.

o ;

TAISESIKA StTRAS OF* KANADA

f . ■ ; I
WITH

THE COMMENTARY OF ^ANKARA MlSRA

• ' ;1
f AND

EXTRACTS FROM THE GLOSS OF JAYANAr AYANA

.

■ ' •
TOGETHER WITH

3TES FROM TH E COMMENTARY OF OHANDRAKANTA AND

AN INTRODUCTION B Y THE TRAN SLATO R

" ri'
TRANSLATED BY ' 4 *

NANDALA^STNHA * #*
;
-

V § Ju , . ^ ' - .. £ . . . ■ :|

PUBLISHED BY

’HE PANINI OFFICE, BHUVANESWARI ASRAMA, BAHADDRGANJ

BllababaO
RINTBD BY PANCH KORY MlTTRA AT THE INDIAN PRESS
1911
 PREFACE.
In the present work an attempt has been made to give a complete
account of one of the principal schools of Indian philosophy, in the shape
of its original source and authoritative commentaries. It is apprehended
thirt, intiu, hurry of a busy official life, full justice has not been done
to the undertaking. 1 am aware of the many imperfections appearing
in the work, and no one will be more sorry than myself, if my translation
leads to any misconception of the tenets of the author of the System.
I also regret that errors of print still appear in the book, in spite of every
oaie having been taken to ensure accuracy through the press It is
noped, however, that there will be occasion in the future when these

; and inaccuracies w iil' be rem°ved as much as possible

n the meantime, useful criticism and friendly suggestions will meet
" Wt' corm> reccpfon at my hand. Lastly, I acknowledge my indebt-

.o : : : : ” WliterS “ tbe ^ ** IW derived

I m > M* * * * r o * R oad , A l ip u r P . 0 . )
* C alcutta. *(
I 23rd March, 1911. J NANDALAL SINHA.
 t a b l e o f c o n t e n t s .

FIRST BOOK.

Chapter I. Page.
Invocation and introduction... ... ••• ••• ••• ••• 9
Definition of Dhurma ... ... ••• ••• ••• ••• ®
Authority of the Veda ••• ••• **• *" ^
Enumeration of the Predicables and source of the Supreme Good ... ... 8
'W A
Classification of Substances ... ... ... ... ... ... 17
Classification of Attributes ... ... ... ... ••• 19
Classification of Actions ... ... ••• ••• ••• 20
Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action ... ... ... ... 21
Difference of Action from Substance and Attribute ... ... ... 25
Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action ... ... ... 25
Definition of Substance ... ... ... ... ... ... 27
Definition of Attribute ... ... ... ... ... ... 28

F
Definition of Action ... ... ... ... ... ... 29
Further resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action ... ... ... 80

Chaptkr II.
Relation of cause and effect ... ... ... ... ... ... 87
Definition of Genus and Ipecies ... ... ... ... ... 39
Existence as Genus ... ... ... ... ... ...48,46
Srlr- Unco-itess, Attribute-ness and Action-ness ... ... ... ...48,48
Final Species ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 45
Refutation of plurality of Existence ... ... ... ... ... 50

H
SECOND BOOK.
.

ueiinition of Earth ... ... ... ... ... gj

Definition of Water ... ... .. ... ... ... 55
Definition of .-fire ... ... ... ... ... ... 57
Definition o f . .tr ... ... ... ... ... gg
Pro-f of Air ... ... ... ... „
Proof of God ... ... ... ... .
Pr< of of Ethee ... ... ... ... ... " " n
Chapter i i .
Attributes m >y be accidental or essential ... ... ^
essential in Earth alone ... ... ... .. ” g
Rot touch essential in Fire alone
Co d touch <ssential in Water alone ...
Proof of Titae ... ... ... 81
Pr >of of Space ... ... ... ...
Causes of Doubt ... ... ... ’*" " " 86
Pruof pf Sound as ah attribute ^
Vn
I„
Chapter I.
'"1
THIRD BOOK.
<SL
Proof of the Soul ... ... ... ... ... ... 104 121
Fallacies of inference ... ... ... ... .
Proof of Souls in others ... ... ... ... 13g
Chapter II.
Proof of Mind ... ... ... ... . ... ^25
Other marks of inference of the Soul ... ... ... ... 127
Proof of the Soul concluded ... ... ... ... ... 131
Plurality of Souls established ... ... ... ... Hg
FOURTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Definition of ‘eternal’ ... ... ... ... ... ... 145
Proof of Ultimate Atoms ... ... ... ... ... ... 445
Requisites of Percept ion ... ... ... ... ... 149
Existence and Attribute-ness perceptible to alt the senses ... ... ... 155
Chapter II.
Division of non-eternal substances ... ... ... ... ... 158
Bodies are made up of one substance only ... ... ... ... 157
Division of bodies... ... ... ... ... ... ... 159
Production and proof of a-sexual bodies ... ... ... ... 160
FIFTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Volitional action ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 104
Ron-volitional action ... ... ... ... ... ... 05
Action which causes merit ... ... ... ... ... ... 169
Action, virtuous, vicious, and indifferent ... ... ... ... 170
Chapter II.
Causes of action in the earth, water, fire, air, ultimate atoms, and mind ... 175
Causes of pleasure and pain ... ... ... ... ... ... 181
Definition of yoga ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 182.
Definition of mokva ... ... ... ... ... ... 184 j
Darkness, not a substance, but a non-entity ... ... ... ... 186
Where action does not appear ... ... ... ... ... 187
Attributes are non-combinative causes of actions ... ... ... 188
SIXTH BOOK.
Chapter I. _ —
Authority of the Veda established ... ... ... 189
Actions which produce ctdriftam, (dharma and adharma) ... ... ... 191
Chapter II.
Production of dharma and adharma further considered ... ... ... 198
Causes of desire ... ••• — ••• • •••
Desire and aversion load into Sak&rtui activity ... ... ... ... 208
Birth and death, and re-birth, what ? ... ... ... ••• 207
How wokqa results ... ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
SEVENTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are eternal and non-eternal ... ... Am
In earth, they are due to burning ... ••• ••• •••
Examination of Measure, Quantity or Extension ... ... ... ... "
 Chapter II. ^
Proof of unity ... ... ... ... ... •••
Proof of separateness
' ... ... ... ... ... ... 284
Conjunction and Disjunction... ... ... ... ... ... 247
Relation of word and object ... ... ... ... ... ... 258
Priority and Posteriority ... 261
Combination ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 266
EIGHTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Cognition examined ... ... ... ... ... ... 271
Soul and Mind not perceptible ... ... ... ... ... 278
Perception examined ... ... ... ... ... ... 276
Chapter II.
Complex cognition examined... ... ... ... ... 283
Meaning of the term ‘object ’... ... ... ... ... ... 284
Perception further examined ... ... ... ... ... 285
NINTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Perception of Non-existence... ... ... ... ... ... 287
Perception by yogins ... ... ... ... ... ... 298
Chapter II.
Inferential cognition examined ... ... ... ... ... 304
Verbal included in inferential, cognition ... ... ... ... 310
Analogy, etc., included in inferenc ... ... ... ... ... 816
Reminiscence examined ... ... ... ... ... ... 319
Dream examined ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 320
Consciousness accompanying dream, examined ... ... ... ... 321
Causes of A-vidyd ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 323
Definition of A-vidyd ... ... ... ... , 323
Definition of Vidyd ... ... ... ... ... 324
Sageiy cognition, etc., examined ... ... .. ... ... 324

TENTH BOOK.
Chapter I.
Pleasure not an alternative form of Pain ... ... 326
Pleasure and Pain not forms of cognition ... ... 327
Diffe ace of effects, in spite of identity of cause, how produced .. 331
Ckaptkk II.
Threefold causes further examined ... ... ...
Authority of the Veda confirmed ... ...

'a'"' ■
' ;:o. \ . / *.

■
lip : 2 ^

[ INTRODUCTION.
- ...
1. KA.NADA: HIS AGE AND PARENTAGE, ETC.
The Vai&egika is otie of the well-known Six Schools of Hindu philosophy.
It was first presented to the civilised world by the great sage A uliikya, other­
wise known as Ka&yapa, and, still better, as Kandda, in the form of more or
less three hundred and seventy Stitrasor short, pithy sayings. Of the author of
I these aphorisms, very little can be known at the present day. It would appear,
from the distinctive appellations by which he is recognised in the vast field of
Sanskrit Literature, that he was the son * of Uluka and a scion of the highly
i spiritual family of KaSyapapc He resided at P rabhasat, possibly the modern
Pabhosa in the Allahabad district (fcr an account of which, see the Modern Review
for June 1909), and was thedisciplejr of Soma &arma who was an incarnation}:
I ___________________________________________________________________________ _________
f • * The word Auldkya is derived from the word Ulxika with the affix Yuri, according to
the rule of Pa 1 ini that words, denoting the lineal, male descendants of Onega and others,

I
are derived from the words Oarya and others with the affix Yaii ( HUTf^-hr
and the word Uluka also is read amongst 'Oarya and others.’ Now, it can be very easily
shown that Auliikya is none else than K m dda himself. Thus, in the koia, a lexicon of that
name, wo find, WirfNiSR:,"—that the name Auliikya should be undersu.'mi w?

denote the Vaisepika. In the Nydya-V&rtika also it has been declared,

*r**?*rfjT*irn onwhicl1 MUm
comments that the word ‘ ’ shows that the above is not the view of the Nyaya
I School who maintain that coubination is perceptible to the senses, but th it of Auldkya,
And in the commentary of Sankara Mtsra on the aphorisms 26 and 28 of tbo s cord
: of tho seventh book, we shall find that, according to Ka mda, combination is super-sen*.
I sible. Combination is, again, referred to as the conclusion of Auliikya, in

I
Bhatta Kumdrila's gloss to Tantra-Vdrtika, I. i. 4. In Kemachandra's Abhidhdna- 'hintamani
also, the Vatie$Bm» are called Auldkyas. And, lastly, in the Starva-DariaM-8«’ngn>.'v>.
Mddhava-Achdrya gives an account of the philosophical theories of Kandda mder "h<
■ heading of Auldkya-Darsuna.
I The word Kdsyapa is also derived, in the sense of a lineal, male descendant,
from the word Kasyapa with the affix m , according to tho rale of Pd 1 Ini, rfWVJ'QtH&ip,
That it refers to Kandda is also equally obvious. The lexicon Trikdnda-sesa has it
that Kandda and Kdsyapa are one and the same individual. The
f dictum, ^ P m T S 5 r # T —that Kdsyapa has declared a contradic­
tor v, or an unproved, or a doubtful mark to be no mark—embodies the view of K aidda
I (vide Ka 'dda-Siltras, III. i. 17. Upaskdra). And in the K Irani nali, in connection with
the ascertainment of marks in the chapter on Inference, Udaynna-Achdrya also quotes
H this dictum and attributes it to Kanida.
i r R i^ t i f w r f a nrqwiqr f f 1 ir*ri=i?rjr>mrra nrmc'rr 11 ^ 11
rfmfq w n >fPnar(?<T <RW*ir: 1 ’ugqp*: tot *r 11 ^ 11
I ^ ?rr<*
 ; '1 J l . .1 J t v , \ 1 ifr lr
r.iSS1]?) ttiT R o m r c T io tf. y^|
of Lord §/va. He lived a pigeon-life*, and used for his daily bread
particles of rice lying scattered on public streets. That is why he came to be
c-.iled by the significant surname of Kandda* with its variant Kana-bhuk or
Ranabhafga, meaning one who feeds upon particles. By such austerities he
pleased the mighty Lord &iva, the Grand Master of all learning, who, appearing
in the form of an owl, as tradition.has it, delivered to him the truths about the
Six 1 tedicables, viz., Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combi­
nation, and appointed him to compose a treatise, embodying those truths for the
benefit of the world. Ihus, under the grace of Godf and by His appointment,
the gieat sage Aandda composed the Sutras of the Vaitesika system.
Novi, about the popularity and antiquity of the Kandda Sutras, there can
be no reasonable doubt. The references that we find to it in the Vdyu-Pardna,
a tna nr ana, Dcvi-Bhagavata, Mahabharata, &rimad-Bhdgavala, and other
popular, ancient writings, bear infallible testimony to its antiquity, and to the
populai ity and wide cuirency at one time attained by it. Even at the present
moment, the Vai&gika, with its sister system of Nydya, largely dominates the
thought of teacheis and pupils alike in all the seats of ancient learning, I mean
the tols and chatuspafhts, in Bengal. One may not be disposed, however, to accept
the authority ot the Puranas and other writings of that class on the question of
chronology, nor do we ask our readers to do so. But still it can be laid down,
with some degtee oi practical certainty, first, that the Vaigegika is the oldest of
all the six ptincipal systems of Hindu Philosophy, and, secondly, that it is at
lea^t-three thousand years old*
1 Wtfjs, as regaros our first proposition ; In the Veddnta-Sdtras, the great
Vydsa has Erectly attacked the theories of Kandda in these aphorisms^ : "O r

I'fRrtr ^t?lt SifT •<!TT2I^fif??2jr5f II By the way, we should notice here that the word Kandda
has been otherwise interpreted by some as meaning Atom-eater, and it is suggested
that the author of the I aisexika-Slitras is called by that name because he has propounded
the theory of atoms.
j There is a mass of evidence behind this traditional divine origin of the Vaisesika
Philosophy, Vide I. i, 4, Upaskdra. In the concluding verse of his Ilbayya, Prasastapdda
in paying homage to Kandda, has alluded to this tradition : “ ht*Tr?TKfTyr?ir ^refPTl^lv?!
I •PT: i r And in the Tihd of Nydya-kandali, Pt&jase-
khara, also has said : f g 5^*1 5RH!P?rq.
3t?5>^ni(r ^TOrifrjisigin I
q?Trr^?^n-cf^q'n!ft!r ^ rro r u
I Veddnta-Sdtras, II. ii. 1 ], 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. Vide vol. XXXIV of tho Sacred
Books of ilic East, With regard to this and the following criticisms of the Vais&jika
Darsana, we feel inclined to make oniy one observation. It seems to us that ail this
criticism proceeds upon a misconception or misconstruction of the position of Kandda
due to oversight of the definite limitation, which we hope we shall be able to establish,
of his standpoint and of the scope and province of his enquiry. We believe also that
such misconception and misconstruction did not exist on the part of the critics themselves,
but in the school which followed and advocated the system of Kandda and against whom
the criticisms were accordingly directed.
 ___ INTRODUCTION.

(fhe world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long originate
from the short and the atomic.” “ In both cases also (in the cases of the
adfista inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not
possible ; hence absence of that (vis., creation and pralaya).” “ And because in
consequence of Samavaya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from
parity of reasoning.” “ And on account of the permanent existence (of activity
or non-activity).” "A nd on account of the atoms having colour, etc., the reverse
(of the Vaigesika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.” “ And as there
are difficulties in both cases.” “ And as (the atomic theory) is not accepted (by
any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.” In the Sdmkhya-
Sutra of Kapila, again, the Vai&egika theories of S ix Predicables, Salvation, Ul­
timate Atoms, External Perception, Combination, etc., are similarly quoted and
criticised ; e.g., “ We do not hold the theory of S ix Predicables, like the Vai&esikas
and others “ There is no uniformity of S ix Predicables ; nor does Salvation
I (result) from knowledge of them ” t —“ Atoms are not eternal, because there is
I Vedic evidence that they are effects Indivisibility (does) not (belong to
I them), being effects “ The law of Perception is not confined to colour ” ||—
r “ Combination does not exist, there being no p r o o f , e t c . —(S&mkhya-Sutram, 1.
25>V. 85,87,88, 89, 99, etc.) The Yoga philosophy of Pataf}/a/i§ again admittedly
comes later than the Sdmkhya. Next, in the Purva-mimansa-dar&ana, “ (Sound),
some say, (is produced from) action, as it is observed therein,” / and other
aphorisms o ija im in i are particularly directed against the Vai&egika theory of the
non-eternality of sound. The priority of the Vaipegika to the Nyaya perhaps is
not so obvious. Max Muller seems inclined to the view that the Vais'egika came
after the Nyaya and other systems. For, in his S ix Systems o f Indian Philosophy,
that great orientalist observes: " It (Kanada’s system) does not contain much
, that is peculiar to it, and seems to presuppose much that we found already
in the other systems. Even the theory of Anus or atoms, generally cited as its
I peculiar character, was evidently known to the Nyaya, though it is more fully
developed by the Vai&esikas.” But it is abundantly clear from what we have
I indicated above that the first proposition of Max Muller is not tenable, and we
shall presently see that there is virtually no justification for holding the second

* *r T*m rf**r q 11 \ 1 ^ n
ibid. H HI H
t *TrS5Jf%rar II ibid. X 1 II
§ h p r ?*t r 11 ibid. * 1 11
|| q 11 ibid. * 1 11
f n^rmr^rer. 11 ibid.n i t t n
$ The great Bengali antiquarian Dr. Rajendralala Mitra fixes the age of Pataniali
| at three centuries before Christ. Vide the preface to his edition of the Yoga Aphorisms of
| Patanjali. ‘i
i / sRwfrli HptHRr 11 ,
[( |§_J________ INTRODUCTION (Cj
' The verses of the Vdyupurdna cited on page i, foot-note $, go to show
that Kanada and Aktapada, the author of the Nydya system, were con­
temporaries and fellow students. A comparison of the two parallel systems
of thought evolved by them respectively leads us to the conclusion that the
Nydya of Aktapada made its appearance after the Vai&etika of Kanada. For
we find that the method of inference which is briefly and imperfectly indicated
in the Vai&egika, is more fully and elaborately developed in the Nydya. This
is also the case with regard to the non-eternality of sound, the investigation of
the soul, and other important topics. Again, whereas the Vatgesika recognises
only three* kinds of fallacies of marks of inference, the Nydya admits fivet of
them and establishes their existence at great length. Had the Vui&egika come
after the Nydya, then, the five-foldness of those fallacies would, in all probability,
have been specifically confuted in it, and their three-foldness vindicated by
cogent arguments. It therefore follows that Kanada showed the way to
Aktapada, at any rate, that what was begun by the former was completed by
the latter. We are confirmed in this conclusion by the observationsi of the
erudite Vdtsyayana while commenting upon the Nydya Sutram§ 1. i. 9, which
runs t h u s S o u l , Body, Sense, Object, Reason, Mind, Activity or Inclination,
Fault, Re-incarnation, Fruits of Action, Pain, and Emancipation,—these are
thfhgs to be known.” Vdtsyayana sees the incompleteness of the enumeration
and adds to it Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination,—
the six Predicables enumerated by Kanada,—thereby showing that the A yaya
presupposes the Vo s'epika, and not vice versa, as Max Muller seems to think.
We shall next discuss the age of Kanada and see what justification there
is for the assumed validity of the second proposition advanced by us. The
j| | simplicity of his diction and the aphoristic form of his writing, while Dars'ana
or philosophy, professedly so called, was just making its appearance into the
thinking world, all, of course, unmistakeably point to a definite period in the
history of Sanskrit Literature. But unfortunately no reliable theory has been
as yet reached regarding the development of the Sanskrit language, and a
History of Sanskrit Literature still remains a desideratum. We, therefore,
turn to the researches of oriental scholars, both European and Indian, before
we proceed to hazard any theory in the matter. Now, in 1885, Professor
Leumann published an article on “ The old reports on the Schisms of the
Ja in a s " in the lndische Sludein (XVII, pp. 91-135)- Among the various
heresies there mentioned, the sixth u'as founded by the author of the Vawesika-

* 3nfr6®rs!pi^stfrs«!|. h Kakadu &&tram, in. i. 15.

t 11 x 1 5 1 v 11 h

Nydya-Sutram, I. ii. 4, et seq.

£ » o # « i

§t 11 y. i \ i %
.v
if || 'i ____ INTRODUCTION.______ (§j|^
Suita, of the Chaulfi race, and hence called ChaulQga. (Is ChaulQga a degraded
form of Aulukya ?) The author Jinabhadra also mentions 144 so-called points
of the Vai&gika system. Jinabhadra's date is fixed by Professor Leumann
in the eighth century A.D Again, Haribhadra, a Brfihmana convert to Jainism,
has left us a work called Sad-Dargana-Samuchchaya-Sutram, in which the
Vais'esika-Dar^ana finds a place. Haribhadra died in 1055 of the Vira era,
585 Samvat, that is, 528 A. D, Lastly, in an account of king Kaniska
(85-106 A. D.) and his Great Council under Vasumitra and PQrnaka, we read
that there was at that time in Kasmira a Buddhist of the name of SQtra, who
is said to have belonged to the Vats'esika School. This would prove the
existence of the Vai&egika Philosophy in the first century A. D. The account
is taken from Sumpatii Choljung, and the same authority states that after the
death of Kaniska, a rich householder of the name of Jati who lived at Atfva-
Paranta, in the north, invited Vasumitra, a monk o f the Va/s'ffika school, from
Maru in the west, and another, Ghosasangha, from Bactria, and supported the
native clergy, consisting of three hundred thousand monks for a period of ten
years. (Vide Journal of Buddhist Text-Society, Vol. I, pp, 1, et seq., part 3,
p. 19.) Thus on the result of modern researches, the Vow'egika would be two
thousand years old. But we need not stop there. We have just now seen
over what a vast range of country and people the Vaidtgika- spread, and how
it was still flourishing in the midst of insurgent Jainism. We have also seen
that the Vais'egika philosophy was propounded long before the Yoga system
of Patafijali, and that the age of the Yoga is fixed in the third century before
Christ. There is, moreover, reason for believing that the Iaidegika was
prevalent prior to the advent of Buddhism, and survived the moral and
intellectual revolution wrought by propagandists of the Bauddha School. For,
the Vais'egika does not consciously labour under the turmoil of that Buddhistic
revolution ; and although some of its teachings may appear to have reference
to the theories of the Bauddha Philosophy,* it is possible that they have in view
only the germs of Buddhism latent in the Upamsals and other older writings,

* In the December number (1910) of the Journal of the American Oriental Society,
Hermann Jacobi, Professor in the University of Bonn, Germany, has contributed a very
thoughtful article on The, Dates of the Philosophical S&tras of the Brahma >s. There is
much in it which goes to strengthen our position with regard to the date of the Vaisexika-
Darsana. For instance, the writer concludes that the Vaisefika is ‘ probably as old as,’
or ‘ rather somewhat older ’ than, the Ny&yu-Darsana ; for V. D. iv. i. 6 is twice quoted
by Vatsyayana, namely in his comment on N. D. III. i. 38 and 67, and V. D. HI. i. 16 is
quoted by him in his comment on N. D. II. ii. 34, and the Uddyotakara quotes the V. D.
several times simply as the Sfttra or Sastra, and once calls its author Paramarsi, a title
accorded only to ancient writers of the highest authority.” But we cannot accept the
ultimate result of the writer’s researches into the age of the philosophical Sfltras, namely^
that the Vaisefiha-Darsuna was composed between 200 and 430 A. D. We have' already
given our reasons to the contrary. We will here simply show that the argument in
support of the writer’s theory is invalid and inconclusive. The argument shortly is as
follows ; We are sufficiently acquainted with Buddhist philosophy and its history
*
fj
(!( Jgvi)l) INTRODUCTION. • \CT
\ x. / ' * / ' ■ J : I J :’ ' ' 1 ' '- ' ■ ' r i 'ni i i r . " • T:.. .

(or that they have been read into the aphorisms of Kanada by his commen­
tators and glossators). Regard being had, therefore, to all these circumstances
the age of Kanada-Suttam may be generally fixed to lie between the sixth
and the tenth century before Christ.

