
1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance
the same as those provided in our laws. It is a
of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
surviving widow and dismissed the petition.
proceedings, personal notice or by publication, or both
to all interested parties must be made.
b) The laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Where it appears that the
proceedings in the court of a foreign country were
held for the purpose of taking the testimony of 2
attesting witnesses to the will and the order for the
probate court did not purport to allow the will, the
proceedings cannot be deemed to be for the probate
of a will, as it was not done in accordance with the
basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.

Since these requisites were not met and proven in this

case, the will executed in China may not be probated in
the Philippines.
02 Fluemer v. Hix (1930)
Rule 77 | Rule on Allowance of Will Proved Outside of
the Philippines
Ponente J. Malcolm
Summary
1. Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of
Edward Hix, alleging that Edward Hix resided in
West Virginia, and that the laws of that jurisdiction
govern. He submitted an excerpt of the West
Virginia Code. CFI denied probate of the will.
2. WON the will should be allowed for probate
3. NO. First, the requirements of the law was not
complied with. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction
must be proved as facts. There was no showing
that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia. Nor was the extract from
the law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under the seal of the
State of West Virginia. No evidence was
introduced to show that the extract from the laws
of West Virginia was in force at the time the
alleged will was executed. Second, the due
execution of the will was not established.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case is the
special administrator of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix, and the respondents is the ex-wife
of the deceased.
2. (Antecedents) – Petitioner alleged that the will
was executed in Elkins, West Virginia by Edward
Hix, who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and
that the laws of West Virginia govern. He
submitted a copy of part of the law as found in the
West Virginia Code, as certified to by the Director
of the National Library. CFI denied the probate of
the last will and testament of the deceased. While
the appeal was pending submission in this court,
the attorney for the appellant presented an
unverified petition asking the court to accept as
part of the evidence the documents attached to the
petition. One of these documents discloses that a
paper writing purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased, was presented for
probate to the clerk in Virginia, and was proven by
the oaths of the subscribing witnesses. Also
another document showed that the Clerk of court
appointed an administration. Application for
probate was filed first in the Philippines.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – CFI
denied the probate of the document alleged to be
the last will and testament of the deceased, thus
the special administrator of the estate appealed.
Issue
1. WON the will should be allowed for probate
Held Lastly, no attempt has been made to comply with the
Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of
1. NO. First, the requirements of the law was not
the allowance of a will said to have been proved and
complied with. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not
allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various States of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
There was no showing that the book from which an
extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of
the State of West Virginia. No evidence was
introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed.

Second, the due execution of the will was not

established. The only evidence on this point is to be
found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this,
there was nothing to indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed
the will in the presence of the testator and of each other
as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without
the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means.
03 MICIANO v. BRIMO (1924)
Rule 77 | Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
Philippines
Ponente J. Romualdez
Summary
1. Joseph Brimo’s (Turkish citizen) will provides that
his Philippine estate be disposed of in accordance
with the Philippine Law. The testator further
provided that whoever fails to comply with this
request would forfeit his inheritance. The Appellant
(Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s
partition scheme of the estate which denies his
participation in the inheritance.
2. Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the
basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estate.
3. The provision of a foreigner's will that his
properties shall be distributed according to
Philippine law and not his national law is an
impossible condition and is considered as not
imposed, because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when according to the Civil
Code, such national law of the testator is the one
to govern his testamentary dispositions. Testator’s
estate shall be distributed according to his national
(Turkish) law.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner Juan Miciano is the
administrator of Joseph Brimo’s estate, while
Opponent-Appellant Andre Brimo is one of the
brothers of the testator.
2. (Antecedents) – Miciano, judicial administrator of
this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
oppositor alleged the following errors:
a. Approval of the scheme
b. Denial of his participation in the inheritance
c. Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition
d. Declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme until the
receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
Issue
1. Whether Turkish Law or Philippine Law should
govern.
a. Turkish Law should govern.
2. Whether the partition of the administrator is valid.
 a. Yes.
Held However, the oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
1. Whether Turkish Law or Philippine Law should
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
govern.
evidence showing that the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and such absence of evidence, it is presumed to
be the same of those of the PH.
Turkish Law should govern. Article 10 of the Civil Code
provides:
No evidence in record that the national law of the testator
Joseph was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force,
respect to the order of succession as well as to the must be complied with and executed.
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated."

2. Whether the partition is valid (despite the CC

provision stating the testator’s national law should
govern).

Yes, partition is valid. The opposition is based on the fact

that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions
of Joseph’s will which are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality, for which they are void as being
in violation of the Civil Code.
04 LEON & GHEZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE
INSURANCE (1951)
Rule 77 | Allowance of Will Proved Outside PH
Ponente J. Tuason
Summary
4. Basil Butler, a former PH resident, died in New
York. He left a will w/c provided for a devisee
(“Residuary Clause”) in favor of Mercedes de Leon
(PH resident). It also provided that all the
properties to be delivered to Mercedes is to be
held in trust and administered for her benefit by
Butler’s 3 executors at their absolute discretion
(appointed by the NY Court). In case the amount
available for the bequest is sufficient to buy an
adequate annuity, the executors in their discretion
may do so.
5. With the beneficiary’s consent, executors bought
an annuity from the Manufacturers Life Insurance
Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada. Contract
stipulated a monthly payment of $57.60 to
Mercedes during her lifetime (w/c she was actually
Facts
receiving). But Mercedes apparently wants to get
the entire amount all at once. So she presented
Butler’s will for probate in the CFI Manila w/c then
appointed Ada Ghezzi as administratrix.
6. Ghezzi filed a motion praying for the citation of the
Manager of the Manila Branch of the Insurance
company to appear and render a complete
accounting of certain funds of the estate allegedly
held by the Manila Branch. It was denied by the
lower court.
7. WON CFI manila has authority/jurisdiction with
respect to the funds involved.
8. NO. Following Sec. 4, R. 78, ROC, the general
rule is that administration extends only to the
assets of a decedent found within the state/country
where it was granted. The administrator appointed
in one state/country has no power over the
property in another state/country. Neither the
domiciliary (New York) or ancillary (Philippines)
executor of Butler’s will, nor the trustee, nor the
annuitant has the power to dispose of any of the
funds beyond the amounts agreed upon in the
contract.
9. In this case, the subject funds are outside of the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Since it
was invested as annuity in Canada, under a
contract executed in that State, Canada is the
situs of the money.
1. Basil Gordon Butler was a former resident of the
Philippines. He died in Brooklyn, New York. He left
a will w/c was duly probated in the Surrogate’s
Court of NY that same year. James Ross Sr.,
James Ross Jr. and Ewald Selph were named
 executors. Since the estate have been settled,
proceedings were closed in 1947.
2. Butler’s will contained a “Residuary Clause” w/c
provided a devisee named Mercedes de Leon of
Caloocan. It also provided that all the properties to
be delivered to her is to be held in trust and
administered for her benefit/advantage by Butler’s
3 executors at their absolute discretion. Further,
the clause said that in case the amount available
for the bequest is sufficient to buy an adequate
annuity, the executors in their discretion may do
so. To carry out this testamentary provision,
James Ross Jr. was appointed as trustee by the
NY Court.
3. With the beneficiary’s consent, Ross Jr. bought an
annuity from the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.
at its head office in Toronto, Canada. He paid
$17,091.03 in advance as premium. Contract
stipulated for a monthly payment of $57.60 to
Mercedes during her lifetime. Thus, since 1948,
Mercedes was receiving monthly allowance
through the Manila office of the Insurance
company.
4. But Mercedes apparently wants to get the entire
amount at once. So she presented Butler’s will for
probate in the CFI Manila w/c then appointed Ada
Ghezzi as administratrix.
5. Ada Ghezzi filed a motion praying for the citation
of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the
Insurance company to appear and render a
complete accounting of certain funds that said
branch allegedly possesses money belonging to
the estate. CFI denied this motion.
Issue
3. WON CFI manila has authority/jurisdiction with
respect to the funds involved (w/c was invested as
annuity with the Insurance Company in Toronto,
Canada).
a. No.
Held
3. WON CFI manila has authority/jurisdiction with
respect to the funds involved
NO. Following Sec. 4, R. 78, ROC, general rule is that
administration extends only to the assets of a decedent
found within the state/country where it was granted. The
administrator appointed in one state/country has no
power over the property in another state/country. Neither
the domiciliary (New York) or ancillary (Philippines)
executor of Butler’s will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant
has the power to dispose of any of the funds beyond the
amounts agreed upon in the contract.
In this case, the subject funds are outside of the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Since it was
invested as annuity in Canada, under a contract executed
in that State, Canada is the situs of the money.

The party whom Ada Ghezzi seeks is only a branch of

the company w/c actually has the funds in its possession.
The Manila branch’s participation is only limited to
delivering to Mercedes the checks issued by the home
office in Canada. There is no showing that the funds have
been transferred to the Manila Branch.

Besides, even if the money were in the hands of the

Manila Branch, said funds no longer form part of Butler’s
estate so it is beyond the control of the court. By
investing the funds, it has completely passed in to the
hands of the Insurance Company in Canada by virtue of
a contract. It cannot be withdraws without the company’s
consent except upon the death of Mercedes (annuitant).
 01 GUERRERO v. TERAN (1909)
Rule 78-85, 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
1. In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the
estate. In 1902, Maria Muñoz was appointed
guardian of minors; from this date therefore, with
respect to the interests of the minors in the estate,
Maria Muñoz was in charge of its administration and
not Teran. In 1906, the Court revoked the
appointment of Maria Muñoz as guardian because
she was not a Philippine resident.
2. WON the revocation of Maria Muñoz as guardian
was proper.
3. YES. When this case was promulgated, there was
no rule yet that non-residents should not be allowed
as administrators or guardians. However, the Court
still held that they should disallow appointments of
non-residents as administrators or guardians
because the courts will find it difficult to fulfil their
duty of protecting estates of deceased persons and
wards of the estate if the administrators and
guardians are not personally subject to their
jurisdiction.
4. (There’s another issue but it’s not the relevant
syllabus issue. If you wanna read it, it’s issue #2
and held #2).
Facts
1. Guerrero, the plaintiff in this case, is the current
guardian of the minors Manuela and Del Carmen
Muñoz. Teran, the defendant in this case, is the
administrator of the estate of Antonio Muñoz.
2. In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the
estate of Antonio Muñoz.
3. In 1902, Maria Muñoz was appointed as guardian
of minors Manuela and Del Carmen Muñoz.
4. While Teran acted as administrator of the estate
after the appointment of Maria Muñoz as guardian,
the fact exists and must be accepted as true that
Maria Muñoz was the actual representative of the
minors in the administration of their interests in the
estate, and thus must be responsible for the
property belonging to such minors.
5. In 1906, CFI Albay removed Maria Muñoz as the
guardian of the minors because she was not a
resident of the Philippines at the time of her
appointment in 1902. CFI Albay appointed Samson
as provisional guardian instead.
6. From the order of CFI Albay annulling her
appointment as guardian, Maria Muñoz appealed to
the Supreme Court. However, she subsequently
withdrew her appeal, making the annulment of her
appointment final.
7. In 1906, Guerrero was appointed as guardian of the
minors.
8. Guerrero is now claiming to recover P4,000 from
Teran on the theory that Teran was the
administrator of the estate from 1901 until 1906.
Issue
1. WON Maria Muñoz was properly removed as guardian.
a. YES. Even if there was no statutory rule on the
residence of guardianship at this time, the Court
 justified that non-residents should not be
appointed as guardians.
b. MAIN ISSUE
2. WON Teran is liable to Guerrero.
a. NO. Records failed to show that any of the
amounts claimed by Guerrero was a result of
Teran’s management in 1901-1902.
b. NOT the main issue
Held
1. WON Maria Muñoz was properly removed as
guardian.
YES. Doña Maria Munoz y Gomez was, as above
indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment
was void because she did not reside in the Philippine
Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the
courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there
are no statutory requirements upon this question, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the
estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will
find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should
not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
. unsuitable to administrate and in these cases, the
2. WON Teran is liable to Guerrero.
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 2 is special.
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed
by the Plaintiff were due as a result of the management of
the said estate during the time while the said Defendant
was administering their interests therein (from 1901 to
1902, when the minors did not have a guardian yet),
except the sum of P188. 39, admitted to be due by the
Defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the only
amount which the Plaintiff is entitled to recover in this
action is the said amount of P188. 39.
02 NAVAS v. GARCIA (1923)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Summary (Extremely Short Case)
5. Appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased,
hence the first in the preference provided in the
ROC, however the lower court gave the
administrative rights to a certain Garcia. The case
did not provide Garcia’s relation to the deceased.
6. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
7. No, Nava was proven to have had adverse interests
in the estate. The court may determine whether or
not the person next in the order is incompetent or
court may assign another person it deems suitable.
Adverse interest may be seen in the hostility of the
 potential administrator with the other persons
interested in the estate.
Facts
9. (Parties) – Appellant in this case is the surviving
spouse of the deceased while appellee is the
appointed administrator of the estate of the
deceased Geronima Uy Coque.
10. (Antecedents) – Appellant maintains that the court
erred in not appointing him administrator instead of
Jose Garcia. (Ito lang talaga yung background facts
hehe promise)
11. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
Appellant wants to be administrator of the estate.
Issue
3. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
Ruling
4. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the
preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate, but if the person enjoying
such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another. This determination rests on the sound
discretion of the court and this judgement will not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively
that the court below was in error.
It was indicated in the records that appellant had
adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to
render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness
may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility
to those immediately interested in the estate.
.
03 Mercado v. Vda de Jaen
Rule 78 | Letters Testemantary and Administration,
When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Diaz
Facts
12. (Parties) - Gorordo is a retired bishop of Cebu.
When he died he left a will naming his heirs and
executor. The respondent De Jean is the sister of
Gorodo who is named as universal heirs including
his nieces, Telesfora and Cesorea Gorordo . The
petitioner Fr Mercado was named in the will as the
executor and in his absence, Fr. Espina (Mercado
being the parish priest in San Nicolas, Cebu and
Espina being the parish priest in Cebu Central).
13. (Antecedents) The will was submitted for probate
before the CFI Cebu. It was allowed and duly
probated. Fr. Mercado, as the executor named in
the will, was confirmed by CFI Cebu and he filed a
bond of 5000. The Heirs opposed the order
appointing Fr Mercado as executor and prayed for
suspension of said order.
 The heirs alleged that even if Fr. Mercado is named
as executor in the will, there is no need to appoint
him because the heirs are already of age and the
estate has no debts. Mercado is also incapable as
executor because he is partial since his parish, San
Nicolas was named as one of the legatees in the
will.
14. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) - WON the
court is bound to appoint Mercado as executor
since he is the named executor in the will.
Issue
5. WON the court is bound to appoint Mercado as
executor since he is the named executor in the
will.
Held
1. Yes. Under Section 641 of Act no. 190 (An Act
Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Action and
Special Proceedings in the Phil now Section 4,
Rule 78), once a will is probated, the court is bound
to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
so named as executor of the will provided he
accepts the trust and files the required bond. While
it may be true that such should not be strictly
interpreted, for the court may be deprived of its
power to appoint another should the executor so
named is incapacitated, it is also true that incapacity
must be manifest and real and not merely
imaginary. Fr. Mercado was found to be fit as an
executor for the estate. He further alleged that the
parish of San Nicolas is not the legatee but the poor
people of San Nicolas. When Gorordo chose
Mercado as executor of his estate after his death,
he must have had good and sufficient reasons and
as such, his will must be respected.
04 Ozaeta v. Pecson (1953)
Rule 78 | Letters Testamentary and of Administration,
Executors, Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Labrador
Summary
8. (Short Facts) Carlos Palanca died leaving a will
where he named Petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as
executor. Upon Palanca’s death, petitioner
presented a petition for the probate of the will with
a prayer that he be appointed special administrator.
Some of decedent’s heirs oppose the petition. The
court appointed Phil. Trust Company as special
administrator, which later presented a petition to
resign as such. The court then appointed Sebastian
Palanca. However, it reconsidered its order
appointing Sebastian Palanca as special
administrator and appointed BPI instead. It held
that it has the discretion to choose the special
administrator and is not bound to appoint the
person named in the will as executor because the
order had been appealed.
9. (Short Issue) WON the probate court erred in
appointing as special administrator a person other
than the executor named in the probated will even
if its order of probate is on appeal – YES
10. (Short Held) When a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the probate court to issue
letters testamentary to the person named as
executor in the will upon the latter's application,
even if the order of probate is on appeal.
Facts
15. (Parties) – The petitioner is former SC Associate
Justice Ramon Ozaeta & other heirs of Carlos
Palanca, and the respondents are Hon. Judge
Pecson of CFI Manila & BPI.
16. (Antecedents) – Carlos Palanca died leaving a will.
The will named petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as
executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify.
Upon Palanca’s death (with Gen. Roxas having
predeceased him), petitioner presented a petition
for the probate of the will, at the same time praying
that he be appointed special administrator.
Some of the decedent’s heirs opposed this petition,
and the court on October 6, 1950, appointed as
special administrator Philippine Trust Company, a
non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings.
Philippine Trust Company presented a petition to
resign as special administrator on the ground of
incompatibility of interest since it had granted a loan
to heir Angel Palanca, who had pledged to it shares
of the FEU allegedly belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
On June 30, 1951, the court appointed Sebastian
Palanca, one of the heirs, to take the place of
Philippine Trust Company. But on Oct. 23, it
rendered another order admitting the will to probate
and appointing petitioner as administrator.
17. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – On Oct.
25, the court allowed the Philippine Trust Company
to resign, reconsidered its order appointing
Sebastian Palanca special administrator, and
appointed BPI instead. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the order, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition was filed.
In its order the court held that it has discretion to
choose the special administrator and is not bound
to appoint the person named therein as executor,
because the order had been appealed.
Issue
Does a probate court commit an abuse of discretion if,
pending an appeal against its order of probate of a will, it
appoints as special administrator any person other than
the executor named in said will? YES.
Held
Yes. When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the
duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor in the will upon the latter's
application, even if the order of probate is on appeal.
Mandamus lies to compel such appointment.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of
his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence,
one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the
disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as
the rights granted by will take effect from the time of his
death, the management of his estate by the administrator
of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when
no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can
be interposed any longer.
It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as
the question as to his peculiar fitness for such a position
or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be
addressed to the discretion of the county judge.
In the case at bar, the will has already been probated, and
respondent judge himself has expressly appointed
petitioner as administrator. Philippine Trust Company,
which had acted as special administrator, has submitted a
bill for P90,000 – this expensive cost of administration
would cut deep in the income of the estate. If BPI would
be the special administrator, it is not improbable that the
estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost
of administration. It would seem unreasonable to refuse to
appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so
would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the
testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary
expense.
05 De Guzman v. Limcolioc (1939)
Rule 78 – 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Villareal
Summary
11. The CFI Rizal ordered that Apolinario De Guzman,
the son of the decedent, was appointed as the co-
administrator of his father’s estate, together with his
sister, Nicolasa. His father’s wife by a second
marriage opposed the court’s decision
12. Issue: WON the court erred in appointing Apolinario
De Guzman as the administrator
13. No. It did not appear that the said court committed
grave abuse of discretion. Apolinario has a greater
share than that of the oppositor, the childless widow
of the deceased by a second marriage, and that he
will only act as a helper of his sister in administering
the estate. It is also discretionary on the part of the
court to determine who should be appointed as an
administrator.
Facts
18. (Parties) – Petitioner – Nicolasa De Guzman,
daughter of the deceased (also mentioned is
Apolinario, his brother); Respondent – Angela
Limcolioc – wife of the deceased by a second
marriage
19. (Antecedents) – In a judgment, CFI Rizal
appointed Apolinario de Guzman as a co-
administrator. In its decision, it stated that although
there’s a preference over the surviving spouse to
administer the deceased spouse’s estate, the rule
is not absolute. It stated that “But this preference
 established by law is not absolute, if there are other
reasons justifying the appointment of an
administrator other than the surviving spouse. If the
interest in the estate is what principally determines
the preference in .the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
and if, under the circumstances of each case, it
develops that there is another who has more
interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor falls to
the ground."
In the case at bar, Apolinario, the son, has a larger
share than the oppositor and that he would merely
help her sister administer the estate, which consists
mostly of fisheries situated in the provinces.
Although the father filed a complaint against him
during his lifetime for misappropriation, the
complaint was dismissed at the instance of the
father himself.
20. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – This is
an appeal by the respondent-appellant to the
decision of the court in appointing Apolinario de
Guzman as the co-administrator of the decedent’s
estate.
Issue
WON the court gravely abused its discretion in appointing
Apolinario as co-administrator – No.
Held
No. In the present case, aside from the fact that Apolinario
de Guzman, as co-administrator, will administer properties
in which he has a greater share than that of the oppositor,
the childless widow of the deceased by a second marriage,
and will act merely as a helper of his sister, there is no
ground to believe that he would squander said properties
and the products thereof.
The lower court having been of the opinion that Apolinario
de Guzman deserves the appointment of co-administrator,
and it being discretionary on its part to determine who
should be appointed administrator of the properties of a
deceased person, the Court believes it is unjustified for it
to meddle in the exercise of such discretion, it not
appearing that said court has committed a grave abuse
thereof.
06 GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (1990)
Rule 82 | Revocation of Administration, Death,
Resignation, and Removal of Executors or
Administrators
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
14. Facts: Petitioner and respondent were co-
administrators of the estate. When petitioner left for the
US for the medical treatment of her husband,
respondent filed for petitioner’s removal which was
granted. Petitioner contends that her removal was
improper because it was not anchored on the grounds
provided under Section 2, Rule 82 of ROC.
15. (Short Issue): WON the removal of petitioner was
proper?
16. (Short Held): No, the removal was improper. In the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. Administrators have such
an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them
to protection from removal without just cause. While it
is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however
must have some fact legally before it in order to justify
a removal. In the present case, the court a quo did not
base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix
on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion
for relief of the petitioner. For mere disagreements
between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct,
one's removal is not favored. Moreover, , temporary
absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. Finally, the removal of an
administrator does not he on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor
on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly
and efficient administration. As the appointment of
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no
satisfactory cause for her removal was shown,
Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of
said estate.
Facts
(Parties)
21. The petitioner in this case is the removed co-
administratix and heir, Beatriz F. Gonzales,
22. the respondents are Hon Zoilo Aguinaldo, and
Teresa F. Olbes, co-administratix and heir.
(Antecedents)
1. Spec. Pro. No. 021, pending before the court a quo is
an intestate proceeding involving the estate of the
deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis who
is survived by her four (4) children who are her only
heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales,
Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
2. The court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-
administratrices of the estate.
3. While petitioner Beatriz was in the US to accompany
her husband for his medical treatment, private
respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, which the
respondent judge granted. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues)
1. Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent
Judge's Order should be nullified on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not
shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the
grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, ROC.
Issue
6. WON the removal of petitioner Beatriz as co-
adminstratrix is proper?
Held
NO. The removal was improper.
3. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of
a deceased person, the principal consideration
 reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
4. Administrators have such an interest in the execution
of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
5. While it is conceded that the court is invested with
ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it
however must have some fact legally before it in order
to justify a removal.
6. In the present case, the court a quo did not base the
removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on any of
the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of
the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the
validity of the charges brought against petitioner by
respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of the
petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the
estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed
between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes
which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the
added circumstance that petitioner had been absent
from the country since October 1984, and up to 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order.
7. The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that
the conflict and disharmony between the 2 co-
administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or
that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management
of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or
any other act or omission showing that her continuance
as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers
the interests of the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the
other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly
administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs;
and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has
prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant
the probate court into removing petitioner as co-
administratrix.
8. Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country.
petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-
administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in
the fulfillment of her duties. Suffice it to state,
temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one
to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re
Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the
state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the
executors' family, is not such a removal from the state
as to necessitate his removal as executor.
9. the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of
the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased
(Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have
opposed the retention or re-appointment of petitioner
as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that
 the removal of an administrator does not he on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court
that it would result in orderly and efficient
administration.
10. Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of
said estate.
07 Johannes v. Harvey
Rule 78 | Executor and Administrator
Ponente J. Malcolm
Summary
17. (Short Facts) – Carmen died in Singapore. Her
husband B.E. was named the administrator of her
Singapore property while her brother Alfred was
named the administrator of her Manila property.
The husband questions the need of another
administrator in Manila.
18. (Short (Short Issue) - WON an administrator in
Manila was still necessary – YES.
19. (Held) – When a person has property in two or more
countries, a different administrator is needed in
each country. This is because any powers of
administration given in one country is limited only to
property located in said country.
Facts
23. (Parties) – Petitioners = B.E. Johannes,
administrator and husband of deceased Carmen
Johannes, 2 of the decedent’s siblings;
Respondents = Judge Harvey of CFI Manila and
Alfred D’Almeida
24. (Antecedents) – Carmen Johannes died intestate
in Singapore. Her heirs were her husband, B.E.
Johannes, 2 siblings also living in Singapore, and
Alfred D’Almeida, her only sibling who lived in
Manila. Her husband was named the administrator
of her property in Singapore while her brother
Alfred, through his petition, was named the
administrator of her property in Manila by Judge
Harvey.
25. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
husband says the appointment of an administrator
in Manila is unnecessary because he was already
appointed the administrator in Singapore.
Issue
7. WON an administrator in Manila was still necessary –
YES.
Held
1. It is often necessary to have more than one
administrator of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in
a foreign country, administration is to be held in both
countries. A grant of administration does not have any
effect beyond the limit of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, even though the husband was declared the
administrator of the Singapore property, he had no
administration powers over the Manila property since the
latter property was located in another country.
 08 GUTIERREZ DE OCAMPO v CALDERON (1934)
Rule 87 | Actions By and Against Executors and
Administrators
Ponente: J. Goddard
Summary
20. Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at the time he
made his will was residing temporarily in France
and that at the time of his death he left no
ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of Dr. Calderon The
appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of
the deceased and have filed an opposition to the
project of partition of their deceased brother
Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention.
The beneficiaries of Calderon are his illegitimate
children.
21. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants
to intervene.
22. No. It must be noted that the appellants are not the
deceased’s forced heirs. As such, they have no
right to any part of the property left by the testator,
once he had disposed of the same by will. Only
forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced
have a right to intervene in a case of this character.
Facts
26. (Parties) – Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a
bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at
the time he made his will was residing temporarily
in France and that at the time of his death he left no
ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of Dr. Calderon. The
appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of
the deceased and have filed an opposition to the
project of partition of their deceased brother
Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention.
The beneficiaries of Calderon are his illegitimate
children.
27. (Antecedents) – The CFI of Manila issued an order
of partition based from the will of Calderon. The
appellants who are siblings of the testator, sought
to intervene and oppose the approval of the project
of partition since the beneficiaries of the will are his
illegitimate children. The appellants contend that
the illegitimate children are not qualified to inherit
from the deceased. However, the CFI rejected the
opposition, stating that the siblings have no right to
intervene in the consideration of the project of
partition as well as the adjudication of the property
of Dr. Calderon.
28. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – With the
opposition being denied, the appellants appealed
before the Supreme Court.
Issue
8. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants
to intervene.
a. No.
Held
11. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants to
intervene.
No. The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela
Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate children, are
not incapacitated to take property under the will of their
father. Article 763 of the Civil Code provides that a person
who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his
property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the
deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the
property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the
same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would
be entitled to intervene in this case and protect their
interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the
will. It is evident therefore that they have not been injured
or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs
whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to
intervene in a case of this character.
09 Testate Estate of the Deceased Damasa
Crisostomo, Nazario Trillana, administrator-appellee v.
Consorcia P. Crisostomo, et al., petitioners-appellants
(1951)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Feria
Summary
1. (Short Facts) – CFI Bulacan admitted the 2nd will of
Deceased Damasa Crisostomo. The petitioners
questions the such judgment claiming that the latter
was obtained through fraud, and that the court
failed to set date for the other (1st) will (there are two
wills).
2. (Short Issue) – Was there fraud? And was there
need to set date for the 1st will?
3. (Short Held) – No fraud. It was not proven. There’s
no need to set date for the 1st will as it was revoked
by the 2nd. Besides, it would be held that the
petitioners are not interested parties which would
entitle them the right to question the probate of the
decedent’s will.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are nephews
and nieces of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo,
and the respondent is the administrator of the
Damasa’s estate.
2. (Antecedents) – According to the facts, Damasa
Crisostomo executed two wills dated August 16,
1948 and October 19, 1948. In both wills, the
testatrix left all her properties as legacies to other
persons (unidentified in the case). On January 5,
1949, CFI of Bulacan admitted to probate the will
dated October 19, 1948. The petitioners filed a
petition for relief from the judgment but was denied.
Hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court
contending that the lower court erred in denying
their petition for relief.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – They
claim that (a) the judgment admitting the will was
obtained through fraud, (b) the lower court failed to
perform its legal duty to set date for proving the will
of August 16, 1948

Issue
1. Was the judgment obtained through fraud?.
a. No. Fraud was not proven in this case.
2. Was there failure to set date for proving the will dated
August 16?
a. No. There was no need to set date because this
will was proven to be revoked by the subsequent
will dated October 19 (the one admitted to
probate by the lower court)
Held
1. Was the judgment obtained through fraud?
No. First of all, the allegation that there was fraud was
belatedly raised. It was not raised as an issue before the
lower court and in the petition for relief and so it cannot
now be raised for the first time in this appeal.
Nevertheless, fraud was not proven in this case. Hence,
we abide by the legal presumption that the court complied
with its duty and acted in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction
in probating said will. Besides, appellee's attorney, in the
statement of facts, stated that "This Honorable Court set
its hearing [of the petition for allowance of the will of
October 19, 1948] on December 2, 1948. Copy of this
order was published in a newspaper of general circulation
in Bulacan on November 5, 12 and 19 respectively, and
the corresponding notices served by the office of the Clerk
of Court, in accordance with law. And the attorneys for the
petitioners- appellant had not denied said statement.
Important pronouncement: Where a will is duly probated
after publication pursuant to 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence
of fraud, effective against any persons. The fact that an
heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make
it impossible for such party to be present at the date
appointed for the, probate of the will does not render the
order of probate void for lack of due process.
3. Was there failure to set date for proving the will dated
August 16?
No. There was no need to set date because this will was
proven to be revoked by the subsequent will dated October
19 (the one admitted to probate by the lower court). It
stands to reason that if two wills are presented for
allowance but one of them is revoked, such will cannot be
included in the probate of the other will, because it would
be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the
subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may
be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking
will is disallowed.
Lastly, the petitioners this case who merely allege that they
are nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the
deceased would have no interest in the probate of said
wills (this was not explained, but maybe because they are
not compulsory heirs hence no interest). Appellants argue
that they are in interested parties, because in the event the
will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16 is
allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared invalid
or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to
appellants. This argument has no merit. In civil actions and
special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law,
the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal
must be material and direct. The interest claimed by the
appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several
uncertain and future events.
10 Gutierrez v. Villegas (1962)
Rule 78 to Rule 85, Rule 87 | Letters Testamentary
and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Paredes
Summary
1. (Short Facts) Irene Santos died intestate, leaving
as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D.
Villegas and two nieces — Rizalina and Adela. In
an unverified manifestation signed by Adela
Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan”, Adela
manifested that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate now belong to aher sister,
Rizalina Santos-Rivera and that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings. 13 days later, she filed
verified manifestation, stating that said deed of
assignment was obtained thru fraud. Adela
presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying
that the administrator and/or his attorneys be
required to furnish her all copies of pleadings. An
opposition was interposed by the administrator,
who alleged that the movant, although originally a
party to the probate proceedings, has voluntarily
and expressly desisted from being so, and that
having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and
participations in the estate, she has no longer any
legal standing in the case.
2. (Short Issue) WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still
entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the
administrator in the probate proceedings and
orders therein issued by the lower court.
3. (Short Held) The judicial approval of the partition
on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment did
not have the effect of making the party making the
assignment lose his standing in the proceedings.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Adela
Santos Gutierrez, one of the intestate heirs of the
deceased, Irene Santos. The respondents are Jose
D. Villegas, the administrator of the estate and
Rizalina Santos Rivera, another intestate heir.
2. (Antecedents) – Irene Santos died intestate,
leaving as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose
D. Villegas and two nieces — Rizalina Santos
Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. The surviving
spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch,
a petition for Letters of Administration and was
appointed administrator of the estate. In the special
proceedings case, an unverified manifestation
signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan”, was presented to the probate court which
solemnly manifests that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate now belong to her sister,
Rizalina Santos-Rivera and that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings. 13 days later, she filed
verified manifestation, stating that the deed of
assignment was obtained thru fraud. The
 administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions
and/or objections to the Manifestation, denying the
allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Adela
presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying
that the administrator and/or his attorneys be
required to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed
or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it
appearing that the administrator presented
pleadings in Court without serving her copies
thereof. An opposition was interposed by the
administrator, who alleged that the movant,
although originally a party to the probate
proceedings, has voluntarily and expressly desisted
from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all
her rights, interests and participations in the estate,
she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
Issue
1. WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be
furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in
the probate proceedings and orders therein issued by
the lower court.
a. Yes. The judicial approval of the partition on the
basis of the alleged deed of assignment did not
have the effect of making the party making the
assignment lose his standing in the
proceedings.
Held
1. WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be
furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in
the probate proceedings and orders therein issued by
the lower court.
YES. Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to
the proceedings. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate,
it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos.
While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it
is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled,
which action is now pending before the Rizal CFI, Pasig
Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping
herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the
supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the
probate Court. No serious argument can be offered to
deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under
probate. It appearing that the transaction is in the nature
of extra- judicial partition, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of
assignment and desistance, Also, it could not divest the
Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction
by the mere fact of dividing and distributing extrajudicially
the estate of the deceased among themselves. But even if
the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of
the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does
not lose her standing in the probate court.
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator
and Rizalina, if they are required to furnish copies of their
pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so, will give
appellee her day in court and provide protection to the
administrator himself.
 11 Duran v. Duran (1967)
Rule 79 | Opposition to issuance of letters
testamentary. Petition and Contest for letters of
administration.
Ponente J. Bengzon
Summary
23. Petitioner assigned his share in the estate of his
decedent brother to the surviving spouse of the
latter for a consideration of 2,500. A year later, he
instituted an intestate proceeding for the settlement
of estate of said decedent, with letters of
administration in his favor. Respondent opposed,
claiming that petitioner is not an “interested person”
for the purposes of issuance of letters of
assignment in view of the deed of assignment he
executed. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss,
alleging the assignment was tainted with fraud and
the price is grossly inadequate. CFI denied the
petition for administration, while also holding that it
has no power to rule on questions of fraud.
Petitioner appealed, citing that assignment by an
heir to a co-heir needs approval by the court to be
valid, the transfer being one of partition.
24. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the
purpose of issuance of letters of administration.
25. No, Cipriano is not an interested person in the
estate of decedent. Court approval is not required
in this case because at the time of assignment, no
settlement proceeding is instituted – properties
assigned was not under the Court’s jurisdiction.
Even allowing the assignment to be one of partition,
it is still valid as between the parties even if non-
compliant with requirements of Rule 74 on
extrajudicial partition since said requisites are only
for purposes of binding creditors. The allegations of
fraud shall be resolved in an action for that purpose
during which time petitioner shall remain a person
not interested in the estate because the assignment
is deemed valid until annulled.
Facts
29. (Parties) – Petitioners Cipriano and Miguel Duran
are two of the surviving sibling of decedent Pio
Duran. Respondent Josefina Duran is the surviving
spouse of decedent.
30. (Antecedents) – Cipriano executed a public
instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Pio Duran in favor of
Josefina, for the consideration of 2,500. A year
later, Cipriano filed petition for an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent, further asking in an ex parte motion that
he be assigned administrator. Josefina filed an
opposition to the ex parte motion, saying that
Cipriano is not an “interested person” in view of the
assignment and renunciation he executed. Cipriano
opposed the motion to dismiss claiming that the
sale was vitiated with fraud, with gross inadequacy
of price. CFI dismissed Cipriano’s petition for his
lack of interest in the estate based on the deed of
transfer he executed. CFI further held that it has no
power to rule on the issue of fraud and inadequacy
of consideration in the said proceeding.
31. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
petitioners appealed directly to the Court, based on
 questions of laws. Petitioners cited the case of In
Re Irene Santos where the court held that an
assignment by an heir of his share in the estate to
another co-heir needs the approval of court, and the
assigning heir does not lose his status as an
interested person in the estate, even after said
assignment is approved by the court.
Issue
9. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the purpose
of issuance of letters of administration.
a. No. The assignment took place when no
settlement proceedings were pending.
Therefore, no court approval was needed.
Held
12. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the purpose
of issuance of letters of administration.
No, Cipriano is not an interested person.
The Santos case is not applicable in this case. In said
case, the assignment between co-heirs happened during
settlement proceedings. At that time, the settlement court
had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of
estate. As a result, any assignment regarding the same
had to be approved by said court. The assigning heir
remains an interested person in proceedings even after
said approval, since it can still be vacated until the estate
is closed.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place
when no settlement proceedings were pending. The
properties subject matter of the assignment was not under
the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition
as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not
need court approval to be effective as between the parties.
An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the
participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for
extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said
requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-
participating heirs only
The remedy for allegations of fraud and inadequacy of
price is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that
purpose. Such assignment is deemed valid until annulled.
Thus, the assignee heir cannot institute a settlement
proceeding because he is left without that "interest" in the
estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
12) De Guzman v. Angeles, 162 SCRA 347 (1988)
Rule 78,85,87 | Rule on Letters Testamentary/
Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Gutierrez JR.
Summary
26. Surviving spouse of the decedent filed for the
settlement of intestate estate of her husband. 2
motions where filed: 1. Writ of possession of the 5
vehicles registered in the name of her husband but
found in the possession of his father in law; and, 2.
Ex parte motion to appoint as Special
 Administratrix. A hearing was set but no notice was
given to the Father-in-law.
27. May a probate court appoint special administratrix
and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties
of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a
petition for the settlement of intestate estate even
before the probate court causes notice to be served
upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
28. No. there is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate
and its jurisdiction over the persons who are
interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person.
a. respondent court acquired jurisdiction over
the proceedings upon the filing of a petition
for the settlement of an intestate estate
b. however, it failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the persons interested in the settlement
29. Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79
of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity
of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
30. notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment
Term defined in the case:
Special administrator: the representative of
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed
Facts
32. Respondent Elaine G. de Guzman (surviving
spouse of the decedent) filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
Guzman, before the RTC of Makati.
33. ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN filed a motion for writ of
possession over five (5) vehicles registered under
the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be
conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which
are at present in the possession of the private
respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro
de Guzman.
34. Elaine D.G. filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of Manolito de Guzman." The motion was
set for hearing but no notice of such order was
given to Pedro D.G. The lower court granted the
Elaine D.G.’s motion to be appointed as special
administratrix. Also an Ex-Parte Motion for
Assistance was granted in favor of Elaine to assist
in the preserving the estate (writ of possession)
35. Pedro D.G. resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B.
Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject
vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties. This resulted in a "near shoot-out
between members of the Makati Police, who were
to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM
soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent
sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman". The timely
arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused
the very volatile situation which resulted in an
agreement between the parties that the bulldozer,
sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the
custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek
clarification of the order from respondent Judge
Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30
a.m.
36. In the conference held before the respondent court
attended by the counsels for both parties, the order
was clarified to the effect that the order "must be
merely to take and preserve assets admittedly
belonging to the estate, but not properties, the
ownership of which is claimed by third
persons."
37. Pedro D.G. then filed a manifestation listing
properties which he claimed to be his own.
38. The instant petition was filed to annul the lower
court's orders, 2 previous decisions (administratix
and ex-parte motion for assistance), and a TRO
was issued enjoining such decisions
39. Causes of action:
PEDRO D.G.’s arguments
40. He contends that the order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the
petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito
de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and
published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court. the appointment
of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse
of discretion for having been made without
giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Issue: whether or not a probate court may appoint a
special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the
estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the said deceased person even before the probate court
causes notice to be served upon all interested parties
pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
NO. The questioned orders are set aside.
The case is remanded to the lower court.
The court can’t appoint a special
administratix and issue a writ of possession
if no notice was served to all interested
parties.
Held
• the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
 settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased
Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79
of the Revised Rules of Court.
• However, there is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate
and its jurisdiction over the persons who are
interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person. The court may also have
jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties
comprising that estate must follow established
rules.
• Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that the Court should set time for hearing
and Notice thereof
o It is very clear from this provision that the
probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the
same. The purpose of this notice is to bring
all the interested persons within the court's
jurisdiction so that the judgment therein
becomes binding on all the world.
• Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79
of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity
of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
• notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment
• IN THIS CASE, no notice as mandated by
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
was caused to be given by the probate court
before it acted on the motions of the private
respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of the deceased person in the
widow's favor, and to grant her motion for
assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.
• All interested persons including herein petitioner
who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the
Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in
the proceedings especially so, because the
respondent immediately filed a motion to have
herself appointed as administratrix.
o Special administrator: the "representative
of decedent appointed by the probate court
to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is
appointed
• The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
interest in the preservation of the estate as the
private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the
 necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court.
13 GARCIA FULE v. CA (1976)
Rule 80 | Executors and Administrators
J. Martin
Summary
1. Virginia G. Fule (llegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of
Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that
on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba
and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion of
reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia (surviving
spouse) but was denied. CA reversed decision of CFI
Laguna but before Fule could receive the CA decision,
Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of
administration at the CFI Quezon City. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as the special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and Garcia
assumed the office.
2. Whether CFI Quezon City erred in granting Garcia
special administratorship. NO
3. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate
of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner is Virginia Fule, the illegitimate
sister of the decedent, Amado Garcia. The respondent is
Preciosa Garcia, the widow of the decedent.
2. (Antecedents) - Virginia G. Fule (llegitimate sister) filed
with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of
administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba and in other places, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time,
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion. A motion of reconsideration was filed by Preciosa
Garcia (surviving spouse) but was denied.
Garcia appealed CFI Laguna. CA reversed decision of CFI
Laguna but before Fule could receive the CA decision,
Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of
administration at the CFI Quezon City. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as the special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and Garcia
assumed the office.
Issue: Whether CFI Quezon City erred in granting Garcia
special administratorship. NO

