EAP Dated 30.11.2019

WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
KRISHNA BHAGYA JALA NIGAM LIMITED
DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN REPORT

FOR ALMATTI DAM (TIER-I)
KA06HH0200
Draft Emergency Action Plan Report -Tier 1
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (ALMATTI)
[KA06HH0200]
Prepared for
KARNATAKA WATER RESOURCE

DEPARTMENT
VOLUME I - REPORT
Prepared by
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY CONSULTANTS PVT LTD

#174/New No.13/2, 1ST 14th E CROSS, NEAR FIRE STATION, INDUSTRIAL TOWN,
AGRAHARA DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 010, Tel.:080-23016200
ehscblr@yahoo.com,ehscblr1974@gmail.com,info@ehsc.in
November, 2019
EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN FOR ALMATTI DAM
Project ID Code KA06HH0200
Emergency Action Plan for Almatti Dam is publishing for the first time during May 2019.
Disclaimer
Every effort has been taken to estimate the severity of flooding and inundation areas
likely to be affected by Almatti Dam in an emergency condition. These estimates are
based on available primary and secondary data. Every effort has been made to foresee
varied emergency possibilities and develop appropriate notification procedures for
timely rescue and relief operations. However, implementation of the Emergency Action
Plan (EAP) involves many agencies, who are required to work in a coordinated manner
to reduce the consequences of the emergency triggered by the Dam site condition.
Effectiveness of the rescue and relief operations depend on many factors including the
adequacy and accuracy of the estimation of the severity of flooding, coordinated efforts
of all the agencies involved in rescue and relief efforts and availability of facilities like
power, telephones, road communications, etc. EAP Developer may therefore, not be held
responsible for the efficacy of the EAP.
For any information, please contact:
V Shankar, IAS
Managing Director
Office of Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd
Mobile No: 94489 94024
Phone No: 08022244484, 08426-281038, 08426-281027
Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN-Tier 1

KBJNL, DAM DIVISION, ALMATTI.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Notification Flowchart (Watch Condition) ............................................................................ IX

Notification Flowchart (Failure Condition) ........................................................................... X
EAP Distribution List................................................................................................................... XII
Log Sheet of Changes ................................................................................................................... XV
Approval and Implementation ............................................................................................. XVII
1.0 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................ 1
2.0 Dam Description ....................................................................................................................... 1
2.1. General................................................................................................................................................ 1
2.2 Reservoir Operations .................................................................................................................. 2
3.0 Responsibilities ........................................................................................................................ 7
3.1 Dam Owner’s Responsibilities ............................................................................................... 7
3.3 Emergency Operations Centre .............................................................................................10
3.4 Responsibilities for Evacuation...........................................................................................11
3.5 Responsibilities for Duration, Security, Termination, and Follow-up..........11
4.0 Communications ..........................................................................................................................12
5.0 Emergency Detection, Evaluation, and Classification ............................................... 12
5.1 Emergency Detection.................................................................................................................12
5.2 Emergency Evaluation and Classification......................................................................15
5.3 Previously Known Problems .................................................................................................17
6.0 Preparedness........................................................................................................................... 28
7.0 Supplies and Resources ....................................................................................................... 31
7.1 Contracts ...........................................................................................................................................31
7.1.1 Equipment and Supplies ......................................................................................................32
8.0 Emergency Operations Center........................................................................................... 33
8.1 Activity Log ............................................................................................................................... 33
9.0 Inundation Areas.................................................................................................................... 34
9.1 Local Evacuation Plan ...............................................................................................................34
10.0 Implementation ................................................................................................................... 35

10.1 Development ...............................................................................................................................35

10.2 Updating .........................................................................................................................................35
10.4 Training ..........................................................................................................................................37

List of Figures
Figure 1 : Rule Curve Elevation for LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (ALMATTI) ..... 6
List of Table
Table 1 : Reservoir features .................................................................................................................... 2
Table 2 : working table for Almatti reservoir ............................................................................... 5

LIST OF ANNEXURES
Sl.No Description Page No.
Annexure – I Vicinity Map Refer

Volume II
Annexure – II Inundation Maps
Annexure – III Flood Hazard Reference Value 27
Annexure – IV Dam Description 36
Annexure – V Sample Public Announcements 37
Annexure – VI Evidence of Distress 39
Annexure – VII Supplies and Resources 52
Annexure – VIII Annual EAP Evaluation Checklist 53
Annexure – IX Plan Review and Update 54
Annexure – X Training Record 55
Annexure – XI Details of Government officials 56

TRANSMITTAL FOR EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP)

Sl. Page Paragraph No.
Original Content Suggestions / Modified Content Compliance
No. No. / item
1. - - General Suggestion {This is the 1st review carried out to the ALMATTI Dam EAP All the suggestions given are incorporated in the Emergency Action
document, and it is requested that after the incorporation of ALL the Plan and further approvals will be taken from the Dam authorities
comments given in this transmittal, KAWRD can proceed with its before finalizing the report.
publication after the corresponding approval of the Dam authorities.
No EAP document will be uploaded in www.damsafety.in, or will be Prior approval will be taken from the Chief Engineer, Superintending
considered as published without a prior minimum approval (e.g. Chief Engineer and concerned Executive Engineers.
Engineer, Superintending Engineer).
After its publication, the document shall be disseminated among all The emergency action plan will be discussed in the stakeholder
stakeholders. Further discussion of improvements and suggestions to consultation in presence of KBJNL officers and the valuable
the plan should be held in a Stakeholders Consultation meeting, to be suggestions/ comments will be incorporated in the Emergency Action
arranged within 60 days after its publication Plan.
Please check Figure 1 at the end of these comments, for your The process of publication and implementation of EAP will be
reference in the overall publication and implementation process of the carried out as per the flow chart given in the Figure 1.
EAP}.
2. - - General Suggestion {Please ensure the ALMATTI Dam EAP is in line with the Hirakud Noted.
EAP model document published by CPMU in the
www.damsafety.inwebsite, before its final publication}.
3. - - General Suggestion {Two different versions of the document were submitted to CPMU Noted
(i.e. Word Format and pdf format), it was assumed that both versions
do not present discrepancies.
Please avoid sending different versions of the same document, and
send only that one which is considered as final. Therefore, the
following comments and suggestions are based solely in the pdf file
received}
4. --- Table of Contents {The tier category refers only to the level of detail in the inundation The tire category has been updated as Tier-1 in the cover page of
EMERGENCY mapping results obtained from the dam breach analysis. Inundation Emergency Action Plan.
ACTION PLAN-Tier maps prepared by CPMU are considered as tier-I; therefore, the EAP
2 is also Tier-I}
5. --- All document M/s EHS {What is the meaning/role of this consultancy firm? Was this firm in The content of EAP has been prepared by M/s EHS Consultants Pvt.
Foot Note Consultants Pvt. Ltd., charge of the preparation of the EAP document?? If so, should be Ltd., Bengaluru and the same is incorporated in the cover page.
Bengaluru described in the cover page, after “prepared by”}
6. i Watch Condition Site Office Dam owner/ This box is reserved to the contact details of ALL the officers Many of the Department officials get transferred or retired and it will
Flow Chart Operator available in the Dam site office round the clock (i.e. operator, be unable to reach those officials. Further, it leads to updating of the
Assistant Engineer, Junior Engineer, etc.). document every now and then for a retirement or relocation of an
Please include NAME, designation, principal and alternate phone individual officer. However, the suggestion will be considered and
numbers, email ID for all the officers in this flowcharts. the details of the officers will be given in the watch condition
Include only the title/designation is not acceptable flowchart page no X.
7. i Watch Condition Office of Emergency Planning Manager Many of the Department officials get transferred or retired and it will
Flow Chart Executive Engineer Title: Executive engineer Name; ??? be unable to reach those officials. Further, it leads to updating of the
Mob.:??? document every now and then for a retirement or relocation of an
Office No.: 08426-281027 individual officer. However, the suggestion will be considered and
Email ID: ???? the details of the officers will be given in watch condition flowchart
{The role of the Emergency Planning Manager should be identified in page no X.
the Notification Flow Charts. Please complete ALL the contact details
(i.e. Name, designation, mobile an office phone numbers, email id)
8. i Watch All {All the flowchart should be redrafted, showing adequate call The flow chart has been redrafted, redrafted flowchart is incorporated
Condition sequence (notification priority) among all the officers/organizations. in page no X
Flow Chart All contact details should expressly appear (only designation with a
single phone number is not acceptable}
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No. No. / item
9. i Watch Available Resources {The EAP should indicate at least three different contractors per Civil contractor details have been furnished in the Emergency Action
Condition each area of specialization. A vast list of contractors should be Plan. However, the mechanical, Instrumentation, Special Equipment
Flow Chart available at the moment of the emergency, with main and alternate contractors and consultants (structural, geotechnical, Hydraulics,
contact details. DO NOT FOCUS ONLY IN CIVIL WORKS Mechanical,
CONTRACTORS Environmental Experts) details are furnished in the EAP Report by
Indicate a minimum of three different contractors per each of the making separate Annexures VII and Annexures XI .
following areas:
-Civil works
-Mechanical Works
-Instrumentation
-Special Equipment (pumps, diving)
- Consultants (Hydraulic, Geotechnical, Mechanical, Structural
- Heavy Equipment (cranes, bulldozers,etc.)
- Communications (IT, warning system,etc.)
There is no meaning of repeating the same contact details several
times, consider to merge all in a single box called “civil works”
instead.
If the page size is not enough, one option is to include only the most
important contacts and put a reference/note in the flowchart referring
to the rest of the contacts list (e.g. Note: Entire list of
Contractors/Suppliers can be found in Annexure No.5)}.
10. --- Watch State Dam Safety {Kindly include at least two contact details in this office, with titles, Noted & Corrected as per your suggestions in the watch condition
Condition Flow Office names, principal and alternative phone numbers (e.g. Director and Dy. flowchart page no X.
Chart Director}.
11. i Watch Condition Office of Chief {There is no need for such redundancy in the flowchart (the title is Noted & Corrected as per your suggestions in the watch condition
Flow Chart Engineer Title: Chief directly understood from the office name), especially when only one flowchart page no X.
Engineer name is included in each box. Space can be used more appropriately
/ and to include more valuable information (e.g. Officer’s Name and
Office Assistant mobile phone numbers}
Engineer Title: Assistant
Engineer Etc.
12. i Watch Condition Office of Planning and {Kindly include at least two contact details in this office, with titles, Noted & Corrected as per your suggestions in the watch condition
Flow Chart Design names, principal and alternative phone numbers (e.g. Director and flowchart page no X.
Dy.Director}
13. ii Failure Condition All {Suggestions from No. 6 to No. 12 are applicable in this flow chart as Noted & Corrected as per your suggestions in the watch condition
Flow Chart well} flowchart page no X.
14. ii Failure Condition All {No call sequence or order of notification was included in the Priorities and Sequence of the Govt., officials are incorporated in the
Flow Chart notification flowcharts, which is one of the important goals of these flow chart and the same has been amended in page no XI.
flowcharts. Please amend}
15. ii Failure Condition CWC Regional Office / {Please be aware that all the officials/agencies mentioned in the Noted, the official agencies who involves in the failure condition are
Flow Chart Sub Divisional flowchart should have explicit responsibilities in the emergency added in flow chart page no XI.
Engineer response process, adequately addressed within the document
/ If these agencies/officers do not have a role in the response process,
Critical Infrastructure please remove. Otherwise, indicate specific responsibilities for them
Officer The Guideline’s template is only a GUIDE and is not meant to be
followed blindly}.
16. ii Failure Condition New Central Dam Safety Organization Corrected and incorporated in page no XI.
Flow Chart {Please add the contact details of the Chief Engineer and DRIP
project Director}
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17. ii Failure Condition New {Please add the control room contact details for the Karnataka DMA Agreed and contact details of Karnataka Disaster Management
Flow Chart as well as the contact details of the National Disaster Response Authority and National Disaster Response Force has been added in the
Force} Failure Condition Flow Chart page no XI.
National Disaster Response Force

(http://www.ndrf.gov.in/ndrf-units):
18. ii Failure Condition New {Please add a box with the contact details of all the districts’ Contact details of all the districts’ representatives involved has been
Flow Chart representatives involved (i.e. Bagalkot, Bijapur). Include the contact added in the Failure Condition Flow Chart, page no XI and details
details of both District Collectors (also known as District Disaster provided as separate Annexure
Management Authority) and corresponding tahsildars.
Rest of relief authorities should also be included (i.e.,
Superintending of Police, Fire Department, etc.)
If space is not enough a District-wise notification flow chart can be
prepared. See Suggestion No.2}
19. ii Failure Condition Owner of {Please add the entire contact details for the Emergency Planning Corrected and incorporated in page no XI.
Flow Chart Downstream Dam Manager of the Downstream dam (i.e. Name, Title, and mobile and
[…] Dam Name: office phone number, email id). Indicate an alternate contact/officer
Narayanapura Dam as well.
Title: Executive The phone number given in this box does not correspond with the
Engineer Office No: number given in the Narayanpur EAP document for the same officer
08444-200422 (i.e. Executive Engineer), please amend}
20. ii Failure Condition New {Local media representatives (i.e. radio, tv, social media,) should be Noted, and will make social media groups and local media network in
Flow Chart added in the failure condition notification flow chart} the EAP.
21. iii EAP All {It is suggested to either substitute the “address” column by one Additional column for Acceptance signature has been added in page
Distribution list column called “Acceptance Signature” or add a new column to the number XIII.
table instead. In this column, all the officers should provide their
digital signatures by which they will concur with the content,
procedures and responsibilities described in the EAP}
22. iii EAP {Kindly include the Site Engineers in the distribution List (e.g. Noted and Engineers details has been added in page number XIII..
Distribution list New Junior Engineer, Assistant Engineer, etc.)
23. iii EAP State Public Works {See Suggestion No. 15} During an emergencies, SPWD takes the key role of providing
Distribution list Department alternative accessible roads and during evacuation
24. iii EAP New {See Suggestion No. 17} Corrected
Distribution list
25. iii EAP Downstream Dam {Kindly add the contact details of the Emergency Planning Manager Noted and incorporated.
Distribution list owner of the corresponding Dam. See Suggestion No. 19}
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No. No. / item
26. iii EAP All {Please incorporate ALL the contact details for each officer (i.e. Contact details of all the government representatives involved has
Distribution list NAME, title, principal and alternate phone number, email id). been added in the Failure Condition Flow Chart page no XI and
Include only a single phone number is not acceptable} details provided as separate Annexure
27. iii EAP All {After incorporating the changes in the Flowcharts, please update Noted and corrected as per your suggestions.
Distribution list the EAP Distribution list accordingly. Also, see suggestions from
No. 6 to 21}
28. vi Approval and All {Kindly include the names of appropriate officers in charge of the Noted and corrected as per your suggestions.
Implementation approval and implementation of the EAP.
Final approval should be done by the dam’s owner maximum
authority (e.g. Principal Secretary, Chief Engineer WRD) and the
acceptance of the notification procedures should be done by the
Chief Engineer (State Dam Safety organization), and the District
Disaster Management Authority (emergency Response
responsible).}
29. 2-4 7.2 Reservoir All {Kindly incorporate the following improvements to this section in Based on previous decade records from the past operation of the dam,
Operations the document as well as from the inundation maps submitted by CPMU, Rule Curve
- Include the Rule Curve for the reservoir operations of Graph has been added and the same details shown in page no 5&6,
Almatti Dam Alert condition incorporated.
- This section should address the levels of alerts (i.e.
thresholds for BLUE, ORANGE and RED alerts) depending
on the reservoir levels and spills.
The thresholds mentioned above can be established based on
historical records from the past operation of the dam, as well as from
the inundation maps submitted by CPMU.
For Instance, a BLUE alert can be triggered/declared as soon
spillway’s gates are operated; ORANGE alert can be reported when
the outflow/reservoir level is reaching its maximum historic. Finally,
a RED alert can be set when the reservoir inflow is near the revised
design flood or when some flooding is caused in the downstream
population.}
30. 5-6 3. All {Please improve this section of the document enumerating all the The entire section revised as per the suggestions and discussions with
Responsibilities responsibilities for each of the officials present in the notification the government officials with respect to their responsibilities during
flowchart (If the name of a person/authority is included in the the emergencies, details of responsibility has been shown in page no
notification flowchart is because he/she has 7-11.
Specific responsibilities).
Responsibilities for District Collector, Disaster Management
Authorities, State / National dam Safety Office, Police departments,
Relief Forces should also be addressed in the document.
Responsibilities for evacuation, notification, termination, and follow
up should also be improve it.
Please refer to the Hirakud model document for further details. See
suggestions No. 2
It is highly recommended to redraft this entire section with your own
words and actual procedures. The Guideline template is only a Guide
and is not meant to be followed blindly (as a form)}
31. 5 8.2 The Chief Engineer is {Is this really a responsibility of the Chief Engineer?? Looks like a The entire section revised as per the suggestions and discussions with
Responsibilities responsible for task for the site engineers or Executive Engineer.} the government officials with respect to their responsibilities during
for Notification inspecting the Dam in a the emergencies, details of responsibility has been shown in page no
potential emergency 7-11.
such as the potential
threat of high waters or
a tropical cyclone
Project ID code KA06HH0200 IV M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru


No. No. / item
32. 5 8.2 If warranted, the Chief {This paragraph is giving the same responsibility to the Chief The roles and responsibilities are relooked and District Collector will
Responsibilities Engineer will notify the Engineer and the District Collector. Only one Organization should manage the communications with the Disaster Management
for Notification State and District manage the communications with the disaster management Authorities, details of responsibility has been shown in page no 7-11.
Disaster Management authorities
Authorities. […] The This responsibility should be held by the District
Vijayapur District Collector/Magistrate, which is the District Maximum Authority and
Magistrate/Collector the District Disaster Management Authority. Please amend}
will implement the
Notification Flowchart
for regional and State
disaster management
contacts.
33. 6 8.3 Emergency The Emergency {Kindly be specific about the location (address) of the Operation Location of the operation center in the Dam zone will be finalized in
Operations Center Operations Centre will Center.} consultation with KBJNL officials.
be established at the
office of Krishna
Bhagya Jala Nigama
Ltd. The Chief Engineer
will be responsible for
initiating actions from
this
Location.
34. 6 8.4 Vijayapura District {Please include all the districts involved, as well as the rest of relief Details of Responsibility for Evacuation has been shown in page no
Responsibilities Disaster Management authorities (i.e. Police Fire departments, Response Forces). Please see 7-11.
for Evacuation Authority or Vijayapura Suggestion No. 2}
City Police are
responsible for initiating
evacuations.
35. 6 8.5 All {Please refer to the Hirakud EAP model document for further details Details of Responsibility for Duration and Security are incorporated
Responsibilities on how to adequately address this section} in the report.
for Duration,
Security,
Termination, and
Follow-up
36. 7 8.6 The various networks {This organization was not included in the notification flowcharts (i.e. Details are incorporated in the report.
Communications for emergency use Karnataka Ministry of Road Transport and Highways), and no contact
include the networks of details are described within the document.
the following: Kindly decide whether to keep or remove this organization based on
[…] The Karnataka the actual procedures of Almatti Dam}
Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways
37. 10 9.2 Emergency New {Please include in this chapter the reservoir levels (flood conditions) Season wise reservoir levels are incorporated in the Emergency
Evaluation and described in the section “2.2 Reservoir Operations” (See Suggestion Action Plan.
Classification No.29).}
38 12 9.3 Previously There are no previous {Writing that the dam does not have any problem is not acceptable Based on DSRP (Dam safety Review Panel) suggestions and Dam
Known Problems problems at Dam (Why Almatti Dam is part of a rehabilitation project then??? Is not expert’s suggestions, the previously known dam safety issues in the
location. logical). Kindly summaries the actual or previous dam safety issues DRIP-I have been taken care and the same will be followed for DRIP-
in the dam (i.e. seepage, slides, lack of monitoring/instrumentation, II. The revision of this section has been incorporated in the report.
warning system, malfunction of gates, leaching, silt, settlements,
animal burrows, trees in the dam body, etc.}
39. 12 10. 1 Surveillance Executive Engineer will {Same responsibility is given to the Chief Engineer in previous Details are incorporated in the report.
monitor the dam during paragraph. In page 12 (Responsibilities for Notification), is stated that
Project ID code KA06HH0200 V M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

No. No. / item
emergency situations “The Chief Engineer is responsible for inspecting the dam in a
such as a severe storm potential emergency such as the potential threat of high waters or a
event tropical cyclone.”
See Suggestion No. 30
It is requested to read the document several times before final
publication. The EAP is an important document, and its preparation
should not be taken so lightly. Assure all responsibilities and
procedures are consistent within the entire document}
40. 13 10.1.1 Executive Engineer will {Kindly address this aspect appropriately. Remove the template text Details are incorporated in the report.
Preparedness respond to situation of and use the actual procedures of Almatti dam to respond on flood
Response on excessive inflow conditions.
forecast of forecast by way of (See Suggestion No.29)}
excessive inflow: controlled spillway
releases after
ascertaining the
reliability of the
forecast.
41. 13 10.1.2 Executive Engineer will (This statement is not realistic (the same officer cannot be available During flood monitoring time, Assistant Engineer/ Assistant
Preparedness be available for 24 hr a day during the 365 days of a year). Please remove the sample Executive Engineer/ Executive Engineer will be available at the site.
Response during emergency response text and use the actual procedures.
weekends and during weekends and
holidays holidays and can be
present at the dam site
within 15 minutes of
detection of an
emergency condition
42. 13 10.1.3 Executive Engineer will {This statement is too vague. The EAP should be a specific document Details are incorporated in the report.
Preparedness arrange for access to with clear procedures of what to do and how to do it. Where are
Response during generators and lights to stored the generators (location details)? Who has access to it? Is a
periods of adequately monitor the provision of new generators needed? Are the generators operative,
darkness and situation. Executive and what is the maintenance schedule? These are some questions that
adverse weather Engineer will be able to should have a clear answer in the document
access the site during Also, almost all the responsibilities for preparedness are being given
adverse weather to the Executive Engineer, which is not realistic and practical.
conditions by foot or Please redraft the entire “preparedness” section using your own
utility vehicle. words and actual procedures. The template is only a guide, and it
is not meant to be used as a form.}
43. 13 10.2 Alternate access routes {Please remove the sample text from the template and address Alternative accessible roads for the Dam under different conditions
should be planned in the adequately this section. Customize the right access conditions to will be detailed with the help of Arc GIS MAP, and this work is under
Access to the site event of an emergency Almatti Dam under different conditions. Read the entire document progress.
at the dam. [Example: several times it’s suggested before its final approval.
The road […] See Suggestion No. 2}
44. 13 10.2 All {The inundation maps for ALMATTI (large controlled release Alternative accessible roads for the Dam under different conditions
scenario, Figure 2) depicts some access roads and crossings prone to will be detailed with the help of Arc GIS MAP, and this work is under
Access to the site be affected. Therefore, please include which of these roads/accesses progress.
are safe to use under the different emergency conditions (LCR, dam
failure etc.)
Please check Table 7 (Section 6.5. Access to the site) of the Hirakud
EAP model document for your reference in how this section should be
adequately addressed}
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45. 13 10.3 All {Since new information was added to improve the document in the Noted and incorporated.
Possible section “Emergency Detection-Situations” (i.e. 9.1.3 Material
Preventive Deterioration Problems , page 9), it is recommended to include
Measures preventive/remedial measures also for this new conditions}
46. 15 11.1.1 Equipment Equipment that is {No equipment is mentioned in this Annexure, only civil works The list of equipment’s has been incorporated in Annexure VII.
and Supplies available for use and contractors. Please amend}
local contractors that
can be contacted […]
are listed in Tab 7.
47. 15 11.2 Reports Pre-monsoon and post- {The following questions should be answered in this matter: Who is Pre-monsoon inspections will be carried out from June 15th to July
Technical Data monsoon inspections of responsible for these inspections/reports?, When are these reports 15th and Post- monsoon inspections will be carried out from
the dam will be made to available for review/reference (months)?} November, 15th to December 15th.
evaluate its structural
safety, stability, and
Operational adequacy
48. 15 11.2 Reports Alternate personnel will {Who are the alternate personnel? The EAP should be a specific Noted and incorporated.
Technical Data be familiar with the document with no room to ambiguities. Be specific about the officer’s
location of the designations and responsibilities}
documents in the event
of an emergency
situation.
49. 16 13 Inundation it has been determined {Which are these structures? The EAP document should identify Structures that could be affected includes local habitations such as
Area that there were a these structures (locations and hazard reference values such as arrival cities, towns and villages, roads, institutes, etc and the details of
significant number of time and water surface elevations} Inundated villages, Affected areas, reference values maximum depth,
structures that could be velocity and flood arrival time has been represented in Annexure- III
affected due to a design and inundation maps prepared with the help of Arc GIS shown in
flood or sunny-day Dam Annexure – II.
breach
50. 16-17 13 Inundation All {Please be more descriptive about the affected area. The template is This section has been revisited and with the help of Arc GIS software,
Area only a Guide and is not meant to be followed blindly. This paragraph inundation area has been prepared and shown in Annexure 1.
can mention the significant areas prone to be affected (taluks,
panchayats, etc.) and the extension of the consequences
This entire section should be redrafted using your own words and
based on the actual results for Almatti Dam.
Kindly check to the Hirakud EAP model document for your reference
on how to address this section appropriately}
51. 17 13.1 Local All {A local evacuation plan should be prepared and attached in this Noted and incorporated.
Evacuation Plan document.
Customize, modify and tailor all this section based on the specific
conditions and results of Almatti Dam. Prepare a table similar to
Figure 3 (annexed to this document) based on the inundation maps.
Identify principal and alternate evacuation routes for every
settlement/village and establish the appropriate shelter/ refuge.
Priorities based on the wave arrival time (warning time/evacuation
window).
A separate Annexure/map can be prepared in this regard}
52. 17 13.1 Local These bridges include {Which are these bridges/crossings? This information should be Details of Inundated villages and affected areas are represented with
Evacuation Plan the Krishna River already explicit in the EAP and inundation maps (Previous the the help of Arc GIS Maps in further studies.
crossings of NH 50. See emergency event). Please include a map with the location of bridges
the Inundation Map in and highways to be closed/restricted (if exist) in case of an
Annexure 2 to determine emergency.
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appropriate barricade Please check the Hirakud EAP model document for your kind
locations. reference
See Suggestion No 49}
53. 18 14 All {Please ensure this entire section is in line with the model document of Noted and adhered accordingly.
Implementation Hirakud EAP}
54. 22-76 Inundation All {Include the maps prepared without any reduction in resolution and Noted
Maps quality. Include original maps with a proper page size and scale
(minimum A3 sheet size, 1:50000 maximum scale), in colour print
and without any distortion
The maps should be printed in a full-page size and not as an inserted
image in the document. This can be done in a different booklet if is
desired}
55. 74-81 Flood Hazard Table {As local authorities/engineers, it is expected that SPMU/Dam Noted and adhered accordingly.
Reference Values engineers modify the name of the locations as per the actual names.
Therefore, please change for an adequate name in those locations
marked as “unnamed/unidentified settlement”;
56. 85-97 Annexe 6 All { Please ensure this table is in line with the Annexure 4 of the model Noted
Evidence of document for Hirakud EAP and is duly customized for Almatti Dam
Distress (i.e. Actions and Responsible)
(See Suggestion No.29 and No. 45)}
57. 98 Annex 7 All (See Suggestion No.46) The details of Supplies and Resources has been incorporated in
Supplies and {This annexure should indicate at least three different contractors Annexure VII page no 53.
Resources per area of specialization (i.e. civil works, geotechnics, mechanical
works, consultancy, suppliers, etc.). Do not focus only on civil
workscontractors.
Kindly add main and alternative contact details. Adding only the
name of the company is of no use in the emergency response.
A vast list of contractors should be available in the moment of the

emergency, with main and alternative contact details. Please check
the Hirakud EAP model document (Annexure 5) for your kind
reference
All the contractor’s details can be added either directly in the flow
chart, or the most important contractors can be included in the flow
chart, and the rest can be referenced in theannexures})
58. --- All document General suggestion {Use a ring binder (loose-leaf binder) with proper identification Adhered accordingly.
labels to store the hard copies of the document, this will help in the
updating process of any part of the document}
59. --- All document General suggestion {include a Table of Content for the Annexures of the document in the Adhered accordingly.
first inside face of the ring binder}
Project ID code KA06HH0200 VIII M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru
Notification Flowchart (Watch Condition)
Note :**Resource Contractors Details Shown in Annexure XII**
Project ID code KA06HH0200 IX M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Notification Flowchart (Failure Condition)
Project ID code KA06HH0200 X M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

THIS PAGE IS LEFT INTENTINALLY BLANK
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XI M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (Almatti Dam)

EAP Distribution List
A copy of the EAP has been provided to the following people:
Authority Emergency Contact Details Acceptance sign

Principal Secretary
Rakesh Singh, IAS
Government of Vikasasoudha Bangalore
Karnataka Karnataka
Off No:080-
22257064/22034710
R.P.Kulkarni (C E) K.B.J.N.L,
Dam Owner(s) and
Dam Zone Almatti
Representatives
08426-281038
Patil B.S(SE)
Dam Owner(s) and
K.B.J.N.L, Dam Circle Almatti
Representatives
08426-281063
Krishna Bhagya Jala Emergency Planning manager
Nigam limited, D.Basavaraju (EE)
Almatti 08426-281027
Office of District Y S Patil, IAS
Collector District Collector
Vijaypura District Phone: 08352-250021
Office of District R Ramachandran IAS
Bagalkot District Phone: 08354-235091
Office of District SHARAT B, IAS
Raichur District Phone:08532-229011, 229012
H Prasanna, KAS
Office of Assistant
Additional Deputy
Commissioner
Commissioner
Vijaypura
08352-250021
Duragesh K Rudrakshi
Office of Assistant
Additional Deputy
Commissioner
Commissioner
Bagalkot
08354-235093
Office of Assistant
Assistant Commissioner
Commissioner
Raichur
Raichur
08532 – 225630
Vinay Kulkarni
Tahsildar’s Office Apparna Pawate
Vijaypura 08352-278707
08358-245226
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XII M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru
Tahsildar’s Office M.B.Nagathan

