Jbo of statute". Thus, where_specific date is provide .

1
"colllJllence:rnent f :rn that date. But 1n the absence of any d nthe
·t ro:rnences ro
itself, i co
. . t fp 'd
h date of rece1v1ng assen o res1 ent or G
such dat Sb~t¼1
conunences from~ et Act receives President's assent on 26 a°''eriiote, • ~;
1 2
case inaY b~- If a t : :idnight between 25th and 26th March ·20o5, it ~tne
8

into operatio~ on after the date of its commencement. Prior 005· lh °lne1 t
sets into motion on1y o this date la~
law has no·force. e,tne

PROSPECTIVE OPERATION "

. ,, :means "in future". Therefore prospective op
"Prospective · ll d erati0 ,,
. fr afuturedate.ACentra awpasse byParliam • n Ille
the operation om 'd · 1 entc0 ans
. fr th date it receives Pres1 entia assent or from a f llltnen
either oro e th 1 . 1· nl uture d cea
. the statute. In both cases, e aw app ies o y to thos ate a
speciiied in . · p . e Proc . s
e been instituted after its commencement. r10r to com eed1n~s
which h a V d • t .. rnence
.~orce As such, a person 01ng an ac prior to comm lllent
a 1aw h as no 11 · encern 0,
th law which declares that act as offence cannot be prosecuted for th ent r
et if after co:rnmencement of that law, a person commits same a t he sallle.
Bu uf'I: . h .h c ' e sh I
be an' offender and shall have to s 1er wit pun1s ment. To explain it f aI
take for example that act ·'A' has been declared as punishable offen urther,
· b rought 1n
'B' 1s · t · ce under
the statute 'If The statute o operat10n from date 'X' p .
to date -'JC,:a person doin~ 'A' cannot be held liable but if the same ~ct~r,
is committed after date X, 1t would attract penal consequences. Similarly
where •the punishment for an offence has been enhanced by a later law '
person already suffering with punishment for that offence. under a previ~u:
law ·cannot be directed to undergo the enhanced term as per subsequent law.
In the same manner, a law shall have no application in case of the proceedings
which-are pending before the court as on the date on which it has been brought
into operation. This is called prospective operation of law. A law is deemed to
be,prospective in operation unless otherwise is intended either expressly or by
necessary implication.
InKeshavan v. State of Bombay, 1 it was held that it is a cardinal principle
of co,n struction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless expressly or
by necessary implication made retrospective.
In Sangam Spinners v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,2 it ~as
held that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is pruna
fac· t· 1 · · de to have
ie prospec ive un ess it is expressly or by necessary implication ma t
ret t· ·
rospec ive operat10n. The absence of a saving clause in a new e
preserv~~g the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is nei er th
~~;;ec,s,ve of the question. In terms of Section 6 (c) of General Cla; ct anY
~::~~t,
nact!llen
·al

. ' u~l~ss a different intention appears the repeal shall not a e t!llent
right, privilege or liability acquired accrued or incurred under the enac
repealed. '

RETROSP~CTIVE OPERATION ective

"retrosP
"Retrospective" means "from past date". Therefore

1. AIR 1951 SC 128.

2. (200s) 1 sec 39 1.
 ,, Jlleans the operation from a -, .. VF STATUTES
er9tiodJ1froill a future date. But the Ler;:slt date. Gen 367
oP t . t:,-1.S atu . eran
et911" b ck date i.e., re rospectively Th re is co Y every
~I) •

~at the r~slature intends to give retr y applied to

t.P 1ieg1 b ospectiv
P:
t,v froJll :rospective law is legitimat~l e result of :~etent to gienact111ent is
rd~sPective Ve
n 1ng
effect to a
0Perar .
lf tbe t bas to e expressly declared e effect t Proceedi 10n is
I
i~teildJlJ:e~eerned to be prospective. · n the absenc~ anf enact111 e:~s also.
e1aw is ' . o such de , such
tb State Banks Staff Union (Madras c· l claration
In 1. d ire e) v U . ,
ective law was exp aine . It was ob · nionof Ind·
ofretrosP d with reference to an enactment served that the woiad, i the llleaning
h J1 use . f may me (' r retro
w e t" or (ii) reoperung up o past, closed and an i) affecting sp~ctive
colltr~c 'accrued rights and remedies· or (iv) f£ c~rnpleted transa ;n existing
affe~tlllge which takes away or impairs the a ecting procedure Rcet1on; or (iii)
wis on A vested o . rospect'
Ia xisting laws. retrospective law tak r accrued rights . ive
under e . . 1 es away or . . acquired
. ed under existing aws or creates new obl' . . impairs vested • h
acqUU' d · b ·1· · 1gation im rig ts
hes in new isa i ity, in respect to transa t· ' poses a new duty
attac . . h c wns or cons·d . 'or
t. Retrospective is somew at ambiguous and th I erat10ns already
phas been caused by the fact that it is used in mor at good deal of confusion
as t d e senses than one I
however, the cour _s re_gar a~ retrospective any statute wh· . n general,
ses or facts coming into existence before its com ich. operates on
ca 'f £ h mencement m the
that it affects, even i or t e future only the charact' sense
. . 1 d. , er or consequences of
transactions p_rev10us yl ebntere i~to or of other past conduct. Thus, a statute is
not retrospective mere y eca use it _a~fects ex~sting ~ights; nor is it retrospective
merely because a part of the requisites for its act10n is drawn one and in its
from the time antecedent to its passing.
In Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills v. Union of India, 2 the Apex Court described
what is meant by "retrospective". The court observed that retrospective means
looking backward contemplating what is past having reference to a statute or
things existing before that statute in question. Retrospective law means a law
which looks backward or contemplates the past, which is made to affect the a~ts
or facts occurring or rights occurring before it comes into force. Retros~ective
statute means a statute which creates new obligation or transact10n or
considerations or destroys or impairs vested rights. .
I z· 3 . b d that it is cardmal
p' . n ile Singh v. State of Haryana, it was O ser~e t've unless it
isrl!lciple of construction that every statute is prima facie prospc~~:e operation.
expressly b . . . d to have retrospe ffi t
But the r ~r y necessary imphcat10n ma e . ct of the sta,tute is to a ec
vested . ule In general is applicable where ~he o~Je . t' g obligations. Unless .\!
ther rights or to impose new burdens or to impair e~is int. 0 of Legislature to
eare w d . h the inten io . \I
· affecte . _or s 1n the statute sufficient to s ow_ 1 I
XIShng rights it is deemed to be prospective on y. e Court held
In T 17 • ' • l Wi k/,4 the SupreIIl_ 1 : uage
that no · Llalia.murthi v. Five Gori Thaikka a 'ctive unless its an~here
reqllir statute should be construed to be retrospe tlllents. However,
esso Th . . dural enac
· e exception to this rule 1s proce
1. (200
2. ( 5) 7 sec 584.
200
a. (200:) 12 sec 198.
4. (2 )sscc 1
008)9~rv, ,.,,..~
·
_JIii
 IN I i:1u •·- -

J68 Where the right of suit is alread .

