Informing Program and Policy Development on

Human Trafficking in the Timor-Leste – Indonesia

Border Area

MARCH 2017

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This assessment and publication were made possible through funding provided by the
Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP).

The opinions expressed within are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of DIBP or of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Main Author:
Greg Mills – independent consultant for the IOM

IOM Project Team:

Andrew Harrington, Counter Trafficking Program Manager/Acting Chief of Mission,
IOM Timor-Leste
Carlos de Araujo, Project Assistant, IOM Timor-Leste
Jacinto Amaral, Senior Project Assistant, IOM Timor-Leste
Lindsey Greising, Consultant – Author of research report on TIP statistics, case studies
and data sources in Timor-Leste
Alva Siregar - Project Assistant, Counter Trafficking - Labor Migration (CTLM), IOM
Indonesia
Anggres Dahi - Head of IOM Sub-office Kupang
Fitriana Nur - National Programme Coordinator, Counter Trafficking - Labor
Migration (CTLM), IOM Indonesia
The consultant also acknowledges support provided by Dr. Siaan Ansori, First
Secretary Immigration, Australian Embassy Dili and by Father Lusius of the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace in Atambua

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 Table of Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 4
2. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 6
3. THE BORDER ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................ 8
4. STATISTICAL DATA ON TRAFFICKING .................................................................... 12
5. FINDINGS AND SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS ............................................................. 18
6. INFORMING POLICY DEVELOPMENT ................................................................... 24
a. The case for a Socialisation Campaign ............................................................ 24
b. Community Based Monitoring Mechanisms. .................................................. 27
c. Building Capacity for Identification and Response .......................................... 30
d. Improving Intelligence Flows .......................................................................... 32
7. ATTACHMENT A - RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 37
8. GLOSSARY OF TERMS .......................................................................................... 39
10. ATTACHMENT D RECENT TIMOR-LESTE HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES ........... 41
11. ATTACHMENT E Summary Data on POLRI TIP cases ....................................... 43

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 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Informing Program and Policy Development on Human Trafficking in the Timor-Leste –
Indonesia Border Area
1.1 With funding from the Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border
Protection (DIBP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) carried out an
assessment of the Timor-Leste - Indonesia border areas focusing on trafficking in persons
(TIP). The study was conducted in February – March 2017 in close cooperation with
officials in both countries. The assessment included consultations with Government
officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith based groups, local Government
officials, community leaders, former labour migrants, and victims of trafficking. The
diversity of people consulted reflects the fact that strategies to combat TIP cannot be
exclusively the domain of Government, but must involve NGOs and communities.

1.2 The primary objective of the assessment was to gather data and provide a more robust
evidence base for policy development to counter TIP on both sides of the border. Based
primarily on data from over 60 interviews conducted, as well as previous IOM research,
the assessment team reached conclusions about the nature of TIP in border areas to
formulate recommendations on approaches for future activity to combat TIP.

1.3 The study found:

• Substantial numbers of residents in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT)1 are being/have been
drawn into irregular 2 labour migration flows which carry a high risk of trafficking.
Primary destinations include Kalimantan and Malaysia for labour exploitation, Batam
and other points in Indonesia and Malaysia where women face sexual exploitation
and domestic servitude. A high proportion of labour migrants end up working in the
domestic assistance sector or in agricultural industries, particularly palm oil
plantations. Labour servitude and sexual servitude frequently occur in these
unregulated employment sectors.
• The primary drivers of this labour migration are poverty and underemployment –
enhanced by vigorous, heavy-handed recruitment tactics promoting alleged benefits
of labour migration, most often by labour recruiters who directly approach families in
border villages in NTT.
• Timor-Leste citizens in the border area are being drawn into the same labour
migration flows out of NTT. This is often self-initiated irregular travel into Indonesia
based on information from family, friends, neighbours and/or the community, rather
than through any formal or official recruitment schemes. Many of these labour
migrants cross the border irregularly and obtain false Indonesian documents,
reportedly in Atambua.
• Formalized illicit recruitment schemes do not appear to have crossed the border into
Timor-Leste – yet – but have been seen in Dili. It is likely recruiters will eventually
expand activities to the Timor-Leste side of the border.

1 NTT is a province of Indonesia which includes about 550 islands, dominated by the three main islands of Flores,
Sumba and West Timor. The estimated population in 2014 was around 5.1 million. The province is divided into 21
Kabupaten which we translate here as district. The next tier of local government is the kecamatan or sub-district
and the lowest unit of local Government is the village headed by the kepala desa or village head. West Timor is
divided into 5 kabupaten.. Three of these kabupaten lie adjacent to the borders with Timor Leste – they are the
kabupatens of Belu, Timor Tengah Utara (North Central Timor) and Malaka. The locations of the NTT field work lie
within these three districts.
2 Meaning outside formal state-sanctioned channels.

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1.4 Statistical data relating to TIP in border regions is virtually non-existent. The statistics
that do exist have a significant margin of error since no systematic approach to collection
exists on either side of the border. Nevertheless, the limited statistical data has indicative
value and is discussed in further detail in the report.

1.5 A high proportion of those using labour migration options out of NTT – Indonesian and
Timorese citizens alike – are being recruited by organisations which do not conform to
legislated Indonesian Government requirements for labour recruitment. The absence of
state controls and relevant protections dramatically increases the prospects of
exploitation and trafficking.

1.6 There have been sporadic efforts to raise knowledge and awareness in both jurisdictions.
These campaigns, conducted by different parties, have generally been small, short lived
and have not had wide geographic coverage, thus achieving modest success. All sources
considered a long term coordinated socialisation campaign focusing on border area
villages should an essential element of any strategy to counter TIP.

1.7 There is a need for further and more intensive training on various aspects of TIP. This
should build on past programs and identify the areas where capacity most needs to be
strengthened. As a priority, development of a joint (Timor-Leste/Indonesia) program of
training should be considered, focusing on border area officials to improve capacity to
(a) identify and (b) respond appropriately to TIP incidents. Additionally, a phased joint
(Timor-Leste/Indonesia) programme of training in collecting, sharing and utilising
intelligence data relating to TIP and other forms of transnational crime should be
considered. This training could also serve as a vehicle for the development of an MOU
on intelligence sharing – crucial given the importance of intelligence in combating
transnational crime.

1.8 In recent history, various well intended and partially effective projects and programs
have been implemented in both jurisdictions to improve the capacity of authorities and
communities to combat TIP. These have been conducted by Government agencies, by
NGOs, by faith based groups and by international organisations (often funded under
bilateral and multilateral mechanisms). Without devaluing those past projects and
interventions, it is clear a need for a more long term, coordinated and transnational
approach is required to combat TIP in the Timor-Leste / Indonesia border areas. The
report makes recommendations for addressing the TIP situation in each jurisdiction,
including joint approaches which are set out comprehensively in Attachment A of the
report.

2. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 In November 2016 the Australian Government DIBP and IOM signed a funding agreement
for the project titled “Informing Program and Policy Development on Human Trafficking
in the Timor-Leste - Indonesia border Area”.

2.2 The objective was to map and identify the current situation and trends concerning internal
and transnational TIP, as well as other related transnational organized crime in the border
area. In agreement with respective Government counterparts, the findings of the
assessment were to be shared in printed form and in official release sessions with
Governments in Dili and Kupang. The assessment aimed to give governments on both
sides of the border a stronger base of evidence upon which to further develop national
and local counter trafficking policy within a broader border security policy, while also
informing potential follow on actions including.

2.3 Work on the project commenced in November 2016 with meetings with government
counterparts in Timor-Leste while IOM Indonesia simultaneously introduced the project
to government counterparts. Following a desk review, fieldwork being carried out during
February – March 2017 in NTT and Timor-Leste, and data analysis and drafting of the final
report undertaken during April 2017.

2.4 Key Locations visited on the Timorese side of the border included: Batugade, Balibo ,
Maliana, Tunubibi, Suai, Salele, Fatumean, Pante Makasar, Sakato and Oesilo – matched
by Kefamenanu, Atambua Silawan, Turiskain, Dilomil, Betun and Wini on the Indonesian
side of the border. On the Timorese side, informants included civil servants from various
agencies – Police (PNTL), Immigration Service, Border Patrol Unit, Prosecutors Office,
District Court, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), District and sub-District
administrators, NGOs, village level officials, church leaders and returned labour migrants.
On the Indonesian side, informants included civil servants from various agencies –
(Immigration, Police, Manpower, Women’s Empowerment), Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), local government officials, church leaders and community
members. A detailed schedule of informants and interview dates/places can be made
available upon request.

2.5 A standard template and semi-structured interview approach was used to guide
interviews. Actual questions varied depending on the role and experience of the person
concerned.

Challenges of a transnational assessment.

2.6 The approach of working in two very different political jurisdictions is complex and thus
carries some challenges, it also brought important positive dimensions. The capacity of
IOM to work on both sides of the border enabled a unique perspective on border
dynamics and a capacity to identify vulnerabilities and possible measures to counter those
vulnerabilities. It also provided a unique platform to assess and promote the potential
benefits of stronger cross border dialogue and cooperation which could result in a safer
environment for citizens of both countries who might be the subject of TIP recruitment or
activity.

2.7 When dealing with two different national jurisdictions, there are important
environmental differences that need to be specified. Indonesia is a large archipelago with

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 a much higher population base than Timor-Leste (250 million vs 1.25 million) and a
sustained tradition of large scale labour migration to the Middle East as well as to other
parts of South East Asia – primarily Malaysia. There are a large number of commercial
actors involved in labour migration out of Indonesia, including registered labour
recruitment companies, subject to regulation at both national and provincial levels. There
are also illicit labour migration brokers, many of which/whom engage in trafficking in
persons and which capture a major share of labour migration activity out of NTT.

2.8 Timor-Leste has a much smaller land area and population. Labour migration dynamics out
of Timor-Leste are quite different from Indonesia. Some Timorese take advantage of the
legal ability to acquire Portuguese citizenship and travel to European Union countries
(primarily in the United Kingdom) for work, though the capacity for the rural/urban poor
to access such employment is limited. There are also labour migration mechanisms which
are overseen by the Ministry responsible for labour matters (SEPFOPE), namely bi-lateral
programs with the government South Korea and individual participation in seasonal
worker programmes in Australia. Both are well regulated and controlled, but relatively
small scale and have selection criteria which, albeit rational (e.g. successfully completing
Korean or English language training and extensive medical health exams for Australia)
effectively preclude access by most Timorese. Unlike in Indonesia, trafficking (TIP) out of
Timor-Leste occurs almost entirely outside the construct of regulated labour migration
activity.

2.9 In both countries, it is this excluded segment of the population who are most likely to be
the targets of trafficking related activity.

2.10 The recommendations of this assessment reflect the focus of the assessment on the
border region and focus on national level policy development in Timor-Leste. The
recommendations are also broadly consistent with directions being taken by the
Indonesian Government and other actors within Indonesia to manage the fight against TIP
– however the assessment does not purport to cover the entire breadth and complexity
of the TIP environment in Indonesia; thus, while some recommendations have national
policy implications, they are most relevant to provincial level policy development for NTT.