Held: Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of
a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a
special administrator or not lies in the probate court.
The consideration that overrides all others in this respect
is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of
the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property
of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if
not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits
than the naked ownership of a property.
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa
B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With
equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G.
Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or
that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable
of any successional rights. On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs to be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration.
14 Roxas v. Pecson (1948)
Rule 78 | Special Administrator
Ponente J. Feria
Summary
- In intestate proceedings, the respondent Judge
appointed two special administrators. The wife of
the deceased was special administrator of all the
conjugal properties. On the other hand, the sister of
the deceased was special administrator of all the
exclusive property.
- May a judge appoint two special administrators,
each with separate and distinct roles in the
administration of the estate? – NO
- Generally, the Judge exercises discretion on who to
appoint as special administrator. However, there is
no reason to appoint two separate special
administratices of the estate of the decedent: one
 of the conjugal or community property and another
of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
- As under the law only one general administrator
may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly
follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the
general administrator.
Facts
41. (Parties) – Petitioner Natividad is the wife of the
deceased while respondents Maria and Pedro are
the siblings of the deceased. The other respondent
is the Judge who appointed two separate special
administrators.
42.
- The respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister
and brother respectively of the deceased (Pablo
Roxas), fi︎led a petition for the administration of the
latter's estate (intestate proceedings).
- Subsequently, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de
Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for
the probate of an alleged will of her deceased
husband, and for her appointment as executrix of
his estate designated in said will
- Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate
proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by
the court.
- In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by
the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, the
petitioner was appointed as special administratrix
and qualified as such over the objection of the
respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought
the appointment of Maria as such.
o Respondent Judge rendered a decision
denying probate of the will.
- Respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed
their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as
special administratrix or special co- administratrix,
and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered
his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad
I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only
of all the conjugal properties of the deceased,
and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all
capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
Issue
- Can a judge appoint two special co-
administratices of the estate of the deceased, one
of the capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased, and another of his conjugal
properties with his wife (now widow)? - NO

Held
- As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.
- But the respondent's subsequent act of appointing
Natividad Vda de Roxas as special administratrix
only of the conjugal or community property, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital
or exclusive property of the decedent, does not
seem to be in conformity with logic or reason
- The respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two separate special
administratices of the estate of the decedent: one
of the conjugal or community property and another
of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
- Section 6, Rule 78, provides for appointment of one
administrator in case of intestacy, except in certain
cases in which two or more joint, but not separate
and independent, administrators may be appointed
under section 3 Rule 81. Therefore the
administrator appointed to administer and liquidate
the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall
also administer, liquidate and distribute the
community property, because the estate of a
deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is,
administered, liquidated and distributed, consists
not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent,
but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, if any, which may pertain to the
deceased, as determined after the liquidation
thereof
- As under the law only one general administrator
may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly
follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the
general administrator.
- In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court
below has no power to appoint two special
administratrices of the estate of a deceased
husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent,
and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess
of the court's jurisdiction in rendering or issuing the
order complained of, and therefore said order is
hereby set aside, with costs against the
respondents.
 15 PIJUAN v. GURREA
Rule 78
Ponente C.J. Conception
Summary
1. Manuela and Carlos were married in Spain and
lived there with their son Teodoro, until Carlos
abandoned her and returned to the PH where he
lived with Teodoro and his common law wife
Rizalina.
2. Upon having knowledge of her husband’s
whereabouts, Manuela came to the Philippines but
since she was refused by her husband, lived with
her son Teodoro.
3. She secured an order from the CFI of Negros for
alimony pendent lite in the amount of 1k per month
from her husband. However the alimony ended
when her husband died.
4. Carlos left a document purporting to be a will
which appointed Pijuan as executor and
disinherited Manuela and their son Teodoro.
5. The will was presented for probate, and Pijuan
was appointed as special administrator.
6. During the probate proceedings, Manuela filed a
motion for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. She claims that as the
surviving spouse, she is given preference under
Section 6, Rule 78.
7. the probate court denied her motion.
8. WON she should be appointed as administratrix –
NO.
9. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate. None of these conditions obtains
however in the case at bar.
10. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules to the surviving spouse refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator or
administratrix, and not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the
latter lies within the discretion of the probate court.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Marcelo Pijuan, as the executor of the
estate of deceased Carlos Gurrea, and Manuela
Ruiz, deceased’s surviving spouse
2. (Antecedents) – Manuela and Carlos were
married in Spain, until he abandoned her and
returned to the Philippines with their son, Teodoro.
3. He lived martially in Negros Occidental with a
woman named Rizalina with whom he had two
children.
4. After being informed of her husband’s
whereabouts, Manuela came to the Philippines but
Carlos refused to admit her to his residence.
Hence, she stayed with her son in Bacolod.
5. She instituted against Carlos an action for support
and the annulment of some alleged donations of
conjugal property in favor of his common law
 spouse Rizalina with the CFI of Negros. In due
course, the CFI issued an order granting her a
monthly alimony pendente lite of P1,000.
6. Carlos died leaving a document purporting to be
his last will and testament in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and
disinherited Manuela and his son Teodoro.
7. Soon, Pijuan instituted a special proceeding for the
probate of said will, and was thereafter upon his ex
parte motion, appointed as Special Administrator
of the estate, without bond.
8. (Cause of action) Manuela moved for her
appointment as the administratrix of the estate
of the deceased. However this motion was
denied in view of the provision of the will of the
deceased designating another person as
executor thereof.
Issue
10. WON she should be allowed to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate – NO.
Held
13. Manuela argued that the lower court erred in denying
her petition for appointment as administratrix. As a
widow of the deceased, she claims a right of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78.
14. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate.
15. None of these conditions obtains however in the case
at bar.
16. The deceased Carlos has left a document purporting
to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. (sic)
It cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate.
17. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is
incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only
not refused the trust but has also expressly accepted
it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and
upon his appointment as special administrator has
assumed the duties thereof.
18. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules to the surviving spouse refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator or
administratrix, and not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the latter
lies within the discretion of the probate court.
16 TAN v. GO CHIONG LEE (1924)
Rule 78-87
Ponente J. Malcolm
Summary
31. Go Chiong Lee was appointed administrator of the
estate Go Bung Kiu. He filed a petition in court so
that he could be allowed to operate two stores
belonging to the estate. Court granted such
however it was subject to the condition that Go
Chiong Lee must submit a report every month.
During his time as administrator, the estate incurred
losses because the two stores hardly made any
 profit, he failed to file monthly reports, failed to
inventory certain sacks of corn, and the creditors of
the estate were not completely paid. Petitioner, as
administrator who replaced respondent, filed case
against respondent and his sureties to recover the
losses incurred by the estate.
32. Issue: WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses
incurred by the estate during his administration. --
NO
WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory. --
YES
WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some
partially, while there some who were not paid at all.
-- NO
33. Issue 1: where an administrator, entrusted with the
carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in
accordance with the usual rules and methods
obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable
for losses incurred.
Issue 2: Law says that the administrator shall make
an inventory. The administrator is accountable on his
bond along with the sureties for the performance of
these legal obligations.
Issue 3: A personal representative will be protected
in the payment of a claim which has been duly
allowed or ordered paid by the court, although it
should not have been paid in full, unless it is made
to appear that such allowance of the claim or order
for the payment thereof, was obtained through his
collusion or bad faith.
Facts
43. (Parties) – Respondent is decedent’s encargador
who was appointed as administrator. Petitioner
replaced respondent as administrator
44. (Antecedents) – In 1920, Go Bung Kiu died in
China. His encargado Go Chiong Lee was
appointed special administrator of his estate. Go
Chiong Lee's status was later changed to that of
administrator. He filed a motion that he be allowed
to operate two stores belonging to the estate. The
court granted the motion but the judge added in ink
a condition stating that a report must be filed
monthly. After filing a bond with the same sureties,
letters of administration were issued in his favor. Go
Chiong Lee continued to discharge his duties as
administrator until he was relieved by Maximina Tan
in 1921. During this period, he filed 3 reports each
covering periods more than a month long.- The
committee on claims rendered its report in1921,
admitting as proved, claims amounting to
P69,029.91. The court issued an order to pay each
and everyone of the persons mentioned in the
report the whole amount appearing there in without
any preference either as to the amount or as to the
time of payment. Go Chiong Lee paid the creditors
of the estate P16,700.39. It appeared that during his
administration, the estate lost over P19,000 as the
two stores hardly made any sales. Maximina Tan
now sues Go Chiong Lee and his sureties on four
causes of action, on amounts totaling P54,700. The
trial court awarded 42,849.08 but limited the
liabilities of the sureties to P30,000.
 Issue
11. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses incurred
by the estate during his administration. NO
12. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory. YES
3. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some partially,
while there some who were not paid at all. NO
Held
19. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses incurred
by the estate during his administration.
NO. The standard of responsibility of the administrator
is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a
bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion
honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally
liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for
waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an
estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the
usual rules and methods obtaining in such business,
he will not be held liable for losses incurred.
The Court said that the failure to file monthly reports
was not fatal because it was seen that Go Chiong Lee
submitted reports whenever it was requested of him.
The losses sustained by the estate resulted from the
risk necessarily attending the operation of the two
stores is a much more reasonable assumption. The
personal responsibility of the former administrator and
the sureties on his bond for losses incurred by the
estate during his administration has not been proved.
20. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory.
YES. An administrator who has qualified shall, within 3
months after his appointment, return to the court a true
inventory of the real estate and of the goods, chattels,
rights, and credits of the deceased, which come into his
possession or knowledge. The administrator shall be
chargeable in his account with the goods, chattels,
rights, and credits of the deceased, which come into his
possession. The administrator is accountable on his
bond along with the sureties for the performance of
these legal obligations
21. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some partially,
while there some who were not paid at all.
NO, A personal representative will be protected in the
payment of a claim which has been duly allowed or
ordered paid by the court, although it should not have
been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that such
allowance of the claim or order for the payment thereof,
was obtained through his collusion or bad faith. After
reading the order of the trial court relating to the
distribution of the assets among the creditors, the
impression of the Court is that the administrator,
although unwisely, attempted to follow the order to the
best of his ability. Moreover, it is not at all certain but
that the estate will finally show enough on the profit
side of the ledger either to pay all of the creditors to the
full extent of their claims, or to give to most of the
creditors who have not been paid a proportion similar
 to that of the creditors who have been paid. In these
same proceedings, the administratrix on her motion, or
the creditors at their initiative, may recover the excess
imprudently paid out to certain creditors.
17 LIZZARGA HERMANOS V. FELICISIMA ABADA
PONENTE J. MOIR
Summary:
The first husband of Abada died leaving hacienda
Coronacion to her administration. Also left by the husband
is a loan from Lizzarga Hermanos amounting to Php.
12,783.74. When Abada performed her role, she leased
out the hacienda to a third person and contracted a loan
personally with Lizzarga. This loan ballooned to what
Lizzarga is claiming at aeound Php. 68,611.01. The heirs
of the deceased decided to enter into a compromise
agreement as approved by court. Lizzarga now claims that
the compromise agreement is void as their 68k claim is not
yet satisfied.
Issue: WON Lizzarga Hermanos has the right to assail the
compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of
debts of the estate?
No.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been
paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of P8,555.78
at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after
their claim had been presented and allowed by the
commissioners, made advances to the administratrix
till their claim was more than P68,000.
It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is
administration expenses, and as such is chargeable
against the assets of the estate. No reason is given
why the expense of administration should be so great,
and the evidence fails to sustain this position.
By expense of administration we understand to be the
reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the
property and managing it till the debts are paid, as
provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as
to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
1. FACTS:
Francisco Caponong died in October, 1906, owing
the Lizzarga Hermanos a sum of money which was
then less than the amount allowed by the
commissioners.
Francisco’s widow, Felicisima Abada, was
appointed administratrix of the estate,
commissioners to appraise the estate and to pass
on the claims against the estate were duly
appointed, and Lizzarga presented their claim
which was allowed by the commissioners in the
sum of P12,783.74. The commissioner's report was
dated in February, 1909.
The administratrix leased the hacienda [farm]
known as "Coronacion" to Hilario Zayco for a term
of years, but afterwards she married Vicente
Alvarez, one of the defendants, and the lease was
transferred to Alvarez by Zayco, October 2, 1908.

AFTER 7 YEARS OF CAPONONG’S DEATH.
Lizzarga herein filed a suit in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros against Felicisima
Abada personally and as administratrix of the
estate of Francisco Caponong, alleging that
Francisco Caponong owed plaintiffs P12,783.74,
and that Felicisima Abada in her own name and
as administratrix, had been receiving from the
plaintiffs money and effects from 1908 to 1912
which money and effects were used by the
defendant in "the expense of cultivation and the
exploitation of the Hacienda 'Coronacion,' "and
that defendant had delivered to plaintiffs the sugar
produced until the last crop which she refused to
deliver to them.
However in the defense of the estate, Abada and the
guardian of the child of Caponong alleges that, upon
entering into a compromise agreement as approved by the
court, the debts are already settled otherwise, the
compromise agreement is a nullity.
Issue: WON Lizzarga Hermanos has the right to assail the
compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of
debts of the estate?
Held: It seems this claim should have been wholly denied
by the trial court, and we think the judgment in favor of the
administratrix and against the plaintiffs should be reduced
from P13,262.50 to P8,262.50 with interest as provided
therein. The other damages allowed by the trial court are
so fully sustained by the evidence, it is not necessary to
discuss them.
Coming now to the present action, the plaintiffs allege in
the complaint in this suit, the former suit and its settlement
with judicial approval; the amount due thereunder; i. e.,
P68,611.01; that defendants had let two installments go by
without paying anything; that the amount due them with
accrued interest was P90,383.49;
In approving the compromise agreement, the record in
case No. 969 is presented as Exhibit C by plaintiffs. In their
complaint in that action (which suit should never have
been filed as all the property was in the custody of the
court), plaintiffs allege that their original claim against the
estate of Francisco Caponong was only P12,783.74, and
that the balance of the claim was due from Felicisima
Abada as administratrix and personally without stating
how much was owed by her personally and how much was
owed by her as administratrix.
Whether the court in approving the compromise intended
to hold the defendant estate liable only for the original
debt, and defendant Abada for the balance, is not material.
The language used by the court is very clear and seems
to be an outright approval of the "transaccion"
(compromise), and would, so far as the language goes,
leave no room for doubt of the court's approval of the
agreement in full and as written.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been
paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of P8,555.78
at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after
their claim had been presented and allowed by the
commissioners, made advances to the administratrix
till their claim was more than P68,000.
It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is
administration expenses, and as such is chargeable
against the assets of the estate. No reason is given
why the expense of administration should be so great,
and the evidence fails to sustain this position.
By expense of administration we understand to be the
reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the
property and managing it till the debts are paid, as
provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as
to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
The administration expense would be the necessary
expenses of handling the property, of protecting it
against destruction or deterioration, and possibly
producing a crop, but if plaintiffs, holding a claim
originally for less than P13,000 against the estate, let
the administratrix have money and effects till their
claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to
charge this amount as expense of administration.
They might be allowed to charge it against the current
revenue from the hacienda or the net proceeds of the
"exploitation of the hacienda" for which it was
obtained and used, as plaintiffs allege, but it cannot
relate back to the presenting of their claim to the
commissioners, and be a charge against the
inheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with
other creditors' claims allowed by the commissioners
That the mortgage given at the same time and as a
result of the agreement was without legal warrant is
equally clear. No mortgage can be placed by an
administrator on the estate of a descendant, unless it
is specifically authorized by statute.
18 WARNER BARNES V. LUZON SURETY
Rule 78 | Rule 85 & 87
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. Plaintiff has a claim over the estate of the
deceased. The administratix of the estate filed a
bond under the condition that the bond shall be void
if she violated the terms of her administration.
Plaintiff is now claiming the bond against the surety
since the administratix allegedly violated the
condition. The CFI later granted summary judgment
of the estate ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff.
Defendant claims that there is no cause of action.
2. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the
plaintiff. YES
WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of
the Republic. YES
3. While the probate court has jurisidcition over the
enforcement of an administrator’s bond, it is not to
say that the matter may not be litigated in an
ordinary civil action before the CFI. Moreover,
allegations of the plaintiff was uncontroverted by
counter-affidacits which the defendant could have
easily fixed. Lastly, though payable to the Republic,
the bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs,
legatees or devisees of the estate of the deceased,
there is no valid reason why a creditor may not
directly in his name enforce the bond in so far as he
is concerned
Facts
1. Plaintiff is Warner, Barnes & Co. (Warner) and
defendant is Luzon Surety Co. Inc. (Luzon Surety)
2. Agueda Gonzaga, administratix of the intestate
estate of Agueda Gonzaga, filed a bond in the
amount of 6,000 in the special proceedings case
before the CFI of Negros Occidental
3. The bond was filed under a condition that the bond
would be void if the administratix faithfully prepared
the inventory of the property of the deceased,
administers the property, pays all the debts and
renders a true account of the administration.
4. Plaintiff, who has a claim against the estate of
Agueda Gonzaga in the amount of P6,482 claims
that the plaintiff violated the terms of the bond by
failing to file an inventory, failing to pay the claim of
plaintiff and failing to render a true account of her
administration. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for
recovery of the 6k bond plus costs against the
adminsitratix’s surety, Luzon Surety.
5. Plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment
which was approved by the CFI and ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of 6k plus
costs.
6. Defendant appeals to the SC contending that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its
liability under the bond because it is only the
probate court that can hold a surety accountable.
Moreover the defendant claims that there is no
showing that the administratix was ever authorized
to pay the claim of plaintiff. Lastly, defendant claims
that the bond in question was executed in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines and the proper
procedure is to enforce the claim in the probate
proceedings.
Issue
1. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
2. WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the plaintiff.
YES
3. WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of the
Republic. YES
 Held
1. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
While the probate court has jurisidcition over the
enforcement of an administrator’s bond, it is not to say that
the matter may not be litigated in an ordinary civil action
before the CFI.
Summary
2. WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the plaintiff.
YES
The allegations of the plaintiff was uncontroverted by
counter-affidacits which the defendant could have easily
fixed.
3. WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of the
Republic. YES
Though payable to the Republic, the bond is expressly for
the benefit of the heirs, legatees or devisees of the estate
of the deceased, there is no valid reason why a creditor
may not directly in his name enforce the bond in so far as
he is concerned
Facts
019 In the matter of the Estate of Charles C. Rear
(Deceased) and J.J. Wilson (Administrator) v. M. T.
Rear, et. al. (Heirs) (1930)
Rule 78
Ponente J. Johns
1. Wilson, administrator of Charles Rear’s estate,
rendered a final account of the properties of said
estate. The court approved the account but the
heirs of Rear objected, stating that he was
neglectful and imprudent in dealing with the
properties of the estate.
2. In ruling whether Wilson can be held liable for the
claims against the estate, the Court ruled on the
affirmative. Because of his failure to seek an
authority from the Court to sell the property to pay
the claims promptly, the estate suffered from a
deficit. The administrator is under no duty to
continue the business of the estate, and when
losses are incurred, he must be held liable for the
same.
3. However, in computing for his liability, the Court
became lenient considering his circumstances that
he lived 300km away from the plantation. Operating
expenses of the plantation for the first 8 months and
claims of the Commissioners were deducted from
his liability.
1. The petitioner in this case is the estate of the
decedent Charles Rear and the administrator J.J.
Wilson.
2. The respondents in this case are M.T. Rear and the
rest of the heirs of Charles Rear.
3. On July 14, 1925, Charles Rear was murdered by
some Moros on an isolated area of his plantation at
Cotabato. Said plantation consisted of public lands.
4. J.J. Wilson became qualified as a special
administrator of the estate. After appraisal, an
inventory and report of the property was made by
the Commissioners.
5. The Commissioners then made a report of claims
against the estate. Because those claims weren’t
paid, the court ordered the administrator to sell a
portion of the property. Upon petition, the property
was sold to Wm. Mannion on October 10, 1927.
6. Welson submitted a report covering his
administration until April 26, 1927 and it was
approved. When he filed his final account on June
10, 1928, although the heirs made objections, the
court approved the account. Hence, this petition
alleging the following errors:
a. The disbursements made by the
administrator are in excess of the amount
required to preserve the estate;
b. Loans and advances made cannot be
applied against the estate because no
authority was granted by the court;
c. Wilson must be held liable because he was
neglectful and imprudent.
Issue
1. WON
a. No.
Held
1. Administrator Wilson did not render accounts from
1925 until before the Commissioners ordered him to
sell parts of the estate.
a. First Inventory on Dec. 27, 1925 - the assets of
the estate including real property, coconut trees,
and houses were P15,300, and the personal
property was valued at P5,250, which included
80 head of cattle, carabao and horses of the
value of P4,000. TOTAL IS 20,550.
b. Although he was appointed special
administrator on November 17, 1925, he never
made any report or filed any account nor applied
for an order from the court until 1927.
c. The attention of the court was for the first time
called to the administration of the estate in 1927
when the commissioners on claims asked to
have their fees paid.
2. Sales of Property of the Estate
d. Livestock
i. According to the account, Wilson sold
hogs, a carabao, and steers which
amounted to P628.
ii. This is the only account ever rendered of
the livestock that was appraised at
P4,000, and yet no specific objection was
made for his failure to render any other or
different account of the livestock. (So,
 kulang yung in-account niya for livestock,
but no one ever made an objection.)
e. Sale to Mannion
i. Made by and with the consent of the
heirs.
3. From the amended account the administrator
submitted, the total amount of cash he should have
received is P9,519.25, but the total amount of cash he
disbursed was P11,328.94, leaving a deficit or balance
due and owing from the estate of P1,809,69.
4. At the time the claims (includes those by one J.S.
Alano, taxes, and salary of Fleming) against the
deceased were paid, the amount of the claims were
P1,655.54.
(Summary of the facts stated above:
● Wilson did not account for the estate until 1927.
● Some portions in the livestock are unaccounted
for;
● The amount the administrator disbursed does not
match the amount he received based on sales of
the property leading to a deficit; and
● The claims after payment creditors/employees
amount to .1,655.54)
5. It the legal duty of the administrator to apply to the
court for an order to sell the personal property to pay the
debts of the deceased and the expenses of
administration.
a. At the time of Wilson’s appointment, the personal
property of the deceased was P5,800, and the
whole amount of claims against Rear at the time
of his death and the court costs and expenses of
administration was P3,422.58.
b. If the personal property of the estate had been
promptly sold, and sold for its appraised value, all
the debts of the deceased and the court costs and
expenses of administration would have been paid,
and the estate would have a balance left of
P2,377.42.
c. Instead of doing that, the administrator without
any authority from the court, continued the
operation of the plantation and the employment of
Fleming as manager and a large number of men,
so that at the time of the filing of the amended final
account, the total expense for labor was
P2,863.62, and the amount of the manager's
salary was P4,533.33, the net result of which was
that all of the property of the estate was
consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit
against the estate of P1,809.69.
d. If the administrator had followed the law and
promptly sold the personal property, all of the
debts of the estate would have been paid, and it
would have a cash balance in its favor of
P2,377.42, and all of its real property left, which
was appraised at P15,000.
e. Wilson's place of business is in Zamboanga, at
least 300 kilometers from the plantation. He
declined to serve as administrator and only
accepted it under pressure. He operated and left
the management of the plantation largely in the
discretion of Fleming, and he was not a party to
any fraud. But even so, he was appointed and
qualified as administrator, and the law imposed
 upon him legal duties and obligations, among
which was to handle the estate in a business-like
manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate
without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay.
f. An administrator, in particular, without a specific
showing or an order of the court, have any legal
right to continue the operation of the business in
which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up
and absorb the assets of the estate in the
payment of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant
case, the administrator on his own volition and
without any authority or process of court
continued the operation of the plantation, and in
the end, as shown by his own report, the estate,
which was appraised at P20,800, with actual
debts of the deceased of only P1,655.54, was all
wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of
P1,809.69.
g. The penalty for continuing a business of the
decedent without authority is the imposition of a
personal liability on the executor or administrator
so doing for all debts of the business. Even so,
considering the fact the circumstances in this
case, that Wilson was located far away from the
plantation and could not give the business of the
estate his personal attention, the SC no longer
charged him with the operating expenses of the
plantation for the first 8 months and the claims of
the commissioners.
h. In computing his liability, the amount of
P1,919.25 from the sale of personal property and
the P7,600 he received from the remaining assets
sold to Mannion, the total of P9,519.25, should be
deducted by P5,680.03 for and on account of the
items above stated, leaving a balance of
P3,839.22.
i. To entitle the administrator to credit for money
paid out in the course of administration, the sales
must be made in the ordinary course of business
and he should submit and file with the court a
corresponding receipt or voucher.
j. The SC reversed the order of the lower court
approving Wilson’s final account as an
administrator and held him liable to pay
P3,839.22.
20 Luzon Surety v. Quebrar (1984)
Rule 81 | Rule on Bonds of Executors and
Administrators
Ponente J. Makasiar
Summary
FACTS: Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in
behalf of defendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates
(Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and
Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after executing an
indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed
to pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the
defendants paid the premiums and the documentary
stamps. In 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of
premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year
when the court granted the motion of the defendants to
have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff files a case in
the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover
since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until
1962.
ISSUES: W/N the bonds still in force and effect from 1955
to 1962?
HELD: YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Luzon Surety,
the surety of the respondent, Pastor T. Quebrar, who is the
administrator of two estates.
2. (Antecedents) – Luzon Surety issued two
administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar as
administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff
and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily
after executing an indemnity agreement where both the
defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the
years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the
documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the
project of partition of the estates that Quebrar was
handling. In 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of
premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year
when the court granted the motion of the Quebrar to have
both bonds cancelled. Hence, Luzon Surety filed a case in
the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover
since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until
1962.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – On March 20,
1975, the Court of Appeals in a resolution certified the
herein case to this Court after finding that this case
involves only errors or questions of law. Both parties
agreed on the ultimate issue - "whether or not the
administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and
after the year (1954) that they were filed and approved by
the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled."
Issue
Whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force
and effect from and after the year (1954) that they were
filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they
were cancelled?
-YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until the
administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law.
Held
YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
The proper determination of the liability of the surety
and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily
upon the language of the bond itself. The bonds herein
were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court. While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it
is required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed
in the light of the statute creating the obligation secured
and the purposes for which the bond is required, as
expressed in the statute. The statute which requires the
giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts
into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute.
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law,
the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for
as long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is
co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces
the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform
in the course of administration, it follows that the
administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity
agreements entered into by him in consideration of the
suretyship. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor
T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an
administrator/executor even after the approval of the
amended project of partition and accounts on June 6,
1957.The contention of the defendants-appellants that the
administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect
with the approval of the project of partition and statement
of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as
administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation
means the determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that
there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June
6, 1957.
As for the argument that non-payment of the
premium extinguished the suretyship, such non-payment
alone of the premiums for the succeeding years does not
necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the
counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in
the contract making such non-payment of premiums a
cause for the extinguishment or termination of the
undertaking. There is no necessity for an extension or
renewal of the agreement because by specific provision
thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made
dependent upon the existence of the original bond.
21 COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO AND
CORDERO (1937)
Rule 78 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Laurel
Summary
1. Soriano is the administrator of the estate of
Baldomero Cosme. He filed a bond of PhP5,000
with Cordero and Pacheco as there sureties to the
bond. Later, the account of the administrator in the
intestate proceeding shows that he is indebted to
the estate in an amount of PhP23,601.21. Upon
application of the administratrix, the court ordered
the execution of the bond. A motion to be
discharged was filed by the sureties to no avail.
Upon remand to the lower court, the sureties
challenge the authority of the lower court, acting as
probate court, to issue an order of execution on the
bond.
2. WON the CFI of Laguna, acting as probate court,
had jurisdiction to order the execution of the
 administrator’s bond? estate in the sum of PhP23,603.21. The court
ordered the execution of his bond after notice duly
3. A Court of First Instance, exercising probate served upon the sureties. (Note: this order is the
jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the challenged act in this case)
administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and
to hold it accountable for any breach of the Later, the court approved a settlement between
administrator's duty. Soriano and a new administratrix, whereby Soriano
ceded real properties to the estate. His
While, it is true that the law does not say expressly indebtedness to the estate was reduced from
or in so many words that such court has power to PhP23,603.21 to PhP5,000.
execute the bond of an administrator, but by
necessary and logical implication, the power is Now, the administratrix had the sheriff levy on the
there as eloquently as if it were phrased in property of the sureties to collect the remaining
unequivocal terms. PhP5,000.

Facts Pacheco and Corder filed motions to be discharged

from the bond. Both were denied.
1. (Parties) – PETITIONER is Rosario Cosme de
Mendoza, administratrix of the intestate estate of They brought an appeal to the Supreme Court. It
Baldomero Cosme; was dismissed.

DEFENDANTs are Januario Pacheco and 3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – When

Raymundo Cordero, sureties for the bond posted the case was remanded to the lower court, Pacheco
by the first administrator of the estate of Baldomero and Cordero filed a motion challenging the
Cosme. jurisdiction of the trial court to issue executing on
the bond.
2. (Antecedents) – Manuel Soriano was the former
administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. To Issue
assure faithful compliance with his duties as 1. WON the CFI of Laguna, acting as probate court,
administrator, he filed a bond for PhP5,000 with had jurisdiction to order the execution of the
Pacheco and Cordero as sureties. administrator’s bond?