.
.. tion to such ~xc<: ?t10:w and a vested right had accru~~lllle.ba
is an excep I vant 1im1tat10n fthe new law, held, the new Pro . to% tr~q
under the re eing into operation o y the accrued vested right. V1sio11 c:t~et
before the coin d ·ght or take awa n~ot
h barre ri .
revive t e MPETENT TO MAKE RETRosp
LEGISLATURE IS CO . Ec'l'lv)
LAW h State Legislature can legislate both p
. t and t e . . t d t rasp .
The Parliainen h the Legislature in en s o enact a ret ectivel
. ly . W here me in uneqmvoca
retrospective . 1 t erms. If no such drosp ect1v
and d ess t e sa d ecia . e
law, it shoul expr the law shall be presume to be Pros ~at100
. the statute, . • t t . . Pect v .
is made in t g presumpt10n aga1ns re rospectivity A 1 e in
. Th e is a s ron . · 1aw ·
operation. er fvely operated unless c1ear1y proVIded The 18 not
deemed t~ be re::f:ii~~ :s used for validating the past executiv~ or le:;er. or
retrospective leg d t which past acts were invalidated, are cured b ative
acts. The defects ue_ o Yway or
retrospective legislation. .
1
In G. Sekar v. Geetha, it was held that retrospecti~e operation of an
.sion would depend upon the nature as also the text and conte
amen ded provl . lC . xt
of the statute. The principle in Sect10n 6 (c) of Genera la uses Act, 1897 is that
acquired/accrued/incurred rights are not to be affected by repeal in the absence
of contrary intention.

PRESUMPTION AGAIN ST RETROSPECTIVITY

As mentioned above, there is a presumption against retrospectivity. The
rule against retrospective effect of statute is not rigid or inflexible rule but is
one to be applied always in the light of language of the statute and subject
matter with which the statute is dealing. A statute is not retrospective which
takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates
a new obligation or imposes new duty or attaches new disability in respect of
transa~tions or considerations already past. A retrospective operation is not
to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation unless
th
e effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to language of enactment.
However no pers h . . d hence
th ' . on as vested right in any course of procedure an . t
e presumpt10n agai t t . 1icat1on o
enactment8 hi h ns re rospective construction has no app torY
Act the w c . deal with the procedural law. If statute is a dee ara inst 1
' presumpt10n aga· t Th ule aga
retrospective op t" . ins retrospectively is inapplicable. er ercoJJle
1 18
not only by exp;::s ; a ~resumption only and as such it may be:r1cient1Y
strong to displace 1•t I o~ds in. the Act but also by circumstances s statute
or a particular n · t _is ca rdinal principle of construction that everY words
8
or by necessaryewi_msel~tio~ is prospective unless it is manifest by expretsherefore
fi ll P 1catio · d · . · It ·o
o ow~ that unless th n in icating retrospective operation. ·nte11t10
of Le·gislature to affec::~ are ~o~ds in statute sufficiently to show th;i:e. Ever;
st
atute Which take e ex!s ting rights; it is deemed to be prospec · ting 1~1,
or c t s away or . d r e,c1s :11t1
. rea es a new ob11· t· impairs vested rights acquired un e disablJ ·
in resp t Of ga ion or · new t t0
have retr ec transacti imposes a new duty or attaches a ded ri 0
· 0 n a 1read · b ·nteil
- ospective effe c.
t Y Past must be presumed to e 1
1. (2009)6Sc~-----
 PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPE
CTIVE OPE
. RA110N o
Thus vested ri~hts acquired Under . FSTATUTES
. g retrospective operation to a existing 1 369
triVJll b k d
bYi,· d from a ac a e. ew duty t N new st atu.te aws
N cannot b
creat\ re a statute which takes awaycan~ot be hn.po ew obligati~ taken away I
~her~ O laWS or creates new obligation or i~Pairs Vesr~dd ~oni an ns c~nnot be
·stlllg t ft 8 or imp e right earlier d
I I

e~ bilitY in respec o . ransactions alread oses a new du s acquired ate.

d1sa t' n unless an intention to D'i _Y Past cannot b ty or attach Under
era 10 1 "..ve it ret e giv es a ne
oP .ded. If the anguage of the enactm rospective ff en retrospect' w
proVld bear more than one meaning leadient suffers from e ebc~ is expret1e
wor s h ld b £ ng to alt am l&Uit sY
. pretation s ou e pre erred which . ernative cont and the
inter gives prospective s ruc~1ons, that
\aW• operation to th
The salient features of the rule ofpr . e
· d
unllnarize as un er. d eslllllption ·
against retrosp ct· .
bes e iv1ty can
(i) This rule is applied in such cas h .
t . 1 . es w ere if th 1
retrospec 1ve y, 1t takes away or P . d' . ' e aw is operat d
· ht • re3u 1cially af£ t . e
veste d rig acquired under existin 1 . ec s or impairs any
new duty or attaches new disabili't•g aws, imposes new burdens or
. ies or creates ne Obl' .
respect of transactions already past. Such statu w igations in
to have retrospective effect. tes are presumed not
(ii) There
· is ha strong
1 presumption against applving a new Act to pending
,J
· .
act10n w en anguage of statute does not clearly say so.
(iii) If new Act affects procedure only, prima. facie it applies to all actions
pending as well as future. '
(iv) Statutes of limitation are considered to be procedural and hence they
apply to cause of action arose before enactment ofrules.
(v) Statutes regulating succession are not applicable to successions
which had already opened.
(vi) Fiscal statutes are considered to be only prospective in respect ~f
· . h d al part of fiscal statutes is
charging section. However, t e proce ~r
considered to be retrospective in operatwn. .
-c
Or increasing penalties for
(vii) Penal statutes creating new Of1ences t' . nature
existing offence are presumed to be prospec ive m_ ·
... 'd d to be retrospective.
(vm) Remedial statutes are consi ere h pellant was
k and others, i t e ap ll t
In G. Nagendra v. State of Karnat~ a Commerce. When appe an
promoted as Assistant Director of Indu str1es ~:that promotion. Subseque~!t4 \1

wKas promoted, Recruitment Rules did not perm~ (Recruitment) Ru~es, dated I
Ii
arnataka Industries and Commerce Servi6ce3 1981 by a notificationt nded
Wer
h· .
·
e amended with retrospective e e
ff ct from · ·
4 7 1986 Before Karnata k a Ad nu'nistrative .
. Tribunal, i
·
ffect was 1nv
·t was cone ·
alid an
d unlawful.
d cannot be
I~
~t amendment to rule with retrospect~;\: only prospectiveS~;reme Co~t
ribuna1 held that amendment of rule wi t' n of appellant. lid onlY with 1\
~etrospective and hence quashed the pr~mo t:at Rules will be v;e Court held
e;ld that Tribunal was not rig~t in holt~~hed. Further Supre
ect from the date on which it was pu
---------------
1. 1998 ~('(' fT n~rl C!\ 1 ?fl4. GIRi
370 IN TERPRETATION OF STATUTES

that rules can be given retrospective effect and therefore !ha

T
'bunal quashing the promotion given to appellant Wass t t_:Part f
ri In K. Kuppusa.my v. Sta.te of T.N., , the Supreme c ,,e t aside · o o, di1

statutory rules cannot be overhnd 'ddtenk by edxe~~tive. order0or 4r exe

ob SQr"ed th 1·,1
Merely because Government a a en ec1sion to arnend th C\itiv, a1
ean that the rule stood obliterated. Till rule is amended th e tuie Pdra~1i~1'
and when amendment is er~1ected, ord'mari·1y 1t
m · would be Pr' e l'ule aphli
9 Oesnr,1·
unless expressly or by necessary imp . 1·1cat·ion ,ound
.!'- to be ret aspect·iv, in" es·\,
In Atal Tea. Co. Ltd. v. Regional . Provident
. Fund rospective
C . · 1atur,
was held that a Legislature is competent to legislate both
h
omm,.,~,.,,.
retrospectively but t ere 1s · presump t·ion against . retrospect· . ively ,a
Prospect· 11

against retrospectiv· e bopera t·10n 1s

· a dpr~sumhption . only and as 1v1ty
s~chTh.e runlei
1
be overcome not on y y express wor s tn t e Act but also by . 11 1
sufficiently strong to displace it. circullts~.,;11
In Govind Das v. l.T.0.,' it was held that now it is well settled
interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial dee . ruJ, I
unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessari]yisions. th~t,
. operations
retrospective . hould not be given
. a it'
to a statute so as to takereql!!re
impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new
otherwise than as regards the matters of procedure. Y
~:I:
11