3. THE BORDER ENVIRONMENT

3.1 Timor-Leste and Indonesia share land border of around 250 km with a north south border
running from Motaain/Batugade to Salele/Mota Masin, and further to the west, a
semicircular land border around the exclave of Oecusse. Along these borders there are
a number of official crossing points staffed by Immigration and customs officials at which
people may lawfully enter Timor-Leste or Indonesia. Some of these posts permit entry by
third country nationals, others do not. Entry to either country through these posts is
limited to conventional office hours; there is a 1 hour time difference between countries
which can lead to some confusion on operating hours on the opposing side.

TABLE A : CURRENT OFFICIAL IMMIGRATION BORDER POSTS

Timor-Leste Indonesia Characteristics
A Batugade Motaain Indonesian nationals and some European nationals may
enter Timor-Leste with Visa on Arrival (VOA) privileges.
Other nationals require a Letter of Authority from
Consulate in Kupang to enter TL.
Border pass holders may cross subject to normal border
pass rules.
TL nationals may enter Indonesia with VOA.
Nationals of third countries require a visa to enter
Indonesia via the land border.
B Salele Mota Masin Same as A
C Tunubibi Turiskain Only services Timor-Leste nationals and Indonesian
nationals
D Bobometo Napan Same as A
E Sakato Wini Same as A
F Passabe Only services Timor-Leste nationals and Indonesian
nationals
G Citrana Not currently operating but expected to open shortly

3.2 Aside from immigration and customs posts, there are a larger number of border
monitoring posts which are staffed by the UPF (Border Patrol Unit) on the Timor-Leste
side of the border and by the TNI (Indonesian National Army) on the Indonesian side of
the border.

3.3 At the time of writing, the UPF had 410 officers in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL).
Its headquarters are in Batugade and operates a total of 18 posts along the north-south
border and 9 posts on the Oecusse exclave border and one in Nicolau Lobato International
Airport in Dili – there are plans for additional posts to cover airports in Suai and Oecusse,
planned to serve international flights and to become operational in the near future. The
UPF conducts foot patrols and trail bike patrols between land border posts.

3.4 The Indonesian Government deploys a substantially larger battalion-size force, with
approximately 4,000 soldiers and 42 border posts. They have all-terrain vehicles, some
aerial surveillance capability and some maritime patrol capability.

3.5 Based on observations made during fieldwork and information provided by local officials
and leaders, there are three types of cross border movements: 1. Regulated entry, namely

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 where people pass through an immigration check and is granted entry, including entry
under agreed framework for Traditional Border Crossing using the Pass Lintas Batas (PLB)
or border pass; 2.Other forms of entry, namely movements for personal or family
purposes, such as funerals, or visiting local markets, where officials on either side of the
border may record the movements; and 3. Irregular Entry, entry which completely evades
formal entry controls, whether for nefarious purposes or not. Those who enter irregularly
are sometimes detected by border patrol units – UPF on the Timor-Leste side and TNI on
the Indonesia side and as a consequence may be repatriated. Many sources pointed to
instances of official corruption on both sides of the border relating to personal
movements and irregular entries.

3.6 Surveillance of the border, primarily by foot and mounted patrols, is carried out
periodically by UPF and TNI, but there are significant limitations surveillance capacity.
Much of the land border runs through isolated and, in parts, mountainous terrain and
parts of the border follow river systems which inhibit cross border traffic in the wet
season. The border is occasionally patrolled at night, but the ability to monitor at night is
limited.

3.7 In this context, irregular border crossing was found to be both common, and easy to
undertake. Border crossers can easily circumvent official border points by using trails,
(known locally as “jalan tikus” or mouse trails) which cross the border or by taking small
boats along the coast, primarily in the Batugade-Atapupu sector.

3.8 Nationals of Indonesia or other third countries who enter the Oecusse exclave irregularly
can easily get from Pante Makasar to Dili using the regular ferry service. There are no
immigration status checks on this domestic service and UPF are neither assigned to the
departure port in Oecusse nor to the landing port in Dili.

Traditional Border Crossing Arrangements

3.9 An important feature of the border area is the practice of traditional border crossing. The
border between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, like land borders in many other parts of the
world, is the product of colonial and post-colonial demarcations. The border is arbitrary
in the sense that it cuts through traditional lands and communities. Villagers on one side
of the border have strong and enduring family, cultural, linguistic and commercial links
with families and villages on the other side of the border. People with such links cross
the border frequently, often without using the official processes.

3.10 Timor-Leste and Indonesia negotiated a set of arrangements in 2003 which resulted
in an MOU and the creation of a system of border passes – known as Pass Lintas Batas
(PLB). Cross border movements on a border pass are not for use beyond 10 KM of the
border and those entitled to apply for a border pass must to live within 10 KM of the
border. The penetration and use of the border pass is greatest in border areas located
within reasonable proximity of an official crossing point. There are numerous locations
along the border where it is much more convenient for local people on both sides to make
an irregular crossing – thus, while border passes have been issued to a proportion of those
residing in the defined border districts, the system is often disregarded and the border
crossed at the nearest most convenient point outside formal controls.

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• In this report, the consultant uses the term
“traditional border crossing” in the generic sense to
cover crossing through a formal checkpoint using
the border pass and crossing irregularly for
traditional purposes.
3.11 While traditional border crossing is not a high
concern from a border protection standpoint, it
does complicate monitoring the border since
traditional movements may be used to mask other
unlawful movements. Many irregular border
crossings are made by people who are not crossing
for traditional purposes; trafficking organisations
may use people who legitimately engage in
traditional movements as facilitators – for example
to escort people across the border in a clandestine or semi clandestine fashion.
According to a resident in Fatumean
(Covalima district), commenting on
the border pass and selling livestock
and agricultural products cross-
border, noted that people obviously
choose to travel 20 minutes directly
to the west into Indonesia, using a
good road to get to the nearest
market rather than drive 3 hours to
Suai. To cross the border officially,
they would have to first drive to Suai,
on very poor roads, then from there
drive west to the official Salele
border point, 15KM past Suai, then
back up to the market across the
border from Fatumean or others.

3.12 The fieldwork revealed notable border crossing activity associated with the
movement of contraband goods across the border. Anecdotally, the assessment found
movement of goods ranges from petty trade in day to day goods to larger scale and more
organised evasion of duties – for example, fuel is subsidized nationally and is cheaper in
Indonesia, while alcoholic beverages are not taxed heavily in Timor-Leste, resulting in
significantly lower prices than in Indonesia.

3.13 The Governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia may seek to address deficiencies in
the penetration and operation of the border pass system, but this issue falls outside the
scope of this study. To do so, however, would likely require large scale investment to
achieve only a modest improvement in compliance, while those intent on evading border
controls would still do so.

The most practical and effective avenue to improve border control would be to cultivate an
intelligence-driven response capability among border agencies on both sides of the border.
An intelligence-based approach will be more effective in limiting TOC activities than
generalized infrastructure upgrades or static border checks. This approach is – discussed at
length in the report below.

3.14 People reported crossing the border irregularly for a number of reasons, including: A.
people living near the border and have always crossed it for family or traditional reasons;
B. Because it is cheaper, easier or quicker to cross the border irregularly and there is little
threat of legal or other repercussion; or C. because they specifically intend to avoid formal
border crossing checks.

3.15 The broad categories are useful for understanding the movement dynamics across
the border. Group C is of most interest for the purposes of this assessment, and may
include third-country citizens. That group could include among others:
• Irregular labour migrants, including potential or actual victims of trafficking, though
some labour migrants do enter Indonesia legally;
• People involved in TIP (as perpetrators);
• People smugglers and people being smuggled (including asylum seekers) who may
seek to use Timor-Leste or Indonesia as a transit point, likely to Australia;
• People involved in other forms of transnational organized crime; and

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 • People concerned to conceal their identity for other reasons.

3.16 To the extent that national officials on either side of the border might intercept border
crossers falling into these categories, they need to be given substantially more training on
(a) how they might identify these profiles and (b) how they should respond when TOC is
identified. It is important, for example, that persons who have been identified as victims
of trafficking are treated in accordance with established human rights principles and in
line with national commitments to provide trafficking victims with protection.

3.17 Similarly, if national authorities have reasonable grounds to suspect that an
apprehended border crosser is engaged in trafficking or some other form of transnational
crime, (as a perpetrator) they need to act in accordance with rules and guidelines which
should themselves be designed to maximize the intelligence value of interceptions and
(where relevant) maximise prospects for successful prosecution.

3.18 While some victims of trafficking and their escorts cross the border unlawfully, others
cross the border lawfully through land border posts, seaports and airports. Training
regimes for border officials must include both irregular entry and regular entry scenarios.
The project found near universal support for joint cross-border training for Indonesian
and Timor-Leste officials on victim identification and response to TIP.

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4. STATISTICAL DATA ON
TRAFFICKING
General Comments on TIP Statistical Data
4.1 Accumulating statistical data on TIP is challenging in any environment. TIP, by its nature,
is covert and is submerged in broader forms of people movement – including labour
migration. The limited figures available on official labour migration offer limited value; it
is widely recognized, including by officials in NTT, that most labour migration is occurring
outside the Government regulatory framework. There is no data available for the areas
surveyed on the proportion of prospective labour migrants who suffer trafficking. The
conclusion from the anecdotal data, mostly gleaned in NTT, is that the incidence of TIP
within the labour migration flows is high.

4.2 It is useful to divide statistical data into primary movement data and recorded case data.
Under this construct, (and taking Timor-Leste border regions as the example) primary
movement data would include figures relating, inter alia, to:
• The number of people leaving Timor-Leste (or a particular district of Timor-Leste) to
enter labour migration flows operating out of Indonesia;
• The number of those people who use officially sanctioned labour migration options
(within or out of Indonesia) and the number who don’t;
• The number of those people who experience trafficking outcomes;
• The nature of those trafficking outcomes;
• The age, gender and occupational profile;
• The destination map.

4.3 This is the kind of data which nation states can readily accumulate and analyse in respect
of regular migration programs. However, primary movement data in relation to TIP is
almost non-existent because, as noted, the activity is illicit and thus escapes recording.
The only element of primary movement data available to this assessment is the number
of official labour migrants who left the district of Belu in 2015/2016 using officially
sanctioned labour migration channels (Table B below).

4.4 Recorded case data relates to alleged or confirmed trafficking incidents which have come
to attention in various ways including, by means of an NGO or international organization
reports; through border control measures; from law enforcement actions; through court
proceedings; victim assistance interventions; and through identification by the media.
Virtually all the data available to this assessment (and this is the case for most TIP
scenarios worldwide) is recorded case data which is utilized because it has some indicative
value. It is impossible to quantify what proportion of the overall TIP caseload in the target
areas comes to attention in one of the ways specified above. Though impossible to state
definitively, the proportion of cases recorded is likely to be far lower than the true number
of cases occurring.

