© 1990 S. Karger AG.
Basel
Human Development 1990;33:362-365
Piaget’s Theory: Alive and More Vigorous than Ever
Harry Beilin
City University of New York Graduate School. New York. N.Y., USA
Halford is at great pains to show how
much current investigators, including him­
self. have gained from Piaget’s theories. Yet,
he advises the field that there is ‘little to be
gained from “testing” a theory [Piaget’s]
known to be inadequate’ [Halford, 1989. p.
351]. Rather, ‘Theoretical development
could be greatly stimulated if less effort were
devoted to testing Piaget's theory and more
were devoted to testing contemporary theo­
ries’ [including presumably Halford's] [Hal­
ford. 1989, p. 351]. The real danger in this
brash admonition is that investigators, par­
ticularly those still being trained, or other­
wise new to the area, may be deflected from
an encounter with Piaget’s works (that so
enriched the research of Halford and others).
This is especially so for books that have
appeared since 1974, including those soon to
be published, that contain a wealth of novel
and interesting experiments, as well as singu­
larly important late developments in the
theory [Beilin, 1989],
Further evidence that Halford views Pia­
get’s theory as static and moribund is his
suggestion in the present rejoinder that it not
be tampered with in its present form. He cri­
ticizes my claim that logics that are shown to
001 8-716X/90/0336-0362S2.75/0
be inadequate in explaining data, as Piaget
had seen his earlier logical models to be,
should be replaced by more adequate logics,
a step Piaget in fact took in the late theory.
The grounds Halford [ 1990, p. 359] gives for
his criticism are that ‘replacing logics to ac­
cord with research data might mean Piaget’s
data could postdict anything and predict
nothing’. This is a most curious view. It is
possible that a new logic or theory will pre­
dict nothing, but unless a body of data is
totally idiosyncratic and unique, the intent
of a superseding theory is that it not only
better account for past or present data but
that it account for new data as well, as Laka­
tos [1970] so cogently pointed out.
The principal thrust of Halford’s rejoin­
der to my critique is to argue the advantages
of analogical, as opposed to logical, theories
of cognitive development. One would not
know from Halford’s statement that the is­
sue transcends particular aspects of cogni­
tive development and has been the source of
a lively, if not bitter, debate in the cognitive
science and philosophy of mind literatures,
with computational theory of mind advo­
144.82.238.225 - 1/11/2018 5:32:36 PM
cates like Pylyshyn and Fodor on the propo­
sitional (logical) side of the debate and Shep­
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Piaget's Theory'
ard. Kosslvn. and others on the analogical
side [Pylyshyn. 1981], Even earlier, serious
debate over the type of analogical model
Halford proposes occurred between Hutten-
locher and Clark [Huttenlocher et al., 1972].
Some argue that the issues, or merits of one
side over the other, are undecidable. Thus, it
is more than premature for Halford to assert
that the claims for logical models of reason­
ing have been seriously faulted and that one
should look to analogical models as a more
viable alternative. My position is that we do
not know enough about logical, linguistic or
analogical models to categorically reject any
one of them [Beilin, 1975]. Rather, the evi­
dence in some sense supports each of the
models, and in my view a model that incor­
porates both functional and structural forms
of reasoning appears the most likely solution
to the issues posed in these debates.
There is much in Halford’s present rejoin­
der about structure. Would one on the basis
of his comments count him among structur­
alists? He says. ‘1 certainly agree that all cog­
nitive architectures entail structure in some
sense’ [Halford. 1990, p. 360]. In some
sense, Skinner, Watson and Pavlov would
count as structuralists, in that connections,
bonds or associations between stimuli and
responses, or responses and responses, can
be considered structures. Halford [1990,
p. 357] is more decisive, ’... my position has
always been explicity structural’. But. he says
further, i view structure differently from the
way Piaget viewed it.... I postulate mental
models that represent the environment.
They are actively constructed, and the con­
struction is guided by experience’ [Halford,
1990. p. 357], He also says in a recent paper
[Halford. 1988. p. 104]: ‘We will define a
structure as a set of elements, with a set of
relations and functions defined on the ele­
363
ments.’ His theory is not concerned with the
development of structures, but with so-
called structure-mappings and their develop­
ment. Structure-mappings are rules for ‘as­
signing elements of one structure to elements
of another structure’ [Halford. 1988. p. 104],
Even if Halford defined structure as does
Piaget, which 1 do not believe he does, the
emphasis in his theory is on functional
change and on relations that are more se­
mantic than functional. Even his definition
of structure is based on functional features,
rather than on holistic properties of struc­
tures and the possible transformations
among them.