In Cooperative Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade, U.P.,• the

Supreme Court held that a provision in an Act inserted with retrospective effo,
from the
prior dateAct.
to that specified cannot be contemplated to have retrospective operati•

In K. Eapin Chako v. Provi.dent Fund Investment Company (P) LtJ.,' i1

was held that a statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview
of the statute and at the remedy sought to he applied. In that connection former
bstateh of law is to he considered and also the legislative changes contempiat,I
W
Y t e statute. or dsnot requmng . . retrospective
. opera t·10n so as to affect . an
existing statutory provision prejudicially ought not to be so construed. It IB •~1
recognize
. d rue I that statull! should be interpreted, 1'f poss1'ble, so as dto respin•
vested rights. In 0th.er words, if a statute deals merely with the proce r~nm,
action, and does not affect the rights of parties, it will be held to app Y
/aci.e le all actions, pending as well as future . ueo

In CIT v. Essar Teleholdings Ltd 6 it was held that it. is. _a. weU-se 1
decisions
th ·
rulet of mterpretat1on
I th . ·, .
hallowed by time and sanctified by l ·ud1c1a 1 ,eqUll· e
rily
1 a , un ess e. terms of a statute expressly so prov1'de or necessa as to take,
't • re t rospective
· operation should not he given to a st 8 tute so ·ropose ne·'e11
away_ or impair
. . _an existing right or create a new obl.igat1onTho..i:enera,~~
or I 8
l rw
hahihty otherwlSe than as regards matters of procedure. torY or
· th at all statutes other than those which are mere1Y declara
1. 1998 SCC (Land S) 1694.
2. 1998 (79) FLR 372 Cal HC.
-
3. AIR 1977 SC 552.
4. (2001) 4 sec 4so.
5. AIR 1976 SC 2610.
6, (2Q]R) 1 C:U'r'l 0 ~-
 -'-•IVE 0
PERAl 1
~1y to matters of procedu 0N OF
te OllJ . . re or Of SlATLJ
tel0. trospective operat10n should evide lEs
od re destroy an existing right not be givnce are h . J, 1
0 r or b . or ere en t 0 t1r1:rna f -
9
Jte {feet cannot e av01ded with ate a ne . a stat acie P
tbo.t e ent. If the enactment is exp out doing vt1hability 0 enc
ollte so asr~sPective
O
ctJll · · ressed · r obli af£
eJl9 • interpretat10n, 1t ought to be · in langu e to the 1 gation ect,
eitb~IarY intention appears, a legislact?ns~rued as P:ge Which is t~guage ~~ltehss
11t1 . t· Th ion is aspect· a1rly e
c0 spect1ve opera wn. e idea b h' Presumed ive onl capable 0f
retro t' ·t' L e ind th not t b Y· . D
a rn current ac 1v1 ies. aw passed t e rule is th o e intend. nless a
gov; oday cannot a alt a current 1ed to have
pas • . PP Y to th aw should
In State of Bihar . £ v. Ramesh Pra d T 7
sa v erm I . e events of th
e
·nstrurnent h av1ng orce of law if 1 . a, it wash ld
otl d t · ' c arificat e thata 1
in nature an pu~por ' in order to suppl a ory'. declaratory orny egislation
oubts qua any pr10r law' retrospective y n_ obvious omiss· explanatory
d operation th . ion or to cle
In Bhakti Manoj kumar Gaggad v St ereof is generally inte ard up
·1· · ate of Mah n ed
pronounce d on app lica b1 ity of amended ro . . arashtra,2 the A e .
and amendments are prospective .
in natup Hv1s1ons. It held that th! 8xt Court
re. oweve atutes
declaratory na t ure or h .aving effect of sub s t't . r,
1 ut10n of • .amendments in for mof
to be construe d as app 11cable from date of th . . ongmal provision have
· f ·· d e1r earlier p . .
introduction o amen ment old provision will . rovis10n. Though till
. . ill . . preva11 from dat Of
old provision
· w no more exist and will not gover. - n any ' body. e amendment
. In CIT v. S.R.M.B. Dairy Farming (P\1 Ltd. a it h ld h .
· ul h t b 1· d · ' was e t at a beneficial
crrc
. li ar
d as o t·e app
1 1e retrospectively while an oppres SIVe
· c1rcu
· 1ar has to be
app e prospec 1ve y.

OPERATION OF VARIOUS KIN DS OF STATUTES

It is well settled that a law which impairs the vested rights, creates new
obligations, imposes new duty or attaches new disability is presumed not to
have retrospective operation. If Legislature intends to give retrospective eff~ct
to any such statute the intention thereof must be declared in clear and specific
terms. The retrosp~ctive operation of various kinds oflaw is discussed below.
(a) Statutes dealing with substantive rights are presumed to be
prospective . . ri hts are deemed to be
The statutes which deal with subS antive t
0
oe retrospective. An f
prospective only. They should not be preSUmed ri ht cannot be gi~en
enactment which seeks to take away any ve~ted d gd The retrospective
retrospective operation unless it is expressly in~ent :ti~n is inanifeste~ bdy
oper t· • d d nl ss that 1n e • · require
a ion 1s not taken to be inten e u 8 1 se attention is
expr . . . Therefore a c o
ess words or necessary 1mplicat10n. . • .
to be paid to the language of the statutory prov1s1on.. . which touch _a rl1g~t
the provisions pect1ve yin
. LORD BLANESBURG observed that t t be applied retros
en
lll t t te are no o
8 ence at the passing of the sta u
t.
1·ntendrnen ·
the ab · ecessarY
----.sence of express enactment or n .
734
1. (2017) 5 sec 665: AIR 2017 SC · 430
2. 201 Q /J::: \ 11 ,fl _ T T () /" !:'. • 'J{l 1 (5) ALL MR .
 372 IN TERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Tl le against retrospectivity, in general, ,is applicable '''h

ie ru . h . b d vv er
of statute is to affect vested rig ts, impose new ur en or illl.Pair ee"?hfoct
obligations. . .
lSf11lg
4
1
In State of Punjab v. Bha1a_n Kaur, it was held that a substanr
. d t be prospective. It 1s one of the facets of the rule of 1ve law
is presume o 939 t d . ht d 1· b" . 1aw. Se .
92-A Of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1 crea e a rig_ an a ia ihty on th ct1on
f h
o t e ve hic e. It is a statutory liability, Whe re a er ?Wner
1 notf a tort10us liability.
b . . h
t d b an enactment in the a sence o a c1ear provision in the st t 1g tis
crea e Y ' . a Ute it'
not to be applied retrospective1y. , is
In State of Maharashtra v. Shyamkant Dattatreya Patil,2 the c· il
(s nior Division) had granted additional benefits, over and above tihv Judge
e
passed by Collector, as per the amen de d prov1s1ons
. . of the Land Acqe awa
... rd
Act The said order was challenged before the High Court. The court : 191t1on
thai the award was passed by the Collector on 3.3.1982, i.e., prior to 0
when the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill was mtroduced. Therefore
ao.:';th;;
respondents in whose favour award was already passed by the Collector P . e
to 30.4.1982 are not _entitled to th~ benefit of ad_d~t~onal component. The hen:~;
could be given only-if the proceedmgs for acqms1tion were pending and award
was not passed by the Collector. _
In N.T.P.C. Ltd. v. M.P. S.E.B., 3 a Regulation (5-A) was inserted in the
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations
1999. This regulation provided for interest on differential tariff. It was held
that the said Regulation cannot be applied retrospectively. The provision
for charging interest is a substantive provision which has to be specifically
provided and would become operative when provided.