4.5 The recorded case data relating to TIP in the Timor-Leste / NTT border areas is of variable
quality – partly because of the absence of any systematic reporting framework (as further
discussed below). One result of the non–systematic approach to case data is multiple
reporting of a single incident. For example, the IOM received three different accounts,
from different sources, of an apparent internal trafficking incident which occurred in Suai
in 2016 – but there were significant material differences in these accounts which made it

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 seem as though multiple incidents had taken place, though it was known that they related
only to the one incident.

Data on TIP in Timor-Leste

4.6 Data relating to trafficking in Timor-Leste over a number of years has been aggregated by
IOM in a study completed in 2016 which has been integrated into this report. From 2000
to 2016, IOM identified 66 incidents of trafficking, including over 811 persons to from and
within Timor-Leste. These numbers are on the low side as they only include cases which
came to official notice and could be recorded. International experience suggests that the
actual number of cases is likely to be far higher.

4.7 IOM’s statistics shows the predominant form of TIP is trafficking out of Timor-Leste with
approximately 600 persons recorded as compared to around 160 person trafficked into
Timor-Leste, and around 74 persons subject to internal trafficking. The volume of new
cases brought to attention in the February 2017 fieldwork is too small to be statistically
meaningful but the situational analysis strongly confirms the dominant category of
trafficking is outward trafficking – even allowing for the fact that the location of the
fieldwork near the border would skew the focus towards outward trafficking.

4.8 The current assessment has identified 6 new cases in Timor-Leste which could be
trafficking – five cases in Cova Lima and one in Oecusse. In some instances, contacts only
held vague details it was common to receive several different versions of what appeared
to be the same case. There are also definitional issues about what constitutes a “case”;
four of the six cases have been the subject of prosecutorial action, three in Suai and one
in Oecusse. The other cases are better-termed alleged situations which may constitute
TIP – for example, sources advised IOM of an alleged brothel in Suai where underage
females are brought in from other areas to perform sex work, though by the time of
writing, no police action had been taken on this serious allegation.

4.9 In Oecusse, IOM recorded three alleged cases of inward bound movements potentially
constituting TIP – all relating to the sex industry. IOM have only recorded one case as TIP
since the details of the other cases suggested the women concerned were not in an
exploitative situation and were not under age. The overall incidence of outward trafficking
in the Oecusse sector appeared lower than in the Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts and
there appeared to be less of a tradition of outward labour migration to the west
(Kalimantan/Malaysia). A matrix with summary details of new cases identified during the
fieldwork is found in the ATTACHMENT D RECENT TIMOR-LESTE HUMAN TRAFFICKING
CASES.

4.10 Overall during 2016, IOM recorded 187 suspected cases (meaning numbers of victims)
of trafficking in persons in Timor-Leste, drawing on direct observation, service providers
and law enforcement sources. All were women and all were for the purposes of sexual
exploitation; six of the victims were underage girls (meaning under the age of eighteen).
Twenty six of these suspected cases were outbound TIP cases – given the reported
numbers of Timorese crossing into NTT and joining the labour migration flow from there,
and that exploitation only occurs once victims are already abroad and trapped, it is very
likely the number of outbound TIP victims is significantly higher.

Data on Indonesian trafficking cases.
4.11 TIP cases involving residents of NTT border areas occur as part of the broader labour
migration flow. That said, developing a reliable statistical baseline for TIP in NTT border
areas is challenging. While there are some statistics for labour migrants who depart these
districts of NTT through legal channels – i.e. using state sanctioned registered labour

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 migration companies – all sources advised the number of labour migrants using unofficial
channels is much higher. Additionally, there is no reliable way to estimate the proportion
of labour migrants who end up in situations of trafficking, though properly framed
longitudinal studies would shed some light on this, including identifying the numbers of
Timorese caught up in the irregular labour migration flow.

4.12 Limited data related to the targeted areas of NTT does exist. It has indicative value
but it relates primarily to labour migration and is not integrated into any coherent
framework – for example :

• One source advised that, out of a group of 90 returned labour migrants who were the
subject of a reintegration assistance program, only 12 had undertaken their labour
migration through Government sanctioned recruitment companies;
• A labour ministry official gave figures on the placement of workers from Kabupaten
Belu though Government endorsed channels over the last two years as set out below.
• From 2014-2017 police in Kefamenanu were involved in the investigation of 11 cases
of TIP. Summary details of those cases are found in ATTACHMENT E Summary Data
on POLRI TIP cases

TABLE B: Placement of Workers from Kabupaten of Belu

Placement of workers 2016 2015 Destination
International 326 277 Mostly to Malaysia
Domestic 190 497 Various provinces: Kalimantan, North
Kalimatan, Papua, South Sulawesi,
Banten

4.13 Developing more comprehensive and coherent data about both labour migration and
TIP in the border regions of NTT should be considered a priority by the national
government in Indonesia, and in NTT. The formation of an Anti-Trafficking Task Force in
NTT is a good start.

Provincial level data

4.14 For the province of NTT as a whole, some data is available but it is noted that the
districts targeted by this assessment (Belu, Melaka and Timor Tengah Utara) have an
estimated population of 630,000, representing around 12.4 per cent of the overall
population of the province (and around 0.3% of the national population).

4.15 IOM statistical data on trafficked persons from NTT assisted by IOM show that from
2005 and 2016, IOM assisted 571 persons from NTT – see Table C:

TABLE C: Trafficked Persons (Assisted by IOM) by Sex and Age
Gender Children Adults Total %
Female 107 405 512 89.67
Male 16 43 59 10.33
TOTAL 123 448 571 100.00

4.16 The great majority of the trafficked persons - 76 per cent – worked in the domestic
assistance sector with another 9.6 per cent working on plantations. This break-up
correlates to the gender balance of those assisted. A further 3 per cent worked in
construction and 2.6 percent in factories. Table D below gives information on the types
of exploitation experienced by the cohort – note that a high proportion experienced
multiple forms of abuse.

14
TABLE D: TRAFFICKED PERSONS BY TYPE OF EXPLOITATION (IOM)
Type of Exploitation Children Adult Children Adult Total %
female female male male
Withholding of travel 53 255 1 17 326 57.09
documents
Not allowed to keep money 51 239 4 19 313 54.82
Psychological abuse 49 226 0 4 279 48.86
Poor sanitation 44 212 0 6 262 45.88
Denied freedom of 43 198 0 3 244 42.73
movement
Denied proper food/ water 38 194 0 8 240 42.03
Total withholding of wages 37 180 0 1 218 38.18
Partially denied freedom of 18 95 2 17 132 23.12
movement
Denied medical treatment 18 98 0 8 124 21.72
Debt bondage 17 100 0 0 117 20.49
Excessive working hours 12 72 0 9 93 16.29
Imprisonment 13 61 0 1 75 13.13
Physical abuse 7 53 0 0 60 10.51
Partial withholding wages 4 25 0 9 38 6.65
Sexual abuse 5 23 0 0 28 4.90
Traded among employers 3 23 0 1 27 4.73
Rape 1 7 0 0 8 1.40
Forced use of drugs 1 2 0 0 3 0.53
Forced consumption of 1 0 0 0 1 0.18
alcohol

4.17 Indonesian Government data for NTT province shows numbers of people assisted by
various Government agencies over a 5 year period.

TABLE E: TRAFFICKED PERSONS ASSISTED BY INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Institution 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 478 547 326 188 746
BNP2TKI* 176 24 45 49 13
Ministry of Social Affairs 321 441 605 495 295
Total 975 1012 976 732 1054
*BNP2TKI is the acronym for the National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian
Overseas Workers

4.18 In NTT unregulated labour migration is an everyday reality. On the Timor-Leste side
of the border, interviewees claimed little or no knowledge of outward labour migration
(perhaps since it is a new problem without formal illicit recruitment), contrasting sharply
with sources in NTT who were very much conscious of the problem. The scale of labour
migration from NTT to potential problem destinations is bigger than in Timor-Leste, and
consequently, so is the scale of TIP. For example, when the IOM team arrived in Silawan
expecting to have a conversation with village chief, over 100 people returned who from
labour migration to Malaysia, Singapore and other destinations appeared in the village
hall eager to discuss their experiences. Without interviewing the entire group, the IOM
team was unable to determine the proportion of labour migrants who experienced
trafficking but, based on the detailed accounts of a few, the incidence is significant. Four
people volunteered on request and were interviewed in detail (one on one) about their
experiences; three of these four cases were definitely trafficked. A case study follows:

15
CASE STUDY “Jeremius Fahik” – not his real name.
Derived from interviews conducted in NTT border village on 6 March 2017.

Jeremius was recruited directly by a recruiter (a calo) who came to his house in 2006. He was taken to
a compound in Kupang (could not remember the name of the company). There he was given a work
contract which stated among other things that he would receive a salary of 1,750 Ringgit per month to
work in a palm oil plantation in Malaysia. He and others in the compound were not given any training.

He was flown to Jakarta and then went by boat to Batam together with a group of other men. From
Batam they went to Johor Bahru by boat. They did not pass through immigration controls.

They were met by an agent in Johor Bahru and taken to a palm oil plantation. For the first ten months
he only received 100 Ringgit a month. When he complained about this he was moved to a position as
a security guard in the plantation. He received 750 Ringgit a month for this work but had to provide his
own food and was living in a shed on the perimeter of the plantation with no power or running water.
He did this for 9 months. He then asked for a salary increase and was moved back to a position as a
plantation labourer but there was no increase in salary.

Shortly afterward he ran away and joined up with a friend from Timor who was living in Perak. He
worked there as a tractor driver. The conditions and salary were better than on the plantation but
sometimes there were long delays in payment and arbitrary pay reductions. If they complained the
boss threatened to report them to immigration authorities.

He worked there for 3 years and 5 months. Then he got sick – he had chest pains and was coughing
blood. He was not given any medical treatment. He decided to return home. He had to pay 2,500
Ringgit to be smuggled back to Batam and from there he was able to get back to NTT. On return to
NTT, he did not have any savings.

4.19 While the labour migration flows discussed above are the dominant source of TIP in
the border areas of Timor-Leste and NTT, there are other categories of TIP occurring. The
different categories are set out in summary form in TABLE F below together with some
key characteristics of these flows.

TABLE F: CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR LABOUR MIGRATION AND

TRAFFICKING TYPES
TYPE CHARACTERISTICS
A Timor-Leste citizens • A labour migration flow with some incidence of TIP.
seeking to enter NTT • Often involves irregular entry to Indonesia
for destinations in
• Often involves identity change – false KTP
Indonesia or
elsewhere (Malaysia
• Most of this groups are effectively travelling as NTT
is the most common labour migrants
destination outside • Often occurs outside Indonesian regulatory framework
Indonesia) • Significant risk of trafficking
B Timor-Leste citizens • Often involves exploitation of minors by members of
who are trafficked extended family /clan networks
within Timor

C Indonesian and • Historically mainly women (and minors) who end up

other nationals who working in sex trade
are recruited into • May involve legal or irregular entry to TL
Timor-Leste
• High risk of trafficking
D Indonesian citizens – • A large labour migration flow with some incidence of TIP
NTT residents who • Occurs both within and outside Indonesian regulatory
are recruited for framework
• Significant risk of trafficking

16
 labour in other
countries
E Indonesian citizens – • A labour migration flow with some incidence of TIP
NTT residents who • Occurs largely outside Indonesian regulatory framework
are recruited for
• Significant risk of trafficking
labour within
Indonesia

4.20 Note that much of category A (Timor-Leste citizens) is effectively subsumed into
categories D and E because these Timor-Leste citizens were identified as frequently
travelling using false Indonesian identities, readily arranged for them by labour brokers in
NTT and elsewhere. For Timorese travelling on false documents, this increases their
vulnerability to trafficking control tactics (e.g. threatening to turn them over to
immigration authorities) increases the prospect that they will face legal sanction from
third country officials, and complicates the prospects of the Timor-Leste Government
being able to intervene on their behalf.

