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Human rights is a topic that has many different starting points.

It all depends on
who associates the story with the victim: the state, the conqueror, the oppressed,
the vanquished, the colonial power or the nationalist.

As noted in the work of Shashi Tharoor, the Western regions have been criticized
by other nations on their beliefs in terms of human rights being universal.
Necessarily, nothing can be universal if viewed from a philosophical aspect; all
rights and values are defined and limited by cultural perceptions and norms. Thus,
if there is no universal culture, then perhaps it is impossible to state that human
rights are universal.

For instance, in the case of traditional beliefs, most developing countries from
Africa focus much on the community rights rather than an individual rights,
believing that it is the community that nurtures and protects an individual and not
the other way around as it is been perceived by most of the Western countries.

In the Western perspective people in different situations all have equal chances due
to rights like freedom of speech. Thus on the basis of contradictory beliefs like this
human rights cannot be universal.

Shashi Tharoor states that “The philosophical objection asserts essentially that
nothing can be universal; that all rights and values are defined and limited by
cultural perceptions. If there is no universal culture, there can be no universal
human rights”. (p.1)

In addition, some of the rights recognized by the UDHR, such as the right to
private ownership of the means of production, equality, marriage, and religious
freedom, are contrary to traditional practices and norms in non-Western societies.
The rights provided by the UDHR are not related to their culture, so these societies
did not accept them. Moreover, rulers in non-Western societies may interpret
certain rights as an imposition of Western culture.

Human rights are not universal, but culturally relative. For example, rapid
urbanization and insensitive enforcement of private property rights have the
potential to disrupt existing cultural norms in many countries. For example,
families in poorer regions of Africa and Asia lack basic rights such as ownership of
communal land. Giant multinational corporations and their executives,
respectively, exploit communal lands for urbanization projects and the introduction
of private property rights with the main goal of achieving their economic goals.
These investors fail to comprehend the detrimental top-down impact of their
investments. With local communities stripped from communally owned spaces,
this ultimately leads to a lack of community spirit and growth. The future of
development and politics relies on strong social links between nations and
communities; without this, conflicts may be provoked amongst different
stakeholders. [1]

In addition, Shashi Tharoor also argues that in non-Western cultures, human rights
are not enjoyed at the same level as in countries of Western culture. Critics of the
universal idea of human rights argue that in the Confucian or Vedic traditions,
duties are considered more important than rights, while in Africa it is the
community that protects and educates the individual. One African writer summed
up the African philosophy of existence as: “I am because we are and because we
are therefore I am.” (p.1)

Caste systems in India do not recognize the importance of equality, above all
before the law. There is a fundamental need for equality; it enforces a ban on
giving preference to people. Thus, through the socialization of the ideals of
equality, the hard players in society must eliminate all forms of discrimination and
along with this have the inclusion of opposing arguments. Despite this, the main
goal of equality in a region like India would be to recognize the dignity of the
underprivileged grassroots. However, in reality, rule makers may not take this into
account; in turn, grassroots and less educated locals may not be able to unite
against the normalization of inequalities.

In addition, the dominant religious groups in Saudi Arabia, despite internal and
external pressure, even now do not promote marriage and personal freedoms. They
counteract their lack of progress in society, assuming that these changes are
contrary to their religious beliefs, some of which do not recognize the rights of
women in marriage [2].

As noted in the work of Shashi Tharoor (p.2-3) these cultural contrasts, to the
degree that they are real, have viable implications. It has been claimed by
numerous developing nations that these human rights are simply not relevant to
their social orders – the right, for example, to political pluralism, the right to paid
vacation, and, unavoidably, the privileges of women- These societies claim that
they see the concept of human rights of being universal as an attempt to force
western values on them.

In theory, if a government within a sovereign state were to disregard the general


human rights of its citizens, it would be morally legitimate for the international
community to use the necessary force to secure their widespread support.

Nevertheless, there are many theories which counteract cosmopolitanism by


arguing about the extent to which human rights can universalized. These theories
contend that people do not inherit rights just because they are human, rather they
acquire them as members of a community. For example, communitarianism
highlights the 'fundamental differences among groups in their moral norms and
values and accompanying world views’. Due to relativism, it is therefore,
impossible to create a definitive list of rights that are relevant and applicable to all.
[3] For example, Within Latin America it is not feasible to disregard the cultural
difference between indigenous communities and more urbanized decedents of
European colonial power.

In Latin America, for example, it is difficult to underestimate the degree of cultural


difference between indigenous communities and the urbanized descendants of
European colonial states. If different cultural factors determine the relative
definition of human rights, then foreign states will not be able to extend their
definition of rights to others, as this would be ethnocentric in nature.

Perhaps, liberal states must accept that they ‘have no cosmopolitan duties to
globalise their own conception of distributive justice’[4] and that, in their very
nature, rights are culturally dependent and far from universal.

LITERATURE

1. Le, N., (2016). Are Human Rights Universal or Culturally Relative? p.203-206

2. Le, N., (2016). Are Human Rights Universal or Culturally Relative? p.207-211

3. Nickel, J., (1987). Making Sense Of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of


California Pres

4. Shapcott, (2008), p. 200

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