International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 15 (2016) 24–28

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Analysis of early warning systems: The case of super-typhoon Haiyan

Yasuhito Jibiki n, Shuichi Kure, Miwa Kuri, Yuichi Ono
Aramaki Aza-Aoba 468-1, Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi-ken, JAPAN (Zip code: 980-0845) Tohoku University

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The previous literature indicates that one major problem with the early warning system in Typhoon
Received 2 April 2015 Haiyan was that local residents did not understand the meaning of the term “storm surge”. Furthermore,
Received in revised form even though they were aware of the Philippines weather authority (PAGASA) warning, they under-
2 December 2015
estimated the severity of the typhoon and did not evacuate in a timely manner. This study aimed to
Accepted 2 December 2015
Available online 5 December 2015
provide a quantitative analysis of this phenomenon. The authors demonstrated that it cannot be con-
cluded that misunderstanding the term “storm surge” directly led to underestimation and failure to
Keywords: evacuate, although a high level of underestimation among respondents was observed. The fact that those
Early warning system who did not underestimate the severity of the typhoon were more likely to evacuate their houses in-
Haiyan
dicates that accurate warning messages were not “personalized” for local residents.
The Philippines
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Storm surge

1. Introduction presented challenges related to its sheer magnitude [10]: 5–13. It

1.1. An evolving concept of human-centered early warning systems
Numerous documents and many international conferences
have emphasized the importance of early warning systems (or
“EWS”) in the context of international efforts to reduce the risk
associated with disasters. Accordingly, the international commu-
nity has recognized that EWS must be optimized to reduce the toll
of natural disasters on human life and infrastructure.
Recent United Nations resolutions and related strategic papers
have provided a people-centric concept of EWS (Table 1). This
concept consists of four key elements: knowledge of risks; mon-
itoring, analysis, and forecasting of hazards; communication or
dissemination of alerts and warnings; and local capabilities to
respond to the warnings received [23]: 12. In the present paper,
we focus on the “communication or dissemination of alerts and
warnings”, paying particular attention to whether warnings are
clear, understandable, and practical [22]: 2. The case of a super
typhoon in the Philippines illustrates that these principles are
difficult to execute in reality.
1.2. The early warning system in Haiyan and purpose of this research
In the context of natural disaster risk reduction, the super-ty-
phoon Haiyan is a very significant event. Typhoon Haiyan
n
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jibiki@irides.tohoku.ac.jp (Y. Jibiki),
kure@irides.tohoku.ac.jp (S. Kure), kuri@irides.tohoku.ac.jp (M. Kuri),
yono@irides.tohoku.ac.jp (Y. Ono).
inflicted heavy damage in terms of human loss (more than 7,000
people) and provides a typical example of a high-intensity, low-
frequency event [11]: 10. A preliminary interview survey of re-
sidents conducted by the authors found that some people had
heard of a super typhoon of a devastating intensity similar to Ty-
phoon Haiyan that caused catastrophic damage in Tacloban and
other areas about 100 years ago. In support of their accounts, an
old newspaper article reported that approximately 7,000 people
were killed by a typhoon and tidal wave in 1897 [15]. According to
another newspaper report, in 1912 a powerful typhoon destroyed
Tacloban, causing the loss of about half the population of the city,
where 12,000 people had lived [18].
The phenomenon of “storm surge” is critical in EWS. During
Typhoon Haiyan, storm surge manifested itself as follows:
 The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical
Services Administration (PAGASA) issued a warning (Severe
Weather Bulletin No. 3) by 11:00 on November 7, nearly 18 h
before landfall. This warning provided an accurate prediction of
the occurrence of “storm surge” and its height [2]: 42.
 However, local residents did not understand the meaning of
“storm surge”. As a result, the warning did not lead residents to
evacuate, even though they had 18 h to do. This led to a large
loss of human life during the typhoon.
In short, this incident reveals serious shortcomings in the
communication of the hazards of a storm to residents.
Previous research has discussed the issue of storm surge in
terms of survey data collected from local residents. Social Weather
Stations (SWS) (2014: 4) [17] found that 22% of people in Region 8

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.12.002
2212-4209/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 Y. Jibiki et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 15 (2016) 24–28 25

Table 1
United Nations resolutions and related strategic papers.