Where to with data collection

4.21 In relation to the way forward for data collection in Timor-Leste and Indonesia, until
functional, detailed and workable data collection systems exist, only highly targeted long
term studies will be able to fully quantify the trafficking problem.

4.22 The logical way to commence building more a reliable data capture and management
system would be to establish and promote a forward methodology which allows for
current/future cases to be documented in systematic way as they come to light.
Recommendation 7 (at Attachment A) relates to this proposal. TIP cases can come to
official attention at many different stages of the trafficking cycle, including at the post
repatriation stage. It is critical that whatever data capture system is adopted, it must be
able to document the entire TIP experience and (where relevant) Government or other
interventions. For example, if a case comes to attention at the exploitation stage (because
a VoT seeks police assistance) the case record must document (to the extent possible) the
history of the trafficking event (recruitment transportation, exploitation) as well as the
action taken by the Government or other actors to address the situation. It is also
important that there is an agreed methodology for giving new cases a unique identifier to
reduce duplication in the records – while maintaining confidentiality for victims.

4.23 The collection of reliable data is not just of academic importance – a consistent data
holding informs intelligence analysis and provides a basis for continued evidence-based
policy evolution. It should be recognized that any data holding will probably only
represent a modest proportion of the actual incidence of trafficking since (as previously
noted) many trafficking cases are not officially recorded.

17
 5. FINDINGS AND SITUATIONAL
ANALYSIS
Recruitment Situation in NTT border areas
5.1 Much of the TIP in NTT border areas occurs parallel to or as a component of labour
migration flows. The 2016 State Department Report3 estimates that there are about 4.5
million Indonesians working abroad—of whom around 1.9 million are undocumented.
The province of NTT is a major source area for Indonesian labour migration.

5.2 Over recent decades and partly in response to revelations about malpractices, the
Indonesian Government has taken various measures to regulate the labour migration
recruitment sector. A full analysis of the organisations and mechanisms which make up
Indonesia’s complex systems for regulating labour migration is beyond the scope of this
assessment but a good analysis is contained in the 2013 IOM study, ‘An Assessment of
Migrant Worker Recruitment Monitoring in Indonesia.’4

5.3 In summary, the regulated labour migration market in Indonesia involves a complex set
of arrangements which include:
• National, provincial and kabupaten level Government bodies which have role in
regulating and monitoring labour migration activity; and
• Registered recruitment companies (PJTKI)5;
• Registered recruiters working for those companies;
• Offshore placement mechanisms;
• Offshore monitoring and verification mechanisms; and
• Complaint mechanisms.

5.4 The registered recruitment companies are regulated through the relevant national law
and a range of associated regulations which require that official recruitment companies:

• Meet certain capital, structural and probity requirements;

• Provide a range of specified services to labour migrants including training services;
• Ensure that recruits meet, age, health, documentary and other requirements
• Place and workers into specific agreed positions.

5.5 Many of the sources interviewed point to the fact that a high proportion of people from
NTT seeking labour migration opportunities avoid these official structures and instead
are recruited by unregulated labour migration syndicates which are almost certainly
criminalized; given the existence of extremist groups and demonstrated links between
criminal enterprises and these groups as funding mechanisms in other locales, the flow
of illicit funds generated is of concern.

5.6 That said, people use the unregulated pathway despite the high risk of being trafficked:
1. The official arrangements are perceived to be time consuming and expensive –

3 US Department of State 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report
4 Report presented by IOM Indonesia, authored by John Lindsay and funded by the European Union
5 This acronym stands for Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia which literally translates as Service company for

Indonesian workers

18
 otherwise stated, it is easier NOT to use them; and 2. The unofficial sector uses highly
aggressive and effective recruiting methods.

5.7 Sources on both sides of the border pointed to common underlying drivers of labour
migration – so called “push” factors – namely poverty, high unemployment and lack of
opportunities, underemployment, low education levels which restrict employment
opportunities and make people more vulnerable to inducement(s), and cultural factors,
such as the obligation to support the family.

5.8 There are also “pull” factors. Labour migration may have positive and negative outcomes
but the positive outcomes tend to get far more publicity – especially as recruiters actively
push the benefits. Some villagers do save money through labour migration and improve
their material prospects. Some who have migrated to Malaysia and elsewhere lobby
relatives and friends to join them. It was clear from discussion with groups of returned
labour migrants (in Dilomil and Betun for example) that many have negative experiences
including TIP outcomes; but the messaging in the community is currently monopolised
by the recruiters. This is one of the areas where knowledge and awareness raising
campaigns could help redress the information imbalance.

5.9 Typically recruiters (known as “calo”) will target poor families, often via the parents,
using cash and other inducements. In line with classic TIP patterns, calos convince people
to take up jobs elsewhere in Indonesia or overseas with promises of high salaries and the
opportunity to rapidly improve their prospects. The recruiters seem to be able to
successfully avoid the scrutiny of village level administrative structures and once they
have recruited someone they move very quickly to transfer the person to a holding
centre and equip them with the necessary documents – usually falsified or falsely
procured. The recruiters are often local people themselves and in many of the cases
observed during the assessment were related to or known to the person recruited. One
source in Betun stated that the unregulated recruiters were paid at least Rupiah 1 million
(USD 80) per person recruited – a significant amount in rural NTT.

5.10 Little information was obtained regarding the nature and composition of the
organisations which employ the unregulated recruiters but it is evident that these
organisations are well resourced and have linkages through to the “end users”, the
people who employ or exploit the labour migrants at the end destination. Some sources
indicated that big business figures were behind some of the syndicates and that some of
them had enjoyed official protection. There have been some cases in the past where
Government officials have been implicated in corrupt practices relating to illegal labour
migration. These corrupt practices, to the extent they exist, undermine the laudable
efforts of other Government officials who are trying to implement national policy and
protect the interests of labour migrants. Beyond this, the final destination for illegal
monies generated – whether to simple organized criminal factors or extremist groups –
raises serious concerns.

5.11 Those labour migrants who go through a registered recruitment company face a
relatively small risk of being trafficked. The risk is dramatically higher in the unregulated
sector since there are no checks, balances or protections. Some sources estimated that
the proportion of people using the unregulated sector in NTT is as high as 80 per cent.
Further complicating the picture, sources within Government advise that some of the
registered labour migration companies have been known to bend the rules, presumably
to improve their competitive advantage.

19
5.12 Several sources in NTT border regions, including police, district officials and NGOs noted
that they did not have accurate information about which companies were officially
endorsed to provide “safe” labour migration services and that this undermined their
capacity to provide accurate advice. The failure of relevant Government agencies to
properly communicate information on safe migration options increases the prospects for
TIP to flourish.

Outward Trafficking of Timor-Leste citizens

5.13 The evidence drawn from the assessment suggests that the Timor-Leste citizens are
being drawn into the NTT labour migration “catchment area” often on the basis of
contact with relatives and friends who are either residing in NTT or are working in
Kalimantan or Malaysia. Both of the returned labour migrants we interviewed in the
Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts were recruited in this way. The close linkages between
Timor-Leste and NTT flow from the fact that many people in border villages have family,
cultural and linguistic ties with their neighbours in NTT. Beyond this, there remains a
substantial community of former residents of Timor-Leste who moved across the border
in 1999 and have remained.

5.14 There is little evidence of pro-active organized recruitment currently occurring in Timor-
Leste border villages. Not a single source among the many interviewed in Timor-Leste
was able to identify a recent recruitment scenario suggesting that, if it is occurring, it is
well hidden and unobtrusive. It is likely that some of the recruiters operating in NTT are
targeting people in Timor-Leste border villages using family relationship and other
linkages.

5.15 It is logical to assume that residents of Timor-Leste border areas are the most prone to
recruitment into the NTT labour migration flow. However, the reach of labour
recruitment is not limited to border areas of Timor-Leste. One of the returned labour
migrants interviewed during the assessment said that she had many Timor-Leste friends
working in Malaysia including people from Dili, Same, Ainaro, Viqueque and elsewhere.
Indeed one case was successfully prosecuted in Dili where a local woman was hired by
an Indonesian citizen (for USD 200/month) to arrange and send Timorese through
Indonesia to Malaysia for work on palm plantations under exploitative conditions.

5.16 It would be inaccurate to characterize this cross border leakage into the NTT labour
migration market as a TIP flow. It is a labour migration flow with a significant risk of TIP.
In the two cases where we were able to interview returnees from Malaysia in the
Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts of Timor-Leste, the women concerned did not
experience trafficking outcomes. They were not abused or exploited and were paid the
monies which were promised to them.

5.17 This brings home the point made by one astute District Administrator in Cova Lima when
he stated:

It is difficult to tell people not to go (to Malaysia or Kalimantan) when they

can’t get any work here and are told by their friends and relatives that they can
earn good money there.

5.18 He acknowledged that the risk of trafficking is high but (although not advocating labour
migration) he considers that the drivers of labour migration are stronger. The unknown
factor is what proportion of those who enter the unregulated labour migration pathways
become trafficked – that is end up in situations of labour or sexual servitude.

20
5.19 In a third specific case involving a Timor-Leste citizen, IOM interviewed a relative of the
labour migrant. In this instance, the person has definitely been trafficked and sadly is
still in a situation of exploitation in Jakarta. At the time she was trafficked, she was living
near Atambua in NTT and it appears that she sought work in Malaysia through
unregulated channels.

5.20 The apparent fact that much of the outward trafficking of Timor-Leste citizens occurs as
part of a broader labour migration dynamic could (in the medium term) influence
Government policy relating to the protection of the interests of Timor-Leste overseas
workers both in Indonesia and in Malaysia and other currently “unofficial” destinations.

5.21 The Timor-Leste labour ministry (SEPFOPE) currently restricts its bilateral labour
migration agreements to highly regulated and generally safe channels – South Korea and
Australia. SEPFOPE has had approaches by other countries (including Malaysia) for
labour migration agreements but has declined to enter into formal arrangements
because they regard them as high risk. That assessment may well be accurate.
Nevertheless, SEPFOPE and agencies of Government more broadly may have to give
greater recognition (if only by bilateral advocacy) to the fact that these unregulated
labour migration channels are operating and that the interests of Timor-Leste citizens are
increasingly being threatened – by trafficking and other less serious forms of exploitation
and human rights abuses.