The issues are complicated by the incor­
poration of elements from structuralist the­
ory into contemporary information-process­
ing theories [Beilin, 1983]. These structures
take the form of semantic networks, decision
trees, lists, and other entities, for the organi­
zation of knowledge in memory. As a rule
these theories, again, are not concerned with
system or other holistic properties of struc­
tures, logical or otherwise, but with the func­
tional properties of systems, and. borrowing
from earlier functionalist theories, they em­
phasize associational and dimensional rela­
tions. Neo-Piagetian theorists, in contrast,
retain more features of structuralist think­
ing, to varying degrees - Case to a greater
degree, Halford and others to lesser degrees
[Demetriou. 1988], The critical question, as
I see it. is to what extent developmental the­
ories can be successful if they ignore the
structural features of thought, and, if they do
not. as is the case with neo-Piagetian theo­
ries, what forms those structures need to
take, and what assumptions are made with
respect to their nature.
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Halford characterizes his mental models
as representational, i.e.. they represent the
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364
environment. Piaget’s structures are not re­
presentations of the environment or any­
thing else: his representations are semiotic
instruments of thought. In characterizing
Halford's theory as based on changes in re­
presentations, I did not mean that he had
adopted Bruner's representational theory,
but that his theory was analogous to Bruner’s
in basing cognitive development on changes
in representations, rather than on changes in
structure. My point is that Halford's theory
rests on functional representations of a di­
mensional character and not holistic, sys­
temic structures that tie distinctive constitu­
ent properties together into coherent units
having properties that transcend those of its
constituents. Halford's definition of struc­
ture departs from Piaget’s, and does not
merely differ from it in content. I would like
it understood that I am not arguing against
models that place their major emphasis on
functional or process aspects of develop­
ment, as do information-processing models
for the most part, nor against neo-Piagetian
models of which Halford’s is a distinctive
example. My own disposition, however, is
toward models that integrate more truly
structural forms with the functional, as the
later Piagetian theory attempts.
Halford asserts that Piaget’s theory is ‘at
best descriptive' and not explanatory. This is
an old claim, and was extensively debated by
Brainerd [1978] and a group of discussants,
so there is no need to repeat that debate here.
Piaget [1985/1975] himself deals with the
same question. Unless Halford can come
forth with a new view of the nature and role
of explanation in science, we have to take his
claim that ‘analogical structure mapping’
can explain difficulties in reasoning while
Piaget’s theory cannot, as vacuous. A less
tendentious claim would be that Halford's
Beilin
theory, in his view, provides a better expla­
nation than Piaget’s. Further, Halford’s
statement about Piaget's theory to the effect
that ‘... children cannot perform certain
tasks because they have not entered a partic­
ular stage is not a satisfactory explanation, as
it only summarizes the data’ [1989, pp. 351 —
352] is one of the reasons I called Halford’s
view of Piaget’s theory ‘overly simple’ (if not
simplistic), considering that Piaget’s vast
body of research and theory provides an
astonishingly rich account of basic mecha­
nisms in development.
It is salutary to have Halford’s assurance
that in a 1982 publication he ‘recognizes that
developing systems can be both continuous
and discontinuous’. Unfortunately, neither
in the 1989 paper nor in the present rejoin­
der does he indicate what he believes is con­
tinuous and what is discontinuous in a de­
veloping system.
In conclusion, as I observed in my origi­
nal critique of Halford’s paper, he does a fine
job of evaluating the merits of various tests
of Piaget’s theory. His evaluations are not
always complete or well-balanced, but on the
whole, they explore important issues in a
highly complex and extensive literature and
the evaluations are often sensitive and so­
phisticated.
Halford may be correct in believing that
insufficient attention has been paid to test­
ing neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive de­
velopment. including his own. It is not, how­
ever, a constructive contribution to the de­
bate on the issues to make a tendentious
claim that all Piaget’s theory merits is ‘ceas­
ing trying to test it’. This is particularly the
case now when a large new body of Piaget's
research and theory is still appearing, re­
search that offers new and fresh insights into
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the nature of cognitive development.
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Piaget's Theory
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Harry Beilin
Developmental Psychology Program
City University of New York Graduate School
33 W. 42nd Street
New York, NY 10036 (USA)
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