2. THE VAISESIKA : WHY IT IS SO CALLED.

The word Vais'esika is derived from the word visesa with the affix thak,
according to the rule* of Pdnini that to denote a book treating of a particular
subject, the affix thak is applied to the word denoting that subject. It is, there­
fore, obvious that the Aphorisms o f Kanada is called the Vaisesika philosophy,
because the principal subject treated therein is vis'esa, one of the Six Predi­
cables enumerated by the author. The distinctive character of this system
lies in its theory of the vis'esa. We shall try to understand later on what
Kanada's conception of the visesa exactly is ; here we should only direct the
reader’s attention to the sixth aphorismj* of the second chapter of the first
The philosophy of Madhyamika Buddhists was i tinyaiada, Nihilism or lllusionism, namely,
that the objects ot perception are non-entities or a mere void. This system was
established by Nagarjnna, who flourished about the end of the second century A. D. On
the other hand, the Vijnami&du of the Yogaehara Buddhists declares that external
objects are produced, so far as our consciousness is concerned, by ideas existing indepen­
dently of them. It was established by Asauga and his younger Vasubandhn during the
latter part of the fifth century A. D. But the Vaiietfku-Dariana maintains the realistic
view that by perception we become truly cognizant of real objects, and in connection
with that, controverts the SflnySvdda, but does not refer to the YijSanavada. It follows,
therefore,.thitt'it must'have been composed between 200 and 450 A.D.
“We, on the contrary, contend that the Veda has been the one source of all the
philosophical theories including the above Buddhist philosophies, that have made their
appearance on the indirtn soil, and that, therefore, the method adopted by the writer is
inconclusive. Even if w,e do not take the Veda into account, still the argument of the
writer is not sound. The Vuisesiha-Dai Sana, it is significant to note, does not directly
* refer to, not to say, discuss, the Sflnyavada, which certainly would not have been the
case, had it been a fact that the former was composed after the definite establishment of
the school of Nihilism. It may bo also pointed out in passing' that as there is in the
Vaise^ika-Darsana reference to the theory of Nihilism, so there is also to the other theory,
namely Idealism (Ka fida sutra, III. i. 18). This is inconsistent with the writer’s position,
and consistent with ours. Lastly, it is equally possible, nay, more, than probable, we
should say, having regard to the natural development of human thought, that the'
Realism of the Vaisesika philosophy was not preceded, but, on the contrary, was followed,
by the Nihilism and Idealism of the Buddhist schools. Acharya SankarU, the great
commentator of the Ved&nhi-Sdtras, seems to have taken the same view as ourselves. For
in his commentary on the Vedanta Sdtm, II. ii. 18, he observes : “ That (the VaKesika)
doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic). That the more thorough
doctrine which teaches universal nompermanency (Sdnyavada) is even less worthy of
being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show,’’
* 31t*I?5£r # 1 U IV. iii. 87.
] fellfoqi II I- >>• 6.
1
f)?; -If t '"
INTRODUCTION.
.....M* I" "»■*'■. - — <■?— *•»------- ■ ■" '■ ' — -------------------------------------------- 1 _

book of Kanada-Sutram : “ (The statement of Genus and Species has been

made) with the exception of the Final Species.’’
Max Muller, however, observes as follows: “ It may be that the name
of Vaisesika was given to Kanada’s philosophy from the differences, or visesas
which he establishes between substances, qualities, and actions, or it may be,
from Visesa as a name of individual things, applicable therefore to atoms.
But this, in the absence of decisive evidence, must for the present remain
undetermined.” Another writer has opined that visega is a name for the
! parama cinu or ultimate atom, and that the system of Kanada is called the
Vais'i'fikn or Atomistic philosophy, because it teaches the theory of atoms. But
these suggestions are so palpably erroneous and absurd, as it will be after­
wards seen, that we need not take the trouble to show them up.

3. THE PHILOSOPHY OP KANADA : ITS STANDPOINT, SCOPE,

PROVINCE, AND METHOD*

Philosophy is, as Aristotle puts it, the science of principles and of causes.
Its office is the investigation of Being as B ein g : the universal essence of the
real. The Sanskrit word for Philosophy is Darsana. In the lexicon Medini
the different meanings of 'Daigana' are given as “ the eye, dream, intelligence,
meri t, cognition, mirror, and &dslra or system.” In the &rimad-Bhdgavatam,
I. 5 8., the word is used in the sense of knowledge also. And the idea ot a
&dslra, in the sense in which it is descriptive of a philosophical writing, is
that it is a system of discriminative thinking about things, evolved in the
course ol a series of discourses between the teacher and the pupils. Incidentally
we may observe here that the Siitras\ by means of which the expressly so
called philosophical systems have been preserved and promulgated, are only
so many short-hand memoranda of the truths delivered by the various teachers
i in response to the needs, queries, curiosities, doubts, expectancies, and
apprehensions of their respective pupils, and thus present to us only one
side of the question, thereby making the task of the commentator and the
reader all the more difficult. The function of these systems of thought, how­
ever, is to teach laltva.jnanam or cognition of reality, the real that is immanent
in the irrational evolution of names and forms, in other words, the founda­
tion of the Non-Ego as contradistinguished from the E g o ; with the ultimate
object of thereby facilitating and accomplishing the spiritual intuition of the
Self by way of either comparison or contrast, as the case may be. Herein
consists the essential agreement amongst the six systems of Hindu philosophy
however much they may differ with regard to particular tenets. And to those
*Read Ka mcla-Sutmm, I. i. 1, 2, 8, 4. V. ii. 16. VI. ii. 16. X. ii. 8, 9. ~~—
t The definition of a Sfitram:

^ R S I Iff: II
(1 ^ INTRODUCTION. (CT
who think that these systems are at daggers drawn with one another, the
reply may be given, once and for all, in the felicitous language of Max Muller :
“ The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become
impressed with the truth of the view taken by Vijnana-Bhikshu and others
that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may
be called a national or popular philosophy, a large Mftnasa lake of philosophi­
cal thought and language, far away in the distant North, and in the distant
past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes.”
(a) Standpoint’.
The Vaisesika philosophy looks at things from a particular, well-defined
point of view. It is the point of view of those to whom the lectures of Kanada
were addressed. It is’ not, therefore, so much a complete, independent system
of philosophic thought, as an elaboration, an application, according to the
immediate environment of its' origin, of the teachings of the Vedic and other
ancient sages who had gone before its author. At its back there lies a whole
system of thought which, ever since its development or revelation even up to
the present moment, has constituted the very fabric of Hindu social and
domestic life and organisation. The existence of G >d, the immortality of the
Soul, Transmigration, Providence, Creation, and many other weighty problems
of philosophy, do not directly come up for consideration in the S3'stem of
Kanada, not that his mind is absolutely blank on those points or that he fails
to realize their importance for the well-being of his disciples, but because they
are practically accepted by him as so many postulates of his system. For
philosophy,with him, as also with the authors of the other systems, is not
a mere intellectual pursuit, a speculative science, but is intended to serve an
entirely practical purpose of the utmost importance. Readers should bear
this in mind when they institute comparisons, which can otherwise be only
superficial, between one system of Indian Philosophy and another, and between
the philosophies of India and Europe. Now, Kanada has got waiting upon
him a class of disciples who have reached a definite stage in the spiritual
education of the Self. They bear spotless character, and are pure In conduct.
They have awakened to a sense of their state of bondage in the evolution of
the universe; they have realized that the inexorable law of karma drags
along, as it were, the jiva, the embodied soul, from one state of existence to
another, and so on, and that the course of these recurrent existences cannot
be arrested otherwise than by the unfiddment of the nature of the Self, inas­
much as the various bodies assumed are so many • vehicles of action’, and the
environments in which they appear, so many appropriate fields for the ex­
perience of the fruits of action merited in previous births, 30 that when the
S elf comes to be aware of its own nature and, thereby placing itself in direct
opposition to the Not-self, gets free from the trammels of karma by renouncing
it, then all the troubles of worldly existence are at an end ; as it has been said :
“ If a person knows the & l f as ‘ I am,’ then, for what purpose, desiring which,
J I M

!' SJ?/' INTRODUCTIOW. i* '

\ A S / , "•/■■■■
'b-■■-"-■
. —--------- .*•
■'.... ■
k / J i > _J

will he suffer along with the body?”* Spiritual evolution of the Self, again, in­
volves a process, and depends upon the assimilation of the truth about the Self.
Accordingly Yajnavalkya eloquently preached to h's favourite consort, “ The Self,
O Maitreyi, should be beheld, should be heard about, should be discriminated in
thought, and should be constantly meditated upon ”t Brihat Aranyaka Upantfat
I I. tv. 5). Herein he, one of the greatest teachers of his time, indicates also
the successive steps towards the beholding, the immediate vision, in other
words, the realisation, of the Self. These are (i) &ravana, hearing, that is, the
acquisition of information about the self from authoritative external sources, e.g.,
by the study of the Vedas, the Smritis, the Purfanas, the Ihh&sas, and such
other writings; (2) Manana, application of the internal organ, the mind, to the
information so acquired, in other words, intelligent discrimination between the
passing and the permanent, the Not-Se!f and the S e lf; and (3) Nididhydsana,
constant meditation on the permanent, the Self, in other words, absorbing atten­
tion to the awakening, as it were, of the dormant Self. The disciples that stand
before Kandda, have realized the painfulness and abnormality, so to say, of
human existence, and, in their eagerness and anxiety to get free, once and for
all, from the coil of mortality, have studied the Vedas, the Sm ritis, the
Pur&nas, the Ilihhsas, and other authoritative writings, and learnt therefrom
that the Spiritual intuition of the Self is the only means of attaining mokaa,
salvation. They respectfully ask the very kind-hearted sage Kandda to teach
them how spiritual intuition of the Self may be possible for them. Kanada
starts from this point, and herein lies the limit to the universal application of
the Vai&esika system as well as the unfairness of estimating it by the standard
of universal applicability. Kandda, however, addressing those earnest seekers
after Salvation, says that what they stand in immediate need of, is Manana,
intelligent discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, that Manana re­
quires tattva-jndna, or knowledge of truth about the S elf and Not-Self, which
ultimately leads to the attainment of salvation, and that he will, therefore, teach
them primarily the truth about the Self and Not-Self, seeing that they have
already cultivated the habit of purity in thought, speech, and deed, by the
observance of precepts and prohibitions. This is the origin of the Vaijesika
System. Its standpoint, therefore, is in the first place, a thoroughly practical
one. Kandda is not a mere philosopher, lover of wisdom, but verily a light on
the path ; nor are his disciples also mere lovers of wisdom, but travellers on
their journey on ward. In the second place, his standpoint is spiritual. I he
Spirit, the Self, is his look out, and not the N ot-Self; he analyses and explains
the Not-Self only to eliminate it, so that purely the S elf may remain. And, in
the third place, his standpoint is individualistic. That is to say, he necessarily

il —Bnhaddranyaka Upamsat, IV. iv. 12.

t 3T ’Strjwit 1
•
I. J|* : INTRODUCTION. VSJJ
recognises that the Karma of no two individuals is the same, and accordingly
untertakes to teach, in a general way, how it may be possible for each in­
dividual, embodied Soul to attain moksa or salvation by means of la/lva-jnctna
or knowledge of the truth about the Self and the Not-self.
(0) Scope :
The scope of the Vaisesika Dar&ana has been sufficiently indicated above.
Its remote object is to teach what moksa or salvation is, and also how to attain
it. Immediately, however, it teaches tattva-jftana; and as moksa and tatlva-
jnana both depend upon dharma accompanied with adharma, or right conduct,
it also defines dharma and adharma, and otherwise indicates their sources and
characteristics. The limitation of the scope of Kandda's enquiry will be pre­
sently pointed out below.
(c) Province :
In one sense, the whole “ choir of heaven and furniture of earth ” fall
within the province of the Vaisesika, as indeed of all, Philosophy. It embraces
all nameable things within its purview, and resolves them into their relatively
ultimate elements, and proceeds no further. We shall explain what we mean
by saying relatively. The Hindu conception of the creation and dissolution of
the world and its relation to God is too big a theme to be adequately or appro­
priately dealt with in this place. It would be, however, sufficient for our
purpose to point out that Sarga, creation, as well as Pralaya, dissolution, is
two-fold, being primary or original, and secondary or derivative. Thus, the
emanation of the world-stuff, so to say, from the pure Self existing all by itself
at the beginning of all creation, is the primary or original creation ; and the
subsequent evolution of the world-stuff into the organised system of the
universe, through its innumerable stages, is a succession of secondary or
derivative creations. Thus, in the Tailtiriya Upanigat, we find : " From this,
that same Self emanated Ether; from Ether, Air ; from Air, Fire ; from Fire,
W aters; from Waters, Earth.’’* In the reverse order, again, the dissolution of
the world-system into the world-stuff is secondary pralaya, and the dis­
appearance of the world-stuff into the pure S elf is primary or Mahd, the great,
pralaya. The secondary pralaya may be called also temporary as it is again
followed by a secondary creation. Now, Kanada carries his analysis of the
world upto the beginning of the secondary creation, or, what is practically the
same thing, up to the last moment of the secondary dissolution, and leaves it
there. This is merely another limitation of his system, He does not, nay he
cannot, as the spirit of Hinduism is wholly and decisively against it, repudiate
the doctrine, inculcated in the Vedas, the Smritis, the Puranas, and the I/iha.sas,
that there is but one prime cause and that the same is God, and that only He
the Self, verily exists. We are supported in this view by the following observ­
ation made by Vidydranya in his commentary on the Taittiriya Upanisat :
* woth srnFrcr: i srrc&mrsrg: i i
 „ /r fe
, || '! INTRODUCTION.

“ Gautama (the author of the Nyaya-Sulram) and others have, in the above
way, explained the process of creation (of the world), commencing from, and
subsequent to, the time when Ether, Time, Space, and Ultimate Atoms (of
Earth, Water, Fire, and Air), produced from the pure Brahman, the root cause,
had been given their definite place and function.” * It would be hardly fair,
therefore, to lay the charge of being an Atomist or Pluralist at the door of
Kandda ; far less, to compare his teaching with the materialistic Atomism of the
west, and to draw a moral therefrom ; as has been done by some of his readers,
to wit, Dr. William Fleming, who has the following two paragraphs in his “ The
Dictionary of Philosophy,” under the word, Atom : " The doctrine of atomism
did not take its rise in Greece, but in the East. It is found in the Indian Philo­
sophy. Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence,
distinct from the world. But he could not believe matter to be infinitely divisible,
as in this case a grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being infinite.
Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible atoms, which are indestructible and
eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit from the
universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus added nothing to their
doctrine. Lucretius gave to it the graces of poetry.
“ In all its forms explaining the universe by chance or necessity, it tends
to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with
a belief in God.”
The shallowness of this opinion will be quite obvious to the reader of
these pages
(d) Method:
The method employed in the Vaiie$ika Sutras, for the purpose of teaching
its truths, is three-fold, consisting of uddeia, enumeration of things, which
includes their classification also, lak^ana, their definition and denotation, and
parik^a, examination or investigation by means of perceptual and inferential
processes, which will be presently described. And it teaches tatlva-jaana,
through their Sadharmya, resemblance and Vaidharmya, difference, i.e., by
showing in what respects things resemble, and differ from, one another.4

4. KAINTADA’S LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY.

Nihireyasam, the Supreme Good, results from Abhyudaya, Tattva-jnana,
or cognition of reality. What then are the sources of knowledge ? What is
the value of human cognition? Are there any limits to human understanding ?
—These problems naturally next come up for consideration. Before we proceed
further, we, however, propose to acquaint the reader with the current theory of
* ywfiRfljra: wfsrar

tRi^piT «raS%g?rr»i. u
 L . ■ 'v

| c xiijj INTRODUCTION.

cognition as held by the followers of the sister systems of Nyaya and

Vat6e§ika. And we cannot do better than make the following excerpt from the
Tarka-Samgraha of Annam. Bhatta.
“ Buddht, Understanding, denotes cognition wjiicb renders all human
conduct possible. It is twofold, consisting of Sniriti, Representative conscious­
ness or Recollection, and Anubhava, Presentative consciousness or perception
and inference, etc. By Sm riti is meant cognition producible by Saniskara,
(Impression left by previous perception), alone. Cognition, different from
that, is called Anubhava, which is, again, two-fold, being real or unreal
(accordingly as it does, or does not, correspond with Artha, object, that is,
objective reality). Anubhava of a thing, in a certain form possessed by that
thing, is real-, e.g., the cognition in the form that this is silver, in the
case of a piece of silver. It is this which is called Pratnd, Certitude.
Anubhava, in a certain form, of a thing which lacks that form, is unreal, e.g.,
the cognition in the form that this is silver, in the case of a shining mother-of-
pearl. It is this which is called A-pratnd, In-certitude. Real Anubhava, again,
is fourfold, according as it is divided into Pralyaksa, Perceptual, Anumiti,
Inferential, Upamiti, Analogical, and &dbda, Verbal; and its Karana, instrument,
also is fourfold, according as it is divided into, Pralyaksa, Perception, Anumdna,
Inference, Upamana, Comparison, and &abda, Word or Testimony. Karana,
instrument, is a Kdrana, cause, not general, (i.e., limited to a particular effect),
and in the exercise of its function or capable of function. K&raua, cause, is
the invariable and unconditional antecedent; K atya, effect, is the counter­
opposite of antecedent non-existence. Cause is three-fold, according to the
difference of Samavayi, the combinative, A-Sam avdyi, the Non-combinative,
and Nimitla, the Efficient or conditional, causes. Combinative cause is that,
being combined in which the effect is produced ; e.g., threads, of the cloth ;
the cloth, of the colour, etc., appertaining to itself. Non-combinative cause is that,
the causality of which depends upon its being combined in one and the same
object either with the effect or with the (combinative) cause ; e.g., conjunction
of threads, of the cloth colour of the threads, of the cobur of the cloth.
Conditional cause is a cause other than the combinative and the non-com­
binative cause ; e.g., the shuttle, the weaver's beam, etc., of the cloth. Now,
amongst these three-fold causes, (the cause) which is unique, i.e., not general,
only that is a Karana or instrument.
“ Now, the instrument of perceptual cognition is perception. Perception
is cognition produced through the contact of the senses and objects. It is two­
fold : Nirvikalpaka, Non-discriminative or Indefinite, and Savikalpaka, Discri­
minative or Definite. Cognition which is void of any definite form or shape, is
Nirvikalpaka, e.g., that it is something; cognition appearing in a definite form or
shape is Savikalpaka, e.g., ‘ This is a wooden elephant,’ ‘ He is a Brahmana,’
‘ He is yellow-complexioned.’ Contact of the senses and objects, which is
the means of perceptual cognition, is six-folds Conjunction, combination in the
the conjunct, combination in the combined in the conjunct, combination,
 -Go' N
f | INTRODUCTION. j

combination in the combined, and the relation of the distinction and the distin­
guished. Conjunction constitutes the contact in the production of perceptual
cognition of a water-pot by the eye. In the production of perceptual cognition
of the colour of the water-pot, contact is constituted by combination in the
conjunct, inasmuch as the colour combines, in other word, inheres, in the water-
pot which is conjunct with the eye. In the case of perceptual cognition of the
genus, colourness, contact is constituted by combination in the combined in
the conjunct, inasmuch ascolouruess inheres in the colour which, again, inheres
in the water-pot, conjunct with the eye. Combinationwconstitutes the contact
in the case of immediate cognition of Sound by the aural sense, inasmuch as
Ether, confined within the cavity of the ear, forms the aural sense, and Sound is
the attribute of Ether, and the relation of an attribute and that of which it is an
attribute, is combination. Combination in the combined is the contact in the
immediate cognition of (the genus) Soundness, since Soundness inheres in Sound
which again is inherent in the aural sense. The Relation of the Distinction and
the Distinguished is the contact in the perceptual cognition of Non-existence,
inasmuch as in the case of the cognition, ‘The spot contains non-existence of a
water-pot,’ non-existence of a water-pot is a distinction, a distinguishing content,
of the spot which is conjunct with the eye. Perception is cognition produced
from the six kinds of contact so (ormed. The senses are its instruments. It
is, therefore, proved that the senses are proof or evidence of perception.
“ The instrument of inferential cognition is Anumdna, Inference. Inferen­
tial cognition is cognition produced from Par&mar&a, Sub-sumption or Manipu­
lation. Param atta is cognition of Paksa-dharmatd, the existence of the mark
of inference in the subject of the inference, accompanied with V)dpti> pervasion
or universal concomitance, for example, (where inference is going to be made
that there is fire in the mountain), the cognition that this mountain contains
smoke which is pervaded by fire, (so that wherever there is smoke there is fire),
is called Pardm arta, and the cognition, which is produced by the above cogni­
tion, that the mountain contains fire, is called inferential cognition. In what­
ever place, there is smoke, there is fire,—this uniformity of concomitance or
co-existence is called vyapti, Pervasion. Paksa dharmatd denotes the existence
of the vyapva, that which is pervaded, (the mark of inference, e. g .t smoke, etc.),
in the mountain, and the like, (that is, the pak$a, the subject of the inference).
Inference is two-fold, logical or for the sake of oneself or for the discovery of
truth, and rhetorical or for the sake of others or for the propagation of truth.
Logical inference is the means of inferential cognition in oneself. Thus, for
instance, after having grasped the pervasion that wherever there is smoke,
there is fire, by observation made by himself on numerous occasions in the
kitchen and other places, when a man happens to come to the vicinity of a
mountain and, on seeing smoke in the mountain, feels doubt as to the exist­
ence of fire therein, he recollects the pervasion that wherever there is smoke
there is fire. Immediately after this, cognition is produced (in him) that 'this
I g i v i j ; __________ INTRODUCTION. _ _ § iL
mountain contains smoke which is pervaded by fire. It is this which is called
Lihgapardmaria, Manipulation of the Mark. From this is produced the cogni­
tion, that is, the inferential cognition, that the mountain contains fire. And this
is logical inference. Rhetorical inference, on the other hand, is the argument,
consisting of five members, which is put forward for the purpose of enlightening
others, after having inferred fire from smoke for oneself. For example, the
mountain contains fire, because it contains smoke; whatever contains smoke,
contains fire; as the kitchen ; so too does this ; therefore, it contains fire. Here­
by (the existence of) fir^is demonstrated to others also from the demonstrated
mark. Pratijnd, Enunciation or Premiss, Hetu, Reason, Udaharana, Instance,
Upattaya, Application, and Nigamana, Conclusion,—these are the five members
(of an argument). The mountain contains fire,—this is the pratijnd ; because it
contains smoke,—this is the hetu) whatever contains smoke, (contains fire),—this
is the iiddharana : so too does this,—this is the upanaya; therefore, it contains
fire,—this is the nigamana It is Lingapardmarga,* Manipulation of the Mark,
which is the cause of inferential cognition, logical as well as rhetorical. The
inference, therefore, is the same as manipulation of the mark.
“ Marks of inference are of three kinds: Anvaya-vyatire/ci, Positive-and-
Negative, Kevalanvayi, Purely Positive, and Kevala Vyatirekt, Purely Negative.
A positive-and-negative mark is that which possesses vydpti, pervasion, in
presence as well as in absence, as, eg., the possession of smoke, when fire is
the Sadhya, that which is to be inferred. Here pervasion in presence or
positive pervasion consists in this that wherever there is smoke, there is fire,
as in the kitchen ; and pervasion in absence or negative pervasion appears in
this way that where fire does not exist, there smoke also does not exist, as in
a large lake. A purely positive mark is that which possesses pervasion or con­
comitance in presenee alone, as, e.g., in the inference that a water-pot, like a piece
of cloth, can be described in words, inasmuch as it can be proved to exist.
Here there is no concomitance in absence or negative pervasion of the being
describable and the being provable, inasmuch as all that exists is describable
as well as provable. A purely negative mark is that which possesses pervasion
I or concomitance in absence alone, as, e.g., in the following infeience . Earth
differs from all else on account of its possession of sm ell; that which does not
differ from the all else, does not possess smell, as, e.g., water; but earth is not
so (i.e., void of smell); therefore, it is not so (i.e., non-different from all else).
Here no positive instance exists that that which possesses smell, differs from all
else, since Earth as such is the subject of the inference.
«. Paksa or Subject of Inference is that in which the existence of the
Sadhya or that which is to be inferred {e.g., fire) is doubtful; as, eg., the
mountain, when the hetu or reason, that is, possession of smoke, is present.
Sapakfa, Favourable instance, is that in which the existence of the Sadhya is
♦ ‘According to Kandda, it is themark itself, and not its manipulation, that causes
an illation to be made.
 INTRODUCTION. ^ L j