(b) Statutes dealing with procedure are presumed to be retrospective

The statutes which deal with the procedure are presumed to be
retrospective. In other words, those statutes which modify the existing
procedures or provide for new procedures are given retrospective effect. If new
Act affects the matter of procedure only, then it applies to all actions pending
as well as future.

MAXWELL says that no person has a vested right in any course of

procedure. He has only the right to prosecution or defence in the mann•;
prescribed. If the procedure is altered he has no other right than to procee
according to altered mode. '
F I
or examp e, a decree passed by Indian Court agamst · . a £orei·gner hat
foreign country is a matter of procedure. Such decree is non-executable. Butt :
decree becomes executable if that foreign place ceases to be foreign country
becomes part of India and Indian Code of Civil Procedure is extended tot
place.
:t
I )\ r India
n 1.vew •
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra,4 it was hel d t h at if new
cial
· type of origmal
· ce rt am
Act reqwres · · proceedings to be institute
· d beii-"ore a spe
1. (2008) 12 sec 112.
2. 2006 (3) Mh. L.J. 577, Bom. H.C.
3. (2011) 15 sec 580.
4. AIR 1976 SC 237. .olllllil
r pROSPECTIVE AN D RETROSPECT
IVE OPERA
. . llON OF
eJ(c\usion of civil courts all s1,nulEs
1to f t· •n '
Proceed·
·b~oa wcauses o ac ion w1 have t b . ing of
i lfl trvai·n,dte anYKumar
r or11e 37
o e inst' that t 3
v. State of MP ituted bet
i • Ype Wheth
new offence but is·m·, itl Was held th ore that 'rr1·ber based
t ere . ere y at unaI
ioesflo
• peC I t·ve in operation. .
Procedural. a
in nat Bton Whi.
Provi .
~,ffo egards the procedural provision8 Ure is norm ~h
f.S t irospectively operated only if th 1contained in aY
~sY br:::1e. e egislative int::::: dstatutes, they
i; ce }• . o so ·t 1
ll'5 s,,khdev Singh V. State of D l C early
In IAI aaryana 2 th
ective effect even to procedural pro .. ' e Apex C
retro~P n unless even after strict const v1s1~ns in criminal soturtt held that
~ give . ruction 1 . a utes
0 ective effect 1s c1ear beyond any amb' . , eg1slative inte cannot
retrosP 1gu1ty. nt to give
It is clear from above that . the statutes dealmg . w'th 1
resume d to b e prospective and the statut d . substantive right
areP b t . B es ealmg 'th s
presUDled to ere . rospective.
d ut the classific t· f
a 10n O stat t .WI procedures a re
and procedura1 1s not eterminative factor of es mto substantive
. M 1 b . prospective or t .
operation. ere Y ecause a statute 18 proced 1 . re rospective
retrospective
· 1y. What 1s · to b e seen is the effect of ura ' it cannot b
. . of the e operated
• · f d . app 11cat10n tat te
If application
· d o a proce
· 1 ural
· law
· like statute of lim ·t
1 a n on past causesu of·
t·
10 s
action lea .s to1 rev1va or ext1ngU1shment of a right of suit , 1·t cannot be operated
retrospective Y. ·
(c) Statutes governing succession are not retrospectively operated
Statutes regulating succession are not applicable to successions which
had already opened.
In Eramma v. Veerupana, 3 it was held that the provisions contained in
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; which lays down that the property
ofa male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to provisions of the Act;
18 mapplicable to a case where successions opened before the Act.
d) s t8 e not retrospectively
( tatutes regulating trans{ers and contrac ar
operated . . .
formalities for effecting
Where a statute is enacted prescribing new h t t te shall have to
a tranSier, any transfer after commencement of .sue
b A s da anYu contravention
·
th
made in accordance with the provisions of eh :sfers inade prior t~
er~to would render the transfer invalid. But t ed rThey are not declare
coming · t £ • unaffecte . d The reason
~teven though the new formalities prescnb~d: Act which w•• •::ti~• of
vo· m o orce of such statute remalll . re not observe · t ated
aft at the formalities have been prescribed y s made in contra dance to
,,I
11
I

er com 1 . f h transfer wa ill 1in accor f

. P etion of transfer. I t e
the
th talw
1 in force at the relevant time, then
a aw H
:a
t nsfer is · ega bservance o
alidated for nonl-oW regulating
ot be 1nv.- r. the a ·
ne · ow ever, the transfer cann t There1ore
tr w formalities prescribed in later enactIIlen ·
ansfer 1·s not applied to past cases. I

1
· (2oo1) 12 sec ss1: AIR 2001 sc
- 2674
53
2. (201::l.\? Qr,r, '>1 '> • .HR 2013 SC 9 ·
· Jv
 374
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

I
"'h koor Hurdeo Bux v . Thakoor Jowahir Singh .
n.1.,a .. c f"J: t· t 'It\\r
statutes prescribing form_ahties ,or e ,ec lllg ransfers are1 not a, held
s.- made prior to their enforcement. app1, th,
trans,er . . ""'b1, •
1 Thus where a statute contamed certalll formalities to b I1
f I tra~sfer and those formalities are dispensed by a late e 0 hae..,,,d
aw u
an invalid .
transfer under previous Iaw d oes no t get validated.r One
enact"''•t, lbfor'
a plea that though the transfer was not legal under the Prev- ca••ot~
non-observance of formalities prescribed therein, but now af1t0 Us law du ke
those formalities by subsequent 1aw, 1·t 1s . no more necessary t erb relb.ovale
and as such the trans,er ecomes ega . e th,~
s.- b 1 1 °
0 serv of
In_ Mata Prasad _v: Nageshwari Sahai, 2 it was held that the
dispensmg with formalities, which were earher necessary for mak. •tatui.,
have not the effect of valid a ting transfer which were lacking in the:•~ lrans1e,,,
and which were made prior to such statute. e orn,alltie,
Where a statut_e prohibits certain transfer and yet a transfer has
made, such transfer 1s mvalid. If subsequently the prohibiting law is be,,
it does not mean that the earlier invalid transfer becomes legal. repezje\
In Ram Kristo v. Dhankisto,' it was held .that transfer Inad .
contravention
repeal ofconforming
of statute a statutory prohibition.
prohibition is invalid and cannot be Validate~ b•Y

A transfer made in accordance with the existing laws is a valid transfer.II

a subsequent enactment prohibits the transfer of the same nature, the effect0
that no such transfer can take place after commencement of prohibitory statut,.
But the earlier valid transfer cannot be invalidated by subsequent prohibition.
Where a contract is valid under the law in force at the relevant timeand
by a subsequent Act the contract of that nature is declared invalid, the earlier
valid contract shall remain unaffected. However after commencement nflater
law, such contracts cannot be validly entered into.

(e) Statutes Prescribing limitation are prospective but may ha,.

retrospective operation for certain matters .