Bagalkot 08354-220374
Shivanand Sagar
Tahsildar’s Shivasharanayya Kattoli
OfficeRaichur 08531-260028
08232-226209
Director (Chief Engineer)CWC,
State Dam Safety SevaBhavan, Delhi
Chickrayappa T.N.
Organisation 9483470181
Phone: 08236-257223
The Principal Secretary to
Government, (Disaster
Karnataka State
Management), 1st Gate, 6th
Disaster
Floor,
Management
M. S. Building, Bangalore-560
Authority
001
Phone: 080-67355000
Under Secretary (Mitigation)
National Disaster
NDMA Bhavana, A-1 Safdarjung
Management
Enclave New Delhi.
Authority
Phone: 011-26701896
Superintendent of Prakash Nikham IPS

police Vijaypura 08352- 250844, 08352-250948
Lokesh Bharamappa Jagalasar

Superintendent of
IPS
police Bagalkot
08354-235077
Superintendent of C.B.Vedamurthy
police Raichur 08532-235001
H.K.Krishnegouda
Chief Engineer
Downstream Dam
KBJNL, O&M ZONE, Narayanpur
owner
08444-229653
8548864937
080-22943346
KSISF Almatti Dam
Commandant Battalion 3,
Security
KSISF, Dharwad.
KSISF Almatti Dam Police Inspector, KSISF, Almatti
Security Dam security, Sitimani.
Karnataka State KSNDMC Campus, Near Attur
Disaster Monitoring Layout Yalahanka
Centre 080-22032416/1070
Assistant Engineer
Krishna Bhagya Jala S.B.Chittawadgi
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XIII M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Nigam limited 08426-281188
Almatti
Assistant Engineer
Krishna Bhagya Jala
Narendra H.C,
Nigam limited,
8762682428
Almatti
naren.hc@gmail.com
Krishna Bhagya Jala Assistant Engineer
Nigam limited, Vithal Jadhav
Almatti 9480165309
Krishna Bhagya Jala Junior Engineer

Nigam limited, Akshay Desai
Almatti 9916432999
Krishna Bhagya Jala Junior Engineer
Nigam limited, Santosh Ganad
Almatti 9738039986
Karnataka State
Natural Disaster
Director
Monitoring Centre,
080-67355000
KSNDMC Near attur
office@ksndmc.org
layout
Yelahanka
National Disaster
S.N.Pradhan. Director General
Response Force
NDRF
6thFloor , NDCC-II
011-23438136
Building, New Delhi
Karnataka Ministry
of Road Transport
and Highways, 1st Commissioner
Floor, 'A' Block, Karnataka Ministry of Road
TTMC. Building, Transport and Highways
phone : 080-22210994
Shantinagar,
Bengaluru-560027
Pramod Narayan Singh
Project Director DRIP& Head
Central Water
CPMU Mob:9958975921
Commission(CWC)
Off:011-26192633/29583480
Email : dir-drip-cwc@nic.in
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XIV M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Log Sheet of Changes
The following changes have been made to the EAP, and revisions have been provided to
the people shown on the EAP Distribution List.
Date Change Made Signature
Draft EAP has been sent to the

May 2019
KBJNL.
Update of the Entire document,

adding new & updated
September notification Flow chart,
2019 inundation maps, Rule curve
Graph, and also changes made in
overall responsibility.
November Suggestions given from KBJNL

officials in the meeting held on
2019 28.11.2019 are incorporated.
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XV M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Project ID code KA06HH0200 XVI M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Approval and Implementation
This Emergency Action Plan is here by approved. This plan is effective immediately and
supersedes all previous editions.
Rakesh Singh, IAS

Principal Secretary to Government of Karnataka Water Resource Department Bangalore
080-22257064/22034710
……./……./……..
I have received a copy of this Emergency Action Plan and concur with the notification
procedures.
Chickrayappa. T.N (C E) State Dam Safety Organization

08236 - 257223
Prabhakar D. Hamigi (C E) Karnataka Water Resource Department

080-22871174/080-22872247
Dr D.N Vinutha (District Disaster Professional) District Disaster Management Authority

080-29781022
R.P.Kulkarni (C E) Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd, Dam Zone Almatti

08426-281038
Date:…/…/….
Project ID code KA06HH0200 XVII M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru
EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

1.0 Purpose
The purpose of this Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is to identify emergencies that could
threaten LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (Almatti Dam) and to plan for an expedited,
effective response to prevent failure of the Dam and warn downstream residents of
impending danger. This plan defines the notification procedures to be followed in the
event of a potentially hazardous situation. The procedures are intended to protect lives
and prevent property damage from an excessive release of water from the Dam
spillways or an uncontrolled outflow of water from the breached portion of Dam.
2.0 Dam Description
2.1. General
Lal Bahadur Shastri Sagar (Almatti Dam) and Reservoir are owned and operated by
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. It is located between, village Almatti of Basavana
Bagewadi taluk and sitimani village, Vijaypura District. The Dam was completed in 2002
and was constructed under Project No. D04310 granted to Owner in 2002. The
reservoir was constructed to serve as a major multipurpose reservoir.
This river being an inter-state river, water utilization as of now is in accordance with
the KWDT (Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal) award of 1976 based on the estimated
75% dependable yield with return flows. The water allocated to Karnataka was 734
TMC. Government of Karnataka has approved a Master plan to utilize 734 TMC of water
in Krishna basin. Out of this, an allocation made for Upper Krishna Project is 4,871.04
MCM (173 TMC).
In Krishna basin, major Irrigation Projects such as Ghataprabha Project and Malaprabha
Project were taken up for implementation, to provide irrigation facilities to the drought
prone areas of Dharwad and Belgaum Districts; Reservoirs were constructed across the
Rivers Ghataprabha and Malaprabha. Gravity canal network and lift irrigation schemes
were provided in the command area.
Project ID code KA06HH0200 1 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Project is planned under Upper Krishna stage I and Stage II for utilization of
4,871.04 MCM (173) TMC. Stage I of the project has been completed and Stage II project
is nearing completion and the total area proposed for irrigation in Stage I and Stage II is
6, 22,023 Ha in Shorapur, Shahpur and Jewargi taluks of Gulbarga District, Sindagi, Indi,
Bijapur, Muddebihal and Basavana Bagewadi taluka’s of Bijapur District, Bagalkot,
Hungund and Jamakhandi taluka’s of Bagalkot District and Lingsugur and Devadurga
taluks of Raichur District.
Out of the Karnataka's share of water, the Government of Karnataka has allocated 130
TMC of water to UKP Stage III schemes. This allocation is to be utilized by way of storing
additional water in the Reservoir by duly raising the FRL from EL: 519.60 m to EL:
524.256 m of Almatti Dam for irrigating an area of 5,30,475 ha in Bijapur, Bagalkot,
Gulbarga, Raichur and Koppal Districts (25 TMC under 65% dependability allocation
and 105 TMC under surplus flows). The total utilization of water for Upper Krishna
Project will be (173 + 130) 303 TMC (Error! Reference source not found. shows the
layout plan of Almatti Dam).
2.2 Reservoir Operations
Table 1 : Reservoir features
FRL 519.60 m (UKP Stage-II), 524.256 m (UKP Stage III)
Original MWL 524.456 m
TBL 529.256 m
Revised Flood Peak 47318 cumecs
Hoist Cylinder support (Cardanic Suspension)

523.00m
Hoist is located at Elevation
Power pack rooms 527.439 m
Catchment Area 35,925 Sq.km (13,871 Sq.miles)
Live Storage 105.46 TMC

Table 1 : Reservoir features
Dead Storage 17.62 TMC
Gross Storage 123.08 TMC
Crest Gate Details
No’s 26
Size 15*15.24 meters (Radial)
Additional spillways details No Additional spillways.
A vicinity map showing the location of the Dam is presented in Annexure 1. Inundation
maps showing the areas subject to flooding as a result of a Dam failure are provided in
Annexure 2. The inundation area is described in further detail in the Inundation Area
section of the report. Lastly, a description of the dam, its spillways, and other features
are outlined in the Dam Description Annexure 4.
2.2.1 Basic Data
The Almatti operation plan consists of step-by-step instructions for operating the dam
and reservoir during routine (normal) and emergency conditions. The operating
procedures for normal operations are discussed in this chapter including operating
criteria for the reservoir, spillway &outlets. The operation of a Dam involves regulation
of its reservoir as per project specific requirements. This includes the use of area
capacity curves and design flood; both are described below.
 Design Flood and Features Related to Safety
The maximum flood design at Almatti Dam site was earlier fixed at 31,007 cumecs.
This was based on the frequency studies for a return period of 10,000 years with 95%
upper continent limit recommended by the Panel of Experts appointed for this purpose
in January 1978.
The spillway is designed for this design flood with 10-percent of the gates non-
operative. The design flood has been reviewed under DRIP. The surplusing capacity of

the spillway was checked for the revised designed flood of 47318 cumecs) with all the
gates operative and is considered to be safe.
Flood Management at Almatti and Narayanpur Reservoirs
Recommended Gate Operation Procedures for Normal Flow Conditions Under normal
flow conditions (i.e. for inflow less than 3 lakh cusecs), the reservoir is operated
according to the rule curve elevations. This means that the irrigation requirements at
Almatti and Narayanpur are met, if the Almatti reservoir level is still above the rule
curve elevation indicated for the concerned fortnight (during June- November) or
month (during December - May), additional releases are made through the turbine for
power production till the water level reaches the rule curve elevation, subject to the
capacity of the turbines: This is done through the penstocks. Only if the water level
tends to rise above 519.6m (524.256mforthehigherFRL), the crest gates are opened.
Sequence of opening or closing of gates.
Out of 26 crest gates, three are intended as stand-by. However, since the model test
results provided by KERS, Krishnarajasagar, relate to the condition when all 26 gates
are open, it is recommended that all 26 gates be operated for releasing water over the
spillway. The gates are numbered 1 to 26.
If, even when water is being released through the turbines at full capacity, the reservoir
level tends to rise above 519.6m (524.256 m for the higher FRL) ,the crest gates should
be opened, starting With the end gates first (i.e., gate No.1 and 26), then the gates at the
center (gates 13 and 14). And then the remaining gates in a systematic manner, such
that the no gate is opened more tha 0.2m. If the releas over the spillway is to be further
increased, the gates are opened further in a similar manner, no gate openingbeing more
than 0.4m. Further opening of gates, if required is dorie in the same way, keeping the
difference in the openings if any two adjacent gates- not more than 0.2m.
During the recession part of the inflow hydrograph, it may be necessary to close the
crest gates in order to maintain the reservoir level at the rule curve elevation. In such a
case, the closure of the gates should be done in the reverse order; the gate opened last
being closed first, the entire operation being such that the difference between the
adjacent gate openings never exceed 0.2-m.
2.2 Rule curve

Under an earlier project, working tables

Table 2 : working table for Almatti reservoir
for the Almatti reservoir were prepared
FRL FRL
Month
for two cases, viz., when the FRL was (i) 519.60 m 524.256 m
June - I 508.62 506.87
5I9.6m and (ii) 524.256m. In each, the
June - II 513.60 515.04
rule curve (also called guide curves) July - I 517.11 519.32
elevations were developed as shown in July - II 513.60 516.81
August - I 518.66 522.09
the Table 2.
August - II 519.60 524.256
These elevations are the target reservoir September - I 519.60 522.87
September - II 519.60 520.33
levels to be achieved at the end of
October - I 518.18 517.66
respective fortnights during June to October - II 519.60 519.94
November and respective months during November - I 516.81 522.09
November - II 519.60 522.09
December to May, for optimal power December 513.02 514.12
products without detriment to irrigation. January 513.02 514.12
The rule curve elevations are shown February 508.62 511.69
March 508.62 511.69
graphically in Figure . April 508.62 510.89
May 508.62 506.87

530.00
RULE CURVE ELEVATION
FRL 519.60 m
525.00
FRL 524.256 m
Resevoir Elevation in Meters
520.00
515.00
510.00
505.00
Period
Figure 1 : Rule Curve Elevation for LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (ALMATTI)

3.0 Responsibilities
3.1 Dam Owner’s Responsibilities
The Dam owner, Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd, is responsible for all Dam operation
and maintenance. The EAP will not designate a specific person for a specific
responsibility but instead will designate the person’s duties or job description.
Roles & Responsibility of AEE AE and JE during Flood Condition
 Coordinate with the Project Engineers of the State of Maharashtra & to get the
information in email on the rainfall in the catchment and inflow status at the state
boundary (Rajapur weir) and to bring it to the notice of the EE/SE/CE
 Assist the EE/SE/CE to issue notification to the villagers downstream in
Newspapers, Radio, TV News channel to be alert regarding the flood situation
 Assist the EE/SE/CE to coordinate with the Revenue authorities (District
Administration) to alert the downstream villagers to evacuate the flood zone to prevent
loss of life and livestock.
 Assist the EE/SE/CE to coordinate with the CWC flood monitoring authorities on
the flood condition.
 Maintain the reservoir water level gauge register and to update on hourly basis
during floods. And to bring to the notice of EE/SE/CE.
 Assess the inflows in the reservoir as per the approved reservoir operation and
to prepare performance consisting of the status of the reservoir capacity and releases
from the reservoir as per the standard Performa and to submit to the EE/SE/CE.
 Submit to the EE/SE/CE on the inflows and releases from the reservoir and
status of the reservoir twice in the day.
 Maintain the spillway crest gate operation log book
 Operate the Spillway crest gates for flood mitigation as per the instructions of
the EE/SE/CE and to update the Gate Operation Log book
 Observe the seepages in the drainage Gallery with respect to the reservoir head
and record the seepages in the infiltration gallery and to immediately bring to the notice
of the EE/SE/CE in case of excessive seepage, leakage in any specific blocks and porous
drains
 Maintain the pump operation log books for the dewatering pumps in the
drainage gallery and to submit to EE/SE/CE

 Observe the gates and to see that the drain holes are not clogged and floating
debris is not deposited in the gate components
 Monitor the condition of the Welding transformers, gas cutting sets, umbrellas,
tool kits torches chain blocks ropes etc on daily basis and to see that things are in place
to handle any emergency situation
 Observe the Gates, hoists and handling equipment during operation for the
smooth movements and to immediately report any untoward excessive sounds in the
motors, pumps or vibrations in the gate.
 Observe the Dam top, embankment, catwalk, approach roads are well maintained
by house-keeping personnel.
 Observe the performance of the Dam and its appurtenant structures / Gates and
Hoists during flood water releases and to report to the EE/SE/CE in case of any
untoward incidents or malfunctioning of the gates of excessive seepages, leakages etc.
 Assist EE/SE/CE to coordinate with the downstream Narayanpur Dam Project
Engineers and getting the flow data
 Assist EE/SE/CE to share the flow data and the reservoir storage details to the
Media on day to day basis
 Assist EE/SE/CE to coordinate with the Project Engineers of the State of Andhra
Pradesh/Telangana and sharing the details of the flood condition in the river and the
reservoir releases
Roles & Responsibility of SE and EE during Flood Condition
 Coordinate with the Project Engineers of the State of Maharashtra & to get the
information in email on the rainfall in the catchment and inflow status at the state
boundary (Rajapur weir) and to bring it to the notice of the CE.
 To issue notification to the villagers downstream in Newspapers, Radio, TV News
channel to be alert regarding the flood situation
 Assist the CE to coordinate with the Revenue authorities (District
Administration) to alert the downstream villagers to evacuate the flood zone to prevent
loss of life and live stock
 Assist the CE to coordinate with the CWC flood monitoring authorities on the
flood condition
 Submit to the CE on the inflows and releases from the reservoir and status of the
reservoir twice in the day
 Operate the Spillway crest gates for flood mitigation as per the instructions of
the CE and to update the Gate Operation Log book
 Observe the seepages in the drainage Gallery with respect to the reservoir head
and record the seepages in the infiltration gallery and to immediately bring to the notice
of the CE in case of excessive seepage, leakage in any specific blocks and porous drains
 Observe the Gates, hoists and handling equipment during operation for the
smooth movements and to immediately report any untoward excessive sounds in the
motors, pumps or vibrations in the gate
 Observe the Dam top, embankment, catwalk, approach roads are well maintained
by house-keeping personnel
Hoists during flood water releases and to report to the CE in case of any untoward
incidents or malfunctioning of the gates of excessive seepages, leakages etc
 Assist CE to share the flow data and the reservoir storage details to the Media on
day to day basis
 Assist CE to coordinate with the Project Engineers of the State of Andhra
Pradesh/Telangana and sharing the details of the flood condition in the river and the
reservoir releases
Roles & Responsibility of CE during Flood Condition
 To issue notification to the villagers downstream in Newspapers, Radio, TV News

channel to be alert regarding the flood situation based on the input by Project Engineers
of the State of Maharashtra, to the information on the rainfall in the catchment and
inflow status at the state boundary (Rajapur weir) and also to Coordinate with the
Revenue authorities (District Administration)
 Coordinate with the CWC flood monitoring authorities on the flood condition
 Issue necessary instructions to the engineers to Operate the reservoir based on
the inflows, rainfall data, releases from the upstream reservoirs and status of the
reservoir
Hoists during flood water releases and to issue necessary instructions to the
AEE/EE/SE
 Coordinate with the downstream Narayanpur Dam Project Engineers
 Conduct Pre and Post Monsoon inspections of the Dam.
Roles & Responsibility of District commissioner/Disaster Management Authority
 Implement the Notification Flow Chart for regional and State Disaster
Management Contacts
 Contact Local Law Enforcement Authorities and relief authorities under their
jurisdiction.
 Liaising and Coordinating with early warning agencies like IMD, CWC, INCOIS,
etc for disaster specific information and disseminating the information for coordinating
with the STATE GOVT. Facilitating the deployment of NDRF in the disaster affected
districts during disaster issue public announcement in coordination with Dam owners
officials and media representatives about the status of emergency event.
Roles & Responsibility of Relief Authorities (Police Department, Civil Defence,

Army Forces
 Notify downstream residents in vulnerable areas.

