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HIDDEN DEFECTS IN BRIDGE COMPONENTS – FORTHCOMING CIRIA

GUIDANCE

Conference Paper · May 2016

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 HIDDEN DEFECTS IN BRIDGES, GUIDANCE ON DETECTION AND
MANAGEMENT – FORTHCOMING CIRIA REPORT

J. Collins D. Ashurst J. Webb A. Ghose

Arup Arup AECOM AECOM
78 East Street Blythe Valley Park, Colmore Plaza 4 Bedford Park
Leeds Solihull, Birmingham Croydon
LS9 8EE B90 8AE B4 6AT CR0 2AP
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom

KEYWORDS: bridge, inspection, management, defects

ABSTRACT
The core component of a bridge management programme is on-site examination by a competent bridge
inspector. These inspections are central to recording bridge condition, used by bridge owners to ensure
defects are identified and rectified within reasonable timeframes as well as identifying larger maintenance
works. Generally, this works well in the UK and Ireland: bridge stock is generally safe for use with the
aim of being fit for purpose. However, the process is based wholly on the quality of inspections. If an
inspection does not include all elements because, for example, they are hidden and not easy to examine,
the adverse effects can be significant or in the worst cases catastrophic. Two high profile cases in the UK
in recent years have brought the importance of hidden defects to the centre of bridge owners’ attention.
In 2009 the Stewarton rail bridge, Ayrshire, collapsed during passage of a freight train. Corrosion to half-
through girder webs was so severe that complete loss of section had occurred in areas of high shear load.
The corroded areas were hidden under ballast and had not been inspected. The M4 Hammersmith
flyover, London had an inspection of hidden pre-tensioning cables undertaken in 2011. Condition was so
poor that an emergency closure and strengthening works were undertaken to restore highway traffic on
one of London’s busiest roads. Prompted by these cases, bridge owners in UK and Ireland identified the
need to define good practice when inspecting, identifying and maintaining hidden bridge components.
A forthcoming CIRIA report is in preparation to undertake this exercise as well as providing guidance on
how to avoid creating potential for such defects in design. The report will aim to do so as an
implementation document: a reference manual presenting information to draw attention to aspects of
defects in hidden components and referring the reader to definitive texts.

INTRODUCTION

Bridge owners, operators and engineers including designers, assessors and maintainers all play key roles
in bridge management. However, the core component of a bridge management programme is on-site
examinations by a competent bridge inspector. These inspections are central to recording bridge condition
and are used by bridge owners to ensure defects are identified and rectified within reasonable timeframes
as well as identifying larger maintenance works. When coupled with an accurate numerical assessment of
capacity, the risk posed by a bridge and / or individual components to threatening safety is defined.
Generally, this works well in the UK and Ireland: there are few serious failures. However, amongst other
items the success of the process is very sensitive to the quality of the access available during the
inspection. If an inspection does not include all elements since, for example they are hidden and not
easily examinable, the adverse effects can be significant or in the worst cases catastrophic.

High profile cases in recent years such as at Stewarton, de la Concorde, Hammersmith and Boston Manor
have bought the importance of hidden defects in bridge components to the forefront of bridge owners’
focus. Prompted by these and other cases, the Bridge Owner’s Forum identified the need to define good
practice when inspecting, identifying and maintaining hidden bridge components. These groups
approached the publisher CIRIA to produce a new report covering these areas. In December 2014, CIRIA
procured the joint services of AECOM and Arup to write this report. Whilst the report covers both UK
and Irish practice, for brevity and to suit the envisaged attendees at Structural Faults + Repair 2016, UK
practice only is discussed in this paper.

RECENT NOTABLE EVENTS

In collating the case studies for the CIRIA report and on presentation to various audiences, it has become
apparent that this document may have an important secondary function. As a collection of interesting and
often difficult works to existing bridges, the case studies provide useful background reading for bridge
professionals and those wishing to understand the daily challenges faced by the industry. A short
summary of four case studies central to forming the new guidance of the upcoming report are given
below.

Stewarton
At 06:12 on 27th January 2009 in Stewarton, Ayrshire, a train carrying a mixed consignment of gas oil,
diesel and kerosene derailed as it crossed a half through steel underbridge. Fuel was leaked into the local
environment and watercourses but there were no fatalities or injuries. Whilst multiple factors and
underlying causes contributed to the failure, the underlying cause was failure of a defective hidden
component (RAIB, 2010).