1Such
Certain statutes Prescribe period of limitation for initiating legal •~':j
1 statutes do not create any right. The object is to prescribe pe:oend.
A.m1·tba t ion.
· After expiry . .toacanoot
· of period of limitation, the righ t to sue comes
tl
su sequen
1 imitation
. . . Act which provides a longer per10 ° .
. d flim1tat10nbecomes
be app r • d toth e cases which are time barred. Once a particu · Iar actwnbe taken t °
barred under _earlier Limitation Act, recourse to late~ Ac_t canr:~ded by JaWl
revive the exting111shed right. The larger period of hm1tat10n P
Act 1s of no help. . r Jaw is
0
n the other hand if limitation period provided . bY the earlie
· us Jaw but,,
st
re duce d bY a 1ater A~\ and ' the right to sue subsists un d• r preVI · !11 •
d by0 earlier 1
ands extinguished as per later Act, the matter will be govern•
only.

1. (1879) 6 IA 161.
2. AIR 1925 PC 272.
3. AIR 1969 8f' ') n ..
 pROSPECTIVE AN D RETROSPECTIVE
0PE!ti\110N OF
STA.TUT Es
1 dia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sh .
111 New _rides shorter period of hmitati· nnti Misra 1 1.t 37 5
rov1 b . . on than th , Wash
ActP bt of suit is su s1sting according to . at Prov· d eld that h
\~J rig t operation, will not be taken to bearli~r Act on~•d by
i1u 01 ein o e ext1ngu. h e date h
••rhe; en
A.
ct,
ctca if the curtailed time to file a . 18 ed. w en later
, wever, ·1 d f . h' suit as P l
Bo . to be ava1 e o wit in that Period er ater A.ct .
right is and benefit of e 1:.not expired
~e·\able- . . 1· . . ar ier Act is not
J~a1 tes providing 1m1tation are regard d
statU . . e as Procedural
tes of limitation are thus prospect· . law.
Statu . h' h. 1 ive in nat
,·ght of action w 1c 1s a ready barred . Ure since they .
. earl d B h
. g on that ate. ut t ey are retrospect· . , nor extin . h a right ofneither
gu1s .
b t1n
18 h f . lVe in so fa action
su s ceedings broug t a ter their operation as they apply t
al pro ior enforc1n o a11
accrue dearlier.
\eg g causes of action
Fiscal Statutes are prospective in res:pect f h .
(0 but are retrospec t·we in
· respect of the o c. .arging Provisions
..
proce dure provisions dealing w'th
i

Fiscal statutes are presumed to be prospective onl d . ·,

h. ul 1· 1 . . y an
However, t is r e app ies on y to charging sections and oth not retrospective
b ..
• •
Provisions. Charging sect10ns are those sections by which a cha
er su• stantive
d
1. . . rge 1s create .
This rule has no app 1cat10n 1n respect of procedural part. Procedur l t f
. . . d li a par o
taxing Act is retrospective an app es to pending proceedings also. I I
In Gem graniies v. Commissioner of Income Tax, T.N., 2 the appellant )\
assessee exported cut and polished granite. For Assessment Year 1987-88 he
claimed deduction under Section 80-HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The ' I I
High Court decided against the assessee, hence this appeal. The Appellant
contended before the Supreme Court that granite although was a "mineral"
within the exclusionary provision of Section 80-HHC (2) (b) but when cut and
polished, ceased to be so. The history of Section 80-HHC indicated that ~ts
object was to develop foreign markets and to earn foreig~ exchange -and with
th
at object a 'distinction had been_made between raw mrqeral and pr0 cessed
mineral at all material times The CBDT circular dated 22.5.84 stat.ed that the
ex~ort of cut and polished di~monds and gems would not amou~t to e~porTthof
ffiliiera18 and ·. '-· ores and . for re1·ie f under the said section.
· hence would qualify .. e
1991 A · ·r The position was
fur mendment to Section 80-HH C clarified that posi 10~· . tion could be
th•r
lo _clarified by CBDT circular of 1995 -That sub_seq~e~t :;:1;ovision. The
1; 9:d into for the purpose of interpreting an earlier s u1spective effect. The
res Amendment was declaratory and had the~efore;~ r; give retrospective
eff Pondent submitted that if Parliament had mten e 1 0 said so. The 1984
c:ct to the 1991 Amendment, it would hav_e expre;;:4 and 1995 Circul~rs
c!lt'llar dealt with diamonds and not with granite. T~; 1 Amendment of Sectwn
J~
80 apply to the assessment years prior to the 1 trictive interpretation tot
'll.1.1.C h h
thewor "e~ce t ere was no reason o:
£ 'ving a res
gi
S reme Cour
HHC (Z) (b). The u~ . which
held thd ~1neraf' as occurring in Section 80- no words of restriction
at in Section 80-HHC (2) (b), there are

~- AIR 1976 SC 237.

2005
( )1 sec289_
D
376 IN TERPRETATION OF STATUTES

lify th
word "minerals" and therefore, the word must be r d
qua e . . . h th b. ea to .
allt ki d f minerals mall its ,orms i.e., w e er su Jected to lllciud
..
,. ,
.,· nl snog as it continued to retain the characteristics of the lllia_nny Proce e
no as o . ,, . d d . eral, 1' or
that the word "minerals never me1u e. processe minerals WoU]d o88hoid
ding words of limitation mto an otherwise clear and unambiguo l'eq%-e
rea . .
provision. Admittedly, grarute 1s covere d bY e exc usionary Pro.; .•tori
th 1 Us stat
Section 80-HHC (2) (b). Therefore, for the un:i-mended Section _l! Ion
8
(b) cut and polished granite would also be a mineral. The introduct· 80 lie(~
p~ase "other than" in Section 80-HH C (2) (b) in 1991 indicates the 0 " of th,ca'
ofa specific class from the generic class of "minerals and ores". This DI l"Ving O,,t
·
were it not for thedebxcephtion, t hde ·fi e d procedsse d ~un
· erals and ores that
eansWou]d
have been covere 1
y t e worb_s md1nerahs an ores . 1t a so indicates that
only the minerals and ores su iecte tot e process of cutting 1 and Poli h
would be entitled to the benefit of Section 80-HHC meaning thereby th!t~
other species of processed _minerals and ores_ would continue to be covered by
the general exclus10n applicable to the genenc class. The 1991 Amendment to
Section 80-HHC thus conclusively demonstrates that the words "DiineraJ, and
ores" must be construed widely and in an unrestricted manner. Every statute
is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication
macje to have retrospective operation. There is nothing in the wording of the
1991 Amendment to suggest that it was to operate retrospectively, Apart from
the lack of any express words indicating such intention, there is nothing in
the statute from which we can infer on any Principle of interpretation that the
intention of Parliament was to give the amendment retrospective effect.
Certain considerations as to operation of fiscal statute are as under :
(i) The fiscal statutes are so operated as not to effect finality of tax
assessment.

(ii) Assessee cannot be subjected to reassessment.