certain ; as, e g , the kitchen in the aforesaid example. Vipahga, Repugnant

or Contrary Instance, is that in which the non-existence of the Sadhya is
certain; as, e.g., the large lake in the aforesaid example.
“ Hetu-abhdsa, Appearance of a Mark, or False Mark is of five* kinds,
being Savyabhichara, Variable, Viruddha, Contradictory, Sat-pratipakfa, Con­
trary, Asiddha, Unproved or Unknown, and Bddhita, Impeded or Obstructed.
The variable mark is that which is not-one-pointed. It is thtee-fold, according
to the difference of Sddhdratya, the General, A-sddhdrana, the Particular, and
An-upasatrthari, the Inconclusive. Therein the general not-one-pointed (mark)
is that which appears also where there is non-existence of the Sadhya or the
thing to be inferred, as in the argument, “ The mountain contains fire, because
it is provable,’’ inasmuch as provableness exists also in the lake where there is
non-existence of fire. The particular (not-one-pointed mark) is that which is
divergent from all Sapalsa and Vipalga or favourable and unfavourable ins­
tances, as in the argument, ‘‘ Sound is eternal, because it is Sound.” (For)
Soundness, being divergent from all eternals and non-eternals, appears in Sound
alone. The inconclusive is that which is bereft of positive and negative ins­
tances, as in the argument, “ Everything is non-eternal, because it is provable.”
Here everything being the pakga or subject of inference, there can be no ins­
tance at all. l he contradictory mark is that which is pervaded by, or included
in, the non-existence of the Sadhya or the thing to be inferred, as in the argu­
ment, “ Sound is eternal, because it is artificially produced,” inasmuch as
artificiality is pervaded also by the non-existence of eternality, that is, non-
eternality. The contrary (or, more fully, an equally valid argument to the
contrary) is that which contains another mark or reason probative of the non­
existence of the sadhya or the thing to be inferred, as to the argument, “ Sound
is eternal, because it is an object of aural perception, like soundness,” (there is
an equally valid argument to the contrary that) “ Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect, like a water-pot.” The unproved is of three kinds:
A&raya-asiddha, Unproved in respect of its receptacle, Svariipa-asiddha, Un­
proved in respect of its proper or intrinsic form, and Vydpyatva-asiddha,
Unproved in respect of the characteristic of being pervaded. An example of
A&raya-asiddha is to be found in the argument, “ A lotus-in-the-air, like a lotus
growing on the lake, is fragrant, because it is a lotus.” Here the lotus-in-the-
air is the d&raya or receptacle (of the supposed fragrance), and it verily does not
exist. Svatupa-astddha may be illustrated by the argument “ Sound is an
attribute, because it is visible.” Here visibility (the supposed mark) does not
exist in Sound, Sound being the object of aural perception. Vydpyatva-asiddha
is & hetu or mark present in the company of an Upddhi or adjunct or condition.
Upadht is that which, while it pervades or invariably accompanies the Sadhya o;
the thing to be inferred, (that is, the major term), does not pervade or invariably
^According to Kuliftda, as has been already pointed out, there are only three
kinds of fallacious marks of illation.
 ( f * ' >*”v& ‘. ’*<t '<‘ ^
•5 gvi f. INTRODUCTION. ___SL
accompany the Sddhana or the instrument of inference, (that is, the hetit,
the middle term). By the being pervasive of the Sadhya is meant the being
the non-counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-extensive, or appear­
ing in the same substratum, with the Sadhya ; and by the being non-pervasive
of the Sddhana is meant the being the counter-opposite of the absolute non­
existence inherent in that which contains the Sddhana. In the argument, “ The
mountain contains smoke, because it contains fire,” the conjunction of wet fuel
is the upddhi. Thus where there is smoke, there is conjunction of wet fuel,
and the upddhi, therefore, is pervasive of the sadhya; but c injunction of wet
fuel does not exist wherever there is fire, there being no conjunction of wet fuel
in a (red-hot) ball of iron, and the upddhi, therefore, is-non pervasive of the
Sddhana. Accordingly, conjunction of wet fuel is an upddhi, inasmuch as
it is non-pervasive of the sddhana, while it is pervasive of the sadhya. Posses­
sion of fire, being accompanied by an upddhi, is vyapyalva-asiddha or a too
wide middle-term. Bddhita is a mark, non-existence of the sadhya or the thing
to be inferred by which, has been ascertained by other proofs, as in the argu­
ment, “ Fire is not-hot, because it is a substance.” Here that the mark is
impeded, i.e., the inapplicability of the mark, appears in this w ay: Not-hot-
ness is the sadhya or the thing to be inferred; the non-existence or negation
of it is hot-ness ; and it is apprehended by tactual perception.
“ Upamdria, Comparison is the instrument of analogical cognition. Upamiti,
analogical cognition is cognition of the relation or connection of names and
objects bearing those names. Its instrument is the cognition of similarity.
Recollection of the meaning of propositions heard at a different place, is a
subsidiary operation. Thus, when a man who does not know the designate
of the term gayal, but hears from some person who had been to the forests that
a gayal is an animal which looks like a cow, and, then, going to the forest,
recollects the meaning of the statement (made by the forester) at the same time
that he sees the body of an animal which looks like the body of a cow, immedi­
ately afterwards is produced (in him) analogical cognition in the form that that is
the designate of the term, gayal.
“ Sabda, Word or Testimony, consists of the vdkya, saying, of an dpta, a
trustworthy person. He is an dpta, whose speech is tuned to reality. Vdkya
means a collection of pada, words, e.g., Bring the cow. Pada is that which
possesses Sakti, force. &akti is arbitrament by the will of God that from such
and such a word such and such a meaning is to be understood. Akdmbsd
Yogvald and Sannidht are causes of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence.
Abdmkfd, expectancy, denotes the inability of a word to force its syntactical
connection into consciousness on account of absence of some other word.
Yogvata, co-herence, means non-impediment to the meaning, Sannidht,
Adjacency, is the pronunciation of words without interval. A saying, destitute
of dkdmksd etc., is no proof. Thus, “ A cow, a horse, a man, an elephant ” is not
a proof, because the words lack dkdmksd ; “ One should sprinkle w.th fire ’’- t h is
is no proof, because the words lack yogyata. The words, “ Bring the cow,”
 ___ INTRODVOTION. <|L
uttered separately at different prahara, periods of three hours each, of the
day, would be no proof, because of the absence of Sannidhi. Sayings are of
two kinds, Vaidika or scriptural and Laukika or secular. The sayings of the
Veda, having been declared by God, are all of them authoritative. Secular
or human sayings are authoritative, provided they come from the mouth of
trustworthy persons. All else is unauthoritative. Verbal cognition is cognition
of the meaning of sayings, and its instrument is Sound or Word.
“ Unreal Anubhava is three-fold, according to its divisiofi into S a ^ a y a ,
Doubt, Viparyaya) Error, and Tarka, Hypothetical Reasoning. Saniiaya is
cognition conversant about the possession of diverse, opposite properties by a
single objec.t, e.g., ‘‘-Whether it be a pillar or a person." Viparyaya is false
cognition ; as, e.g., the cognition that it is silver, in respect of a shining mother-
of-pearl. Tarka consists in the attribution of the Vyapaka, that which pervades,
(i.e., the major term) by means of the attribution of the Vydpya, that which
is pervaded, (i.e., the middle term); e.g., “ Were there no fire, there would be
no smoke also."
“ Stnrilt, Reminiscence, also is two-fold: real and unreal. 1'he real is
that which is produced from prama or correct anubhava or experience, the
unreal is that which is produced from apramd or incorrect anubhava or
experience."
Jnanam , cognition, then, may be Prama, Certitude, and Apramd, In­
certitude, or, in other words, Vidva, Science, and A-vidyd, Nescience.
A-vidyd is imperfect or faulty cognition (X . ii. u). According to Kandda,
a-vidyd has four varieties, Svapna, Dream, Sr.rpgaya, Doubt, Viparyaya, Error,
and Anadhyavasdya, Non-finality, or Regression. Dream (IX. ii. 7) and
y«ast-Dream (IX. ii. 8) result from a particular conjunction of the inner sense
with the soul and from impressions left by experience, as well as from merit
ai d demerit previously acquired (IX. ii. 9). Doubt arises from the perception
of the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and the re­
collection of the alternatives, all at once (II. ii 17). Doubt also arises where
that which is seen, resembles that which was seen (II. ii. 18), and where that
which has been seen in one form, is seen in a different form (II. ii. 19).
Science and Ne-science also give rise to D >ubt (II. ii. 20) Error springs from
imperfections of the senses as well as from imperfections of the impressions
left in the memory ( IX. ii. 10). (Non-finality is due to the observation of the
particular attribute only). Vidva is perfect or faultless cognition (IX. ii. 12 1.
It is likewise four-fold, according to K an dda: P ralyaffa, Perception, Laihgika,
Inference, Smriti. Reminiscence, and Arfajf&na, Sagely Cognition or Intellec­
tual Intuition. Siddha Darianyi, Vision by the Perfected Ones is included in
perception. The Vai&egika theory of perception, we shall treat of hereafter.
Here we shall describe the process of inference developed by Kandda. In
his view, cognition is produced either by the senses or by means of marks;
in other words, it is either immediate or mediate. Word, Gesture, Comparison,
Presumption, Comprehension or Equivalence, Non-existence, and Tradition
■/ ^ ^ ^ \ \ ■ 1

■l INTROD iTCTiout. (K!

k Jl-i
"v....— r-f""!,if— e * •«........ ........ — r-1— r
are not, according to him, independent instruments of cognition (IX. ii. 3,
4> 5)-
Now, mediate cognition, or cognition produced by means of marks,
appears in this form that one thing is the effect or cause of, or conjunct with,
or contradictory to, or combined in, another thing (IX. ii. 1). It is therefore based
upon the uniformities of cause and effect, conjunction, contradiction, and com­
bination, according as the linga, mark, variously called as hetu, apadeda, pramana
and Parana (IX. ii. 4), is (the cause or the effect), the conjunct, the contradictory,
or the combined (III. i. 9). The law of causation has been set forth in the
following aphorisms : Non-existence of effect follows from the non-existence
of the cause (I. ii, 1), but non-existence of cause does not follow from the
non-existence of the effect (I. ii. 2). The attribute of the effect is preceded by
like attribute in the cause (II. i. 24), and the nature of the effect follows
from the nature of the cause (IV. i. 3). Cause and effect, on the other hand,
are not identical • nor do the two together form a distinct unit separate from all
other things (VII. ii. 7). That which is termed a cause, is an invariable and
unconditional antecedent of what may be then termed its effect. It is either
combinative, or non-combinative, or efficient or conditional. For example,
substance is a combinative cause, Attribute and Action are non-combinative
causes, and Time is a conditional cause. Conjunction and combination will be
explained in the sequel.
It must not be supposed, however, that it is these uniformities which lead
to inference. That which leads to inference is the cdnsciousness of Vyapti, or,
as Kanada prefers to call it. Prasiddhi, pervasion or universal concomitance, in
the form 1 Asya idam,’ that is, that the given Sddhana, middle term, is pervaded
by, or included in, the given Sad/iya, the major term (IX. ii. 5;. For, a mark,
whether it be a conjunct, a combind, a co-combined, or a contradictory (III. i.
9), or a co-effect (III. i. 10), or a non-effect (III. i. i i ), or an effect (III. i. 12, 13),
must be accompanied with pervasion, (III, i. 14), in order that it may lead to an
inference. Otherwise, any one thing could be the mark of any other thing
(III. i. 8), and the mark could as well be identical with that of which it would be
the mark (III. i. 7). But this is not so. The unproved or unpervaded is a false
mark in the very same way as the non-existent and the dubious also are false
marks (III. i. 15)- To give a few examples: Because it has horns, therefore
it is a horse (III. i. 16); because it has horns, therefore, it is a cow (III. i. 17).
What purpose, then, is served by the introduction of these uniformities
in an account of the process of inference? They serve to render the applica­
tion of the illustrative or corroborative member of the syllogism, in other
words, the appeal to experience, more ready and effective (IX. ii. 2) We have
already stated what the different members of the syllogism are, and also which
is the illustrative one. Incidentally we may observe that in this view, the
value of the syllogism lies, not in the discovery, but in the exposition, of truth,
that is to say, it is a rhetorical, rather than a logical, process.
\AgW-y INTRODUCTION. WJLj
x ^ -s r <7^ - ------------------ —f------------*------------------— ----------- ------- — ---------- r— —:
Inference, therefore, may take place in respect of succession as well as
co-existence. Inference of the former kind is either purvavat, i.e., from cause
to effect, or s'esa-vat, i.e., from effect to cause. Inference of the latter class
is called Sdmdnyato-drieta, i.e., inference by the equally observed mark (IX. ii. i)
which, however, does not establish a thing in its individual aspect (II. i. 16).
Language is a subsidiary to inference. Tactual and visual languages
aside, oral language consists of inarticulate sounds or cries and articulate
sounds or words. If we consider the connection between these signs and
thought, we find that there are two kinds of languages as there are two
kinds of signs, namely, a conventional and a natural language. A natural
language is a collection of signs that are used involuntarily and without
knowledge of the end to be attained. Speech is the language par excellence,
for it also assists in the formation and development of thought. “ 1 bought,’’
says Plato, “ is an interior and silent conversation of the soul with
herself.’’ Speech is its external expression. Some thinkers maintain
that words are eternal, and their connection with objects is natural and
necessary. Others hold that words themselves have no power to convey
a complete sense, and vest that function in another Sound which they term
- sphota (II. ii. 17 and 21). Kanada does not accept these theories; in
fact, he demolishes them (II. ii. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and
37, and VII. ii. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 19). According to him, words and objects
are unrelated (VII. ii. 181. The intuition of objects from words follows from
convention (VII. ii. 20). The convention, however, is not of human origin,
but of divine. It lias not been, at the same time, arbitrarily imposed by God ;
authoritativeuess per se is denied by Kanada. The composition of sentences,
distribution of names, formulation of precepts and prohibitions in the Veda
and its various branches, have all been the work of an Intelligent and Inde­
pendent Person possessing accurate knowledge about the objects treated in
them (II. i. 18, 19, VI. i. 1, 2, 3, and 4). Words as well as letters have, accordingly,
a determinate and unalterable meaning.
The sources of cognition have been described. The validity of human
cognition is now in question. Kanada does not challenge it in the least. With
him there is nothing that stands between the knowing subject and the object
known. I he channels of cognition remaining pure, perfect, and efficient,
and dharma, merit, and absence of adhanna, demerit, co-operating, the Self
cognises objects as they are. The elements of cognition are, after all, states
of consciousness. Inference ultimately depends upon perception, and remi­
niscence grows out of it. We shall, therefore, revert to this subject when
we come to understand Kanada’s theory of sense-perception.
The next question in order will be: Are there any limits to human
understanding? that is to say, is there anything in the universe which is
absolutely beyond the pale of human cognition ? The question may seem
strange to modern readers, specially to our brethren of the west. But it was
 ' CoH X v '--vX' • ■\\ 'v .

(f( S * ) j I N T R O D U C T I O N (flT
■- —X / * J • wVHW-'j --- 7— T"‘ ;................
not so to the ancient sages, and people, in general, of Hindustbana. Indeed,
they had no occasion for raising the question at all. Their conception of
the Self is, as the word Atmd itself implies, that it is all-pervading (VII. i. 22).
Theirs is the Avachchhedavada, the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self
in so far as limited by its upadhi, adjuncts, e.g , the senses, the physical
organism, the external world, time, space, and the like. It is consistently
with this sublime doctrine, that Kanada divides men, as knowing agents, into
loka, ordinary mortals, yogi, ascetics, siddha, the perfected ones, and rift's,
seers. Lokas have ordinary perception and inference. Rift's cognise truth
instinctively. This intellectual intuition occasionally occurs to lokas also
(IX. ii. 13). Siddhas cognise ordinarily super-sensible objects by heightening
the efficiency of their senses by means of mantras, ointments, and other
extraordinary appliances (IX. ii. 13). While the yogins possess omniscience
through the potency of yoga (IX. i. n , 12 13, 14, 15), which consists in the
inhibition of the activities of the int« n al 01 gan and in the concentration of
the Self upon itself, so that connection of the Self will) those limiting circum­
stances is cut off and it becomes free in the exercise of its inherent power.
Thus unbounded knowledge is not impossible for man, and there is no limit
to human ui oerstanding.
It iseasy-to characterise this doctrine as fanciful, but it is so much
interwoven into the daily life of even the present-day Hindu society, and
backed by such wealth of literature and abundance of excellent thought in
the civilisation of ancient India, that one must pause and be sufficiently in­
formed before one can pronounce any judgment in the matter.5

5. PREDICABLES ENUMERATED BY KANADA.

The word used by Kanada to denote a predicable or category is Padartha,
lit. Object denoted by a term. Padarlhas are the Irghest classes into which
all Nameable Things, as Mill appropriately calls them, may be arranged for
philosophical purposes. For, philosophy seeks to know all things, and it is not
possible to know them individually. Every thinker, theiefote, in every age
and in every country, has attempted a classification of things suited to the
-nature of his thought. In the history of philosophy the categories have been
successively universal classification of things, of words, ot ideas, or of forms
of thought. And a complete theory of classification, or a complete system of
categories is still a desideratum. Kanada's enumeration of the predicables,
however, appears to us to be eminently satisfactory. He d.vides all nameable
things primarily into two classes, v iz , Existence and Non-extsence. Objects
of the first class are next sub-divided as Dravya, Substance, Guna, Attributes
Karma Action, Sdmdnya, Genus, V.&efa, Species, and Samavdya, Combination.
These ’ with Abhdva, Non-existence are the seven Paddrthas, Pred.cables
(I. i. 4). Substance,. Attribute, and Action are further sub-divided under nine,
twenty-four, and five classes respectively (I. 1. 5, 6 and 7). Genera and
I INTRODUCTION.

species are together as many as there are Substances, Attributes, and Actions,
plus the summum genus and the Infintce species. Combination is only one in
number.
The scheme of categories developed by Dr. Christoph Sigwart in his Logic
is so nearly akin to that of Kanada, and the coincidence is so remarkable, that
a reference to it in this context would be instructive. Dr. Sigwart observes :
If we examine the contents of our Thought, that which can enter into our
judgment as Subject or Predicate, or as part of Subject or Predicate, we find
that it consists o f:—
I. Things, their Attributes and Activities, and Modifications of these.
II. Relations of Things and of their Attributes and Activities. These
may be Spatial and Temporal, Logical, Causal or Modal.
* * * * * * *
“ This distinction between the ideas of Things and the ideas of Attributes
which inhere in them, Activities in which they are engaged, must be regarded

* * *
as a fundamental fact of Thought.
* * * * *
“ And just as Things are distinguished by their Activities and Attributes,
so the similar Activities and . Attributes of particular Things are distinguished
by degrees and modes which we may comprehend under the name of Modi­
fications.”
* * sK
“ The one characteristiccommon to the ideas of Things and their Attributes
and Activities which we have been considering is, that in all there is an imme­
diately intuitable element, which is determined by the function of one or more
of our senses, or by inner perception. * * * blit while the categories
of Thing, Attribute, and Activity are always the same, the product of sense-
intuition, or of imitative imagination, constitutes the real essence of the idea,
and g ves to it its distinguishing content. * * * It is this element which
distinguishes the ideas of Things and their Attributes and Activities from the
second main class—Ideas of Relation.”6

6. THE TEACHINGS OF KANADA WITH REGARD TO THE PREDICABLES.

(a) Subsstance.
The definition of Substance is that it possesses Action and Attribute, and
is the combinative cause (I. i. 15, X . ii. 1, 2). It is relatively eternal as ultimate
atoms, (IV. i. 1) and non-eternal as bodies in the wide sense of the term.
Bodies are real. Substance is their combinative cause. They are effects as*
well as causes, and contain subaltern genera and species (I. i. 8). They origi­
nate their congeners (I. i. 9 au dio), and do not destroy their effect or cause
(I. i. 12).
The divisions of substance are nine only, v iz , Earth, Water Fire Air
1 Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind (I. i. 5). Ether, Time, and Space denote
 IS «v c ' p •

X'UliP^ ' INTRODUCTION. Z )Ij

single realities, while the rest denote classes. Ether, Time, Space, and Soul
are infinite, while the rest are FIN ITE.
(i) Earth.
Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch (II. i. i), and number, quan­
tity, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity',
and potential energy. Of these, smell belongs to Earth alone, and is, in conse­
quence, its distinctive attribute (II. ii. i and 2). It is either fragrant or non-
fragrant. The colour of Earth is manifold, white, etc. Its taste is of six kinds,
sweet, etc .; and its touch is neither too hot nor too cold, and is due to burning.
As a simple Substance, an element, Earth consists of ultimate atoms
which are relatively eternal, existing at the beginning oftsecondary creation.
As a compound Substance, groupings of ultimate atoms, it is non-eternal, being
an effect. Terrene compounds originate three things, namely, body, sense,
and object (IV. ii. 1, 2, 3 and 4). Of these, the body is two-fold, sex-born and
not-sex-born (IV. ii. 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 and 11). A-sexual bodies, that is, bodies
produced independently of blood and semen, are those of the celestials and seers
as well as the penitential bodies of little creatures such as gnats, mosquitoes, etc.
Sexual bodies are produced from the coming together of blood and semen.
These are either womb-born, as those of men and the lower animals, or egg-
born, as those of birds and reptiles.
The sense of smell is the terrene sense (VIII. ii. 5), as it causes the
manifestation of smell, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc.
It is originated by terrene particles unovetpowered by Water, etc.
The object which is terrene, is characterised as earth, stone, and the im­
moveable. The modifications of earth are the divisions of land, wall, brick, etc.
Stones are the mountains, jewels, diamond, red-chalk, etc. The immoveables
are grass, herbs, trees, shrubs, creepers, etc
(ii) Water.
Water possesses colour, taste, touch, fluidity, and viscidity (II. i. 2) and
number, quantity, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority,
gravity, and potential energy. Its colour is white, taste sweet, and touch cold.
Viscidity belongs to Water alone ; so also does constitutional fluidity. These
and cold touch are the distinctive characteristics of Water (II. ii. 5)- Like
Earth, Water also is relatively eternal as a cause (consisting of ultimate atoms)
and non-eternal as an effect. Its products are likewise threefold, body, sense,
and object. Aqueous bodies are all a-sexually generated. They exist in the
world of Varum and are capable of experiencing the fruits of Karma, inasmuch
as terrene particles enter into their composition as contributory causes or
conditions. The organ of taste is the aqueous sense (VIII. ii. 6), as it causes
the manifestation of taste only, while it does not cause the manifestation of
colour, etc. It is originated by aqueous particles unoverpowered by heterogene­
ous substances. Aqueous objects are rivers, seas, dew, hail-stone, etc,
.H. INTRODUCTION. ■

(iii) Fire.
Fire possesses colour and touch (II. i. 3), and number, quantity, separate­
ness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, and potentiality.
Its colour is white and luminous, and the hot is its only touch. These are the
distinctive attributes of fire (II. ii. 3 and 4). It is also two-fold, existing as
simple substances or atoms and as compounds, that is, effects. It originates
body, sense, and object. Igneous bodies are all a-sexually produced. They
exist in the world of Adilya, and are capable of experiencing the fruits of
Karma, inasmuch as terrene particles enter into their composition as con-
tributary causes or conditions. The organ of vision is the igneous sense (VIII.
ii. 6), as it causes the manifestation of colour only, while it does not cause the
manifestation ot taste, etc. It is originated by igneous particles unover­
powered by other particles. Igneous objects are fourfold, being differentiated as
terrestrial, celestial, abdomenal, and mineral. The terrestrial is that which is
produced from fuel, such as wood; the celestial is that which is not produced
from fuel, e.g., lightning, etc. ; the abdomenal is the stomachic, capable of
extracting the juice of rice, etc. ; and the mineral is goid, etc.
(iv) A ir.
Air possesses touch (II. i. 4), number, quantity, separateness, conjunction,
disjunction, priority, and posteriority (IV. i. 12), and potentiality (V. i. 14).
Its touch is neither too hot nor too cold and at the same time, it is not due to
burning. Touch and the flotation of leaves, clouds, air-ships, etc., are the
mark of the existence of Air as a substance, but the name Vayu, Air, is obtain­
ed from the Veda. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its plurality
(II. i. 9, 10, 1 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17). Air is two-fold, as ultimate atoms and
as their products. These products, again, are fourfold, viz., body, sense,
object, and Pr&na or life-breath. Aerial bodies are all a-sexually produced. They
exist in the world of the Maruts, and are capable of experiencing the fruits of
Karma, inasmuch as terrene particles enter into their composition as
contributory causes or conditions. The skin, spreading over the whole body,
is the aerial sense (VII. ii. 6), as it causes the manifestation of touch, only,'
while it does not cause the manifestation of smell, etc. It is originated by
aerial particles un-overpowered by terrene and other particles. The aerial
object is the wind which is the seat or support of the touch which can be felt.
The fourth effect of Air, which is called Prdiia is the means of disposing of the
essences, excreta, and the humours or vital fluids within the body. Though
one, still Prana, acquires the names of Ap&na (/>., the air which throws
out), etc., according to the diversity of its functions.
(v) Ether. m
Colour, taste, smell, and touch do r.ot belong to Ether (II, i. 5) i ts
attributes are sound, number, quantity, separateness, conjunction, and* dis-
junction. Sound is its distinctive attribute, and leads to the inference of its
I existence, by the method of residues (II. i. ao, at, aa, a * a5, a6 and 27)'
■( ___________ ISTRODVCTTOli. (c i
it (II. i. 29, 30, and 31). It is universally present, being infinitely large (VII. i.
22). In the form of the sense of hearing it becomes the instrument for the
perception of sound. The organ of hearing, again, called the cavity of the ear,
is a portion of Ether determined by merit and de-merit which lead to agreeable
and disagreeable experiences caused by sound. And although Ether is eternal,
deafness is due to the absence of these determining circumstances.
(vi, Time.
Cognitions of (priority) posteriority, simultaneity, slowness, quickness are
marks of the existence of Time (II. ii. 6). These cognitions do not arise in respect
of eternal substances but arise in respect of substances which have a production.
Time, therefore, is the name given to the occasional or efficient cause of all
that is produced (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26), and that which also makes possible the
application of the terms hibernal, vernal, pluvial, etc., to flowers, fruits, etc.
Time is a substance, and is eternal (II. ii. 7). Its attributes are number,
quantity, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction. Its unity and individuality
are proved like those of Ether and Existence (II. ii. 8). Being a cause, whether
specific or universal, it is all-pervading (VII. i. 25). Its conjunction and dis­
junction are proved from the origin of temporal priority and temporal
posteriority (VII. ii. 22). The use of its manifoldness, in spite of its unity, is
occasioned by external conditions.
(vii) Space.
Space is that from which, in respect of two simultaneously existing bodies,
which are also fixed in direction and place, such cognition and usage arise
that the one is remote from, etc., the other (II. ii. 10). Like Air, Space is a
substance, and is eternal (II. ii. 11), and like Existence, it is one and possesses
individuality (II. ii. 12). ■ Like Time, it is all-pervading, and possesses con­
junction and disjunction. The attribution of multiplicity to it is due to the
divergence of effects (II. ii. 13). Directions in Space are explained by
reference to conjunctions of the sun (II. ii. 14, *S» an<^ 1^)-
(viii) Soul-
The immediate purpose of the Vaifa$ika Dariana is to teach the difference
between the Self and the Not-Self. Kandda has accordingly entered into a
detailed enquiry respecting the existence and attributes of the Soul. He
has shown that the self is not an empty idea but has a real existence; that
the soul is not a by-product of physiological processes, nor is identical with the
stream of conscious states, nor, again, ult imately resolvable into the Supreme
Self during the circle of secondary creation and dissolutions but that it is a
distinct entity possessing distinct attributes, and length of experience. Now,
among substances, the Soul, like Ether, Time, Space, Air, and ultimate Atoms,
is not an object of external perception (VIII. i. 2). It is also not an object of
internal perception by ordinary minds. Only persons who have attained to a
certain level of spiritual development, that can, through a particular conjunc­
tion of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul, have immediate consciousness of the
existence and attributes of the Soul, as also of other Substances as weli as
4
 •S I TNTROD UCTtON.