 Provide to the District Disaster Management authority precise and accurate
feedback information about progress of relief action and advice the emergency can be
terminated.
 Notify to their corresponding command the necessity to deploy more resources
to attend the rescue and relief actions.
Roles & Responsibility of Media Representatives
 Disseminate wide public awareness during emergency condition of Dam through

social media platform such as Face Book, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Instagram.
 The news media, including radio, television and newspapers, should be utilized
to the extent available and appropriate
 Pre plan in coordination with Chief Engineer/ Superintending Engineer the most
effective way to disseminate the most delicate and common emergency situations
among the population. Pre-defined news shall be available in order to improve
readiness of the decision making process.
3.3 Emergency Operations Centre
In the event of a failure condition, the Executive Engineer will activate the Emergency
Operations Centre to serve as the main distribution centre for warning and evacuation
activities. The Emergency Operations Centre will be established at the office of Krishna

Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd Almatti. The Chief Engineer will be responsible for initiating
actions from this location.
3.4 Responsibilities for Evacuation
Evacuation and relief actions are Exclusive responsibilities of District Authorities, and
emergency relief forces at local and state level. For Almatti Dam, a total 3 districts
would be directly affected by a potential failure / Emergency /event at the Dam site, and
therefore, each districts representative is responsible for evacuation/ relief actions in
their jurisdiction. List of Districts potentially affected by an Emergency Event in Almatti
Dam are given below,
Sl No Districts The Vijaypura, Bagalkot, Raichur Districts

Disaster Management Authority or Vijaypura,
1 Vijaypura
Bagalkot, Raichur Districts City Police are
2 Bagalkot responsible for initiating evacuations.
3 Raichur
3.5 Responsibilities for Duration, Security, Termination, and Follow-up
 The Executive Engineer is responsible for monitoring of emergency situations at

the Dam and keeping authorities informed, based on the Notification Flowcharts.
 The Executive Engineer and the Vijaypura District Magistrate/Collector are
responsible for declaring that an emergency at the Dam is terminated. Applicable
authorities will be notified based on the Notification Flowcharts.
 The Chief Engineer will ensure that a follow-up evaluation is completed by all
participants after the emergency. The results of the evaluation should be documented in
a written report and filed with the EAP.
 Responsibility of Managing director is to inspect the Dam once in a year, and
Providing Funds for normal operation expense and for any immediate repair works as
per the site requirement based on the estimates submitted by CE.
 Deputing design wing officials or the technical experts as and when required and
requested by CE.
 Responsibility of S.D.S.O is to check the pre monsoon and post monsoon reports
and identify the problems which are needed to be attended and provide suitable
remedial measures.
 Making suitable arrangements to DSRP officials for inspection as and when

required.
 Reporting problems faced of forecasted to CDSO.
4.0 Communications
Local officials and downstream residents will be notified by landline telephone, if

available; otherwise via cell phones or emergency personnel (in person or using their
radios). The various networks for emergency use include the networks of the following:
• The Vijaypura District Police or Vijaypura City Police
• The Bagalkot District Police or Bagalkot City Police
• The Raichur District Police or Raichur City Police
• The Karnataka Disaster Management Authority
• The Karnataka Ministry of Road Transport and Highways
Sample public announcements appear in Annexure 5. Verification or authentication of

the situation can be made by contacting the Chief Engineer and the Vijaypura District,
Bagalkot District, and Raichur district disaster management officials. Television, Radio
and bulk SMS facilities of the local Mobile Network Operators can be used as much as
possible to notify area residents of the possible dangers. Public announcements are to
be issued by the concerned District Disaster Management officials or the Krishna
Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd public affairs officer.
5.0 Emergency Detection, Evaluation, and Classification
5.1 Emergency Detection
5.1.1Situations
Many Dam conditions can lead to emergency situations, not all of which will necessitate
the implementation of the EAP. However, if any of them occur, the appropriate actions
must be taken.
 Severe Storms/Inclement Weather: Although generally not in themselves, a

threat to the Dam, severe storms and other inclement weather conditions can
contribute to an existing problem and hinder any remediation efforts. Severe
storms also cause the uncontrolled release of floodwater, and increase flow in
already rain-swollen areas.

 Tropical cyclones: Tropical cyclones do occur in the area, with the potential for
structural damage to the Dam, possibly resulting in its failure. If a tropical
cyclone has struck in the area, an inspection of the Dam for any signs of damage
will be appropriate.
 Earthquakes: Almatti Dam is located in the seismic zone [II]. An earthquake is a
possibility, and appropriate post-earthquake inspections should be performed.
The epicentre of the Earthquake is Kalgurki which is 25km away from Almatti
Dam site. The Karnataka State Natural Disaster Monitoring centre (KSNDMC) has
established a Seismological observatory. Micro-tremors of magnitude less than
2.5 were observed during 2010.
 Sabotage: A threat to damage the Dam has been made. Appropriate actions must
be taken to protect the Dam. Almatti Dam has been provided with security cover
of Karnataka State Industrial Security Force (KSISF). 96 KSISF Security personnel
are deployed for Dam security round the clock.
5.1.2 Signs of Failure
The Executive Engineer is responsible for conducting routine inspections and

identifying conditions that could indicate the onset of problems leading to a Dam failure.
The early identification of potentially dangerous conditions can allow time for the
implementation of EAPs. It is important to understand how distress can develop into
failure. With appropriate action, distress need not lead to a catastrophic failure of the
Dam. The following sections describe some of the different types of failure, which could
lead to a Dam failure.
 Seepage Failure: Although all earthen embankments allow some, minor seepage
through the Dam or the foundation, excessive, uncontrolled seepage can result in
piping (the movement of embankment material in the seepage flow) and lead to
failure. Piping can occur for years at a slow rate. If the piping has progressed to a
dangerous level, it will be evident by increased flow or the discharge of muddy
water (or both). At that stage, immediate action to stop the piping is needed.
Fully developed piping is difficult to control and is very likely to result in failure.
A whirlpool in the reservoir is a sign of uncontrollable piping and necessitates
immediate emergency action.

 Embankment or Foundation Sliding: Sliding is usually first apparent when cracks

or bulges in the embankment appear. Slides with progressive movement can
cause failure of the embankment.
 Structural Failure: The structural failure or collapse of any non-overflow portion
of the Dam, spillway or spillway gates could result in loss of the reservoir. A
structural failure of a portion of the spillway could cause piping and possibly
embankment failure.
 Overtopping Failure: Overtopping of the embankment results in erosion of the
Dam crest. Once erosion begins, it is very difficult to stop.
5.1.3 Material Deterioration Problems
The problems of concrete/masonry deterioration may be due to:
 Expansion and consequent volume changes due to shrinkage, cracking, thermal

effects of cement hydration, and temperature changes in the body of the Dam
and alkali aggregate reaction.
 Use of poor materials: - Use of poorly graded or weak aggregate in the concrete
mix.
 Due to poor workmanship like -Lean mix Poor, compaction or joints, preparation
Aggressive water in the reservoir (acidic), Frost action in the cracks, freezing and
thawing action and Vegetation growth.
5.1.4 Alkali aggregate reaction
 The structural damage and deterioration of the concrete is generally quite

evident when the total alkali concentration is greater than about 0.60 per cent
expressed as Na2O and there is an abundance of highly reactive siliceous -
material in the aggregates.
 Cracking, usually of random pattern at a fairly large scale on the surface
extending to a depth of 15 cms to 45 cms.
 Oozing of gelatinous and whitish amorphous deposits on the surface.
 Chalky appearance of the freshly fractured concrete.

5.1.5 Sulphate attack
 Certain salts like sulphates of Sodium, Potassium, Calcium or Magnesium are

sometimes found in soil or dissolved in ground water adjacent to concrete
structures and they can attack concrete.
5.1.6 Leaching of Lime
 The process of dissolution and removal of Calcium Hydroxide from the hardened
cement by the water percolating through the body of concrete or masonry Dam
is known as lime leaching.
 When the seepage water containing soluble product of cement hydration
evaporates at the surface of concrete, a white deposit of calcium carbonate is
formed on the surface of the concrete due to reaction of Calcium Hydroxide with
the atmospheric Carbon Dioxide. This is also known as "Efflorescence". All
concrete/masonry structures constructed with Portland cement have to
inevitably undergo lime leaching and after a certain period of time, loose
cohesiveness.
5.2 Emergency Evaluation and Classification
This section lists the conditions and actions, which may be used to classify the level of
emergency response, as a guide for the Executive Engineer. Specific Dam observations
and corresponding emergency classification levels can be found in the Evidence of
Distress table in Annexure 5.
5.2.1 Internal Alert Condition BLUE –A “watch” condition. A problem has been
detected at the Dam that requires constant monitoring. At this time, the distress
condition is manageable by Dam personnel. The Executive Engineer will be responsible
for monitoring, repair as soon as possible, and implementing the appropriate
Notification Flowchart. The following is a list of conditions that would initiate this
condition:
 Cloudy or dirty seepage or seepage with an increase in flow, boils, piping, or bogs
 Seepage around conduits.
 Large sinkholes with corresponding seepage anywhere on the embankment or

downstream from the toe

 Any slide that degrades the crest of the embankment or that is progressively
increasing in size.
 Cracking or movement of any concrete structure.
 An increase in the reservoir level leading to engagement of the emergency

spillway
 Exceptionally heavy rainfall in the catchment of the Dam reservoir.
 Shearing of the Bolts in critical components viz. Trunnion, Arm and Horizontal
girder termination plates.
 Deformations in the Web plate connecting lifting connections to Hydraulic

Hoists.
 Welds: Cracks in critical welds of Gates viz. Tie flats, Trunnion Hub, Yoke Girder
Ribs.
 Profuse leakages in Hydraulic Hoists (Hoses).
5.2.2 External Alert Condition ORANGE– This is indicative of a Dam condition that is
progressively getting worse; and there is a high probability of Dam failure. Although
there is no immediate danger, the Dam could fail if conditions continue to deteriorate.
The Executive Engineer will be responsible for initiating immediate repairs, including
lowering the reservoir if appropriate and implementing the appropriate Notification
Flowchart. The following is a list of conditions that would initiate this condition:
 Large boils, increasing in size and flow rate, especially if there is flowing muddy
water
 Significantly increasing seepage, especially flowing muddy water
 Slides involving a large mass of material that impairs the crest of the Dam and is
continuing to move
 Sinkholes with seepage flowing muddy water
 Large cracks, movement or failure of a portion of any major concrete structure

that forms an integral part of the Dam
 An increase in the reservoir level to near the top of the Dam
 Overtopping of a Dam that is not designed for overtopping

 Near to ‘Design Flood’ inflow forecast
 Buckling of Radial Arms
 Upheavals in Trunnion Chair and Failure of Anchor rods.
5.2.3 External Alert Conditions RED – These are “failure” conditions. Either the Dam
is in immediate danger of failing or has already failed. No time remains to implement
measures to prevent failure. Evacuate immediately. Evacuation efforts will continue
until the situation is stabilized. The Executive Engineer is responsible for implementing
the appropriate Notification Flowchart. The following is a list of conditions that would
initiate “imminent Dam failure” or “Dam failure” conditions:
 Rapidly increasing boils or the presence of new, significantly flowing boils,

particularly muddy ones near previously identified ones
 Rapidly increasing seepage, especially flowing muddy water
 Slides involving a large mass of material or which have degraded the crest of the
embankment to a level that approaches the water surface level, or if significant
seepage is observed through the slide area
 Settlement that is predicted to degrade to the reservoir level
 Cracks that extend to the reservoir level
 Significant movement or failure of any structure that forms an integral part

of the Dam
 Overtopping of an earthen Dam
 Uncontrollable release of the reservoir
5.3 Previously Known Problems
Package wise activities were taken up under Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement
programme-I were taken and the details of the same are as follows:

Package-1: Grouting the Body, Upstream treatment, reaming and redrilling of the
porous holes /Foundation holes of the Almatti Dam.
Name of the Agency entrusted M/s Ferro Concrete Construction India Pvt Ltd, MP.
Contract Amount Rs. 2207.00 Lakhs (1.03% below CPT: Rs. 2248.33 Lakhs
Date of agreement 03.06.2016
Tender Period: 28 Months
Due Date of Completion 02.10.2018
Repair Materials Body and upstream lift Joints Grouting: Cement (OPC 43
Grade), Crystalline Admix (NORMET from TAM international)
and Silica Powder (CETEX).
Resurfacing Poly Ironite Ceramic Cementitious Repair Mortar PICC.
Present status of Work Nearing Completion.
Outcome of the work The Downstream leakages stopped. Gallery Leakages Reduced
from 12 Ltrs/S to 2 Ltr/S.
Photographs showing the Leakages before DRIP-I

Seepage and Leaching in the Body of Dam
Lift Joints Opened as seen in the Bore Hole Photography
Clogged Porous Drains in the Drainage Gallery
Supervision of grouting works by Project Engineers.

Inspection of grouting works by Secretary & MD,CNNL
Inspection of grouting works by Mr.Ed-Flint & Mr.Marco Capabianco.

(CPMU-EGIS)
Deep Racking of masonry Pressure Jet washing of masonry joints

Bond coat application to masonry joints
Upstream pointing to masonry joints Upstream pointing to masonry joints

completed
Package-2: Providing treatment to the spillway piers of the Almatti Dam.
Name of the Agency entrusted M/s Kavle's pressure Concrete Pvt ltd,, Mumbai
Contract Amount Rs. 1509.4 Lakhs (4.99 % below CPT: Rs. 1588.69 Lakhs)
Present status of work Completed
Purpose of work  Providing high strength rigid sealant resin injection treatment
to the observed leakages through the spill way piers.
 Providing high abrasion resistant protective coat to surface of
the spill way piers/ogee
Repair Materials Injection: MC Injeckt 2700L.
Repair Mortar Emcecrete Type A Polymer modified repair Mortar
Protective coating High Abrasion resistance coating material MC RIM PROTECT.