(iii) A provision which is retrospective and opens up time barred liability
shall be strictly construed.
(iv) Tax Authorities cannot be authorized to commence proceedings
( ) Thwhich, before new Act, had become time barred.
v . . which
e prov1s1on . creates new obligation or affects exis
. t·ngrights
1
is presumed to be prospective. . bas
· I
(vi) A h
c ange m 1 ty and which
aw which seeks to vary the tax liab'li ffecl th•
been brought after beginning of assessment year, does not a
assessment made for that year. ,id
In CI· · T· Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., 1 1· t wasathth•
that as the income tax liability is computed according to law in_ f~~ty after
begrruung of assessment Year, any change in law affecting tax has ecificaUY
that date does not apply to assessment made for that year unless p
made retrospective. · tb'
I n Karimtharuvi Tea Estates. Ltd. v. State of Kerala,' it was held
beibllt
ppli' d
!_llrcharge on Agncultural Income Tax imposed from 1.9.1957 cannot 8
1. AIR 1961 SC 1633. -
1
,......- pl{OSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF
. STATU
.

t year 19 57 •58 as it was not b TES

#j)le~ 1st APril 1957. rought into t 37)
l' ar ,_e.,
'ti"t 1' 1))t wJiich cororoenced during c .
orce fro
mthe begin .
I baef• rovisions of new Act if suc:~muance of Id nmg
. at'der !nt of new Act. For example no efamt con~u Act, can be
1~¢,ncej)ldefault-It continues till the time :fihng of inco es at the ti!••lt
~iil'"'\lS
1 \lllaer a new Act. e return is fil:e~ax return '.so!
I .1 ~•tli . . . . · hecase,
/ft /J ya JW" PunJ v. Comm,sswner of I 1 an be

I
ltldefault
a ill filing of return
1 h h. of income is nc~me
a contmui Tax, Delh.i, it w h
.

w•t• goch a defau t, t oug it commenced wh ng default till th as2 eld

i@ed· vet can be dealt with under Income T enAincome Tax Act return
,' fot"'' · nt of new Act.
l;
ax ct, 1961 if continues: 2 was
~,nc•j)le afte
c0Jll If a ,,,,ong Act
f hseeks
A to impose
h A tax on an event which . . '
tiJII' ofp"6sing o t e ct, sue• ct cannot be given retrospective
is contmuing at the
operation
penal Statutes creating new offences or inc . ·
~) ,xisting offences are prospective only reasing penalty for
. 1 e pena1ty of an e . t'
Th• penal statutes which seek to enhance th
o,nce cannoth e Id retrospective
I d y hi operated. The penalty sh a11 contmue. xistomg
be
b
governed
ff by t ~oh awt, un er w ch a. particular act was 1declared
88
to be an .
•,nce
11' and purus£ roen ,,,orit was prescribed.
. . If the offender • ufr,ermg · a term ·
of t\,re' months or an ouence as per enstmg law and subsequently a new Act is
O
~•cted which enhances the pumshment for the same offence to six months, the
offender cannot be coropelled to serve out enhanced punishment of six months.
Similarly the penal statutes which create new offences can be prospective
only. Creation of new offence roeans that a particular act which was not an
oilence previously, is declared to be an offence and made punishable. However,
such act shall be considered to be an offence onlY upon effectuation of the new
law and as such penal liability for cornrnission of that act would arise_oulY after
fuestatute is brought into force. The penal consequences would flow if a person
oommits the prohibited act after cornrnencement of law declanng it an offence.
But a person who did that act prior to operation of law forbidding
1 t~t
;mnot be held liable. An act legal at time of doing it, cann° be made u awth
I · L d v State of Madras: e
Ysome new enactroent. ,
S n West Ramnad Electric Distributwn Co. t · · t offence or which I
·upreme Court held that the penal statute• which ere•. e 1,
mcrease 1. ill Onl be prospective. I
I pena
p ties for existing offence w v·
Y t r Jarnrnu and [(aShmir .
Ind n . yare Lal Sharma v. Managing ,rec o ' d J{aslu!lir Industries
E ustries Ltd.' a the Regulation 16. 14 of the Ja!ll!llulu a_n ca01e to be a01end_ed
mployee S . Thi• Reg at1on . of service
on 20 .4 s ervice Rules was in quesuon. ounds for termination "if he (the
ofan .1983. By way of aroendroent, rnore gr. rted grou11ds was ed that
•mp) employee were added. One of the newlY,;"$:pre!lle court ob:":J on th•
it is iee) remains on unauthorized absence · 0 n• can be pen• "'
--..C::: basic principle of natural justice that no
:· AIR l986 SC 293. -
3. AIR l962 SC 1753 .
. AIR 19R~ ~r. 1854.
 378
IN TERPRETATION OF STATUTES

dO
groun f the conduct which was. not d fpenal on h the. day it,vv.. as
. f this it was held that peno o unaut or1zed absen Coll:i.h. •
view o k . "d .
endment could not be ta en mto cons, erat10n for term . . 10, to •i. ce Pr· ~ltt
amemployee.
an •nat!Jlg i,te1, '•>,;
1
In Mururam v. Union of India, by the Cr.P.c. (A:rnend ce or
8
of 1978, Section 433-A was inserted to the Code of Criminal lllpent) A.ct ,
This section requires
· t h at w h ere a sen t ence ofl L<e "" imprison~
· · . 1!r, 1'~o· 4a
roced
conviction of a person for an ofience
'J.' fior w hi ch death 1s · one of
.......th
ent Is 1·lllpo,,' 197a.
such person shall not be released from prison unless he has e l>UlJ.is¾ie1 n
fourteen years of imprisonment.
. . . h as been held tserved
Th.is prov1s10n h at 1,1140
to sentences imposed after coming into force of the section and O e •PPllca:
convicted before its. commencement and coming . into
. force. not to a Poo e
In Waddington v. Miah,' it was held that retrospective crimin I! . 00
is against Article 11 (2) of Declaration of Human Rights of Dn~ ?Nlatioo
and Article 7 of European Convention for Protection of Human
Fundamental Freedom.
h
g ts•~
R; •tio~
Certain considerations as to operation of penal statute are as under.
(i) Any provision which iacreases penalty particularly if coupled . h
an additional liability to imprisonment cannot he construed t"'bt
retrospective.
. o e
(ii) The penal statute which creates new offences can he prospect,~
only.

(iii) If subsequent to commission of offence, provision is made by law fm

imposition of lighter penalty, offender shall benefit thereby.
(iv) The procedure prescribed for trial of offence in a new Act may be
applied for trial of similar offences under repealed Act.
(h) Statutes prescribing future disqualification on past misconduct
are not retrospective

If a future disqualification under a statute results from a prior misconduct,

it does not make the statute retrospective. No man has a right in his preVl:us
crimes and their consequences. Therefore the past conviction of a person und::
an earlier statute may be looked into while punishing him for an offenceu1':l'not
new Act. No person is entitled to insist that his previous history sho ond
be considered in a future legislation. If a statute increased penalty on :~ be
conviction of an offence, a conviction before commencement of statute co
taken into account. ton