Fig. 1 Left, the collapsed Stewarton Bridge. Right, heavy corrosion to the buried web.

Investigation demonstrated a shear failure to two of the three main girders. The web plate thickness had
reduced due to heavy corrosion in areas that were buried under ballast. In some locations, complete loss
of section had occurred.

Prior to the collapse, concerns had been raised on corrosion to visible areas of the bridge. It was also
noted that at defined locations there were areas under ballast that may be prone to severe corrosion and
lamination leading to loss of section. Following this urgent defect report, the bridge owner inspected the
main girder to assess the issues raised, suggest actions and recommendations. The full extent of the
corrosion in buried areas was not identified in this inspection and no recommendations were raised to
repair the defect.

De la Concorde

In 2005 the suspended span of a highway bridge over a dual carriageway collapsed, killing five people.
Brittle failure to a half-joint detail had occurred (Figure 2). Whilst there were a number of contributing
factors including leaking expansion joints, the root cause of failure was identified as inadequately fixed
reinforcement. Half joint reinforcement detailing offers little redundancy to such defects. This hidden
defect was exacerbated by: high stress concentrations focussed at re-entrant corners; the debris and
moisture trapping nature of the joint’s re-entrant corner; the difficulty of accessing the bearing shelf for
inspection or maintenance.

Fig. 2 Left, de la Concorde collapse. Right, incorrectly fixed reinforcement.

Hammersmith

The M4 Hammersmith flyover, London had an inspection of hidden post-tensioning cables undertaken in
2011. Condition was so poor that an emergency closure and strengthening works were undertaken to
restore highway traffic on one of London’s busiest roads (Figure 3). At the time of writing, mitigation
works are over £100m.

Fig. 3 Left, corroded tendons at Hammersmith. Right, temporary strengthening works by external post-
tensioning.

Boston Manor

The 1 km Boston Manor viaduct is in Brentford, West London (Wearne, 2014) (Nicholls, 2015) carrying
the dual carriageway of the M4 motorway (Figure 4). Opened in 1965, its girders and trusses have over
600 electroslag butt welds. Electroslag welding is rarely encountered in bridgeworks: Boston Manor is
thought to be the only electroslag welded bridge on the UK trunk road network. Following concerns over
the method’s susceptibility to fatigue and brittle fracture, by the late 1970s the method was superseded.
As late as 2011’s principal inspection, no cracks breaking through the surface of the paint system had
been found. Aware of the historic issues of electroslag welding, the Highways Agency (bridge owner)
commissioned a numerical assessment of the welds. No issues were found. To verify the assessment, non-
destructive testing (NDT) and material samples were taken in 2012. The rapid development of events was
remarkable:

• Mid March 2012, start of NDT inspection.

• 22 March 2012, first crack in electroslag weld identified.
• 23 March 2012, further cracks found and 17.5t emergency weight restriction imposed.
• 28 March 2012, increasing incidence of crack discovery: 7.5t emergency weight restriction
imposed.

In total, 111 cracks were found in electro-slag welds. It was stated that the cracks would require
remediating within a maximum of 250 weeks to avoid critical failures. A summer embargo on structural
works was approaching around the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, during which all
weight restrictions required removing. Work to remove cracks by grinding / burring started immediately.

Fig. 4 Boston Manor viaduct. Right, crack in electroslag weld.

The deepest and longest crack on the bridge was identified in a truss section of the bridge. During the
final part of its grinding on 30 June 2012, two weeks before the Olympic embargo and lifting of the
weight restriction, a small inclusion in the weld material was uncovered. Hourly monitoring showed the
crack to be propagating under fatigue cycles. Further attempts to remove the crack by burring lead to
continued propagation: the crack was being “chased”. Just seven days before the embargo, the length of
the crack and its propagation rate posed such risks to the safety of traffic that the road was closed to all
traffic: brittle fracture was a real possibility.

The crack was finally removed by burring under monitoring by thermal image detection. The bridge
reopened 13 July 2012 to 7.5 tonne traffic and Olympic coaches only.