Package-3: Rectification to existing Rip Rap of upstream earthen embankment of

Almatti Dam
Name of the Agency entrusted M/s Balaji Constructions Karjuve, Rathnagiri

Contract Amount Rs. 781.70 Lakhs (14.18% below the CPT : Rs. 923.00 Lakhs)
Present status of work Work completed in 2016
Outcome of the work The subsided/damaged upstream slope of the earthen dam is
protected by providing concrete templates and Rip rap laid over
filter media.
Views of the slipped portion of the Rip Rap on the upstream side of the Earthen Dam.

Dewatering
Earthen Embankment Profile Rectification
Quality Control Tests.

RCC Toe Wall & Casing
Circular and Radial RCC templates. 90 cm Thick Completed views of the Rip Rap.
Rip Rap. Water Stored up to RL 519.60M

Package-4: Treatment to the eroded/damaged portion of the Stilling Basin of

Almatti Dam.
Name of the Agency entrusted Sri.Anil Mallanagouda patil, Bijapur

Contract Amount Rs. 2126.95 Lakhs (8.60 % below CPT: Rs. 2362.75 Lakhs
Present status of work WORK COMPLETED IN 2017
Repair materials High Performance steel fibre reinforced Silica Fume concrete of M
60 Grade.
Outcome of the work Severely damaged/ scoured apron of the stilling basin is treated
by M60 Grade HSFRC
Stilling basin showing severe damages before DRIP-I
Anchor rods provided

About to complete View Concrete Boom Pump
Placing of the Concrete in Stilling Basin Work carried out on warfoot basis
Water released for Flood control
Exposed and twisted reinforcement of the stilling basin as seen in the under water videography .

Field Quality Tests
Inspection of DRIP works by the Managing Director, KBJNL
Review of DRIP works by Mr.Ed-Flint & Mr.Marco Capabianco.(CPMU-EGIS)

State Govt of Karnataka is conferred with Central Board for Irrigation and Power Special
Recognition Award 2018 for “Excellence in Health & Safety of Dams presented on 3rd January
2018 at SCOPE Convention Center, Scope Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi.
“The Award of Excellence”

6.0 Preparedness
Preparedness actions are to be taken both before and following the development of
emergency conditions and should identify ways of preparing for an emergency,
increasing response readiness in a uniform and coordinated manner, and helping to
reduce the effects of a Dam failure. The following are some steps that could prevent or
delay failure after an emergency is first discovered.
6.1 Surveillance:
Round the clock surveillance at the Dam and it’s appurtenant on the rim of reservoir
will be carried out by Site Engineers during emergency situations. For this, the postings

of special observer of high experience and keen observation are an important

requirement of EAP during high flood period. To ensure that the whole system
(including civil structures and mechanical installations) is being maintained well upto
satisfactory level, the repair maintenance must be carried out as per requirement of O &
M of Almatti Dam. In addition, it must be ensured that maintenance and upkeep of
different components is carried out and will be only possible through deployment of
well procedure conversant and trained staff. The list of such persons should be
displayed on a photo frame mounting at convenient safe places at Dam site and list of
local telephone numbers inside the Dam and outside the Dam area. it will be updated
from time to time for any change.
6.1.1 Response on forecast of excessive inflow:
The gross storage of Almatti Dam at FRL 519.6m is 123.08 TMC and Gross storage of
Narayanpur Dam is 37.965 TMC at FRL-492.252m. The Almatti and Narayanpur Dams
have been designed for a probable maximum flood (PMF) of 31,007 cumecs 10.95 lakhs
cusecs) and 37,945 cumecs (13.40 lakhs cusecs) respectively. The storage in
Narayanpur Dam has commenced during 1982 and Almatti Dam in year 2002. During
monsoon, incident rains in the catchment area cause the flash floods in Krishna River.
These floods may lead to problems like people getting displaced from their homes, huge
damage to crops and other assets. The floods can have disastrous impact on the
environment also. Adequate measures are required to be taken up in advance to control
and regulate the flow water in the river. The regulation of flood water released from the
Dams in Maharashtra is very important and has a most impact in Karnataka. The
following measures are essential for effective management of floods in Krishna River
during the monsoons. 1) Nomination of liaising officers for respective reservoirs. 2)
Sharing of Sub-basin wise directory of concerned officers responsible for flood
management. 3) Exchange of data regarding rainfall, releases from Dams, reservoir
water levels. 4) Reservoir operation schedules, exchange of data regarding rainfall,
releases from Dams, reservoir water levels. The Central Water Commission has
established office at Almatti during 1985 for assisting in flood warning in the Krishna
River Basin. Based on the rainfall in the catchment and flow in the river and tributaries,
CWC office will furnish flood forecasting reports to office of Karnataka, whenever O&M
Manual for Almatti Dam November 2018 Doc. No. CDSO_O&M_KA06HH0200_Almatti
Dam_v1.0 Page 34 probable flow at Almatti is more than 50000 cusecs. It also informs

the trend of flow (Raising, steady or Falling) the list of rain gauges in the catchment of
Krishna basin and daily rainfall is to be collected by concerned offices. It will helpful for
prediction of probable floods in the river. During monsoon daily water releases from the
Dams/Barrages at 8 hrs. & 16 hrs. In normal situation and hourly data exchange during
heavy floods is necessary. In this regard, the data is required to be established. The data
regarding exchange floods is made available to the Revenue authorities and public by
broadcasting in AIR, TV and publication in newspapers.
6.1.2 Response during weekends and holidays:
Executive Engineer will be available for emergency response during weekends and
holidays and can be present at the Dam site within 15 minutes of detection of an
emergency condition, in case of non-availability of Executive Engineer, the Assistant
Executive Engineer or Deputy Executive Engineer will take his responsibilities.
6.1.3 Response during periods of darkness and adverse weather:
Site Engineer will arrange for access to generators and lights to adequately monitor the
situation. Executive Engineer will be able to access the site during adverse weather
conditions by [method of access –that is, by foot, utility vehicle, or some other means].
Almatti Dam has express line from the Karnataka power corporation private
limited(KPCL) Which provides 24X7 power due to this power failure chances are very
less even though if any failure occurs mainly due to adverse weather, falling of tress
over power line or from KPCL issues.
6.2 Access to the site:
Alternate access routes should be planned in the event of an emergency at the Dam.
[Example: The road across the Dam is a gravel roadway with grassed edges which
should allow discharge across the road rendering this route inaccessible. The north and
east alternate routes should be used instead under such conditions. All-weather access
to the downstream toe of the Dam will also be unavailable. For developing situations
near the downstream toe of the Dam, gravel may need to be brought in to stabilize a
road in that area].
6.3 Possible Preventive Measures
Preventive measures can be taken in an emergency to prevent the catastrophic failure

of the Dam, but such repairs should be undertaken with extreme caution. The repairs

are only temporary, and a permanent repair should be designed by an engineer as soon
as possible.
The following actions should only be undertaken under the direction of a professional
engineer or contractor. In all cases, the appropriate Notification Flowchart must be
implemented and the personnel of the SDSO must be notified.
6.3.1 Seepage Failure
 Plug the flow with whatever material is available (Bentonite or plastic) if the
entrance is in the reservoir.
 Lower the water level in the reservoir by using the low flow outlet and
pumping if necessary, until the flow decreases to a non-erosive velocity or
until it stops. Place an inverted filter (a protective layer of sand and gravel) on
the exit area to hold the material in place.
 Continue operating at a lower level until a repair is made.
6.3.2 Embankment or Foundation Sliding
 Lower the water level in the reservoir by using the low flow outlet and
pumping if necessary, at a rate and to an elevation considered safe, given the
slide condition.
 Stabilize the slide, if on the downstream slope, by weighting the toe area
below the slide with soil, rock, or gravel.
 Continue operating at a lower level until a repair is made.
6.3.3 Structural Failure
 Implement temporary measures to protect the damaged structure, such as

placing rock riprap in the damaged area.
 Lower the water level to a safe elevation through the low flow outlet and by
pumping if necessary.
7.0 Supplies and Resources
7.1 Contracts
If Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd personnel and resources prove to be inadequate
during an emergency; requests will be made for assistance from other local

jurisdictions, other agencies, and industry, as needed. Such assistance may include
equipment, supplies, or personnel. All agreements will be entered into by authorized
officials and should be in writing whenever possible. The Executive Engineer shall have
the authority to enter into agreements as deemed necessary to prevent the failure of the
Dam.
Emergency Planning Manager, (Executive Engineer)
Superintending Engineer
Chief Engineer
7.1.1 Equipment and Supplies
Equipment that is available for use and local contractors that can be contacted to
provide equipment during an emergency event are listed in Annexure 7.
7.2 Reports:
Pre monsoon and post monsoon inspections of the Dam are made every year during the
month of May and December respectively by site engineer, to evaluate its structural
safety, Stability, and operational adequacy. In the event of an abnormal occurrence to
these reports, particularly the photographs can be beneficial in the evaluation of a
potential problem.
7.2.1 Technical Data
Pre-monsoon and post-monsoon inspections of the Dam will be made to evaluate its
structural safety, stability, and operational adequacy. In the event of an abnormal
occurrence, reference to these reports, particularly the photographs, can be beneficial in
the evaluation of a potential problem.
Pre-monsoon inspections will be carried out from June 15th to July 15th and Post- monsoon
inspections will be carried out from November, 15th to December 15th.
Technical records such as drawings and inspection reports should be stored and
carefully maintained at the Krishna Emergency planning manager office. Site Engineer is
familiar with the location of the documents in the event of an emergency.
 Final detailed project report and details of modifications done during

construction.
 Geological/geotechnical data and reports on the foundation and abutment.

 Details of special foundation and abutment treatment carried out.

 A set of completion drawings according to which the project was constructed.
 Detailed drawings of all service facilities like internal lighting, emergency
lighting, drainage, etc.
 Records of corrective measures, repair or treatments that have been done
subsequent to completion.
 Details of design criteria followed.
8.0 Emergency Operations Center
8.1 Activity Log
Any unusual or emergency condition should be documented, including the following:
 Activation or deactivation of emergency facilities
 Emergency notifications to other local governments and to state and central

government agencies
 Significant changes in the emergency
 Major commitments of resources or requests for additional resources from

external sources
 Telephone calls should be recorded in chronological order
 Issuance of protective action recommendations to the public
 Evacuations
 Casualties
 Termination of the incident
8.2 Costs of the Emergency Operations Center
For major emergencies, the emergency operations center will maintain detailed records
of costs expended. These records may be used to recover costs from the responsible
party or insurers, or as a basis for requesting financial assistance allowable response
and recovery costs from the state or central government. Documented costs should
include:
 Personnel costs, especially overtime
 Equipment operation
 Equipment leasing and rental
 Contract services to support emergency operations
 Specialized supplies expended in emergency operations
9.0 Inundation Areas
The inundation map illustrates the areas subject to flooding from a failure of the Dam,
and can be found in Annexure 2(A) and Annexure 2. The map was prepared using the
results of a full breach analysis.
After examining the results of the breach analysis of Lal Bahadur Shastri Sagar (Almatti
Dam), it has been determined that there were a significant number of structures that
could be affected due to a design flood or sunny-day Dam breach. These structures are
located along the Krishna River. Cities and Town like Vijayapura and Bagalkot can suffer
a significant impact from a breach of the Dam. In addition, water results from a breach,
and associated damages, can, under certain circumstances, travel down the Krishna
River affecting the cities of Raichur and others.
The breach analysis contains profiles of the peak flood levels expected, as well as an
estimation of the time from the beginning of the breach to the peak flood elevations. A
comparison of the areas that are likely to be flooded with the plots showing the times
from the start of the breach to the flooding shows the areas of evacuation and the time
constraints involved. Figures in the breach analysis include information on the
estimated impact of flooding on the bridges along the Krishna River. These structures
may suffer such impacts before the peak elevation of the flood wave.
9.1 Local Evacuation Plan
If imminent failure of the Dam with uncontrolled downstream flooding is anticipated,

local disaster management and law enforcement personnel should notify those
downstream, for evacuation in the most expedient manner possible. The organizations
and personnel on the Notification Flowchart should be contacted immediately. Local
law enforcement officials, along with local mobile network operators, radio and
television stations can best spread the notice for evacuation. The immediate impact will
be to areas along Krishna River downstream of the Dam. For sunny-day and design
flood breaches, the following actions should be taken.

Barricading all bridges that could possibly be flooded to prevent access to the affected
area. These bridges include the Krishna River crossings of NH 50, state highway 135
connecting Sitimani & Araladinni, Solapur-Mangalore highway near Yelaguru, SH 60
near Dhannur. Refer the Inundation Map in Annexure 2 to determine appropriate
barricade locations.
The District Disaster Management office can assist with the notification of all persons
and agencies involved, with the possibility of additional support including contacting
others not accessible by radio or telephone.
District officials are generally familiar with developed areas in their jurisdiction. Such
knowledge, coupled with the requirements of state law that they respond to disasters,
make them the logical officials to be notified and to spread the warning message to all
areas subject to flooding.
10.0 Implementation
10.1 Development
The draft EAP was sent to the CPMU, Karnataka Water Resource Department and SDSO
for review, and agency their comments will be incorporated into this document for final
publication.
10.2 Updating
Copies of the EAP have been provided to all authorities/officials included in the
distribution list and signed by Principal Secretary of Karnataka water resource
department, District Disaster Management Authority and Dam Safety Organization. This
plan will be reviewed and updated annually before the 1st of June of every year by the
Emergency Planning Manager and the Superintending Engineer; this review will involve
corresponding personnel from local disaster management agencies in conjunction with
Dam safety organization staff.
The Superintending Engineer will organize every year prior to monsoon an orientation
meeting to introduce the revised EAP to local officials, emergency responders. this
meeting will give an opportunity to all the stake holders to review and comment on EAP
document and their respective roles.
The Executive Engineer will review and complete all items on the Annual EAP
Evaluation Checklist in Annexure 8. After the annual update is complete, a new

Approval and Implementation sheet will be attached and the annual update will be
documented on the Plan Review and Update sheet in Annexure 9.
If revisions to the EAP are made as a result of the annual update, such changes will be
recorded on the Log Sheet of Changes form at the front of the report. A copy of the
updated portions of the EAP will be sent to the SDSO and all other concerned as per the
EAP Distribution List. If the EAP was reviewed and revisions were not required, the
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd, and Karnataka will submit written notification to all
concerned that no updates to the EAP have been adopted or implemented.
10.3 Testing
Superintending Engineer shall organise the following exercise as specified below:
Orientation (Stake holder’s consultation): Superintending Engineer will organise an

Orientation meeting every year with local responders and stakeholders to solicit input,
established roles during emergency situation and facilitate reliable response to
emergencies. In Orientation Meeting the emergency planning manager will introduce
the revised EAP to local officials and emergency responders and provides those entities
the opportunity to review and comment on the documents and on their roles and
responsibility described in EAP.
Table top exercises: Superintending Engineer and Emergency Planning Manager will
organize a table top drill once in 2 years to discuss and review the simulated or
imaginary emergency situation. The table top drill involves meeting of emergency
planning manager with local and state disaster management officials in a conference
room. The drill begins with a description of a simulated event and proceeds with
discussion by the participants to evaluate the EAP and response procedures, and to
resolve concerns regarding coordination and responsibility. Any problems identified
during a drill should be included in revision to EAP.
Before the table top exercise begins, meeting participants will visit the Dam familiarize
with the Dam site. Emergency Planning manager will present a scenario of an unusual
or emergency event at the Dam. The scenario will be developed by prior to the exercise
with the support of Dam Safety Organization

10.4 Training
Superintending Engineer will ensure all people involved in the EAP be trained to ensure
that they are thoroughly familiar with its elements, the availability of equipment, and
their responsibilities and duties under the plan. Personnel will be trained in problem
detection, evaluation, and appropriate corrective measures. This training is essential for
proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels of responsibility. Training
records will be maintained in Annexure 10.