Persons who were earlier convicted or who have a stigma

. t large. Jo
Of misconduc
.
their character under a prior law may create nuisance for the pubhc a a statute
order to protect the public from wrongful activities of these person~ is not to
..I
f may he brought. This statute is prohibitory in nature. _The 0
mJhct Pumshment on such persons but to impose prohibiitwn on . or sngin
wrong/u; ~t:ir
,-;;
activities. While proceeding under such statute, the past convic;w:,iviction or
of misconduct of such person may be relied upon, although a c
th
1. AIR 1980 SC 2147.
2. (197 4) 2 All ER 377 (HL).
~
p~os ECTIYE
.
A.ND RETROSPECTIVE OP
ERATION O
FSTATUTES
37
. ear her law. Thus, where it
s \l11de1 " shall be forever disqualifiwdas Provided th 9
,v~ felonJ • li e for 1. at "
,l. edof fl diSq . ualification app ed to every
h A conviset lingsPints
.. every
b Person
l.)'1'Id tP~tdprior
. to or after t e ct came into o
.
c ed felon h Y retail" .t
perat1on. w ether h , ,
' ,jct' sorribaY v. Vishnu Ramchand I e wa,
I 5tall of t 1951 was in question which ra, Section 57 of
1011 police Aco~victed of certain offences l_aulthorized remov tlhe State of
I~ nc" nc ud · • al a
! bes bee twas whether person convicted of thef mg theft". The Person
1° tb' "'1 frotll a specified area. It was cont t m 1949 could b \ueetion
lorere!llove Act was brought into force subseqeuntedl that convictioen irected
oe dthe
i 19 all JllenceJ)lent of t h e Act, cannot be conent.dy . The convictionwasb .in
,JJ co]'.]'.l LAH J b s1 ered £ h emg
·,o,etD jJJPPJATUL ' ., o served that the A t d or t e purposes I
~i,t- aJ<:es punishable that which was not c f'i! oes not create an/
iv nor ]'.]'.l . .. f d . an o ience It . w
~ ce bl·c froJll activities o un esirable person h · 1s designed to
,~tee f particular k.in d. The section
.10 t pu l . only enabl o have been convicted
s w th
• r1 ces • d es e auth ·t·
·(011e11flhe..;,.O convictions an to put them outside the area of thon· 1es to... take
~•o the public tnaY be protected from repetition of such
1 . eir actiV11tes,
;otbat ,;on taken against him is-after the Act comes . t a£ctiv1ties. So long
he''" . . mo orce th t
ii b ,id to be apphed retrospectively. · es atute
t
rannot es
. Be,nedial statutes are not necessarily retrospective
(t) osterior d.isqualifi cat10n . under a statute resulting from an ant enor .
,_,,,duel
AP does not tnake the statute retrospective. Similarly, if a prospective
••fitftowmg {rotn a statute depends on earlier facts, it does not mean that
the law is retrospective.
In R. v. Mary Whitechapel (St.) (Inhabitants).' Section 2 of the Poor
~medial Act, 1846 was interpreted. This section laid down "No woman residing
manyparish with her husband at the time of his death shall be removed from
"'1 parish for twelve calendar months next after his death, if she so Jong
oonlmues a widow." Accordingly, one widow was sought to be removed within
O,lve months from date of death of her husband. But her husband had died
l'IDl to commencement of the Act. Therefore it was contended that application
; the provisions of Section 2 in this case would amount to retrospective th
'l'!ation of the statute. The contention was rejected and it was held tba_t e
exphression "shall be removed'.' covers all cases offuture retnovals irrespective of
IRher husband died prior to the Act.
ether t

t:
w
n a~quennessa
apellllane t v. Lal Bhadur Chhetri,' a tenantt t d from evict·10n. It
who has ac
•• held structure on the land of tenancy was pro ec est tur• was built
~ten at such protection covers even such cases where ruc
ant be£ore com mg . mto
. force of the Act. W and
T n Barb . £ (Married oroen
O!tfeas
I er v. Pigden,' Section 3 of Law Re o]'!!I .d d "the husband of
alll.a,.,.;eodrs)
" woAct, 1935 was interpreted. This
· section
· b ·prov1
her ehusband ' be liable
1 men shall not, by reason onlY of his eing

1. AIR 96
2. (1 ~ 1 SC 307.
8
3. AIR { 116 ER 811.
4. (1937~~4SC 1511.
All ER 115 PC.
 IN TERPRETATION Of STATUTES

J80 . ·tted by her, whether before or aft

t rt comm1 rt . er th
ct of anY o A t applied to a to committed Prior to e
in;:9J:n was w~ethe:adcnot commenced when Act came into o Act,
i:~!I~~
Q hi h proceedings 1·cable to such torts. . Peratiori esp~
ofw c h Act was app 1 ·lt 111·q
held that t e . . ew remedies for enforcement of ex· . ~
ovid1ng n f t· Th ist1n
Statutes pr ell as past ca~ses o ac ion. e reason is that g l'ighta
ly to future as w edural since they do not affect existin ~hese st 11/i~
aPp .d d to be proc g right !lt~1.
are cons1 ere . 1 t tutes are liberally c~nstrued. There£ s.
The remed~a ts atrospectivity is not strictly applied to thore the l'\lJ
t. on a gains re ese stat e
presuIDP 1 t mean that the. presumption is dispe lltes.
B t 1·t does no . nsed Vv'
u . lies but not in strict s~nse. 1th. 'Jlt
presumption app f B "h i . 'II!
In Shakti Tubes Ltd. v._ ~ta~e ol i ~'.' hilt was held that
. . . st retrospectivity 1s a so app 1ca e to a welfar 1 . gelleral
resumption again e egislar!On_
P •
(j) Statutes dealing .with appeals are prospe~tive only
An peal may be defined as a process of moving a superior court .
appassed by an inferior court. Right to prefer an appeal is con .dagalilst
t he order . . . . . ll . d . h . . s1 erect~
substantive right. It 1s Judic1a y recogmze ng t vestmg m the 8 .
be a . . . . di llltor at
the time of institution of angina1 procee ngs.
Some statutes or their certain provisions provide for an appeal a .
. . ht t al . grunst
, the order passed by a court. Smce ~1g o appe 1s a vested right, any statu~
affecting it cannot be retrospectively operated. If after commenceme~ of
original proceedings, the law relating to appeal is amended so as to adverseli
affect this vested right to appeal, it is presumed to be prospective only.
In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, 2 the Supreme Court
deduced following propositions.
(i) the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are
really but steps in a series of proceedings all co~nected by an
intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) the right of appeal is not mere a matter of procedure but is a
substantive right.
(iii) the institution of the suit carries with it the implication th8 t j
rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto
the reS t of the carrier of the suit. e
th
(iv) the · h . enter
su n~ t of appeal is a vested right and such a right tod fro!ll the
da~=~~r c~urt accrues to the litigant and exists as on exercise0
wh lis commences and although it may be actu~ Jt is to br
g en t e adverse judgment is pronounced, such r~g t' on of the
ot~tern.. ed by the law prevailing at the date of the inst1htu d1gte of its
Su · or proce ,J~ ·1 t t e
ciec· . · eUJ.ng and not by the law that prevai 8 a
is1on or at the d t f fi ~t
(v) this vested .. h a e o ling of appeal. bseq~e
_
-1
· t of appeal can be taken away ~nly 01 ent all
enactment
-;;;;~=:;~~it~so~provides or by necessary inten
b a su dool
J
I. (2009> 7 sec 673 -
2. AIH101::,,n,..._ ·
r PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECT1 IVEop

otherwise.
ERJ\T10N OF
STATlJTEs
r the change in law relat· · 381
,11nethe h th . Ing to
VP' f appeal or w e er It would appeal h
rigbt of construction applies. merely harnps ~11 cornpl t
~e . le o er its e e ely d
i~~c1P statutory provision dealing With ,Xercise, thee::roy
fbe eal ag~inst the order passed by a appeal specifi Ille
~cbaPP ourt i.e., the court to which a court rnay he es the collrt
w eUate c ot exist. PPeal lies d Preferred B h_efore
8PP also cann oes not exist t. u~ if the
~pe b Legislature has abolished the ' he l"Ight of
1ft r:vided for any other court in its ;rpellate court by an
hSlnt~ht of appeal is also destroyed.At~ for filing new ap;:frnentand

~forde :t have been abolished.