Arributes, and Actions (IX. i. n , 12, 13, 14, and 15). Otherwise the proof of
the existence and attributes of the Soul is by means of inference. The mark of
inference is in this case supplied by the very fact of experience. For, perception
of the objects of the senses is a universal experience among mankind (III. i. 1))
and this universal experience of the objects of the senses is a mark of
the existence of an object, (namely the Soul) different from the senses and their
objects (III. i. 2 and 18). It cannot be a mark for the inference that the body
or the senses are the seat of consciousness (III. i. 3 ) for there is no conscious­
ness in their causes (III. i. 4), as otherwise consciousness would have appeared
also in the other effects of those causes (III. i. 5). which is, however, not the
case (III. i. 6). Thus, upon the fact of perception, an employer, a presiding
Soul, is inferred from the employment, in perception, of the organ of bearing
and the other senses as instruments. That the relation of causation or identity
does not subsist between the Soul and the senses does not affect the inference
in the least (Ill.i. 7, 8, 9, to, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17). It is further implied
that not merely perception, but cognition as such, is a mark of the inference of
a distinct entity called the Soul. The fact of re-cognition, again, disproves the
theory that the soul is but a stream of conscious states in ceaseless flow (III, i.
18). Moreover, the ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the clos­
ing and opening of the eye-lids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affec­
tions of the other senses, and also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition
are marks of the existence of the Soul (III. ii. 4). The view, held by some, that
the existence of the Soul is proved, not by cognition nor by inference, but by
Revelation alone, is not tenable, since, as Ether is proved by sound, so the Soul
is proved in particular by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the
form of ‘I’ accompanied by the divergence of such cognition from ail other things
(III. ii. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, it, 12, 13, 14, 15, i6, 17, and 18). The sense of ‘ l’-ness can­
not be eliminated even in the last analysis, and the popular attribution of it to
the body is not real but transferential. it is the sense of ‘I’-ness, again, which
establishes the difference betwen the Soul and hvara, the Supreme Self,
Besides there is no sufficient ground for maintaining the unity of the S o u l; on
the contrary, variety of status or lots proves diversity of Souls (III. ii. 19 and 20),
which is supported by the Veda also (III. ii. 21). And activity and inactivity,
observed in one’s own Soul, become the marks for the inference of Souls in
other bodies (III. i. 19).
Now, the Soul is a Substance, being a substratum of attributes, and is eternal,
so far as secondary creation and dissolution are concerned, as there is no proof
for the supposition of parts in it (III- ii. 5), ami infinite, in consequence of its
vast expansion (VII. i. 22). Its attributes accordingly are cognition, pleasure,
pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, VI. i. 5), impression or subcon­
scious latency, number, quantity, separateness conjunction, and disjunction.
h v a ra or God is the Supreme Self. H s existence is proved by Revela­
tion and inference. The universe infers th. existence of an Active Principle,
| independent of adritfairi, as its creator, and he Veda infers the existence of an
I
(*^Jt^pi INTRODUCTION. ______ V^J
Independent Person, eternally free from all faults whatever (I. i. 3, 11. i. 18 and
19, VI. i. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and X . ii. 9), as its Author. In Him, there are, therefore
according to some, eight attributes, vis., number, quantity, separateness,conjunc­
tion, disjunction, cognition, desire, and volition, or, as according to others, six
attributes, viz., the above with the exception of desire ahd volition, His cognition
itself being, in their view, sufficient to translate itself into action. Being thus
the substratum of these six or eight attributes, specially of cognition, He cannot
be essentially different from Souls ; and hence it follows that God is a Soul. And
there is only one God, as the supposition of a plurality of gods is contravened
by redundancy.
(ix) Mind.
Mind is the internal organ of sense. Like the Soul, it also is not an object
of ordinary perception (V J1I. i. 2). Its existence is inferred from the production
and non-production of cognition, even on the contact of the Soul with the senses
and objects (III. ii. 1). Its attributes are number, quantity, separateness, con­
junction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, and potentiality. Its substanceness
and eternality are proved like those of Air (111. ii. 2). From the non-simultaneity
of volitions and cognitions, it follows that there is only one Mind in each organ­
ism (111. ii. 3). For the same reason, its quantity is atomic (VII i. 23).
Now, the Mind is the inner sense, the organ of internal perception. We
shall here describe Kondda's theory of perceptual cognition in general. Percep­
tion denotes certain, unchanging cognition, produced in the soul, through the
contact of the senses and objects. This contact, or presentation of objects to
the Soul through the medium of the senses, is either laukika or ordinary, or
a-laukika or extraordinary. We have given a full account of ordinary presenta­
tion in the quotation which we have made above from the Tarka-Sau.igraha. But
the conditions under which external perception can take place remain to be
pointed out. The first condition of external perception is that the five external
senses are respectively constituted by the very same elements which they
severally apprehend (VIII. ii. 5 and 6). Community of substance, therefore,
between the sense and object is the essential condition for the apprehension
of the external objects, viz., Earth, Water, Fire. The conditions of external
perception in particular instances are laid down in the aphorisms (IV. i. 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.)
Ordinary mental perception consists in apprehension, through the medium
of the inner sense, of all the attributes of the soul with the exception of
nirvihalpaka j'ndna, non-discriminative cognition, and Jivanayoniyatna, volition
the source of vitality.
Objects that are beyond the reach of the senses, under ordinary circum-
tances, therefore, are the Ultimate* Atoms, Air, Space, Time, Ether, Mind, Soul,
Combination, Gravity, etc. They aie, however, cognizable in two ways, namely,
intuitively, in rare cases, as in me case of sagely cognition (IX. ii. 13), or
through the medium of alaukika or Extraordinary presentation of objects to the
Soul. Extraordinary presentation is three-fold, being samdnya-lahsana,

V
 )V INTRODUCTION. xll^.
jndnalak&ana, and yogajadharma, that is, presentation through the media of
the genus, cognition, and virtue born of yoga. Presentation by the genus
consists in the cognition of the genus itself; without it there can be no conception
or formation of the general idea from particular instances; or, as the concep-
tualist would prefer to say, without it there can be no cognition of the concept
which has a real existence apart from concrete embodiment. Presentation by
cognition consists in the immediate contact with the mind, of that in respect
of which cognition is going to arise. A s in “ Fragrant Sandal-w ood:” here
the concept ‘ fragrance ’ may be revealed by presentation by the genus, but
1 fragrance-ness ’ can be revealed only by presentation by cognition. Yogaja­
dharma is two-fold, according as it is produced in those who are united and in
those who are disunited (IX. i. 13). It is of inconceivable efficacy and makes
everything, e.g., omniscience, possible to man. Tho process of perception
through presentation constituted by Yoga has been elaborately described by
Kanada in the aphorisms IX. i. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.
The Vailesika doctrine of realism is founded upon this theory of percep­
tion.
{h) Attribute.
The characteristic of an Attribute is that it naturally inheres in Sub­
stances, does not contain an Attribute itself, and is not an independent cause
of conjunction and disjunction (I. 1. 16). There are twenty-four Attributes,
namely, Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Measure or Quantity, Separate­
ness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Understanding or Cog­
nition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity,
Potentiality (Velocity, Elasticity and Impression), Merit, Demerit, and Sound
(I. i 6). Of these, Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Priority, Posteriority, Fluidity
Viscidity, and Velocity are attributes of corporal or ponderable or finite Sub­
stances; Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Merit, De-merit
Impression, and Sound are attributes of (two of the) incorporal or imponderable
or infinite Substances, namely, the Soul and Ether ; while Number, Quantity
Separateness, Conjunction, and Disjunction are attributes of both finite and infi-
nite substances. Conjunction, Disjunction, Duality, Separateness of Two etc '
inhere in more Substances than one, and the rest inhere in single Substances’
Colour, Taste, Touch, Smell, Viscidity, constitutional Fluidity, Cognition
Pleasute, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Merit, Demerit, Impression and*
Sound are distinctive or particular attributes, and Number, Quantity Separate
ness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, occasional Fluidi"
ty, and Velocity are general attributes. Sound,,Touch, Colour, Taste and SmeH
are apprehensible by the external senses severally; Number, Quantity Sena
rareness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Fluidity V i s c id ^
and Velocity are apprehensible by two senses jointly • Comfitinn P.
rain, Desire, Aversion, Voi.iion are ^ * £ ^ 2
or Mind ; while Gravity, Merit, Demerit, and Impression are super-sensum^
Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, which are not produced by burning, Quantity
;l. INTRODUCTION.

Unity, Individuality, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, and Velocity, are preceded

by like attributes in their causes; while Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire,
Aversion, Volition, Merit, Demerit, Impression, and Sound are not so prece­
ded. Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Merit, Demerit,
Impression, Sound, Quantity produced by loose conjunction as in a mass of
cotton, subsequent Conjunction, occasional Fluidity, and Colour, Taste, Smell,
and Touch which are not produced by burning, are the effects of Conjunction ;
Conjunction, Disjunction, and Velocity are effects of Action; and Sound and
subsequent Disjunction are effects of Disjunction. Priority, Posteriority,
Duality, Separateness of Two, etc., depend upon Understanding. Colour, Taste,
Smell, louch which is not too hot, Sound, Quantity, Unity, Individuality, and
Viscidity originate their likes; Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition
originate their unlikes; while Conjunction, Disjunction, Number, Gravity,
Fluidity, hot I ouch, Cognition, Merit, Demerit, and Potentiality originate both.
Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Impression, and Sound originate
their effects in the same substratum in which they themselves inhere; Colour,
Taste, Smell, Touch, Quantity, Viscidity, and Volition originate their effects
in a different substratum ; while Conjunction, Disjunction, Number, Individu­
ality! Gravity, Fluidity, Velocity, Merit, and Demerit originate their effects in
both places. Gravity, Fluidity, Velocity, Volition, Merit, Demerit, and a par­
ticular Conjunction (called Impact and Impulse) are causes of Action or Change.
Colour, Taste,-Smell, Touch which is not too hot, Number, Quantity, Individu­
ality, Viscidity, and Sound are non-combinative causes ; Cognition, Pleasure,
Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Merit, Demerit, and Impression are efficient
causes ; Conjunction, Disjunction, hot Touch, Gravity, Fluidity, and Velocity
are both ; while Priority, Posteriority, Duality, Separateness of Two, etc.,
possess no causality at all. Conjunction, Disjunction, Sound, and particular
attributes of the Soul are separable, that is, may or may not exist in their
substrata; while the rest are inseparable, that is, always exist in their sub­
strata, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, which are not due to burning, and
Quantity, Unity, Individuality, constitutional Fluidity, Gravity, and Viscidity
endure so long as their respective substrata endure; while the rest vanish
even dtiring the continuance of their substrata.*
The reader will find a detailed account of the mode of production, destruc­
tion, and apprehension of these attributes in the body of the book (vide Books
VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X).
(c) Action.
The characteristic of Action is that it inheres in one Substance only, does
not possess Attribute, and is an independent cause of Conjunctions and Dis­
junctions (I. i. 17, 20, 26, and 30). There are five kinds of Action, v is.,' Throw­
ing Upwards, Throwing Downwards, Contraction, Expansion, and Going'or
Motion (I. i. 7). Although Motion is synonymous with Action, yet it is sepa­
rately mentioned here with the object of including such other forms of Action
* This summary is taken from the Pad&rtha-Dhurma-Sumyraha of Prasastupada.

\
if! H ? ..... . - .... . ..... . ■'--------- --------------
ifiT
INTRODUCTION.

as Rotation, Evacuation, Percolation, etc. Action is speedily destroyed (II, ii.

25). It appears in corporal or finite Substances only (II. i ail, so that it does
not appear in Time, Space, Ether, and Soul, as well as in Attribute, and Action
(V. ii. 21 and 22). Action is produced from Gravity, Fluidity, Volition, and
Conjunction (I. i. 29). It is destroyed by Conjunction produced by itself
(I. i. 14, and II. i. 23). It operates as a non-combinative cause (X. ii. 3), and
produces its effect in its own substratum as well as in other places. It does
not originate its like ( I. i it, 24, and 31), nor does it originate Substance (I. i.
2i, 22, and 31)
Actions may be volitional or non-volitional, as in the familiar instance of
throwing down a pestle into a mortar, and its bounding back, where, again, all
the actions are produced from Conjunction, except the original action which
is produced from volition (V. i 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). Gravity causes falling
down in the absence of Conjunction (V. i. 71, as in raining (V. ii. 3), and of
Velocity (V. i. 18), as in the falling down of a discharged arrow which shoots
up in the sky in consequence of Impulse and Velocity (V. i. 17). Other in­
stances of non-volitional action are the playful movements of the hands and
legs of a child (V. i. u ), the but sting forth of burning bodies, and the move­
ments of the body of a sleeping person (V. i. 13). Evaporation of water is
caused by the rays of the sun through conjunction with Air, etc. (V. ii. 5 and 6).
Pormation and dissolution of clouds is caused by conjunction of Fire (V. ii.
8,9, 10, and 11). Fluidity causes the flowing of waters on the surface of the
earth (V. ii. 4).
Action is also produced from Impact and Impluse (V. ii. 1), and also from
Adrift,ant, the unseen principle, that is, the sum total of the potential after­
effects of previous acts voluntarily produced (V. i. 15, V. ii. 13 and 17).
Voluntary action, under particular ciicumstances, becomes the source
o fdharma, merit, or adharma, demerit, as the case may be; involuntary action
does not produce dharma or adharma,
(d) Genus, and (e) Species.
Genus is the principle of assimilation, and Species is the principle of
differentiation. Both the notions are relative to the understanding (f. ii. 3.)
Existence, however, is the summum genus, as it causes assimilative cognition
only (I. ii. 4.) Substance-ness or that which makes substance what it is
Attribute-ness or that which makes Attribute what it is, and Action-ness or
that which makes Action what it is, are, for example, both genera and species
(I. 11. 5.) While the inftma species are those ultimate differences, final
species, which inhere in each individual ultimate atom, Soul, Mind, and in
Space, lime, and Ether, thereby constituting their distinctive peculiarities
and account for the very great variety of things and events in the universe
(I.11.6.) It is, as has been already pointed out, on account of the recognition
of these infimoe species, that the system of Kandda is called the philosophy of
Final Species. Genus and Species, again, are both eternal. Genus presup­
poses more than one individual, different from one another in all other
 V• ^ t a , ‘j^ '

[If 1 » x IN TR O D U C TIO N . V fil

■: ---------------------- .------------------------- SLLi
respects. The supposition of genus and species in genus and species and
combination would entail infinite regression. (VIII. i 5.)
Now, by ‘ Existence’ we mean that which, in the case of Substance,
Attribute, and Action, makes possible intuition and predication in the form
that it is existent (I. ii. 7). It is not identical with Substance, Attribute, and
Action (I ii. 8, 9, and 10). And there is but one Existence (I. ii. 17). Substance-
ness, Attribute-ness, and Action-ness also are not identical with Substance,
Attribute, and Action (I. ii. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.)
(/) Combination.
Combination is that relation of things, inseparably associated by nature
and bearing to one another the relation of the container and the contained,— «
which is the source of intuition in the form of ‘It is here’ (VII. ii. 26). This
is the relation of parts and wholes, of objects and their attributes, of action
and that in which it appears, of genus and species and things in which they
reside, and of eternal substances and their ultimate differences. Combination
is not mere Conjunction. For, Conjunction is the association, externally pro­
duced, of things existing'separately in nature ; its various causes are action of
either of two things, action of both, and another Conjunction (VII. ii. 9); it
terminates in Disjunction, is perceptible to the sense, is manifold, and is perish­
able; whereas none of these characteristics exists in Combination. On the
contrary, Combination has no production (V. ii. 23), is super-sensuous, eternal,
and one (VII. ii. 28). It is established by inference, and is quite distinct from
Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species (V II. ii. 27.)
(g) We shall now briefly dwell upon the second main division of Name-
able Things, that is, Non-existence. Non-existence is primarily two-fold,
non-existence of relation and non-existence of identity. Non-existence of
relation is divided as antecedent, as of a water-pot prior to its coming into
existence, consequent, as of the water-pot subsequent to its passing out of
existence, and absolute, as darkness. Non-existence of identity is such that the
nature of a cow does not exist in a horse, and vice versa. Non-existence is an
object of perception (IX. i. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.)
The aphorisms of Kanada, just now cited,- are specially directed to contro­
vert the Samkhya theory, Sat-kdrya-vdda, that the effect is existent even prior
to its production. Vide also 1. ii. 1 and V II. ii. 8,7

7. THE VAISESIKA THEORY OP CREATION AND DISSOLUTION

OP THE COSMIC SYSTEM*
We have already observed that Kanada does not carry his analysis of
the Cosmic System behind the start of what may be called secondary creation.
This limitation of his enquiry should be constantly borne in mind in estimating
the soundness of his theories. Now, at the beginning of secondary creation,
there exist ultimate atoms of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, and Time. Space,
♦ Read II. i. 18, 19. IV. i. 1, 2,3, 4, 5. V. ii. 1,12,18. VII. ii. 9,10. X. ii. 2.
|; INTRODUCTION. kjSL
Ether, Souls and Minds. Primary Creation means the emanation or evolution
of these entities from the Supreme being ; but with this we are not at present
concerned. It should be observed, however, that the system of the universe
has no internal purpose of its own, but that it exists for the sake of the
Souls. In other words, the evolution of the world is not an end in itse lf; the
reason of its existence lies in so far as it explains, accounts for, makes possible
and helps the evolution of the Souls, travelling in succession through all forms
of mortal existence, under the influence of Adristam, according to the law of
Karma. It should be also observed that each secondary creation and each
secondary dissolution that follows the former, make up one cycle, the duration
of which is twice 15,55,20,00,00,00,00,0 years, and a number oLsuch eyrie roll
by before one great cycle of primary creation and ultimate dissolution can be
completed. In each minor cycle, the great Lord presides over the universe,
during integration, as the Evolver, and, during disintegration, as the With-
d rawer.
Now, at the close of the period of the Evolver, the great Lord desires to
give rest to the struggling souls,-----struggling to get relief from the sufferings
of mortal existence and release from the chain of Adriftam ; and no sooner is
such desire entertained by Him than are suspended the functions of the
Adristam, unseen principles, appertaining to every Soul, which are the primary
causes of the formation of bodies, of senses, and of Earth, Water, Fire and
Am And the same desire of the Great Lord, penetrating into Souls’ and
* Atoms produces actions which result in disjunction of the constituent
auses of the bodies and senses, and on the cessation hereby of the conjunction
of those causes, disintegration continues till the Ultimate Atoms are reached
Earth, Water, Fire, a„ d Af. are, one after anolhei. k

meri d e m e rira 'd i T 8' These .Ultimate Aton,s and Souls, charged with
the , 1 ’i ! ? 1 impressions, exist in a state of disintegration during
pet tod of the W ithdraw n Such is the process of secondary dissolution
to c H ° f thC Pen° d ° f dlslnteg ration, again, the Great Lord desires
to create, and thereupon, under the influence of A dV sta^, merit and demerit
ppenammg to every Soul, action is produced in the uhimate atom. 7 A r
h ough conjunction with the desire of the Lord, and the great element of Afr
is thereby produced ,n the series of binary atomic aggregates etc and floats
on Ether in ceaseless flow. In the same way, and f o L i n g h e c o u r s e
of evolution, the great element of Water annears a ,y r- , ,
atoms of W ater; thereafter the great elements of’ Earth’ thc. ult,n,ate .
from the ultimate atoms of Earth • and lastlv tho ' ! ’ aPPears> ln Water,
in Earth, Iron, the ultimate elementTof Fh / ' ^ 2 ^ 1 ^ *"*"*
thus sprung into existence, the w i , , . ^
appearance of the Great Egg from the composition of terrene and
atoms, and therein appears the Evolver and takes nn tl P , an<* igneous
living beings, and, according to the stored up consequences T f" act °i
by the S o u , in the previous cycle, evolves
r & . ■ -_

(if S x k ; INTRODUCTION. V flj

\ v \ 3 -^ / •--- -— '■ .•'■■v.-' —i— ;— -I ' —~~ - dI
Manns, Celestials, Seers, P ilris, Men, and all other animals, high and low,
all differing from one another in cognition, experience, and length of life,
and endows them with religious tendenc}', cognition, dispassion, and other
excellences in accordance with their deserts. Such is the process of secondary
creation.
Kanada of course has not given us such a complete account of creation
and dissolution in his Aphorisms. But this is the traditional view, and the
reference to the above in his aphorisms is, in the circumstances of the case,
sufficient to show that he accepts it.
Now, in the above account we have started with the existence of Ultimate
Atoms and of Adristam. W e will now see how Kanada proves their existence.
(a)Ultimate Atoms.
The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused (IV. i. 1). The eternal
exists (IV. i. 4). Things as they appear in nature cannot be eternal, for, being
effects, they are destroyed, as they are produced. In them, however, the
relation of parts and wholes is a matter of ordinary experience. It cannot be
unlimited, since, otherwise, there would be no difference in quantity between
mount Meru and a grain of mustard seed, both being originated by infinite
parts. Therefore, a substance without parts must be the limit, and that
substance is the ultimate atom (IV. i. 2). It is eternal (IV. i. 5, and VII. i. 20)
and imperceptible. And as there are four elements, so there are four classes
of Ultimate Atoms.
(b) Adristam.
Adristam has been declared to be the cause also of earthquake and other
terrestrial disturbances (V. ii. 2), of the growth, flowers, fruits, and the like
cf trees (V. ii. 7), of desire for particular objects (VI. ii. 10), and of other
effects (V. i. 15 and V. ii. 13). What, then, may be this adriftam ? It is,
as its name implies, an unseen principle, capable of initiating changes. It is
intended to denote the potential after-effects of volitional acts performed in
previous births. It consists of dharma, merit, and adharma, demerit, and
inheres in the Soul. The doctrine of adristam is based upon the law of
karma which includes causation and conservation of energy. The existence
of adUstam may be demonstrated in the following manner : Voluntary act
is an act done with a definite purpose or end. Such ends are within view
in the case of acts like milking, cooking, etc ; fruits of certain other acts, e.g.,
sowing, ploughing, planting, etc., appear in the near or distant future, as the
case may be, but, in any ease on earth, and generally within the life-time of the
agent | while there are other acts such as sacrifice, charity, pure living, high
thinking, religious observances, etc., (VI. ii. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), the fruits of
which are not enjoyable on earth. These acts cannot be said to be purposeless ;
nor can name and fame be the result of them, for they aie not performed with
an eye to it. On the other hand, as the Veda declares, Exaltation is the
fruit of acts the purposes of which are not within sight (VI. ii. 1 and X . ii. 8),
and the authority of the Veda rests on the strongest proof (II. i. 3 and X. ii. 9).
xVxi|^/ INTRODUCTION. x^J
Now, Exaltation includes spiritual intuition of the self, the result of Yoga
or holy communion, as well as enjoyment of heaven, the result of sacrifice,
almsgiving, ministration, and the like. These results obviously accrue in the
most distant future ; so that they cannot be directly or immediately connected
with their respective causes, that is, acts which by nature (II. ii. 25) speedily
vanish out of existence. Hence it follows that there is, in these cases, an
intermediate common substratum of the action and the fruit, and this is
adristam It is, in other words, an acquired capability or tendency of the
Soul. The same method of demonstration applies to the case of adharma
produced from cruelty, impurity, and the like causes,