Common trafficking outcome scenarios

5.22 While the assessment found it challenging to locate people who had been trafficked in
Timor-Leste border regions, the opposite was the case in NTT border regions. Many
returned labour migrants attended meetings arranged for the assessment team in NTT
and were keen to tell their stories – a significant number had experienced trafficking.

5.23 The most common type of work for male labour migrants was agricultural work in palm
oil plantations in Kalimantan and Malaysia. A smaller number worked in construction
and other sectors. The most common type of work for female labour migrants was in the
domestic assistance and child minding sector with a smaller number working in factories
and food service areas. While some of those attending stated that their basic
expectations (in relation to salary and conditions) had been met, there were also many
claims of abuses and exploitation – particularly in the unregulated sector. Common
claims match the complaints found in IOM Indonesia victim assistance data for NTT
province above, and included:
• Retention of documents (this was almost universal even in cases where salary was
paid at agreed levels);
• Failure to pay wages at agreed rates;
• Salary reductions beyond what was originally set as the administrative cost of their
migration (a form of debt bondage);
• Excessive working hours;
• Absence of health care;
• Deprivation of freedom of movement;
• Constraints on communication;
• Very poor food and living conditions;
• Abuse of domestic workers by household heads including, in some cases, sexual
abuse.

21
5.24 For workers in palm oil plantations it was common for VoTs to run away from their initial
employer and then seek employment elsewhere – generally in other palm oil plantations.
When they leave employment in this way, they are completely undocumented leaving
them vulnerable to further exploitation. It was also common for undocumented NTT and
Timor-Leste workers in Malaysia to have to pay large sums to be smuggled back into
Indonesia – by boat from Johor Bahru to Batam or across the Kalimantan border. Many
of those who attended IOM-led meetings advised they had worked for several years in
the palm oil industry but returned to NTT without any savings. They often face difficulty
re-integrating into village life.

Sexual exploitation and servitude

5.25 Having regard to some of the cases which have come to light during the assessment and
to broader international experience, it seems evident that there are two broad types of
TIP cases where sexual servitude is involved.

5.26 In the first type, the sexual violence is, in a sense, incidental to the purpose of the TIP
(though no less traumatic for the victim). Examples are:
• A young woman is in a holding centre in Jakarta pending transportation to Malaysia
where she will be engaged in domestic assistance work. One of those facilitating the
arrangements demands sex so the agreed labour migration arrangements can be
continued.
• A young woman is allocated by a labour migration broker in Kuala Lumpur to a
particular domestic employer who then decides to sexually abuse her.

5.27 In the second type of case, the original intent of the labour migration broker/trafficker is
to exploit the subject in the commercial sex industry. The sexual exploitation of
Indonesian and other women in Malaysia, Riau and other parts of Indonesia is well
documented. While it is known that many cases of this nature occur, the assessment
delivered very little information about how this part of the TIP industry operates. This is
not surprising since (a) it is highly criminalized and (b) victims and others who know about
these cases are often reluctant to divulge any information for cultural and other reasons.

Victim Support
5.28 During the course of the assessment IOM visited a number of locations and groups in
Timor-Leste and NTT which provide support to victims of trafficking – some managed by
NGOs, some managed by the church and some by Government entities. These
organisations and institutions contributed much to our understanding of the TIP
problem. Safe houses are an important element in the policy approach towards TIP.
When officials make an intervention which results on the identification of VoTs (or
suspected VoTs), they need to engage quickly with protection facilities to ensure that
VoTs get protection and psycho-social support. These facilities are part of the holistic
approach to combating trafficking.

5.29 This report makes no recommendations in relation to this component of the counter TIP
infrastructure but notes that organisations involved in providing protection to VoTs:
• Need to be part of the broader discussion on counter TIP activity at both national and
local levels; and
• Need to be linked into TIP coordination mechanisms discussed at paras 6.11 to 6.12;
• Can be valuable partners in socialisation activity;
• Can contribute to intelligence holdings (to the extent this is consistent with
confidentiality obligations and concerns).

22
Other Forms of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
5.30 While the focus of this border assessment has been on TIP, the assessment team asked
most sources about the incidence and nature of other forms of TOC which could
potentially include people smuggling, smuggling of contraband, and smuggling of
weapons and or narcotics.

5.31 Historically there have been incidents of people smuggling mostly associated with efforts
by nationals of various countries to reach Australia and claim asylum. There has been a
substantial decline in the incidence of people smuggling activity in recent times, primarily
as a result of Australian border protection policies which have drastically reduced the
volume of attempted illegal maritime entries into Australian waters. None of the sources
interviewed identified any recent instances of people smuggling. The border remains
vulnerable to people smuggling but no evidence was produced suggesting this is a current
problem.

5.32 While only one instance of narcotics smuggling was specifically identified (by POLRI in
Atambua) many sources noted that smuggling of goods across the border (mainly into
Timor-Leste) is a common occurrence. Much of this activity seems to be petty in
character involving day to day consumer goods (including fuel) but it also seems likely
that more organized and larger scale smuggling activity occurs – including smuggling of
vehicles and more expensive consumer items. One source raised a case involving
smuggling of weapons into the Maliana area but these were light weapons used for
hunting.

23
 6. INFORMING POLICY DEVELOPMENT
6.1 In considering how the data (with its limitations) and the situational analysis might
influence policy measures to counter TIP, it is timely to reiterate some key facts:
• Both Timor-Leste Citizens and Indonesian citizens in border areas face the risk of
TIP;
• There are labour migration and trafficking flows into Timor-Leste and out of
Timor-Leste;
• Some people participating in these flows cross the border legally and some
irregularly – the bulk of the westward flow (Timor-Leste citizens) are crossing
irregularly;
• Because of the personalized and covert nature of the recruiting scenarios for
outward migration from Timor-Leste, recruitment is often difficult to detect;
• Many if not all TL citizens entering labour migration pathways obtain false
documents in NTT;
• There are major labour migration and trafficking flows out of NTT border regions
(seemingly at a higher level) to locations including Kalimantan and Malaysia;
• Both Timor-Leste citizens and Indonesian citizens in NTT may have a greater or
lesser chance of being trafficked depending on the nature of the organization
doing the recruitment and post recruitment activity;
• The unregulated labour migration sector in NTT is likely to be criminalised and to
engage in trafficking.

6.2 There are some key TIP preventative strategies that relate directly to the border control
environment.
• Promoting safe migration pathways and raising awareness of the dangers of
unregulated labour migration;
• Improving community reporting capability and mechanisms;
• Intelligence driven targeting of enforcement and monitoring activity; and
• Training of frontline officers in identification and response.

6.3 Some of these strategies can be applied to other forms of TOC. For example community
reporting mechanisms can be valuable in detecting TOC incidents such as narcotics and
arms trafficking or high volume smuggling of goods. The skills which relate to intelligence
collection, analysis, dissemination and use are integral to efforts to combat various forms
of TOC.

6.4 The four strategies set out in paragraph 6.2 are all directly complementary:
• Raising awareness of TIP risks is likely to influence the behaviour of some
potential labour migrants and make people in border communities more capable
of identifying problems and more motivated to report matters;
• Enhanced reporting (along with other inputs) will improve the intelligence base;
• A stronger intelligence base should (a) increase prospects of interdiction at or
near the border and (b) inform investigation and intervention.

a. The case for a Socialisation Campaign

6.5 During the field work in Timor-Leste and NTT border areas, every source, without
exception supported the need for community awareness campaigns in border villages as
a means of increasing awareness about the dangers of TIP. In about 60 per cent of cases,
contacts made this suggestion entirely of their own volition. In other cases, when sources

24
 were struggling to identify policy responses to TIP, we presented them with a range of
policy options to discuss including a socialization campaign.

6.6 The 2016 State Department Report Narrative for Indonesia stated that :

The government and NGOs note as awareness of trafficking increases,

traffickers are recruiting more victims from eastern Indonesian provinces,
where awareness is lower.

6.7 The obvious implication of this is that awareness raising in other parts of Indonesia has
had some positive effect. It also suggests that the areas targeted in this study are a
prime focus for illegal recruiting and that awareness of the risks of TIP is lower in eastern
provinces such as NTT than in other areas.

6.8 The assessment team asked sources who advocated socialization campaigns to comment
on how those programs should be run. There were three key messages about
socialization campaigns received during the field interviews:
• That delivery of such a program must be in concert with local community leaders
and organisations;
• That the method of delivering the message must be carefully considered;
• There has to be a consistent and ongoing program of socialisation – one-off
efforts are unlikely to have any effect.

6.9 Based on inputs from many sources, the second point is crucial. There is no point handing
out written materials in border villages although posters and comics may be part of the
mix. A source in Dilomil (NTT) recounted that one organisation has distributed large
volumes of pamphlets and posters as part of an awareness raining campaign. He
suggested that this was a complete waste of time and money as the material was too
complex and, of those who could read it, very few people would.

6.10 Speeches (by external actors) have little impact. A program involving village meetings,
short films or plays followed by Q&A sessions may have more impact especially if
community leaders and/or local NGOs are engaged. IOM Jakarta and the NGO Yayasan
Tapen Bikomi6 in NTT have both developed films designed to support counter TIP efforts
so there are examples of how such visual materials can be developed. Messages need to
be delivered in a way which is engaging and sympathetic to local experience. Witness
statements by people who have been trafficked can be a powerful tool.

6.11 The key considerations for effective socialisation will be:

• engaging local actors;
• keeping costs down;
• providing an ongoing program with comprehensive geographic coverage;
• getting the right messages delivered in the right way.

6.12 Much can be learned from previous experience with other social/community awareness
programs on social issues – there have for example been successful campaigns in Timor-
Leste to raise awareness of domestic violence issues. Social media options should also
be considered as part of the mix. The penetration of social media in border areas is
limited but it is increasing rapidly in the younger generation who are the group most
likely to be preyed upon by traffickers.

6 An NGO based in Kefamenanu which works primarily in the area of counter TIP campaigns

25

6.13 On the NTT side of the border, many current actors have delivered socialisation
campaigns or efforts including police, Ministry of Manpower, the Catholic church, the
office of women’s empowerment and NGO’s but these efforts do not seem to be part of
any systematic approach in terms of the locations and frequency of campaigns. Each of
these actors claims that the frequency and scope of their socialization efforts has been
limited by lack of funds. A more coordinated approach to socialisation is clearly required.
A coordinated approach cannot be coercive - individual actors will still have independent
views and agendas - but it can ensure that where synergies exist they are sensibly utilized,
better access for all parties to resources and information, and that the penetration of
such campaigns is maximised.

6.14 Under a program funded by JTIP7, IOM is supporting provincial Governments and district
(kabupaten) administrations in the formation of Anti Trafficking Task Forces (ATTF) at
district level. NTT already has a task force at provincial level. The current IOM supported
program aims to establish ATTFs in six kabupatens – three in West Timor and three in
Flores. The key role of the ATTF will be to ensure that the various state and non-state
actors involved in anti-trafficking activities are coordinating and achieving synergies to
enhance collective counter trafficking efforts. Each kabupaten level ATTF will be
required to develop a Plan of Action setting out its strategic approach to counter
trafficking activity.