EXISTING CURRENT METHOD OF MANAGING HIDDEN DEFECTS

Highways

Responsibility for the UK’s stock of bridges and highway structures rests with many different
organisations including national and local government, private companies and charities. Trunk road
networks are managed and maintained by Highways England in England and by devolved executives in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Local government manages all remaining public roads. There are
over 200 Highway Authorities across the UK, as defined by the Highways Act 1980. In Northern Ireland
TransportNI is the Highways Authority covering all public roads.
Typical bridge management practice for trunk roads is defined in the Design Manual for Roads and
Bridges (e.g. BD 63 (Highways Agency, 2007)). Local authorities typically refer the the UK Roads
Liaison Group’s “Managing Highway Structures: a Code of Practice” (UKRLG, 2013). Regardless, for
the purposes of identification and mitigation of hidden defects, the approaches of the two documents is
similar. Bridge condition is recorded from a regime of inspections including general, principal, and
special inspections. Inspections provide key information for all maintenance interventions, including
making any decisions for monitoring or testing. The definitions of the different types of surveys have a
consistent theme of relying on visual inspection:

• General inspections comprise a visual inspection of all parts of the structure without the need for
special access or traffic management arrangements.
• Principal inspections comprise a close examination, within touching distance, of all accessible
parts of a structure. Testing by non-destructive methods such as half cell and chloride tests to
concrete bridge elements were once undertaken, but now rarely form part of principal inspections.
• Special inspections are carried out when a particular problem is detected during an earlier
inspection. The problem may be from: a previous inspection at that bridge; or due to raised
awareness of a risk due to a specific component, typically a failure or event elsewhere.

Historic practice has been to undertake general inspections biennially, once every six years for principal
inspections. Whilst the majority of principal inspections remain at this frequency, risk based approaches
are used to determine structure specific frequencies. Indeed, the interpretation of many local authorities to
UKRLG’s guidance has been to prove by risk assessment that principal inspections are not needed at the
majority of their bridges. IAN 171 (Highways Agency, 2012a) provides a method to calculate the interval
between principal inspections. General inspections interval may also differ following a risk based
approach.

None of aforementioned inspections and guidance on highway bridge management for general or
principal inspections explicitly detail a regime for uncovering and inspecting hidden components.
Typically, a hidden component would only be uncovered as part of a special inspection if either: concern
had arisen from a principal inspection as to the condition of a hidden element (rust staining, evidence of
local failure etc.); a regime of special inspections is instigated, typically following a collapse or concern
of a common detail. Examples of this latter case include:

• Half-joints. The de la Concorde collapse accelerated the Highways Authority in England’s

inspection of all hidden surfaces to concrete half-joints. Special inspections were specified and
numerical assessment undertaken (Highways Agency, 2004).
• Deck hinges. From 2001 bridges with reinforced concrete hinges in their decks were focussed
upon in assessment following observations of joints not acting as per original design intent. Where
concern over capacity or fatigue life was raised by numerical assessment, a trigger point
determining when interim measures are required was defined. Special inspections and monitoring
regimes were used to determine whether the trigger point had been exceeded: BA 93 (Highways
Agency, 2009a).
• Post-tensioned concrete bridges. Undertaken from the 1990s, a programme of post-tensioned
concrete bridge special inspections (PTSI) was undertaken in response to increasing numbers of
structures found with problems in the 1980s, culminating in major refurbishment or replacement
schemes (Woodward, 2001). At risk structures continue to be managed to BD 54 (Highways
Agency, 2015). A PTSI inspection as part of ongoing risk management given the known
deterioration issues and monitoring that were already in place uncovered the aforementioned
issues at Hammersmith.

It is remarked that highway bridge management’s techniques is reactive in nature: a visible possible
symptom is reserved or known issue identified prior to commencing an active search for defects.
Network Rail

The owner and maintainer of bridges on the British heavy rail network, Network Rail, operates
inspections similar to the highways’ authorities’ inspections:

• Routine examination: annual and visual only from ground level.

• Detailed examination: typically once every six years, though may be between one and 18 years
based on a risk based approach. Access to within touching distance.

Under this regime, it would not be usual practice to expose hidden components. Following the collapse of
the Stewarton Bridge in 2009, Network Rail reviewed their inspection approach to incorporate hidden
critical elements (HCE). This interesting, proactive work is detailed in the upcoming CIRIA guidance and
has resulted in intrusive inspection to approximately 4000 bridge spans. This has led to a programme of
works, including bridge replacement and strengthening (Figure 5). HCE examination has now entered the
regular cycle of bridge inspections.