Document name Year Highlights by the authors

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 42/169
([19]: Para. 4. (a))
Yokohama Strategy ([20]: Annexes Chapter I Para. 5 and
Chapter V F. 46.(g))
Hyogo Framework of Action ([21]: Resolution 1. 3 and Re-
solution 2. III. B. 14. 2)
Global Survey of Early Warning Systems [22]
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction ([21]: Para.
33(b))
1987 ● Endorsed International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.
● Recognized the responsibility of the United Nations system for promoting international co-op-
eration in the development of early warning.
1994 ● Noted EWS as a “Principle”.
● Warnings are only as effective as the level of understanding of the people to whom they are
directed.
2005 ● Stated that enhancement of EWS is one of the five priorities for action.
● Mentioned a concept of people-centered early warning.
2006 ● Emphasized the concept of people-centered early warning
2015 ● It is important to invest in, develop, maintain, and strengthen people-centered multi-hazard,
multisectoral forecasting and early warning systems.

* Source: This table was developed by the authors.

(Eastern Visayas), one of the areas most devastated by Typhoon
Hayan, underestimated the typhoon's strength. Jibiki et al. (2015:
59) noted that 55.6% of respondents underestimated the damage
caused by the typhoon, and only 12.8% understood the meaning of
the term “storm surge” prior to Yolanda. Esteban et al. (2015: 6) [4]
described “some level of confusion” among local residents.
The existing research offers several reasons for the failure of
residents to evacuate, several of which are related to not under-
standing the storm surge warning. According to Jibiki et al. (2015:
65), 64.8% of residents thought that “the wave should not be that
large”. In [17]: 10, 36% of respondents said “it was safer at home/
we preferred to stay home,” whereas 25% said they “thought the
typhoon was not strong”. Meanwhile, according to [4]: 6, 34% of
those polled thought that “the ground was high enough,” whereas
Leelawat et al. (2014: 23) [12] found that half of respondents were
“uncertain about the expected typhoon level; it might subside”.
In summary, according to the literature, one major problem
with the EWS in Haiyan was that local residents did not under-
stand the meaning of the term “storm surge”. Furthermore, even
though they were aware of the PAGASA warning, they under-
estimated the severity of the typhoon and did not evacuate in a
timely manner. In this study, we aimed to provide a quantitative
analysis of this phenomenon.
difficult for many people to directly relate to them. In the case of
Typhoon Haiyan, it is likely that some residents underestimated
the warnings because they did not include a personalized
message.
2.2. Literature related to the Philippines
Previous studies on early warnings have been conducted in the
context of the Philippines. Javellana, Rene [7] and Mateo and Oki
[13] examined modes of dissemination for early warnings. Studies
conducted on the community level have emphasized that in-
digenous and local knowledge play important roles in early
warning socialization [1,5,3,16]. Huigen and Jens [6] addressed the
case of Typhoon Harurot in 2003, describing how most local re-
sidents were informed that the Typhoon Signal was level 2. It was
later escalated to level 4 (the highest level); however, because the
residents had not adequately prepared for the typhoon, it caused
immense damage.
It has been estimated that all but 1.7% (Jibiki et al. [8] or 2% [17]:
3) of Haiyan residents received early warnings before landfall.
Therefore, it is more important to focus on how local residents
interpreted the warnings than to discuss the methods used to
dissemination the warnings.

3. Research methodology and results of analysis

2. Literature review

3.1. Research methodology

2.1. “Personalizing” early warning systems

This section briefly explains the methodology used in a survey

Among the numerous extant studies regarding EWS, Sorensen
and Sorensen [9] and Mileti and Sorensen [14] can be considered
the most comprehensive to date. Although these two articles were
written based on disasters in the United States of America, they are
relevant to the Philippines as well. These two works convey the
idea of “personalizing” warnings, which is very applicable to the
case of the storm surge in Typhoon Haiyan. According to [14]: 5–2,
“personalizing” means the following:
People think of warnings in personal terms—that is, in terms of the
implications of the risk for themselves, their families or their
group. If people do not feel that they are the targets of the warning
(even though it may be understood and believed), they may well
ignore it. This is illustrated by the “it can't happen to me” syn-
drome, in which people deny the existence of a risk for which they
have been warned. Personalizing a warning is an important step
that facilitates a response to the warning.
In other words, although people may understand warnings,
they are likely to ignore them unless they feel they will be per-
sonally affected. As warnings are, by nature, issued en masse, it is
conducted by the authors. A more detailed description can be
found in Jibiki et al. [8].
The survey was conducted from March 14 to March 22, 2014
using questionnaires completed by and interviews with re-
spondents. The geographic area targeted by the survey included
four barangays in Tacloban City, three barangays in the Palo Mu-
nicipality, and three barangays in the Tanauan Municipality. All the
targeted barangays are located on Leyte Island, and they share the
same coastline along the Leyte Bay. These barangays are geo-
graphically close to one another and were exposed to similar ha-
zard levels. We intended to survey 200 respondents in each lo-
cation: Tacloban City, Palo Municipality, and Tanauan Municipality.
The demographic characteristics of survey respondents were
consistent with those of the population of the Philippines. Ulti-
mately, the survey included 642 respondents.
The term “underestimation” is defined in this article based on
the following survey question: “Before the typhoon Yolanda,
what level of damage did you expect would be done to your fa-
mily/house due to the typhoon?” Respondents who answered
“very low” or “low” were categorized as having made an
26 Y. Jibiki et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 15 (2016) 24–28