6.15 A similar approach should be considered in Timor-Leste. National counter trafficking

efforts are coordinated by the Inter-Agency Trafficking Working Group and the policy
agenda is set through the recently revised National Action Plan to Combat Human
Trafficking. A mechanism for coordination of effort at the District level could and should
be encouraged. Coordinating networks have been created to deal with issues such as
child abuse and domestic violence so these models could probably be applied to anti
trafficking efforts.

6.16 Another strategy recommended by many of those interviewed was to target schools with
an information campaign particularly in the 12-15 year age groups. Some suggested that
TIP should be addressed as part of the school curriculum. An example of this approach
is the work done by the Tapen Bikomi Foundation in the Kefamenanu district of NTT.
They have taken the counter TIP message into schools within that district (kabupaten)
and claim that they are getting very good outcomes including an increased incidence of
people reporting illegal recruiters – calos – in the district. Some counter trafficking
programs have also been run in select Timor-Leste schools8 so there are precedents in
both jurisdictions.

6.17 The primary reason for a socialisation campaign is to provide a counterweight to the
propaganda methods used by illegal recruiters. In advocating for a socialization
campaign, it is important that policy makers consider the message which will be pitched
to village communities and note that there will be differences in approach in different
jurisdictions. Ultimately the content of the campaigns is a decision for the relevant
coordinating bodies in both jurisdictions but the issues and challenges need to be
carefully evaluated.

6.18 In NTT, the most logical message would be to advocate for safe (or safer) labour
migration channels – a message which many actors are currently promoting. National

7 JTIP is the branch of the US State Department which leads the US global counter TIP program
8 2016 US State Department Report Country narrative East Timor

26
 policy makers in Indonesia may need to consider some of the views coming from local
leaders in the regions who are critical of the complexity of Indonesia’s “legal” labour
recruitment laws and procedures. If the “legal” requirements are universally perceived
as too complex, too time consuming and too expensive, then efforts to persuade people
to use these services may be undermined. This creates a real policy tension – advocates
of the official system would argue that the procedures are all necessary in order to
safeguard the welfare of labour migrants. There needs to be discussion about whether
elements of the official labour market recruitment system can be made simpler and
cheaper.

6.19 Another message which some leaders in NTT are advocating is that village people should
be encouraged to remain in their home areas where there are developing opportunities
in agriculture and small industry which are being actively promoted by local Government.
This approach aims to undermine the fundamental drivers of labour migration – poverty
and unemployment. To the extent that these ills can be reduced, the push factors also
reduce.

6.20 The message for socialisation in Timor-Leste border villages would be broadly similar –
that going across the border and using unregulated labour migration channels is a high
risk proposition. There is an added complexity. It may be difficult for the Timor-Leste
Government to advocate for people to use safer migration pathways, when the pathways
in question are theoretically only available to Indonesian citizens. Policy makers will need
to deal with the fact that most of the Timor-Leste citizens entering the NTT labour
migration stream do so using false Indonesian identities and false Indonesian documents.
This was the case with the three Timor-Leste labour migrants who were interviewed
during the fieldwork. Anecdotal data suggests that adoption of false identities is the
norm.

Recommendation 1 is for a socialisation campaign.

b. Community Based Monitoring Mechanisms.

6.21 The challenges of improving security along the land border include:
• The limited screening capability of static border control posts;
• The limitations of surveillance especially when it is not informed by good intelligence
inputs.

6.22 International experience suggests that in populated border areas, community networks
are probably the best and cheapest tool to conduct border monitoring. Community
members have the capacity to readily distinguish between traditional border crossing
movements and movements which do not fit into the traditional cultural movement
framework. Although they would not be aware of all movements, local community
members generally know when irregular movements are made through or in close
proximity to their communities. The problem lies in motivating community members to
report abnormal activity and providing mechanisms where such movements can be
reported and acted upon.

6.23 Both Timor-Leste and Indonesia already have already taken certain initiatives to improve
engagement between village residents and law enforcement. Timor-Leste has
implemented a program of community policing (Ofisial Polisia do Suco) which is designed
to have police officers living in and interacting with local communities. The system of

27
 local level governance including the village chiefs (Chefe do Suco) and the hamlet chiefs
(Chefe Aldeia) is also a conduit for community engagement.

6.24 When the assessment team discussed the efficacy of community policing arrangements
in Timor-Leste with local officials at the village level, there was a fairly consistent view
that, while the concept is good, the system is not yet operating as it should. The biggest
complaint was that in most cases, the village level police are not living in the village. Their
role therefore is reactive rather than pre-emptive and the level of community
engagement is still low. The Government is trying to address this through a program
whereby houses will be constructed in the village so that village police are a part of the
village community. That system will take some time to mature.

6.25 On the Indonesian side, there is also a hierarchy of local governance with the village head
(kepala desa) and higher levels of the local government hierarchy the sub-district
(kecamatan). There is also a community policing approach known as Bhabinkamtibmas9.
Under this initiative, the Indonesian Police have assigned “bintara” (lower-level) officers
to carry out pre-emptive tasks in the villages and sub-districts by partnering with the
community.

6.26 In principle, their task is to (1) regularly visit the community, (2) talk and listen to the
community, and (3) record and follow up on what has been discussed with the
community.

6.27 Sources in NTT border regions agree that this is a good concept but suggest that (as in
Timor-Leste), the approach is yet to be fully and properly implemented. Often the
assigned officers do not live in the village and there are budget challenges associated
with full implementation of the scheme. Because of the covert way that the illegal labour
recruiters work, often local police and the village head do not know that a particular
person or persons have departed for labour migration. It was instructive that in one
village in NTT where the village head invited returned labour migrants to attend a
meeting with the fieldwork team, the number who turned up was in excess of 100
people. The village head commented that even he (a returned labour migrant himself)
did not realise how many people from the village had been involved in labour migration.

6.28 As the community policing mechanisms in both countries mature and are fully
implemented, the capacity for closer monitoring of illegal recruiting activity should be
enhanced.

6.29 In term of counter TIP activity, the intended outcome is to have a stronger social
consensus at the village level about the risks of TIP. Building on the socialization effort,
it is possible that some adaptation or refinement of community governance
arrangements could be used to achieve more effective monitoring and reporting of
irregular entry events than occurs at present. This concept was suggested and supported
by many of those interviewed during the field work. In building this stronger consensus
local NGOs and also faith based groups must be engaged as they can also play a vital role.

6.30 Sources in NTT also put forward the concept of developing village regulations which
would impose a stronger obligation on prospective labour migrants to communicate their
intentions to village officials. Given the methods used by unregulated recruiters, it is

9This acronym stands for Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat or Police to Promote the
Protection and Safety of the Community

28
 uncertain how effective such regulations would be but this may be an approach worth
trialing.

6.31 Many sources advised that people at village level were reluctant to communicate
concerns about possible illegal activities to officials. There are many possible reasons for
this reluctance but it is reasonable to suggest that if (a) consciousness of the risks of
unregulated labour migration is heightened and (b) barriers between Government actors
and village people are lowered, improved reporting outcomes can be achieved. In NTT
the ATTFs would have an obvious role in promoting community awareness and
community monitoring capability.

6.32 IOM cannot define exactly how such community monitoring mechanisms might operate;
local and national authorities are far better placed to understand the local dynamics and
to consider:
• How best to integrate local resources including police and village heads to achieve
better protection of the community from predatory recruitment activities; and
• What mix of policy, training and support would best serve this purpose.

International models for community based monitoring

6.33 Two relevant regional models are the use of a community policing network in PNG10 (now
unfortunately largely defunct) and the MMO network11 used by Australia in monitoring
traditional and other movement between PNG and Torres Strait islands.

6.34 The following paragraph, drawn from a UNDP project prospectus 12 provides both an
example of the universality of the issues faced along land borders and a good summary
of the objectives of systematic community engagement:

Improved interaction between local populations and law enforcement

authorities would allow the gradual development of a new community-based
policing approach to border management, shifting the balance from security
control at the border line to an intelligence-led interdiction model. Tentative
efforts in this direction need to be bolstered and institutionalised, through the
establishment of mechanisms that increase the presence and responsiveness
of the State to the human security needs of border populations.

6.35 While the scale and severity of security issues in the Sahel is very different to the situation
of the Timor-Leste / Indonesia border, the proposed approach reflected in the underlined
text is very relevant.

6.36 In exploring the potential for enhanced community reporting, it is not intended to impose
some draconian form of border control which would monitor all movements. That would
be unworkable and unrealistic. It is about better reporting of movements and activities
which are out of the ordinary and which might exhibit some of the characteristics of TOC.

10 The consultant conducted an assessment of people smuggling activity at the northern end of the PNG Indonesia
border (Vanimo/Wutung) in 2015. Senior PNG police officers noted that community police network had been
established and had proved an effective mechanism for monitoring various irregular activities. They also advised
that the mechanism had recently been abandoned (apparently for funding reasons)
11 See DIBP Fact Sheet at : https://www.border.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/72torres
12 UNDP project proposal titled “Border Management & Border Communities in the Sahel” ref:
https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/NER/Border Management Border Communities in the Sahel (Pro Doc)
bv2.pdf

29

6.37 Enhancing community reporting mechanisms is a potentially useful part of the broader
strategy but it is not a panacea which will eliminate irregular border crossing or eliminate
TIP and other forms of TOC. The strategy has some obvious limitations which should be
recognised:
• Because of the nature of cross border flows, many of the movements associated
with labour migration will not be readily identifiable;
• In many cases residents of border villages will either be complicit in the activity
or see reporting as against their own interests or the interests of family members
– many residents of border areas, for example, are involved in low grade
smuggling of daily consumer goods.

6.38 Allowing for the limitations of this model, many sources appear confident that some form
of enhanced community monitoring can be introduced and can be effective in increasing
awareness and in identifying problem activities. This should then drive a targeted
interdiction or patrolling approach and relevant agencies (police and border patrol) need
to consider how they can best respond to any problems or alerts which the monitoring
produces.

6.39 Concerned actors on both sides of the border expressed support for the development of
better models of community engagement and reporting. Recommendation 2 is based
on these concepts.

c. Building Capacity for Identification and Response

6.40 It is important that officials and others who are in border control or monitoring roles or
are in positions where they might encounter trafficking:
• Have an understanding of the TIP continuum of recruitment, transportation and
exploitation;
• Are able to make interventions at any point in this continuum;
• Have an understanding of how to deal with cases which arise including identifying
perpetrators and victims and referring, managing and documenting these cases;
• Know how to maximize the intel value and evidence value of these encounters.

6.41 If, for example, groups of young Timor-Leste females were crossing the border irregularly
under escort then there would be some chance of this coming to attention through more
developed community reporting mechanisms. A trafficking incident of this nature
occurred at Salele in 2008 when a group of Timor-Leste females – some under age - was
intercepted by PNTL and UN police as they were about to enter Indonesia. This action
was taken on the basis of a community tip-off. Similar preventative interventions, based
on information from the community, have been carried out by Indonesian police in
Kefamenanu and elsewhere.