Soriano’s account showed him indebted to the

 a. YES. The probate court had jurisdiction to
issue the order.
2. WON a separate action is necessary to go against
the administrator’s bond?
a. NO. It can be done within the probate
proceeding
Held
1. YES. The probate court had jurisdiction to issue the
order.
Before an administrator, or an executor, enters
upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration are issued, the
person to whom they are issued is required to give
a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs,
with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned
upon the faithful performance of his trust. The
administrator is accountable on his bond along with
the sureties for the performance of certain legal
obligations.
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising
probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the
filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of
the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an
all-embracing power over the administrator's bond
and over administration proceedings, a Court of
First Instance in a probate proceeding can not be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that
bond answerable for the very purpose for which it
was filed.
It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so
many words that such court has power to execute
the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and
logical implication, the power is there as eloquently
as if it were phrased in unequivocal terms.
2. It can be done within the probate proceeding.
It should be observed that section 683 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or
administrator, trustee, or guardian, a person liable
as surety in respect to such account may, upon
application, be admitted as a party to such
accounting, and may have the right to appeal as
hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
person who may be held liable as surety in respect
to an administrator's account the right, upon
application, to be admitted as a party to the
accounting, from which we may not unreasonably
infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the
bond during the process of accounting, that is,
within the recognized confines of probate
proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct
from such proceedings.
 22 Gustilo vs. Sian (R 82 2) 53 SCRA 155
J. Street
S. Facts: Agripino S. Gustilo was appointed administrator
of the estate of his deceased father, Angel Gustilo; In
1925, Agrapino filed his accounts for the years 1923 to
1925, inclusive. In 1926, the widow and the other heirs
moved for the removal of Agrapino for negligence,
exorbitant accounts and illegal expenses, ruinous to the
state under administration.
S. Issue: WON Judge Salas erred in approving the two
accounts;
S. Held: Yes. It was improvident, to say the least, and
made without a reasonable opportunity having been given
to the adverse creditors to make effective opposition
A careful examination of the facts revealed in this record
concerning the activities of Agripino S. Gustilo, as
administrator of Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that he
is not a fit person to be administrator of this estate and that
he has not in fact administered it so far with due regard to
the rights of other persons in interest.
FACTS:
Agripino S. Gustilo was appointed administrator of the
estate of his deceased father, Angel Gustilo; In 1925,
Agrapino filed his accounts for the years 1923 to 1925,
inclusive. In 1926, the widow and the other heirs moved
for the removal of Agrapino for negligence, exorbitant
accounts and illegal expenses, ruinous to the state
under administration.
On July 16, 1927, Agrapino moved that he be granted a
salary of P3,000 annually. On the same day, Agrapino
presented separate accounts 1925-1926 and 1926-1927.
In the first of these accounts there appeared a deficit of
P462.25; while in the second there appeared a deficit of
P3,222.91. Leocadia Majito, one of the creditors, opposed
to the accounts, especially to the annual salary of P3,000
and the sum of P1,000 paid to his attorney. This opposition
was reiterated in writing in which exception was taken to
the distribution of surplus in the amount of P11,304.50. Still
later, Leocadia Majito, in a more detailed writing of
opposition, pointed out that certain alleged debts had been
charged twice to the estate and that no adequate vouchers
were exhibited to justify the charges.
On August 23, 1927, Judge Santamaria (of the CFI of
Iloilo), disapproved the accounts of the administrator and
ordered him to file amended accounts within thirty days.
On September 30, 1927, the administrator asked for an
extension. On February 28, 1928, the administrator
presented for a second time the old accounts without
change.
On March 26, 1928, Judge Fernando Salas (in the
absence of Santamaria) ordered the administrator to
present amended accounts within ten days; but, on April
7, 1928, he reconsidered the order Judge Santamaria and
at the same time approved the same two accounts.
On his order the opposing creditors do not appear to have
received due notices. On June 26, 1928, the attorney for
the appellant moved for reconsideration of Judge Salas’
order, alleging fraud, mistake and surprise, for the removal
of the administrator and for forfeiture of his bond.
ISSUE: WON Judge Salas erred in approving the two
accounts;
HELD: Yes. It was improvident, to say the least, and made
without a reasonable opportunity having been given to the
adverse creditors to make effective opposition. We hereby
set aside the order of Judge Fernando Salas of April 7,
1928, with the result of the proceedings will be restored to
the position in which they stood before that order was
entered, except as stated in the next paragraph. A careful
examination of the facts revealed in this record concerning
the activities of Agripino S. Gustilo, as administrator of
Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that he is not a fit
person to be administrator of this estate and that he has
not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the
rights of other persons in interest. It is the opinion of the
court, therefore, that he should be removed and required
to render his accounts as administrator. However, to order
the forfeiture of the bond of the administrator would be
premature.
23 DEGALA v. CENIZA & UMIPIG (1947)
Rule 76 | Allowance/Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. Petitioner Degala wanted Judge Ceniza to remove
respondent Umipig as the special administrator of
the estate of deceased Mina. Among the grounds
claimed by her are adverse interest, failure to
include properties in the inventory and failure to pay
taxes.
2. WoN WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his
discretion in appointing Umipig as the
administrator.
a. NO. The removal of an administrator lies within
the discretion of the court appointing him.
3. The sufficiency of the ground must be determined
by the court. Just because the former administrator
removed by court on the ground of adverse interest
is the attorney for respondent administrator Umipig,
it doesn’t mean that the latter is already disqualified.
Any interest which said attorney may have is
exclusively personal to him, in which the
respondent Umipig can have nothing to do.
Facts
1. he petitioner is Santiago Degala who seeks relief
from refusal of Judge Ceniza to remove the special
administrator (respondent) Umipig of the estate of
deceased Placida Mina.
2. Petitioner’s grounds for respondent’s removal as
administrator are as follows: 1. Umipig has an
adverse interest to the estate 2. He is a stranger to
the estate and not a beneficiary 3. He failed to
include some properties in the inventory 4. He failed
to pay taxes due 5. He failed to render an
accounting.
a. He invoked Rule of Court No. 83, section 2
which says that “if an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its
discretion, may permit him to resign.”
Issue
1. WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in
appointing Umipig as the administrator.
 a. NO. The removal of an administrator lies within
the discretion of the court appointing him.
2. As to the other allegations of failure to render an
accounting, to include properties in the inventory etc.
a. See below
Held
1. WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in
appointing Umipig as the administrator.
NO. The removal of an administrator lies within the
discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of
the ground must be determined by the court. Just because
the former administrator removed by court on the ground
of adverse interest is the attorney for respondent
administrator Umipig, it doesn’t mean that the latter is
already disqualified. Any interest which said attorney may
have is exclusively personal to him, in which the
respondent Umipig can have nothing to do.
2. As to the other allegations of failure to render an
accounting, to include properties in the inventory etc.
Whether the respondent administrator failed to include in
his inventory some properties belonging to the estate, is a
question of fact to be determined by the respondent Judge
after the reception of necessary evidence. It may be true
that the respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes
due from the estate, but said failure may be due to lack of
funds, and not to a wilful omission. Regarding the alleged
failure of the respondent administrator to render an
accounting, it appears that he did so. The timeliness of the
accounting is addressed to the judge’s discretion. Thus,
petition is hereby dismissed.
24 Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario (1932)
Rule 78 l Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente: J. Villa-real
Summary
1. This case involves two cases involving the Intestate
Proceedings of Chua Piaco (Father) and the
Intestate Proceedings of Chua Toco (Adopted son)
Petitioners were assailing that during the Intestate
proceedings of the Father, certain sums of money
(P20k and 38k) belonged to the Adopted son. The
CFI dismissed the case and ordered costs against
the petitioner. – since questions raised by Petitioner
were already decided in the previous Intestate
proceeding of the Father. (basically, settled na yung
claims sa intestate and decided na ng judge yung
issues dun)
Respondents in this case were alleging that there
was already RES JUDICATA between the two
cases since
2. w/n there was Res Judicata between the two cases
3. Held: YUP! Briefly: (1) While there is no identity
between the plaintiff in the former case and the
plaintiffs in the present case, there is the relation of
representation between them; (2) there is identity of
cause of action; (3) there is identity of subject
matter; and (4) there is identity of issue, upon which
depends the granting or denial of the relief sought
in each of said cases, and this issue has been
impliedly decided in the former case. Therefore, all
the elements of res judicata in accordance with the
aforecited legal provisions are present.
Facts
1. Parties: Chua Tan – Heirs of Chua Toco
(Adopted son of Chua Piaco)
Del Rosario – administratix of intestate estate of
Chua Toco
2. Antecedents – Chua Tan is seeking to appeal
the decision of CFI Manila for dismissing their
complaint and absolving Del Rosario as
administratix of estate of Chua Toco
- Petitioner is alleging that CFI erred in
sustaining the Res Judicata argument of the
Respondents
o Because there was already a decided
case by the SC on the Intestate
proceedings of Chua Piaco
- Petitioner was arguing that CFI erred in not
holding that the sums of P20,000 and
P38,559 did not belong to Chua Toco
exclusively as an heir of Chua Piaco
Issue
W/n Res Judicata applies in this case
Held
Yup!
- Requisites of Res Judicata
o (1) the former judgment must be final;
o (2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
o (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and
o (4) there is — between the first and
the second actions — an identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of
action
- All requisites for Res Judicata are present in
this case
o Identity of parties - Benedicta Santa
Juana, as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the late Chua
Piaco, was the legal representative
not only of said estate but also of its
creditors and heirs. In view of this
relation of agent and principal
between her and the plaintiffs in the
present case, the decision rendered
against Benedicta Santa Juana, as
such administratrix, in the former
case is conclusive and binding
upon said plaintiffs in the present
case,
§ Under the provisions of the
law, the judicial administrator
is the legal representative not
only of the testate or intestate
estate, but also of the
creditors, and heirs and
legatees, inasmuch as he
 represents their interest in the
estate of the deceased.
o Identity of Subject Matter - In the
former case the petition was for the
rendering of an accounting of certain
funds alleged to have been delivered
in trust by the late Chua Piaco to his
adopted son, the late Chua Toco. In
the present case the petition is for
the partition of those same funds
and their fruits between the heirs
of both deceased.
o Identity of Cause of Action – Former
case - had refused to render an
accounting of said funds and the fruits
thereof. In the present case the
plaintiffs include the same allegation
of trust, and the defendant makes the
same denial, except that instead of a
rendition of accounts, the partition of
said funds and the product thereof is
asked.
o Identity of Cause of Action - he
rendition of accounts in the former
case, is different from the relief
sought in the case now before us,
which is the partition of funds, but the
question at issue, upon the
determination of which depended
the granting or denial of such
relief, is the same, namely, whether
Chua Piaco or Chua Toco was the
owner of said funds.
25 Adapon v. Maralit (1940)
Rule 78, 85, 87 | Letters Testamentary and of
Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Laurel
Facts
1. Petitioner in this case is Pedro Adapon, the
administrator of the estate of deceased Rudocindo
Adapon. The surviving spouse of the testator by a
second marriage, Felisa Maralit, is the oppositor-
respondent.
2. Petitioner filed an inventory of the properties and
assets of the estate and respondent presented a
petition asking the court to order the administrator
to pay her a monthly allowance of P50, and to
include in the submitted inventory various
properties that include credit due to the testator,
1000 cavans of palay, 100 animals (carabaos etc,
the inventory was in Spanish so I can’t understand
entirely), a house, and a tract of land for raising
palay crops.
3. (Assumption based on held, because some facts
are in Spanish) The administrator claimed that he
owned some of the properties listed in the petitioner
of respondent listed above.
4. When the petition was set for hearing, the
respondent moved that the administrator should be
relived of his duties and another appointed to act in
his place. The probate court suspended the hearing
 for sometime in an effort to have the parties reach
an agreement.
5. The decision of the trial court on the petition to have
the petitioner is in Spanish, but I assume that it was
granted because the petitioner elevated the case
through appeal.
Issue
1. (Issued raised also in Spanish, this is an inference)
WON the CFI could, upon petition of an oppositor to
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by
the administrator determine the question of ownership
(because administrator raises the issue of ownership
over some properties).
a. Yes. It is not seen how the probate court can
determine the respective merits of the
conflicting claims made by the administrator
and the oppositor without necessarily
declaring the lawful ownership of the
properties involved.
Held
1. WON the CFI could, upon petition of an oppositor to
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by
the administrator determine the question of ownership
over the properties involved.
Yes. It is not seen how the probate court can determine
the respective merits of the conflicting claims made by the
administrator and the oppositor without necessarily
declaring the lawful ownership of the properties involved.
Such a declaration is necessary and inevitable, and
without it the probate court cannot properly proceed and
dispose of the petition submitted by the oppositor. (That’s
the extent of their explanation on this issue, short case).
26 INTESTATE ESTATE OF SAMUEL WILLIAM
ALLEN. MOORE & SONS MERCANTILE CO.,
APPELLANT, VS. CARMEN WAGNER, APPELLEE.
(1927)
Rule 78-Rule 85 and Rule 87
Summary
34. (Short Facts) The wife and the child wants to claim
support from the estate of the deceased husband.
However, liabilities of the deceased are greater
than the value of the estate.
35. (Short Issue) May support be demanded when the
liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of the
deceased spouse? No
36. (Short Held) Support cannot be granted if proved
that there is no more property, private or conjugal,
pertaining to the surviving spouses or heirs of the
deceased since by virtue of Art. 1430 (NCC),
support is only an advance payment on account of
the respective share of each partner. In this case, it
is indisputable that the deceased Samuel Allen's
estate liabilities exceed the assets.
Facts
45. In the proceeding for settlement of the intestate
estate of deceased Samuel Allen, his widow
petitioned for provision of allowance for hreself and
her daughter Avelina Allen amounting to P80.00.
The Special Administrator appointed objected to
 the allowance requested on the ground that the
estate is insolvent since the total claims presented
against it amounts to P2,457.00 while the estate's
balance only amounted to P870.97. The lower court
approved the allowance citing Art. 1430 of the New
Civil Code and Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
lower court's decision.
Issue
May a widow validly demand for support or
allowance when the liabilities of the deceased's
estate exceed its assets?
Held
No. Support cannot be granted if proved that there is
no more property, private or conjugal, pertaining to
the surviving spouses or heirs of the deceased since
by virtue of Art. 1430 (NCC), support is only an
advance payment on account of the respective share
of each partner. In this case, it is indisputable that the
deceased Samuel Allen's estate liabilities exceed the
assets. Moreover, his widow admitted that she has
not contributed to the property of marriage. As such, it
is therefore unlawful to grant support when there is no
property to be partitioned.
1. WON the request for support shall be denied
27 Santero vs CFI of Cavite (1987)
Rule 83 Sec. 3 | Rule on Provision for Support of
Family
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. This case is for the allowance of support filed by
one of the mothers and her children. This allowance
is contested because there are missing children in
the allowance and that these children have already
achieved age of majority.
2. WON they are entitled to support
3. Yes, support is provided in the civil code and that
age, employment and marriage is of no moment in
the civil code. Support under civil code is
substantive while the minor requirement in rule 83
sec.3 is procedural only
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
illegitmate sons of the decedent from the second
woman (not wife).
2. (Antecedents) – So there is a mass of inventory
held in trust located in Kawit. The petitioners are
asking for support for the education of the children.
The administrator said that the money is held in
trust.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the fact that some are already of age and working,
support shall be denied
Issue
 a. No. Because Article 188 and 290 doesn’t qualify declared null and void. The court granted the
age marriage or employment motion, ordering Fenix to lease the lands to the
Held highest bidder in a public auction.
1. WON the request for support shall be denied
3. Nava, as lessee, now asks Supreme Court to set
NO. Because Rule 83 Sec. 3 which talks about children aside the said order of the lower court for being
being minor is a procedural rule and cannot go over issued without jurisdiction. Nava argues that the
those found in the civil code which is left unqualified. contract can only be annulled in a separate,
Procedural cannot go over substantial provision. Since it independent proceeding.
will be used for schooling which is under support then it
shall be allowed.
Issue
1. WON the lower court has the power to annul, in the
intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by
28 Hilado v. Nava (1939)
the administratrix without its intervention
Rule 78 | Letters Testamentary and of Administration,
When and to Whom Issued
a. No. The lease contract was a mere act of
Moran J.
administration
Facts
1. Petitioner, Concepcion de Hilado (Hilado), an
Held
intervenor in the intestate proceedings of the
1. WON the lower court has the power to annul, in the
estate of Jocson. Respondent, Jesus Nava (Nava)
intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by
was the lessee over certain properties of the said
the administratrix without its intervention
estate.
No. The contract of lease, being a mere act of
administration, could validly be entered into by the
2. Estefania Fenix was the administratrix of the
administratrix within her powers of admin, even without
intestate estate of Jocson. Fenix executed in favor
the court’s previous authority. The court had no power to
of Nava a contract of lease wherein for a period of
annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate
5 crop years, certain properties of the estate would
proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the
be rented out to the latter for P1,000 a year.
person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is
Initially, the court did not intervene in the
necessary to that effect
conclusion of the contract. However, petitioner
Hilado filed a motion asking for details of such
lease contract and asked that the same be
 29 SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE (1964)
Rule 78 - 85 | Letters Testamentary and of
Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Paredes
Summary
46. Nombre, as judicial administrator of the intestate
estate subject of the Sp. Proc., leased one of the
properties of the estate (fishpond) to Pedro
Escanlar, the other respondent. [Terms of the
lease: 3 years with a yearly rental of P3,000 to
expire on May 1, 1963]. The transaction was done
without previous authority of approval of the Court
where the proceedings was pending.
Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of
the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was
appointed instead. Respondent Escanlar then was
cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to
surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed
administrator.
47. WON a judicial administrator can validly lease
property of the estate without prior judicial
authority and approval
48. Rule 85 Sec 3 of the Rules of Court authorizes a
judicial administrator to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed of by will. Under this
provision, the executor or administrator has the
power of administering the estate of the deceased
for purposed of liquidation and distribution. He may,
therefore, exercise all acts of administration without
special authority of the Court.
Facts
1. The case at bar had its origin in Special
Proceedings No. 7279 of the CFI of Negros
Occidental, wherein respondent Adelo Nombre was
the duly constituted judicial administrator.
2. On May 1, 1961, Nombre, as judicial administrator
of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc.
Stated above, leased one of the properties of the
estate (fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar, the other
respondent. [Terms of the lease: 3 years with a
yearly rental of P3,000 to expire on May 1, 1963].
The transaction was done without previous
authority of approval of the Court where the
proceedings was pending.
On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as
administrator by Order of the court and one
Sofronio Campillanos was appointed instead.
Respondent Escanlar then was cited for contempt
for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to
the newly appointed administrator.
On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion
asking for authority to execute a lease contract of
the same fishpond in favor of petitioner herein,
Moises San Diego Sr for 5 years from 1961 at a
yearly rental of P5,000.00.
Escanlar was not notified of such motion. Nombre
presented a written opposition pointing out that the
 fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3
years. He also invited the attention of the Court that
to grant the motion of the new administrator would
in effect nullify the contract in favor of Escanlar, a
person on whom the Court has no jurisdiction. The
Court declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar
was null and void for want of judicial authority and
that unless he would offer the same as or better
conditions than the prospective lessee, there was
no good reason why the motion for authority to
lease the property to San Diego should not be
granted.
Nombre moved to reconsider stating that Escanlar
was willing to increase the rental to P5,000.00 but
only after the termination of his original contract.
The MR was denied.
3. A petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of
the Orders was presented by Nombre and Escanlar
with the CA. A writ of preliminary injunction was
likewise prayed.
Issue
13. WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property
of the estate without prior judicial authority and
approval
a. Yes, no such limitation on the power of a judicial
administrator to grant a lease of property placed
under his custody is provided for in the present
law.
Held
Under Art 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only when
the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that
it cannot be instituted without special authority.
Rule 85 Sec 3 of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial
administrator to administer the estate of the deceased not
disposed of by will. Under this provision, the executor or
administrator has the power of administering the estate of
the deceased for purposed of liquidation and distribution.
He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration
without special authority of the Court.
For instance, he may lease the property without securing
previously any permission from the court. And where the
lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in
the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of
the lessee, over whose person it has no jurisdiction. The
proper remedy would be a separate action by the
administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.
30| JARODA V. CUSI JR. (1969)
Rule 78 – RULE 85 AND RULE 87
J. REYES
Summary
1. Facts: Two orders were issued by the Judge in the
intestate proceeding of the deceased. The first is
the approval of withdrawal of deposits in the bank
while the second is the approval of the power of
attorney executed by Tan and the appointment of
him as attorney-in-fact to sell the subdivision lots.
2. Issue: WON the orders are valid.

3. Both orders are invalid. The first being outside the
powers that may be granted to the special
administrator. Also, said order was issued without
notice and hearing of the heirs of the deceased. As
for the second order, it is invalid for want of notice
to the heirs.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner Natividad Jaroda, one of
the children of the deceased. The respondents are
Vicente Cusi, Jr., the Presiding Judge of CFI Davao
and Antonio Tan, the judicial administrator of
intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille.
2. (Antecedents) – Judge Cusi issued 2 orders in the
intestate proceeding of Carlos Abrille. The first
order granted an ex-parte petition by Tan to
withdraw money from PNB (savings and checking
account in the name of Abrille. The money was
allegedly held in trust for the decedent’s co-owners
in the San Juan Subdivision. The second order
approved ex-parte the power of attorney executed
by Tan appointing himself attorney-in-fact to sell the
share of estate in the subdivision lots.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
Petitioner moved to nullify the orders but the Court
denied for “lack of merit”.
Issues
1. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
• No. The said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a special administrator.
2. WON the order approving the power of attorney is
valid.
• No. It is void for want of notice and for approving an
improper contract or transaction.
Held
1. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
No. Said order was invalid. First, said withdrawal is foreign
to the powers and duties of a special administrator as
provided by Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Its powers are to: take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same
for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits
as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.
Second, the order was issued without notice to, and
hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. Said withdrawal is
a waiver by the special administrator of a prima
facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank
deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision,
who were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the
administrator in his motion
2. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
The very rule, Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
relied on by respondent Tan to sustain the power of
attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate
in the subdivision requires "written notice to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to
be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish
such notice. Without such notice, the order of the court
authorizing the sale is void.
31 Garcia v. Escudero (1922)
Rule 78
J. Romualdez
Summary
37. Gregorio Verdejo died, leaving an open will where
he named as heirs his three sisters (plaintiffs
herein) and Escudero (defendant) as one of the
administrators. The intestate proceedings were
commenced for the properties not disposed of by
will. Plaintiffs brought an action against the
defendant to render an account of the properties
inherited by them. The trial court ordered Escudero
to deliver the properties of the deceased (such as
furniture, jewelry, cattle, and coconut lands). In
Escudero’s statement, he explained that these
properties have been either seized, destroyed by
fire, and the cattle died due to rinderpest.
38. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
properties under his administration through
fortuitous event (please read all issues in the long
form)
39. No. The administrator in an administration
proceeding is not responsible for the loss, by a
fortuitous event, of the personal properties under
administration in the absence of proof that said loss
was due to his negligence. lso the administrator is
not bound to render an account of the products of
the realties seized by the Philippine revolutionary
troops during the Philippine Revolution.
Facts
49. Plaintiffs are the three sisters of Gregorio Verdejo
(decedent), while defendant Placido Escudero is
one of the decedent’s appointed administrators.
50. Gregorio Garcia Verdejo is the owner of properties
situated in the Dolores, Tayabas. He died in Manila
in 1895, leaving and open will where he named as
his heirs his three sisters, and appointed as
administrators Marasigan and Escudero.
51. Intestate proceedings were commenced in Dolores
for the settlement of the deceased’s estate
undisposed of by will, and testamentary
proceedings leading to the settlement of his estate
covered by his will were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas by whose order said
justice of the peace, on February 24, 1896,
delivered to the defendant the properties of the
deceased.
52. The plaintiffs, as the testamentary heirs of said
deceased, brought this action, it is prayed that they
be declared heirs of the deceased and the
defendant ordered: (a) To deliver to them the
 properties inherited by them, and (b) to render an
account of his administration from February 24,
1896.
53. The trial court granted these reliefs, ordering
Escudero to deliver all the properties to the
plaintiffs;
a. and to render accounts duly verified for each
year of his administration and management
thereof,
b. and in lieu of the furniture and jewels, he
must pay P230 unless he can deliver the
same.
c. In lieu of cattle, the sum of P1447 unless he
can deliver the animals themselves whose
deaths were not proven.
54. Escudero filed the necessary bond in order to stay
the execution, which was granted by the Court. He
however, agreed to rendered an accounting of the
properties in his custody.
55. The plaintiffs impugned these accounts. After
hearing, the trial court ordered Escudero to file an
amended statement of account in accordance with
its findings that:
a. Items under Sundries account – amounting
to P1,491.50; disapproved and must be
deducted from the general account
b. He must render an accounting of the lands
w/c had 1997 coconut trees which yielded 50
nuts per year from February 24, 1896 to
January 1, 1902. The fact that these were
seized by the Revolutionary government and
taken from his administration and control
was immaterial.
c. He must render an accounting of the ‘fourth
period’, which is from Jan. 1, 1902 to August
15, 1906.
56. Defendant perfected this present appeal.
Issues
1. WON the administrators should be liable for certain
personal properties destroyed by fire. No.
2. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
value of the cattle that perished during the
rinderpest in 1989. No.
3. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the coconut lands and liable for their
value. No.
4. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the ‘fourth period. No.
5. WON the sundries account was properly
disapproved by the court. No.
Held
1. WON the administrators should be liable for certain
personal properties destroyed by fire.
No. The trial court held the defendant responsible
for such properties, it being of the opinion that he
was negligent in having left them in the barrio of
Santo Nino where they were. Taking into account
the fact that the fire occurred in a calamitous time,
for, as appears from the evidence, it was caused by
the North American forces who were fighting the
Philippine revolutionists, we find that the disaster
could not have been prevented by the defendant. It
might be said that he could have foreseen it, but it
 does not appear just how and where those
properties could have been proven that the town of
San Pablo, the place of residence of the defendant,
was any safer than that of Santo Nino. It was not
shown that such properties were destroyed through
the negligence of the defendant.
2. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
value of the cattle that perished during the
rinderpest in 1989.
No. In the first place the fact of the death of those
animals is proven by the testimony of the defendant
based on his personal knowledge, and this
testimony is not a secondary, but original, evidence
of such fact. It would be a secondary evidence if
such testimony were a mere recital of the contents
of the credentials or annotated certificates issued in
accordance with article 7 of the Large Cattle
Regulation approved by Royal Order dated August
19, 1862, in force in the Philippines in 1898.
Besides, it does not appear that whenever an
animal died, the officer having authority on the
matter (teniente de ganados) was notified in all
cases of the fact and the regulations complied with.
In the second place, no timely objection was made
to said testimony of the defendant.
3. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the coconut lands and liable for their
value.
No. The evidence shows that those coconut lands
were seized by the Philippine revolutionists in the
year 1899 to 1902, they were a forest. The
Philippine Revolution lasted, practically, during the
whole period from 1896 to 1902, and the defendant,
residing as he was, in a town far away from the
coconut lands, could not, as he testified, go to the
lands to gather their fruits, and thus he got none,
according to his testimony.
4. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the ‘fourth period.
No. The defendant says in his statement of
accounts that in 1902 and 1903 the fruit of the
coconut trees hardly covered the small expenses;
that in 1904 and 1905, they began to yield
something but very little. It not having been proven
that in those periods the coconut lands produced
anything to be accounted for, we find the report
made by the defendant sufficient on this matter, and
it is unnecessary to require him to make a detailed
statement of said products.
5. WON the sundries account was properly
disapproved by the court.
No. those items are proved by the testimony of the
defendant, the plaintiffs' evidence being insufficient
to overthrow or weaken it. We believe that the items
under "Sundries" account in defendant's statement
should have been approved.