Fig. 1. Relationship between understanding technical terms and underestimating typhoon impact.

“underestimation”.
Three types of variable were used for the analysis discussed in
the next section. The first variable refers to whether the re-
spondents understood certain technical terms used in warning
messages. The second quantified “underestimation” as defined
above. The third reflects different types of evacuation behavior. In
the survey, respondents selected an answer from among the fol-
lowing options: “evacuated to some place from my house,”
“evacuated to the second floor or rooftop of my house” or “did not
evacuate”.

3.2. Results
Here, we analyze the relationship between “underestimation”
and the level of understanding of certain terms included in
warning messages. The chi-square test revealed no statistically
significant relationship between “underestimation” and under-
standing the term “storm surge” (Fig. 1A). On the other hand, those
who understood the terms “wind speed,” “maximum in-
stantaneous wind speed”, and “atmospheric pressure” were more
prone to underestimation (Fig. 1B–D).
According to the chi-square test, there was no statistically
significant relationship between understanding the term “storm
surge” and evacuation behaviors (see an upper result of Fig. 2).
The chi-square test also demonstrated that those who did not
Fig. 2. Relationship among evacuation behavior, understanding of the term “storm
surge,” and underestimating typhoon impact.
underestimate the magnitude of the typhoon were significantly
more likely to evacuate their houses significant (Fig. 2).
4. Conclusion
In this study, we quantitatively analyzed of the impact of the
use of the term “storm surge” in warnings regarding Typhoon
Haiyan. It has previously been argued that local residents did not
understand the meaning of this term and that they failed to
 Y. Jibiki et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 15 (2016) 24–28
* Note: The photos were taken by the authors on March 12, 2014 at the City Disaster Risk
Reduction Management Office in Calbayog City, Samar Island.
* Note: Red boxes in the photos were added by the authors.
Fig. 3. Brochure of Tropical Cyclones and their associated hazards. *Note: The photos were taken by the authors on March 12, 2014 at the City Disaster Risk Reduction
Management Office in Calbayog City, Samar Island. *Note: red boxes in the photos were added by the authors.
evacuate because they underestimated the severity of the ty-
phoon. Here, we demonstrated that it cannot be concluded that
misunderstanding the term “storm surge” directly led to under-
estimation and failure to evacuate, although we did observe a high
level of underestimation among respondents. The fact that those
who did not underestimate the severity of the typhoon were more
likely to evacuate their houses indicates that accurate warning
messages were not “personalized” for local residents.
In 2007, PAGASA distributed a brochure to local governments
explaining tropical cyclones and their associated hazards (Fig. 3,
right panel). The brochure described how tropical cyclones cause
storm surges, which, in turn, destroy buildings and pavement
(Fig. 3, left panel). This brochure demonstrates that the Filipino
people are able to share knowledge using the framework of pre-
vious experiences without relying on technical terms such as
“tsunami”. On the other hand, we found that that those who un-
derstood the terms “wind speed”, “maximum instantaneous wind
speed”, and “atmospheric pressure” tended to underestimate the
damage caused by the typhoon. These results show that commu-
nicating with technical terms may be insufficient for encouraging
evacuation and that more personalized messages may be more
effective.
Finally, the limitations of our methodology must be acknowl-
edged. The present study, as well as previous research (e.g., SWS
(e.g., [4,12,17]) were conducted in affected areas using a survey
approach. This type of data collection provides invaluable feedback
directly from those affected by storms. However, this feedback is
reflected by the survived people and any surveys are unable to
examine those who were claimed by disasters. This point should
be taken into account when considering the results and conclu-
sions of this and other survey-based studies.
Role of the funding source
The research has been financially supported by Discretionary
Budget from the president of Tohoku University, Japan.
Acknowledgment
The authors appreciate the financial support provided by the
27
Discretionary Budget of the President of Tohoku University.
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