8. KAIVADA’S THEORY OB’ THE COSMIC EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL.

Activity may be Sakdma, directed to the attainment of objects of desire
or the avoidance of objects of aversion, or Nifkam a, employed, not with a view
to enjoy the consequences, but in a spirit of devotion to duty. Sakdma activity
is the source of atlr/f'an (q.v.) or dhorma and adharma, and Nigkdma activity
produces purification of the ckilta or mind, i.e., the internal organ, of the faults
ol desire and aversion I he former induces inclination to worldly experience,
and the latter induces disinclination towards it. Now, under the influence of
Avidyd (q.v.t, the Soul, possessing desire and aversion, acquires dharma and
adharma which lead it into worldly existence. If the quantum of dharma is
gieater than that of aahari,1a, the Soul comes into conjunction with agreeable
physical organism, senses, and objects, in strict accordance with the results of
previous acts to be enjoyed, in the world of Brahma, Indra, Prajdpati, Pitrts,
or i en. If, on the other hand, the quantum of adharma is greater than that of
dharma, the Soul comes into conjunction with disagreeable body, senses, and
objects, amongst Pretas or a class of fallen Souls and the lower animals, as well
as in tlie vegetable kingdom, etc. In this wav, in consequenee of dharma and
a larma, the Soul undergoes, over and over again, a cabined, cribbed and
con ne existence, in the celestial, human, animal, and hellish kingdoms. This
is the order of creation.
It does not follow, however, that the law of karma, in other words, the
doctrine of adnfam , binds the Soul as with a chain of iion, so that there can
be no escape from it, except, if it be, by means of an extraordinary intervention
immediate or mediate, on the part of God. For Panada, or, for the matter of that’
any Hindu thinker, does not advocate determinism in Philosophy nor preaches’
vicarious salvati m m Religion. On the contrary, it is the pride and glory of
Hindu philosophy and Hindu Religion (between which there has never been
any divorce, as in the west) that it upholds and vindicates the intrinsic freedom
of the Soul, and teaches to the world for all time that, as the Soul happens to
be the cause pf its own suffering, real or imaginary whatever that may be so
it is quite capable of working out its own salvation, which no external aeencv
can do for it. 5 *
 m | (2
5ix
W
A
kS
tiviff-' . ' INTRODUCTION. VStil J
Now, Kanada's idea of salvation or more properly, release, niokga, wherein
consists Nihsreyasam, the Supreme Good, is relative to what the state of trans-
migratory existence, over and over again, as described above, implies. In the
first place, it implies a state of bondage,—of slavish attachment to objects of
pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion,—of limitation by the physical embo­
diment, by the senses, and by the surroundings, in time, place, and situation
and circumstances. In the second place, it implies all that is the necessary
accompaniment of such mortal existence, —multitude of afflictions caused by
influences from within the body as well as from outside it, from physical, animal,
human, and superhuman agencies,— in one word, pain, or suffering, technically
called, the three-fold afflictions. The Supreme Good, therefore, consists in the
final cessation of these three-fold applications (I. i. 4), and Release means
release from the coil of mortality (V. II. 18).
How then can Release be obtained ? We have seen that dharma and
adhartna are causes of birth, that is conjunction of Soul with body, mind, and
life, and of death, that is, disjunction of body, mind, and Soul (V. ii. 17 and VI.
ii. 15). Application to acts which produce dharma and adhartna, is induced by
Desire and Aversion (VI. ii. 14). Desire and Aversion arise respectively from
pleasure and pain (VI. ii. 10), and promiscuously from habit (VI. ii. 11). adriftam
(VI. ii. 12) and racial characteristics (VI. ii. 13). Pleasure and Pain result
from contact of Soul, sense, mind, and object (V. ii. 10), action of the
mind establishing connection between the Soul and the senses and objects.
Action does not originate in the mind when it has become steady in
the Soul ; after this, there is non-existence of pain in the embodied Soul.
It is this state, of permanent impossibility of pain, which is called yaga
or holy communion (V. ii. 16). In yoga, the Soul acquires perfect control
over the internal and external senses, and once more regains its natural
freedom from all limitation in respect of cognition as well as volition
and creative power (VI. II. 16). It then derives accurate knowledge of previ­
ously produced dharma and adhartna, which have to be experienced in other
bodies and places, builds up various bodies suitable to such experience, and
exhausts that dharma and adhartna by experiencing them in those bodies. And
Release consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, whether
after death or during life, as is the case with those who are called Jivanm ukla,
i.e., released while living, when there is, at the same time, no potential body
existing, and consequently re-birth cannot take place in future (V. ii. 18).
Emancipation, therefore, characterised as final cessation of pain, ensues on
the cessation of birth, due to cessation of tendency to acts which bind down,
in consequence of non-production of subsequent dharma and adhartna, oil
account of the dispersion of the mists of faults characterised as desire, aversion,
and infatuation, by means of spiritual intuition of the Soul in the state of yoga.
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 T H E V A IS E S IK A S tJT R A S O F K A N A D A
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AND
✓ ' ‘ tV-i' ’ '■ v
EXTRACTS FROMTHE GLOSS OF JAYANArAYANA
B ook F ir s t — C h apter F ir s t .

Upaskira.—Salutation to Sri Ganesa. I bow to Hara, who has the heavenly river
playing on the lap of his uptied matted locks, and whose forehead is adorned with the
embellisher of the night. My salutations constantly roach those two, Kanada and Bha-
vanatha, by whom I have been thoroughly enlightened in the Yaisef ika system. May
success attend this venture of mine who, like the funambulist in the air, walk here
without any support, with the only help of the S&tram (rope or aphorism).
Being overcome with the three-fold afflictions,* people endowed
withdiscriminativeintelligence, collectedfromthe variousGratis, Smritis,
ItihasasandPuranas, in thecourseof their search for a radical remedy
for the prevention of the three afflictions, that the immediate under­
standingof theprincipleof the Soul or simply, self-realization, alone is
that remedy. Theythenapproached the very kind sage Kanada with
the desireof enquiringof himthe way for the attainment of that even.
Now, thesageKanada, possessing knowledge of essences, lordliness and
dispassion, remembering that it is the knowledgeof the essencesof the
sixpadarthas (predicables) by way of their resemblance anddifference
whichis thegreat wayfor theattainment ofself-realization, and thinking
that that knowledgewill beof easy access tothem through the dharma
of renunciation and that therefore he will first of all teach them
dharma (piety) as it is initself andin its characteristics, and after that
thesixpadarthas also, by their enumeration, definition, and demonstra­
tion,—proposes, inorder todrawtheir attention:
* I.e., Pains due to (1) mental and bodily processes, (2) physical forces andTsj SpiritY
and such other entities, and other created beings, men, animals, etc.
A • --- -v. . . . . . . . . .

g ) V _________ V A IS E S IK A P H IL O S O P H Y . __________ j g

Vivriti. lie whoof His ownwill spreads out the production, pre­
servation, anddestructionof the universe; Hewho, even though shining
forthinsuppressionof all these, still is not known by other than wise
men; He, byknowingwhomas Heis in Himself, men are saved from
further immersionintothe waves of the streamof transmigration; the
sameis Bhava(i.e., the Lordof Creation), and He is easy of access by
thepath of communion with Him in constant devotion. May He be
pleased togiveyouprosperity. I adore Bhavani (the consort of Bhava),
Malietil (theconsort of Mahe^a, the Great Lord), who, Herself bearing
limbs as darkas thecloud, still dispels the mass of darkness by myriads
ofcollectedrays; whowhilecuttingasunder thebondof re-birth of Her
devotees, isHerself bound bylovetoBhavaand is Hisconstant delighter ;
who, although Sheisaladyofhigh birth, yet wears the clothes of the
quarters; who, although She is born of the Immobile (the Himalaya',
still movesfromplace toplace; and who, while being the consort of the
Pure (Siva), is seatedonacorpse.
After bowing to his good preceptor, the fortunate twice-born
Jayanarayanaiswritingout thevivriti (explanation or elaboration) of the
aphorisms of Kanadafor thepleasureofIsvara.
Here indeedoneandall ofthedisciples, desiring to throw off the
multitudeofafflictions arising from birth, decrepitude, death, and the
like, hear fromthe various Srutis, Smritis, Itihasas, Puranas, etc., that
thevisionof therealityof theSelf is the fundamental means of escaping
them. Thus, there is the$ruti: “Verily, verily, theSelf is tobeseen, to
beheardabout, tobethought over, and meditatedupon. Verily, 0 verily,
this is(the measureof) immortality(Brihadaranyaka2, 4, 5); ” also, “when
thePuru§a (thein-dweller) will knowhimself—theSelf—as “Iam,” then
wishingwhat, for whichdesire, will he pursue the course of transmigra­
tion?” AndtheSmriti also: “Byelaboratinghis understandinginthree
ways, namelybysacred writings, inference, and habitual flow of contem­
plation, apersonattains tolaudablecommunion.”
Now, somedisciples, who were unenvious and who had properly
studiedtheVedasand the Veda/igas, {i.e., treatises regarded as so many
limbsas it wereof theVedas) and hadalsoachievedthe Sravaria (i.e., the
stageof self cultureknownbythename, audition, inother words the mere
acquisitionof knowledgeor information as referredto in the preceding
paragraph), withdueritesapproached the great andmightyage Kanada
for thepurposeof manana orintellection (thesecondstage of self-culture,
i.e., that of discrim inativeunderstanding). Thereuponthat sage, full of
great compassion, taught them a system(ofself-culture) in Ten Books.
■'!{ ^ ji; K ANA DA SUTRAS I, 1-1. (gjj
Therein the First Book he has stated the entire group of padarthas
(Predicables); intheSecondBookhe has ascertained Substance; in the
Third Book he has described the Soul and the Inner Sense; in the
Fourth Book he has discussed the body and its constituents; in the
Fifth Book he has established Karma (Action); in the Sixth Book
hehas considered Dliarma (piety) according to Sruti; in the Seventh
Bookhehas established Attribute and Samav&ya (co-inherence or com­
bination); inthe Eighth Book he lias ascertained the manifestation of
knowledge, its source, andsoon; inthe Ninth Book he has established
particular or concrete understanding; and in the Tenth Book he has
establishedthedifferences of theattributesof the Soul.
Theoperationof thistreatise (towards teaching) is three-fold: Enu­
meration, Definition, and Examination or Demonstration. Classification
orDivisionisaparticular formof Enumeration; and hence it does not
constituteanadditional method.
Althoughthissystemis mainly concerned with the determination
of the Predicables, still, inasmuchas Dharma, being at the root of the
knowledgeoftheessenceof the Predicables, possesses a prominence of
itsown, thereforehe(Kanada) proposes to ascertain that (Dharma) first
ofall :
Subject Proposed.

w u r t -rn f ti t i i ? u
Atha, now. Atah, therefore, qwfo Dharmmam, piety, religion.
«sqps*irc*tT*r Vyakliyasyamal.1, (We) shall explain.
1. Now, therefore, we shall explain Dharma .— 1.
Vpaskara.—1Atha’ indicates sequence to the desire of the disciples. ‘Atah ’—Because
disciples, skilful in JSrava ia (audition), etc., and unenvions, approached (him), therefore.
Or the word ‘ atha ’ has the sense of auspiciousness. For it has been said: “ QmkCira
(aum) and the word Atha—these two came out, at the beginning, by breaking through
the throat of Brahma ;'hence both of them are auspicious.” And it is as it should be.
How, otherwise, is it possible on the part of the great sage, While composing the Vaises ika
system of self-culture, not to observe the auspicious ceremony, which has acquired "the
obligatory nature of a duty, by a succession of observances by pious men ? It cannot bo
said, on the other side, •*The non-observance might be due to the experience of the non-
apperance of fruit even where the auspicious ceremony has been observed and of the
appearance of fruit even where it has not been observed; since a wise man does not
engage in a useless pursuit.” For its usefulness becomes certain on the supposition of
its observance in another birth in the case of the above non-observance whore the fruit
still appoars, and of defect in some part (of the ceremony) in the case of the above obser­
vance, where the fruit does not still appear. Again there need be also no apprehension
| | | '| _______ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (g j^

of its uselessness raoroly on account of the non-appearance, for the tirao being,
of the fruit of that the obligatory nature of which has been taught in the Sruti and oan
be inferred from the conduct of the elect or polite. Nor is it that there can be no suppo­
sition of something in another birth since it must produce its fruit in this (one) life only ;
because, as in the case of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, so here the characteristic
of producing fruit in one and the same life is not proved to exist. Whereas the character­
istic of producing fruit in one and the same life belongs to Kftriri (sacrifice for rain) and
other sacrifices, because these are performed with that desire alone. Here the agent is
desirous of completion, as the agent in a sacrifice is desirous of heaven. The difference
is that there the object (of the observance) is a new entrance in the shape of a d rift am,
while here it is the annihilation of hindrances, since the undertaking is with the desire
that what has been begun may be safely completed.
It cannot besaidthat theconsequenceof theobservanceis themere
annihilationof hindrances while completion will follow from its own
cause. For, the mereannihilationofobstaclesis not initself anobject of
volition, whereas completionas themeans of happiness is an object of
volition, and it is also uppermost in the mind. Moreover the mere
destructionof demerits is not theend ; for that being otherwise capable
of accomplishment bypropitiation, singing the name of God, crossing
theriver Karmaniy«i, etc-, therewillbeapluralityof causes, i.e., aviolation
of therule (that onlytheobservanceof the omen will produce the end).
If it isheldthat the destructionof denrerits is the exrd, as thedestruction
of the particular demeritswhichobstruct thefrdfilment oftheundertaking,
thenthefulfilment itself properlybecomesthe end. Here too there will
beaviolationof therule, sincesuchdestruction of particular demerits is
produciblebygift of gold, bathing(at theconfluence of the GahgA and
Yamuna) at Prayaga(Allahabad), etc. ; andit will be rash to speak of
themas somanygoodomens.
Again, the causalityof thegoodomenconsists inthis that it being
observed, thecompletionmust necessarilyfollow. Soit has been said :
“Becauseof the rulethat the endnecessarilyresultsfromanact, complete
inall itsparts, accordingtotheVeda.” Hence analternativecausealsois
certainlyacause, forthe idea of acauseinthe Veda refers only to the
uniformityof immediateness or totheimmediatesequence of the effect.
It isperversetosupposeadifferenceinkindin the effects, in thecaseof
aplurality of causes. Where causalityhas tobe deducedfromsequence
(i.e., cause toeffect) as well as fromantecedence(i.e , fromeffect tocause)
there theruleof antecedenceto theeffect should he observed, but not in
theVedaalso, where the question of (arguing from effect to cause or)
regression or reversiondoes not figureasa weightyconsideration. Thus
there isnoviolationof therule that theomen being observed in ftUits
parts, thecompletionnecessarilyfollows,
 ll fA
K ' ' jl j______ K A K lD A SUTRA I, 1-2. __jSl
Now,completionor fulfilment is that onthe performance of which
arises the belief that this acthasbeencompleted. Inthecaseof writings,
it consists inthe writingof the last sentence, inthe case of a sacrifice,
etc., inthefinal oblation, inthe caseofacloth, etc., intheadditionof the
last thread, inthecaseof goingtoavillage, etc., in the final contact of
thefeet withthe village ; and it should be similarly understood in all
other cases. Therefore in the case of completion due to auspicious
observance, even if we suppose a difference in kind in the effect,
still there is no violation of the rule in both respects (sequence and
reversion).
Anauspiciousobservanceis anact which brings about fulfilment
as its endbythepathof theannihilationof obstacles, and that is really
of theformofsalutationtothe deity, etc. Evenwhere obstacles do not
exist of themselves, although the commonly attributed (as above)
characteristicof issuingbythepath of the annihilation of obstacles is
absent there, still the ideaof the auspicious observance isnot toonarrow,,
becausethesalutation, etc., as such, possess the incidence of thecharacter­
isticof issuingbythepathof the annihilationof obstacles. This is the
point.—1.
The Vivriti adds: Others again say that the non-existence of
anyhindrance havingbeeninsuredbythe virtue born of concentration
(Yoga), the sagedidnot attend tothe auspicious observance, or that if he
did, he hasnot inserted that at the beginning of the book. Later
thinkers, ontheother hand, saythat as in the treatiseof Gautama (i.e .,
Nyaya Sutra), in the recital of the word pramana (Proof) whichfalls
within thegroupof the names of God, so too in this treatise, the
auspiciousceremonyhas beenobserved, intheformof reciting the word
dharma, w hichalsois asynonymof God.
It shouldbe understoodhere that dharma leads up to knowledge
bythe wayofthepurificationof the mind(ehitta), thirst after knowledge,
andsoon. For the Vedasays : “Theycome tothirst after knowledge
bythe performanceof sacrifices,”etc. Andsays theSmriti also, “Know­
ledgeisproducedafter demerits or dark deeds have beendestroyed by
goodacts.”
Definition of Dharma.
H u n i: II 9 I I R ||
3KT Yatab, whence. Abhyudaya, niligireyasa-
siddhih, Exaltation, Supreme Good, Accomplishment, g; Saji, that, qwh
I Pharma, Piety, Religion. .
gj|)| VA/SEISKA PHILOSOPHY, ' (c i
Dharma (is) that from which (results) the accomplish­
ment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good. 2.
UpasMra.—Now he describes the subject proposed :
‘Abhyudaya ’meansknowledgeof the essences. ‘Nihrfreyasain’ is
final cessation of pain. That fromwhichbothof themresult is dharma.
The compoundof the two words, rendered as ‘nilnheyasa’ by the path
of ‘abhyudaya,’belongs tothat class ofcompounds whichare formed by
the elisionof the middleterm; or it is aTat-purusa compound ablatively
formed.
This dharma will be later on described as beingcharacterised by
forbearance. If it is the effect of constant contemplation and other
practicesof Yoga andisthesameas adristam (theinvisible, potential after­
effectsof actions, or Merit and Demerit), then it is produciblebypositive
performances.
The Yrittikara, however, says : “‘Abhyudaya’ is happiness, and
‘nihifreyasam’ thesimultaneous annihilation of all the particular attri­
butes (i.e ,, modifications) of theSoul- The proof is that in the case of
dharma, the body, etc., of D evadattaaremade upof elements sodirected
bythe particular attributes of theenjoyer or sufferer, and as theyare
•products or effects, theyare, as the meansof his enjoyment or experience,
like a garland made by himself.” Now this explanation has been
discardedby superficial readers as beingnot wide enough to apply to
eachandall (a). Whereasinfact “what isdharma ? and what itscharac­
teristic?”—the enquiryof the disciples being of sucha general nature,
theanswer comes, “That from which iresults) the accomplishment of
Exaltationandof theSupreme Good.”
Thus, that whichleads to the attainment of Exaltation, and also
that whichleads tothe attainment of the Supreme Good, both of them
aredharma. Thus that theinvariable cause of the object of volition is
dharma, being the m atter tobe expressed, theexpression “theaccom­
plishment ofExaltationandof theSupreme Good” has been used with
the object of speciallyintroducingthe twogreat objects of volition, viz.,
happiness andabsence ofpain. Because paradise and emancipation are
theonlygreat objects of volition, being theobjects of desire whichis not
dependent upondesire for ulterior objects. Andit will beshown that the
absenceof pain alsois anobject of volition. 2.
[Note.—(a). “ Not wide enough to apply to each and all.”----- The separate character­
istics are that it produces pleasure and that it produces the Supreme Good. The former
(Joes not include the dharma of niyritti Jind the latter does not include the dharma
 R A N A d A SUTRAS I, 1-3. (jfij ;<
of pravritti. The collective characteristic is that it produces both pleasure and the
Supreme Good. And this does not include that which produces pleasure only, nor that
which produces the Supreme Good only. Thus the definition of dlutrma as explained by
the Vpittikara is in either case too narrow. This is, according to Upaskara, the view of
superficial readers.]
Authority of the Veda.
srwnrcig; in n m i
Taclvachaoat, being His Word or declaration, or its (of dharma)
exposition. Amnayasya, of the Veda. nr*TTO*WL I’ramanyain, autborita-
tiveness.
3. The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from
its) being the Word of God [or being an exposition of dhar­
ma,].—3.
Upaskdra.—It may be objected, “ Well, the Veda is the authority for this that dharma
characterised by nivritti is the source of the Supreme Good by means of the know­
ledge of the essence or reality. But we are doubtful about the authoritativeness of the
Veda itself, on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition. Falsity is
shown by the non-production of the son, even after the sacrifice for a son has been per­
formed. The homa (oblation to fire) after sun-rise, etc., actually prescribed in the ordinan­
ces ‘He offers oblation unto fire after sunrise, ho offers oblation unto fire before sunrise,
he offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,’ is counteracted by such texts as ‘Syava
(a dog of Yama) eats up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire after sunrise,
Savala (the other dog of Varna) cats up the oblation of him who offers oblation
unto fire before sunrise, Syava and Savala eat up the obtation of him who offers oblation
unto fire at a belated hour,’ etc. And repetition surely appears from the mention of the
thrice recital of the first and the last Samidheni (the J.tik III. 27. l-ll. directed to kindle
fire) in ‘Ho will recite the first for three times, he will recite the last for three times.’
Besides there is nothing to establish the authoritativeness of the Veda. Its eter-
nality being uncertain, its eternal freedom from defect also becomes doubtful. On the
other hand, if it is the product of a human brain, then by the possibility of mistake, over
sight, uncertainty, want of skill in the agent, etc., its characteristic of being the infallible
testimony of a great and good (apta) man, certainly becomes doubtful. Thus there is no
Supreme Good, nor is knowledge of reality its means, nor again is dharma. Thus all this
remains uncertain.”
To meet this objection ho says :
‘Tat ’ alludes toGodwhoseexistenceis a well-known, although the
worddoesnot appear in the context; as in the aphorism of Gautarna,
“That is unauthoritativeonaccount of thefaults offalsity, contradiction
andrepetition,” theVedais alludedtoby the word ‘tat,’ althoughit does
not appear inthecontext. Thus‘tadvachanat,’meansbeingthecomposition
of Him, Idvara; ‘amnayasya,’of theVeda; ‘pr&m&nyam.’ Or, ‘tat’refers
todharma onlywhich is closeby, i. e., inthecontext. Thus, ofdharma •
‘vachanat,’beingtheexposition; amnayasya, of the Veda; ‘pramanyam•’
 ' eot*T\ v ,'

;(( | | jp; Va i &e s i k a p U rto so P tif. V ^[

sincethat statement isreallyproof whichestablishes something whichis

authoritative. Godand the qualityof His beinganapta (i . e., agreat and
goodperson) will beestablishedlater on.
Now, with reference to what has beensaid, namely, “ onaccount
of thefaults of falsity, contradiction, andrepetition,” there inthe caseof
falsity, the explanationlies inthe supposition of producing result in
anotherexistenceor thesuppositionof defect inthe act, theagent, andthe
instrument, sincethere is the rule that the result necessarilyfollowsfrom
anact, completeinall its parts, prescribed in theVeda. Moreover it is
not the case that theresult must appear inthis andonlythislife, asinthe
caseof K arin , (i.e., sacrificefor rain). There theoccupation is that of
onewhodesires arevival of crops whichare gettingdry. Inthecaseof
thesacrificefor ason, the occupationis that of onewhodesires asononly.
This is the difference. There is also nocontradiction, because the con­
demnatory passages such as “Syava eats uphis oblations,”etc., have
reference onlytocases whereafter having particularly vowedoblations
after sunrise, etc., oneperforms suchhomas at other times. Nor is there
the fault of repetition, because the repetitionhas this justification that
eleven mantras for kindling firehaving been asa matter offact recited,
fifteen such mantras asrequired by the text, “By the means of the
fifteenword-thunders he opposed that enemy who is here,” cannot be
obtained without reciting the first and thelast mantra for three times
each.—3.
Vivriti.— Or here theword ‘tat ’itselfdenotesIdvara, onthestrength
of the saying:“ Om, Tat, Sat—this has been remembered tobethe three­
foldreference toBrahman.”
Knowledge of Predicables is the means of attaining the Supreme Good.