32 Nicolas v. Nicolas
Rule 78, 85 and 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Villa-real
Summary
40. Facts: Domingo as the ex-administrator of the
estate appealed because the court rejected as
evidence some of the pleadings he submitted in
support of his position as ex-administrator. He also
assails that the court erred when it did not submit
him to an examination under oath and in not holding
a hearing on his accounts. Lastly, there were
expenses he incurred as administrator which the
court rejected.
41. Issue: WON the court erred in eliminating his
pleadings, in not examining him under oath, and in
not allowing the expenses he incurred
42. Ruling: NO. The court stated that the pleadings had
to be certified transcripts of the the order appealed
from and not the inclusion of any other order,
pleading etc. The court also stated that it allowed
the petitioner to be heard when it conducted a
hearing and lastly, expenses were disapproved
because he failed to get authorization from the
court.
Facts
57. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case is Domingo
Nicolas who was the ex-administrator of the estate
of Santiago Nicolas.
58. (Antecedents) – Domingo appealed the courts
decisions which stated:
“The court, therefore, approves the two accounts dated
August 14, 1933 and March 14, 1934, presented by the
ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas, with the amendments
above-stated and with a balance of P726.01 in favor of the
administration, which sum said Domingo Nicolas must turn
over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the
clerk of this court, within the period of twenty (20) days
from this date. In case of noncompliance with this order on
the part of Domingo Nicolas, let the bond given by said ex-
administrator be attached in order to collect said sum of
P726.01”
He alleged numerous errors committed by the court.
The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the
lower court erred in disapproving the record on
appeal presented by the appellant on August 1934, and in
ordering the amendment thereof by eliminating certain
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments not related to
the order of June 20, 1934, appealed from
The appellant in insisting upon the inclusion of said
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments in the record on
appeal alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the
best evidence of the services rendered by him and his
attorney.
The second question to be decided, by reason of its
procedural nature, which is raised in the eighth and last
assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the court a
quo erred in not submitting the appellant to an examination
under oath and in not holding a hearing on his accounts.
There were also expenses done for the estate which
Domingo Nicolas wanted to be reimbursed for such as
Money advanced to Attorney Bartolome Domingo, P400,
Partial payment of debt of deceased in favor of Miguel
Julian, P105.1, partial payment to Commissioner Gabriel,
P100. Expenses during the anniversary of the deceased,
P36.5.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – This is an
appeal taken by Domingo Nicolas, ex-administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas, from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
Issue
14. WON the court committed errors in eliminating the
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments - NO
15. WON the court erred in not submitting the appellant to
an examination under oath and in not holding a hearing
on his accounts - NO
16. WON the court erred in rejecting certain expenses
incurred by Domingo as the administrator - NO
Held
1. With regards to the the first issue of eliminating
certain pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments,
the court ruled:
What section 779 of the Code of Civil Procedure
requires to be transmitted to this court in case of an
appeal from a decree or order approving or
disapproving the accounts of an administrator, in
accordance with the provisions of section 778, is a
certified transcript of the appeal, order, decree or
judgment appealed from and of the accounts
embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other
order, decree or judgment from which no appeal
has been taken being unnecessary and
superfluous.
The court a quo, therefore, committed no error in
ordering the elimination from the record on appeal
of the other pleadings, decrees, orders and
judgments not appealed from, which, according to
the appellant himself, are nothing more than
evidence of the services rendered by him and his
attorney.
2. With regards to not examining under oath:
"Upon calling for hearing the accounts of the ex-
administrator Domingo Nicolas, the one dated
August 14, 1933, only with respect to Nos. 3,5 and
6 of the item 'III—Payments', and No. 9 of the item
'IV—Traveling Expenses', and another dated May
15, 1934, there appeared the said ex-administrator
Domingo Nicolas in his own behalf and Sisenando
Palarca who is opposed to the approval thereof.
It is clear, therefore, that the ex-administrator-
appellant Domingo Nicolas was given the
 opportunity to explain his accounts and present his
evidence in support thereof, and that he appeared
at the hearing of said accounts.
3. Expenses:
We are of the opinion that the court a quo correctly
rejected them on the ground that they had not been
authorized by said court
Item 9 thereof, consisting in expenses incurred by
the appellant on the occasion of the anniversary of
the death of the deceased, amounting to P36.50,
cannot be considered a part of the funeral expenses
nor treated as the erection of a mausoleum which
forms part of the sepulture of the deceased,
because it bears no relation to the funeral.
With respect to the other expenses and fees which
the ex-administrator- appellant seeks to collect and
which the lower court rejected, the law only
authorizes the administrator to collect for his
services as such the sum of P4 for every day
actually and necessarily spent by him in the
administration and care of the estate of a deceased
person, not for every act or task he might perform,
even if it were to take only a few minutes to do so,
as indicated by the nature of the great majority of
the task performed by him, for each and every one
of which he seeks to collect P4.
33 UY TIOCO v. IMPERIAL (1928)
Rule 78-85, 87 | Administrator or Executor
J. Ostrand
Summary
1. Respondent Panis filed a motion (which was
granted) in a probate proceeding for the allowance
of attorney’s fees. The guardian of the decedent’s
sons filed a notice of appeal. Later, Respondent
filed for an order (which was granted twice) for
payment of ¾ of the attorney’s fees. Petitioner
refused to make the payment and filed an action
with the SC.
2. WON, despite an appeal, the estate should be liable
for attorney’s fees.
3. No. The lower court is not authorized to enforce
immediate execution of its orders after an appeal
has been perfected. Moreover, the attorney cannot
hold the estate directly liable for attorney’s fees.
The liability rests on the executor or the
administrator. However, if the fees paid are
beneficial to the estate and reasonable, the
executor or administrator is entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. Hence, the probate
court may not enforce payment until the appeal has
been decided.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Uy Tioco,
the administrator of the estate and husband of the
 deceased. The respondents are Judge Imperial and
Panis, the counsel for the estate’s administration.
2. (Antecedents) – Respondent Panis filed a motion
during the probate proceedings for the allowance of
attorney’s fees. The court granted the motion
despite the objection by Petitioner Uy Tioco. The
guardian of the decedent’s (and Petitioner’s) sons
filed a MR but was denied because notice to the
administrator was deemed sufficient compliance
with the law on the notice to the heirs.
3. The guardian filed a notice of appeal to the SC. In
this regard, Respondent filed a motion in the
probate court setting that the appeal can only be on
¼ of the attorney’s fees and that ¾ of it should be
ordered paid. This is because one of the minors
died and the share will go to Petitioner as the father.
Since the property is also community property, ½
belongs to Petitioner also as husband. Only ¼
therefore remains with the other minor, who the
guardian represents. The probate court ordered the
payment of such amount.
4. Petitioner refused to make the payment despite two
orders by the court. Hence, the present action
brought to the SC.
Issue
1. WON the immediate execution of a probate court’s
order is allowed despite an appeal. NO
2. WON the liability for attorney’s fees is on the estate and
not the administrator or executor. NO
Held
1. WON the immediate execution of a probate court’s
order is allowed despite an appeal.
No. The orders of the probate court for partial payment
were issued after an appeal was taken and perfected (by
the filing of an appeal bond). No law authorizes the lower
court to enforce the immediate execution of such orders in
probate proceedings after an appeal has been perfected.
The probate court may not enforce the payment of the
attorney's fees until the appeal taken has been passed
upon or dismissed.
2. WON the liability for attorney’s fees is on the estate and
not the administrator or executor.
No. The services for which attorney’s fees are claimed are
rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in
the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not
hold the estate directly liable for the fees. Such fees are
allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the
attorney.
The liability for the payment rests on the executor or
administrator. But, if the fees paid are beneficial to the
estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement
from the estate. Such payments should be included in his
accounts and the reimbursement therefor settled upon the
notice.
34 DACANAY v. HERNANDEZ (1928)
Rule 78-Rule 85 and 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Facts
1. The parties are TIRSO DACANAY, administrator of the
estate of Justiniano Rogero Dacanay. Tirso is one of
Justiniano’s three acknowledged natural children. On
the other side is SILVERIO HERNANDEZ, in his own
behalf and as guardian of minor MARIA HERNANDEZ.
Silverio is the surviving spouse of Justiniano’s only
legitimate child, BIENVENIDA.
2. Justiniano died testate. His natural child Tirso was
named executor. The will greatly favored the natural
children at the expense of Bienvenida, the only
legitimate child. The will stated that Bienvenida had
been disobedient thus the decedent felt justified in
curtailing her inheritance. The will was presented for
probate and was duly probated.
3. Tirso qualified as administrator and commissioners on
claims and appraisal were appointed. The
commissioners prepared a final report but no further
steps were taken towards settlement until the Judge of
the CFI appointed commissioners for the partition of
the estate. The commissioners submitted a scheme of
partition in which the provisions of the will were closely
followed while the law on succession appears to have
been clearly disregarded.
4. Silverio Hernandez, in representation of his deceased
wife and his children, opposed the approval of the
scheme on the ground that the portions of the estate
assigned to the natural children greatly exceeded the
maximum shares allowed them as acknowledged
natural children.
5. The CFI rendered a decision finding that the will
resulted into Bienvenida receiving only part of the
estate of her deceased mother and none of the
property acquired by the testator father. The court
disapproved the partition and ordered the
commissioners to make a new partition.
6. No further action was taken by the commissioners. The
executor Tirso Dacanay presented a plan for the
partition of the estate. Another scheme was submitted
by Silverio. Both were unsatisfactory to the court. The
judge rendered a decision providing for a complete and
fair distribution of the estate according to evidence.
7. Tirso filed before the SC a motion for the reopening of
the case on the ground that he had discovered new
evidence consisting in an inventory of property alleged
to have been donated to Bienvenida on the occasion of
her marriage. The Court granted the motion and
ordered the case remanded to the CFI for additional
proof. The CFI judge found the inventory genuine and
directed the commissioners to submit a new scheme of
partition.
8. The record was again remanded to the CFI and the
commissioners submitted another scheme of partition
which was opposed by Silverio.
9. The parties, finding the plan by the commissioners
unsatisfactory, entered into stipulation. The court
approved this stipulation.
10. No regular final account was presented by the
administrator, but annual accounts for 10 years were
submitted. The accounts show income as against
expenses. Silverio and his daughters opposed the
approval of accounts.
Issue
1. WON the will is an authentic document executed by
decedent Justiniano.
2. WON the scheme of partition presented by
administrator Tirso Dacanay should not have been
approved.
Held
1. No. The document in question is a forgery. Pedro
Floresca, who at the time was the principal public
school teacher in Bacnotan and a boarder in the house
of Tirso Dacanay, testified that while there, he wrote
the document from a draft furnished by Tirso. He did
not however write the signatures. An examination with
a good lens of the alleged signature of Justiniano
Dacanay appearing at the bottom shows clearly that
the pen strokes are different from those of the authentic
signatures of Justiniano. Note also that the paper on
which the document is written bears indications of
having been subjected to some artificial process for the
evident purpose of giving it the appearance of age.
2. Yes. The fees and deductions laid down in the
accounts (deduction of value of bundles of palay
allegedly stolen and spoiled, compensation for
administrator Dacanay’s services, attorney’s fees -
NOTE THAT THE CASE LISTS THE SPECIFIC
EXPENSES IN SPANISH) relate to services rendered
for the benefit of the administrator and for that of the
other natural children of Justiniano, not for the benefit
of the estate.
• It is true than an administrator may employ competent
counsel on questions affecting his duties and on which
he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses
may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court. Such however, is not the case
here. The administrator deliberately and knowingly
resorted to falsified documents for the purpose of
defrauding legitimate heirs of the deceased.
• The claims that palay was lost and spoiled cannot be
entertained. Repairs in the storehouse were made from
time to time with permission of the court. There is room
for grave suspicions that the administrator converted to
his own use at least a part of the palay alleged to have
been stolen or spoiled. The administrator was in a
position in some respects analogous to that of a bailee
for his own sole benefit and was bound to exercise great
care and attention in the conservation of the property
under administration. The administrator must then be
held responsible for loss or disappearance of the palay
and must be ordered to pay the value of the same to the
estate.
• The compensation administrator is asking for seems
excessive. The prolongation of the settlement of the
estate was entirely due to the efforts of the administrator
 to defraud the legitimate heirs and he cannot be allowed
to profit from his own fraud. The per diem compensation
of an administrator can only be allowed for necessary
services.
• Commissioners’ compensation is allowed.
• The services of the handwriting expert and the
stenographer who transcribed the notes taken down
during the hearing upon the will and the fees of the clerk
cannot be allowed. These services were contracted in
furtherance of administrator’s fraudulent designs.
Other notes:
• Having been unfaithful to his trust, the administrator has
no right to be retained as administrator. The court below
erred in not removing him from office.
• Instead of being a creditor of the estate, the administrator
is now indebted to it. This is because of the
discrepancies between the accounts and vouchers
presented to the court.
• The income of property donated to Tirso Dacanay by his
father should have been brought to collation but there is
no sufficient data from which the amount of said income
may be ascertained. Thus the parties may bring a
separate suit against the administrator for recovery of
their share of the collationable income.
• The Court has decided to make the distribution upon the
data existing in the record and without the appointment
of other commissioners. It adhered to the plan of
distribution made in the CFI in 1916, in accordance with
the evidence presented. (The distribution was
reproduced but in Spanish.)
35 Lacson v. Reyes (1990)
Rule 85 (Sec. 7) | Accountability and Compensation
of Executors and Administrators
Sarmiento, J.
Summary
43. Respondent, Atty. Emphraim Serguina, petitioned
the court for the probate of the last will and
testament of Carmelita Farlin. Respondent likewise
petitioned the court to be the executor under the
will. The court issued the certificate of allowance,
and was named executor. Respondent filed a
motion for attorney’s fees alleging that the heirs
agreed to pay the sum of P68,000.00 for his
services. Heirs denied this, but RTC granted
P65,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Hence, this appeal.
44. WON respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to
the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules
of Court.
45. Yes. Because Rule 85 Sec. 7 provides that when
the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall
not charge against the estate any professional fees
for legal services rendered by him. It is pointed out
that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of
a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from
the estate. The rule is therefore clear that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for
the necessary expenses he has incurred as such,
 but he may not recover attorney's fees from the
estate.
Facts
59. (Antecedents) – private respondent, Atty. Ephraim
Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the
probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
Farlin.
60. He also petitioned the court in his capacity as
counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
executor under the will.
61. The petition was not opposed. Court issued the
certificate of allowance.
62. Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's
fees" against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs
had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services
rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.
63. The heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for
P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed upon was
only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already
paid.
64. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue
17. WON respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees contrary to the provisions of
Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.
a. Yes. Because Rule 85 Sec. 7 provides that
when the executor or administrator is an
attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him.
Held
Yes. It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently
an executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's
fees from the estate. The rule is therefore clear that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the
necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may
not recover attorney's fees from the estate. (Please read
the whole Rule 85, Sec. 7)
Sec. 7 of Rule 85:
Xxx
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the
settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed.
If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance
may be reexamined on appeal.
Xxx
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall
not charge against the estate any professional fees for
legal services rendered by him.
xxx
Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the
sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's
fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject properties," the
trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its
discretion.
Who pays the attorney’s fees?
We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor
may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his
client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself
the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay
therefor.
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty.
Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by him
(P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court
(P65,000.00).
Attorney’s fees are subject to the following standards:
(1) they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have
a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in
controversy;
(2) the extent of the services rendered; and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already
been paid the sum of P6,000.00. It is our considered
opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his
efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the
heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
36 ROSENSTOCK v. ELSER (1925)
Rule 78 | COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS
(RULE 85)
J. JOHNS
Summary
1. When Elser died, Rosenstock was appointed as
executor, with a monthly compensation of P1,000
as agreed by all interested parties. This was
questioned by the widow, stating that the
compensation of the executor must be based on the
Code of Civil Procedure. The Court lowered the
compensation to P400/month (but this was already
19 months after his appointment).
2. Issue: w/n the trial court erred in reducing the
executor’s compensation from P1,000 to P400 a
month - NO
3. Although by mutual consent his compensation was
fixed at P1,000 per month at the time of his
appointment, that was not a valid or binding
contract continuous throughout the whole
administration of the estate. It was always subject
to change and the approval of the court, and to
either an increase or decrease as conditions might
warrant. At all times the compensation of the
executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the
probate court.
Facts
1. When Elser died, Rosenstock filed a petition in the
CFI of Manila for the probate of the former’s will,
and that he, Rosenstock, be appointed as executor
of the estate. Rosenstock also asked the court in a
 separate petition to allow a P1,000/month
compensation as executor, owing to the size and
involved condition of the estate. In asking for the
said amount as compensation, it was alleged by
Rosenstock that all interested parties in the estate
had agreed to such. These petitions were granted
by the CFI.
2. The widow of Elser filed a petition praying for the
revocation of the order allowing the P1,000/month
compensation of Rosenstock, and instead
contended that the compensation of the executor
should be based upon the provisions of section 680
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. The widow’s petition was granted and the
executor’s compensation was reduced to
P400/month, but the widow still appealed this order,
stating that the court erred in failing to reduce the
compensation of the executor to the statutory
amount allowed under section 680.
Issue
W/N the trial court erred in reducing the executor’s
compensation from P1,000 to P400 a month
- NO
Held
1. At the time of his appointment, all parties agreed
that the executor should have and receive P1,000
per month for his services. The order of granting
Rosenstock such compensation, among other
things, recites the agreed facts, and is largely
founded upon that stipulation.
2. The present order, reducing the executor's fee to
P400 per month, from which both parties have
appealed, was made more than nineteen months
after the original order was made. That is to say,
that at the time the last order was made,
Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the
estate for more than nineteen months.
3. As such, he must have been administering the
affairs of the estate, with the ultimate view of
winding up and closing it. It is very apparent that
whatever reasons may have existed for allowing
him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the
time of his appointment have ceased to exist.
During that period, all of the assets and liabilities of
the estate should have been legally ascertained
and determined.
4. In other words, the character and class of the work
which now devolves upon the executor is of a very
different type and nature now than at the time of his
appointment.
5. Although by mutual consent his compensation was
fixed at P1,000 per month at the time of his
appointment, that was not a valid or binding
contract continuous throughout the whole
administration of the estate. It was always subject
to change and the approval of the court, and to
either an increase or decrease as conditions might
warrant. At all times the compensation of the
executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the
probate court.
 37 Joson v. Joson (1961)
Rule 85 | Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Bautista J.
Summary
1. When Tomas Joson died, Eduardo, his son,
presented his will for probate. Eduardo was
appointed as administrator of the estate. He filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased but
it was opposed several times by different heirs. The
heirs entered into an extrajudicial compromise but
since the court was not informed of the said
compromise, it still ordered Eduardo to file an
accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954.
Without complying with this order, the administrator
filed a motion to declare the proceeding closed and
terminated. The trial court granted the motion.
2. Issues: a. Is the duty of an administrator to make an
accounting of his administration a mere incident
which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled? NO
The duty of an administrator to render an account
is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or disregarded
when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty
that has to be performed and duly acted upon by
the court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated.
b. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the
mere execution of an extrajudicial partition of the
estate without the necessity of having the accounts
of the administrator heard and approved by the
court?
The fact that all the heirs of the estate have
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition in order to put an end to their differences
cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of
the objections of the heirs to the accounts
submitted by the administrator
Facts
1. Tomas Joson died leaving behind heirs and
properties. He married thrice and was survived by
nine heirs. Upon his death, his will was presented
to the CFI of Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo for
probate. Felicisimo was appointed administrator of
the estate so he filed an inventory of the properties
left by the deceased.
2. Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition
to all the accounts filed by the administrator wherein
he alleged that the administrator diminished the
shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the
properties and had padded his expenses of
administration.
3. In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise
their differences and entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of the entire estate.
However, as the court was never informed of this
extraj. settlement it issued an order requiring the
 administrator to file an accounting of his
administration from 1949 to 1954.
4. Without complying with the order of the court to
render an account for such years, the administrator
filed a motion to declare the proceeding closed and
terminated and to relieve him of his duties.
5. The trial court granted such motion and declared
the proceedings terminated and relieving the
administrator not only of his duties as such but also
of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs’
opposition to said accounts.
6. It is claimed by the oppositors that the estate cannot
be declared closed and terminated for the reason
that some of the accounts have not been approved.
Issue
1. Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting
of his administration a mere incident which can be
avoided once the estate has been settled? NO
2. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate
without the necessity of having the accounts of the
administrator heard and approved by the court? NO.||
NO
3. Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
proving his account from the moment said partition has
been executed?||| NO
Held
1. Is the duty of an administrator to make an
accounting of his administration a mere incident
which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled?
● Section 1 of Rule 86 (now Rule 85) categorically
charges an administrator "with the whole of the
estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession at the value of appraisement contained
in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and
income of such a estate; and with the proceeds of
so much of the estate as is sold by him, at the
price at which sold."|||
● Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the
duty to render an account of his administration
within one year from his appointment, unless the
court otherwise directs, as well as to render such
further accounts as the courts may require until the
estate is fully settled. |||
● It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to
render an account is not a mere incident of an
administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated, but that
it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted
upon by the court before the administration is
finally ordered closed and terminated.
● Here the administrator has submitted his accounts
for several years not only motu proprio but upon
requirement of the court, to which accounts the
heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition.
● Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the
motion for in doing so it disregarded the express
provisions of our rules relative to the settlement of
accounts of a judicial administrator.|||
2. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without
the necessity of having the accounts of the administrator
heard and approved by the court? NO
● The fact that all the heirs of the estate have
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition in order to put an end to their differences
cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of
the objections of the heirs to the accounts
submitted by the administrator not only because to
so hold would be a derogation of the pertinent
provisions of our rules but also because there is
nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid
accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
3. Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
proving his account from the moment said partition has
been executed?||| NO
● While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said
extrajudicial settlement is plausible and has
contributed to the early settlement of the estate,
the same cannot however be considered as a
release of the obligation of the administrator to
prove his accounts. |||
38 Philippine Trust Co. vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
(1961)
Rule 78 | Venue and Process
Ponente: J. Dizon
Summary
46. Picard was appointed as administrator of the
Intestate Estae of James Burt upon filing a bond of
1k. After some time, he was dismissed as
administrator and appointed Phil Trust in his place.
An inventory report was done by the latter showing
only 57.75 pesos as the only asset left in the estate
of Burt. After review by the Court, it was found that
there is still 7k balance so Picard was ordered to
deliver within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of the
Order. Later on, he was prosecuted for estafa. The
Court then ordered Luzon Surety to show cause
why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of
Picard would not be confiscated.
Luzon filed a motion to set aside said order upon
the following grounds:
• Firstly, that the Court cannot order the
confiscation of the administrator's bond, on
prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or
heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having
been shown
• Secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex
proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond."
Court denied the motion as well as the MR.
 47. WON the surety privy to the proceedings against
the executor or administrator? (Thus, giving the
probate court the power to confiscate the bond)
48. YES. From the very nature of the obligation entered
into by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he
(surety) is bound and concluded, in the absence of
fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his
principal, even though said surety was not a party
to the proceedings against the administrator, nor
notified in connection therewith prior to the
issuance of the court order for the confiscation of
the bond.
Facts
CFI of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as
Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James
R. Burt upon a bond of P1,000.00. Thereafter he submitted
and the Court approved his bond in the required amount,
with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. For
reasons that do not fully appear of record, the Court
dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the
Philippine Trust Co. in his place.
After qualifying for the position, Phil Trust, on July 19,
1948, submitted an inventory-report showing that the only
asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the
balance of the checking account of said deceased with the
Philippine National Bank.
It appears that Piccard, deducted his expenses amounting
to P887.22 from the total amount of property amounting to
P8,873.73, leaving a balance of P7,986.53. He likewise
deducted further expenses amounting to P865.20 from the
balance of P7,986.53; hence, leaving the balance of
P7,121.33 as of May 27, 1948.
CFI of Manila ordered Piccard to deliver the difference
amounting to P7,063.58 to PNB. In compliance with the
above order, Picard submitted an itemized statement of
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate,
showing that as of February 6, 1947 the estate funds
amounted to P7,986.53; that on June 8, 1948 he reported
to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting to
P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that
thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250 to defray the
burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance
of P6,871.33; that on several occasions during the period
from February 22, 1946 to May 14, 1947, he had delivered
to Feliciano Burt, adopted son of the deceased James R.
Burt, different sums of money totalling P5,825, thus
leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering this
statement, the Court, on September 18, 1948, issued an
order finding Picard guilty of having disbursed funds of the
estate amounting to about P8,000, without authority.
For this reason, the Court referred the matter to the City
Fiscal of Manila for investigation. Result of this was the
prosecution of Picard for estafa. Having pleaded guilty to
the charge, judgment of conviction was accordingly
rendered, and he was, besides, held civilly liable in the
sum of P8,000.00. The Court issued an order requiring
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the
administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard should
not be confiscated.
Luzon Surety filed a motion to set aside said order upon
the following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order
the confiscation of the administrator's bond, no prejudice
or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of
James R. Burt having been shown, and secondly, that "a
probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the
probate bond". Court denied appellant's motion and
ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of
appellant's motion for reconsideration, it took the present
appeal.
Issue
WON the the surety is privy to the proceedings against the
executor or administrator?
Held
YES. From the very nature of the obligation entered into
by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he (surety) is
bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and
collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though
said surety was not a party to the proceedings against the
administrator, nor notified in connection therewith prior to
the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the
bond.
In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135,
the sureties on the administrator’s bond were held liable
thereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding
against the administrator, nor were they notified in
connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court
order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to
Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or administrator,
his sureties “may upon application, be admitted as a party
to such accounting.” The import of this provision is that the
sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to
intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor
or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.
39 Dela Cruz v. Camon (1966)
Rule 85 | Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Escalante
Summary
1. The administrator of the estate of Thomas Fallon
and Anne Fallon Murphy moved the court for an
order to direct Camon to pay the estate's 2/3 share
of the rentals for the previous years. Camon
challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his
person. Court ruled that it must be made by
independent action.
2. WON the probate court may rule on the demand
for rentals
3. NO. The amount demanded is not, by any means,
liquidated. Camon may set up defenses, one of
which is that the hacienda has already been sold
along with the right to the accrued rents, which the
administrator denied. Because of all of these, the
money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the
 hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the
effective control of the probate court.
The administrator may not pull him against his will,
by motion, into the administration proceedings.
Even "matters affecting property under judicial
administration" may not be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if
the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner is the administrator of the
estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy,
while respondent is the lessee of a property owned
by the estate.
2. (Antecedents) – The estate of Thomas Fallon and
Anne Fallon Murphy owned 2/4 share pro-indiviso
of Hacienda Rosario. The whole hacienda was held
in lease by Camon. The administrator of the estate
moved the court for an order to direct Camon to pay
the estate's 2/3 share of the rentals for the previous
years.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Camon
challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his
person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals
cannot be made "by mere motion by the
administrator but by independent action." From this
the administrator appealed.
Issue
1. WON the probate court has jurisdiction over the 3rd
party
a. No. The property has already been sold. The
demand is for money due allegedly for rentals.
Camon is a third person. Hence, the
administrator may not pull him against his will,
by motion, into the administration proceedings.
Even "matters affecting property under judicial
administration" may not be taken cognizance of
by the court in the course of intestate
proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are
prejudiced"
Held
1. WON the probate court may rule on the demand for
rentals
NO. Appellee's opposition to the motion served a warning
that at the proper time he will set up the defense that the
administrator, had sold the estate's share in Hacienda
Rosario together with "all the rights, title and interest
(including all accrued rents) that said heirs had inherited
from the said deceased." Appellant administrator in his
reply to the opposition admits the fact of sale of the land,
but not of the rentals due. Accordingly, the right to collect
the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be
threshed out upon a full-dress trial on the merits.
Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due
is not property in the hands of the administrator; it is not
thus within the effective control of the probate court.
Recovery thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by
separate suit commenced by the administrator. With
reason, because of the absence of express statutory
authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into defending
himself in the probate court. And, we are confronted with
the unyielding refusal of appellee to submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the probate court.
 40. QUIRINO v. GROSPE (1989)
Rule 78-85 and 87 | Accountability and
compensation of executor and administrator
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
49. This involves settlement of issues claimed by
different parties to the intestate proceedings of Don
Alfonso. Different parties filed their respective
motions for reconsideration citing various issues
predicated on alleged error of judgment of Judge
Grospe (respondent).
50. On claims against the estate for attorney’s fees,
transportation, and representation expenses, the
court held that these are services rendered to the
substituted heirs of Don Juan, hence these can not
be charged to the estate of Don Alfonso.
51. As for expenses related to acts of administration,
the rule is that where the monetary claim against
the administrator has a relation to his acts of
administration in the ordinary course thereof, such
claims can be presented for payment with the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate is pending, although said claims were not
incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and
collectible after his death.
52. Respective MRs denied.
Facts
65. (Parties) – Petitioners are Juan F. Gomez, Jesus
T. David, Raquiza children and their father Antonio
V. Raquiza (as alleged heirs of Natividad Castellvi),
and petitioner Antonio Quirino (motion for
reconsideration); Carmen Castellvi et al. (as
alleged heirs of Don Juan Castellvi) (motion for
intervention); Juan F. Gomez (motion for
clarificatory order); and Raquiza children (omnibus
motion for early resolution and immediate release
of funds) against Judge Grospe of CFI-Pampanga.
66. (Antecedents) – Petitioners have various issues
on the settlement of estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi,
which the SC decided by piecemeal.
Issue
18. Whether the claims for transportation and
representation expenses for services rendered to the
heirs of Don Juan can be chargeable to the estate of
Don Alfonso.
a. No. Did not inure to benefit of Don Alfonso’s
estate.
19. Whether claim for attorney’s fees of intervenor Jesus
David rendered for Dona Carmen’s estate can be
chargeable to the estate of Don Alfonso.
a. No. Did not inure to benefit of Don Alfonso’s
estate.
20. Whether expenses related to the acts of administration
can be chargeable to the estate of Don Alfonso.
a. Yes, but such must be presented with the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is pending!
Held
ISSUES 1 and 2: As to different claims for services
rendered for other decedents’ estates, they cannot be
allowed as claims against the estate of Don Alfonso.

The term “claims” required to be presented against a
decedent’s estate is generally construed to mean debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been
enforced against the deceased in his lifetime or liability
contracted by the deceased before his death.
It is important to note that movant’s claims for attorney’s
fees and transportation as well as representation
expenses are for services rendered to the alleged
substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi and such services
did not inure to the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his
estate.
The court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don
Alfonso Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any
disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the
estate.
ISSUE 3: Meanwhile, a monetary claim against the
administrator which has a relation to his acts of
administration may be presented for payment with the
court where a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is pending, though such claim was not
incurred by the deceased in his lifetime and collectible
after his death.
With regard to Floro’s claim for payment for services
rendered to the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, the rule is
that where the monetary claim against the administrator
has a relation to his acts of administration in the ordinary
course thereof, such claims can be presented for payment
with the court where a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is pending, although said claims
were not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and
collectible after his death. This is so, because the
administration is under the direct supervision of the court
and the administrator is subject to its authority.
MINOR ISSUE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court
The court a quo has limited jurisdiction to settle only the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, and any act done in
excess of such limits may not be given effect.
Where movant’s claim is chargeable to the heirs of Don
Juan Castellvi, his clients, then the court a quo has no
jurisdiction to fix such fees for services rendered not to the
estate of Don Alfonso, but to the heirs of Don Juan.
It follows that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to approve
a contract of legal services between claimant and the heirs
of Don Juan. The court a quo is of limited jurisdiction,
empowered to settle only the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi, any act done in excess of such limits may not be
given force and effect.
41 AGUAS v. LLEMOS (1062)
Rule (78, 85) 87 | Actions by and against Executors
and Administrators
Ponente J. JBL Reyes
Summary
53. Petitioners Sps. Aguas and Francisco Salinas
allegedly received by registered mail a copy of a
 petition for a writ of possession with notice that it
would be submitted to the CFI of Catbalogan,
Samar from Defendant Hermogenes Llemos. So,
from Manila, Petitioners Aguas et.al (w/ their
lawyers) went to the said CFI only to discover that
no such petition had actually been filed.
54. Thus, Petitioners Aguas et.al jointly filed an action
in said CFI to recover damages from Llemos saying
that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court
making their expenditure & trouble in vain which
caused them mental anguish and undue
embarrassment.
55. However, before Llemos could answer the
complaint, he died. Petitioners Aguas et.al
amended their complaint to include the Heirs of
Llemos. Meanwhile, the Heirs filed an MTD w/c was
granted on the ground that the legal representatives
(not the heirs) should have been defendants. Also,
since the action was for recovery of money,
testate/intestate proceedings should be initiated
and petitioner’s claim filed therein.
56. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
57. YES. 2 rules were discussed in this case. Rule 86,
sec. 5(3) provides for actions abated by death – all
claims for money against decedent arising from
contract, express or implied. Rule 87, Sec. 1(3)
provides for actions that survive and may be
prosecuted against a decedent’s
executors/administrators – actions to recover
damages for an injury to person/property.
58. SC held that this case does not fall under said Rule
86 bec. the cause of action arises from tort, not
contract. Rather, this case falls under said Rule 87
bec. SC considered that when Llemos maliciously
caused Petitioners Aguas et. al to incur
unnecessary expenses, it caused injury to their
property/estate. Thus, the action can be prosecuted
against decedent’s executor/administrator.
59. Note that the parties eventually arrived at an
amicable settlement so the case became moot.
Facts
1. Short case. The whole facts of the case are already
in the summary.
Issue
1. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
a. Yes.
Held
1. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
YES. 2 rules were discussed in this case: Rule 86 and
Rule 87 (w/c were mistakenly cited by the Ponente as Rule
87 and Rule 88 respectively).
Rule 86, Sec. 5 – Actions abated by death:
 1. Claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
sickness of decedent;
2. Judgments for money;
3. All claims for money against decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied.
Rule 87, Sec. 1 – Actions that survive against a
decedent’s executors/administrators:
1. Actions to recover real & personal
property from the estate;
2. Actions to enforce a lien thereon;
3. Actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property.
SC held that this case does not fall under Rule 86, Sec.
5(3) bec. the cause of action arises from tort, not contract.
Rather, this case falls under said Rule 87, Sec. 1(3) bec.
SC considered that when Llemos maliciously caused
Petitioners Aguas et. al to incur unnecessary expenses, it
caused injury to their property/estate. Thus, the action can
be prosecuted against decedent’s executor/administrator.
“Injury to Property” is not limited to injuries specific to
property. But extends to other wrongs by w/c personal
estate is injured/diminished.
Anyway, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement so
the case became moot.
42 MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (1989)
Rule 87 | Actions By and Against Executors and
Administrators
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
60. Balla and Paredes died in a head-on collision of two
buses; Balla owned and operated the first bus while
Paredes drove the second bus. Heirs of Paredes
filed a torts case against the heirs of Balla, alleging
that Balla was at fault. The Heirs of Balla moved to
dismiss, claiming that there is no cause of action
against them as it is incorrect to hold them liable for
Balla’s negligence. The Heirs of Paredes amended
their complaint to include Balla’s estate as
defendant. CFI still denied the motion to dismiss of
the heirs of Balla. Note that the Heirs of Balla never
instituted testate/intestate proceedings as they
claim that Balla left no properties (even though in
reality, Balla actually left the bus as inheritance).
61. WON CFI may entertain a case for damages arising
from the death of a person, filed against the estate
of another deceased person as represented by the
heirs
62. YES. It was correct for the Heirs of Balla to move
for dismissal and proper for the Heirs of Paredes to
correct the deficiency by amending the complaint to
include the estate of Balla; however, this is still futile
since there were no steps taken towards settling the
estate of Balla, nor was an administrator or
executor appointed. It is true that Rule 87, Section
1 states that actions to recover damages against
the deceased may be brought against the
administrator. However, the Court held that in case
of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate, in case
 where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate, or when it is reasonable to believe that
the heirs will not take any step to settle the estate
(such as in this case), then the court will allow the
heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased.
Facts
67. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case, the Melgas,
are children of the decedent Felicidad Balla. The
public respondent, Buenviaje, is the CFI Judge who
rendered the assailed decision. Private
respondents, Spouses Paredes, are forced heirs of
the decedent Fabian Paredes.
68. (Antecedents) – A bus swerved to the left, collided
head-on with a Ford Fierra, swerved further to the
left, and then collided with a second bus.
69. As a result of the accident, Felicided Balla, owner-
operator of the first bus and mother of the
petitioners, died. The driver of the first bus. The
driver of the second bus, Fabian Paredes, also
died.
70. Spouses Paredes filed a case for damages against
the children of Felicidad Balla, alleging that it was
the latter’s driver’s negligence that caused the
accident.
71. Defendants of the complaint, the petitioners in this
case, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action against
them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold the
children liable for the alleged negligence of their
deceased mother and to consider suing the heirs of
a deceased person the same as suing the estate of
said deceased person inasmuch as the last portion
of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means
that the creditor should institute the proper intestate
proceedings wherein which he may be able to
interpose his claim.
a. Petitioners argue that distinction should be
made between a suit against the estate of
Felicidad Balla and the present action which
is a personal action against the children of
Felicidad Balla, considering that the children
have absolutely no participation directly or
indirectly in the alleged negligent acts of
Felicidad Balla, and there is absolutely no
logical basis to hold the children liable for
damages resulting from alleged negligent
acts of Felicidad Balla. In fact that second
sentence of Article 1311 of the New Civil
Code provides:
b. ... The heir is not liable beyond the value of
the property he received from the decedent
72. CFI denied the MTD.
73. Spouses Paredes then AMENDED THE
COMPLAINT and NAMING THE ESTATE OF
FELICIDED BELLA AS DEFENDANTS.
74. CFI denied the subsequent MR.
75. Hence, this petition.
Issue
21. WON CFI may entertain a case for damages arising
from the death of a person, filed against the estate of
another deeased persona s represented by the heirs.
a. YES. Because there were
 Held
22. WON Rule 1 is applicable in this case.
Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that
are abated by death are: (1) All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due or contingent; (2) All
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent; and (3) Judgments for money
against the.
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those
enumerated. Otherwise stated, actions for damages
caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive
the death of the latter.
The action can therefore be properly brought under
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an
executor or administrator. The rule provides:
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. — No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
Hence, the inclusion of the "estate of Felicidad Balla" in the
amended complaint as defendant.
The point of controversy is however on the fact that no
estate proceedings exist for the reason that her children
had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her
estate, claiming that Balla left no properties.
Thus, while petitioners may have correctly moved for the
dismissal of the case and private respondents have
forthwith corrected the deficiency by filing an amended
complaint, even before the lower court could act on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of their
motion to dismiss, such action would still be futile because
no steps were taken to settle the estate of Felicidad Balla,
nor has an executor or administrator been appointed.
From the statement made by the petitioners that "many
persons die without leaving any asset at all" (Reply to
Respondents' Comment, p. 78; Memorandum for
Petitioners, Rollo, p. 5), which insinuates that the
deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that the
petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early
settlement of the estate, judicially or extra-judicially if only
to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note
however the deceased Balla apparently left the bus).
Under the circumstances the absence of an estate
proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take
the place of the deceased.
As restated in a much later case, in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of
the estate or in case where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
dismissed and petitioners are ordered substituted for the
deceased Felicidad Balla.
43 NAVAS v. GARCIA (1923)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Cruz
Summary
63. Appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased,
hence the first in the preference provided in the
ROC, however the lower court gave the
administrative rights to a certain Garcia. The case
did not provide Garcia’s relation to the deceased.
64. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
65. No, Nava was proven to have had adverse interests
in the estate. The court may determine whether or
not the person next in the order is incompetent or
unsuitable to administrate and in these cases, the
court may assign another person it deems suitable.
Facts
76. (Parties) – Petitioner in this case is the widow and
the heirs of the brother of private respondent while
private respondent is the daughter of the mother,
who was the principal actor in this case.
77. (Antecedents) – The mother was a person named
Juana Suterio. She had two siblings named
Perfecta and Felipe and upon the death of Perfecta,
Juana and Felipe executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue
of this settlement, the two forced heirs donated the
subject property to a person named Salud, the
private respondent in this case.
Even though the property was donated, it was never
registered in Salud’s name even though it was said
in the record that she took possession of the subject
land immediately. Eventually, Salud said that
according to her mother Juana’s request, she
transferred the possession of the donated property
back to her mother, who was staying with a certain
person named Claudio. What happened next
though was the Juana sold the property to Claudio
even though she did not have title to the land but
only its possession.
78. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – After
Claudio’s death, private respondents filed a
complaint for reconveyance of the property saying
that the deed of conveyance was fictitious and the
registration was null and void due to this.
Issue
1. WON the respondent has right to the subject
property.
Ruling
1. WON the respondent has right to the subject
property.
 YES. Petitioners assail the intrinsic validity of the
extrajudicial settlement and that it is not really a donation
because they argue that the real donor of the property
was Perfecta who could no longer bestow the gift as she
died already. The court was not persuaded as the
argument was already nitpicking. Felipe and Juana had
declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners
of the property, as such they were free to give the land to
whomever they chose. In fact, the donation of the land to
Salud shows the two forced heirs’ integrity as it was in
accordance with the wishes of the deceased.
Furthermore, Juana had no right to sell the property to
Claudio as she was no longer the owner, having
previously donated it to Salud. She only held the land as
a trustee to Salud who had transferred merely the
possession of the land upon her request.
44 Bernardo v. CA (1963)
Rule 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Barrerra
Summary
1. (Short Facts)
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were
husband and wife. The first died and his will was
admitted to probate disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins. Thereafter,
Hermogena Reyes died. Upon petition of Bernardo,
executor of the estate of Eusebio Capili, she was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate
heirs.
The executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,.
These collateral relatives of Hermogenia filed an
opposition to the executor's project of partition and
submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will
of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that
they belonged not to the latter alone but to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Petitioners claimed that the properties disposed of
in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged
to him exclusively and not to the conjugal
partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had
donated to him her half share of such partnership;
1. The probate court, the issued an order declaring the
donation void for violating prohibition against
donations between spouses and alternatively, for
not conforming with the formalities of a will.
.
2. (Short Issue) WON the probate court has authority
to pass upon questions on whether certain
properties belong to the estate or the conjugal
partnership - YES
3. (Short Held) The matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties
 involved — whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a
matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily
Facts
2. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are
Deogracias Bernardo (Executor of estate of
Eusebio) and the heirs of Eusebio. The
respondents are the collateral heirs of Hermogena
Reyes who substituted her in her participation in the
estate of Eusebio.
3. (Antecedents) – Eusebio Capili and Hermogena
Reyes were husband and wife. The first died and a
testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins. Thereafter,
Hermogena Reyes herself died. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the
deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned. These relatives
filed an opposition to the executor's project of
partition and submitted a counter-project of partition
of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties
mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.
In the memorandum for the executor and the
instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the
properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not
to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena
Reyes had donated to him her half share of such
partnership;
4. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –the
probate court, the issued an order declaring the
donation void without making any specific finding as
to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter
vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that,
considered under the first category, it falls under
Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits
donations between spouses during the marriage;
and considered under the second category, it does
not comply with the formalities of a will
 .
Issue
1. WON the probate court has authority to pass upon
questions on whether certain properties belong to the
estate or the conjugal partnership - YES
Held
1. The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a
deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has
beenrecognized to be vested in probate courts. This is
so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and
expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate among the persons
entitled to succeed him.
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership
of certain of the properties involved — whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has
to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
45 Guanco v. Philippine National Bank (1930)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Summary
1. Decedent Espiridion Guanco, during his lifetime,
obtained a credit from PNB. He pledged shares of
the Binalbagan Estate and of Hinigaran Sugar
Plantation. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation gave PNB a
promissory note which covers Guanco’s debt. It
also secured a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB
for the note and for future credits. However, the
shares given to PNB as security for the decedent’s
transaction were not mentioned in such mortgage.
Upon motion of the administrator of Guanco’s
estate, the CFI ordered PNB’s bank manager to
appear in court for examination in regard to the
shares of the Binalbagan Estate under Sec. 709 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. It thereafter ordered –
in the same proceedings and without trial – the
manager to deliver the said shares to the
administrator.
2. WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the bank manager to deliver the subject shares to
the administrator – YES
3. The purpose of the proceedings provided for in
section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to elicit
evidence and does not, in terms, authorize the court
to enforce delivery of possession of the things
 involved. To obtain such possession, recourse
must generally be had to an ordinary action.
A certain number of shares of corporate stock was
turned over to the defendant bank as security for
credits granted the deceased. The SC held that CFI
could not compel the bank to surrender possession
of the shares upon a mere citation under section
709.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The appellee is Celso Guanco, the
administrator of the Guanco Estate and the
oppositor-appellant is PNB.
2. (Antecedents) – On January 18, 1921, the now
deceased Espiridion Guanco obtained a credit (not
exceeding P175.00, with interest) from PNB,
pledging as security 250 shares of the capital stock
of the Binalbagan Estate, Inc. and 1,916 shares of
the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc.
Hinigaran Sugar Plantation gave the bank a
promissory note, which includes Guanco’s
original debt.
Hinigaran Sugar Plantation also gave a mortgage
on real property in favor of PNB as security for the
note and for such future credits as might be
granted the company. The shares given to the
bank as security for the decedent’s transaction
were not mentioned in the mortgage.
Section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure only provides
a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having
After Guanco's death, the administrator of his
estate filed a petition in the proceedings asking that
the CFI order PNB’s president/manager to
appear in court for examination in regard to the 250
shares of the Binalbagan Estate under Sec. 709 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The CFI ordered bank manager Miguel Cuaderno
to appear before the court. The bank’s attorney filed
an answer asserting that the pledge of the 250
shares was still in force as security for the debts of
Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
CFI, in the same proceedings and without any trial,
ordered the bank manager to deliver the said 250
shares to the administrator of the Guanco Estate
within thirty days from notice of the order.
Upon appeal, the bank’s counsel maintains that the
CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery
of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding
under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue
WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
delivery of the shares to the administrator in a
proceeding under Section 709 of the Code of Civil
Procedure – YES
Held
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away property of the
deceased or withholds information of documentary
evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the
deceased to such property or to disclose the possession
of his last will and testament.
The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit evidence, and
the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to
enforce delivery of possession of the things involved. To
obtain the possession, recourse must therefore generally
be had to an ordinary action.
The CFI largely relied on a dictum in the Alafriz case that
"there may be cases, where papers and documentary
evidence of ownership of property are held by a third
person belonging to the estate of a deceased person, in
which it would be perfectly proper for the court to order the
same turned over to the court."
That may be true; it might apply to the possession of a will.
But in the same case, it was ruled that "the court had no
right to deprive appellant of her evidence relating to the
property, until the question of ownership had been settled."
That is practically this case. The bank maintains that the
pledge of the 250 shares is still in force. It may have
documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a
third party, on the strength of a citation under section 709.
The possession of the certificates of the shares in question
is a part of that evidence and it is obvious that if they are
surrendered to the administrator of the estate and possibly
disposed of by him, the bank will lose its hold on the shares
as a pledge. The bank is entitled to its day in court, and its
right can only be determined in a corresponding action.
46 ALFARIZ v. MINA (1914)
Rule 78 – 85 and 87 (Rule 87, Sec. 6)
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
4. Petitioner Alafriz was appointed as administrator of
the estate of Navarro. Navarro at the time of his
death, left some minor children, a widow, and
properties, real and personal. Respondent Mina
was appointed as the guardian of some of the minor
children. Mina had in her possession a certain
document for a certain jewelry deposited by
Navarro before his death as a security for a loan.
The administrator asked through a motion that Mina
be cited to appear in court for the purpose of
showing whether she had such document. Mina
offered proof for the purpose of showing that the
said jewelry belonged to her and her mother.
5. Issues:
a) WON the administrator may bring such
actions against Pia Mina as he may deem
necessary and the rights of which pertain
to the intestate estate of which he is the
administrator? - YES

b) WON the court erred in not permitting the
introduction of evidence relative to the
ownership of the said jewel? – NO.
1. YES. Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule
87, Sec. 6) expressly authorized the order of
which complaint is made. If upon the hearing,
there was good reason for believing that the
person cited had property in his or her
possession belonging to the estate, then it was
the duty of the administrator to proceed by an
ordinary action to recover possession of the
same.
2. NO. Section 709 does not seem to make
provision for the determination of the right of
ownership of property. Said section provides
that the person suspected of having property
belonging to the estate may be cited, and the
court may examine such person, under oath, on
the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere
expressly gives the court the power to determine
the right of property. The usual way of
determining the right of contending parties to the
ownership of property is by instituting an
ordinary action for that purpose.
Facts
3. (Parties) – Petitioner Alafriz – appointed
administrator of the estate of deceased Navarro;
Respondent Mina – widow of the deceased Navarro
4. (Antecedents) – Petitioner Alafriz was appointed
as administrator of the estate of Navarro. Navarro
at the time of his death, left some minor children, a
widow, and properties, real and personal.
Respondent Mina was appointed as the guardian of
some of the minor children. Mina had in her
possession a certain document for a certain jewelry
deposited by Navarro before his death as a security
for a loan. The administrator asked through a
motion that Mina be cited to appear in court for the
purpose of showing whether she had such
document. Mina offered proof for the purpose of
showing that the said jewelry belonged to her and
her mother. The court ordered the administrator to
commence an ordinary action against Mina to
recover the said jewelries. In the present case, the
defendant (Mina) was entitled to retain possession
of the pawn ticket (the document) until the question
of the ownership of the jewels should be determined
in the proper way.
Issues
1. WON the administrator may bring such actions
against Pia Mina as he may deem necessary and
the rights of which pertain to the intestate estate
of which he is the administrator? - YES
2. WON the court erred in not permitting the
introduction of evidence relative to the
ownership of the said jewel? – NO.