veste bich he would have preferred an gant cannot claim ths, then the
appeal when he institutedattha co~
caul n · smt e
The •vested right of appeal at the comm encement of . . '
di
. 1:,,,ited to the same procee ngs. But this right . onginal proceedin
is Jl.1,1-' • • 1 d' . / Is not avail bl . g
I alater origma procee ing even if the same is somew a e m the case
:riginal one. hat connected with the
When the repealing A~t abolishes the existing courts and .
rourts, the forum for pursmng the vested right of appeal t bprov1des ~or ne_
w
; mus e asproVIded m
the repea1ing Act • ,
~) if'endin! proceedi'!gs : alterat·i_ons ~n procedure can •be •applied but
·alterations affecting substantive right cannot'be applied
If any alteration as to procedure takes place in the law during pendency
of alegal proceeding, then such alteration may be retrospectively operated. It
means that the alteration in procedural part may be applied to the pending
proceedings as well. But where the alterations affect substantive rights of the
parties to suit, they cannot be applied on pending proceedings unless otherwise
: ;1

r I
18 provided expressly or legislative intent to that effect can be drawn by
necessary implication.
ALTERATION OF SUBSTAN TIVE RIGHTSt .
ectively no alteration

0 er words, the alterations as to vested rights canno

r:
. In the absence oflegislative intent to opera~e re rosp a· g p;oceedings. In
~:ubstantive rights of the parties can be applied to
e
:ven retrospective
operation. . uentlY
0 . . an Authority is subseq all be
IVithdr n the same principle, if a power vesting :thdrawal of p~wers sh
effe t' awn by way of an amendment, s_uch ding proceedmgs. f
cive prospectively and cannot be apphed to pen . der Section 16-F of
In A . i proceeding un the Director o
the Dp .A, Cotton v. Director of Education, 8 ending before of.Principal.
Edu . : Intermediate Education Act, 1921 w~ iroent to the post JilendJilent,
The cat10~ for selection of candidates for appo1nf proceedings. Btcld that the
Pow!rovision was amended during pendenc~t~drawn- It "'.asplication, could
w;
alll.en~ of Director to appointment were 8 or-necessarY JJJl
ng Act, in the absence of express wor
1. AIR. i:--
98_3_S_C_11_4_3_---
 382 IN TERPRETATION OF STATUTES

not be construe d t o take away of powers of Director in Pend.ing :P:toc

P . ci·az Government of Madras v. J.S. Basu.n eed.i_,,
.• In rovin dment in Madras Genera l S a 1es T ax Act ~Pa ,i .:iecr c, ,,~
ted by amen d" h , 193 9 w ion. ·
1nser .d d "No suit or other procee mg s all be. instit"t as in. 18,A
hich prov1 e 1 h" "" ed i
w .
t aside or mo . . .
d d
d"fy any assessment ma e un er t 1s Act" It
db £
nan.,,%.e8t1. "
· Was h J Co11. 0•
h

se . . Id not apply to suit institute e ore amendme t

provision wou n callleel<l. th'<ft~
1
<It th
A l aw seeking to introduce change of forum does n t tl.tofor e
new . . d " t· th t d. . o at] 1 Ce
. nless there is clear m ica 10n a pen ing actions ar ect Pen.d· .
actions u , e affected 'I
I S fali Ray Choudhary v. A.K. Dutta, 2 under West B .
R t ~on:'..-ol (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, a tenant hendgal Prelll.i
en• st a sub-tenant for hi s eJectmen
. t . D uring
. t h e pendency af hfiled a sea ,,
agrun o t e . 8~,t
Act was repealed. A ne~ Act namely, West Bengal Tenancy Act, 8U1t, the
b ought into force replacmg the repealed Act. The new Act had .1956 Was
r . . d ·r
that pending proceedings may e continue as 1 repealed Act had been. c1•u~
b saving
and had not been repealed. The new Act also upgraded sub-tenant lllforce
The sub-tenant was thus b rough t 1n · d.irect re1at10ns
· hip oflandlord Itas tenant.
that it was open for sub-tenant against · w h om suit · was pending at th · Wash t' eld
new Act came into force, to take benefit of new Act and to contend theatl~ehthe
plaintiff tenant ·had come to an end. ngt~
I In Inacio Martines v. Narayan Hari_ Naik, 3 it was h~)d that if a new la,
.. ·I enacted dunng pendency of a smt ma CIVIi court provides no Civil Courtsh,Jj
have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with certain questions which'"
committed to jurisdiction of Revenue Courts" and the pending suit relates to
these questions, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be ousted.

ALTERATION IN MATTERS OF PROCEDURE

Since the litigant has no vested right in the matters of procedure, therefore
alterations in procedural law apply to both future and pending actions and as
such are retrospective.

In Rajabhau SI o Mahadeorao Rah~te v. Dinkar SI o Shantaram Ingole,1

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was amended by Act 46 0f
1999. The amendment was brought into force ' with effect from 1st Ju
· 1Y, 2002·
, e quest10n
Th · was whether a revision application pending be £ore the .court
. asf
1
on th t d · 1·
10a ay s iable to be decided in accordance with amen e P d d rov1s1ons
· · ns0
S ect· 1\ 1 l5 or the amendment may not effect the pending reviswns.
. • Prov1s1
the (),Ii
0
of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as Ameuded by 1.1.2002
of C1VI] Proeedure
1 (Amendment) Act No 46 of 1999 with effect from t under
are appl"c bl fr . . H"gh Cour
S · . 115 a e om that date to all proceedings pending m 1 .imgsar<

I
i
I
ect,on
n~. saved
th by
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Such pendin.g .pro~••plicatio~
ndiSection 6 of General Clauses Act 1897. All revtSIOll pth strictl!
: e er pe ng. as on 1.7.2002 or filed thereafter have to be dealt t;.2002. ti;
. ~~cordance with Provisions of Section 115 with effect from ·nable even
reVJ.s10n applicat" . . terta1
- . ion against an interlocutory order will be en
1. AIR 1964 SC 1873. -
2. AIR 1976 SC 1810.
3
- AIR 1993 SC 1756 ,
4 2002
· i
(3) Mh W 92 ffiom ('I \
 p1tOSPECTIVE AN U Kl:TROSPECTIV .
EOP·ERAT -..._
ION OF ST
riot to 1.7.2002 as movin . ATlJTEs
Jl)sde p115 of the Code of Civil pg High Court 383
t 15 tioll . d d rocedur Unde s
l 1~t. sedc\l!e prescnbe .an provided by th e, 1908 righr ection 1!5 .
,r1~roce ce by the High Court over c e Code for t from its i is not
. i p odetl ourts b exer . ncepti
F ~pte .. aot to JllOVe an application und su ordinat c1se of Pow on
%
;~IiP sJjt;~o8 for exercise of jurisdiction ~r Section 115 ~f it. There : of
,lldl)le, . question of it being saved b entioned therei Code of Ci!~
00
1.iv~t, tberel1sC \auses Act, 1897. . y recourse to prov~· . t being not a
~~1i era - s1ons of S .

,4:~
1JiJeP nt Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bomb 1
JP A. was inserted in the Code of C~Y, . by Amending Act 1
~ oP 3 ~ded that accused person shall be c~ma! Procedure
ect1on

18;8 li~·
irct10Il pron oath in disproof of the charges It :pethenlt witness ;nd may· ai s
.dnee o t. hi . as e d that th i:,se
iVJ e )icable to a prosecu 1On w ch was pending at th . e amendment
&PP , ce e time of Amending Act
iilto 1or ·
ra!lle the procee d'1ng or tna . l 1s
. completed before changem . 1aw of proced
If d £
l!keseffect, it cannot be reopene or applying new procedure. ure
In Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar, 2 under Section 5 (3) of Prevention
olCorruption Ac!, 1947, the accused was convicted for criminal misconduct in
jjscharge of official duty. He preferred an appeal agamst his conviction. While
ilie appeal was pending, Section 5 (3) was repealed. It was held that repeal of
Section 5 (3) after competition of trial did not affect the trial and conviction
rouldnot be set aside on the ground that procedural provision was repealed.