Dharmma-visesa-prasfltat, Produced by a particular dhar-

ma. - Dravya-gutja-karmma-s&m&nya-vi^e?a-sam-
avayan&m, of Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination,
'repfrri-Paddrthanam, of the paddrthas or predicables.
Sadharmmya-vaidharmmyabhyam, By means of resemblance and difference.
fl^Umrfl-'Tattvajhanat, From knowledge of the essence. Nifisre-
yasam—The Supreme Good.
 K A N A d A SUTRAS 1 , 1-4. ^
4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge,
produced by a particular dharma, of the essence of the Pre­
dicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and
Combination, by means of their resemblances aj’.d differences.
Or, the Supreme Good (results) from (the study of) this
Treatise or System, produced by a particular virtue, which
teaches the knowledge, etc.—4.
UpaskUrci. Having described the nature and characteristic of d'utrma in accordance
with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining
the subject-matter and the relation :
Such knowledge of the essences is dependent upon the Vai4e§ika
System; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of
the Supreme Good. If, throughits derivation inaninstrumental sense,
namely, that the essence is known by it, the word ‘tattvajnana’refers
to the treatise, then it will not have apposition tothe word ‘dhar-
ma-viffesa-prasutat. In ‘dravya-guna, etc.,’ the compound is a ‘copu­
lative compound’ wherein all the words are .prominent, because the
knowledge of the essence of all the Predicables is the source of the
Supreme Good.
Now, herethe ‘relation’is understood tobe: betweenthe Doctrine
andthe Supreme Good, that of the means and the endor motive; bet­
weenthe Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of formand
matter ; betweenthe Supreme Goodandthe knowledgeof the essences,
that of effect andcause; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and
the Doctrine, that of the demonstrable and that which demonstrates.
Andfromthe knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supreme
Goodapply themselves tothis Doctrine, and those whodesire salvation
apply toit onlywhentheyrealizethat thesageisan apta or trust-worthy.
‘Nihsfreyasam’ is final cessation of pain; and the finality of the
cessation of pain liesin the non-simultaneousness with the antecedent
non-existence (i. e., potential existence) ofco-extensive pain, or in the
simultaneousness with the annihilation of all the co-existent and co­
extensiveparticular attributes of the soul.
Or salvationis the antecedent non-existence ofpainup tothe mo­
ment of the annihilation of the innumerable particular attributes. Not
that it isnot anobject ofvolition, beingincapable ofachievement, because
evenantecedent non-existencecanbe brought about by theneutralisation
of thecause. Nor doesit therebyloseinthecharacteristic ofbeingantece­
dent non-existence, becausesuchcharacteristicremainsasthecharacteristic8
8
I? #OVy VA.TSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. [q j

$f^e non-existence of that which produces the opposite(i. e., theexis-

tenceof pain); andproductiveness is merely compatibility with itself.
Again, antecedent non-existence is not the last member or element,
sothat it existing, the effect must necessarilyappear ; for if it wereso,
then it would followthat aneffect alsohas nobeginning. Thus, as in
theabsenceof acontributory causeit didnot produce the effect solong,
soalsoinfuture it will not produce it without theco-operation of acon­
tributory cause, theperson operating to the eradication of the cause.
Therefore this aphorismtooupholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in
thesecond aphorismof Gautama, “Pain, birth, activity, faults, andfalse
notions—onthesuccessive removal of thesein turn, there is the removal
o:fthe onenext precedingandthereafter salvation”the statement of the
non-existenceof theeffect onthe non-existence of thecause, strengthens
the idea of salvation as havingtheform of the antecedent non-existence
ofpain. Removal of activityonthe removal of faults, removal ofbirth
onthe removal of activity, of pain ontheremoval of birth—here removal
doesnot mean annihilationbut non-production, and that is nothingbut
antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is not knowntobe
real, for theoppositeissurelyknown tobereal intheformofpainingene­
ral, as inthe caseof propitiation, sincethere tooonlythe non-production
of pain is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world
alsoit is seenthat theremoval of the snake, thorn, etc., has theobject of
the non-production of pain. Sotheactivity of the wiseis directed only
towards removingthe causes of pain.
Some however say: “ Only the absolute non-existence ofpain is
salvation. If it is not seated in theSoul, yet as seatedin the stone, etc.,
it isprovedin theSoul; andits proof liesinthe annihilation of thepain
whichdoes not accompanytheprior non-existence (or potential existence)
ofpain, as it is found in ‘relation’totheannihilation of suchpain, see­
ingthat such annihilation takingplace, therearises theconsciousnessof
the absolute non-existence ofpain in that place. This being so, such
texts of theVeda as “Hemoves about beingabsolutely relievedofpain,”
alsobecome explained.” Wereplythat it is not so. Absolute non-exis­
tence of pain, being incapable of accomplishment, isnot an object of
voluntaryactivity. Nor lias annihilation of painany ‘relation’tothat,
sincethis would entail atechnicality. Thetext of the Veda “Hemoves
about being absolutely relieved of pain” implies that byway of the
. neutralization of causes prior non-existence of painmaybe reducedinto
aconditionsimilar tothat of the absolutenon-existence ofpain. It can­
not besaid, “This is not an object of the Will, as it isnot anobject of
|° ( | l f )r, k a n Ada s u t r a s i , 1-4.

desire whichis not externally conditioned, because those onlywho seel

pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeingthat pleasure is not
producedat the timeofpain because it is equallyeasytosaythecontrary
also. Willnotdesirefor pleasurealsobeconditionedbytheabsenceofpain?
seeingthat menoverwhelmed withgrief as well as those whoturn their
facesaway frompleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are
inclined to swallowing poison, hangingthemselves, etc. Alsoit cannot
besaid, “Even if it is anobject of the will, it is soonlybecause it isan
object of cognition. But salvation as absence of pain is not even an
object ofcognition. Otherwise (i . e., if tobean object of cognitionwere
not anecessarycondition of being an object of the will) men would
be inclinedtobringabout states of swoon, etc.;” for that whichiscapable
of beingknown fromthe Veda andby inference cannot be reasonably(
saidtobeunknowable. For there are the texts of the Veda: “He movesj‘
about being absolutely relieved of pain,”“By knowing Him onlyone
transcends death,”etc. There is inference also: The series of pain is
finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a series like a series of
lamps; andsoon. It canbe known byperceptionalso, since final anni­
hilationof pain for a moment becomes the subject-matter of thought in
therealization ofpain in consciousness, andalsobecausethe yogins per­
ceivethe futureannihilation ofpainby virtue of thepower bornof con­
centration{yoga). It cannot besaid, “Still, the loss and gainbeingthe
same, it is not the object of the will, since with pain, pleasure is also
removed, the removal of both beingdue to the same set of causes for
mennaturally dispassionate and fearful of dark days of suffering and
whooverestimateeveryglow-wormof pleasure, are activetothat end. It
cannot again be said, “Cessation of painis not the object of the will ;
because cessation of pain which is yet to come, is impossible, pain
which is past is in the past, and pain which is present will cease
evenwithout aneffort of the person for the activity of the person is
towards the eradicationof causes, as inpenances. Thus false knowledge
attended with desire is thecauseofSarhsara, i. e.y succession of mortal
existence; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the truth about the
Self; and knowledgeof the truthabout the Self is producible by the
practices of Yoga ; hence activityinthisdirection isjustified.
It cannot be saidthat onlythe manifestationof permanent pleasure
is salvationandnot theabsenceofpain; for there is noproof that pleasure
can be permanent, if there were such proof then the manifestation of
pleasure being constant, there would be nodifference betweena worldly
andanother-worldly orliberated man, and also manifestation being a
(f( |||ji) FAjfesiO PHILOSOPHY. (C l
product or effect, onits termination there will again follow Smhsara or
streamof mortal existence.
It cannot besaidthat salvationconsists inthe laya or disappearance
of the JtvcLtmd or embodiedSelf intothe Brahnl&tmA or un-embodiedor
universal Self; for if laya means amalgamation, then there is anobstacle,
as twodo not become one. It cannot be explained that laya means the
removal of thesubtle embodiment composedof the eleven senses and of
thephysical organism; for herebytheabsenceof thecauses of painbeing
implied, it follows that theabsenceof painaloneissalvation.
Hereby the doctrine of the Eltadaridins (a sect who carry staffs
consisting of singlesticks) that salvationmeans the remainingofthepure
Self after thecessationof Nescienceor falseknowledge and that Self is
by nature true knowledge andhappiness, is alsorefuted, becausethere is
noevidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the
Yeda “Brahma is eternal, knowledge, andbliss,” isnoevidence, because
it provespossessionof knowledge and possession of bliss. For we have
the perceptions as “I know,” and “I amhappy,” but not the perceptions
“I am knowledge” and “I amhappiness.” Moreover Brahman being
even now existent, it wouldfollowthat there is nodistinctionbetweena
liberatedandaworldlyman. Thecessationof Avidyaor false knowledge
isalsonot object ofthewill. Brahmanalso, beingeternal, is not a sadhya
or what has toheaccomplished. The realizationof Brahman within the
Self, havingHimas theobject, is not asadhya or what has to be accom­
plished. Similarlybliss also, havingHimas its essence or object, is not a
sadhya. For these reasons activitydirectedtow ards Himis not justified.
It cannot be said that salvation lies in the cessationof thestream
of consciousness. For if by cessation is meant the removal of such
clouds aspain, etc., thenthis much alone being the object of the will,
there is noproof bywhichthe streamofconsciousness can be carriedon.
Moreover the retention of the stream of consciousness can be done by
means of the body, etc., andhence theretentionof saihsara or the stream
of mortal existence alsobecomes necessary.
It is therefore proved that cessation of painasdescribedaboveis
alonethe Supreme Good.
In ‘knowledgeof the essence’thegenitivehas beenusedintheplace
of. the accusative. The thirdcase-endingin‘Sadharinmya-Vaidharmmya-
bhyarn’shows the mode(of knowledge). Of these 1Sadharmmya’ means
recurrent property and ‘Vaidharmmya’ divergent property. Although
a property which is recurrent in one placeis divergent inanother, and.
f/r>
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KANADA SUTRA 7 , 1-
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vice versa, still knowledgein theshape of recurrent anddivergent proper­
ties, is hereintended.
Here the enumeration itself of the Predieables, Substance, etc., has
cometobe their division, whichhas the effect of excludingamore or less
number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables areonlysixin
number. Andthis is not proved. If anyother Predicable whichrequires
to be excluded is known then the rule does not standgood; if it is not
known, then theexclusionis invalid. It cannot be said that this is not
the exclusion of the addition of somethingelsebut theexclusionof non­
application; inother words, that the non-application of thecharacteristics
of the six to all predicables or things is excluded. For all known
predicables havingbeenincluded bythe word ‘Predicable,’there is here
then the fault of proving over again, andalsothat somethingelse is not
known. Moreover, which is to be excluded, non-application of the
characteristics jointly or their non-application severally? In the first
alternative, joint non-applicationprevails everywhere, sothat therecanbe
noexclusion. It cannot be saidthat inthe second alternative also there
canbenoexclusionas withreference tooneanother their individual non­
applicationprevailseverywhere; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude
the non-application of the characteristics of the six, when, accordingto
others, they do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other
predicables recognised by them. Therefore the meaningof the rule that
Predicables areonly sixin number is that inall perceptibleobjects, there
is applicationof oneor other of thecharacteristics of thesix, and not that
there isnon-application. Now, ‘only,’if it goes with the noun, it means
exclusion of theadditionof somethingelse; if it goeswith the adjective,
it means exclusion of non-application; and if it goes with the verb, it
means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according to some
oidy has all this three-foldsignificance; whileothers saythat its force
liesinmereexclusionandthat non-application, additionof somethingelse,
etc., arethings tobe excluded, whicharederived byassociation.
“Producedbyaparticular dharma ”is the adjective of “knowledge
of theessence.” Here “particular dharma ”means pietycharacterised by
forbearance or withdrawal fromtheworld. Ifby“tattvajhana” explained
as “by this essence is known,” the treatise (i. e., the Aphorisms of
Kanada) is meant, in that case it shouldbesaidthat “particular dharma ”
meansthegrace ofandappointment fromGod, for it is heardthat thegreat
sageKanadacomposedthis Systembyobtaining thegraceofand appoint­
ment fromGod, In the aphorism by “knowledge of the essence” the
|\ ('v '----^y-y
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realization of the truth about the Self in theunderstandingis intended,

becausesuch realization alone is competent to root out false knowledge
attended with desire. “By knowingHimonlyonetranscends death, no
other roadis known(vidyate) for travelling,” “TwoBrahmans have tobe
known(v e d i t a v y e ‘‘HavingnoeyesTieyetsees,etc.,”—inallthesepassages
the wordvedana hasthesenseofrealizationintheunderstanding. And the
use of the fifthcase-endinginthe causal sensein the word ‘tattvajnanat ’
indicates that suchrealization of the Self comes inthe progressivecareer
of hearing fromthe Sastras, thinkingwithinoneself, meditation, etc.,—4.
V iv riti.— ‘D harmmavitfesaprasutat ’ means produced by aparticular
(goodconduct, virtueor) merit, acquiredinthis lifeor in previous births.
It is thequalificationof ‘tattvajnanat ’(knowledgeof essence). Aspointed
out by the author of Mukt&vali, ‘S&dharmmya’ meanscommonproperty,
and ‘Vaidharinmya’means opposing(i. e., distinguishing; property. The
use of the third case-ending indicates manner. The fifthcase-endingin
‘tattvajnanat ’has the sense of applicability. Thus the meaningis-: By
particular virtue knowledge of essence is produced by means of the
' generic and specific properties of the Predicables, Substances andothers;
thereafter is produced ‘intellectual conception’of theSelf, andnext comes
the realization of the Self inthe understandingbyconstant meditation;
after this liberationfollows inthetrain of the removal of false knowledge,
etc., (Vide NyayaSutram, 1. i. 2.)
The author of the Upaskara has however said: The word‘tattva-
jnana’ intheaphorismconveys theprincipal idea of the realization of the
Self in the understanding; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental
sense, it refers to the treatise whichis the (instrument or) means of such
realization. Tnthe first of these cases, the word ‘dharmroavisfesa’ will
meanthat dharma the characteristic ofwhichisforbearance (n ivritti); and
inthelatter case it will meanaparticular virtueormerit in theformof the
graceofandappointment fromGod, accordingtothetraditionthat thegreat
sage Kaniida composed this treatise under thegraceandappointment of
God. Andas thecausal useof the fifth case-ending bears the sense of
applicability, the realization of theSelf inthe understandingwill follow
from the treatise through the chain of intellection, constant m editation,
and so on, for thewordknowing insuchtexts of theVedaas “Byknow­
ingHimonlyone transcends death,” “TwoBrahmanshave tobe known,”
etc., denotes realization in the understanding(i. e., spiritual intuition),
andthat alone is competent to root out false Knowledge together with
desires.”
(ffW PS KAXAl)A SUTRA 1, 1-4. (Sjj
--------------- ---------------------------------- p8U ^
This should beconsidered. If theword‘tattvajhana inthe apho­
rismdenotes the realization of one’s Self in the understanding which
counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it wouldfollow
that the expression ‘by means of genericand specificproperties as well
as the term, ‘of the Predicables,’ bearing the sense of the sixth case­
ending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the
realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the
modality of the generic and specific properties, nor thematerialityor
substantiveness of the six Predicables; because theydonot exist there,
as they are distinct from the body, etc., whereas the realization of
the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires,
etc., which are not distinct fromthebody, etc. It cannot besaidthat
in the state of the representation of separateness fromtheother (i. e.,
the Not-Self) in the Self by thevirtue born of Yoga (concentration),
knowledge of the six Predicables, namely rSubstanee, etc-, bymeansof
their generic and specificproperties, is alsoproduced through their tem­
porarycontiguity, inasmuchasthesubject-matter of such knowledge(i. e.,
thePredicables, etc.) appearsthere for the timebeing. For notwithstand­
ingthat suchrepresentationcontains such indifferent generic property,
etc., within itself, since it isnot necessary forthe real purpose inview, the
descriptionof it bythereveredsagewill meansomuchmad talk on his
part.
Again, the venerableauthor of theUpaskarahasbrought forwardthe
texts “ByknowingHimalone, etc. ”asbeingevidencethat therealization
of theSelfinthe understandingis thecause of liberation. That too has
been improper. For the SupremeSelf alone beingimplied bythe text,
“I know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun, beyond the
reachof darkness, ” the word‘tat ’(that) has reference to the Supreme
Self, and therefore it cannot refer totheJivatmd (Subordinate or Embo­
diedSelf) which has not been so implied. So much for the sakeof
brevity.
Here the enumeration of sixPredicables has beenmade under the
viewof Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non-Being also
has been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence
there is no improprietyeither in theaphorism“Non-existence of effect,
from non-existence of cause” (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in
suchaphorisms as “Fromnon-existence of qualification by Action and
Attribute ” IX. i. 1) of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the Nyaya-
Lildmti, it has beensaid: “ N on-existence alsoshould bestated as con­
ducive tothe Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This
% ' gojJX.
A "> r^ V \ • n
fi( \ g) ' VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
•\ &
. x. T'FTTrr- . / \ y A,_J
couduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence oftheeffect
followsfromthe non-existenceofthe cause inall cases. ” In the Dravya-
kiranAvali also, N yayateachers haveadmitted that Non-Existenceis the
seventh Predicable, inthe passageending thus : “AndthesePredicables
have been mentioned as being the principal ones. Non-Enistenee,
however, althoughit possesses aformof its own, has not beenmentioned,
not that it is something negligible, but because its ascertainment
is dependent upontheascertainment of its opposite. ” Thus theknow­
ledge of the generic and. specific properties of the seven (and not
six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good; and that
conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the modeof knowledge
of marks (linga), etc., inthematter of theestablishment of separateness
fromtheNot-Self intheSelf.
* $ O
The Supreme Good, according tothe views of theNyaya, Vaijfesika,
and Sa/ikhya philosophies, consists in the permanent cessation of pain,
andresults as the annihilationof pain, whichisnot synchronous withpain
co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is non-
synchronous with pain co-existent with itself, since nopaincanat that
moment ariseintheliberatedSoul. WithasectionoftheNyAyathinkers,
salvationmeanspermanent cessationof demerit only, because, in their
view, this onlycanbedirectlyaccomplishedby therealizationof the Self
in the understanding, as the Vedasays, “And his actions wear off when
hesees that High-and-Low(Mundaka2, 2, 8).” In theopinionoftheone-
staffedVedantin, salvationlies inthe cessationof nescience, andnescience
is (withhim) adifferent Predicable. In the opinion ofthe three-staffed
Vedantin, salvationmeans the disappearance of the Embodied or finite
Self in- the Great Self, and results as the cessationof the UpMhi or
external conditionof the Jiou (Embodied 8oul), and of the causal body.
Causal body again has been proved tobe “theorganiccombinationof
the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and ten senses, arising from
the elements which have not been compounded (i. redintegrated),
possessingsubtle limbs, andbeingthemeans of experience (i. e., biivga).
The Bhattas however say that salvationconsists inthe manifestation of
eternal happiness, and that eternal happiness, though evidenced by the
Veda and penetratingall livingbeings(Jivas ), is unmanifest inthestate
of transmigration (Sathsdra), and becomes manifest to tie sense, imme­
diately after the realization of the truth about theSelf in theunders­
tanding. Thepossibledefects inthese views are not shown here for
fear of increasing the volume of the book- But in all the views the
 k a n Ada SUTBAS I, 1-5 ._______________ j y L

f permanent cessationofpain inthe state of salvation remains uncontra-

dicted. Andthat isour point.
Now,it maybecontended, “There are additional Predicables such
as Energy, Similarity, etc. Howelse can it be explained that inthe
vicinityof thejewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes
burningand is caused when it is not in the vicinity? Therefore it
must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning energy
of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them
revivifies it. In like manner, similarity alsois adifferent Predicable,
for it does not fall withinthe six forms of existence, as it equally
applies tothemall, sincesuchsimilarityas in“As bovine-ness is eternal,
so also is horeseness, ’ is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence, asit
appearsintheformof anexistence. ” But our replyis that reconciliation
being possible by the mere supposition of theself-activityof fire, etc.,
existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of theabsence,
etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper to
imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation.
It should not be asked again howtherecan be burning even inthe
close presence of a powerful jewel, because that supposition has
beenmadeonlyofthe absence of jewels ingeneral, which are powerful
butremote. Inthesame way, Similarityalsoisnot adifferent Predicable,
but denotes that, whileonethingis quite distinct fromanotherthing, the
one possesses themajorityor thechief of theattributes belongingtothe
other ; astheSimilarityof themoonin the face, means that the facewhich
is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness, andother
attributes belongingtothe moon. This inbrief.
Enumeration of Substances.
' j f h w w i t m g u + rc i ^ i i fu m u r ffh
s p a n fts r ii \ i ? i * it
Prithivi, earth. ?rrtr: Apas, water. Tejas, fire, Vayus air
AkSsam, Ether. Kalah, time, Dik, direction, space, ’AmiA
Sell. JUT: Manas, mind. hi, only. DravyAni, substances. ’
5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether', Time, Space, Self,
, and Mind (are) the only Substances.—5.
Vpaskara. Because it participates in salvation and is the support of all the Predi
cables, therefore he now says by way of giving the division and particular reference of the
first mentioned Predicable, Substance:.
Iti’ has the sense of determination. Therebythe meaningis that
Su3bstances arenineonly, neither more nor less. If it is doubted that
(r( )ij VAI8ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
" ' " 1 11 ....... 111 ..-■■■■■—■ ..... ...... .... ..... ... -EgyaL.—A
exclusion ofagreater or less number Lavingbeensecuredbytheforce
of the divisionitself, there wasnoneedforthe word ‘iti,’thenit should be
understood that it beingpossible totake theaphorismina merelydeno­
tative, indicatoryor enumerativesense, the word ‘Iti’ is usedto indicate
that it has theobject of division also, and that the word is used also
toindicate that gold, etc., as well as God areincludedin them, andalso
that Darkness whichmay beapprehendedtobe an additional substance
is a non-being. The fact that the words have not been compounded
goestoshowthat they are all equallyprominent. And the author of the
aphorisms himself will point out their definitions or differentiaewhile
treatingof ‘difference.’
It cannot besaidthat Goldis neither Earth as it has nosmell, nor
water as it has nowetness and natural fluidity, nor Fire asit hasweight
andonthelast account, nor Air, nor again Time, etc. ; therefore it is
somethingover andabove the nine. For, inthe first twocases, there can
benocomparison; inthethirdcase, that whichhas to beproved is some­
thingimaginary(i.e., that goldis not a transformation of Fire). After
that therehas been analoguous argument, although there is no doubt
about that which has to be proved, and also the markofinference is
fallacious, lie will prove afterwards that gold is a transformation
of fire—5.
Viviriti. —It maybe objected, “The writer of the Kandali andthe
Sahkhya teachers haveheld that Darkness is a Substance. And it is
right. For otherwisehowcan peoplehave the perceptionof qualityand
actionin it, viz., ‘Dark Darkness moves’? Now, being devoidof Smell,
Darkness is not earth; as it possesses dark colour it cannot be included
inWater, etc. Therefore howisit right tosaythat thesubstances arenine
only?” Wereply, “It is not so, because it isillogical to imagine- another
Substance, whenitcanbeproducedbytheabsenceof necessaryLight. The
perceptionof darkcolour is, liketheperception of the vault of heaven,
erroneous. The perception of movement is also an error, occasioned
bythe departure of light, as theperception of movement by thepassen­
gersof aboat in respect of the trees, etc., standing on the bankof the
river, is occasionedby the movement of theboat, etc. The supposition
that Darkness is asubstance will entail the suppositionofthe antecedent
non-existenceandannihilation ofan infinite number ofits parts. Inthe
opinionof thewriterof the Kandali, Darkness is included in Earth. So
that according to him there is no impropriety in the exclusion of a
greater number.”
| ll ; KAN AD A SfJTEAS T. 1-6. (ffij f
Amongthese ninedivisionsof substance, Ether, Time, and Space do
not formanyclass, sincetheyhave onl}’asingle individual existence, but
the restformclasses.
Enumeration of Attributes.