Held
1. YES. Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule 87, Sec.
6) expressly authorized the order of which complaint is
made. If upon the hearing, there was good reason for
believing that the person cited had property in his or
her possession belonging to the estate, then it was the
duty of the administrator to proceed by an ordinary
action to recover possession of the same.
2. NO. Section 709 does not seem to make provision for
the determination of the right of ownership of property.
Said section provides that the person suspected of
having property belonging to the estate may be cited,
and the court may examine such person, under oath,
on the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere expressly
gives the court the power to determine the right of
property. The usual way of determining the right of
contending parties to the ownership of property is by
instituting an ordinary action for that purpose.
The court believes that Sec. 709 did not provide for a
trial of the right of property of a deceased person,
embezzled or alienated by a third person.
The administrator in this case placed the jewelry In his
inventory but this is in no way deprives the appellant of
her property therein. She is still entitled to be heard
upon the question of ownership to a proper court.
47 Heirs of Gregoire v. Baker (1927)
Rule 87 | Actions against Administrators and
Executors
Ponente J. Street
Summary
6. (Short Facts) : Heirs of Gregoire filed claims against
the estate of Ankrom, administered by Baker. At first,
the estate appeared to be sufficient to cover the claims,
but later it was discovered that decedent assigned all
his interest on a tract of land to a certain Jung. Hence,
Baker amended the inventory and omitted the subject
tract of land. A 1st order to restore the inventory was
made, but a later order approved the omission.
7. Issue #1: What is the remedy of the appellants? The
remedy of the appellants is to indemnify the
administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to
set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed
to have been made in fraud of creditors.
8. Issue #2: WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd
order is invalid? NO. Orders made by a court with
reference to the inclusion of items of property in the
inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are
manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and
interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or
change at any time during the course of the
administration proceedings. Such orders are not
conclusive of the rights of any one, and the order in
question not final in the sense necessary to make it
appealable.

Facts
(Parties)
5. The petitioners in this case are the claimants against
the estate, heirs of gregoire; and
6. The respondent is the administrator of the estate of
Ankrome, Albert L. Baker.
(Antecedents)
1. J.H. Ankrom died and A.L. Baker (appellee) qualified
as his administrator. Administrator field his inventory
of the assets of the decedent, which included a
tract of land covered by a TCT and an area of more
than 930 hectares, estimated nearly at P60,000.
2. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire (appellants) filed a
claim against the estate of Ankrom for the
sum of $35,438.78 or P70,877.56, based upon a
judgment rendered in the SC of Panama. This claim
was allowed by the commissioners in the
estate of Ankrom, and no appeal was at any time
taken against the order so allowing it. Total claims
against the estate was P76,645.13 but 4 creditors
were paid in full, thus the balance is P75,005.31, the
greater part to the appellants.
3. At first, the assets appeared to be sufficient to pay all
claimants but administrator later discovered that
decedent executed a REM on the subject property to
Philippine Trust Company (PTC). 2 days after,
decedent made an assignment of all his interest in
the mortgaged property to one J. G.
Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported
consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations. Thus, administrator amended his
inventory, omitting the subject property which made
the estate insolvent.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
1. A 1st order to restore the property to the inventory was
made by the court, but a 2nd order approved the
omission. This order is the subject of the appeal.
Issue
22. What is the remedy of the appellants?
a. Action for conveyance with a bond.
23. WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd order is invalid?
a. No. Because orders of this nature is subject to
modification or change at any time during
the course of the administration
proceedings.
Held
1. What is the remedy of the appellants?
The precise remedy open to the appellants in the
predicament above described is clearly pointed out in
section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads
as follows:
"When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an
executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and
when the deceased person made in his life-time such
fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate
or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding
section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the
court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced
such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment,
in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for
the recovery of the same, and may recover for the
benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or
interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be
commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with
sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned
to indemnify the executor or administrator against the
costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon
the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred
and such other expenses as the court deems equitable."
The remedy of the appellants is to indemnify the
administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to
set aside the assignment or other conveyance
believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.
2. WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd order is invalid?
Appellants also contended that the 1st order to restore the
item was not appealed and must be final, and the 2nd order
be considered beyond the competence of the court.
This contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with
reference to the inclusion of items of property in the
inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are
manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and
interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or
change at any time during the course of the
administration proceedings. Such orders are not
conclusive of the rights of any one, and the order in
question not final in the sense necessary to make it
appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was
expressly made without prejudice to the rights of the
creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the
provision above quoted from the Code of Civil Procedure.
The order appealed from not being of an appealable
nature, it results that this appeal must be dismissed.
48 Velasquez v. George (1983)
Rule 87 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Gutierrez
Summary
9. Benjamin died leaving behind his wife Maria and
their children. He was a majority stockholder of a
company. The officers of this company and the
administrator of Benjamin’s estate mortgaged and
sold 3 company lands to Villanueva. Villanueva said
the heirs could not contest the sale since the Rules
of Court gives this power to the administrator.
10. WON Maria and her children could file the
complaint – YES.
11. Considering that the sale due to the machinations
of the administrator, it would be far-fetched to
expect the said administrator himself to file the
action in behalf of the estate. Since the
administrator is the one at fault, the heirs can file
the case themselves as the owners of the property.
 Facts administrator himself to file the action in behalf of
7. (Parties) – Petitioners = Maria Velasquez vda. De the estate.
George and her children; Respondents = Officers of
Island Associates Inc. and Andres Muñoz, the
administrator of the estate of Benjamin George
8. (Antecedents) – Maria’s husband Benjamin died.
While he was alive Benjamin owned 64% of the
shares of stock of Island Associates Inc.. Without
approval of the probate court and without notice to
the heirs, the officers of the company and Muñoz
mortgaged 3 of the company’s lands to Erlinda
Villanueva. The lands were eventually sold to her.
9. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Maria
and her children filed a complaint to annul the sale
since it will impair the distribution of Benjamin’s
estate. Villanueva contends that they have no legal
personality to do so. She says that according to
Sec. 3, Rule 87, only the estate’s administrator has
the capacity to file the case.

Issue
2. WON Maria and her children could file the
complaint – YES.
Ruling
2. The administrator is not the only person who can
file the case. They heirs of the deceased can do
so as well because they are now the owners of the
property. Especially so in this situation because
the administrator is also one of the persons who
caused the contested sale. Considering that the
sale due to the machinations of the administrator,
it would be far-fetched to expect the said
01 TIMBOL v CANO (1961)
Rule 88 | Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Ponente: J. Labrador
Summary
1. Mercedes Cano died intestate, leaving his son Florante
Timbol as the only heir. Jose Cano, brother of the decedent,
was appointed administrator of the estate. The probate court
granted Jose’s motion, asking for the conversion of 30
hectares into a subdivision, as well as the proposal that the
agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him. Later,
Florante was appointed administrator and he filed a motion to
have the 30 hectares increased to 42 hectares. Jose objected,
averring that the enlargement of the subdivision of the land
would deprive Jose’s tenants of their landholdings and that he
is in possession of a valid contract, approved by the court. The
court approved Florante’s motion. Hence, the appeal by Jose
where he alleges, among others, that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to deprive him of his lease rights. Also, he alleged
that the court had no jurisdiction to appoint a new
administrator, considering that the partition had already been
approved and had become final.
2. WoN the probate court had jurisdiction.
3. Yes. SC held that in probate proceedings, the court orders,
among others, the payment of lawful debts. Also, the probate
court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and delivery of the remaining
estate to the heirs. In this case, the debts had not yet been paid,
and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs.
Facts
1. The petitioner in this case is Florante Timbol, the son of the
decedent Mercedes Cano, who was appointed as administrator
after Jose Cano, who is the the brother of the decedent.
2. Mercedes Cano died intestate in 1945, leaving her son
Florante Timbol as her only heir. Jose Cano, brother of the
decedent, was appointed administrator. Jose then filed a
petition thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle
of the minor Florante, proposing that the agricultural lands of
the estate be leased to Jose for an annual rental of P4000. This
rental was to be used for the maintenance of the minor as well
as the payment of land taxes and dues to the government. The
said motion was approved.
3. A motion was filed by the administrator, with the conformity
of the minor heir and his uncles, for the reduction of the annual
rental from P4000 to P2400, as well as the conversion of 30
hectares of the agricultural lands into a subdivision. This
motion was approved as well.
4. Florante was later appointed administrator in place of Jose,
and he presented a motion where he alleges that the area
destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30
hectares to 42 hectares. This motion was approved, but the
approval was set aside to give opportunity to Jose, a former
administrator and lessee, to formulate his objections to the
motions. Jose’s objections were that 1) the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would
deprive his tenants of their landholdings and that 2) he is in
possession under express authority of the court under a valid
contract and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily
upon a simple petition.
5. The court granted the motions of Florante, overruling the
objections of Jose. The court held that the said contract of
lease is illegal. Under the Civil Code, executors and
administrators cannot acquire by purchase or to become lessee
of the property of the estate under administration.
6. Hence, the present appeal before the SC.
Issue
1. WoN the probate court has jurisdiction to deprive Jose of his
rights under the lease.
a. YES.
 2. WoN the probate court still has jurisdiction to appoint a new the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not
administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be yet been delivered to the heirs.
converted into a subdivision, considering that the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final.
a. YES.

Held
1. WoN the probate court has jurisdiction to deprive Jose of his rights
under the lease.

Yes. SC held that in probate proceedings, the court orders the probate
of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administrations, hears and
approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment
of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real
estate, and directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto,
among others. It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as
such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely
and economically administered, not dissipated.

In this case, the lease was obtained with the court’s approval. If the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, it could also order its
revocation and reduction. The matter of giving the property to a lessee
is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. If
the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts
of the administrator, its orders may be subject on appeal and may be
reversed on appeal.

2. WoN the probate court still has jurisdiction to appoint a new

administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be
converted into a subdivision, considering that the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final.

Yes. SC held that the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and delivery
of the remaining estate to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In
 02 Jaucian v. Querol (1918)
Rule 88 | Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Ponente J. Street
Summary
4. Petitioner Jaucian was a creditor of the deceased Rogero. The
former filed his claim in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of Rogero but this was denied by the lower court for
non-presentation to the committee on time.
5. WON petitioner’s claim is barred by prescription?
6. YES. Applying section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
this court has frequently decided that such claims are barred if
not presented to the committee in time; and for this reason, the
claim was properly rejected by the lower court.
Facts
7. (Parties) – The petitioner, Roman Jaucian, is a creditor of the
deceased, Hermenegilda Rogero. The defendant, Francisco
Querol, was the administrator of the Rogero’s intestate estate.
8. (Antecedents) – In October 1908, Lino Dayandante and
Hermenegilda Rogero executed a private writing in which
they acknowledged themselves to be jointly and severally
indebted to the petitioner in the sum of around P13K.
Hermenegilda Rogero signed this document in the capacity of
surety for Lino Dayandante; but as clearly appears from the
instrument itself both debtors bound themselves jointly and
severally to the creditor, and there is nothing in the terms of
the obligation itself to show that the relation between the two
debtors was that of principal and surety.
Hermenegilda Rogero sought for the cancellation of the
private document on account of fraud. CFI granted the petition
(appealed to SC then the latter eventually reversed). During
the pendency of appeal to SC, Hermengilda died and
proceedings were had in the CFI of Albay for the
administration of the estate of Rogero. Querol was appointed
administrator. A committee was appointed to pass upon
claims against the estate. This committee made its report on
September 3, 1912. On March 24, 1914, or about a year and
half after the filing of the report of the committee on claims
against the Rogero estate, Jaucian entered an appearance in
the estate proceedings, and filed with the court a petition in
which he averred the execution of the document of October,
1908, by the deceased, the failure of her co-obligor
Dayandante, to pay any part of the debt, except P100 received
from him in March, 1914, and the complete insolvency of
Dayandante.
The administrator opposed upon the grounds that the claim
had never been presented to the committee on claims for
allowance; that more than eighteen months had passed since
the filing of the report of the committee, and that the court was
therefore without jurisdiction to entertain the demand of the
claimant.
9. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The CFI of Albay,
entered an order refusing to grant Jaucian’s petition on the
grounds that as the claim had never been presented to the
committee on claims, it was barred; that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain it. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Issue
3. WON the claim of Jaucian was contingent or absolute?
a. It was absolute.
4. WON the claim of Jaucian was barred for not presenting it to the
committee on claims on time?
a. Yes.
Held
3. WON the claim of Jaucian was contingent or absolute?
It was absolute. Appellant contends that his claim against the deceased
was contingent. His theory is that the deceased was merely a surety of
Dayandante. His argument is that as section 746 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that contingent claims "may be presented with the
proof to the committee," it follows that such presentation is optional.
Appellant, furthermore, contends that if a creditor holding a contingent
claim does not see fit to avail himself of the privilege thus provided,
there is nothing in the law which says that his claim is barred or
prescribed, and that such creditor, under section 748 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, at any time within two years from the time allowed
other creditors to present their claims, may, if his claim becomes
absolute within that period present it to the court for allowance. On the
other hand counsel for appellee contends (1) that contingent claims
like absolute claims are barred for non- presentation to the committee
but (2) that the claim in question was in reality an absolute claim and
therefore indisputably barred.
Articles 1822, 1144, 1830, 1831 of the Civil Code make it clear that
Hermenegilda Rogero was liable absolutely and unconditionally for
the full amount of the obligation without any right to demand the
exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor previous to its
payment. Her position so far as the creditor was concerned was exactly
the same as if she had been the principal debtor.
The absolute character of the claim and the duty of the committee to
have allowed it is full as such against the estate of Hermenegilda
Rogero had it been opportunely presented and found to be a valid
claim is further established by section 698 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides: When two or more persons are indebted
on a joint contract, or upon a judgment founded on a joint contract,
and either of them dies, his estate shall be liable therefor, and it shall
be allowed by the committee as if the contract had been with him alone
or the judgment against him alone. But the estate shall have the right
to recover contribution from the other joint debtor.
It is thus apparent that by the express and incontrovertible provisions
both of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, this claim was
an absolute claim.
4. WON the claim of Jaucian is barred for non-presentation to
the committee within the period prescribed by law.
YES. Applying section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this court
has frequently decided that such claims are barred if not presented to
the committee in time; and we are of the opinion that, for this reason,
the claim was properly rejected by Judge Jenkins of CFI Albay.
As already observed the case is such as not to require the court to apply
sections 746-749 (for contingent claims), inclusive, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, nor to determine the conditions under which
contingent claims are barred.
Some discussions on difference between absolute and contingent
claims
But a few words of comment may be added to show further that the
solidary obligation upon which this proceeding is based is not a
contingent claim, such as is contemplated in those sections. The only
concrete illustration of a contingent claim given is section 746 is the
case where a person is liable as surety for the deceased, that is, where
the principal debtor is dead. This is a very different situation from that
presented in the concrete case now before us, where the surety is the
person who is dead.
It is possible that "contingency," in the cases contemplated in section
746, may depend upon other facts than those which relate to the
creation or inception of liability. It may be, for instance, that the
circumstance that a liability is subsidiary, and the execution has to be
postponed after judgment is obtained until the exhaustion of the
assets of the person or entity primarily liable, makes a claim
contingent within the meaning of said section; but upon this point it
is unnecessary to express an opinion. It is enough to say that where,
as in the case now before us, liability extends unconditionally to the
entire amount stated in the obligation, or, in other words, where the
debtor is liable in solidum and without postponement of execution,
the liability is not contingent but absolute.
 03 CU UNJIENG v. TIAOQUI (1937)
Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the State
Ponente J. Imperial | (Alejandro)
NOTE: I’m sorry mahaba Complete to promise.
RECIT READY
RECIT READY
Facts: Alfonso M. Tiaoqui instituted a civil case against the Cu
Unjiengs to recover the sum of P140,000 at the RTC of Manila.
After filing a bond of P20,000, the court ordered the preliminary
attachment of the properties of the defendants. The Cu Unjiengs
filed an amended answer setting up special defenses and counter
claim in the amount of P9,050,000.
During the pendency of the case, Tiaoqui died. Intestate
proceedings were commenced where Jose S. Tiaoqui and Alfredo
Hidalgo Rizal were appointed joint administrators. The appointed
commissions on claims and appraisal submitted their report after
assessing the properties, stating that no claims had been
presented against the deceased. With this, the court ordered the
joint administrators to present final account and a project of
partition. This deadline set was extended more than once and one of
the grounds is that the litigations on the P140,000 and other
properties of the intestate estate continued to be pending and,
therefore, could not be included in the project of partition. After the
presentation of the final account and the project of partition, and
after having paid the inheritance tax, the administrators presented
the deed of delivery of the properties to the heirs, which deed
was ratified and accepted by the heirs.
The court issued an order relieving the administrators,
cancelling their respective bonds and ordered the closing and final
filing of the record of the intestate proceedings. The case was
subsequently reopened through the filing of the administrators of
an ex parte petition on the ground that the civil case continued to
be pending in the court and, were they to cease as such, the decease
would be left without representation. The court set aside its
former orders and directed that the case remain open for the
sole purpose of enabling administrators to prosecute the
pending civil case to its termination.
The Cu Unjiengs, upon being informed of the latest proceedings
followed in the intestate case, filed a motion, praying for the
annulment of the deed of delivery executed by the
administrators in favour of the hers, and for them to return by
said heirs, to the intestate estate, of all the properties received by
them, to answer for the counterclaim in case it should prosper. After
due hearing, the court denied the motion because the defendants
neither informed the court of their counterclaim nor asked for
the retention of properties sufficient to pay said counterclaim.
Issue:
1. WON the counterclaim of the Cu Unjiengs is a contingent claim
2. WON the Cu Unjiengs are duty bound to inform the probate court
of the filing of the counterclaim.
3. WON the probate court was duty bound to order the cancellation
of the deed of delivery and the return by the heirs of the properties
received by them.
Held:
1. NO, the counterclaim of the defendants-appellants is not a
contingent claim because the obligation sought to be enforced
against the deceased or his legal representatives, the
administrators, does not depend on an uncertain or future event.
2. YES. Although the Code of Civil Procedure contains no
provision directly imposing such duty on them, however, if the
defendants-appellants wanted some remedy from the probate
court for the protection of their rights, they should timely apply
to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay
for the counterclaim in case it should prosper.
3. NO. As the court had not therefore been directly informed of
said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was
 ready for distribution, it appearing from the report of the
committee that there were no debts to be paid and it being
inferable from the record that the expenses of administration,
including the inheritance tax, had already been paid.
Doctrine:
A contingent claim is that "in which liability depends on some
future event that may or may not happen, and which makes it
uncertain whether there will ever be any liability."
It is true that the Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision
directly imposing the duty to inform the probate court of the
filing of the counterclaim, however, if under section 602 of the
same Code the probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try
and decide the settlement, payment of debts and distribution of the
estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot
be denied that if the defendants-appellants wanted some remedy
from said court for the protection of their rights, they should timely
apply to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay
for the counterclaim in case it should prosper.
Separate Opinion: The proper remedy that the appellants should
have applied for is the for is the annulment of the order of the
court approving the project of partition of the properties of the
deceased Tiaoqui and requiring the administrators, after
payment of the inheritance tax, to deliver said properties to the
heirs of said deceased in accordance with the approved
partition.
To ask, as the appellants have done, for the annulment of the deed of
delivery of the properties to the heirs and for the return of said
properties by the latter to the administration of the intestate estate of
Tiaoqui, without asking for the annulment of the order approving the
partition which is the root and legal reason for said delivery of the
properties to the heirs, was to ask for an inadequate and ineffective
remedy for the protection of their rights, that is, to secure the payment
of their counterclaim in case it should prosper against the heirs.
FACTS:
1. [Civil Case] Alfonso M. Tiaoqui (Tiaoqui), in life, instituted a
civil case against Guillermo A. Cu Unjieng, Mariano Cu Unjieng
(the Cu Unjiengs) and Rafael Fernandez to recover the sum of
P140,000 at the RTC of Manila. After filing a bond of P20,000,
the court ordered the preliminary attachment of the properties of
the defendants. Note: This is already the fifth preliminary
attachment levied on the same properties. The Court had
previously issued resulting writs at the instance of third parties
upon filing a bond.
2. [Intestate Proceedings] During the pendency of the case, Tiaoqui
died in Manila. Intestate proceedings were commenced in the RTC
of Manila. Jose S. Tiaoqui and Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal
(administrators) were appointed joint administrators.
3. [CC] The Cu Unjiengs filed an amended answer setting up special
defenses and counter claim in the amount of P9,050,000.
4. [IP] The appointed commissions on claims and appraisal
submitted their report after assessing the properties, stating that no
claims had been presented against the deceased.
5. [IP] Upon being informed that no claims had been presented
against the estate, the court ordered the joint administrators to
present final account and a project of partition within the period
of 15 days.
6. The administrators fi led a motion for extension, in view of the
fact that the balancing of the business early next year, and
furthermore, because there were credits and properties of the
administration which were the subject matter of pending
litigations. The court granted the motion.
7. [CC] The court, by means of an order, authorised the
administrators to substitute the deceased as plaintiff in the civil
case.
[IP all the way]
8. The administrators asked for another extension of time as the
balance sheet was still incomplete and limitations on credit and
the properties of the administration continued to be pending. The
Court granted the extension.
9. The administrators presented the final account but asked for
another extension of the time for filing the project of partition
on the ground that the litigations on the P140,000 and other
properties of the intestate estate continued to be pending and,
therefore, could not be included in the project of partition. The
court approved the final account and order the administrators to
present the project partition of the properties not involved in the
litigations, within 30 days.
10. The administrators filed the project partition required of them.
This was approved by the court. The court also required the
administrators, after payment of inheritance tax, to deliver the
properties adjudicated to the heirs within 15 days and to verify the
delivery of said properties.
11. After having paid the inheritance tax, the administrators presented
the deed of delivery of the properties to the heirs, which deed was
ratified. The acceptance by the heirs appeared therein below. In
view of this, the court issued an order relieving the administrators
of their duties and responsibilities and cancelling their respective
bonds and ordered the closing and final filing of the record of
the intestate proceedings.
1
SEC. 701. An executor or administrator may sue. — Nothing in this chapter shall
prevent an executor or administrator from commencing and prosecuting an action
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, for the recovery of a debt or claim, to fi nal
judgment, or from having execution on a judgment, and in such case the defendant
may plead in offset the claims he has against the deceased, instead of presenting
them to the committee, and mutual claims may be offset in such action; and if
final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the judgment so rendered
shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had
12. Twelve days after the order of the court for the closing of the
intestate proceedings, the administrators filed an ex parte
petition for the reopening of the case on the ground that the civil
case continued to be pending in the court and, were they to cease
as such, the decease would be left without representation.
13. The court set aside its former order closing the intestate
proceedings, ordering the final filing of the record and relieving
the administrators of their duties, and directed that the case remain
open for the sole purpose of enabling administrators to prosecute
the pending civil case to its termination.
14. The Cu Unjiengs, upon being informed of the latest proceedings
followed in the intestate case, filed a motion, praying for the
annulment of the deed of delivery executed by the administrators
in favour of the hers, and for them to return by said heirs, to the
intestate estate, of all the properties received by them, to answer
for the counterclaim in case it should prosper. This was objected
to by the administrators.
15. After due hearing, the court denied the motion. The court declared
that, while the counterclaim of the Cu Unjiengs was proper
according to section 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it
1
was not necessary to present it as a claim before the committee
on claims on the ground that sections 746 and 747 of the same
2
Code are not applicable thereto, however, as the defendants did
not duly appear in the intestate proceedings and they neither
informed the court of their counterclaim nor asked for the
retention of properties su fficient to pay said counterclaim, in
case the court should decide it favorably to them, said defendants
are not entitled to the cancellation of the deed of delivery or to the
return by the heirs, to the intestate estate, of the properties received
been presented before the committee. Such actions shall be prosecuted in the same
province and same court as they would have been if brought by the deceased person
while alive.
2
SEC. 746. Claims may be presented to committee. — If a person is liable as surety for
the deceased, or has other contingent claims against his estate which can not be
proved as a debt before the committee, the same may be presented with the proof,
to the committee, who shall state in their report that such claim was presented to
them.
 by them in the ordinary course of the intestate proceedings. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
16. Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON the counterclaim of the Cu Unjiengs is a contingent claim.
a. NO, the counterclaim of the Cu Unjiengs is not a
contingent claim because the obligation sought to be
enforced against the deceased or his legal representatives,
the administrators, does not depend on an uncertain or
future event.
2. WON the Cu Unjiengs are duty bound to inform the probate court
of the filing of the counterclaim.
a. YES. Although the Code of Civil Procedure contains no
provision directly imposing such duty on them,
however, if the defendants-appellants wanted some
remedy from the probate court for the protection of their
rights, they should timely apply to it and ask for the
retention of properties sufficient to pay for the
counterclaim in case it should prosper.
3. WON the probate court was duty bound to order the cancellation
of the deed of delivery and the return by the heirs of the properties
received by them
a. NO. As the court had not therefore been directly
informed of said counterclaim, it understood that the
inheritance was ready for distribution, it appearing
from the report of the committee that there were no debts
to be paid and it being inferable from the record that the
expenses of administration, including the inheritance tax,
had already been paid.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. The appealed order being in accordance with law, it is hereby
a ffirmed, with the costs of this instance to the defendants-
appellants. So ordered.
RULING:
Definition of Contingent Claim (nasa Sandy Crab so I included
everything)
1. In the case of E. Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, this court de fined a
contingent claim as that "in which liability depends on some
future event that may or may not happen, and which makes it
uncertain whether there will ever be any liability."
2. Elaborating on the idea, it was stated: "The expression is used in
contradistinction to the absolute claim, which is subject to no
contingency and may be proved and allowed as a debt by the
committee on claims. The absolute claim is such a claim as, if
contested between living persons, would be proper subject of
immediate legal action and would supply a basis of a judgment for
a sum certain. It will be noted that the term 'contingent' has
reference to the uncertainty of the liability and not to the
uncertainty in which the realization or collection of the claim may
be involved.
3. The word 'contingent,' as used in the original English, in the Code
of Civil Procedure, conveys the idea of ultimate uncertainty as
to the happening of the event upon which liability will arise;
and it is not the precise equivalent of the Spanish word 'eventual'
by which it is commonly translated. The idea involved in the word
'eventual' may be satis ed with the idea of that which is uncertain
only in respect to the element of time. A thing that is certain to
happen at some time or other will eventually come to pass
although the exact time may be uncertain; to be contingent its
happening must be wholly uncertain until the event which fixes
liability occurs."
4. Some courts of the American Union have defi ned a contingent
claim as follows: "A contingent claim is where the liability
depends upon some future event which may or may not
 happen, and therefore makes it now wholly uncertain whether
there ever will be a liability.” "A claim which may never accrue;
one which has not accrued and which is dependent on the
happening of some future event; one that depends for its effect on
some future event, which may or may not happen.”
Issue: WON the counterclaim of the Cu Unjiengs is a contingent claim.
5. From the definitions just quoted, it is evident that the
counterclaim of the defendants-appellants is not a contingent
claim because the obligation sought to be enforced against the
deceased or his legal representatives, the administrators, does
not depend on an uncertain or future event.
6. According to the allegations of the counterclaim contained in the
amended answer, the obligation contracted by the deceased arose
from the time the conspiracy was carried out and from the time the
preliminary attachment was obtained illegally and without any
just cause. However, the administrators contend in their brief that
the counterclaim is of the nature of a contingent claim because it
can not be realized until final judgment has been rendered by the
court. This contention is su fficiently refuted by reproducing
what has been stated in the case of E. Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit,
to the effect that "the term contingent has reference to the
uncertainty of the liability and not to the uncertainly in which
the realization or collection of the claim may be involved.”
Issue: WON they are duty bound to inform the probate court of the
filing of the counterclaim
7. It is true that the Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision
directly imposing such duty on them. However, if under section
602 of the same Code the probate court alone had acquired
jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts
and distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion
of all other courts, it cannot be denied that if the defendants-
appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the protection
of their rights, they should timely apply to it and ask for the
retention of properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim
in case it should prosper.
8. Although the administrators were also in duty bound to inform the
probate court of the existence of the counterclaim, which duty was
partly complied with by them when they reiteratedly informed the
court that it was not possible to present a final account or project
of partition on the ground that there were pending litigations, such
duty, however, was coextensive with that of the defendants-
appellants and the latter were not relieved thereof by the
conduct that might have been observed by the administrators,
which conduct, on the other hand, can not be considered improper
taking into consideration all the circumstances hereinbefore
stated.
Issue: WON the probate court was duty bound to order the
cancellation of the deed of delivery and the return by the heirs of the
properties received by them
9. It can not be denied that in the ordinary course of an intestate
proceeding the probate court should not authorize the delivery of
the properties until after payment has been made of the
acknowledged debts of the deceased and of the expenses of
administration, and after the approval of the project of partition
(sec. 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and that, as the
counterclaim of the defendants-appellants was pending decision
in another court, it was improper to order either the distribution of
the inheritance or the delivery thereof to the heirs, but in this case,
we should not lose sight of the fact that, as the court had not
therefore been directly informed of said counterclaim, it
understood that the inheritance was ready for distribution, it
appearing from the report of the committee that there were no
debts to be paid and it being inferable from the record that the
expenses of administration, including the inheritance tax, had
already been paid.
10. If the defendants-appellants had no effective remedy under the law
in case their counterclaim should prosper, this court would not
hesitate to take another action and would order the cancellation of
 the deed of delivery and the return of the properties to the intestate said delivery of the properties to the heirs, was to ask for an
estate. But the fact is that said appellants have available the inadequate and ineffective remedy for the protection of their
remedy afforded by section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure rights, that is, to secure the payment of their counterclaim in
under which they may, after having obtained favorable case it should prosper against the heirs.
judgment, ask that the heirs contribute in proportion to the 3. As the Cu Unjiengs failed to fi le any motion to set aside said order
value of the properties received by them, to pay their or to appeal therefrom the only remedy open to them, in my opinion,
counterclaim. Although not effective because the heirs may in the was to bring a separate civil action for the annulment of the order in
meantime dispose of said properties, to which it may be remarked question, utilizing, in the meantime and from the commencement of
that the risk, if any, may well be prevented by adopting the the action, the preventive measures prescribed by the Code of Civil
precautionary measures authorized by law. Procedure to restrain in leaving the decision that may be rendered
11. In so deciding the question, this court has furthermore taken into entirely ineffective thereby annulling the partition.
consideration the fact that the preliminary attachment levied by
the deceased upon the properties of the defendants-appellants was
in effect nominal, having been the fifth, because prior to the
issuance thereof said properties had likewise been preliminarily
attached. Under these circumstances, it seems unnecessary to
adopt so drastic a measure as to result in depriving the heirs
of their possession of the properties received by them by order
of the court and to the delivery of which the appellants themselves
have contributed in the manner already stated.

Separate Opinion: Concepcion, J.

What is the proper remedy that Cu Unjiengs should have applied for?
1. The proper remedy that the appellants should have applied for
is the for is the annulment of the order of the court approving
the project of partition of the properties of the deceased Tiaoqui
and requiring the administrators, after payment of the
inheritance tax, to deliver said properties to the heirs of said
deceased in accordance with the approved partition.
2. To ask, as the appellants have done, for the annulment of the deed
of delivery of the properties to the heirs and for the return of said
properties by the latter to the administration of the intestate estate
of Tiaoqui, without asking for the annulment of the order
approving the partition which is the root and legal reason for
 04 Intestate Estate of Januaria Gonzales v. De Guia (1941)
Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estates
Ponente J. Moran | (ALVAREZ)
RECIT READY
Facts: In the summary settlement of the estate of Gonzales, the
court ordered lot no. 1157 (only property left by deceased) to be
sold at an auction for failure of the heirs to pay the creditor. The
creditor/purchaser filed a motion praying that a final deed of sale
shall be executed in his favor after the lapse of the redemption
period and no such redemption has been made. Heir of the
deceased opposed and alleged she had delivered the redemption
price to the sheriff. The court overruled the motion filed by the
creditor/purchaser.
Issue: WON the sale of the estate of the deceased is subject to legal
redemption.
Held: NO. The execution sale of the assets of the deceased
pursuant to a claim by a creditor is not subject to legal redemption.
Doctrine: In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a
deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of
debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption.
FACTS:
1. In the summary settlement of the estate of Januaria Gonzales, the
court ordered the heirs to pay creditor Sisenando Abarro
(claimant-appellant herein) P800 plus legal interest. Lot No. 1157,
the only property left by the deceased, was ordered sold at an
auction for failure of heirs to pay the creditor. The lot was awarded
to the creditor himself as the highest bidder thereat.
2. The sheriff's deed of sale contained a proviso to the effect that the
property was subject to redemption, as provided by law, within
one year. With no redemption having been made by the heirs
during such period, the creditor/purchaser filed a motion in court
praying that the sheriff be ordered to execute a final deed of sale
in his behalf. Tomasa de Guia, heir of the deceased, opposed the
motion, alleging that she had delivered to the sheriff the amount
of P1,056.40 for the redemption of the property. The court found
this to be true and overruled the motion filed by the purchaser.
ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the estate of the deceased is subject to legal
redemption.
a. NO, because there is no legal provision allowing
redemption in the sale of property of the estate for
payment of debts of the deceased.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. With the declaration that the sale made in favor of Sisenando Abarro
is final, judgment is reversed, with costs in both instances against
appellant.
RULING:
1. De Guia has no right to redeem and the sale made in favor of
Abarro is final. In the administration and liquidation of the estate
of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for
payment of debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption.
Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision
allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts
of a deceased person.
2. Citing the Intestate Proceedings of Josefa Jimenez, the court held
that: (this part is in Spanish, translated via google translate)
Neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the redemption of properties sold in public auctions
for the payment of debts of the deceased. The procedures in
which such sales take place is special, provided for by special
legal provisions, and not by the general ones that regulate
ordinary actions in which the redemption of properties sold in
public auction is provided for.
 In addition, the code of civil procedure provides that the
summary distribution of the estate of the deceased ordered by
a competent court is final and definitive, unless within two
years following the summary distribution it appears that there
are debts to pay or that an heir or another person has been
unduly deprived of their legal share in the inheritance, in
which case any creditor, heir or interested person can force the
distribution and partition of the above-mentioned assets in the
courts. If the administrator-appellant is allowed to redeem the
property, the purposes of the law for allowing summary
distribution would be frustrated since the estate could not be
closed before the period for redemption has prescribed.

3. From the outset, the purchaser acted undoubtedly under the

erroneous impression that legal redemption, as noted by the sheriff
on the deed, was valid, accepting thus the deed without any
objection whatsoever. But, as a general rule, and under the
circumstances of the case, no estoppel attaches to validate a
contract or any part thereof that in itself is contrary to law.
 05 ECHAUS v. BLANCO (1989)
Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Ponente J. MEDIALDEA | Anonas
RECIT READY
Facts:
Angelina Echaus instituted a civil case against C.N. Hodges praying
for the recovery of her share in the profits covering the Ba-Ta
subdivision plus damages. During its pendency and before a
decision could be rendered by the RTC, Hodges died. Upon his
death, he was substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate. A
petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was
instituted in 1962. On March 1963, a notice to creditors was
published in "Yuhum" newspaper. A judgment was rendered by the
trial court in favor of Echaus and a writ of execution was
subsequently issued against PCIB. On February 20, 1967, Echaus
filed her motion for direct payment. Magno averred that the claim
of Echaus was already barred for she filed it more than 4 years from
the publication of notice.
Issue: WON the claim presented in the estate proceedings is already
barred by the statute of non-claims. No
Ruling:
The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period
set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions
stated in the rules are present. The period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may
be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the
discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are
equitable. At the time of Echaus’ motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet.
In this case, the claim was filed in the probate court on February
1969, while the defendants in the civil case were still perfecting
their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator
objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The
pendency of that case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of
the claim.
Doctrine: Money claims against the estate may be allowed any time
before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the
court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable
FACTS:
The petitioner herein, Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf
and as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis
Puentevella filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 against Charles
Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting of the
business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in
the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of
expenses and moral and exemplary damages. However, C.N. Hodges
died which resulted to the filing of a petition for the settlement of his
estate.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private
respondent to pay the amount indicated in the decision. On January
21, 1967, the same trial court issued an order granting plaintiff's
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against PCIB. However,
the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted to file a motion dated
February 20, 1967 in SP No. 1672 (estate proceedings of deceased C.
N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus seeking to order
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), C.N. Hodges
estate’ administrator, to pay the judgment credit in Civil Case No.
6628. It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case
No. 6628 is now final and executory and the execution thereof
becomes a matter of right under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court. The duty to order the execution of a final and executory
judgment is ministerial and the failure of respondent judge to issue
such order is a proper case for mandamus.
Private respondent Avelina Magno, in her memorandum alleged that
the Judgment sought to be enforced is barred under the Rules of Court.
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was
opened in 1962 and the notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum"
a newspaper of general circulation in its issues of March 12, 10, and
27, 1963. Under Section 2, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, the time
provided for filing claims against the estate shall be stated by the court
in the notice, which shall not be more than twelve (12) months nor less
than six (6) months after the date of its first publication. Since
petitioner filed her motion to direct payment only on February 20,
1967, which is more than four years from the publication of the notice
then, it is already barred.
ISSUE:
1. WON the claim presented in the estate proceedings is already barred
by the statute of non-claims.
a) No. Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the
period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the
conditions stated in the rules are present
At the time of Echaus’ motion to direct payment of the judgment credit
was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. In this case, the
claim was filed in the probate court on February 1969, while the
defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein.
The record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon
the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case is a
good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim.
2. No. Mandamus not available – immediate payment of claim by the
administrator is NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT. The court stressed
that the time for paying debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by the
probate court having jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased (Sec.
15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing that respondent judge who
is taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the
administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts and legacies
of the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to
order payment of petitioner's claim.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for the writ of mandamus is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. WON Petition for Mandamus should be granted.

a) NO.Mandamus not available – immediate payment of claim
by the administrator is NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT.