Fig. 5 Whilst ballast retention plates had

been provided at Southend High Street,
they were lidded. During a HCE
inspection lids were removed exposing
extensive corrosion. Here, maintenance
painting appears to have been carried out
only to the top of ballast plate level. This
bridge was replaced.

Legislative, contractual and code of practice requirements

In the UK, the Health & Safety at Work etc Act (1974) is the main statutory instrument that affects
incorporation or otherwise of hidden components in bridgeworks. By implementation of the Act in CDM
regulations, the designer has a duty (amongst others) to eliminate, reduce or control foreseeable risks that
may arise during maintenance and use of a bridge once it is built. As the upcoming CIRIA report
demonstrates through its body of references and case studies, there are identifiable risks posed by
defective hidden components. A practicing designer should hence be able to foresee such risks and
manage them appropriately in accordance with CDM. The designer’s risk register is typically the key
document in which this process is recorded. CDM’s requirements for as-built records are also important
in identifying possible areas for hidden defects in the future without resorting to intrusive investigation to
prove material types, look for hidden components etc.

Design basis documents (Approval in Principle (AIP) documents) are a good place to record the hidden
defect risk mitigation approach to be made in detailed design. Whilst the AIP is often appended to a
contract, it is suggested that specific requirements for the avoidance of hidden components and, where
present, suitable efforts to mitigate the residual risk posed, are specified by the bridge procurer at the
earliest possible stage in design. Consideration of this important aspect may prove critical when choosing
between possible options, not just in forming of the final bridge at detailed design stage.

Contemporary design practice is to Eurocode. The Eurocode contains a general approach with the option
on selected items for Nationally Determined Parameters. The accompanying UK National Annex (NA)
for each Eurocode standard records this national choice. The Eurocode suite contains no specific
requirement for the avoidance or otherwise of hidden defects though certain parts of the background
document BS EN 1990 could be interpreted as being applicable. Where explicit reference to particular
hidden defects existed in pre-Eurocode BS 5400 practice, the UK NA typically reproduces these
requirements. In summary, it is not felt compliance with codes of practice necessarily is evidence that
efforts to mitigate risk posed by hidden defects have been made.

DEFINING HIDDEN

In a bridge, a hidden component is an element that would not usually be visually inspected as part of a
principal inspection i.e. to within touching distance using normal inspection techniques such as visual
techniques and hammer tapping.

The CIRIA report goes further than physically obscured bridge areas by stating that shortcomings in
inspection quality may lead to a component being to extent hidden. There may be very good reasosn for
this. For example, an element may be inaccessible at the time of inspection e.g. water levels preventing
access to a bridge pier. Whilst bridge inspectors generally do an excellent job, unfortunately poor
practices including inaccurate recording and low levels of detail are regularly found.

PROPOSED METHOD OF MANAGING HIDDEN DEFECTS

Understanding risk
The upcoming CIRIA report provides detailed guidance, largely based on features

REGULAR REVIEW
the approach taken by Network Rail post-Stewarton, on how a bridge
owner / operator / maintainer can manage the risk posed by hidden
defects to their portfolio of bridges. There are three stages, summarised in Implementing a
targeted inspection
Figure 6. regime

Understanding risk features

Evaluation and
It is anticipated that the vast majority of UK bridge owners already have intervention
a bridge management system from which the task of identifying at-risk
structures can commence. Each bridge portfolio managed will be distinct, Fig. 6 Simplified flow
though there is likely to be common features that can be used to chart of suggested
streamline management. Following identification of all bridges, hidden process for managing
components should be grouped. In general terms, the criticality of these hidden defects.
components can be ranked to assist in prioritising works.

Implementing a targeted inspection regime

Structure-by-structure, hidden components are identified by desk study. Inspections can commence. It is
anticipated that this stage will identify further hidden components.