ftwiT i^ r:
PTT: M I! U II
: Rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsafi, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch.
CTS3T: Saukhy&h, Numbers; qfCTrgfTR Parim&nani, Measures. Extensions..
Prithaktvam, Separateness. tlitruT^^n^r Samyoga-vibhagau, Conjunc­
tion and Disjunction. Paratvaparatve, Priority and Posteriority.
BuddhaySli, Understandings, Sukha-duhklie, Pleasure and pain.
Ichchha-dvesau, Desire and Aversion. smaf: Prayatnab, Volitions. ^ Cha,
And, jgtJtT: Gunah, Attributes.
6. Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch,
Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunc­
tion, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and
Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.—6.
Upaskara.—He gives the enumeration and division of Attributes immediately after
substance, because Attributes as such reside in all substances which become their subs­
trata, are manifested by substances, and themselves also manifest substances.
Theword‘cha’gathers up Weight, Fluidity, Liquidity, Impression,
Virtue, Viceand Sound; theyarewell-known Attributes, it ishence that
theyhavenot beenverballystated. Their attributeness hewill, in tlieir
properplaces, explainwith respect totheir natureandmark. Thewords
Colour, Taste, Smell, andToucharecompoundedintoasainnsa in order to
showthat theydonot co-exist withcontemporaneous Colour, Taste, Smell,
and Touch. But Numbers and Measuresare not so compoundedand are
statedintheplural number,toshowthat theyco-exist withcontemporaneous
NumbersandMeasures. Althoughthat whichco-existswithunityisnotano­
ther unity, orthat whichco-existswithlargenessorlengthnotanotherlarge­
ness or length, still there is infact co-existenceof duality, etc., amongst
themselves and alsooflargeness, length, etc., withlargeness, length, etc.,
of adifferent kind. Althoughseparateness is oo-existent withthe sepa­
rateness ofTwo, etc., andthereforeshould be specified intheplural, like
numbers, still its specificationinthesingulargoestoindicateits difference
fromNumbers, namely, tobe knownor shown byits limits. Conjunction
and Disjunction arestated in the dual number to showthat bothof them
 ^
(li//®0)i; VATSEBIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CTT
are theeffectsof one and the same act. Priority and Posteriority are
statedinthe dnal number toshowthat they aretobe knowninrelation
toeachother and that theyareequally marks of Space and Time. The
plural number in ‘understandings ’indicatesthe refutationof the theory
of oneandonlyoneunderstandingheldbythe Safikhya thinkers, onthe
groundof its divisionintoknowledge, etc. The dual number inPleasure
andPainisintendedtopoint out that both of them are causes of one
effect which is distinguished as experience blioga) and that theyare
equally instrumental to the inference of adristam, and also that even
Pleasure resolves intoPain. Thedual number inDesireand Aversionindi­
catesthat bothofthemare causes of Activity. Theplural in Volitions
ismeant toshowthat ten kinds of volitions which comprise both per­
mittedandprohibited acts, arecausesof Virtue and ten other kinds are
causesofVice.
Or, Colour, Taste, Smell, andTouchhavebeen shown in a samasa
formtoteachthat theyare themeans of the dispositionof the elemental
sensesor sense-organs or toestablishtheoperationor change dueto beat.
Number ismentionedin the plural number to indicate a refutation of
thisthat there is a contrariety in numbers, such as duality, plurality,
etc. Separateness isseparatelymentionedtoindicatethatit is also plural
onaccount of the pluralityof Numbers, and also that its differencefrom
Numberslies in its beingrevealed bythe knowledge of limits. TnMea­
sures or Extensions theplural number is meant to remove the contradic­
tionofdengtb, shortness, etc. The dual number in Conjunction mid Dis­
junction points out theirmutual opposition. Priority andPosteriority are
mentionedalsointhe dual number lest it might be doubted that the
divisionof Attributes is too narrow, because Priority and Posteriority
may befour-fold bythepossibilityof their being different in kind by
their differenceasrelatingtoSpaceandasrelatingtoTime.
Hewill give their definitionasheproceeds.—6.
Enumeration of Actions.

i m m i vs ii
Utksepanam, throwing upwards. Avaksepanam,
throwing downwards. Akunchanam, contraction. jranOTq, Prasara-
nam, expansion. Gamanam, going motion. ff?r Hi, namely. ? W r t
Karmm&ni, actions.
7. Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Co
traction Expansion, a n d Motion are Actions,—7,
 n

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\ •&\ f;l
</ TTAWiDA SUTRAS 7. 1-7
\ ^ <^> « ^ r ^ /..i..n...l,.r,;,—...... . — w ... ' i ■■»•,•„•„■.'... - f f i . ■■■■ v - ■ ----- '-.mv':;:-"'
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k^yJL A,
.
Upaslcdra.—Actions become the object of the sense by reason of their production
by Substances and Attributes as well as of their Combination with Substances having
colour. Therefore immediately after the statement of Substances and Attributes he states
the enumeration and division of Actions.
Throwing upwards, Throwingdownwards. Contraction, Expansion,
andMotionareActions. ‘Iti ’ has theforceof determination, as Rotation
etc., are included in Motion. Here (lienthere are five‘classes’directly
pervaded by Action-ness, namely, thequalityof throwingupwards, the
qualityof throwing downwards, the quality of contraction, the quality
of expansioij, and the quality of motion, (or throwing-upward-ness,
throwing-downward-ness, contraction-ness, expansion-ness, and motion
ness).
Well, but it is disprovedby the fact that Motionis a synonymof
Action, because the consciousness of Going is experienced in all cases.
The four classes, throwing-upward-ness, etc, which have the co-exten­
sionor common field of the absolute non-existenceof eachintheothers,
arenot knowntobeco-existent; therefore the classespervadedbyAction-
ness areonlyfour. (To this objection wereply): It is true that Motion
is another name for Action. But it isseparatelymentioned withthe ob­
ject of collecting under one word Rotation, Evacuation, Percolation,
Flamingupward, Bending, Uplifting, etc., whichproduce different states
ofconsciousness and areknown bydifferent names. Or Going-ness also
isreallyafifthclass pervaded by Action-ness. Sothat the applicationof
Motion to Rotation, Evacuation, etc., aloneis primary, and if there is the
application of Going to throwing upwards, throwing downwards, etc.,
then it issecondaryor analogous. The commonpropertyof the primary
and analogous instances is onlythis that they are the non-combinative
causes (i. e., conditions) of Conjunction withand Disjunctionfromone’s
own support; whereas that whichdistinguishes theclass of Going-ness
isits beingthenon-combinativecauseof Conjunctionwith andDisjunction
fromconstantlychanging places and directions, andthis belongs toRota­
tionand others, sothat bythe inclusion of Going these toohave been
included.
The states of egress, ingress, etc., however, arenot classes; for, in
respect of one and thesameAction, e. g., apersongoingfromoneroom
to another, one observer will have theconsciousness, ‘he enters’•while
another, ‘he. comes out’; and thus there will result an intermixture of
classes. Soalsoin the caseof Rotation, etc., on enteringone water-course
after coming out byanother, there will arise twostatesof consciousness,
‘he comes out ’ and ‘heenters therefore theseshould beresolved into
relativity ingeneral,
if(- § 2 )i; VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (^ j

In the case of throwingupwards, etc., however, the action of

throwing upwards iscaused inthehand bythevolition produced bythe
desire ‘I throw up the pestle,’ through the non-combinative cause of
conjunction with the soul exercising volition ; thenfromthenon-combi-
native cause of motionin the hand thrown up, there appears theaction
of throwing upwards inthe pestle also; or, these two actions take place
simultaneously. Then through the conjunction of the soul exercising
volitionproduced bythedesire tothrow down the handand pestle which
have beenthrownup, and alsothrough tiremotion of the hand, there is
produced inthehand and the pestle simultaneouslythe actionof throw­
ing downwards favourable to the fall of thepestlewithin the mortar.
Then towards the sudden going upwards of thepestleafter conjunction
with a harder substance, neither desirenor volition is thecause, but the
springing up of the pestle is due only to Re-action; and this isonly
going and not throwingupwards, the application of throwing upwards
to it is only secondary. Similarly is the application of the name of
Throwing upwards to two bodies of Air aswell as tograss, cotton, etc.,
carried bythem, goingupwards by theforceof thecollisionoftwobodies
of Air flowinginopposite directions. So also in thecaseof the goingup
of Water under thecollisionof twocurrents. Thus the useof throwing
upwards and throwing downwards is primary, only in thecaseof the
body, its limbs and pestles, clubs, etc., incontact withthem; for there
are suchperceptions ashethrows upthe hand, hethrows up thepestle, he
throws upthe club; as also, lie throws down.
Contraction is action which produces flexion in cloth andother
things made up of parts and non-initial conjunctions of parts among
themselves even whilethere exist theinitial conjunctions of thoseparts ;
whence arise such perceptions as thelotus contracts, theclothcontracts,
theleather contracts. Similarly, Expansion is action destructive of the
non-initial conjunctions already produced, of parts; whencearisesuch
perceptions as the clothexpands, theleather expands, thelotus expands.
Actions whichare different from these four are formsof Going. Therein
Rotation is action, favorable to oblique conjunctions, appearinginthe
hand, fromconjunctionwithsoul exercisingvolition, andinthewheel, etc.,
from revolving and fromconjunction called nodana (molecular motion)
with the hand possessing Action. Evacuation, etc., shouldbesimilarly
explained. He will alsomake themclear as heproceeds.
Nowit shouldhe understoodthat inthecaseof prescribed sacrifices^
baths, gifts, etc., these Actions are theproducts ofconjunctionwith the
soul exercising volitionfavourable towards theproductionof Virtue; and
:f [ J | V§; K A N A d A SU T R A S 7. 1-$. (^ |
"' 1 k_/ j Li J

in the caseof goingtoaforbidden place, slaughter, eatingtobacco, etc.,

they are the products of conjunction with thesoul exercising volition
tendingtowardstheproductionof Vice.—7.
Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action.

II \ \ \ I q II
Sat, existent. Auityam, non-eternal. go®rc?|; Dravyavat, con­
taining substance. gtfcg Katyyam, effect. cKRCR. K&ranam, cause.
SSnianya-visesavat, being both Genus and Species. frW *ti, this. ?s»RPItK-
’‘TOfflL Dravya-guna-karnunanam, of Substance, Attribute, and Action.
Avi^esah, resemblance.
8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, an
Action lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have
Substance as their combinative cause, are effect as well
as cause, and are both Genus and Species.—8.
UjHMfeara.- After the enumeration of Substance, etc., he begins the topic of the
Resemblance of the three. lie states the Resemblance of the three even before the
enumeration of tuo other three Predieables, Genus, etc., inasmuch as it is expected first
of all by the disciples because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favour­
able to the knowledge of reality.
In thepresenceof the word ‘vitfesa’ the word ‘avitfesa’ denotes
Resemblance. ‘Sat’ connotes the quality of beingthe object ofthe per­
ception and name in the formof that whichis existent, becauseall the
three have fitness for existence. ‘Anityam’connotes the quality of that
which tends towards annihilation. Although it is not, common tothe
ultimate atoms, etc., still it is intended todenote the possessionof the
upddki or condition w hichdistinguishes predicables having the function
or nature of that whichtends towardsannihilation. ‘Dravyavat’means
that whichcontains substanceas its combinativecause. This too is not
present in the ultimate atom,etc. Therefore the intention istodenote
the possessionof theupddki or condition whichdistinguishes predicables
having’the function of that whichcontains substanceas its combinative
cause. ‘Karyyam’ is intended to denote the possession of theupddki
or conditionwhichdistinguishes predieables havingthe function of that
which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-existence (or potential
existence). ‘K&ranam’indicates the possessionof theupddki or condition
whichdistinguishes predieables havingthefunctionofthat whichbelongs
tothe class ofconstant (Mill’s invariable and unconditional) antecedents
(f( VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. V ^|

of all effectsexcept knowledge. Thus the definitionis not toowideso

as toinclude the Soul which isthe object of Self-intuition, as acauseof
Self-intuition, or toextend tothe generic qualityof beingacow, etc; nor
is it too narrowsoas toexclude the ultimate atoms (l i t , perfect spheres)
which are not causes. ‘Samanyavirfesavat,’ means the possession of
those characteristics which though they are genera, still are species
inasmuchas theyserve todifferentiate themselves severally, e. g., Substan-
ceness, Attributeness, Actionness, etc. ft cannot be said that causality
is too wide, becausefrom“Give.acow,”“ Acowshouldnot be touched
withthe feet ” andother texts of theVeda it appears that class or kind
(SHUT;also is acauseof virtue and vice; for aclass has thesoleuseof
limitation.
This aphorism is illustrative. It should he observed that the
Resemblance of the threelies alsointheir beingcapableof beingdenoted
bywordshaving themeaninginherent inthem.
Jf it issaid that the characteristic of beingeffectsand non-eternali-
tv belongtothose onlywhich havecauses, and that this is their Resem­
blance as laid down by Professor Pratfastadevain l'And causality(ap-
pears) elsewherethan in the perfect spheres(ultimate atoms',” thenaccord­
ing to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the
upadhi orcondition w hich distinguishes predicables.
The characteristics of being thecauses of Attributesand alsothe
effects of Attributes belongtothethree except theeternal Substances.—8.
Resemblance of Substance and Attribute.

u i? m i
Dravya-gunayoli, of Substance and Attribute.
Sajatiyarambhakatvam, the characteristic of being the originator of congeneis.
Sadharinmyam, Resemblance.
9. The Resemblance of Substance and Attribute is the
characteristic of being the originators of their congeners.—-9.
XJpasMra—He now points out the Resemblance of Substance and Attribute only.
•Hemakesclear this veryaphorisminthe followingone.—9.
Explanation of the foregoing aphorism,
O T s r \ \\is ®n
£S3tTR!! Diavyftni, Substances. gsaiPctt Dravyantaram, another Substance.
Arabhante, originate, jpnr Gunah, Attributes. =ar Cha, and. JJtiJUrU*
Gunantaiam, another Attribute.

fV
 ( W )!) KAN A d A SUTRAS T. 1-11. &
’ -. :-P - ~ . ’-______________________________________ __________________________

10. Substances originate another Substance, and

Attributes another Attribute.—10.
[ UpasMm.—The Resemblance in respect of the characteristic of being the originators
of congeners should be understood or observed with the exclusion of universal Substan­
ces composed of final parts, the Attributes of what are composed of final parts, and also
the Attributes of Duality, the Separateness of Duals, Priority, Posteriority, etc. Or the
author means to indicate the possession of the upatdhi or condition which distinguishes
predicables having the function of that which originates its congener, whereby Substan­
ces and individuals which are not causes, are also included.—10.

Actions do not originate Actions.

fcsm II \ I % l II
gpw Karrama, action, Karmmasadhyam, producible by action.
^Na, not. Vidyate, is known.
11. Action, producible by Action, is not known.—11.
Upaskura.—But it may be asked : why do not Actions originate other Actions ? So he
sa y s:
Here the root ‘vid’has the senseof knowledge, andnot existence.
The meaningis that there is noproof of the existenceof Action whichis
producible byAction, as inthe caseof Substance andAttributeoriginated
I bytheir congeners.
Here the ideaisthis: If Actionis toproduce Action, thenit will,
like Sound, produce it immediately after its own production. Therefore
Disjunction fromsubstances inConjunctionhavingbeencompletelycaused
bythe first Action itself, fromwhat will the secondAction causeDisjunc­
tion? For Disjunctionmust be precededbyConjunction, andanewCon­
junction has not also been producedinthe subject inquestion. But
the definitionof Action suffers if there is non-productionof Disjunction.
It cannot besaidthat anewActionwill beproduced at another moment ;
becauseapotency cannot be delayed and because there is nothingtobe
waited for. In the case of the production(of Conjunction) at the very
moment of the destructionof the previous Conjunction, the productionof
Disjunction(byAction) will be surelynot proved. Thesame alsowill be
the result inthe caseof its productionat the timeof the productionof
thesubsequent Conjunction. Andafter the productionof the subsequent
Conjunction there isreally destruction of Action. Thereforeit has been
well saidthat ActionproduciblebyActionis not known.—11.
D iffe re n c e ! Substance from Attribute and Action.

* 33$ 5FTW v ffb IM i i i u

I
l[ Jt|6)* _
---------- r_VAISESIEA
__X_........ ..
PHILOSOPHY.
. , __IOJu
fiT

ff Nar not. jsbi Dravyam, substance. eRitsf Karyyam, effect, ^fn^ir K&ra-
nam, cause. =q Cba, and. Badhati, opposes; annihilates.
12. Substance is not annihilated either by effect or
by cause.—12.
VpaaMra.—He mentions the Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action ;
Substance isnot destroyed either by-its own effect or byits own
cause. Themeaningisthat therelationofthedestroyer andthe destroyed
does not exist betweentwoSubstances whichhaveenteredintothe relation
of effectandcause, because, (andthisisthepurport), Substanceisdestroyed
onlybythe destructionof thesupport or substratum and the destruction
of theoriginative Conjunction.
The form‘badhati ’(insteadof the correct form‘hanti ’)isfoundin
aphorisms.—1 2 .
Above continued.

g m r: i n m m
Uhhayatha, in both ways. jjjth': Gunffh, attributes.
13. Attributes (are destroyed) in both ways.—13.
Upaskara.—He says that Attributes are capable of being destroyed by effect and
cause.
The meaningis (that theyare) capable ofbeing destroyedbyeffect
as well as bycause. The initial Sound, etc., (inaseries) are destroyedby
their effects, but the last is destroyedby its cause, for the last but one
destroys thelast.—13.
Above continued.

c R w t 11 \ 1 \ 1 \ a 11
Karyya-virodhi, whereof the effect is the opposite or contradictory.
Kartnina, action.
14. Action is opposed by its effect.—14.
Upaskcira.—After stating that Attributes are opposed by (and so cannot co-exist with)
both their effects and causes, he mentions the opposition of effect to Action :
‘Karyyavirodki’is aBahuvrihi or adjective compoundmeaningthat
of which the oppositeiseffect, because Actionis destructible bysubse­
quent Conjunctionproduced byitself.
The non-oppositionof effects and causes is uniforny'inthe case of
Substances only. But it isnot therulein thecaseof AttributeandAction.
For what theauthor desires tosayis that those Attributes destroy, which
are theoppositesof thedestruction duetothedestructionof the non-com-
binative causeof thedestructionof thesubstrat^im.—14.
 || : KANADA SUTRA I, 1-15.__________
Characteristic of Substance.

Kriya-gunar-vat, p o ssessin g A ction and A ttribute. rw R iaairW

Sam avayi-karanam , com binative cause. ?fh Iri , such, £sq5T^p!T D ravya-laksanam ,
mark o f substance.
15. It possesses Action and Attribute, it is a combi­
native cause—such (is) the mark of Substance.— 15.
Upaskdrci.—After describing the Resemblance of the three according to the wish of
the disciples, he now goes on to state their marks :
‘Kriyagunavat ’ means wherein Actions andAttributes exist. The
word‘laksana,’bytheforceof its derivation, viz. ‘Bythisit ismarkedout,’
denotes amarkas well asaparticular differentiating markor sign which
| divides off objects of like and unlike kinds. Therein by Action it is
markedout that this isasubstance. Andbythepossessionof Attributes^
Substance, excluded fromobjects oflikeandunlike kinds, is marked out.
Of these the like kinds, i. e., objects whichresemble oneanother inbeing
existent, arefive, viz., Attributes, etc. The unlike kind however is Non-
Existence. Therefore Substance isdifferent from Attribute, etc., because
it possesses Attribute. That whichis not different fromAttribute, etc.,
does not possess Attribute,Ze. g., Attribute, etc. Although the possession
of Attribute is not found in a substance made up of parts at the
moment of its origin, still the possessionof the oppositeof the absolute
non-existenceof Attribute ismeant tobe stated, because the antecedent
; and the subsequent non-existence of Attribute are also opposites
of the absolute non-existence of Attribute. Similarly, thebeing the
combinativecause also, whichdivides thesixPredicables, is a mark of
the PredicableSubstance.
HeretheSddhya, i . e that whichhas tobe proved, does not suffer
fromthe fault of beingunknown, for difference from Attribute, etc., is
proved byperception in the w ater-pot, etc. Nor is here the fault of
provingthat whichhas beenalreadyproved, for although the difference
of the water-pot assuchfromothershasbeen proved, yet such difference
remainstobeprovedinrespect of it considered as a Substance. Some
saythat inthecase of the difference of that which defines the pah§a
(i.e., the object in which the existence of the Sddhya is sought to be
proved, e.g., the mountain when the existence of fire is sought to be
proved init), therecanbeno proving of that which has already been
proved, as, for instance, in “Wordand Mindareeternal.” But this isnot
I SO, for that w hichhqstobeproved being proved in anything whatever
((( SfeijS ■ VAISE8IKA PHILOSOPHY. (q T
— .......... rT-.y,^ - - v ; A . \ : ^ ; ^ ^ .,,^ ..,:a iL -.......;.■■ ■■ .,■■ »■■. — «— -— - g U j
determined by that which determines the characteristic of being a
paksa, the pahsa suffers in its essential, and hence that which has to
beprovedinsuchcases, must be provedas such, i. e., independently.
The word‘iti ’means ‘others.’ Therefore thepossessionof Number,
the possessionof Measure, the possessionof Separateness, the possession
of Conjunction, and the possession of Disjunction also are brought
v together.—15.
Characteristic of Attribute.

w if w i
%
i?iH »
Dravyagrayi, inhering in substance. Agunavan, not
possessing Attribute. Saiiiyoga-vibhagesu, in Conjunctions and
Disjunctions. Akaranam, not a cause. Anapeksali, indepen­
dent. ?f?r Iti, such, Guna laksanam, mark of Attribute.
16. Inhering in Substance, not possessing Attribute
not an independent cause in Conjunctions and Disjunc­
tions,—such is the mark of Attribute.—16.
Upaslcara.—Attributes having been enumerated after Substances, he gives their
mark:
‘Dravyaskayi ’means that of whichthe nature is toreside in Subs­
tance. This however pervades Substance also. Therefore he says
‘Agunavan’ or Attributeless. Still it over-extends to Action; so he
adds ‘not acause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions.’ Yet it does not
include Conjunction, Disjunction, Merit, Demerit, knowledgeof God, etc. ;
soheadds ‘independent.’ After ‘independent,’ ‘Attribute’ should be
supplied. The meaningthereforeis that Attribute is that which is not
anindependent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions
andDisjunctions, etc., aredependeduponbyConjunctionandDisjunction.
Attributeness is the chracteristic of possessing the genus pervaded by
existenceandresidingin the eternals with eternal functions. The re-
vealer of Attributeness is thecausalitypresent in something possessing
genus and devoidof combinative causalityand non-combinative causa­
lity towards Conjunctionand Disjunction combined. Conjunction and
Disjunction are severally caused by Conjunction and Disjuction, but
not jointly. Merit, Demerit, knowledge of God, etc., have been in­
cluded because they are only occasional or conditional causes of both
and are not their combinative causes or non-combinative causes. Or
therevealer of Attributeness is the characteristic, co-extepsive withgenus,
[|( W ■■
; ___ KANADA^SdTRA M7._S L
©fbeingdevoidof combinative and non-combinative causality towards
ConjunctionandDisjunction. Or the mark of Attribute is simply the
characteristic of not possessing Attribute along with the possession of
Genus and of differencefromAction.—16.
Characteristic of Action.

sreraj^u i?i
% n
qirgzil Ekadravyam, resting or residing in one susbtance only,
Agunam, devoid of Attribute. ?r%»TT^f*T!3 Samyoga-vibhagesu, in Conjunctions
and Disjunctions. Anapeksa-karanam, independent cause. $f?j Iti,
such. Karmma-laksanam, Mark of Action.
17. Residing in one Substance only, not possessing
Attribute, an independent cause of Conjunctions and Dis­
junctions—such is the mark of Action.— 17.
Upaskara.--He states the mark of Action which has been mentioned after Attribute :
‘Ekadravyam’means that of whichonlyoneSubstanceis the subs­
tratum. ‘Agunam’isthat inwhichnoAttribute exists. ‘Sarnyoga, etc.’
means independent ofsomethinginthe formof positive existence whicli
comes toappear after its ownproduction; sothat it is not unestablished
wherethere is necessityfor or dependence upon the combinative cause
andalsowherethereis dependence upon absenceof antecedent conjunc­
tion. Or independence of that which has its production after the
productionof Action itself, is meant, because the annihilation of the
antecedent conjunctionalsohas its production after the production of
Actionitself, andbecause asanon-existenceit does not bear relation to
its first moment.
Action-ness is the possession of the genus directly pervaded by
existenceother thanthat residing in the eternals, or the possession of
thegenus determinative of the uncommon or specific' causality which
produces the perceptionthat somethingmoves, or the possession of the
genus residingonlyinwhat is devoid of Attribute and not being an
Attribute, or thepossessionof thegenus determinative of the causality
towards Disjunctionpresent at the moment immediately subsequent to
theproductionof Actionitself.
Andthisagainis a Predicable evidenced by the perception that
somethingmoves, whichcannot be demonstrated by its production, etc.
at placeshavingnointerval betweeneachother, because the breaking up
ofamoment will berefutedlater op,
I ROW® F*/i$B8 ZKA PHILOSOPHY. (A t
— — — .............................................
The manner inwhichthe markservestodistinguish it from others
is thesameas liasbeenalreadydescribed.—17.
Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action.