RULING:

1. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period
set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions
stated in the rules are present. The period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be
allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the
discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.
 01 Estate of Gamboa v. Roberto Floranza (1908)
Rule 89 – SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER
ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT
Ponente J. Willard | (Bundalian)
RECIT READY
Facts: Commissioners in the settlement of the estate of Luis Gamboa
Carpizo in favor of Balbino Jaucian for Php. 2,720.00. The claim was
secured by a mortgage on real estate stating that since it was
mortgaged to Jaucian then Jaucian had a preference in the payment
of the mortgage debt. The court, without notice to any of the parties,
and without hearing any of them, made an order directing that the
property mentioned in the petition be sold for the purpose of paying
the mortgage debt to Balbino Jaucian. The creditor who has
appealed says that the document evidencing the loan of Balbino
Jaucian is not a mortgage. The appellant has not seen fit to have the
document brought here and this assignment of error cannot,
therefore, be sustained.
Issue: WON the probate court has the power to sell specific assets of
the estate to pay specific creditors?
Held: No. There is nothing in any one of these sections nor in any
other sections of the code which indicates that the Court of First
Instance, in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, has any power to
order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of
paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon
Doctrine: General not specific; It may be that the court would have
authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the
purpose of paying other debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving
the court authority to sell it for the purpose of paying that specific
debt.
Facts:
1. Commissioners in the settlement of the estate of Luis Gamboa
Carpizo in favor of Balbino Jaucian for Php. 2,720.00.
2. The claim was secured by a mortgage on real estate stating that
since it was mortgaged to Jaucian then Jaucian had a preference
in the payment of the mortgage debt.
3. The court, without notice to any of the parties, and without
hearing any of them, made an order directing that the property
mentioned in the petition be sold for the purpose of paying the
mortgage debt to Balbino Jaucian.
4. The property actually belongs to the widow of Carpizo, not to the
estate of the deceased.
5. Floranza the creditor: The creditor who has appealed says that the
document evidencing the loan of Balbino Jaucian is not a
mortgage. The appellant has not seen fit to have the document
brought here and this assignment of error cannot, therefore, be
sustained.
Issue: WON the probate court has the power to sell specific assets of
the estate to pay specific creditors?
Dispositive Portion:
A creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by mortgage
or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute
his claim before the committee, and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon his security, by ordinary action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant; and if there is a judgment for a
deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceedings to realize upon the
security, he may prove his deficiency judgment before the committee
against the estate of the deceased; or he may rely upon his mortgage
or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time, within the
period of the statute of limitations, and in that even he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of
the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall
prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as
security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it
to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be
made.
We do not find it necessary to decide this question, for the orders
appealed from must be reversed on other grounds. The code states in
its sections 714 to 721 various conditions under which the real estate
of the deceased may be sold for the payment of debts. There is nothing
in any one of these sections nor in any other sections of the code which
indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction, has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real
estate for the purpose of paying a mortgage debt which is a lien
thereon. It may be that the court would have authority to sell the
property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying other
debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving the court authority to
sell it for the purpose of paying that specific debt. lawphil.net
Ruling:
The orders appealed from, namely, that made on the 22nd of October,
1906, and that made on the 12th of November, 1906, are reversed, and
the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the law.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.
 02 Bonaga v. Soler (1961)
Rule 89 - Sales, mortages, and other encumbrances of property
of decedent
Ponente J. JBL Reyes | (Paolo Bautista)
RECIT READY
Facts: Upon application, the administrator of the estate was
authorized by the probate court to sell certain parcels of land
pertaining to the estate. These lands were sold to Roberto Soler.
Subsequently, a new administrator was appointed. The new
administrator sought to annul the sale of the parcels of land on the
ground that the transactions were fraudulent, made without notice (of
the hearing of the application to sell) to the heirs of the decedent, and
that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs. Without hearing the
case on the merits, the lower court dismissed the action.
Issue: WON the sale of a decedent’s property can be annulled on the
ground that certain heirs were not sent any notice of hearing. - YES
Held: A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested
parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90 (now 89), must comply with
the requisites therein provided, which are mandatory. Among these
requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an
application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential;
and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order
approving it, would be null and void ab initio.
Without reception of further evidence to determine whether the
requisites of the applicable provisions of the Rules had been
followed, the dismissal of the action was erroneous and improvident.
Doctrine: A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the
interested parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90 (now 89), must
comply with the requisites therein provided, which are mandatory.
Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing
for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are
essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and
the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio.
FACTS:
1. Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac
in 1935 and 1940, respectively, intestate proceedings for the
settlement of their estate were commenced. Juan Garza was
appointed administrator of the estate. Upon application, Juan
Garza was authorized by the probate court to sell certain parcels
of land pertaining to the estate. Pursuant hereto, Garza sold said
parcels of land on August 30, 1944 in favor of appellee Roberto
Soler, which sale was subsequently approved. On October 14,
1944, the heirs of the deceased wife, Maria Isaac, after having
been declared as such, sold all their shares and interests over
certain parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler.
2. Sometime during the war, the records of the Special Proceeding
were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these records by court
order, Julian Boñaga was issued letters of administration. On May
1952, the instant action was filed by Boñaga in his capacity as
administrator, seeking to annul the sales of August 30, 1944 and
October 14, 1944 in favor of Roberto Soler on the ground that said
transactions were fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of
Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the
sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons, and
praying for reconveyance of the lands sold, and for recovery of
damages.
3. The lower courts dismissed the action on the grounds of estoppel
and prescription.
ISSUE:
1. WON sales of a decedent’s property can be annulled by showing
lack of compliance with the requirement of sending notice to the
heirs.
a. YES, the requisites of fixing the time and place of hearing
for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the
heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell,
the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null
and void ab initio.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the appealed order dismissing the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2123 of the court below is reversed, and the case
remanded, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this
decision. Costs against appellee Roberto Soler.
RULING:
1. Nothing in the record would show whether, as required by Rule
90 (now 89), sections 4 and 7, the application for authority to sell
was set for hearing, or that the court ever caused notice thereof to
be issued to the heirs of Alejandro Ros. Incidentally, these heirs
seem not to have gotten any part of the purchase price since they
were then allegedly in Spain. Yet, in the order of declaration of
heirs of the wife and approving the sale to Soler, the declaration
of the heirs of the husband Alejandro Ros was expressly held in
abeyance, indicating a recognition of their existence. Appellees
maintain that the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts,
but this, at least, is controversial. Appellant asserts that the total
outstanding debts of the estate at the time of the sale amounted to
only P4,641.48, a relatively meager sum compared to the large
tracts of land sold.
2. We think the lower court erred in dismissing the action without a
hearing on the merits. A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial
to the interested parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90 (now 89),
must comply with the requisites therein provided, which are
mandatory. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and
place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice thereof
to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell,
the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void
ab initio (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718; Gabriel, et al. vs.
Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954, and others cited
therein). Rule 90 (now 89), Section 4, does not distinguish
between heirs residing in and those residing outside the
Philippines. Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless
of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said
rule.
3. The contention that the sale was made under Section 2, Rule 90
(now 89) (wherein notice is required only to those heirs, etc.,
residing in the Philippines), is not substantiated by the record.
Neither the deed of sale on August 30, 1944, nor the orders issued
by the probate court in connection there with, show whether, as
required by said Section 2, the personal properties were
insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. There
is not even a showing, to start with, that the sale was made for the
purpose of paying debts or expenses of administration (or
legacies), a condition which circumscribes the applicability of that
section. On the face of the reamended complaint at any rate, it
does not appear that the contested sale was one under section 2 of
Rule 90 (now 89); and the same can not be invoked to sustain the
motion to dismiss. Without reception of further evidence to
determine whether the requisites of the applicable provisions of
the Rules had been followed, the dismissal of the action was
erroneous and improvident. Plaintiff should at least have been
given a chance to prove his case.
 03 VDA DE CELIS vs. VDA DE LA SANTA (1953)
Rule 89 – Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of
Property of Deceased
J. Padilla | Bernardo
RECIT READY
Facts:
- PARTIES: Asuncion Roque Vda. Dela Santa
(respondent) is the sister of the decedent, and in her
brother’s will, she was given a 1/7 undivided share in a
house and lot in Batangas Street, Manila City. Luisa Vda.
De Celis (petitioner) bought the house and lot when it was
sold by the executor pursuant to an authority to sell
granted by the probate court.
- FACTS: Asuncion is an heir of Teofilo Roque and was
given a 1/7 undivided share in a house and lot located in
Batangas Street, Manila City.
- The instituted heirs, except Asuncion who was very ill in
the provinces, filed a petition praying for the sale of the
house and lot for the price of P350,000 for the purpose of
paying off a debt of P1,600 to the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank.
- Knowing the difficulty in serving notice to Asuncion, the
probate court issued an order directing that notice be
given instead to Ricardo, her son and attorney-in-fact, by
virtue of a special power of attorney she executed in his
favor.
- Due to Ricardo’s continuous non-appearance, the hearings
for the petition kept getting postponed.
- A first authority to sell was granted. However, because the
sale did not push through, the authority to sell was
eventually cancelled.
- Asuncion filed a petition praying that since the sale did
not push through, personal properties of the estate (instead
of the house and lot) should be sold and proceeds of the
sale be used to pay off the debt. (This was her objection to
the sale)
- The judge issued the second authority to sell the house
and lot for not less than P245,000. He issued another order
approving the deed of sale of the property executed by the
executor in favor of Luisa Vda. De Celis.
- But no copies of the orders were received by Asuncion
and her attorney in fact, in spite of the fact that the said
orders contained directives that notice be served upon
them
Issue:
- Did failure to give notice to the heir, Asuncion,
nullified the sale of the property? – NO. It was proven
that she had actual knowledge of the application to sell the
lot and the buildings thereon.
- Did the objection made by the Asuncion to the sale
deprive the probate court the power to grant license to
the administrator to sell the property? – NO. Provided
that the license to sell will redound to the benefit of the
interested persons and hasten the settlement of the estate
Held:
- Under the Code of Civil Procedure, partition of real estate
assigned to two or more heirs, devisees or legatees and
held by them in common could be applied to the court or
judge having jurisdiction of the estate by any of the co-
owners, and such partition may bring about or result in
the sale of the real estate held in common despite
objection to the sale by a co-owner.
- Neither the objection of Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa
to the application for authority to sell the lot and buildings
erected thereon belonging to the estate of the deceased
Teofilo Roque nor the failure to receive the notice of such
application caused to be served upon her personally or
upon her son Ricardo de la Santa as her attorney-in-fact, it
 appearing that she had actual knowledge thereof, is
sufficient legal cause to annul the sale, because the
probate court had authority under the provisions of section
4 and 7, Rule 90, to grant authority to the executor or
administrator to sell the property of the deceased
Doctrine:
The Rules of Court do not deprive the probate court of the power
to grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal
and real property of the deceased even if there be an objection to
it by an heir, devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell
will redound to the benefit of the interested persons and hasten the
winding up or the final settlement of the estate
Facts:
1. Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted
heirs in the will of her deceased brother, Teofilo Roque
together with her other brothers and sisters, Marcela,
Catalina, Sofronio, Joaquin, Manuela and Francisco, all
surnamed Roque, and was given a one-seventh (1/7)
undivided share in a house and lot located at Nos. 2191-
2199 Rizal Avenue and No. 428 Batangas Street, City of
Manila.
2. In the probate proceedings, Judge Diaz issued an order
reciting that:
3. The instituted heirs, with the exception of Asuncion
Roque, who was very ill in the provinces, had prayed for
the sale of the house and lot for the price of P350,000. The
sale was for the purpose of paying off a debt of P1,600 to the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank.
4. That the administrator asked that the authority should not be
given until after 2 weeks, in view of the fact that Asuncion
had not appeared before the court.
5. And that the difficulty of her non-appearance might be
avoided in view of the fact that Asuncion already executed a
special power of attorney in favor of her son Ricardo.
6. The order contained a provision that notice would be given
to Ricardo, Asuncion’s son, and her attorney-in-fact, by
virtue of a special power of attorney she executed in his
favor.
7. The hearings for the petition (for the sale of the house and
lot) were postponed for the non-appearance of Ricardo to
express his conformity or non-conformity with the proposed
sale. Later on, the court issued another order requiring the
appearance of Ricardo, and the other heirs, to manifest the
minimum and maximum price they wanted the property sold.
8. The late judge issued another order authorizing the
administrator to sell the property for a price of not less than
P350,000 within one month. The authority to sell will be
automatically cancelled if the sale is not realized within that
time.
9. The sale did not push through.
10. Asuncion filed a petition praying that since the order to sell
had not been carried out, the persnal properties of the estate,
which were being concealed by the heirs and the
administrator, should be sold and the proceeds used to pay
the debt. (Instead of the house and lot)
11. Before the hearing of the Asuncion’s petition, the other heirs
filed a motion praying for new authority in favor of the
administrator to sell the property at a price ranging from
P245,000 to P300,000.
12. The judge issued an order authorizing the administrator to
sell the said property for not less than P245,000. Later on he
issued another order approving the deed of sale of the
property executed by the administrator in favor of Luisa Vda
de. Celis
13. No copies of the orders were received by Asuncion and her
attorney in fact, inspite of the fact that the said orders
contained directives that notice be served upon them.
Issues:
1. Did failure to give notice to the heir, Asuncion, nullified
the sale of the property? – NO. It was proven that she had
actual knowledge of the application to sell the lot and the
buildings thereon.
2. Did the objection made by the heir to the sale deprive the
probate court the power to grant license to the
administrator to sell the property? – NO. Provided that
the license to sell will redound to the benefit of the interested
persons and hasten the settlement of the estate
Held:
1. Before the promulgation of the Rules of Court, section 718
of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that the authority to
be granted to the administrator or executor to sell personal or
real property of the estate of a deceased person when
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees, must be with the
consent and approbation in writing of said heirs, devisees
and legatees.
2. And at the hearing of the petition seeking authority to sell it,
the executor or administrator had to produce to the court
such assent and approval in writing signed by the heirs,
devisees and legatees or by their guardians, if minors, or
otherwise under guardianship.
3. The court appointed a time and place of hearing for deciding
upon such application and was to require notice to be given
of it and of the time and place of hearing to the persons
interested, and the notice was to state the nature of the
application and the reason for the same, the time and place
of hearing, and was to be published three weeks successively
previous thereto, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
neighborhood of those interested, to be designated by the
court.
4. All such requirements were done away with by section 7,
Rule 90, except as to notice.
5. Pursuant thereto, the notice caused by the court to be made
may be given to the person interested personally or by mail
or by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.
6. If the interested party to whom the notice was mailed at his
residence, as it appeared on the record of the special
proceedings, had absented himself therefrom and failed to
receive it, that fact would not deprive the court of the power
to proceed with the hearing of the petition of the executor or
administrator seeking authority to sell property of the estate
of the deceased and to grant or deny it.
7. From the findings of the Court of Appeals which recite the
allegations set out in the motion filed by the respondent
Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa of 5 June 1944, by which
she objected, for the reasons therein stated, to the sale of the
lot and buildings in question, it appears that she had actual
knowledge of the application to sell the lot and buildings
erected thereon. Such knowledge is equivalent to notice.
8. The question then that arises is: Granting that she objected to
the sale of the lot and buildings erected thereon and her
objection considered, as it must be presumed for it was in the
record of the special proceedings when the hearing of the
application for authority to sell was heard, but was
disregarded, by the probate court, could her objection be
sufficient to prevent the probate court from granting the
executor authority to sell the property? No.
9. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, partition of real estate
assigned to two or more heirs, devisees or legatees and held
by them in common could be applied to the court or judge
having jurisdiction of the estate by any of the co-owners, and
such partition may bring about or result in the sale of the real
estate held in common despite objection to the sale by a co-
owner.
10. Consequently, neither the objection of Asuncion Roque Vda.
de la Santa to the application for authority to sell the lot and
buildings erected thereon belonging to the estate of the
deceased Teofilo Roque nor the failure to receive the notice
 of such application caused to be served upon her personally
or upon her son Ricardo de la Santa as her attorney-in-fact, it
appearing that she had actual knowledge thereof, is sufficient
legal cause to annul the sale, because the probate court had
authority under the provisions of section 4 and 7, Rule 90, to
grant authority to the executor or administrator to sell the
property of the deceased.

Doctrine:

The Rules of Court do not deprive the probate court of the power to
grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal and real
property of the deceased even if there be an objection to it by an heir,
devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell will redound to
the benefit of the interested persons and hasten the winding up or
the final settlement of the estate
 04 De Jesus v. De Jesus (1961)
Rule 73 Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Reyes, J.B.L. | (Bernas)
RECIT READY
Facts: Sister of the decease had a claim against the estate. The claim was
never heard. Instead, she entered into a stipulation of facts with the
administratrix (wife of deceased). The agreements were presented to court
for approval. Probate court approved the agreements. Years later, the son
of the administrator filed an action to annul the stipulations on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on the
agreements and lack of notice to the heirs.
Issue: WON the stipulations in question are void and ineffective, either
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on them, or
for lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased.
Held: YES. While the probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve
the stipulations in question, the requisite notice to the heirs was not
complied with.
Doctrine: The Rules of Court make it mandatory that notice be served on
the heirs and other interested persons of the application for approval of
any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and where no
such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance itself, is
completely void.
FACTS:
1. Eusebia de Jesus, the deceased's sister, filed a verified claim
against the estate.
2. This claim was never heard. Instead, the administratrix Ines
Alejandrino (wife of deceased), claimant Eusebia de Jesus,
and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus, another brother also deceased,
entered into a stipulation of Facts wherein administratrix
Alejandrino recognized that Eusebia de Jesus and Cirilo de
Jesus are co-owners with the deceased Melecio de Jesus of
Lot No. 931, and that said parcel was registered in the sole
name of the deceased only in trust for all the co-owners.
3. On the same day, administratrix Ines Alejandrino and
claimant Eusebia de Jesus entered into another agreement
called 'Supplementary Stipulation of Facts" wherein the latter
agreed to waive and renounce her money claim against the
estate upon the approval and becoming final of the
aforementioned Stipulation of Facts.
4. Both agreements were, on the very day of their execution,
presented to the court for approval, on the ground that they
"will conserve the family filiation and attachment and will
forestall any litigation between them"; and on the day
following the probate court entered an order approving both
agreements.
5. Years later, Ines Alejandrino was replaced by her son Leon de
Jesus in the administration of the estate of Melecio de Jesus.
6. Leon de Jesus filed in the lower court the present action
seeking to annul the stipulations entered by the former
administratrix Ines Alejandrino with the defendants Eusebia
de Jesus and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus on the theory that they
are null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
probate court to act on them, as well as for lack of the
requisite notices to all the interested parties, specifically
the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus.
7. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming res
judicata and prescription
8. Trial court sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal of
the complaint. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE:
2. WON the stipulations in question are void and ineffective, either
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on
them, or for lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the
deceased.
a. YES. While the probate court had jurisdiction to act on
and approve the stipulations in question, the requisite
notice to the heirs was not complied with.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. The appealed order dismissing the complaint is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the court below for answer and trial
on the merits. Costs against defendants-appellees.
RULING:
On Jurisdiction of the probate court
1. The probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve of the
stipulations in question, not only as an incident to its power to
exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90 (old ROC, it is now
under sec 9, Rule 89), Rules of Court, which permits the
probate court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real
property in trust for another person, to authorize the executor
or administrator to deed such property to the person or persons
for whose age and benefit it was so held.
2. There being no controversy between the former administratrix
and the defendants that the latter and the deceased Melecio de
Jesus own the lot in question in common and that it was
registered in the deceased's name only in trust for all the co-
owners, there was no need to file a separate action in an
ordinary court to establish the common ownership of the
parties over said property, and the probate court could
approve, as it did approve, the agreement wherein in the
parties expressly recognized their common ownership of the
property in question.
On the lack of notice to heirs
1. Section 9, Rule 90 (now sec 9, rule 89), however, provides
that authority can be given by the probate court to the
administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased
to the beneficiaries of the trust only "after notice given as
required in the last preceding section"; i.e., that "no such
conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application
for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all
persons interested, and such further notice has been given, by
publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper" (sec. 8,
Rule 90).
2. This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on the
heirs and other interested persons of the application for
approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by
the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order
authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance
itself, is completely void.
3. Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was given the heirs
of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for approval
of the stipulations in question, and it is quite probable that the
claim is true, because said heirs were all minors when the
proceedings in question took place.
 In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Emeterio
Lopez. CONCEPCION LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ADELA
LOPEZ ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants. (May 26, 1939)
Rule 90 – DISTRIBUTION AND PARTIION OF THE ESTATE
Ponente J. Moran | (Bundalian)
RECIT READY
Facts: There is a question whether Concepcion Lopez is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died
intestate, leaving no legitimate descendants, ascendants or widow. In
the intestate proceeding filed by Concepcion in which she pleads for
the probate court to declare her to be universal heir of Emeterio’s
Php. 6,000 estate amended as Php. 9,000 estate, the oppositor-
appellants filed an opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying
that, as they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be
adjudged entitled to the property let by him. After hearing, the
probate court issued an order declaring the petitioner an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased entitled to the rights
accorded her by law.
Issue: Whether or not person claiming to be an acknowledged
natural child of a deceased need to maintain a separate action for
recognition before he or she can intervene in the intestate
proceedings?
Held: No. It is a well-settled rule that a person claiming to be an
acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not maintain a
separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in the
intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the
inheritance.
Doctrine: ACTION FOR RECOGNITION; INTERVENTION IN
THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — It is a well-settled rule that
a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased
need not maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply
intervene in the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving
therein his or her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right
to share in the inheritance.
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
Facts:
● Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings
of the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and praying
that she be declared his universal heiress entitled to a
summary award of his estate, same being valued at less than
six thousand pesos (P6,000).
● The oppositors-appellants, thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña,
filed an opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying
that, as they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be
adjudged entitled to the property let by him.
● Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging
that, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine
thousand pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution
could not be made summarily but thru regular administration
proceedings.
● Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who, thru
Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed later a motion for a
declaration of heirs and prayed that the oppositors-appellants
be so adjudged.
● After hearing, the court issued an order declaring the
petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
entitled to the rights accorded her by law.
● The oppositors appealed.
Issue: Whether or not person claiming to be an acknowledged natural
child of a deceased need to maintain a separate action for recognition
before he or she can intervene in the intestate proceedings?
Dispositive Portion:
Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a person
claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not
maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in
the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the
inheritance.

The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is

alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is no prayer therein that
she be declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be
adjudged universal heiress, of the deceased. In the body of the petition
there is an allegation that she is a natural child of the based and has
been in an uninterrupted possession of such status. And inasmuch as
the recognition of her status is a prerequisite to her right to heirship,
her prayer that she be declared universal heiress implies a like prayer
that she be recognized as an acknowledged natural child. Furthermore,
it is a well-settled rule of pleadings, applicable to motions or petitions,
that the prayer for relief, though part of the pleading, is no part of the
cause of action or defense alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled
to as much relief as the facts duly pleaded may warrant.
The facts found by the lower court as basis for the declaration that the
petitioner had been in an uninterrupted possession of the status of
natural child of the deceased In previous cases, similar facts were held
to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to recognition.
Ruling: Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

02 HEIRS OF PERFECTO SANTIESTEBAN V

SANTIESTEBAN (1939)
 Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Ponente J. Imperial | (CASTIGADOR)
RECIT READY
Facts: The surviving spouse and children of the deceased, Benita
Lambengco, entered into an extrajudicial partition of her estate
which was approved by the court. The properties having been
delivered to the heirs, the court ordered the final closure of the
intestate proceedings. The husband of Benita conveyed the land he
received from the partition to his daughter, Guadalupe. However,
the ownership to the land was being claimed by Macondray & Co.
who alleged that the land was previously subject to a foreclosure of
mortgage in their favor. Guadalupe then filed a petition to reopen
the intestate proceedings which was opposed by her siblings. The
court granted the reopening but upon MR of the oppositors, reversed
the former order and sustained the order of final closure of intestate.
Issue: WON the court had authority to reopen the intestate
proceedings. No.
Held: The order of final closure of the intestate proceedings put an
end thereto and relieved the administrator of his duties.
Doctrine: What brings an intestate proceeding to a close is the order
of distribution directing the delivery of the residue to the persons
entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the
deceased.judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the
guardian.
FACTS:
1. Benita Lambengco died intestate and was survived by her children
and her husband, Ambrosio Santiesteban. Ambrosio was named
administrator in the intestate proceedings before the CFI of Rizal.
2. Since the deceased left no debts, Ambrosio and their children
executed an extrajudicial partition which was approved by the
court on October 18 1932. The properties having been delivered
to the heirs, and after payment of inheritance tax, the court ordered
the final closure of the intestate proceedings on November 29
1932.
3. Ambrosio received eight parcels of land from the partition. He
then conveyed these to his daughter Gaudalupe who in turn
applied for the registration of the land under her name. However
this was opposed by Macondray & Co. on the ground that the same
lands have been subject to a foreclosure of mortgage in their favor
and against the previous owners. Guadalupe petitioned the CFI of
Rizal to reopen the intestate proceedings and appoint a new
administrator, a certain Mariano de la Paz. This petition was
opposed by Guadalupe’s siblings and the latter’s heirs.
4. On October 1 1935 the court ordered the reopening of the intestate
proceedings and appointment of a new administrator. The siblings
of Guadalupe filed a motion for reconsideration which the court
also granted. Thus the October 1 order was set aside and the
November 29 1932 order of final closure of intestate proceedings
was sustained.
5. In her appeal before the Supreme Court, Guadalupe contends that
the court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the motion for
reconsideration arguing that the order reopening the intestate
proceedings having become final was not subject to modification
or reversal.
ISSUE:
1. WON the lower court had authority to reopen the intestate
proceedings of the deceased.
a. NO. The order which reopened the estate and appointed a
new administrator was irregularly issued since the
intestate has been closed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. The appealed order being in accordance with law, the same is
affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the appellants. So
ordered.
RULING:
1. The order which reopened the intestate and appointed a new
administrator was irregularly issued by the court. The order
closing the intestate dated November 29 1932 put an end thereto
and relived the administrator of his duties.
2. Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, what brings an
intestate proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing
the delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after
paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. This order
was issued since October 18 1932 when the court approved the
partition executed by all the heirs.

03 SOLIVIO v. CA (1990)
Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Ponente J. Medialdea| (CASTILLO)
 RECIT READY
Facts: Esteban, Jr. inherited properties from his mother. Before he
died, he expressed to his aunt Celedonia that he wants to place his
estate in a foundation after the name of his mother. Celedonia
communicated the same to Concordia and the latter agreed. When
Esteban, Jr. died, Celedonia filed for appointment as special
administratrix of the estate and she was declared sole heir.
Concordia filed an MR because she too was an heir of the deceased.
Both the trial court and CA ruled that the Celedonia should submit
an inventory and accounting of the estate. Celedonia refused as the
properties of the deceased have already been transferred to the
foundation.
Issue: Whether Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the case for
partition and recovery of Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even
while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court.
Held and Doctrine: The assailed order which declared Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate does not toll the probate proceedings.
A court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a
co-equal court.
Doctrine: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
FACTS:
6. This case involves the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel “Without Seeing the
Dawn”. He died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives
are his two aunts; Petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the sister of his
mother Salustia Solivio and Private respondent Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father.
7. Salustia Solivio brought to her marriage paraphernal properties
which she had inherited from her mother but no conjugal property
was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban Sr. On
October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her
only child, Esteban, Jr. His father died 10 months after the
marriage and 4 months before he was born.
8. During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his aunt
Celedonia, who raised him with Salustia, his plan to place his
estate in a foundation in honor of his mother. Unfortunately, he
died sooner having set up the foundation. Two weeks after his
funeral, Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place
his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom
his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased.
9. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia
then filed a special proceeding for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate in RTC Branch 26. Thereafter, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Four
months later after the court’s pronouncement, Concordia
Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision in RTC Branch 23 because she too was an heir of the
deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the
court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia
filed for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages.
10. The trial court ruled in favor of Concordia and ordered the
execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia
to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. Celedonia
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
instant petition.
ISSUE:
2. WON RTC Branch 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia's
action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban, Jr. while the probate proceedings for the settlement of
said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there
being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue
of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.
a. The orders of the RTC 26 in setting aside the probate
proceedings on the ground of extrinsic fraud, declaring
Concordia to be a co-heir, ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring Celedonia to submit inventory and
accounting, were improper as these are within the
exclusive competence of the probate court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE.
Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However,
comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir,
Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be
conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation,"
of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be
trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number
of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation
which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its
charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit
to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of
the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
3. RTC 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia’s action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate while probate
proceedings are still pending in RTC 23, there being no orders for
the submission and approval of the administratix’s inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings.
4. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled that brings to a close the
proceedings and relieves the administrator of his/her duty. The
assailed order of declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings.
As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate."
5. In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings, Concordia's
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and
recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly
filed by her. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was
to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed
more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. The separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate.
6. A court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in
a co-equal court. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary,
would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of
avoiding multiplicity of suits.
7. In the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but
nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared
as co-heir in said proceedings so the court opted likewise to
proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
8. The orders of the RTC 26 in setting aside the probate proceedings
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, declaring Concordia to be a co-
heir, ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring Celedonia
 to submit inventory and accounting, were improper as these are 1. Inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
within the exclusive competence of the probate court. deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia
Solivio Vda. De Javellana, an agreement which she ratified
Extrinsic Fraud and confirmed in a motion, she is bound by that agreement.
9. Extrinsic fraud is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which 2. She did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but
prevented a fair submission of the controversy. she did agree to place all of Esteban’s estate in the foundation.
10. There was no extrinsic fraud in this case. Concordia was not 3. This is a judicial admission in which no evidence need be
unaware of the special proceedings intended to be filed by presented to prove the agreement.
Celedonia. She and Celedonia agreed that the latter would initiate
the necessary proceeding and pay the taxes and obligations of the
estate.
11. Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Additionally, she knew that the estate
came exclusively from Esteban’s mother, Salustia Solivio, and she
had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had intended.
12. Celedonia’s allegation that she was the sole heir of Esteban was
not false and it was made in the honest belief that because the
properties of Esteban had come from his mother, and she, as
Esteban’s nearest surviving relative on his mother’s side, is the
rightful heir. It would be inconsistent with her claim as a sole heir
if she indicated that Concordia was her sole heir.

Reserva Troncal
1. The estate of the deceased is not subject to reserva troncal.
The property is not reservable property as Esteban, Jr. was not
an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia
Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. 04 Salvador v. Sta. Maria (1967)
He also did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within Ponente J. Bengzon | (CRUZ)
the third degree on his mother’s side.
2. Reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
brother or sister.

As to ½ of Concordia’s share

RECIT READY
Facts: Parcels of land are owned by Celestino Salvador. He sold it to Spouses
Halili. Alleging that the sale is void for lack of consideration, Celestino filed an
action for reconveyance against the Sps Halili. While the action was pending,
Celestino died and was substituted by his 21 heirs. The court ordered the
reconveyance of the property to them. However, the probate court of Celestino’s
estate ordered the sale of the reconveyed property in order to pay the debts of
the estate. Hence, the petition for certiorari against the probate court’s order.
Issue: Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the 21 heirs who
substituted Celestino, bar the disposition of the reconveyed properties by the
probate court?
Held: NO. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said
parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having
received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance action, was perforce in trust
for the estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said properties
among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate being first
satisfied.
Doctrine: It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive
shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debts of
the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be
enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of
the debts.
FACTS:
11. Seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land,
situated in Bigaa, Bulacan, were owned by Celestino Salvador. In
1941, he executed a deed of sale over them in favor of the spouses
Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili.
12. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed
on May 12, 1955, against said vendees, a suit for reconveyance of
said parcels of land (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I).
13. On April 27, 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged
heirs, twenty-one persons were on May 18, 1956 substituted as
plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. And meanwhile, special
proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary
was instituted (CFI of Bulacan, Br. II).
14. In the suit for reconveyance, on November 26, 1956, the Court
(CFI of Bulacan, Br. I) rendered judgment, ordering the
defendants spouses Halili, to reconvey the parcels of land to the
estate of Celestino Salvador. Appeal therefrom to the Court of
Appeals was interposed by said defendants.
15. On August 12, 1961, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
reconveyance judgment, with the correction that reconveyance be
in favor of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted as plaintiffs
therein.
16. About three years later, pursuant to an order of the CFI of Bulacan,
Br. II, in the testacy proceedings, dated April 21, 1964, one of the
parcels of land involved, Lot 6, was sold, so that with its proceeds
debtors who filed claims may be paid. The Philippine National
Bank bought at P41,184.00.
17. On December 7, 1965, Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the
Philippine National Bank to release the P41,184.00 proceeds of
the sale of Lot 6, to the twenty-one (21) plaintiffs in the
reconveyance case.
18. However, On March 30, 1966, Br. II (probate court), ordered
release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184.00, or so
much thereof is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of the estate.
19. After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the twenty-one
(21) substituted heirs, filed with Us the present special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail the order to pay
the debts of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of
Lot 6; and to question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose of
the parcels of land involved in the reconveyance suit in Br. I.
ISSUE:
1. Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the
twenty-one so-called heirs who substituted Celestino Salvador,
bar the disposition of the reconveyed properties by the settlement
court?
 -NO, because it is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to
specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally
determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then,
in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are
inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment
of the debts.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for

certiorari is denied, without costs. So ordered.

RULING:
13. Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts
abovementioned. They only contend that the properties involved
having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to them, not to
the estate the same are not properties of the estate but their own,
and thus, not liable for debts of the estate.
14. Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on
their alleged character as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were
substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them
was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It
follows that the properties they claim are, even by their own
reasoning, part of Celestino's estate.
15. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said
parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise.
Their having received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance
action, was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its
obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among 05 TIMBOL v. CANO (1961)
themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
being first satisfied. Ponente J. Labrador | (SEBASTIAN)
 RECIT READY
Facts: Mercedes Cano died intestate, leaving as sole heir her son
Florante Timbol. Jose Cano, Mercedes’ brother, was appointed as
administrator. He filed a motion for the approval of the reduction
of the annual rental of Mercedes’ agricultural lands (from P4k to
P2k) and the conversion of 30 hectares of the said lands into a
subdivision. A project of partition was later approved, designating
Florante as the sole and exclusive heir of all of Mercedes’
properties. He was thereafter appointed as administrator. He
presented a motion to increase the 30 hectares to 41.92333
hectares. The plan was approved despite Jose Cano’s objections
that (1) the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land
leased to him (and thus would deprive tenants of their
landholdings) and (2) that the probate court has no jurisdiction to
authorize the enlargement of the land. Jose Cano appealed the
probate court’s decision.
Issues:
1. WON appellant’s tenants would be deprived of their landholdings
– NO;
2. WON, in view of the project of partition, the probate court has
lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator/to authorize the
enlargement of the land – NO
Held:
1. No. The appealed order does not have the effect of immediately
depriving them of their landholdings, it only states that the lands
leased shall be reduced and subdivided. The tenants know or ought
to know that the lands leased are lands under administration, subject
to be sold, divided or finally delivered to the heir, according to the
progress of the administration of the lands of the intestate.
Appellant cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for
refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
2. No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
The debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been
delivered to the heir as such heir. Since the lease is null and void, it
is proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to
take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or
so much thereof as is needed in the course of administration.
Doctrine: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
FACTS:
20. The intestate Mercedes Cano died, leaving as her only heir her son
Florante C. Timbol.
21. Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator.
22. Jose Cano filed a petition, thru his counsel, proposing that the
agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator
(Jose) for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the
maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues
the government. The court approved the motion.
23. On Jan. 14, 1956, the court, upon motion of the administrator and
the conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the
reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the
intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the
conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a
subdivision.
24. On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of
partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole
and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate. Florante
was appointed administrator in place of Cano.
25. He presented a motion alleging (a) that the area destined for the
projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved.
26. The motions were approved but were immediately thereafter set
aside to give opportunity to Jose Cano (ex-administrator & current
lessee) to formulate his objections.
27. His objections are: (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision
would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants
of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be
deprived of his leasehold summarily upon simple petition.
28. The court grants Florante Timbol’s petitions, approving the
amended plan for subdivision, and overrules Jose Cano’s
MR/objections. It held that:
a. The said contract of lease is illegal – the Civil Code
provides that 'the persons disqualified to buy referred to
in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become
lessees of the things mentioned therein', and under article
1491 (3) of the same Code, executors and administrators
cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate
under administration.
b. If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only
appointed administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said
contract of lease having been executed on July 9, 1956,
the same falls within the prohibition provided by law.
c. While Jose Cano questions the probate court’s jurisdiction
to pass upon the legality of the lease contract, it held that
there is no need for the court to declare such contract
illegal and, therefore null and void as the law so expressly
provides.
29. The above order is the subject of the present appeal. The ff. are
Jose Cano’s assignment of errors:
a. The effect of the reduction of the area under lease would
be to deprive the tenants of appellant of their
landholdings. (4 assignment of error)
th
b. Since the project of partition had already been approved
and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction
to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the
enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision.
(7 assignment of error)
th
ISSUES:
3. WON the effect of the reduction of the leased area would be to
deprive appellant’s tenants of their landholdings
a. NO, it does not have the effect of immediately depriving
them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it
only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and
subdivided.
4. WON, in view of the final & approved project of partition, the
probate court has lost its jurisdiction to appoint a new
administrator/authorize the enlargement of the land to be
converted into a subdivision
a. NO, the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same – such payment & delivery has not
happened yet in this case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
2. The court's order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against the appellant.
RULING:
First issue: The appealed order does not have the effect of
immediately depriving them of their landholdings, it only states
that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided
16. The tenants know or ought to know that the lands leased are lands
under administration, subject to be sold, divided or finally
delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the
administration of the lands of the intestate.
17. If they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will
certainly proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the
lessee cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for
refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
Second issue: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same
18. In the case at bar the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate
had not yet been delivered to the heir as such heir.
19. We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the
appellant on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid
to naught by the declaration of the court that the lease of the
agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the
administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and void
not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the
administrator to himself is prohibited by law. (See Arts. 1646 and
1491, Civil Code).
20. And in view of the declaration of the court below that the lease is
null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem
proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to
take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein,
or so much thereof as is needed in the course of administration.