Evaluation and intervention

As in any bridge management regime, high quality inspections are only of value if they are accurately
interpreted and remedial works enacted upon. This stage of bridge management is generally well recorded
in existing guidance. Accurate interpretation may include consideration of how the identified condition of
the hidden element effects bridge capacity: numerical assessment may be required. Then, if unacceptable
risk remains, remedial works would follow that may include:

• Monitoring
• Load restrictions
 • Further numerical assessment
• Component replacement
• Alternative load path provision
• Strengthening
• Bridge replacement
• Updating of emergency plans

Regular review

Risk posed by a hidden defect may change over time due to:

• Condition degradation
• Load changes
• Changes in load path
• Developments in structural understanding
• Cultural change in risk perception

It is hence vital that once the hidden defects programme is set up, it is regularly reviewed. This should
include incorporation of intrusive works to hidden areas as part of the established inspection regime.

THE FUTURE – STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING SYSTEMS

Other engineering disciplines have demonstrated the technical and commercial advantages bought about
by extensive monitoring and data analysis afforded by technological advances in database systems. Rolls-
Royce’s engine health management is an excellent case study (Waters, 2009). It is felt that the nascent
application on bridges as structural health monitoring systems (SHMS) has much potential in the
detection of hidden defects. This is true both for installation on existing bridges (Anderson, 2012) and, as
a preventative action, on new bridges. Stonecutters Bridge, Hong Kong, was perhaps the first new bridge
to have an exhaustive SHMS installed (Figure 7).

Fig. 7 SHMS on Stonecutters Bridge, Hong Kong. Image courtesy of Highways Department, Hong Kong
SAR.
GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC BRIDGE COMPONENTS

The upcoming CIRIA guidance goes into considerable detail on all the common UK bridge types and
their possible hidden defects. Areas covered are summarised in Table 1. Guidance is given to:

• Define the component that may contain a defect. Common defect types are described.
• Inspection guidance on
• Identification and maintenance
• Design guidance

There are many excellent guides already covering many of the specific areas covered. Therefore, the
report is extensively cross referenced to other key texts.

Common themes emerge, the most important one is pragmatic but poses significant challenges for the
bridge operator on stretched budgets and with little opportunity of access to their bridges: a hidden defect
can typically only be found if it is uncovered. What may sound a simple statement has significant
implications: much intrusive and possibly destructive works are required. Non-destructive techniques
certainly have a role to play, as does use of remote viewing such as by endoscope or drone. However, in
most instances there is nothing else to compare with the quality offered by an experienced inspector
viewing a defect to within touching distance with a direct line of sight.

CONCLUSIONS

Defective bridges may put the travelling public, those working on the bridge and third parties at risk.
Where a defect is not known and if applicable, appropriate monitoring is not undertaken, the associated
risk cannot be managed or mitigated appropriately. In severe cases this can at worst lead to fatalities as at
the de la Concorde Bridge in Quebec in 2006. In 2009, the collapse of Stewarton Bridge, Scotland was
also as a result of a defective hidden critical component. If the guidance now implemented by Stewarton’s
owner Network Rail were undertaken, collapse may have been avoided. The following steps would have
taken place:

1. Identified by desk study that the half-through nature of the bridge with webs buried in ballast
constitute a hidden component, the condition of which may affect load carrying capacity.
2. Intrusive inspection by digging ballast and close visual examination. This would have identified
heavy corrosion loss.
3. Numerical assessment to demonstrate the effects on load carrying capacity of the defect.
4. Mitigation works.
5. Entered into a regular routine of examination of the hidden element: revisit to assess change in
condition.

Although undeniably an intensive process requiring intrusive works which are often difficult to
accommodate, Network Rail’s work post-Stewarton to inspect 4000 spans and undertake appropriate
remedial work (e.g. Southend High Street, Case Study 8) provides clear precedent that such a programme
is feasible. Given the proactive nature of this process, the upcoming CIRIA guidance develops procedural
and technical suggestions on how all bridge owners can manage risk associated with hidden defects.

Consideration and appropriate remedial action at the design stage of hidden components is viewed as an
obligation under CDM on the designer. Thorough design basis (AIP) documents including detailed
designer’s risk registers bespoke to the bridge are vital. This is not only to demonstrate conformance with
best practice but also as a record that may affect operation and maintenance methods and approaches. The
application of SHMS offers an exciting and interesting methods of identifying then managing hidden
components.
With aging bridge stock ever more heavily used, effective management of hidden bridge components is
going to only ever increase in importance unless extensive actions are taken. Bridge owners, maintainers
and inspectors are urged to consider this most important subject in their day-to-day work.