Annexure – III
Flood Hazard Reference Value
Flood hazard reference values consisting of maximum water depth, maximum depth-
averaged velocity, and flood wave arrival time at various locations downstream from
Lal Bahadur Shastri Sagar (Almatti Dam) are presented in this Annex. Reference values
were determined close to the identified positions and represent the degree of danger
that would be created by the flood. Flood wave arrival times are provided only for the
two Dam breach scenarios (that is, failures caused by overtopping and internal erosion).
NOTE: Because of the method, procedures, and assumptions used to determine the
flooded areas; the limits of flooding shown and flood wave travel times are approximate
and should be used only as a guideline for establishing evacuation zones. Areas
inundated in an actual event will depend on actual failure conditions and may differ
from areas shown on the map.









Annexure – IV
Dam Description
Official Dam Name: LAL BAHADUR SHASTRY SAGAR (Almatti)

Name of Stream: River Krishna
Dam Location: Between, village Almatti of Basavana Bagewadi taluk and Sitimani village, of
Vijayapura District.
Latitude 160 19' 52.32" N Longitude:750 53' 12.66" E
Seismic Zone: Seismic Zone II Year of Starting of Dam Construction: 1964
Year of First Impoundment: 2002 Year of Commissioning of Dam Project:2002
Name of Immediate Upstream Dam: Hipparagi Barrage (Krishna valley), Hidkal Dam
(Ghataprabha)
Name of Immediate Downstream Dam: Narayanpur Dam
Dam Owner: Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Limited, (A Govt of Karnataka Undertaking)
Phone Number: 08022244484/08426281038/08426281027
Dam Owner’s Address: Managing Director, KBJNL, Bengaluru.
Embankment
Type Gravity/Masonry and Zoned Earth fill
Year Constructed 2002
Length 402 meters
Maximum Height 40.5 meters
Top Width 9.00 meters
Top of Embankment Elevation 529.25 meters- MSL
Drainage Area 35,925 square kilometers
Main Spillway
Type Gated ogee
Location From Ch. 695.50 m to 1182 m
Crest Length 486.50 meters
Crest Elevation 509.016 meters
Capacity 47318 cumecs
Emergency Spillway
Type Not Applicable
Location NA
Crest Length NA
Crest Elevation NA
Capacity NA
Inlet-Outlet Works
Type Regular Gates
Location Block 53Ch. 1526.50 m (Right End of the Dam)
Invert Elevation (Inlet) 517.00 meters MSL (bottom of pipe)
Invert Elevation (Outlet) 517.00 meters- MSL (bottom of pipe)
Capacity 14.91 cumecs
Reservoir
Elev. Top of Conservation Pool 519.60 meters- MSL
Capacity Conservation Pool (Normal Pool) 2986.26 millions of cubic meters
Capacity at Top of Dam (Maximum) 3485.204 millions of cubic meters
Surface Area 48787 hectares

Annexure – V
Sample Public Announcements
Note: These messages are communicated to downstream residents to alert the public of
impending danger. The Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd, should coordinate with the India
Meteorological Department, Vijaypura Disaster Management Authority, and the District
Magistrates/Collectors for Vijaypura, Bagalkot and Raichur prior to release. Messages
can be communicated via radio, television, bulk SMSs of local mobile networks, and
other media outlets.
Announcement for a Slowly Developing “Watch” Condition (BLUE Emergency

Level)
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd has declared a BLUE Level “Watch” condition for Almatti
Dam, Project Identification Code KA06HH0200 as of [time and date]. [Briefly describe
the problem or condition.] Although there is no immediate danger of the Dam failing,
[Describe what actions are being taken to monitor and control the situation.] [State the
quantity of any releases from the reservoir.]
Announcement for a Worsening “Watch” Condition (BLUE Emergency Level)
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd has declared a BLUE Level “Watch” condition for Almatti
Dam, Project Identification Code KA06HH0200 as of [time and date]. [Briefly describe
the problem or condition.] Although there is no immediate danger of the Dam failing a
possibility now exists that the Dam will fail if correction efforts are unsuccessful.
Describe what actions are being taken to monitor and correct the situation.] [State the
quantity of any releases from the reservoir]. Additional news will be made available as
soon as it is received.
Announcement for a Probable “Failure” Condition (ORANGE Emergency Level)
Urgent! This is an emergency message. Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd has announced
that Almatti Dam, Project Identification Code KA06HH0200 is probably going to fail.
[Describe what actions are being taken to monitor and control the situation.] It is
possible that the Dam will fail in [##] hours. Residents in low-lying areas along the
Krishna River and as well as the town of Vijaypura, should prepare for immediate
evacuation. Additional news will be made available as soon as it is received.

Announcement of an Impending “Failure” Condition (RED Emergency Level)
Emergency! This is an emergency message. Almatti Dam, Project Identification Code

KA06HH0200 is going to fail at any moment. Residents who have not yet done so should
immediately evacuate some parts of Vijaypura District and low-lying areas along the
Krishna River, The flood water have already reached [Highway] and [Road]. Additional
news will be made available as soon as it is received.
Announcement of an Ongoing “Failure” Condition (RED Emergency Level)
Emergency! This is an emergency message. Almatti Dam, Project Identification Code

KA06HH0200 failed at [time and date]. Residents who have not yet done so should
immediately evacuate some parts of Vijaypura District and low-lying areas along the
Krishna River, the. The flood water has already reached [Highway] and [Road].
Additional news will be made available as soon as it is received.

Annexure – VI
Evidence of Distress
Specific Emergency
General Equipment, material,
condition Emergency action Data to record
observation observation and supplies
level
Small boils, no increase of Closely check all of downstream None Site and location,
water flow, flowing clear toe, especially in the vicinity of approximate
water. boil for additional boils, wet flow
BLUE
spots, sinkholes, or seepage.
Closely monitor entire area for
changes or flow rate increases.
Boils
Large or additional boils Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Sandbags, filter cloth Site and location,
near previously identified Monitor as described above. approximate
ones, without increasing Construct sandbag ring dikes flow
flow rate, but carrying around boils, to cover them with
BLUE
small amount of soil water to retard the movement
particles. of soil particles. Filter cloth may
be used to retard soil
movement, but do not retard

Specific Emergency
level
the flow of water.
Large or additional boils Continue 24-hour surveillance. Sandbags, pump Site and location,
near previously identified Continue monitoring and approximate
ones, increasing flow rate, remedial action as described flow
carrying soil particles. ORANGE above. Initiate emergency
lowering of the reservoir. Issue
a warning to downstream
residents.
Rapidly increasing size of Downstream evacuation. Dozer, shovels, Site and location,
boils and flow increasing Employ all available equipment source of earth fill approximate
RED
and muddy water. to attempt to construct a large flow
ring dike around the boil area.

Specific Emergency
level
Minor seepage of clear Closely check entire Wooden stakes, Site, location,
water at toe, on slope of embankment for other seepage flagging approximate
embankment, or at the areas. Use wooden stakes or flow
abutments. BLUE flagging to delineate seepage
area. Try to channel and
measure flow. Look for
upstream whirlpools.
Additional seepage areas Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Dozer, shovels Site, location,
Seepage
observed flowing clear Monitor as described above. approximate

water and/or increasing Construct measuring weir and flow
BLUE
flow rate. channel all seepage through
weir. Attempt to determine
source of seepage.
Seriously or rapidly Continue 24-hour monitoring Dozer, shovels, Site location,

increasing seepage, under- and remedial action as source of fill material approximate
ORANGE
seepage, or drain flow. described above. Initiate flow
emergency lowering of the

Specific Emergency
level
reservoir. Construct a large ring
dike around the seepage area.
Additional seepage areas Downstream evacuation. Dozer, shovels, Site location,

with rapid increase in flow Employ all available equipment source of fill material approximate
and muddy water. RED to attempt to construct a large flow
ring dike around the seepage
area.
Skin slide or slough on Examine rest of embankment Stakes, tape measure Distance
slope of embankment. No for other slides. Place stakes in between stakes
further movement of slide BLUE slide material and adjacent to it
Slides or severe erosion
and embankment crest not for determining if further

degraded. movement is taking place.
Slide or erosion involving Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Dozer, shovels, Distance

large mass of material, Mobilize all available resources sources of fill between stakes
crest of embankment is BLUE and equipment for repair material, sandbags
degraded, no movement operations to increase
or very slow continuing freeboard and to protect the

Specific Emergency
level
movement. exposed embankment material.
Start filling sandbags and
stockpile near slide area.
Slide or erosion involving Continue monitoring and Dozer, shovels, Distance

large mass of material, remedial actions as described source of fill between stakes
crest of embankment is above. Place additional material material, pump
ORANGE
degraded, progressively at the toe of the slope to stop
increasing in size. the slide.
Slide or erosion involving Downstream evacuation. Utilize Dozer, shovels, Distance

large mass of material, all available equipment and sandbags, pump between stakes
crest of embankment is personnel to sandbag the
severely degraded; RED degraded slide area to prevent
movement of slide is it from overtopping.
continuing and may reach
pool level.

Specific Emergency
level
Sinkholes any whereon Carefully walk the entire Stakes, flagging Size, location
the embankment or within embankment and downstream
150 metres downstream BLUE area looking for additional
from the toe. sinkholes, movement, or
seepage.
Sinkholes with Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Dozer, shovels, pump Size, location
corresponding seepage Monitor as above. Construct
Sinkholes
anywhere on the sandbag dike around the

BLUE
embankment or seepage exit point to reduce the
downstream from the toe. flow rate. Start filling sandbags
and stockpile near sinkhole.
Large sinkholes with Continue monitoring and Sandbags, dozer, Size, location
corresponding seepage remedial action as described pump
anywhere on the ORANGE above. Utilize sandbags to
embankment or increase the freeboard on the
downstream from the toe. Dam if necessary.

Specific Emergency
level
Sinkholes rapidly getting Downstream evacuation. Utilize Dozer, shovels, pump Size, location
worse, seepage flowing all available equipment and
muddy water and RED personnel to attempt to
increasing flow. construct a large ring dike
around the area.
Obvious settlement of the Look for bulges on slope or None Size, location
crest of the embankment, changes in crest alignment.
BLUE
especially adjacent to
concrete structures.
Settlement of crest of Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Sandbags, dozer, Size, location

Settlement
embankment that is Mobilize all available resources shovels, source of fill

progressing, especially for repair operations to increase material
adjacent to concrete freeboard. Fill and stockpile
BLUE
structures or if any sandbags. Identify any boils
corresponding seepage is near settlement points for
present. flowing material and pursue
action for boils.

Specific Emergency
level
Settlement of crest of Continue monitoring and Sandbags, shovels, Size, location

embankment that is remedial actions as described dozer, source of fill
rapidly progressing above. Use sandbags to increase material
especially adjacent to the freeboard on the Dam if
ORANGE
concrete structures or if necessary.
any corresponding
seepage is flowing muddy
water or increasing flow.
Progressing settlement Downstream evacuation. Utilize Dozer, shovels, Size, location

that is expected to degrade all available equipment and source of fill
the embankment to personnel to build up the crest material, sandbags
reservoir level. in the area that is settling.
RED
Identify any boils near
settlement points for flowing
material and pursue action for
boils.

Specific Emergency
level
Cracks in the embankment Walk on entire crest and slope Stakes, tape measure Size, location
crest or on slopes. BLUE and check for additional
cracking.
Numerous cracks in crest Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Stakes, tape Size, location
that are enlarging, Carefully monitor and measure measure, dozer,
especially those cracking to determine the speed shovels, source of fill
perpendiculars to the and extent of the problem. material
BLUE
Cracking
centre line of the Dam. Mobilize to fill cracks. Cracks

parallel to the centre line
indicate a slide. Follow remedial
action for slides.
Large cracks in the crest Continue monitoring and Dozer, shovels, Size, location
that is rapidly enlarging, remedial action as described source of fill material
especially those ORANGE above.
perpendiculars to the
centre line of the Dam.

Specific Emergency
level
Cracking that extends to Downstream evacuation. Dozer, shovels, Size, location

pool elevation. RED Continue remedial actions as source of fill material
described above.
Minor cracking and/or Immediately install measuring Crack Monitors, Size, location
movement. device to monitor movement. stakes, tape measure
Cracking or movement of concrete structure
BLUE
Significant cracking Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Burlap, rock, dozer, Size, location,
and/or movement. Lower burlap on upstream face shovels flow rate
of crack to reduce flow of soil
particles. Dump large rock on
BLUE
downstream of moving concrete
structure monolith to resist the
movement.
Serious cracking and/or Prepare for evacuation. Dozer, rock, burlap, Size, movement,
ORANGE
movement Continue monitoring and crack monitors flow rate

Specific Emergency
level
remedial action as described
above.
Major cracking and/or Downstream evacuation. Dam Dozer, shovels, rock Size, location,
movement failure is imminent. Continue flow rate
RED monitoring and remedial
actions as described above.
Whirlpool in the lake in Downstream evacuation. Dozer, fill material, Size, location,
the vicinity of the Attempt to plug the entrance of sandbags, filter cloth, flow rate
Upstream whirlpool
embankment the whirlpool with riprap from straw, rocks

the slope of the embankment.
RED Search downstream for an exit
point and construct a ring dike
to retard the flow of soil
particles.

Specific Emergency
level
Malfunction of gate
Structural member of a Initiate 24-hour surveillance. Crane and welder Type of problem,
gate or gate operator Immediately place stop logs in location
broken or severely ORANGE front of gate and initiate
damaged so as to prevent necessary actions to get gate
operation of the gate repaired.
Lake level rising and rain Initiate 24-hour surveillance of Lake level,
rising lake
Rapidly
continuing BLUE lake level and rainfall. Generate rainfall

inflow forecasts every 12 hours.
Water flowing over the Prepare for evacuation. Dozer, fill material, Lake level,
Overtopping
Dam and lake continuing Continue monitoring. sandbags, filter cloth, rainfall
to rise. No significant ORANGE Generate inflow forecasts every rocks
erosion of downstream 3 hours.
embankment.
Water flowing over the Immediate evacuation. Dam Cameras. Status of breach
Dam, the lake continuing RED failure is imminent or ongoing. formation. Width
to rise, and significant of breach as it

Specific Emergency
level
erosion of downstream enlarges.
embankment with
development of head-cuts
encroaching on the Dam
crest, or significant
movement of sections of
concrete or masonry
portions of the Dam.

Annexure – VII
Supplies and Resources
The following equipment and supplies may be necessary for use during a Dam
emergency. Contact information for local contractors who can provide the following
items during an emergency is listed below.
Equipment/Supplies Location
Backhoes 1. V.M.Hebbal (9986882070)

Dump trucks 2. S.S.Alur (9483549495)
Portable welding equipment 3. P.B.Alur (9448477779)
Generators 4. Aditya Constructions. Pvt Ltd ,Belgaum,
Bulldozers Shri. Purandar,Mob : 9448112966
Excavators Shri.HundekarMob:9448273169
Loaders Email:aditya.acco@gmail.com
Motor graders 5. M/s Hardware and Tools Machinery Pvt
Ltd,Dam Site Office No :91-79-
26871804,26872107 Shri.Kalpesh Trivedi,
Manager Mob:8105916178
Email:trivedikd@gmail.com
6. M/S Narayan Engineers, Hospet.