06 URIARTE v. CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (1970)

Rule 90 – Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Ponente J. Dizon | Soriano, A.
 RECIT READY
Facts:
• Background of the story: Petitioner filed for an intestate
proceeding in CFI-Negros but respondents contend that Don
Juan left a will found in Spain and therefore they filed a
proceeding for the probate of will in the Manila court.
Petitioner’s contention is that Manila court did not have any
jurisdiction over the estate proceedings since it was the Negros
court that first took cognizance of the settlement of the estate.
• There are 2 special proceedings in this case. One is with the
CFI-Negros (intestate proceeding) and the other’s with the
CFI-Manila (probate of the will/testate proceeding).
Issue: WON the respondent should have filed the probate of the
last will of Don Juan with the CFI-Negros or to commence a
separate action as he did in the Manila court
Held:
Respondent should have submitted the will for probate in CFI-
Negros, either in a separate proceeding or in a separate motion
filed in the same special proceeding. HOWEVER, Don Juan is a
non-resident and he has properties both in Negros and Manila
court.
Petitioner’s contention that Manila court did not have jurisdiction
cannot be accepted. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable
procedural defect and that petitioner in this case has waived his
right to raise such objection from doing so by laches.
Doctrine: [lifted from escra]
Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had
already been commenced, the probate of the will should be filed in
the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in
appropriate motion
FACTS:
30. The parties in this case are Petitioner Vicente Uriarte;
Respondents – Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte (nephew),
and the CFI-Negros and CFI – Manila. Don Juan Uriarte –
decedent involved (he’s a non-resident)
• This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner praying that
the orders by CFI-Negros dismissing the petition he filed be
set aside and that CFI-Manila does not have any jurisdiction
on the settlement of the estate. He contended that it was CFI-
Negros that has jurisdiction since it was the court that first
took cognizance of the case. Petitioner also prays for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from
proceeding with special proceeding no. 51396 [CFI-Manila]
• Petitioner filed an intestate proceeding of the estate of Don
Juan in CFI-Negros and he is further alleging that he is a
natural son of Don Juan (note though that by the time he filed
the intestate proceeding, he’s not an acknowledged natural
son so he instituted a civil action for him to be acknowledged
as a compulsory heir).
• Respondents filed an opposition contending that Don Juan
executed a last will and testament in Spain. Furthermore, they
instituted a separate proceeding for the probate of will in CFI-
Manila.
• Don Juan is a non-resident with considerable amount of
properties located in Manila and in Negros.
• CFI-Negros dismissed the special proceeding case and CFI-
Manila admitted the will for probate.
31. Summary of causes of action: Petitioner contends that CFI-Manila
(probate proceedings) does not have any jurisdiction on the
settlement of estate of Don Juan since he had already filed an
intestate proceeding in CFI-Negros
ISSUE:
5. WON the respondents should have filed the probate of the last will
of Don Juan with CFI-Negros or to commence a separate action
as he did in the Manila court
a. The respondents should have filed it with CFI-Negros.
However, as it is settled in our jurisprudence, venue are
waiveable. Therefore, CFI-Manila has jurisdiction over
the settlement of estate of Don Juan.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is
hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the
petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the
supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939,
are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
RULING:
21. The respondents should have filed it with CFI-Negros. However,
as it is settled in our jurisprudence, venue is waiveable. Therefore,
CFI-Manila has jurisdiction over the settlement of estate of Don
Juan.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a
waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches.
It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of
the existence of a will executed by Don Juan since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 [CFI-Negros]; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition
for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1862 when
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date. To allow him now to assail
the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Incidental issues/doctrines that sir might ask:
• Petitioner instituted a separate civil action for him to be
acknowledged as a compulsory heir. The court held that
the proper thing he should have done was to intervene in
the testate estate proceeding in the CFI-Manila instead of
instituting an independent action.
• In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction. testate proceedings for the Settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for 'the probate
of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice, that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding- shall continue as an intestacy
01 THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA,
ET AL. applicants-appellants v. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, ET
AL. oppositors-appellees (1990)
Rule 91 Escheat
Ponente J. Imperial | (Don)
RECIT READY
Facts: The municipal council of San Pedro filed a petition for
escheat claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro. The hacienda was
originally temporal properties of the Fathers of the Society of
Jesus which was later on confiscated by the Crown of Spain.
Later on, Spain ceded properties to the US under the treaty of
Paris which include the hacienda. In the end, the US ceded the
properties to the Philippines.
The petition was assailed by Colegio de San Jose, Inc. on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction; and the petition does
not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicant to the remedy
prayed for. It was also assailed by Carlos Young who filed a
motion for dismissal on the ground that the Code of Civil
Procedure is not applicable. The court allowed their intervention
despite objections and also dismissed the petition for escheat.
Issue:
1. WON Colegio de San Juan and Carlos Young have the right to
appear in the case or to substantiate their respective alleged
rights?
2. WON the Municipal Council fo San Pedro has personality to
institute petition for escheat?
Held:
1. Yes. They are interested and necessary parties and may appear
and oppose the petition for escheat. Any person alleging to have
a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat.
2. Since the hacienda is already owned by the Government of the
Philippines at the time of the filing, then the hacienda is not
property owned by a deceased person who has left no heirs.
Therefore, escheat is not the proper remedy.
Doctrine:
1. Essential Facts which should be alleged in the petition based
on Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
a. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will;
b. that he has left real or personal property;
c. that he was the owner thereof;
d. that he has not left any heir or person who is by law
entitled to the property;
e. that the one who applies for the escheat is the
municipality where the deceased had his last residence
or where the property is situated if a non-resident.
FACTS:
1. The municipal council of San Pedro filed a petition for escheat
wherein they claimed the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan.
2. Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the
petition on the following grounds: 1) the court had no jurisdiction;
and 2) the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the
applicant to the remedy prayed for.
3. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion for dismissal of the
petition on the ground that: 1) the Code of Civil Procedure is not
applicable because it was not yet in force when the original owner
of the hacienda died, which was in April 1596. not a typo
4. The court rejected the objection to the appearance and intervention
of Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young. The court also
dismissed the petition for escheat.
5. Hence, this appeal attributing the following errors: 1) in not
excluding Young and Colegio de San Jose, Inc. in the proceedings;
 2) in sustaining the petitions to dismiss without previous hearing
and in derogation of the right to amend; 3) in taking judicial notice
of facts in other judicial records; 4) in holding that the
municipality of San Pedro has no standing to file a petition for
escheat; that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action.
ISSUE:
1. WON Colegio de San Juan and Carlos Young have the right to
appear in the case or to substantiate their respective alleged rights.
a. Yes. They are interested and necessary parties and may
appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
2. WON a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading in a petition for
escheat.
a. No, a motion to dismiss is allowable in escheat
proceedings.
3. WON Municipal Council of San Pedro has personality to institute
petition for escheat?
a. No personality to file petition for escheat.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are
affirmed, with, the costs of this instance against the petitioners and
appellants. So ordered.
RULING:
2. In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary
party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the
present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young
appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims
to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the
former.
a. Essential Facts which should be alleged in the petition
based on Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
i. That a person died intestate or without leaving
any will;
ii. that he has left real or personal property;
iii. that he was the owner thereof;
iv. that he has not left any heir or person who is by
law entitled to the property;
v. that the one who applies for the escheat is the
municipality where the deceased had his last
residence or where the property is situated if a
non-resident.
3. The Code of Civil Procedure does not in fact authorize the filing
of a demurrer to the petition for escheat nor does sections 91 and
99, which permit the interposition of demurrers to the complaint
and answer, apply to special proceedings.
But there is no reason to prevent the filing of a motion to dismiss
based upon any of the grounds provided by law for a demurrer to
a complaint. In such case, the motion to dismiss plays the role of
a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal questions raised
therein. When a petition for escheat does not state facts which
entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for, and when it is clear
that there are not grounds for the court to proceed, we see no
reason to disallow an interested party from filing a motion to
dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoints.
4. The petitioners base their right to the escheat upon the fact that the
temporal properties of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, among
them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by
order of the King of Spain and passed from then on to the Crown
of Spain. Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan from then on passed to
the Crown of Spain under the administration and management of
its representative here, the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. Then, the US acquired all the properties of the Crown of
Spain in the Philippines, under the Treaty of Paris, including the
subject property. Afterwards, the hacienda passed to the
Government of the Philippine Islands for administration by virtue
of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Thereafter, by virtue of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law, the US ceded to the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, all the properties ceded by Spain to the US, among
them the hacienda in question.

In the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, which is the only property

sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San
Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim
that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is
no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person
who has not left any heir or person who may legally claim it, these
being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a
petition for escheat should not lie. From the moment the hacienda
was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be
the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the
Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Fathers, and became the property
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer
under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition.
 02 Republic vs. IAC (1987)
Rule 91 ESCHEAT
Ponente J. Cruz | De Jesus, Mark
RECIT READY
Facts: Property dispute was among the lands taken over by the
USA under the Ph Property Act of 1946 . Essentially this is the
transfer of properties to the Philippine Govt which was held by the
US Govt as Alien Property Custodian. The Japanese national
owner of the property in Zamboanga was never heard after the
WWII. The PH govt filed escheat proceedings in Zamboanga but
the court in Zambo ruled in favor of City of Zamboanga.
Issue: WON the court due to the inadvertence in the transfer by
the American Government to the Philippine Government should
escheat the property in favor of the local government.
Held: No. mere inadvertence on the part of the American
government in omitting to transfer the disputed land to the
Republic of the Philippines. The obvious purpose of the Act was
to turn over to the Philippine government all enemy properties
situated in its territory that had been seized and were being held
for the time being by the United States, which was then exercising
sovereignty over the Philippines. The transfer of such enemy
properties to the Philippine Republic was one of the acts by which
the United States acknowledged the elevation of this country to the
status of a sovereign state on July 4, 1946.
FACTS:
1. The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the
United States Government under the Philippine Property Act of
1946 enacted by the American Congress. It was registered in 1930
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9509 of the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga in the name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese
national, who has not been heard from since the end of World War
II. Under the said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to
the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The transfer was never made, however, and the property remained
registered in the name of Koyama. Nevertheless, the lot has since
1978 been covered by Tax Declaration No. 42644 in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines with the Board of Liquidators as
administrator.
3. Earlier, in 1976, the Republic of the Philippines had filed
escheat proceedings against the said property, claiming that the
registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past ten
years or more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the
purpose of appointing his successor." It also alleged that since
he left no heirs or persons entitled to the aforementioned
property, the State should inherit the same in accordance with
Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
4. After the required publications, hearing was held at which the City
of Zamboanga did not appear and no claim or opposition was filed
by any party. The Solicitor General allowed the appearance of the
Board of Liquidators as administrator of the disputed land and the
City Fiscal of Zamboanga City did not object.
5. Finally, the trial court declared the property —
". . . escheated to the State in favor of the City of
Zamboanga where the property is located for the
benefit of public schools and public charitable
institutions and centers in the City of Zamboanga."
ISSUE:
1. WON the court due to the inadvertence in the transfer by the
American Government to the Philippine Government should
escheat the property in favor of the local government.
HELD:
a. No. The obvious purpose of the Act was to turn over to
the Philippine government all enemy properties situated
in its territory that had been seized and were being held
 for the time being by the United States, which was then
exercising sovereignty over the Philippines.
b. The lack of such records does not mean that it was not
made as this would run counter to the mandate of the
Philippine Property Act of 1946, which, to repeat,
intended to vest title in the Philippines enemy properties
found in its territory. It would be more reasonable to
suppose that the President of the United States, or the
person acting under his authority, complied with, rather
than neglected (and so violated) this requirement of
Section 3 of the said Act, if only on the basis of the
presumption of the regularity of official functions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and another one is
hereby entered declaring the Republic of the Philippines to be the legal
owner of the land subject of the instant petition. No cost.
 03 VICENTE TAN vs. CITY OF DAVAO (1988)
Rule 91 Escheat
Ponente J. Grino-Aquino | (Dy)
RECIT READY
Facts: Dominga is the adopted daughter of Cornelia and Baltazar.
Dominga married a chinaman then they emigrated to China.
Dominga died intestate and left a lot in Davao City but neither her
husband nor her children returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.
Cornelia’s nephew Ramon occupied a part of Dominga’s property
and collected the rentals from the owners of other houses occupying
the land. Another nephew alerted the Solicitor General about the said
property.
City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI to declare the property in
favor of the City and declared Dominga and her children presumed
dead pursuant to r. 92 of the old rules of court
Issue: WON the City of Davao had personality to the escheat
petition
Held: YUP! The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the case did
not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on
September 12,1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92
of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed
When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property
in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to
the same, the municipality or city where the deceased last
resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality
or city in which he had estate if he resided out of the
Philippines, may file a petition in the court of first instance
of the province setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate
of the deceased be declared escheated.
(OLD RULES OF COURT WAS APPLIED)
Doctrine: Under the OLD Rules of Court, the Municipality or
City where the deceased last resided MAY FILE a petition in the
CFI of the province praying that the estate of the deceased be
declared escheated.
FACTS:
1. Dominga Garcia is the adopted child of spouses Cornelia
Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, who were residents of Davao
City. The former married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias Seng
Yap, with whom she had 3 children one of whom is the named
petitioner herein. In 1923, they emigrated in Canton, China.
Accordingly, Dominga died intestate and left a lot in Davao
City but neither her husband nor her children returned to the
Philippines to claim the lot.
2. Years after Dominga’s adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro died,
the latter’s nephew, Ramon Pizarro occupied a part of
Dominga’s property and collected the rentals from the
owners of other houses occupying the land. Another
nephew informed the Solicitor General about the property,
which led to the investigation of the City Fiscal and NBI. On
September 12, 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the
CFI of Davao to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated
in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children
are presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no
heir person by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same
should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of OLD RULES OF
COURT The court set the petition for hearing and directed
the City to cause (as it did ) the publication of its petition in
the 'Mindanao Times," a newspaper of general circulation in
the city and province of Davao, and in the Official Gazette,
once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks. Pizarro filed a
motion to dismiss but to no avail. Trial Court rendered a
decision that Dominga’s property and its rentals shall escheat
and the same are assigned to the City of Davao for the benefit
 of public schools and public charitable institutions and centers
in the said city.
3. On appeal, CA affirmed the appealed decision of the trial
court. Hence, Vicenta Tan and/or her attorney-in-fact, Ramon
Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to the SC, alleging
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the city of Davao
had personality to file the escheat petition and in declaring that
petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed dead
4. The petitioners in this case are basically contesting the
personality of the City of Davao to file this petition
ISSUE:
2. WON the City of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition
– YUP – OLD RULES OF COURT ALLOWED THE CITY
TO FILE ESCHEAT PETITION
3. WON CA erred in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan be
presumed dead – NOPE! Correct presumption
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. These factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on Us.
They may not be disturbed in this petition for review where only
legal questions may be raised
(Sec. 2, Rule 45).
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51786-R, the petition for
review is denied for lack of merit.
2. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's
RULING:
1. YES. With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General, may file the
escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964)
Rules of Court, the Appellate Court correctly ruled that the case
did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on
September 12,1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of
the 1940 Rules of Court which provided: (OLD RULES OF
COURT WAS APPLIED)
Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed
When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property
in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the
same, the municipality or city where the deceased last resided,
if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in
which he had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may
file a petition in the court of first instance of the province setting
forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be
declared escheated.
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until
January 1, 1964. Although the escheat proceedings were still
pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to
the petition because to do so would work injustice to the City of
Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving"
clause: These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall
govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all further
proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in the
opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice in which event the former procedure shall
apply.
ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead
in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to
settle her estate. Indeed, while a petition instituted for the sole
purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that were the only
question or matter involved in the case, the courts are not barred
from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident
of, or in connection with, an action or proceeding for the
settlement of the intestate estate of such absentee. Vicenta Tan,
if she still exists, was never served with summons extra-
territorially under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She
never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never
filed a pleading therein, hence, she never submitted to the court's
jurisdiction. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court;
Ferrer vs. Villamor, 60 SCRA 106; Filipinas Industrial Corp. vs.
San Diego, 23 SCRA 706; 1 Moran 144). He could have arranged
for the taking of her deposition in Hongkong by means of letters
rogatory under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules
of Court, aside from that, Ramon Pizarro, the alleged
administrator of Dominga Garcia's property, was not a real party
in interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition.
 04 Bermudo v. CA (1987)
Rule 91 Escheat
Ponente J. Fernan | Escalante
RECIT READY (a lot of facts, please read the full digest)
Facts: This is a case between Bermudo and the Chinese Nationalist
Party.
Tom Chow & Go Se Pieng obtained a judicial decree of registration
as co-owners over Lot 77s. They were issued OCT 10256 in 1932. But
before the OCT was issued, they both renounced all their interests and
rights over the property, saying that they were mere trustees of the lot
for the Chinese Nationalist Party. The Party allegedly acquired the
property from Philippine Refining Company.
24 years later, Bermudo filed in the CFI a petition for the
reconstitution of the records. He alleged that he was sold ½ of the
property. The reconstitution was granted and he was issued a TCT
because there was no opposition. The Chinese Nationalist party filed
a petition for relief from the order and prayed for its annulment. They
claimed that the reconstitution was obtained in bad faith because they
were not notified of the hearing in spite of the fact that Bermudo lived
adjacent to Lot 776 and had personal knowledge that the lot had been
owned and possessed by the Party for more than 30 years.
The reconstitution was annulled by the CFI. CA affirmed.
Issues:
1 WON CA exceeded authority in affirming the CFI.
2 WON Bermuda properly owned the ½ of the property.
Held:
1 YES. When the Chinese Nationalist Party filed its petition for relief, the
order of reconstitution had not only become final and executory, the said
order was already executed by the issuance of the reconstituted OCT No.
10256 which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 1948 to Bermudo. As a
petition for relief from judgment is proper only when the court is still in
control of the proceedings, the lower court should not have entertained the
Party’s (Chinese) petition because at that time, it was already deprived of
its jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, the lower court should have
considered the fact that premised on equity, relief from judgment is granted
only in exceptional cases, and being an act of grace, it is not regarded with
favor.
2 NO. As correctly held by the CFI and CA, Bermudo acted in bad faith
in seeking reconstitution of OCT No. 10256. However, doubts as to the
capacity of the Chinese Nationalist Party came into view—there being no
proof that it had the juridical capacity to hold property when it acquired it
because only corporations that are 60% Filipino owned could hold
property.
ONLY MENTION OF RULE 91 ESCHEAT:
To remove all doubts over the Party's right over lot 776 and to settle
the question of who really should be entitled to register said lot in his
name, We are convinced that an escheat proceeding under Section 5,
Rule 91 of the Rules of Court must be initiated by the government. All
interested parties, especially the actual occupants and the adjacent lot
owners including petitioner Bermudo shall be personally notified of
the proceeding and given the opportunity to prevent their valid claims
over Lot 776 otherwise it will be reverted to the State.
Doctrine: When there is doubt as to the ownership of the property, the
Coourt may make use of Escheat proceedings where in the property is
reverted back to the ownership of the state if there is no proper claim to
the ownership of the property.
FACTS: (A lot of details and facts---for Rule 91 only, recit-ready
is enough—Rule 91 Escheat was not the main issue—it was merely
the remedy decreed by the court for the case so there’s nothing on
Rule 91)
6. This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition stemmed
from the decision of the CFI of Leyte granting a petition for relief
from its order directing the reconstitution of an original certificate
of title covering a parcel of land.
7. Tom Chow and Go Se Pieng were issued a judicial decree of
registration and Original Certificate of Title No. 10256 over Lot
776 in Tacloban City as co-owners pro-indiviso on November 3,
1932.
8. The record shows, however, that on June 27, 1931, before the
issuance of said decree and title, Tom Chow and Go Se Pieng had
renounced their interests, rights, and privileges over the lot in a
document wherein they professed that they were mere trustees of
the Chinese Nationalist Party of Tacloban. The latter allegedly
acquired said lot from the Philippine Refining Company, Inc.
Consequently, on September 4, 1940, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 858 was issued to the Chinese Nationalist Party.
9. Almost twenty-four years later, or on June 23, 1964, Valentin
Bermudo filed in the CFI of Leyte a petition for the reconstitution
of the records of OCT No. 10256 (the one issued before the TCT
of the Chinese Nationalist Party). He alleged therein that he was
the vendee to the extent of ½ pro-indiviso of Lot 776. Annexed to
the petition was a certification of the Register of Deeds stating that
the Book containing OCT No. 10256 was completely destroyed,
that a diligent and religious search thereof proved futile, and that
no owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 10256 was ever
issued in favor of anybody.
10. There was no opposition to the petition, and the reconstitution of
records of OCT. No. 10256 was ordered. The court based its order
on its findings on a judicial decree of registration that showed that
Tom Chow and Go Se Pieng were the owners of Lot 776 and that
they executed a deed of adjudication and absolute sale transferring
all of Tom Chow’s interests to Bermudo. Shortly thereafter, on
December 8, 1964, TCT No. 1948 was issued to Bermudo and Go
Se Pieng as owners in equal shares undivided.
11. On January 23, 1965, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Party) filed
a petition for relief from said order and prayed for its annulment
and for the issuance of an order cancelling TCT No. 1948. It
alleged that the reconstitution order was obtained through
misrepresentation and fraud there being no notice of hearing of the
petition for reconstitution in spite of the fact that Bermudo, who
was residing adjacent to Lot 776, had personal knowledge that
said lot had been owned and possessed by the Party for more than
30 years. It added that it came to know of the reconstitution order
only on January 5, 1965, when the occupants of said lot informed
its president that Bermudo had filed an ejectment case against
them.
12. In his opposition, Bermudo averred that notice of the hearing of
his petition was duly published; that he did not know of any
participation of the Party in said land; that the latter had no legal
capacity to sue; that under existing laws, it could not own land’
that the land allegedly titled in its name was not the same parcel
of land subject matter of the case and that the petition for relief
was pro forma and intended merely to delay the proceedings in
the case.
13. The lower court set aside its order to reconstitute OCT No. 10256,
annulled and cancelled TCT No. 1948 and declared TCT No. 858
to be in full force and effect. The lower court found that Bermudo
acted in bad faith in obtaining the reconstitution. Being a resident
of the property adjacent to Lot 776, Bermudo could have known
the possessor and owner of the lot.
14. Bermudo filed an appeal with the CA. The CA dismissed the
appeal, Ruling that Bermudo did not acquire a legal and valid title
over Lot 776 from his predecessor-in-interest Chow, and hence,
he is not entitled to seek reconstitution of the title. It underscored
the fact that OCT No. 1256 was no longer in force when the
reconstitution order was issued because as early as September 4,
1940, said title had been cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No.
858 was issued in favor of the Chinese Nationalist Party.
15. Bermudo elevated the case to the SC, it was denied. The MR was
likewise denied. He refiled the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition. He asserts that the Court of Appeals acted beyond its
power and authority when it affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
4. WON the Court of Appeals acted beyond its power and authority
when it upheld the lower court’s decision. (Procedural Issue)
a. YES. When the Chinese Nationalist Party filed its petition
for relief, the order of reconstitution had not only become
final and executory, the said order was already executed
by the issuance of the reconstituted OCT No. 10256 which
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 1948 to Bermudo.
5. WON Bermudo had a proper claim to one-half interest over Lot
776. (Substantive Issue)
a. NO. As correctly held by the CFI and CA, Bermudo acted
in bad faith in seeking reconstitution of OCT No. 10256
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
2. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is herein
dismissed. The Solicitor General or his representative is hereby
directed to immediately file an escheat proceeding pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court in the proper Regional
Trial Court which shall give priority to the case and decide it at
the earliest possible time.
RULING:
WON the Court of Appeals acted beyond its power and authority when
it upheld the lower court’s decision. (Procedural Issue)
3. YES. When the Chinese Nationalist Party filed its petition for
relief, the order of reconstitution had not only become final and
executory, the said order was already executed by the issuance of
the reconstituted OCT No. 10256 which resulted in the issuance
of TCT No. 1948 to Bermudo. As a petition for relief from
judgment is proper only when the court is still in control of the
proceedings, the lower court should not have entertained the
Party’s (Chinese) petition because at that time, it was already
deprived of its jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, the lower
court should have considered the fact that premised on equity,
relief from judgment is granted only in exceptional cases, and
being an act of grace, it is not regarded with favor.
4. For its part, in choosing a remedy for the allowance of the
reconstitution of OCT No. 10256 and the subsequent issuance of
TCT No. 1948, the Party should have considered the fact that it
was, by its own admission, not served notice of the judicial
reconstitution proceeding. Rule 38 cannot be applied when the one
deprived of his right was never made a party to the case for lack
of the requisite notice.
5. Under the circumstances, the Party should have availed of the
remedy provided for in Republic Act No. 26 which states:
a. SEC. 19. ... Provided, however, That if the reconstituted
certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed
or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary or by an
order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been
issued, the procedure prescribed above with respect to
memoranda or new liens or encumbrances made on the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution,
shag be followed with respect to the new certificate of
title, and to such new hens or encumbrances, if any, as
may have been made on the latter, after the issuance
thereof.
6. The procedure referred to in said provision with respect to
memoranda of new liens or encumbrances annotated on a
reconstituted certificate of title, consists of the filing of a petition
with the proper Court of First Instance "for the annotation of such
right or interest on said reconstituted certificate of title and the
court, after notice and hearing, shall determine the merits of the
petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may
require.”
WON Bermudo had a proper claim to one-half interest over Lot 776.
(Substantive Issue)
 5. The existence of three transfer certificates of title all numbered
1. Bermudo has not denied the fact that he was residing adjacent to 858 in the same locality is an anomaly that requires investigation
Lot 776 when he filed the petition for reconstitution of title and and correction. That anomalous situation, coupled with Our
yet, he failed to give notices of the hearing on the petition for finding that it is very possible that both at the time of the Party's
reconstitution even to its actual occupants. Such failure acquisition of Lot 776 and the issuance in its favor of TCT No.
manifested an attempt to present any opposition to his petition, not 858, it was not qualified to hold and own private land under the
realizing that it would prove fatal to his case considering that 1935 Constitution and pertinent laws, compel Us to consider the
notice and the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 26 are Party's ownership over Lot 776 as questionable.
mandatory. Thus, courts must exercise utmost caution in 6. To remove all doubts over the Party's right over lot 776 and to
entertaining petitions for reconstitution and should make sure that settle the question of who really should be entitled to register said
the indispensable parties, i.e., the actual owners and possessors of lot in his name, We are convinced that an escheat proceeding
the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal under Section 5, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court must be initiated
notice of the petition, and not by mere general publication. by the government. All interested parties, especially the actual
2. On the other hand, the Party’s claim to Lot 776 seems dubious as occupants and the adjacent lot owners including petitioner
well. It is unsure whether the Party even had the juridical capacity Bermudo shall be personally notified of the proceeding and given
at the time the 1935 Constitution was in force to hold title to the opportunity to prevent their valid claims over Lot 776
properties because of the constitutional limit on acquisition of land otherwise it will be reverted to the State.
only to corporation or associations at least 60% owned by
Filipinos.
3. Worth noting is the fact that it was only on November 29, 1966,
while its petition for relief from judgment was pending resolution
in the lower court, that the Party reorganized itself, reincorporated
under the new name Leyte Kuomintang Cultural Association, Inc.
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We
view such belated move as aimed at obtaining documentary
evidence of its juridical existence to supplement the testimonial
proof of its juridical personality which was questioned by
Bermudo.
4. Furthermore, in his memorandum, Bermudo also alleged that
aside from the fact that the Party presented only a photograph of
TCT No. 858 with a certification from the office of the Register
of Deeds that it was a true copy, the Register of Deeds of Leyte
found three transfer certificates of title bearing the same number
in the names of the Party, one Feliciano Labastida, and the
Tacloban Electric and Ice Plants Co., Inc. The Party failed to rebut
said allegation.

05 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CFI MANILA (1988)
Rule 91 Escheat
Fernan J. | (Evangelista)
RECIT READY
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of
Manila a complaint for escheat against 31 banks, including herein
private respondent.
Private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss
the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue.
Issues:
a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in
interest in the escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. 73707
of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
YES because the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the
government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such
deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the
judgment of the suit”
b. Whether or not venue of action in Civil Case No. 73707 has
been properly laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant
banks, wherever they may be found, could be included in one
single action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3936.
NO. The addition of the phrase "that for escheat of unclaimed
bank balances all banks located in one and the same province
where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may be
made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly intended to
save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as
authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in
the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
c. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court on venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings
instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
NO. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought
in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant
deposits, is located.
FACTS:
16. Pursuant to the Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks
including herein private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank
forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of 1968
separate statements under oath by their respective managing
officers of all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in
the names of such depositors or creditors known to be dead, or
who have not been heard from, or who have not made further
deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more.
17. The Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of
Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks,
including herein private respondent.
18. Summonses were accordingly issued to defendant banks and the
creditors/depositors requiring them to file severally their answers
to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the
summons with notice that should they fail to file their answers,
plaintiff would take judgment against them by default.
19. The aforesaid complaint, list of depositors-creditors (Annex
"A"of the complaint), summons and notice were duly published.
20. On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the
CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on the
ground of improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the
motion to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order.
21. It is petitioner's contention that private respondent bank, being a
mere nominal party, could not file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, the real party in interest being the
depositors themselves; that the avowed purpose of Act No. 3936
is to benefit the government by escheating unto itself dormant
bank deposits and that this purpose will be defeated if escheat
proceedings will have to be instituted in each and every province
or city where a bank is located because of the publication
expense; that the convenience or inconvenience of the depositors
is not the determining factor as to venue of action, but that in
view of Rule 144 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that all cases brought after the effectivity of the Rules on January
1, 1964 shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of
Court, Section 2(b) of Rule 4 on venue is made applicable and
available to the Republic in the instant case.
ISSUE:
6. WON Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the
escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. 73707 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
a. YES because the escheat of the dormant deposits in
favor of the government would necessarily deprive said
bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that it
stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit”
7. WON venue of action in Civil Case No. 73707 has been properly
laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks, wherever
they may be found, could be included in one single action,
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3936.
a. NO. The addition of the phrase "that for escheat of
unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the
same province where the Court of First Instance
concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in
one action" was clearly intended to save on litigation
and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority
for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in
the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
8. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court on venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings instituted
by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
a. NO. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must
be brought in the province or city where the rem in this
case the dormant deposits, is located.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal by certiorari is hereby
denied. No costs.
RULING:
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
7. A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who
would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the
party entitled to avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that
private respondent bank falls under this definition for the
escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government
would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such
deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the
judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason that Section 3 of
Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined
as a party in the action for escheat, thus:
Section 3. Whenever the Attorney General shall be informed of
such unclaimed balances, he shall commence an action or actions
in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the bank is located, in which shall
be joined as parties the bank and such creditors or depositors. All
or any member of such creditors or depositors or banks, may be
included in one action. (Emphasis supplied.)
8. Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the which must be brought in the province or city where the
legislature would not have provided for its joining as a party in rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.
the escheat proceedings.

9. Private respondent bank being a real party in interest, it may and

can file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

VENUE

1. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the

Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to commence an
action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines
in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank
is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very
significant. It manifests awareness on the part of the
legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever
located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in
view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same
section, i.e., the province where the bank is located. Thus,
the addition of the last sentence, which the lower court
had correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of
unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the
same province where the Court of First Instance
concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in
one action" was clearly intended to save on litigation and
publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for
the lumping together of all banks wherever found in the
Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.