FURTHER INFORMATION

The report will be published in summer 2017. Please keep up to date with its progress and launch details
by the CIRIA website www.ciria.org from where subscription to regular newsletters can be made. The
report authors would welcome any further discussion on this paper or the report once issued: please
contact john-h.collins@arup.com.
 Bridge type / element
Iron / steel bridges
Concrete bridges
Masonry arch bridges
Timber
Bearings and expansion joints
Hidden durability components
Hidden safety components
Other bridge components
Ancillary components
Substructure
Table 1 Summary of bridge types / elements and their typical hidden areas and defects that may be
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The report is being published by CIRIA, project manager Lee Kelly. Report funding is from Freyssinet,
Welsh Government, ICE, Transport Scotland, Highways England, Transport Infrastructure Ireland,
Network Rail, TransportNI, Environment Agency, Ramboll, Mouchel, Strainstall, Arup and AECOM.
Hidden components Defects
Elements under ballast / Metallurgical
surfacing
Protected steel surfaces Section loss from corrosion
Insides of boxes Latent weld defects
Plates behind non-structural Fatigue cracking
elements
Abutting structures Brittle fracture
Deck / buckle plates Bolting and rivets
Hangers and cables
Suspension bridge hangers
Elements deemed too difficult to
inspect / missed
Within the concrete body Alkali-silica reaction
Reinforcement Chemical attack
Prestressing wires / strands and Chlorides
anchorages
Box sections including formed Carbonisation
voids
Half-joints Cracking
Obscured surfaces Reinforcement / prestressing
corrosion
Freyssinet hinges Missing / inadequately fixed
reinforcement / prestressing
Arch rings Hollowness
Spandrels Mortar loss
Masonry piers Masonry degradation
Cracking
Within the timber Biological attack
Connections Splitting
Poor access Metallurgical and corrosion
Uninspectable details Bearing seizure
Inspection at the “wrong” time Sliding surface degradation
Elastomeric degradation
Bearing setting out errors
Other bearing defects
Other expansion joint defects
Drainage, waterproofing, paint, galvanising, sealants, cladding
Parapets, surfacing, access / walkways / gantries
Moveable bridges
Service bays
contained therein.
Report contents have been shaped by the project steering group including members from the sponsorship
organisations and other interested parties.

REFERENCES

ANDERSON, M, GALE, J, ST LEGER, J (2012)

“The role of structural monitoring in the management of bridges”
Structural Faults + Repair 2012 proceedings, Edinburgh

HIGHWAYS AGENCY (2007)

“Inspection of highway structures”
Design manual for roads and bridges.
BD 63/07, The Stationary Office, London

HIGHWAYS AGENCY (2012)

Interim Advice Note 171/12, Risk Based Principal Inspection Intervals
IAN 171/12
Highways Agency, London

HIGHWAYS AGENCY (2015)

“Management of post-tensioned concrete bridges”
Design manual for roads and bridges.
BD 54/15, The Stationary Office, London

NICHOLLS T, ARMSTRONG C, EL-BELBOL S, HARRISON J, MAKINSON N, SMITH DA (2015)

“Repairs to electro-slab weld defects on M4 Boston Manor viaduct”
Proc ICE Bridge Engineering
Institution of Civil Engineers, London, Vol 168(3), pp259-272

RAIB (2010)
Derailment of a freight train near Stewarton, Ayrshire
Report 02/2010, Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Derby, UK

UKRLG (2013)
Management of Highway Structures, A Code of Practice
2005 edition, updated 13 August 2013, The Stationary Office, London

WATERS, N (2009)
“Engine Health Management”
Ingenia Issue 39 June 2009, Royal Academy of Engineering, London

WEARNE C, ARMSTRONG C, NICHOLS T, HARRISON J (2014)

“Collaboration in an emergency: repairing London’s M4 Boston Manor viaduct”
Proc ICE Civil Engineering
Institution of Civil Engineers, London, Vol 167(1), pp33-39

WOOWARD, R (2001)
“Durability of post-tensioned tendons on road bridges in the UK”
Durability of post-tensioning tendons, Workshop 15-16 November 2001, Ghent (Belgium)
Technical Report Bulletin 15, fib Lausanne, Switzerland and IABSE Zurich, Switzerland

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