Crane
7. M/S Choudhari Cranes, Nidagund.
8. Pooja Engineering Works, Almatti.
9. NMR Hydro Mechanical Works, Hospet.
10. Aditya Constructions. Pvt Ltd ,Belgaum,

Sandbags
Shri. Purandar,Mob : 9448112966
Shri.HundekarMob:9448273169
Email:aditya.acco@gmail.com
11. V.M. Hebbal Contractor, Almatti.
12. V.M. Hebbal, (9986882070).

Rock riprap
13. S.S.Alur (9483549495).
14. P.B.Alur (9448477779)
15. V.M. Hebbal, Contractor Vijaypura

Fill Material
16. Kadri Contractor

Other:
17. Akshata under water services Belagavi.

Annexure– VIII
Annual EAP Evaluation Checklist
Was the annual Dam inspection □ Yes If yes, has the EAP been □ Yes
conducted? □ No revised to include any signs □ No
of failures observed during
the inspection?
Was weed clearing, animal □ Yes If yes, describe actions taken and date:
burrow removal, or other □ No
maintenance required?
Was the outlet gate operable? □ Yes If no, describe actions taken and date:
□ No
Does the Notification Flowcharts □ Yes If yes, list the dates of the contact
require revision? □ No information revision and redistribution:
(Note that revision of the contact
information will not require EAP
approval; however, the revised
contact information pages will
need to be redistributed as
replacement pages.)
Was annual training or a □ Yes Circle: training drill

tabletop drill conducted? □ No
Date conducted:
Are inspection and training □ Yes

records included in the EAP? □ No
Was the EAP reviewed? □ Yes If yes, review date:

□ No
Were changes required to the □ Yes If yes, date of revised EAP approval:
EAP? □ No
[Name and Title of Appropriate Manager for Owner] Date

Annexure – IX
Plan Review and Update
This plan will be reviewed and updated annually and tabletop drills will be carried out
at least once every five years. Document these reviews below.
Date of review: Participants
Date of review: Participants:
Date of tabletop drill: Participants:

Annexure – X
Training Record
Use this form to record training sessions. File the completed form in the appropriate
Tab of the EAP. All items in the EAP should be thoroughly reviewed during training.
Appropriate Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd employees and EAP team members should
attend a training session annually (or participate in a simulated drill).
TRAINING LOCATION:
DATE: TIME: INSTRUCTOR:
CLASS SIGN-IN:
Type of Simulation Conducted: Circle Emergency Type:

Emergency water release
Watch condition
Possible Dam failure
Imminent Dam failure
Actual Dam failure
Comments, Results of Drill:
Revisions Needed to EAP Based on Results of Drill?

□ Yes □ No If yes, list revisions required:

Annexure – XI
Details of Government Officials
STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
1 Shri. GangaramBaderiya,IAS 9483869160 080-22032995
2 Shri.K.Umapathy 9686940969 08022032426
3 Somashekar 8971644479 080-22340676
4 Sudhakar Shetty 9945218097 80-22340676
5 Prashanth Kumar 9448024073 080-22032582
6 Dr.G.Vishwanath 9845136219 080-22032582
7 Madhu.S 8694907152 080-22032582
NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
1 Secretary 011-26701710
2 N C Marwah, PVSM, AVSM, Member 011-26701775
3 Dr. D N Sharma, Member 011-26701738
4 Shri Kamal Kishore, Member 011-25701740
5 Dr. Pradeep Kumar, IAS, 011-26701780
6 Brig. Ajay Gangwar Advisor 011-26701886
7 Dy. Project Director 011-26701791

Sl.No KBJNL OFFICIALS
1 R.P.Kulkarni (CE) 08426-281038
2 K.G. Mahesh (SE) KBJNL, Bengaluru 08022-244484
3 B.S. Patil (SE) 08426-281063
4 D. Basavaraju (EE) 08426-281027
5 B S Patil(Design) 08426-281038
6 S.B.Chittawadgi (AEE) 08426-281188
7 Narendra .H.C (AE) 8762682428
9 Vithal Jadhav (AE) 9480165309
10 Akshay Desai (JE) 99164 32999
11 Santhosh Ganad (JE) 97380 39986
Sl.No Dam Safety Review Panel Field of Expertise
A.K.Bajaj, Chairman DSRP. Dam Construction

1 Retd Chairman, Central Water Engineering and
Commission, Champa D-44,Gulmoha Management
Dam Safety
2 S .B. Koimattur, Vice Chairman ,DSRP Surveillance Masonry/
Concrete
K.S Krishnamurthy Former Director
3 Engineering Geology
Geological Survey of India
Dam Design and
construction of Hydro
4 Sri. Basavaraj Koti
Electric Project and
Management
5 Sri.S.Venkataramana Spillways of Dams.
Crest Gates and
6 N. Kannaiah Naidu Electromechanical
Equipments
Water resource
7 M.S Rama Rao
Engineering

Appendix: Glossary of Terms for Dam Safety
The purpose of this glossary is to establish a common vocabulary of Dam safety terms
for use within and among Central and State Government agencies. Terms have been
included that are generic and apply to all Dams, regardless of size, owner, or location.
Abutment – The part of the valley side against which the Dam is constructed. The left
and right abutments of a Dam are defined with the observer looking downstream from
the Dam.
Appurtenant work –Structures associated with the Dam including the following:
a) Spillways, either in the Dam or separate there from;

b) Reservoir and its rim;
c) Low-level outlet works and water conduits such as tunnels, pipelines or
penstocks, either through the Dam or its abutments or reservoir rim;
d) Hydro-mechanical equipment including gates, valves, hoists, and elevators;
e) Energy dissipation and river training works; and
f) Other associated structures acting integrally with Dam body.
Auxiliary spillway –Any secondary spillway that is designed to be operated

infrequently, possibly in anticipation of some degree of structural damage or erosion to
the spillway that would occur during operation.
Barrage –While the term barrage is borrowed from the French word meaning “Dam” in
general, its usage in English refers to a type of low-head, Dam that consists of a number
of large gates that can be opened or closed to control the amount of water passing
through the structure, and thus regulate and stabilize river water elevation upstream
for use diverting flow for irrigation and other purposes.
Boil – A disruption of the soil surface due to water discharging from below the surface.
Eroded soil may be deposited in the form of a ring (miniature volcano) around the
disruption.
Breach – An excavation or opening, either controlled or a result of a failure of the Dam,

through a Dam or spillway that is capable of completely draining the reservoir down to
the approximate original topography so the Dam will no longer impound water, or
partially draining the reservoir to lower impounding capacity. An uncontrolled breach is
generally associated with the partial or total failure of the Dam.
Project ID code KA06HH0200 Appendix M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru
Breach analysis – The determination of the most likely uncontrolled release of water
from a Dam (magnitude, duration, and location), using accepted engineering practice, to
evaluate downstream hazard potential.
Breach inundation area – An area that would be flooded as a result of a Dam failure.
Chimney drain –A vertical or inclined layer of pervious material in an embankment to

facilitate and control drainage of the embankment fill.
Cofferdam –A temporary structure enclosing all or part of the construction area that
construction can proceed in the dry. A diversion cofferdam diverts a stream into a pipe,
channel, tunnel, or other watercourse.
Compaction –Mechanical action that increases soil density by reducing voids.
Concrete lift –The vertical distance between successive horizontal construction joints.
Conduit –A closed channel to convey water through, around, or under a Dam.
Construction joint –The interface between two successive placements or pours of

concrete where bond, and not permanent separation, is intended.
Construction – Building a proposed Dam and appurtenant structures capable of storing

water.
Contact grouting –Filling, with cement grout, any voids existing at the contact of two
zones of different materials, i.e., between a concrete tunnel lining and the surrounding
rock.
Core wall –A wall built of relatively impervious material, usually of concrete or

asphaltic concrete in the body of an embankment Dam to prevent seepage.
Cut-off trench –A foundation excavation later to be filled with impervious material so

as to limit seepage beneath a Dam.
Cut-off wall –A wall of impervious material usually of concrete, asphaltic concrete, or

steel sheet piling constructed in the foundation and abutments to reduce seepage
beneath and adjacent to the Dam.
Dam –Any artificial barrier including appurtenant works constructed across rivers or
tributaries thereof with a view to impound or divert water; includes barrage, weir and
similar water impounding structures but does not include water conveyance structures
such as canal, aqueduct and navigation channel and flow regulation structures such as
flood embankment, dike and guide bund.
Dam failure – Failures in the structures or operation of a Dam which may lead to
uncontrolled release of impounded water resulting in downstream flooding affecting
the life and property of the people.
Dam incident –All problems occurring to a Dam that have not degraded into ‘Dam
failure’ and including the following:
a) Structural damage to the Dam and appurtenant works;
b) Unusual readings of instruments in the Dam;
c) Unusual seepage or leakage through the Dam body;
d) Change in the seepage or leakage regime;
e) Boiling or artesian conditions noticed below an earth Dam;
f) Stoppage or reduction in seepage or leakage from the foundation or body of the

Dam into any of the galleries, for Dams with such galleries;
g) Malfunctioning or inappropriate operation of gates;
h) Occurrence of any flood, the peak of which exceeds the available flood discharge
capacity or 70% of the approved design flood;
i) Occurrence of a flood, which resulted in encroachment on the available freeboard,

or the approved design freeboard;
j) Erosion in the near vicinity, up to five hundred meters, downstream of the spillway,
waste weir, etc.; and
Dam inspection–On site examination of all components of Dam and its appurtenances
by one or more persons trained in this respect and includes examination of non-
overflow portion, spillways, abutments, stilling basin, piers, bridge, downstream toe,
drainage galleries, operation of mechanical systems (including gates and its
components, drive units, cranes), interior of outlet conduits, instrumentation records
and record-keeping arrangements of instruments.
Dam owner –The Central Government or a State Government or public sector

undertaking or local authority or company and any or all of such persons or
organizations, who own, control, operate, or maintain a specified Dam.
Dam safety –The practice of ensuring the integrity and viability of Dams such that they
do not present unacceptable risks to the public, property, and the environment. It
requires the collective application of engineering principles and experience, and a
philosophy of risk management that recognizes that a Dam is a structure whose safe
function is not explicitly determined by its original design and construction. It also
includes all actions taken to identify or predict deficiencies and consequences related to
failure, and to document, publicize, and reduce, eliminate, or remediate to the extent
reasonably possible, any unacceptable risks.
Design water level –The maximum water elevation, including the flood surcharge, that
a Dam is designed to withstand.
Design wind –The most severe wind that is reasonably possible at a particular
reservoir for generating wind setup and run-up. The determination will generally
include the results of meteorological studies that combine wind velocity, duration,
direction and seasonal distribution characteristics in realistic manner.
Diversion Dam –A Dam built to divert water from a waterway or stream into a
different watercourse.
Earth-fill Dam–An embankment Dam in which more than 50% of the total volume is
formed of compacted earth layers.
Effective crest of the Dam – The elevation of the lowest point on the crest (top) of the
Dam, excluding spillways.
Embankment Dam– Any Dam constructed of excavated natural materials, such as both
earth-fill and rock-fill Dams, or of industrial waste materials, such as a tailings Dam.
Embankment zone –An area or portion of an embankment Dam constructed using

similar materials and similar construction and compaction methods throughout.
Emergency action plan (EAP) – A written document prepared by the Dam owner or
the owner’s professional engineer describing a detailed plan to prevent or lessen the
effects of a failure of the Dam or appurtenant structures.
Emergency condition level – The following three emergency condition levels are
considered:
BLUE – An event has taken place that is developing slowly and needs to be monitored
closely. Immediate correction action is required.
ORANGE – Dam failure is highly probable but might be avoided with corrective
actions.
RED – Dam failure is imminent or ongoing.
Emergency repairs – Any repairs that are considered to be temporary in nature and
that are necessary to preserve the integrity of the Dam and prevent a possible failure of
the Dam.
Emergency spillway – An auxiliary spillway designed to pass a large, but infrequent,

volume of flood flow, with a crest elevation higher than the principal spillway or normal
operating level.
Failure mode –A potential failure mode is a physically plausible process for Dam failure
resulting from an existing inadequacy or defect related to a natural foundation
condition, the Dam or appurtenant structures design, the construction, the materials
incorporated, the operations and maintenance, or aging process, which can lead to an
uncontrolled release of the reservoir.
Fetch – The-straight-line distance across a body of water subject to wind forces. The
fetch is one of the factors used in calculating wave heights in a reservoir.
Filter –One or more layers of granular material graded (either naturally or by selection)
so as to allow seepage through or within the layers while preventing the migration of
material from adjacent zones.
Flap gate –A gate hinged along one edge, usually either the top or bottom edge.
Examples of bottom-hinged flap gates are tilting gates and fish belly gates so called from
their shape in cross section.
Flashboards –Structural members of timber, concrete, or steel placed in channels or on

the crest of a spillway to raise the reservoir water level but intended to be quickly
removed, tripped, or fail in the event of a flood.
Flip bucket –An energy dissipater located at the downstream end of a spillway and
shaped so that water flowing at a high velocity is deflected upwards in a trajectory away
from the foundation of the spillway.
Flood hydrograph –A graph showing, for a given point on a stream, the discharge,
height, or other characteristic of a flood with respect to time.
Gabion – Rectangular-shaped baskets or mattresses fabricated from wire mesh, filled

with rock, and assembled to form overflow weirs, hydraulic drops, and overtopping
protection for small embankment Dams. Gabion baskets are generally stacked in a stair-
stepped fashion, while mattresses are generally placed parallel to a slope. Gabions have
advantages over loose riprap because of their modularity and rock confinement
properties, thus providing erosion protection with less rock and with smaller rock sizes
than loose riprap.
Gallery–A passageway in the body of a Dam used for inspection, foundation grouting,
and/or drainage.
Gate – A movable water barrier for the control of water.
Geomembrane –An essentially impermeable geosynthetic composed of one or more

synthetic sheets.
Geosynthetic –A planar product manufactured from polymeric material used with soil,
rock, earth, or other geotechnical engineering related material as an integral part of a
man-made project, structure, or system.
Geotextile –Any fabric or textile (natural or synthetic) when used as an engineering

material in conjunction with soil, foundations, or rock. Geotextile have the following
uses: drainage, filtration, separation of materials, reinforcement, moisture barriers, and
erosion protection.
Gravity Dam– A Dam constructed of concrete and/or masonry that relies on its weight
and internal strength for stability.
Grout–A fluidized material that is injected into soil, rock, concrete or other construction
material to seal openings and to lower the permeability and/or provide additional
structural strength. There are four major types of grouting materials: chemical; cement;
clay; and bitumen.
Grout blanket–An area of the foundation systematically grouted to a uniform shallow

depth.
Grout cap–A concrete filled trench or pad encompassing all grout lines constructed to
impede surface leakage and to provide anchorage for grout connections.
Grout curtain–One or more zones, usually thin, in the foundation into which grout is
injected to reduce seepage under or around a Dam.
Hazard potential–The possible adverse incremental consequences that result from the
release of water or stored contents because of failure or incorrect operationof the Dam
or appurtenances. Impacts may be for a defined area downstream of a Dam from flood
waters released through spillways and outlet works of the Dam or waters released by
partial or complete failure of the Dam. There may also be impacts for an area upstream
of the Dam from effects of backwater flooding or landslides around the reservoir
perimeter.
Hazard potential classification – A measure of the potential for loss of life, property
damage, or economic impact in the area downstream of the Dam in the event of a failure
or malfunction of the Dam or appurtenant structures. The hazard classification does not
represent the physical condition of the Dam.
Height of Dam – The difference in elevation between the natural bed of the
watercourse or the lowest point on the downstream toe of the Dam, whichever is lower,
and the effective crest of the Dam.
Hydraulic fracturing –Hydraulic fracturing in soils is a tensile parting that is created