6.42 An appropriate program of training should improve the capacity of officials to identify
and appropriately respond to trafficking scenarios which may be identified, namely at
official border posts – air, land or seaports or through other targeted interventions
(which would generally be supported by intelligence).

6.43 Both Government and non-Government sources on both sides of the border were highly
supportive of the concept of joint training in this area and wanted such training to be
inclusive and to occur locally (not in Jakarta or Dili).. Note that joint training in this context

30
 means having training programs where officials (and other actors) from both countries
train together and share their knowledge and experience.

6.44 In determining the appropriate response to TIP incidents, the law is the crucial
underpinning framework which provides relevant powers and sets out relevant
obligations. Both Timor-Leste and Indonesia have passed laws which criminalise TIP – in
both cases the provisions conform in general terms to the definitional aspects of the
Palermo protocol. The Indonesian counter trafficking legislation13 was enacted in 2007.
The Timor-Leste legislation – “Lei No. 3/2017 de 25 de Janeiro Lei da Prevencao e Luta
contra Trafico de Pessoas e Quarta Alteracao ao Codigo Penal Comprehensive law to
prevent, punish and provide victim support to victims of trafficking in persons”14 came
into effect in late January 2017 re-iterated and expanded existing counter-trafficking
provisions founds in the 2009 Penal Code. Additional offenses specific to trafficking focus
on criminal responsibility through established corporations and/or informal
organizations (e.g. organized criminal groups) while a new raft of protective services are
now established in law as due to victims of trafficking – including laying out victim rights
comprehensively. One of the key novel elements is the legal establishment of a National
Counter-Human Trafficking Commission (CLASH is the Portuguese acronym) which will
take over from the current Inter-Agency Trafficking Working Group which IOM is
supporting. CLASH will be charged with elaborating and finalizing a National Action Plan
on trafficking in persons and will likewise be charged with leadership and coordination
responsibilities for counter-trafficking socialization and data collection in Timor-Leste.
The exact make up and precise duties of CLASH will be fully established in subsequent
implementing regulations which must be implemented by July 2017.

6.45 In Timor-Leste, IOM has previously delivered trainings (in Dili) aimed at law enforcement
to sensitise them to the provisions of the law (including obligations towards victims) and
develop the skills needed to build credible evidence and sustain successful prosecutions.
Given the recent enactment of new and more comprehensive anti-TIP legislation, further
training is warranted. Judicial and prosecutorial authorities (neither of which have
received any TIP training under previous programming or are targeted for such training
in the future) in border areas of Timor-Leste who were interviewed as part of the
fieldwork indicated a compelling need for more intensive training in the implementation
of anti-TIP law and Recommendation 8 gives substance to this. Socialization campaigns
would also help to improve knowledge of the legislation in the community though the
message must be sensitive to the environment. Members of village communities would
not be receptive to a long discourse on the legislation, but they do need to know in simple
terms what trafficking is, how it occurs, the fact that it is illegal and the fact that there
are mechanisms to support victims.

6.46 In Indonesia, senior police sources interviewed in both Kefamenanu and Atambua had a
good knowledge of the anti-TIP legislation and had initiated some prosecutions. The
consultant notes that in interaction with Government officials on both sides of the
border, there is considerable variation in the level of knowledge on trafficking legislation
and trafficking issues more generally. A common issue is the impact of staff rotation
policies which to some extent undermine the effectiveness of training regimes.

13 For an English language version of the Indonesian anti trafficking legislation - Law 21/2007 on the Eradication
of the Criminal Act of Trafficking in Persons. see: http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/indonesian-law-on-anti-
trafficking
14 The Trafficking in Persons Law, Law No. 3/2017.

31
The Exploitation Phase
6.47 While training of border officers is important in managing interventions in early phases
of the trafficking cycle, this type of training also needs to be directed at officials who
might be dealing with the exploitation phase of the TIP cycle. The detection of TIP during
the exploitation phase can occur in a number of ways:
• Through self reporting of victims (often escaped victims);
• Through targeted enforcement activity – eg raids on brothels, bars or worksites;
or
• As a by product of other forms of policing activity.

6.48 From a Timor-Leste perspective, VoTs subject to sexual servitude are likely to be either
citizens of other countries or Timor-Leste citizens who are victims of internal trafficking.
The identification of VoTs is based on an interview process and relevant officers must be
well trained in:
• Interviewing skills and strategies,
• The characteristics of trafficking,
• The nature and value of intelligence
• The appropriate management of potential victims, including referral to the
agreed protection mechanisms where appropriate: and
• The accumulation of evidence for prosecution where this is in prospect.

6.49 Timor-Leste and NTT victims of trafficking who are in servitude situations outside Timor
can come to attention in the same ways as mentioned. In such cases, the officials
handling the matter will be officials of the host country (most commonly Malaysia or
Indonesia). International experience demonstrates that the systematic exchange of
intelligence between jurisdictions can increase the likelihood of successful enforcement
interventions and prosecutions and also lead to an increase in victim support
interventions including supported voluntary repatriation.

6.50 Recommendation 3 (Attachment A) is for joint training of officials (and other actors) in
the identification of and response to TIP.

d. Improving Intelligence Flows

6.51 Throughout the world, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) of which TIP is a component,
flourishes in environments where there is poor communication about criminal activities,
poor awareness of TOC characteristics and a lack of effective intelligence gathering
capability. Borders are, in one sense, an obstacle to criminal syndicates; however, they
can also work to the advantage of criminal syndicates because of:
• The reluctance of national authorities to share information across borders means
that there is less likelihood of effective counter TIP action by authorities;
• The separation of jurisdictions increases impunity from prosecution;
• The facilitation of border crossing creates a way of increasing debt bondage and
victim disempowerment.

6.52 A key finding of the fieldwork was the view put forward by many sources that they do
not have adequate intelligence to effectively identify and combat trafficking and that
they need support to improve their intelligence gathering capabilities and their
intelligence using capabilities.

32
6.53 Intelligence, in this context, is information which has been evaluated in terms of its
relevance or its strategic purpose. Intelligence is critical in combatting all forms of crime
including TIP. A key feature of intelligence gathering is the fact that disparate pieces of
information can, once evaluated, result in a clearer and more comprehensive picture of
what is occurring. There are many potential sources of intelligence relevant to TIP
including information derived from:
• Casework with VoTs;
• Returned VoTs and to a lesser extent returned labour migrants;
• Interviewing of suspected or identified traffickers;
• Interpol and international law enforcement sources;
• Immigration data and investigations;
• Police data and investigations;
• Bilateral and multilateral partners and international organisations;
• NGOs and faith based groups;
• Community leaders and community members.

6.54 The consultant concludes that, especially in the Timor-Leste15 context, many of the
sources identified in the previous paragraph are not utilised and there is no systematic
attempt to draw these sources together for analysis, distribution and tasking. Logically,
a central unit should analyze these inputs and then apply reasonable protocols for
sharing and disseminating the intelligence.

6.55 Ideally the process of capacity building in intelligence should involve:

• Developing intelligence capacity within relevant agencies;
• Identifying a central repository of intel on TIP (and possibly other forms of
transnational organized crime);
• developing mechanisms and protocols for sharing intelligence between agencies
and across borders;
• Regular collective review of the intelligence to determine whether enforcement
action is appropriate or whether further investigation of particular matters is
warranted.

6.56 One underutilized source of intelligence on TIP is the experience and knowledge of labour
migration and TIP returnees. A proportion of those who are trafficked eventually make
it back to their country of origin – either through informal means or because they have
benefited from some form of repatriation support. Returned victims of trafficking are a
subset of a larger group of labour migration returnees. Considerable useful intelligence
can be derived from interviewing returnees who are willing to provide information. Their
accounts provide valuable detail about:
• Recruitment and transportation methods used by traffickers
• (in some cases) the identities of people involved in TIP
• The types of exploitation they have suffered
• Possible opportunities for law enforcement intervention.

6.57 The assessment team met many returnees, some of whom had been trafficked and their
accounts did much to increase the team’s awareness of local TIP dynamics. Government
and non-Government actors on both sides of the border should consider ways in which
this information can be collected and utilized.

15 The consultant is not in a position to evaluate the nature and effectiveness of Indonesia’s intelligence gathering
arrangements in relation to TIP as to do so would require substantial research and time in Jakarta and elsewhere
in Indonesia

33
Timor-Leste / Indonesia intelligence exchange on TOC
6.58 Sharing intelligence across national jurisdictions can be challenging but it is definitely
achievable on matters of mutual interest. Even though combating TIP is an area where
there should be few if any reservations about sharing relevant data, intelligence
exchange is unlikely to occur spontaneously. There needs to be some formal cooperation
construct to make it happen.

6.59 The following fictional scenario (adapted from a confirmed TIP case in another
jurisdiction) demonstrates the value of sharing intelligence and the limitation of
outcomes which occurs when it is not shared.

A. Statements given to Timor-Leste authorities by Indonesian and Thai victims of sex

trafficking in Dili suggest that they entered Timor-Leste illegally in small groups. They
were escorted across the land border by two men who took the VoTs to their house
in a village close to the border – later they were taken to Dili by chartered minibus.
One of the men is known as Ali but it is not clear if this is a real name or an assumed
one.

B. An intelligence report containing this information is sent to operational units in

Batugade – BPU, PNTL and immigration. It turns out that Ali is known to PNTL and
Customs for suspected smuggling of goods and that he travels on a regular basis to
Atambua. BPU increase targeted monitoring of irregular entry routes suspected to
be used by Ali and intercept Ali in the company of four young (under age) East
Javanese girls.

C. The four girls are interviewed, identified as VoT’s and given protection. Some
weeks later, in accordance with their wishes, they are repatriated to their families in
Java. Statements given by them to police yield further intelligence about the activities
of a smuggling syndicate which operates in East Java, Bali, Kupang, Atambua and Dili.

D. Corroborating information given by Ali during police interviews leads to further

detailed intelligence about the operations of the syndicate in Atambua and Dili. This
triggers an investigation by the Scientific and Criminal Investigations Police (PCIC)
which ultimately leads to the successful prosecution of the owners of two karaoke
bars in Dili and a number of their subordinates.

E. Information conveyed to Indonesian police during a regular liaison meeting on TOC

leads to them arresting and charging an Atambua businessman with trafficking
offences and contributes valuable information to an ongoing TIP investigation in East
Java.

6.60 In this case it can be seen that the intelligence report provided in Step B of the scenario
has resulted in (a) two successful police interventions (b) two prosecutions (c) the
production of further intelligence and (d) the launching of additional investigations. If
that initial intelligence product had not been disseminated, none of the positive counter
trafficking outcomes set out in B, C, D and E could have occurred.

6.61 Building on this example it is worth setting out various scenarios in which TIP intelligence
products could and should be used. These include :
• Identifying and investigating TIP or people smuggling recruitment activity;
• Enforcement action against recruiters;

34
 • Targeting of border monitoring and response capability on the basis of
intelligence;
• Intel based profiling of border crossers – both legal and illegal;
• Disruption of TIP facilitation, documentation and transportation arrangements;
• Investigations into TIP syndicate activities;
• Intel based targeting of workplaces and sex industry establishments where there
are valid grounds to suspect labour servitude or sexual servitude.