ESCHEAT AS IN REM PROCEEDING

1. Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b)
of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern
escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to
personal actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem
 01 Francisco vs CA
Rule 97 Sec. 2 When is the Guardian Removed or Allowed to
Resign
Ponente J. Guerrero | (Fabia)
RECIT READY
Facts:
This case is about a 72 year old guardian named Feliciano
Francisco who was replaced for failure to submit an inventory
and render accounting. He was replaced on the ground that he is
already of old age and someone older has replaced him
Issue:
WON old age can be considered a factor in determining the
competency of a guardian and be used as a ground to make
him resign
Held:
Yes, the court held that age can be considered a factor in
determining the capacity of the guardian to serve his
function. The delay in the inventory and accounting shows
that the judge was correct in asking the guardian to retire
Doctrine: While age alone is not a controlling criterion in
determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or
be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.|||
FACTS:
1. This is a case of guardianship where Feliciano (72 years old)
failed to render an accounting and an inventory. There were also
allegations that he misreported a sale of land from 14k to 12k.
Judge relieved him but reconsidered since he believed that 12k is
true. He also said that since the guardian is of advanced age, he
must retire and submit a person who can replace him. That
person became Pelagio Francisco who is 5 years older than him
while his appeal for replacement is ongoing.
2. He said that he has been doing it for 12 years and that him being
replaced by an older person made him file a case to question the
validity of old age as a ground to be removed or asked to resign.
ISSUE:
1. WON old age can be considered a factor in determining the
competency of a guardian and be used as a ground to make him
resign
a. Yes, because it is a trust relation and it is for the benefit
of the ward and not the guardian. His old age might
render him unfit to continue.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed
decision and resolution of the respondent court dated April 27,
1981 and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.|||
2.
RULING:
1. The court held that age can be considered a factor in
determining the capacity of the guardian to serve his
function. The delay in the inventory and accounting shows
that the judge was correct in asking the guardian to retire.
The fact that he was delayed in rendering the accounting and
inventory shows. Sustaining him as a guardian might be
detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling
criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be
appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for
consideration.|||
 02 LAVIDES v. CITY COURT OF LUCENA (1982)
Rule 92 Guardianship
De Castro J. | FLAMENO
RECIT READY
Facts: Petitioner instituted guardianship proceedings for the
benefit of his 7 minor children in the administration of the estate
of his wife. The estate was valued at P35,000, with each child
receiving P5,000. This was initially granted by the respondent
court, but after the lapse of 7 years, the case was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction based on the total value of the
estate.
Issue: Whether the basis for jurisdiction in guardianship
proceedings is the total value of the estate or the individual share
of each minor—individual share
Held:
The respondent court erred in dismissing the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The court must use the value of each
individual share as basis in acquiring jurisdiction. It was also
inequitable considering that 7 years have passed since the
respondent court granted the petition for guardianship.
Doctrine:
The individual share of each minor or incompetent in a
guardianship proceeding is determinative of which court has
jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS:
3. Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Lavides instituted before
the respondent court a guardianship proceeding with respect to
the person and property of their 7 minor children. The estate was
valued at P35,000. Each minor child was to receive P5,000.
4. Petitioner was appointed as guardian by the respondent court.
Petitioner was then authorized to settle the estate extra judicially
and to sell a portion thereof consisting of stocks. The petitioner
sold the said stocks.
5. Petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a Deed
of Exchange Agreement. While this motion was pending, the
respondent court (with a new judge) reviewed the case, and
finding that the value of the undivided estate was worth at least
P35,000, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the
appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled all
proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order.
6. Petitioner now argues that the respondent court erred in using the
TOTAL value of the undivided estate as basis for determining
jurisdiction despite the clear wording of Rule 92, Sec. 1
ISSUE:
2. WON the respondent court erred in dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction, on the ground that TOTAL value of the estate
exceeded the jurisdiction of the city court
a. NO, because under the Rules of Court, the proper basis
in acquiring jurisdiction in guardian proceedings
involving multiple wards is the individual share of each
ward in the estate.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of respondent City
Court of December 5, 1978 dismissing the petition and the Order of
December 27, 1978 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to it for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
2. Sec. 1, Rule 92—Guardianship of the person or estate of a
minor or incompetent may be instituted in the CFI of the
province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality,
or in the municipal court of the chartered city where the minor
 or incompetent person resides x x x provided, however, that the appointment of petitioner, and annulled the
where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent proceedings taken
exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of peace or municipal i. This in inequitable; will pave a pattern of
court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the CFI. judicial instability.
3. The above provisions clearly grants concurrent jurisdiction
between the municipal and city courts AND CFI in the
appointment of guardians either with respect to the person or
property of the minor or incompetent
a. EXCEPT where the value of the property of such minor
or incompetent EXCEEDS the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts, the guardianship proceedings
shall be instituted in the CFI
4. The value of the property of the minor or incompetent
sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court
has jurisdiction. The property referred to is the
INDIVIDUAL estate of the minor when there are multiple
minors sought to be placed under guardianship
a. What determines which court has jurisdiction is the
value of the individual property of each minor or
incompetent
5. In the present case…
a. Each minor would receive P5,000, hence it was well
within the jurisdiction of the city court
b. The case of Delgado cannot be invoked by respondent
i. In the said case, the estate was valued at P7,000
= each minor would receive P2,333.33; said
INDIVIDUAL SHARE was in excess of the
jurisdiction amount for inferior courts
c. Under the present rule, concurrent jurisdiction is
granted, except that where the value of the property
of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction
of inferior courts, the proceedings shall, be instituted
in the CFI
d. EXTRA NOTE: 7 years passed when the respondent
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked
01 ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYOT v. LEONOR
INES LUCIANO (1976)
Rule 93 Appointment of Guardians
Ponente J. Aquino| FRANCISCO
RECIT READY
Facts:
1. Sotero Baluyut died in 1975 leaving an estate valued at not
less that 2 million. He was survived by Encarnacion Lopez,
his 75 year-old widow. 
 MR.
2. After his death, Alfredo Baluyut, his nephew, filed a petition
in the CFI of Quezon City for the settlement of the decedent’s
estate. He alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally incapable of
administering her affairs and the decedent’s estate or of acting
as executrix of his will, if any. He prayed after hearing, he be
appointed administrator and in the meantime, special
administrator.
3. On that same day, he filed in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City a petition to declare Mrs.
Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship
alleging that due to a head injury she “has suffered impairment
of her mental faculties” and that “she is no longer competent,
physically and mentally”, to manager her affairs. He claimed
that he was able, qualified, and ready to act as her guardian.
4. Alfredo filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be subjected
to a neuro-psychiatric examination. Later on, Alfredo moved
orally that be considered disqualified to act as guardian in
view of his appointment as special administrator. Lower court
granted Alfredo’s motion to be disqualified and that Mrs.
Baluyut should undergo a neuro-psychiatric examination.
5. Lower court issued the questioned order declaring Mrs.
Baluyut an incompetent on the basis of Doctor Lapuz’s
report.
6. Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel does not sustain the declaration of
incompetency. She observed that the lower court’s order
was “issued in a blitz manner”, without any hearing on the
report and giving notice to her and without giving her a
copy of the report. On Oct 6, she filed a MR. She called
attention to the fact that in the administration proceeding
Judge Ericta had declared her “competent”. However, the
lower court on Dec 10 issued an order denying such
Issue:
1. WON the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of
the question as to Mrs. Baluyut’s alleged incompetency
should await the adjudication in the administration
proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue
as to her competency to act as adminstratrix.
2. WON she was denied due process when the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court summarily declared her
an incompetent just one day after it received the
psychiatrist’s report and before the report was set for
hearing.
Held:
1. YES, the incompetency to act as executor or administrator
cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the
placing of a person under guardianship.
The incompetency to act as executor or administrator
cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the
placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that
a person may be incompetent to act as executor or
administrator, it does not follow that he could be under
guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as
executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent
person envisaged in the law of guardianship.
 2. YES, a finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.
In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have
first set for hearing the psychiatrist’s report and examined
Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an
incompetent.
Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to
the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court
for appointment of guardians.
DOCTRINE: Rule 93 provides that after filing of the petition, the
court should fix a time and place for haring and give the proper
notices. At the hearing, “the alleged incompetent must be present
it able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has
been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the
parties in support of their responsive allegations” (Sec 5, Rule 93).
FACTS:
1. Sotero Baluyut died in 1975 (at the age of 86 years old),
leaving an estate valued at not less that 2 million. He was
survived by Encarnacion Lopez, his 75 year-old widow. 
 act as guardian in view of his appointment as special
Round One of the Guardianship Proceedings
2. Feb 20, 1975: Soon after his death, Alfredo Baluyut, his
nephew, filed a petition in the CFI of Quezon City for the
settlement of the decedent’s estate. He alleged that Mrs.
Baluyut was mentally incapable of administering her affairs
and the decedent’s estate or of acting as executrix of his will,
if any. He prayed after hearing, he be appointed administrator
and in the meantime, special administrator.
3. However, Alfredo did not content himself with the filing of
the administration proceeding. On alleging that same day, he
filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon
City a petition to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to
place her under guardianship.
4. He alleged that due to a head injury she “has suffered
impairment of her mental faculties” and that “she is no longer
competent, physically and mentally”, to manager her affairs.
He claimed that he was able, qualified, and ready to act as her
guardian.
5. After the petition was partially heard, Mrs. Baluyut learned of
the guardianship proceeding. She filed a verified
opposition wherein she denied the allegations regarding her
alleged mental incompetency. She alleged that the petition
was filed after Alfredo’s attempts to get possession of the
decedent’s estate were aborted and after Mrs. Baluyut’s
residence was ransacked resulting in the loss of important
papers and cash of not less than P100,000.
6. April 7: Alfredo filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be
subjected to a neuro-psychiatric examination. She filed a
countermotion to expunge that motion from the record.
7. April 15: Alfredo filed an amended petition praying that Mrs.
Cuesta and Mrs. Viray be appointed guardians of the person
and property of their sister, Mrs. Baluyut. The latter opposed
the amended petition.
8. Later, Alfredo moved orally that be considered disqualified to
administrator. Lower court granted Alfredo’s motion to be
disqualified and that Mrs. Baluyut should undergo a neuro-
psychiatric examination.
9. Lower court in its order dismissed Alfredo’s petition for
guardianship.
Round Two of the Guardianship Proceedings
10. May 6, 1975: Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed in the same
court their petition dated April 28 praying that Mrs. Baluyut
be declared an incompentend and that they be appointed as her
guardians.
11. May 7: Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed an urgent ex-parte
motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be ordered to remain at the
conjugal residence and that she be placed under the court’s
 protection or in her sisters’ custody so that she could be
available for psychiatric examination. Without hearing Mrs.
Baluyut, the lower court on May 8 granted the motion.
12. June 18: Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed a new petition for
guardianship, without mentioning their petitions of April 28
and May 8. Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel claims that no filing fee
was paid for docketing the petition.
13. July 2: lower court issued an order appointed Doctor Lapuz as
commissioner to determine the competency of Mrs. Baluyut
as to whether she should be placed under guardianship.
14. Sept 25: lower court issued the questioned order declaring
Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent on the basis of Doctor
Lapuz’s report.
15. Mrs. Baluyut was first examined by Ma. Paz Guzman, a
psychologist. The latter found that as of Sept 11, Mrs. Baluyut
was “an integrated well-functioning individual”, “an aware
and responsive individual who has a mind of her own”, and
“competent enough to understand her position relative to the
case involving her”.
16. The evaluations of the psychologist and the psychiatrist,
which according to Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel do not sustain the
declaration of incompetency. She observed that the lower
court’s order was “issued in a blitz manner”, without any
hearing on the report and giving notice to her and without
giving her a copy of the report. On Oct 6, she filed a MR. She
called attention to the fact that in the administration
proceeding Judge Ericta had declared her “competent”.
However, the lower court on Dec 10 issued an order
denying such MR.


ISSUE:
1. WON the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the
question as to Mrs. Baluyut’s alleged incompetency should await
the adjudication in the administration proceeding (pending in the
probate court) of the issue as to her competency to act as
adminstratrix.
a. YES, the incompetency to act as executor or administrator
cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the
placing of a person under guardianship.
2. WON she was denied due process when the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court summarily declared her an incompetent
just one day after it received the psychiatrist’s report and before
the report was set for hearing.
a. YES, a finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of Sept 25 and Dec 10,
1975 are set aside. The Court a quo is directed to suspend the
guardianship proceeding and to await the final verdict of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII on the
competency of Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut to act as
executrix or administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband,
Sotero Baluyut.
RULING:
First Issue
1. The court held in consonance with the last sentence of Section
29-A of the charter of QC the guardianship proceeding should
be suspended and should await the adjudication of the issue as
to Mrs. Baluyut’s competency to act as administratrix.
3. The incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot
be equated with the incompetency that justifies the placing of
a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may
be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not
follow that he could be under guardianship. But if a person is
competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not
the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship.
Second Issue
4. The lower court did not notify the parties of the filing of the
report, did not give them a chance to register their objections
 and did not set the report for hearing as required in sections 9-
11, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. Instead, on the day
following the receipt of the report, Mrs. Baluyut was declared
incompetent within the meaning of Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court.
5. The lower court upon being apprised of the foregoing
conclusion of the probate judge, should have at least tried to
take judicial notice of what was happening in the
administration proceeding.
6. In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first
set for hearing the psychiatrist’s report and examined Mrs.
Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an
incompetent.
7. Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the
procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for
appointment of guardians.
8. Rule 93 provides that after filing of the petition, the court
should fix a time and place for haring and give the proper
notices. At the hearing, “the alleged incompetent must be
present it able to attend, and it must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall
hear the evidence of the parties in support of their
responsive allegations” (Sec 5, Rule 93).
 02 YANGCO v. CFI OF MANILA
Rule 93 APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
Ponente J. Moreland| (Dece Fulache)
RECIT READY
Facts: Luis Yangco, 21 years old, is the owner of property valued
at P1M and temporarily travelling abroad at the time of the
proceedings were had. He was declared a spendthrift and guardians
of his property was appointed without serving personal notice to
him.
Issue: WON the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and
appointing a guardian for his property was void for lack of
jurisdiction
Held: YES, because notice to the petitioner as required by the
statute is jurisdictional.
Doctrine: For residents, personal notice must be given to the
person to be put under guardianship.
FACTS:
1. Luis Yangco, 21 years old, is the owner of property valued at
P1M and temporarily travelling abroad at the time of the
proceedings were had. He was declared a spendthrift and
guardians of his property was appointed.
2. Summary of causes of action. The proceedings mentioned were
conducted without notice personally given to the petitioner.
ISSUE:
3. WON the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and
appointing a guardian for his property was void for lack of
jurisdiction
a. YES, because notice to the petitioner as required by the
statute is jurisdictional.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. It is the judgment of the court that the proceeding to declare that
the petitioner for the writ is an incompetent and all orders,
judgments, and decrees made and entered in said proceeding are
null and void, as having been done, had, made and entered by the
Court of First Instance without jurisdiction, and the same are
hereby so declared.
RULING:
The petitioner is a resident and was only temporarily absent
therefrom traveling abroad at the time proceedings were instituted.
The decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a
guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. In
proceedings of this class notice as required by the statute is
jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a
valid decree in the premises.
The Statute provides that notice must be given to the supposed insane
or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition,
not less than five days before the time so appointed. The statute does
not authorize a substituted service except in cases where the person
for whose property the guardian is sought to be appointed is a resident
of a foreign country. Personal notice being essential under the
statute, the notice to the mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the
alleged spendthrift was of no legal value.
To declare a person of full age to be incompetent to manage his affairs
and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and
manage his property is a serious thing. Hence, personal notice is
important for him to be present in court during proceedings.
Even if petitioner is to be considered as non-resident, still the notice
required has not been given. That section requires notice "to all
interested, in such manner as such court orders, by publication or
otherwise." No notice whatever was given to the alleged incompetent,
either by publication or otherwise, and he certainly is one of the parties
"interested."
 01 Nario v. Philippine American Life Ins. Co. (1967)
Rule 94 Bonds of Guardians
REYES, J. | (Galang)
RECIT READY
Facts:
Mrs. Nario was issued a life insurance policy by respondent; she designated
as irrevocable beneficiaries Delfin Nario and Ernesto Nario, her husband
and minor son, respectively. Mrs. Nario then applied for a policy loan from
respondent, but it was denied because the written consent for the minor son
must not only be given by the father as legal guardian but must be authorized
by the court in a competent guardianship proceeding. Mrs. Nario then
decided to surrender her policy and demanded the cash surrender value
thereof, which was denied by the respondents for the same reason.
Issue:
WON court authorization is needed for the policy loan application and the
surrender of said policy
Held:
YES, judicial authorization is necessary for the consent to be given by the
father to a policy loan or to the surrender of a life insurance policy wherein
a minor has a vested interest worth P2,500.
Doctrine:
As there was no such petition and bond, the consent given by the
father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without prior
court authorization, to the policy loan application and the surrender
of said policy, was insufficient and ineffective, and defendant-
appellee was justified in disapproving the proposed transactions in
question.
FACTS:
1. Mrs. Alejandra Santos-Nario was, upon application, issued by the
Philippine American Life Insurance Co., a life insurance policy under
a 20-year endowment plan, with a face value of P5,000; she designated
thereon her husband, Delfin Nario, and their unemancipated minor
son, Ernesto Nario, as her irrevocable beneficiaries.
2. Mrs. Nario then applied for a loan on the above stated policy with the
Insurance Company, which she, as a policy-holder, has been entitled
to avail of under one of the provisions of the said policy after the same
has been in force for 3 years – for the purpose of using the proceeds
for the school expenses of Ernesto.
a. Said application bore the written signature and consent of
Delfin Nario in two capacities: first, as one of the irrevocable
beneficiaries; and the other, as the father-guardian of said
minor son and irrevocable beneficiary, Ernesto Nario, and as
legal administrator of the minor’s properties, pursuant to
Article 320 of the Civil Code.
b. The Insurance Company denied the application because the
written consent for the minor son must not only be given by
his father as legal guardian but it must be authorized by the
court in a competent guardianship proceeding.
3. Thereafter, Mrs. Nario signified her decision to surrender her policy,
which she was entitled to avail of under the provisions of the same
policy, and demand the cash surrender value which then amounted to
P520.
a. The Insurance Company likewise denied the surrender of the
policy on the same ground given in disapproving the load
policy application.
4. Hence, Mr. and Mrs. Nario brought suit against respondent, seeking
to compel the latter to grant their policy loan and/or to accept the
surrender of policy in exchange for its cash value.
5. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.
6. Petitioner appealed directly to the Supreme Court, contending that the
minor’s interest to only one-half of the policy’s cash surrender value
of P520; that under Rule 96, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court,
payment of the ward’s debts is within the powers of the guardian,
where no realty is involved; hence, there is no reason why the father
may not validly agree to the proposed transaction on behalf of the
minor without need of court authority.
ISSUE:
WON court authorization is needed for the policy loan application and the
surrender of said policy
a. YES, judicial authorization is necessary for the consent to be given
by the father to a policy loan or to the surrender of a life insurance
policy wherein a minor has a vested interest worth P2,500.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: a. Since the law merely constitutes the parent as legal
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants administrator of the child's property (which is a general
Nario. So ordered. power), the parent requires special authority for the acts above
specified, and this authority can be given only by a court. This
RULING: restricted interpretation of the parent's authority becomes all
1. The full face value of the policy is P5,000.00 and the minor's vested the more necessary where as in the case before us, there is no
interest therein, as one of the two (2) irrevocable beneficiaries, consists bond to guarantee the ward against eventual losses.
of one-half (1/2) of said amount or P2,500.
2. The Article 320 and 326 of Civil Code have already been implemented
and clarified in our Revised Rules of Court which provides—
SEC. 7. Parents as guardians.—When the property of the child
under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment,
shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the child's property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the
petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court
may, however, appoint another suitable person." (Rule 93)
3. It appearing that the minor beneficiary's vested interest or right on
the policy exceeds two thousand pesos (P2,000); that plaintiffs did
not file any guardianship bond to be approved by the court; and as
later implemented in the above quoted Section 7, Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court, plaintiffs should have, but, had not, filed
a formal application or petition for guardianship, plaintiffs-parents
cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on them, as legal
administrators of their child's property, under articles 820 and 326
of the Civil Code.
4. As there was no such petition and bond, the consent given by the
father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without prior
court authorization, to the policy loan application and the surrender
of said policy, was insufficient and ineffective, and defendant-
appellee was justified in disapproving the proposed transactions in
question.
5. The result would be the same even if we regarded the interest of
the ward to be worth less than P2,000.00. While the father or
mother would in such event be exempt from the duty of filing a
bond, and securing judicial appointment, still the parent's authority
over the estate of the ward as a legal-guardian would not extend to
acts of encumbrance or disposition, as distinguished from acts of
management or administration.
 02 Arroyo vs. Jungsay
94 – Bonds of Guardians
Ponente J. TRENT (NICO)
RECIT READY
Facts: The creditor who is the new guardian is claiming against the
old guardian and his sureties. The sureties are contending that they
be credited with their property, as the old guardian has properties
which can be attached.
Issue: WON the properties of the old guardian can be attached and
the sureties credited with their property?
Held: NO. The property pointed out by the sureties is not sufficient
to pay the indebtedness; it is not salable; it is so encumbered that
third parties have, as we have indicated, full possession under claim
of ownership without leaving to the absconding guardian a fractional
or reversionary interest without determining first whether the claim
of one or more of the occupants is well founded.
Doctrine: Where a judgment has been rendered against a
guardian and his sureties, the latter are not entitled to be DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
credited with the value of certain property levied upon as that of
the former when such property is in the exclusive possession of 1. The judgment appealed from, being in accordance with the law, the
third parties under claim of ownership. same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants .
FACTS:
1. The plaintiff in this case is the guardian of one Tito Jocsing, an
imbecile, appointed by the court to succeed Jungsay, the former
guardian, who absconded with the funds of his ward. The defendants
are the absconding guardian and his bondsmen. From a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the sum of
P6,000, together with interest and costs, the bondsmen appealed.
2. The principal question presented for our consideration is whether
the appellants should be credited with P4,400, the alleged value of
certain property attached as that of the absconding guardian, all of
which is in the exclusive possession of third parties under claim of
ownership.
3. The appellants in contending for the credit, rely upon article 1834
of the Civil Code, which gives to the surety the benefit of a levy
(exclusion), even when a judgment is rendered against both the
surety and the principal. But, according to article 1832, before the
surety is entitled to this benefit, he must point out to the creditor
property of the principal debtor which can be sold and which is
sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.
ISSUE:
1. WON in a judgment against a guardian and his sureties,
the sureties are entitled to be credited with the value of certain
property levied upon that belongs to the guardian but is in the
exclusive possession of third parties under a claim of ownership?
RULING:
In Hill & Co. vs. Bourcier and Pond (29 La. Ann., 841), where
provisions similar to our Civil Code were under consideration, the
court said:
"The surety has the right, under certain circumstances, to demand the
discussion of the property of the principal debtor. Where suit is
brought against the surety alone, he may interpose the plea, and
compel the creditor to discuss the principal debtor. The effect of this wherein the sureties are made parties and given an opportunity to be
is to stay proceedings against the surety until judgment has been heard. All this was done in the instant case.
obtained against the principal debtor, and execution against his
property has proved insufficient. When the suit is brought against the
surety and the principal debtor the plea of discussion does not
require or authorize any suspension of the proceedings; but the
judgment will be so modified as to require the creditor to proceed by
execution against the property of the principal, and to exhaust it
before resorting to the property of the surety. (Bernard vs. Custis, 4
Martin, 215; Bands vs. Brander, 13 La., 276.)

"In either case, the surety who desires to avail himself of this right
must demand it in limine, 'on the institution of proceedings against
him.' He must, moreover, point out to the creditor property of the
principal debtor, not encumbered, subject to seizure; and must
furnish a sufficient sum to have the discussion carried into effect. (R.
C. C., 3045, 3046, 3047.)

A plea which does not meet these requirements must be disregarded.

(Robechot vs. Folse, 11 La., 1336; Bands vs. Brander, 13 La., 176)"

The property pointed out by the sureties is not sufficient to pay the
indebtedness; it is not salable; it is so encumbered that third parties
have, as we have indicated, full possession under claim of ownership
without leaving to the absconding guardian a fractional or
reversionary interest without determining first whether the claim of
one or more of the occupants is well founded. In all these respects
the sureties have failed to meet the requirements of article 1832 of
the Civil Code.

Where a guardian absconds or in beyond the jurisdiction of the court,

the proper method, under article 1834 of the civil Code and section
577 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to ascertain whether such
guardian is liable and to what extent, in order to bind the sureties on
his of official bond, is by a proceeding in the nature of a civil action
 01 De Pua v. San Agustin (1981)
Rule 95 Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
Ponente J. Barredo | (HERMOSO)
RECIT READY
Facts: De Pua, the guardian of an incompetent heir, sold two
properties to San Agustin. In contrast to the first property, the
guardianship court denied both petition for authority to sell and the
motion to approve the sale of the second property under Lots 632
and 633. The court opined that the sale was unnecessary nor
beneficial to the ward. Thereafter, San Agustin filed a motion to
confirm the sale of Lots 632 and 633 based on the supplemental
project of partition filed by the co-heirs of the incompetent heir.
Under the supplemental project of partition, the co-heirs
recognized the conveyance of Lots 632 and 633 to San Agustin,
and conveyed their rights to the said lots to the incompetent heir.
The probate court granted the motion.
Issue: WON the sale of a ward’s property requires prior authority
by a guardianship court? Yes
Held: Rule 95 requires that properties of a ward could only be sold
only under authority of the guardianship court. Absent it, the sale
is void. Moreover, a probate court has no jurisdiction to authorize
the sale of property under guardianship nor approve a sale when it
was disapproved by a guardianship court.
Doctrine: A probate court has no jurisdiction to authorize or
approve the sale of property under guardianship where the
guardian has not secured prior authority from the guardianship
court.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Navarro died intestate in 1945 on March and February
respectively. They left as heirs two daughters and two
grandchildren from a predeceased son. Leonora, one of their
daughters, is represented by De Pua, because of incompetency due
to insanity.
2. A Project of Partition was presented during the course of the
settlement of the estate which the court approved. Leonora was
awarded Lot 634-A, and Lots 632 and 633 with an aggregate area
of 1.5 hectares.
3. De Pua, the judicial guardian of Leonora, filed a petition for
authority to sell Lot 634-A on the ground that the sale will be
beneficial to the ward for maintenance. The court granted the
judicial guardian authority to sell. Accordingly, Lot 634-A was
sold to San Agustin.
4. De Pua also sold at the same time Lots 632 and 633, but the
petition for authority to sell these lots were filed on a later date.
5. Days after the sale was made, De Pua filed a petition for authority
to sell Lots 632 and 633, and a motion to approve the sale of
property. The petition however disclosed the true area of the two
lots which was 11 hectares, not 1.5 hectares. The court denied both
the motion and petition as the sale was not necessary nor
beneficial to the ward.
6. Thereafter, the co-heirs discovered because of the sale that Lots
632 and 633 actually consisted of 11 hectares, not 1.5 hectares.
Hence, a Supplemental Project of Partition was filed recognizing
the conveyance to San Agustin and conveying their rights to
Leonora subject to payment of a certain amount and rescission of
their mortgage obligations.
7. De Pua then filed a motion manifesting her desire to return to San
Agustin the amount advanced for Lots 632 and 633. This is so that
the said lots may be returned to the guardianship. Later, however,
De Pua filed a civil action against San Agustin seeking the
reconveyance of Lots 632 and 633.
8. In turn, San Agustin filed a motion for the confirmation of the
transfer of rights over the said lots. The court granted the motion
for confirmation in favor of San Agustin.
9. An appeal was filed to the SC on the ground that the transfer of
rights is void ab initio and cannot be approved nor confirmed.

ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of a ward’s property without prior authority by the
guardianship court is void.
a. YES, because Rule 95 requires that properties of a ward
could be sold only under authority of the guardianship
court.
2. WON a probate court has jurisdiction to authorize the sale of
property under guardianship.
a. NO, because a probate court has no jurisdiction to
authorize the sale of any property under guardianship,
more so when the sale has been previously disapproved
by a guardianship court.
to dispose of the lots in question without prior permission of the
guardianship court
4. A probate court has no jurisdiction to authorize the sale of any
property belonging to an heir who is under guardianship without
first requiring the guardian to secure the corresponding authority
from the guardianship court.
5. In addition, a probate court does not have any power to effectively
approve a sale of an heir-ward which had been actually
disapproved by the guardianship court.
6. A guardianship court is designed purposely to see to it that the
interests of wards under its jurisdiction are taken care of by the
court's appointed guardian with the diligence and prudence of a
bonus pater familiae.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the
impugned order of November 12, 1966, and ordering the
guardianship court in Case No. 282 of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch I, to proceed with the accounting pursuant to the
above opinion.

RULING:
Prior authority of the guardianship court is required
1. This Court has ruled that under Rule 95, the properties of a ward
could be sold only under authority of the guardianship court.
Without such authority, any sale would necessarily be illegal.
2. Even on the assumption that the lack of authority from the
guardianship court resulted only in a voidable sale which could be
ratified, there is no showing in the record that there was any such
ratification. The approval by the probate court of the amended
"Supplemental Project of Partition" is not tantamount to the
required ratification.

Lack of authority of a probate court over a ward’s property

3. The approval by the probate court of the supplemental project of
partition did not in any degree confer upon Mrs. de Pua the power
 02 GONZALEZ v. ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ (1990)
Rule 95 Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
Ponente J. Narvasa | PARAS, E.B.G.
RECIT READY
Facts: Rodolfo Gonzalez married Luz Dizon after his first wife
died. They executed an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and for Establishment of Separation of Property, for the
purpose of avoiding confusion and/or differences among the 2 sets
of heirs (of the first marriage and of the second marriage.) Salvador,
one of the children of the first marriage, instituted proceedings to
place under guardianship the property of Rodolfo on the ground of
incapacity on account of illness and advanced age. Salvador caused
notices of lis pendens to be annotated on certain titles of properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Rodolfo and Luz. One
property was even tagged paraphernal, in the name of Luz
Gonzalez, married to Rodolfo Gonzalez. Rodolfo filed a petition to
cancel the annotations but the court denied it.
Issue: WON the inscription of lis pendens was merely for the
purpose of molesting the proposed ward and was not necessary to
protect the rights of Salvador and his siblings.
Held: No. The first wife’s estate has not been shown to have been
settled. The children of the first marriage indisputably have interest
in the property of the first and second marriage. Also, even if the
annotation of lis pendens extends to the properties of Luz Gonzalez
who is not a party to the guardianship proceedings, this cannot be
helped because her name appears in the titles together with her
husband’s. Under the law, no disposition of property can be made
alone by either of them.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are spouses Rodolfo Gonzalez and Luz Dizon-
Gonzalez. Private respondent is Salvador Gonzalez, Rodolfo’s son
with his first wife.
2. Rodolfo was formerly married to Carmen Rojas. She bore him 4
children, Salvador being one of them. Carmen died.
3. Sometime later, Rodolfo married Luz Dizon. The latter bore 2
children.
4. Rodolfo and Luz executed an Agreement for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership and for Establishment of Separation of
Property, for the declared purpose of avoiding confusion and/or
differences among the two sets of heirs of Rodolfo in the
settlement of the estates of the spouses in case of death.
5. They filed a petition with the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court of Manila for approval of their agreement. The children by
first marriage moved for, and were granted leave, to intervene in
the case.
6. Salvador, the eldest among the children of the first marriage,
instituted in the same court proceedings to place under
guardianship the property of Rodolfo, grounded on the latter’s
alleged incapacity to manage and direct his financial and
ownership status, owing from the deterioration of his mental
faculties on account of illness and advanced age. The petition also
averred that the children of the first marriage will be prejudiced.
7. Rodolfo and Luz drew up a contract for the sale of 2 parcels on
land. These parcels were subject of first mortgages held by
Philippine Trust Company and Philippine National Bank. The
banks were not willing to accede to the assumption by the vendees
of the mortgage obligations. The spouses caused annotation of the
sales as adverse claims on the TCTs.
8. Salvador caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated on the
spouses’ titles not only over the two lots above described, but also
over other properties – one in Rizal, in the names of spouses
 Gonzalez and another pair of spouses, and one in Cavite, in the
name of Luz Gonzalez, married to Rodolfo Gonzalez,
denominated “paraphernal property.” This request for annotation
was based on the pendency of the guardianship proceeding.
9. Rodolfo filed a petition for cancellation of notices of lis pendens.
The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court denied this and found
that it has not been established that the purpose of the notice of lis
pendens is merely for molesting the proposed ward and that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of petitioners.
10. The Gonzalez spouses went to the Supreme Court to assail the
Orders of the lower court denying the petition for cancellation and
the MR.
11. Note that in the lower court, they asserted a theory that the rule on
notices of lis pendens does not apply to guardianship cases. They
did not raise this issue in the Supreme Court anymore as the
question has been settled by Diaz v. Perez.
12. What they allege now is that the estate of Carmen was properly
settled and distributed among the heirs, thus there is no need to
disturb the property arrangements of the second marriage.
ISSUE:
1. WON the inscription of the notices of lis pendens was merely for
the purpose of molesting the proposed ward.
a. NO. Evidence adduced by the parties failed to establish
that Salvador caused the inscription merely for molesting
the proposed ward.
2. WON the inscription of the notices of lis pendens was necessary
to protect the rights of Salvador Gonzalez, et al.
a. YES. The children of the first marriage indisputably have
an interest in the property of the first marriage, as well as
in the property of the second.
[Note that I just separated the issues for clarity, but they were lumped
together in the case.]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioners.
RULING:
1. Nothing in the record establishes the claim that Carmen Roxas’
estate had indeed been settled. The record in fact does not indicate
that satisfactory evidence in substantiation of this claim was
presented in the court a quo. What is disclosed is that the evidence
adduced failed to establish that Salvador had caused inscription of
the notices of lis pendens merely for molesting the proposed ward
or that such inscription as not necessary to protect the rights of the
petitioners. The facts on record demonstrated the need to give
constructive notice to all parties having occasion to deal with the
property registered in the name of Rodolfo that his capacity to
create any encumbrance or make any disposition was suspect.
2. The children of the first marriage indisputably have an interest in
the property of the first marriage, as well as in the property of the
second. They have a right to allege and prove in the appropriate
proceeding in the proper forum that their father, Rodolfo, had
brought property acquired by him and his first wife into his second
marriage.
3. The issues involved are factual (degree of alleged incapacity,
manner and other circumstances of the acquisition of the
properties during the marriages, attendance of fraud/undue
pressure or influence). These issues cannot be resolved without
evidence which may not be received by this Court in the first
instance. Until these issues are resolved, there is a need to warn a
person interested in any property titled in the name of Rodolfo, of
the pendency of proceedings which might result in invalidation of
any transaction made by Rodolfo affecting such property.
4. While it may be true that the effect of the notices of lis pendens
extend to the proprietary interests of Luz Gonzalez, who is not
personally involved in the proceedings for guardianship, this
cannot be helped since the latter’s name does in fact appear in the
titles together with her husband’s. Under the law, no disposition
can be made alone by either of them.
5. Whether the person whose property is sought to be placed under
guardianship be sole owner or co-owner is immaterial. If shown
to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under
either supposition would be equally defective.
6. The chief issues to be determined by evidence before the court a
quo are whether or not Dr. Gonzalez is incompetent and whether
or not there has been liquidation of the property of the first nuptials
and the nature and character of the property acquired by either or
both of the spouses of the second marriage.
 03 LINDAIN V. CA (1992)
Rule 95 Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
Ponente J. Griño-Aquino | REYES
RECIT READY
Facts: When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already
the registered owners of a parcel of land. Their mother, then
already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children,
sold the land to defendants spouses.
Issue: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the
minors' property by their mother.
Held: YES. Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal
(as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of
his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or
alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval.
Doctrine: The powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule
84 by the Rules of Court are only powers of possession and
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or
otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must
proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires
court authority and approval.
FACTS:
1. When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the
registered owners of a parcel of land. Their mother, then already
a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the
land to defendants spouses. The spouses registered the property
in their names.
2. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their
mother to the defendants is null and void because it was made
without judicial authority and/or court approval.
3. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was
valid, as the value of the property was less than P2,000, and,
considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31
years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to
rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4)
years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed.
ISSUE:
1. WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors'
property by their mother.
a. YES, because under the law, a parent, acting merely as
the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of
the property of his/her minor children, does not have the
power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said
children without judicial approval.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RULING:
1. The relevant law in effect at the time of the sale (Civil Code):
a. Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the
child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
2. Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as
distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of
his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of,
or alienate, the property of said children without judicial
approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property as provided in
Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and
Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of
possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage,
 encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor
children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89
which requires court authority and approval.
3. The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in
good faith is not credible for they knew from the very beginning
that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court approval
could not validly convey to them the property of her minor
children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the
transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when they
went ahead and bought the land from her anyway.
4. The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for
"real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years". Since
the sale took place in 1966, the action to recover the property had
not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987.

04 MANECLANG v. BAUN (1990)
Rule 95 Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
Ponente J. DAVIDE JR.| (RODRIGUEZ)
RECIT READY
Facts: Margarita died intestate, leaving nine children. One of them,
Maneclang, petitioned for the settlement of the estate. No guardian
ad litem was appointed for any of the minor heirs.
On September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the
intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to
mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the estate for the
purpose of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition.
Some properties were then sold; the City of Dagupan bought a
parcel of land and built a market on it.
In 1965, the newly appointed administratrix contested said sale,
saying that no sale can be valid with the absence of notice to the
heirs, who did not even have a guardian ad litem to begin with.
The RTC ruled for the annulment of the sale and demanded that the
City of Dagupan return the properties it bought. Aggrieved, the City
appealed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether the sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of
an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell
and an order granting it which were filed and entered, respectively,
without notice to the heirs of the decedents, is valid.
Held: NO. Without notice and hearing, the sale, mortgage or
encumbrance is void. Notice is mandatory. Noncompliance
therewith under the sale is null and void. Violation of Rule 95
rendered the sale void ab initio.
Doctrine: The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs are
the presumptive owners. Since they succeed to all the rights and
obligation of the deceased from the moment of the latter’s death,
they are the person directly affected by the sale or mortgage and
therefore cannot be deprived of the property, except in the manner
provided by law.
FACTS:
1. On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate, leaving
several parcels of land. She was survived by her husband Severo
Maneclang and 9 children.
2. Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by
Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the CFI
at Dagupan City, Pangasinan. At the time of the filing of the
petition, 7 of her 9 children were below the age of 18 but no
guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor
children.
3. On September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the
intestate estate filed a petition asking the court to give him the
authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to
meet the debts enumerated in the petition. While notice thereof
was given to the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through
his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to
the heirs of Margarita.
4. Despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued
an Order granted Feliciano’s petition.
5. Following the order Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator
executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan,
represented by its mayor, a portion consisting of 4,415 square
meters of the lot. This sale was approved by the intestate court.
6. The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and
constructed thereon a public market It has been in continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of
the market.
7. On September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late
Margarita filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous
administrator pursuant to the order cancellation of titles,
recovery of possession and damages against the vendees Juan
T. Baun and Amparo Baun, etc and the City of Dagupan.
ISSUES:
1. R95 ISSUE: WON the sale to the City of Dagupan is null and void
ab initio. YES, authority to sell, the sale itself and the order
approving it would be null and void ab initio.
a. NOTE however that 4 of 9 children are BARRED by
laches, as they are already of legal age when the sale was
executed/ (Hence, only 5/9 of the property may be
recovered as stated in the dispositive portion!)
2. MINOR ISSUE: WON petitioner is in estoppel in assailing the
legality of the sale. NO, Estoppel is unavailable as an argument
against the administratrix of the estate and against the children.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision in all respects, except to the extent as above modified. As
modified, (a) the sale in favor of the City of Dagupan is hereby
declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches
as abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the
presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and
Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, may be recovered; (b) subject,
however, to its right to retain the property until it shall have been
refunded the amounts of P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the City of
Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate estate of
Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question, for which
purpose said parties shall cause the appropriate partition thereof,
expenses for which shall be borne by them proportionately; and
(c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable
compensation for the use of 5/ 9 of the property in question until
it shall have effectively delivered the possession of the property to
the intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos. Upon the other hand,
said intestate estate is hereby ordered to refund to the City of
Dagupan that portion of the real estate taxes the latter had paid for
the lot corresponding to 5/9 thereof effective taxable year 1965
and until the latter shall have been delivered to said intestate
estate.
RULING:
The authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would
be null and void ab initio.
1. The Civil Code provides that the father or mother, as such, the
administrator of the child's property but it does not follow that for
purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule
89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the
children.
2. It is explicitly provided that notice must be in be writing, must be
given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall
fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice
to be given to the interested parties.
3. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. The remaining
seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem
having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the
requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth
in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and
essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and
the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of
the estate and against the children.
1. The court reiterated the ruling in Boñaga vs. Soler, "that a
decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of
his own void deed purporting to convey land; and if this be true of
the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not
 be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor are not
conformable to law."

The children who were already of legal age at the time of sale were
already barred by laches
1. Four of the children were already of legal age when the deed of sale
was executed. As it was Oscar who executed the deed of sale, he
cannot be expected to renounce his own act. With respect to Hector,
Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken immediate steps to
protect their rights. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years
amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute laches.
2. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to the rest of the children
(4) who were then minors and not represented by any legal
representative.
3. They could not have filed an action to protect their interest; hence,
neither delay nor negligence could be attributed to them as a basis
for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of the
questioned property.