because of increased fluid pressure. Initiation and/or propagation cracks in the core
sections of earthen Dams because of hydraulic fracturing affect adversely structural
safety of the Dams.
Hydraulic gradient –The change in total hydraulic pressure per unit distance of flow.
Hydrology –One of the earth sciences that encompass the natural occurrence,
distribution, movement, and properties of the waters of the earth and their
environmental relationships.
Hydrometeorology –The study of the atmospheric and land-surface phases of the

hydrologic cycle with emphasis on the interrelationships involved.
Hydrostatic pressure – The pressure exerted by water at rest.
Inclinometer –An instrument, usually consisting of a metal or plastic casing inserted in

a drill hole and a sensitive monitor either lowered into the casing or fixed within the
casing. This measures at different points the casing’s inclination to the vertical. The
system may be used to measure settlement.
Inflow design flood – The flood hydrograph used in the design of a Dam and its
appurtenant works particularly for sizing the spillway and outlet works and for
determining maximum storage, height of Dam, and freeboard requirements.
Instrumentation –An arrangement of devices installed into or near Dams that provide
for measurements that can be used to evaluate the structural behaviour and
performance parameters of the structure.
Internal erosion –A general term used to describe all of the various erosional
processes where water moves internally through or adjacent to the soil zones of
embankment Dams and foundation, except for the specific process referred to as
'backward erosion piping'. The term internal erosion is used in place of a variety of
terms that have been used to describe various erosional processes, such as scour,
suffusion, concentrated leak piping, and others.
Inundation map – A map showing areas that would be affected by flooding from
releases from a Dam’s reservoir. The flooding may be from either controlled or
uncontrolled releases or as a result of a Dam failure. A series of maps for a Dam could
show the incremental areas flooded by larger flood releases. For breach analyses, this
map should also show the time to flood arrival, and maximum water-surface elevations
and flow rates.
Large Dam – A Dam which is above 15 m in height, measured from the lowest portion
of the general foundation area to the top of Dam; or a Dam between 10 m to 15 m in
height and that satisfies at least one of the following, namely
a) The length of crest is not less than 500 m;
b) The capacity of the reservoir formed by the Dam is not less than one million cubic
meters;
c) The maximum flood discharge dealt with by the Dam is not less than 2000 m3/s;
d) The Dam has particularly difficult foundation problems; or
e) The Dam is of unusual design.
Liquefaction –A condition whereby soil undergoes continued deformation at a constant

low residual stress or with low residual resistance, due to the buildup and maintenance
of high pore-water pressures, which reduces the effective confining pressure to a very
low value. Pore pressure buildup leading to liquefaction may be due either to static or
cyclic stress applications and the possibility of its occurrence will depend on the void
ratio or relative density of cohesion less soil and the confining pressure.
Loss of life – Human fatalities that would result from a failure of the Dam, without
considering the mitigation of loss of life that could occur with evacuation or other
emergency actions.
Low level outlet (bottom outlet) –An opening at a low level from a reservoir generally
used for emptying or for scouring sediment and sometimes for irrigation releases.
Maintenance – Those tasks that are generally recurring and are necessary to keep the
Dam and appurtenant structures in a sound condition and free from defect or damage
that could hinder the Dam’s functions as designed, including adjacent areas that also
could affect the function and operation of the Dam.
Maintenance inspection – Visual inspection of the Dam and appurtenant structures by

the owner or owner’s representative to detect apparent signs of deterioration, other
deficiencies, or any other areas of concern.
Masonry Dam –Any Dam constructed mainly of stone, brick, or concrete blocks pointed
with mortar. A Dam having only a masonry facing should not be referred to as a
masonry Dam.
Maximum storage capacity – The volume, in millions of cubic metres (Mm3), of the
impoundment created by the Dam at the effective crest of the Dam; only water that can
be stored above natural ground level or that could be released by failure of the Dam is
considered in assessing the storage volume; the maximum storage capacity may
decrease over time due to sedimentation or increase if the reservoir is dredged.
Maximum wind –The most severe wind for generating waves that is reasonably
possible at a particular reservoir. The determination will generally include results of
meteorological studies that combine wind velocity, duration, direction, fetch, and
seasonal distribution characteristics in a realistic manner.
Meteorology –The science that deals with the atmosphere and atmospheric
phenomena, the study of weather, particularly storms and the rainfall they produce.
Normal storage capacity – The volume, in millions of cubic meters (Mm3), of the
impoundment created by the Dam at the lowest uncontrolled spillway crest elevation,
or at the maximum elevation of the reservoir at the normal (non-flooding) operating
level.
Outlet – A conduit or pipe controlled by a gate or valve, or a siphon, that is used to

release impounded water from the reservoir.
Outlet gate – A gate controlling the flow of water through a reservoir outlet.
Outlet works –A Dam appurtenance that provides release of water (generally

controlled) from a reservoir.
Parapet wall – A solid wall built along the top of a Dam (upstream or downstream
edge) used for ornamentation, for safety of vehicles and pedestrians, or to prevent
overtopping caused by wave runup.
Peak flow –The maximum instantaneous discharge that occurs during a flood. It is
coincident with the peak of a flood hydrograph.
Penstock –A pressurized pipeline or shaft between the reservoir and hydraulic

machinery.
Phreatic surface –The free surface of water seeping at atmospheric pressure through
soil or rock.
Piezometer –An instrument used to measure water levels or pore water pressures in
embankments, foundations, abutments, soil, rock, or concrete.
Piping –The progressive development of internal erosion by seepage.
Plunge pool –A natural or artificially created pool that dissipates the energy of free
falling water.
Pressure relief pipes –Pipes used to relieve uplift or pore water pressure in a Dam
foundation or in the Dam structure.
Probable Maximum Flood –The flood that may be expected from the most severe
combination of critical meteorological and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably
possible in the drainage basin under study.
Probable Maximum Precipitation –Theoretically, the greatest depth of precipitation

for a given duration that is physically possible over a given size storm area at a
particular geographical location during a certain time of the year.
Principal spillway – The primary or initial spillway engaged during a rainfall runoff
event that is designed to pass normal flows.
Proposed Dam – Any Dam not yet under construction.
Radial gate –A gate with a curved upstream plate and radial arms hinged to piers or
other supporting structure. Also known as tainted gate.
Repairs – Any work done on a Dam that may affect the integrity, safety, and operation
ofthe Dam.
Reservoir – Any water spread which contains impounded water.
Reservoir Storage – The retention of water or delay of runoff in a reservoir either by

planned operation, as in a reservoir, or by temporary filling in the progression of a flood
wave. Specific types of storage in reservoirs are defined as follows:
a) Active storage – The volume of the reservoir that is available for some use such as
power generation, irrigation, flood control, water supply, etc. The bottom elevation
is the minimum operating level.
b) Dead storage – The storage that lies below the invert of the lowest outlet and that,
therefore, cannot readily be withdrawn from the reservoir.
c) Flood surcharge – The storage volume between the top of the active storage and the
designwater level.
d) Inactive storage – The storage volume of a reservoir between the crest of the invert
of thelowest outlet and the minimum operating level.
e) Live storage – The sum of the active-and the inactive storage.
f) Reservoir capacity – The sum of the dead and live storage of the reservoir.
g) Surcharge – The volume or space in a reservoir between the controlled retention

water level and the maximum water level. Flood surcharge cannot be retained in
the reservoir but will flow out of the reservoir until the controlled retention water
level is reached.
Riprap – A layer of large rock, precast blocks, bags of cement, or other suitable material,
generally placed on an embankment or along a watercourse as protection against wave
action, erosion, or scour.
Risk analysis – A procedure to identify and quantify risks by establishing potential

failure modes, providing numerical estimates of the likelihood of an event in a specified
time period, and estimating the magnitude of the consequences. The risk analysis
should include all potential events that would cause unintentional release of stored
water from the reservoir.
Risk assessment – The process of deciding whether existing risks are tolerable and
present risk control measures are adequate and, if not, whether alternative risk control
measures are justified. Risk assessment incorporates the risk analysis and risk
evaluation phases.
Rock anchor – A steel rod or cable placed in a hole drilled in rock, held in position by
grout, mechanical means, or both. In principle, the same as a rock bolt, but usually the
rock anchor is more than 4 meters long.
Rock bolt – A tensioned reinforcement element consisting of a steel rod, a mechanical

or grouted anchorage, and a plate and nut for tensioning or for retaining tension applied
by direct pull or by torque.
Rock reinforcement – The placement of rock bolts, un-tensioned rock dowels, pr-
stressed rock anchors, or wire tendons in a rock mass to reinforce and mobilize the
rock’s natural competency to support itself.
Rock-fill Dam – An embankment Dam in which more than 50% of the total volume is
comprised of compacted or dumped cobbles, boulders, rock fragments, or quarried rock
generally larger than 3-inch size.
Roller compacted concrete Dam – A concrete gravity Dam constructed by the use of a
dry mix concrete transported by conventional construction equipment and compacted
by rolling, usually with vibratory rollers.
Rubble Dam – A stone masonry Dam in which the stones are not shaped or coursed.
Saddle Dam (or dike) –A subsidiary Dam of any type constructed across a saddle or
low point on the perimeter of a reservoir.
Safe manner – Operating and maintaining a Dam in sound condition, free from defect
or damage that could hinder the Dam’s functions as designed.
Scour – The loss of material occurring at an erosion surface, where a concentrated flow
is located, such as a crack through a Dam or the Dam/foundation contact. Continued
flow causes the erosion to progress, creating a larger and larger eroded area.
Seepage –The internal movement of water that may take place through a Dam, the
foundation or the abutments, often emerging at ground level lower down the slope.
Seiche –An oscillating wave in a reservoir caused by a landslide into the reservoir or
earthquake-induced ground accelerations or fault offset or meteorological event.
Settlement –The vertical downward movement of a structure or its foundation.
Sinkhole –A depression, indicating subsurface settlement or particle movement,

typically having clearly defined boundaries with a sharp offset.
Significant wave height –Average height of the one-third highest individual waves.
May be estimated from wind speed, fetch length, and wind duration
Siphon –An inverted U-shaped pipe or conduit, filled until atmospheric pressure is
sufficient to force water from a reservoir over an embankment Dam and out of the other
end.
Slide – Movement of a mass of earth down a slope on the embankment or abutment of a

Dam.
Slide gate –A gate that can be opened or closed by sliding in supporting guides.
Spillway –A structure over or through which flow is discharged from a reservoir. If the
rate of flow is controlled by mechanical means, such as gates, it is considered a
controlled spillway. If the geometry of the spillway is the only control, it is considered
an uncontrolled spillway.
Stilling basin –A basin constructed to dissipate the energy of rapidly flowing water, e.g.,
from a spillway or outlet, and to protect the riverbed from erosion.
Stillwater level – The elevation that a water surface would assume if all wave actions
were absent.
Stop logs –Large logs, timbers, or steel beams placed on top of each other with their
ends held in guides on each side of a channel or conduit so as to provide a cheaper or
more easily handled means of temporary closure than a bulkhead gate.
Toe drain –A system of pipe and/or pervious material along the downstream toe of a
Dam used to collect seepage from the foundation and embankment and convey it to a
free outlet.
Toe of Dam –The junction of the downstream slope or face of a Dam with the ground
surface; also referred to as the downstream toe. The junction of the upstream slope with
ground surface is called the heel or the upstream toe.
Top thickness (top width) –The thickness or width of a Dam at the level of the top of
Dam (excluding corbels or parapets).In general, the term thickness is used for gravity
and arch Dams, and width is used for other Dams.
Trash rack –A device located at an intake to prevent floating or submerged debris from
entering the intake.
Uplift –The hydrostatic force of water exerted on or underneath a structure, tending to

cause a displacement of the structure.
Vicinity map – A map that shows the location of the Dam and surrounding roads that
provide access to the Dam. This map should display the location of the Dam in relation
to major roads and streets, and should include a north arrow and scale bar.
Volume of Dam – The total space occupied by the materials forming the Dam structure
computed between abutments and from top to bottom of Dam. No deduction is made for
small openings such as galleries, tunnels, and operating chambers within the Dam
structure. Portions of powerplants, locks, spillway, etc., are included only if they are
needed for structural stability of the Dam.
Watershed –The area drained by a river or river system or portion thereof. The
watershed for a Dam is the drainage area upstream of the Dam.
Watershed divide – The divide or boundary between catchment areas (or drainage
areas).
Wave protection – Riprap, concrete, or other armoring on the upstream face of an

embankment Dam to protect against scouring or erosion due to wave action.
Wave run-up – Vertical height above the Stillwater level to which water from a specific
wave will run up the face of a structure or embankment.
Weir – A barrier across a stream designed to alter its flow characteristics. In most cases,
weirs take the form of obstructions smaller than conventional Dams, pooling water
behind them while also allowing it to flow steadily over their tops.
Weir, broad-crested – An overflow structure on which the nappe is supported for an

appreciable length in the direction of flow.
Weir, measuring– A device for measuring the rate of flow of water. It generally consists
of a rectangular, trapezoidal, triangular, or other shaped notch, located in a vertical, thin
plate over which water flows. The height of water above the weir crest is used to
determine the rate of flow.
Weir, ogee – A reverse curve, shaped like an elongated letter "S.” The downstream faces
of overflow spillways are often made to this shape.
Wind setup –The vertical rise in the still-water level at the face of a structure or
embankment caused by wind stresses on the surface of the water.
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WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT

KRISHNA BHAGYA JALA NIGAM LIMITED

DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN REPORT

KARNATAKA WATER RESOURCE

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY CONSULTANTS PVT LTD

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (ALMATTI)

Project ID Code KA06HH0200

For any information, please contact:

Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN-Tier 1

Notification Flowchart (Watch Condition) ............................................................................ IX

Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

10.1 Development ...............................................................................................................................35

Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Sl.No Description Page No.

Annexure – I Vicinity Map Refer

Annexure – III Flood Hazard Reference Value 27

Annexure – IV Dam Description 36

Annexure – V Sample Public Announcements 37

Annexure – VI Evidence of Distress 39

Annexure – VII Supplies and Resources 52

Annexure – VIII Annual EAP Evaluation Checklist 53

Annexure – IX Plan Review and Update 54

Annexure – X Training Record 55

Annexure – XI Details of Government officials 56

Project ID code KA06HH0200 M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

TRANSMITTAL FOR EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP)

Project ID code KA06HH0200 I M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

Project ID code KA06HH0200 II M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

National Disaster Response Force

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

Project ID code KA06HH0200 IV M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

Project ID code KA06HH0200 VI M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

Sl. Page Paragraph No.

A vast list of contractors should be available in the moment of the

Notification Flowchart (Watch Condition)

Note :**Resource Contractors Details Shown in Annexure XII**

Project ID code KA06HH0200 IX M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

Notification Flowchart (Failure Condition)

Project ID code KA06HH0200 X M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

THIS PAGE IS LEFT INTENTINALLY BLANK

Project ID code KA06HH0200 XI M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (Almatti Dam)

Authority Emergency Contact Details Acceptance sign

Authority Emergency Contact Details Acceptance sign

Tahsildar’s Office M.B.Nagathan

Superintendent of Prakash Nikham IPS

Lokesh Bharamappa Jagalasar

Authority Emergency Contact Details Acceptance sign

Krishna Bhagya Jala Junior Engineer

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (Almatti Dam)

Date Change Made Signature

Draft EAP has been sent to the

Update of the Entire document,

November Suggestions given from KBJNL

Project ID code KA06HH0200 XV M/s EHS Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Bengaluru

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI SAGAR (Almatti Dam)

Note :Resource Contractors Details Shown in Annexure XII