6.62 At the national level, the resources devoted to transnational crime intelligence in
Indonesia are substantial. Both jurisdictions have existing intel capability in various
agencies – police and immigration being the key actors in the area of TIP. Inputs received
during the fieldwork suggest that police and immigration officers in Indonesia - Timor-
Leste border regions see benefit in a program of joint training which would sharpen their
capacity to accumulate and utilize intelligence on TIP activity. Both countries stand to
benefit from mechanisms which improve cross-border intel exchange on TOC. In the TIP
context, the end beneficiaries of improved capability and intel exchange will be the
potential VoTs.

Building a Pathway for Intelligence Cooperation and Exchange

6.63 At present there is an annual bilateral meeting between Timor-Leste and Indonesia that
discusses border related issues. There are also occasional ad hoc meetings and joint
training exercises – for example, in 2017 document fraud training provided by DIBP
(Australian Immigration) in Batugade was attended by officials from Timor-Leste and
Indonesia. A meeting at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in
Semarang (6-10 Feb 2017) brought together Indonesian and Timor-Leste officials for a
discussion on transnational crime. Over time there have been various initiatives and
training programs in both jurisdictions relating to capacity building in criminal (including
anti TOC) intelligence as well as other areas of intelligence and synergies with such
programs should be embraced.

6.64 Interviews conducted with border officials suggest that relationships between
immigration and police on both sides of the border are positive. This is consistent with
the positive feedback received in relation to the recent Semarang workshop and the
document fraud training.

6.65 A useful first building block for intelligence cooperation would be to develop a forward
schedule for training and TOC discussion. This could occur on a fixed term rotational
basis – for example six monthly. This training should involve, among others, front line
officers dealing with border security and criminal investigation issues. The parties could,
over time, move to a program whereby each country would present a written bulletin
and briefing on its current intelligence analysis of the TOC situation in the border region,
focusing on TIP and people smuggling.

6.66 The ethos of these arrangements should rest on the proposition that transnational
crimes require transnational solutions.

6.67 It would be premature and inappropriate for the consultant to set out the specifics of
how such meetings might be conducted – the where, when and who. This would best be
negotiated on a bilateral basis by the parties concerned.

35
6.68 Subject to the agreement of national authorities, there would potentially be a role for
international organisations and donor support in giving effect to these arrangements and
providing expert inputs to the training.

6.69 Recommendations 4, 5 and 6 create a pathway for enhancing TIP intelligence capability
and exchange.

36
 7. ATTACHMENT A - RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations made in this report are based on:
• Consideration of the inputs and insights derived from the fieldwork process; and
• Analysis of research and previous data; and
• Broader international experience.

The report recommends:

1. That the national or regional bodies charged with coordinating the fight against human
trafficking16 develop and deliver a widespread program of community education (initially
in border villages) which should be simple, ongoing, well designed and preferably
delivered through (or with the involvement of) local government officials, NGOs and
community leaders. Consideration could be given to the inclusion of some elements of a
TIP socialisation campaign in the school curriculum, particularly at SMP level.

2. That authorities explore opportunities for better engaging community reporting

mechanisms to detect and monitor (a) recruitment activity which is outside the scope of
legitimate labour migration mechanisms17 and (b) unlawful movements across the border
which are outside the framework of traditional movement. As part of enhanced
reporting and communication strategy authorities could consider the potential for SMS or
phone reporting hotlines and the exploitation of social media options.

3. That a program of joint training and capacity building (involving officials of both countries)
be developed to build and maintain skills in the identification, apprehension and initial
management of both victims of trafficking and traffickers (identification and response
capability). For Timor-Leste this should include the development of basic SOPs (already
flagged in the National Action Plan).

4. That a program of training and capacity building be developed to build and maintain skills
in intelligence analysis within border agencies including a focus on the identification and
management of TIP and people smuggling. The program should also include protocols for
the dissemination and use of intelligence to initiate investigations and/or interventions.

5. That a regular cross border TOC intelligence coordination meeting be held at six monthly
intervals and be alternately hosted by Timor-Leste and Indonesia. The meeting would
focus on trends in TIP, people smuggling and other forms of irregular migration.

6. That parties engaged in these regular coordination meetings work towards the
development of an MOU on cross border cooperative measures to share information and
minimise the incidence of TOC, including TIP, irregular migration (other than traditional
movement) and other transnational crimes.

7. That an agreed format be developed for recording incidents of TIP. Over time this would
lead to a greater consistency in the reporting of incidents and the building of a more solid
evidence base for policy.

16 The Inter-Agency Trafficking Task Force in Timor Leste and the Anti Trafficking Task Force in Indonesia
17 In the Timor-Leste context this means recruitment activity other than that conducted by or under the oversight

of the labour ministry SEPFOPE

37
8. That, building on past training efforts and already developed skills (and identifying any
gaps), there should be a structured and long term program of training and capacity
building in Timor-Leste and in border areas of NTT to maintain and improve the skills of
police investigators, prosecutors and judges who are responsible for bringing TIP cases
before the courts or hearing those cases.

9. That consideration be given to a campaign to encourage people who have returned from
labour migration destinations (with a focus on those who have experienced TIP) to tell
their stories noting that the information they provide can refine law enforcement
responses and ensure that potential labour migrants are better informed about the risks
they may face.

38


8. GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ALOLA Timor-Leste NGO which provides support services for vulnerable

women and children

ATTF Anti Trafficking Task Force – coordinating bodies established under

Indonesian regulations at various levels of administration to promote
the coordination of anti trafficking activity.

BELUN Timor-Leste NGO which focuses on conflict prevention activities

F-FDTL Timor-Leste Armed Forces

FOKUPERS Timor-Leste NGO which manages safe houses for victims of violence
and advocates for social protection

KTP Kartu Tanda Penduduk – Indonesian identity card

MNEC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Timor-Leste)

MSS Ministry of Social Solidarity (Timor-Leste)

NGO Non Government Organisation

NTT Nusa Tenggara Timur – East Nusa Tenggara province of Indonesia

OPG Office of Prosecutor General (Timor-Leste)

PCIC Scientific Criminal Investigations Police Unit (Timor-Leste)

PJTKI Authorised Indonesian Labour Hire Company

PNTL National Police of Timor-Leste

POLRI Police of the Republic of Indonesia

PRADET Timor-Leste NGO which provides services and protection to victims of

sexual violence and has provided services to VoTs

SEPFOPE Secretariat of State for Vocational Training, Policy and Employment

(Timor-Leste)

SIKIN National Criminal Intelligence Unit (within PNTL)

SM Immigration Service (Timor-Leste)

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TIP Trafficking in Persons

TNI Indonesian Army

TOC Transnational organized crime

UPF Timor-Leste Border Patrol Unit

UPM Timor-Leste Maritime Police

VoT Victim of trafficking

VPU Vulnerable Person Unit (within PNTL)

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10. ATTACHMENT D RECENT TIMOR-LESTE HUMAN TRAFFICKING

CASES


Case Location Date Type of Source Number of victims Comment
No. recorded trafficking
1 Suai 13/2/17 Outward MSS Suai 1 young female Submitted to prosecutor – girl was taken to
Indonesia to live with relatives
2 Suai 13/2/17 Internal Suai, prosecutors 1 young female Under indictment – brought to live with uncle
office and aunt who sold her for sex
3 Suai 13/2/17 Internal Pradet 1 young female Girl was brought to Suai by a neighbour and put
in a hotel, then raped by a third party. Neighbour
has been arrested. Case being compiled.
4 Suai 14/2/17 Internal In confidence Young female 14 Girl was abducted and raped in a hotel in a
situation arranged by God parents. Under
Indictment
5 Suai 15/2/17 Internal plus Fokupers Several females Allegation that brother operating in village
inward outside Suai and that several of the girls may
have come from other areas and some are under
age. No police action at time of field work
6 Pante 23/2/17 Inward District court Three females Case occurred in 2014. Women were brought in
Makasar by two men from Kefa and prostituted. The two
men were convicted but are currently appealing
the sentence.

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Cases Noted by IOM Timor-Leste During 2016

TOTAL – 187 suspected cases of trafficking in persons

80 “firm” cases of trafficking in persons identified

• 100% female – breaks down into

• 6 girls
• 74 women
• All are sex trafficking victims except for one sale of a child (unclear whether TiP case)
• 20 were outbound, though PNTL have raised possibility that this is not a TiP case.

107 unconfirmed VoTs: For these cases, IOM was not directly involved in the intervention or subsequent protection and investigation and has no
way to confirm or dis-confirm the information involved. The 107 unconfirmed VoTs break down as follows:

• Four Thai women who were allegedly trafficking and removed from the country in under 24 hours – sex trafficking.
• Sixty Seven potential victims pulled out during four raids carried out in December 2016 by Immigration Service – sex trafficking. All told the
same rehearsed story, no TiP confirmed, strongly suspected.
• Thirty potential victims pulled from three unidentified bars on unknown dates, though apparently November/December the Scientific
Investigations Police (PSIC) –sex trafficking suspected, but all told the same rehearsed story.
• Six victims, mixed male/female (unclear) identified to local NGO, mid-last year, labor exploitation – outbound to central Java.

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 11. ATTACHMENT E Summary Data on POLRI TIP cases

Summary Data on Cases investigated by POLRI in Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara (POLRES TTU) 2014 – 2017

Case Date recorded Type of Number of Comment
No. trafficking victims
1 20/12/14 Internal 2 young females Brought to Kefa with promise that she would work in a shop but on arrival prostituted
2 5/2/15 Attempted 2 females The accused persuaded the victims to become TKI through unofficial channels.
outward Intercepted on bus to Kupang
3 31/3/2015 Outward 1 female Parents informed police that VOT had been recruited in 2010 and they did not know
her situation
4 26/1/2015 Attempted 2 females Recruited through non approved channels. Were being taken to Kupang but POLRI
outwardc intervened
5 18/4/2016 Attempted 3 females Intercepted en route to Kupang – they were going to work in Jakarta – using false
internal documents
6 18/4/2016 Outward 1 female VoT deceased under suspicious circumstances in Malaysia. Once relative sighted the
condition of the body they reported their suspicions to POLRI
7 23/4/2016 Attempted 1 female (16 Accused recruited VoT without proper documentation. Reported by family
outward years)
8 Feb 2016 Attempted 1 female Recruited illegally to work in Medan without required documents. Family reported
outward recruitment to POLRI
9 5/3/2016 Attempted 2 under age Recruited through non approved channels and held in house in Kefa. VOTs escaped
outward females and reported the matter to POLRI
10 13/10/2016 Attempted 1 under age Recruited through non approved channels for work in Papua in palm oil plantation.
outward female Did not have required documentation and police intervened.
11 23/1/2017 Attempted 24 persons The accused recruited 24 TKI who were being taken by bus to Tenau port in Kupang
outward for work in palm oil plantations in Kalimantan without proper documentation /
POLRI intervened.

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