The goal of human life 77

completely undeveloped. We suppose that whether she could be

accounted a ‘‘success’’ in her life may very well hinge on how she
makes use of this special talent – that she might after all fail and
‘‘waste her gifts.’’ The Function Argument can similarly be under-
stood in this sort of intuitive way, but now with respect to the
‘‘talents’’ of the human race as a whole. What special talents set us
apart from other animals? Would we not be ‘‘wasting those gifts’’ if
we lived no differently from animals that lack the ability to think and
to direct their behavior through thinking?
The next part of the Function Argument aims to say just what the
work or function of a human being is, by looking for something that
is distinctive of us:
Well enough, but then what could this be? Living is clearly something
shared even with the plants, but one seeks something that belongs only to
human beings. Yet in that case a life involving mere nourishment and
growth has to be put aside. Some sort of life involving perception comes
next, but plainly that too is something shared with other things – with
horses, oxen, and with every animal. The only alternative, then, is that the
work to be done by a human being is some sort of life displayed in action of
the part of us which possesses reason. (1097b33–1098a4)
As we saw (pp. 4–5 above), in supposing that the function of a thing is
distinctive of it, Aristotle is following Plato, who maintained in his
own Function Argument at the end of Republic, book 1 that the
function of a thing is what it alone can do, or what it does better
than anything else. And the first thing Aristotle does is to turn Plato
against himself. In his own Function Argument Plato held that the
function of a human being (or, more precisely, the human soul) is to
live (see Republic 353d). He said this because he was presupposing
that souls generally constitute a uniform kind, a view which was
consistent with his belief in reincarnation across species.14 Yet this
view hardly yields a distinctive function of human beings, as
Aristotle points out: mere living is not something we alone do, or
which we do best of all.
It is commonly objected that Aristotle’s own candidate for the
human function, ‘‘a life involving reason’’ is likewise not distinctive,

14
Aristotle in contrast in the De anima holds that souls differ in kind and form a series – souls
with higher powers contain within them the capacities of souls that have lower powers only.