3>iiynj-:FWHi|i jfsq II? 1 I II

gsaRprqwyjr Dravya-gima-karmmanam, Of Substance, Attribute, and Action.
Dravyam, Substance. qflRW Karanam, cause, Samanyam,-Common,
Uniform.
18. Substance is the one and the same cause of Subs­
tance, Attribute, and Action.—18.
Upaskaret. - Now he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three only by way of
their cau se:
‘Samanyam’(common).means thesame, one, as in‘These twohave
acommon mother.’ The meaningis that Substance, Attribute and Action
exist inoneand thesame Substance whichis their combinativecause.
The Resemblanceof the threelies in the possession of the genus
having the function of that which has Substance as its combinative*
cause.—18.
Above continued.

gun ii t i m u ii
5T2R Tatha, Similarly, spi: Gunah, Attribute.
19. Similarly Attribute (is the common cause of Subs­
tance, Attribute, and Action).—19.
Upaskfira :-H e states the Resemblance of the three as having Attribute as their
non-combinative cause:
The Resemblanceof the three lies in the possession of the genus
residinginthat whichhas Attribute as its non-combinativecause. Con­
junction is the non-combinative cause ofsubstances. Thepossession, as
their non-combinativecause, of Attributes which are thecauses of their
congeners, belongs to theAttributes of effects, e. g., Colour, Taste, Smell,.
Touch, Number, ExtensionorMagnitude, Separateness, etc. TheAttributes
of the ultimateatomsofEarthhaveConjunctionwithFireastheir non-com­
binative cause. Thenon-combinativecause of Actions, however, are Fire
etc., internal vibration, impact, weight, fluidity, impression, conjunction
withsoul possessinginvisibleconsequences ofActions (adri^tam), conjunc­
tionwithSoul exercisingVolition, etc. Theseshouldbe respectivelyunder­
stoodbythe reader. Sometimeseven one Attribute gives rise toall the
threeSubstance, Attribute, andAction; for instance, Conjunction witha
ball of cotton possessed of Impetus, produces Action inanother ball of
(if kan A d a stiT B A S i, 1-22 . for
bUfoto——----------------------------------------- 5s I,
cotton, originates aSubstance, viz., anaggregate oftwoballsofcotton, and
the Extensionof that aggregate also. Sometimes asingle Attribute origi­
nates a Substance and an Attribute; e. g., Conjunction which maybe
described as anaggregation independent of Impetus, with a ball of
cotton, originates aSubstance whichis anaggregate oftwoballs of cotton
as well as its Extension.—19.
Effects of Action.

uhnifauumRT <swt ?whhji ? 1 1 11

^nrfw^TPWTT'Tt Sai’nyoga-vibhaga-veganam, Of Conjunction, Disjunction,
and Impetus. afiw? Karmraa, Action. h h r Samanam, Common.
20. Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Dis-
l junction, and Impetus.—20.
Upaskira.—He says that sometimes a single Action is productive of a multitude of
effects:
Theword‘lcaranain’shouldbe supplied. Producingas many Dis­
junctions as the number ofSubstances inconjunction with the Substance
inwhichActionis produced, it (Action) alsoproduces an equal number of
Conjunctions elsewhere. Andthesame Actionagain produces Impetus in
its ownsubstratum.
The wordImpetus indicates Elasticityalso.—20.
Difference between Substance and Action.

II 3 i i i A II
H Na, not. sRjnfff Dravyanffm, Of Substances. g;wT Karmma, Action.
21. Action is not the cause of Substances.—21.
Upaskiira. But it may be argued that originative Conjunction having been brought
about by substance possessed of Action, the substance which is originated thereby, is
surely produced by Action since Action has been its antecedent as a rule. Hence he
sa y s:
Themeaningis that Actionisnot thecauseof substances.—21.
Above continued.

ii % \ n
\

Vyatirekat, because of cessation.

22. (Action is not the cause of Substance) because of
its cessation.—22.
Upaslcara.—He points out why it is so :
*Vyatirekftt ’ means on account of cessation. Substance isproduced,
on the cessation of Action, by the ultimat?
Conjunction ; therefore Action.
 v• '* . A/|f
_____ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. fA j
'V'.>VX_ ^ "
.' . is not acauseof Substance. Neither is Actionwhich has ceased toexist,
acauseof Substance. MoreoverifActionbesuchacause, it must beeither
thenon-eombinativecauseof Substanceoritsconditional cause. It cannot
be the first, because thenit will followthat Substance will be destroyed,
even onthe destructionof the Actionof theparts inasmuchas Substance
iscapable of being destroyedbythe destruction of the non-combinative
cause. Nor canit be the second, for inthat case there will beaviolation
of therule, sincesmall pieces of cloth being producedjust fromthe Con­
junctions still existingafter the destruction of alargepieceof cloth, it is
seen that evenparts whichare devoidof Action, originate Substance.—22,
Difference between Substance and Action.

^ % is \ * \ \ \
JMIHSJT,Dravyanam, of many substances. jrsj(, Dravyam, a single sub­
stance. karyyam,effect. Samanyam,common.
23. A single Substance may be the common effect
more than one Substance.—23.
Upaskara.—Having stated that one may be the originator of many, he now states that
of one effect there may be many originators :
Of Substances, i- e., of two Substances as well as of more than two
Substances. Thus by two threads a piece of cloth consisting of two
threads is originated, so also by many threads one piece of cloth is
originated. It cannot be said that a piece of cloth consisting of one
threadis seen where the warp and woof are supplied by one and the
same thread, for owingto the non-existence of the Conjunctionof asingle
object, thereis no non-combinative cause here. Nor again can it besaid
that the Conjunctionof the threadand the fibres is the non-combinative
cause, becausethe relationof such parts and wholes being naturallyes­
tablished therecanbe no Conjunction between them, also because the
relationof that whichis tobeoriginated and the originator is not per­
ceived, and alsobecauseof the impenetrability of condensed bodies. It
cannot be saidthat this iscommonlyobserved. For here, as a matter of
fact, cloth isproduced bythemutual conjunctionsof manysmall pieces of
thread, producedon.the destructionof along thread by the impact of the
loom, etc., whereas fromthe natureof things therearises the false notion
of unity inrespect of threads whichare reallymanyinnumber.—23.
Above continued.

II * I I 8 ||
Tpjpbjjjhrff, Guna-vaidharmmyat, onaccount ofthe Difference of Attributes.
*Na, not. <K*$HjTT,Karmmaijani, ofActions. 3r*4, Karmma, Action.
m R A N AD A SUTRAS 1, 1-26. M j

24. Action is not the joint effect of many Actions, on

account of the Difference of their Attributes.—2 4 .
5 Upaskara.—Well, it may be asked, as a single Substance is the effect of many Substances,
as also a single Attribute of many Attributes, so is a single Action the effect of many
Actions ? Hence he sa y s:
‘K&ryyam’isthe complement. It has been already stated that
theResemblanceof Substance andAttribute is that they originate their
congeners. Alsoit has beenalreadydenied that Actions are productive
ofAction, inthe aphorism“ Actionproducible by Action is not known.”
This ishererepeated. This is the idea.—24.
Difference between Attribute and Action.

uw : im m vn
Dvitva-prabhritayah, Duality, ,etc. Samkhyffh, Numbers.
jtrurffHrur Prithaktva-samyoga-vibhagEih, Separateness, Conjunction,
and Disjunction. Cha, And.
Duality and other Numbers, Separateness, Con­
25.
junction, and Disjunction (are originated by more than one
Substance).—2 5 .
Upaskara. —Now, pointing out that Attributes which reside in aggregation are origi­
nated by many Substances, he says :
“Originatedbymorethanone substance”—This isthe complement.
The wordSeparateness appearingtogether with Duality, etc., alsodenotes
Separateness of two, etc. Thus Numbers beginning with Duality and
8 endingw ith the highest arithmetical figure, Separateness of two, etc.,
| Conjunctions, and Disjunctions aro originated by two as well as by
morethan twoSubstances. Sothat thecharacteristic of residingin more
Substances than onebelongs tothem. And this characteristic again is
the sameasco-extensionwith the mutual non-existence of combinative
causes.—25.
Above continued.
* fh u h m 5 1 --t« ii

sreRsjrsn'H,, Asamavffyat, on account of non-combination. tTRT; q5RT<«3l,

Samanya-karyyam, common effect. Karmma, action. ?r, Na, not.
Vidyate, is known.
26. Action which is the joint result (of an aggregate
of two or more substances,) is not known, as it is not found
in combination with them.— 2 6 .
Upaskara. Well, it may be asked, as Substances which are made up of parts, as well
as Attributes already mentioned, have the characteristic of residing in aggregation so
does not that characteristic belong to Actions also f So ho sa y s:
I ' 5 I
|(1il VAT&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
?a \ -*<s- ......
^ ‘On account of non-combination’shouldbe joined with 1 in two
substances,’and ‘in more than two substances.’ Thus a single Action
doesnot combine intwo substances ; nor does a single Action combine
inmore thantwosubstances; so that Action whichis the effect of an
aggregate, is not known. Here too the root ‘vid’in ‘vidyate’has the
sense of knowledge and does not denote existence. If Action resided in
aggregation, thenone substance moving, therewotfidarise theconscious­
ness, ‘It moves,’ in respect of two substances and more than two
substances; but it is not so; therefore Action does not reside in aggre­
gation. This is the meaning.
It cannot be argued, “The Action of thebodyand its parts are
certainlyoriginated bymany substances, namely, the body and its parts;
otherwise, the bodymoving, howcantherebetheconsciousness, ‘It moves,’
inrespect of thehands, feet, etc. ? Similarly in thecase of other objects
madeupof parts.” For such consciousness is due tothefact that the
quantityof the Actionof the parts is pervaded bythe quantity ol the
Actionof the whole made up of these parts. The contraryis not the
case, becausethe part moving there does not arise the consciousness, It
moves,’inrespect of theentire wdtolemade up of the parts. Otherwise
fromtheconjunctionof causeand not-cause, theconjunction of effect and
not-effect alsowill not follow, since there can be conjunctionof an effect
also, only withthe Action of thecause.—26.
Resemblance of Substance, Attribute and Action.

#TT*THf W \ \ % I ^ N
Sariiyoganam, of Conjunctions. Diavyam, substance.
27. Substance is the joint effect of many Conjunc­
tions.—27.
UpasMra.—lle again mentions a single effect of many (causes) :
The meaningis that substance is thesingle effect ofmanyConjunc­
tions. It should be observed that here 1 Conjunctions’should be taken
tothe exclusionof theconjunctions of touch-less substances, substances
made upof final parts or ultimate formations, and heterogeneous sub­
stances.—27. Above continued.

il! i * i ^ li
R ftpan am, Of colours. Rftparn, colour.
28. Colour (is the joint effect) of many colours.—28.
Upaskhra—Now he says that many Attributes produce one Attribute as their
effect:
(if ___ KANADA SUTRA I. 1-29 -^ L
‘Colour is the single effect’—this is the connection. Theword
‘colour’inboththe instances are indicatory, and its indicative power
issuchthat it does not abandon its own meaning. And the common
propertyof the intrinsic and the indicatory significance is dependence
upontherelation of theproduct and producer by means of the proximity
knownascombinationwithanobject which is oneandthe same as the
cause. Hence Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Liquidity, Natural Fluidity,
Unity, andSeparateness of one are brought together. For these, being
present in thecause, originate inthe effects only one Attribute of the
same kind. Infact the operation of non-combinativecauses istwo-fold.
Someproducetheir effectsbyproximity to the object which is one and
thesameas thecause. Herethecause is the combinative cause and it
- is thecauseof theeffect, namely colour, etc., which havetobeproduced.
Thus Colour whichis present inthepotsherd originates theColour of the
pot bymeansof thecombination, knownas combination with the object
whichisoneand the same as the cause, with the combinative cause,
namelypot, etc., of the effect such as Colour, etc. SimilarlyTaste, etc.
Insomeplaces, however, thereisanoperationofnon-combinativecausality
bymeansof proximityto the object whichisoneand the same as the
effect.- For instance, Sound, although it is a eause, originates in the
skyanother Sound, although it is an effect. In thesky itself Colour,
etc., alsoare produced by Conjunctionof Fire with theultimate atoms
of Earth bymeansof theproximity in the formof combination with the
object whichisoueand thesameas the effect.—28.
Above continued.
»i r u r g q r a v v m . m i ; i u n
Gurutva-prayatna-samyoganam, of gravity, Volition, and
Conjunction, Utksepanam, Throwing upwards
29. Throwing upwards (is the joint product) of
Gravity, Volition, and Conjunction.—29.
ITpasfccra.—He says that a single Action may be the effect of many causes :
The meaning is that Throwing upwards is their single effect.
HereWeight residinginthe hand, stone, etc., is the conditional cause and
Conjunctionof theSoul exercising Volitionis the non-conbinativecause,
of the Throwingupwards seated in the hand, whereas the non-combina­
tive cause of the Throwing upwards seated inthestone is the internal
movement or vibrationof the hand.
Here also the term Throwingupwards is indicatory of Throwing
downwards, etc.—29,
(l j|jj|| VAISESJKA PHILOSOPHY. (^J
— ■A^//
Causality of Action upheld.

^THTftvrmrsr n ^ i ^ i ^o u
^rar»lf%*rrnr•' Samyoga-vibhagdh, Conjunctions and Disjunctions, Chaf
and. cRwiwf Karmmanam, of Actions.
30. Conjunctions and Disjunctions also (are individual­
ly the products) of Actions.—30.
Upaskara.—But it has been said that Attributes which have taken a shape,
(t. e., by appearing in some Substance) are, as effects, preceded (and so caused) by the
Attributes of the causes ; it has also been said that they are preceded by the Attributes of
that in which they reside; therefore it follows that Action produces no effect whatever.
That being so, oven the inference of ultrasensual phenomena such as the movements of the
Sun, etc., becomes impossible in the absence of any mark of inference. For this reason,
merely reminding the reader of what has already been said in the aphorism “ Action is
the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus,” he says :
‘Products’ is the complement. The plural number is for the
purpose of individual reference. ‘Impression’ also shouldbetaken as
indicated.—30.
Vivriti.—The word‘cha’implies Impetus andElasticityinaddition
(toConjunctionsandDisjunctions).
Above continued.

X \X I\ \\\
^TTUFrarcun Karana-samanye, under the topic of causes in general.
Dravya-karmmanam, of Substances and Actions. Karmma,
Action. srgirviT
Akdranam, not cause. Uktam, said.
31. Under the topic of causes in general, Action has
been stated to be not a cause of Substances and Actions.—31.
Upaskara—But it has been already said that Substance and Action are not the effects
of Action. Conjunction and Disjunction again are the effects of Conjunction and Disjunc­
tion alone. So that the affirmation of the Causality of Action here seems to be self-con­
tradictory. So he sa y s:
The word‘Karanasamanya’ denotes the topic ofcauses ingeneral.
Thus in thetopic of the statement of causes in general, Action has been
said to be not a cause of SubstanceandAction, andnot that it isalto­
gether anot-causeonly, whereby the aphorism “Conjunctions and Dis­
junctions also are individually the products of Actions” might be
destroyed.—31.
Hereends the first chapter lessonof the First Bookinthe Commen­
taryofSahkaraontheVaidet-ika aphorisms,
||Jfj______ KAVADA s C'TRA 1. 2-1.____ # (§1
B ook F ir s t , C h a pter S eco n d .

Causation.

^RWTHPrTrT \\ % l^l^U
gfnTWHnTfl KSranabhavat, from the non-existence of cause. g>p:sr>7r^.'
Karyyabhavalj, non-existence of effect.
1. Non-existence of effect (follows) from the non-exist
ence of cause.—32.
Upaskara.—Well, in this section (i. e., the last half of the book) the Resemblance
of the three Predicables has been stated as constituted by the identity or sameness
of their effects and causes. But this is not established as the relation of effect and
cause itself has not been proved. Therefore ho says:
Whereas it isseenthat inspiteof earth, wheel, water, potter, thread,
etc., beingbrought together, there is non-existence of the pot, if thereis
non-existence of the potter’s staff, and that in spiteofearth, water, etc.
beingbrought together, there isnon-existenceof theshoot if there is non­
existenceof theseed; it (i. e., non-existence) cannot be explainedwithout
the relation of effect and causebetweenthe potter’sstaff andthepot or
between theseedand theshoot. Otherwisethere will be non-existenceof
thepot evenonthenon-existenceof the loom,etc., andthere will benon­
existence of the shoot even on the non-existenceofpiecesof stone, etc.
Moreover it isseenthat thepot, apiece ofcloth, etc., exist for atimeonly.
That even cannot be explained without therelationof causeand effect.
For theybeingnon-existentat onetime, their temporariness inthe formof
existenceat anothertimeisnot possiblebutbythedependence of existences
uponcauses. For ifthere were no dependence uponcauses, thenathing
couldonlybeor not be, but couldnot beforatime only; sinceanexisting
thing cannot be non-existent, nor can it comeintoexistence fromthat '
whichis not its cause, nor canit come into existencefrom one knows not
what, nor can it comeintoexistencefromunreal things such asthehorn
of a hare, etc., but from a really existing limit or beginning like the
potter’s staff, the loom, etc., as isseeninsucheffects as apot, apieceof
cloth, etc. Nowthelimit or beginningis nothingbut the cause.
Thus if therelationofeffect and causedid not exist, there wouldbe
no inclination, or disinclination to activity. Then the worldwouldbe­
come desireless, inert. For there can benoactivitywithout theknow­
ledge that this is the means of attainingthat whichisdesired; nor can
there be forbearance without the knowledge that this is the meansof
avoidingthat whichis not desired.—1 ,
■* ||38.: VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ____ S l
V ivriti .—The Siifrkhya thinkers argue as follows: “Awater-jar,
etc., existing in an enveloped state in earth, etc., frombefore, develop
into visible existence, and again bybeingstruckwithacudgel, etc., are
enveloped therein and ‘exist. Sothat production anddestructionarenot
veal, but merely development and envelopment. This beingso, why
shouldnot a water-jar beproduced fromyarns? It cannot be said that
theexistence of effects incausesprior totheir production is without evi­
dence, for the proof issuppliedby such texts of Vedaas ‘Onlytheexis­
tent, 0 Dear One, was at thebeginning,’(Chliandogya6, 2, 1 ‘, etc.”
This viewshould beconsidered. Theadmissionof the development
of development willentail non-finality. If, on the other hand, development
bepreviously non-existent, thenit will be necessary toadmit production
fromthe non-existent, andhence the suppositionof thepriorexistence of
the water-pot, etc., will become groundless. Thuscausalityis the belong­
ing tothe class of invariable andunconditional antecedents which cannot
be otherwise accounted for, or the qualityof that whichfails toproduce
an effect onaccount of defect inthe contributories, or anadditional Pre­
dicable, beingaparticular relationarisingout of its ownnature.
Above continued.
T w m u r : n ». i * i *m i

5j Na, not. 5 Fu,"but. gfrc9T*rTffrc[Karyyabhavdt, fromnon-existence of

effect. gRTPSTfffr?: Kdranabh&vali, non-existenceofcause.
2. Bat non-existence-of cause (does) not (follow) from
the non-existence of the effect.—33.
Upaskurn.—It may be objected that only the existent is produced, and not the
non-existent, according to the authority of the Veda, e. 3., “ Verily the existent was at the
beginning, O calm one!,” etc. Otherwise in the case of undifferentiated non-existence
there will be no such uniformity that a piece of cloth is produced from threads only and
not from potsherds. If it is so then, we reply, this uniformity must be accepted by the
advocates of the doctrine of transformation (cfUUnUdr?:) who admit the theory of causes ;
otherwise how it happens that the manifestation of the pot is only in the potsherds, and
not in threads ? Moreover if the manifestation or development also really existed from
before, then that too being eternal, it comes to this that production and destruction are
merely development and envelopment. Now, development and envelopment depend upon
causes. Therefore it results that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc., also surely depend upon
causes and also that there is production of that which was not before. The objection that
there is no proof of the uniformity towards the cause is answered by the uniformity of the
nature of the cause, and this uniformity of the nature of the cause (to produce the effect)
becomes known by the method of agreement and difference. For it is a universal experi­
ence that no pot is produced without a potter’s staff and that a pot is produced when
there is the potter’s staff. Thus causality is the quality of that which belongs to the class
pf invariable and unconditional antecedents, which cannot be otherwise established or
Il RATS'ADA SUTRAS I. 2-3. _______($||
explained, or the characteristic of being attended with the non-production of the effect
due to defect in some contributory cause. Although there is no invariable antecedence in
such places as “ one should perforin sacrifice with barley or with paddy," etc., because the
sacrifice with paddy is not an antecedent of the result producible by the sacrifice with
barley, stiil a cause ordained in the alternative is truly a cause, as causality is proved in
the case of both even though the results are similar in kind. Thus the characteristic of
being attended with the non-production of tho effect due to defect in some contributory
cause, forms the causality which is common to both secular and scriptural practices;
whereas invariable antecedence known by the method of agreement and difference is the
causality which is secular only. For in such cases as “ He who desires heaven should
perform sacrifice,” etc., the difference or negative side is not required, because knowledge
of the agreement or positive side alone is sufficient to induce activity. For this reason
also, if the alternative is assumed, then both lose their significance in the code, for the
result of the same kind being secured by one alone, the performance of the other becomes
futile. Hence also it has been rightly said : “ The result necessarily follows from practi­
ces taught in the Veda, if performed in all their parts.” When the Achiiryya (preceptor)
says “ And this object proceeding from the Veda, breach of uniformity is no fault," he
only means to refer to ordinary objects. In the case of grass, igniting wood, and jewel,
however, heterogeneity of effect is necessary ; because there causality being inferred by
agreement and difference, non-existence of the effect is necessary from non-existence of the
cause. If heterogeneity of effect is supposed in alternative cases, causality will be in the
alternative in Rajasuya, Vajapeya, and other sacrifices. For these reasons ho goes on
establishing the same law of the relation of effect and cause.
If the law of therelationofeffect andcausedonot exist, thennon­
existenceof cause will follow also fromnon-existence of effect. Non­
existence of effect isnot instrumental towards thenon-existenceof cause;
but non-existenceof causeis instrumental towardsnon-existence of effect.
Thus the applicationof this introductorysectionof twoaphorisms is that
personsdesirous of mokqa (salvation) are concerned in non-existence of
birth for thesakeof non-existenceof pain, innon-existence ofactivityfor
the sakeof non-existenceof birth, innon-existenceof faults for the sake
of non-existence of activity, inpreventionof falseknowledge for the sake
of non-existenceof faults, and in spiritual intuition of the Self for the
sakeofpreventionof falseknowledge.—2.
Genus and Species relative to understanding,

sihfu ffir m i ^ i vn
StPlFd Sfimanyain, G en u s, V isesah, S p e c ie s . 51% Iti, these.
Buddhyapeksam, relative to understanding.
3. The notions Genus and Species are relative t
the Understanding.—34
Upaskdra.—After the marks of the three Predicabl .S in the order of their enumera­
tion, he now states the mark of the Predicable Genus w hich has also been mentioned :
Genusistwo-fold, highandlow,ofwhichthefirst isExistenceandthe
secondisSubstanceness, etc., pervadedby Existence. TheUnderstanding
 VIASESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (gT
\ * \ -tW- ./, / k^/A—A
itself is themarkofGenus andits Species: the cognition of re-appear­
ance or recurrence, of Genus, and the cognition of disappearance or
reversion, of species. The word ‘iti ’ takes themsingly, andhencethe
word‘buddhyapeksam’has beenused inthe neuter gender. The writer
of the v-pitti however applies it to species onlyand explains its use in
the singular number andneuter gender bytherule “Awordintheneuter
gender used with a word not in the neuter gender optionallyentails
neuter gender andsingular number.” ‘Buddhyapeksam’ means that of
which the understanding or cognition is the mark or the definition.
‘Genus' inthe aphorismmeans that whichis eternal andresidesin more
individuals than one. Or, Genus, whether high or low, is, while it is
eternal, co-existent in thesamesubstratumwiththe mutual non-existence
of its ownsituationor foundation. Moreover Genus alsotakes the name
of Species, as for example, at thesametimethat there isthe cognitionof
re-appearanceorrecurrence, namely, ‘This isSubstance,’‘ThisisSubstan­
ce,’ and so on, thereis the particular cognition that it is not Attribute,
that it is not Action, etc. Sothat the nature of species belongs to the
genera themselves, e. g., substanceness, etc.
It maybeobjected, “Genus <i. e., the Universal), as an objective
reality, is a non-entity, since the consciousness of recognition can be
explained (without it) bythe absence of reversion or divergence. For
theobject of the cognition, “It is a cow,” is that it is not different
fromacow. Even theadvocate of thedoctrineof kinds ijati) admits that
this is the subject-matter of theconcrete cognitions ofbovineness, etc. ;
for concreteness or particularityisnot something other than absence of
difference from itself; it is the absenceof divergencefromacow,etc.,
whichis alsothe occasionof theuse of the words cow, etc. Moreover,
where does the Genus of bovineness reside? Not surely in the bovine
animal, because the animal is non-existent prior to the appearanceof
neness. Nor inanon— bovineanimal, becausetheie will be then con­
tradiction'.. Whence does bovineness come to reside in the bodyof a
bovineanimal’whensuchabodyisproduced? It did not surely remain
in that locality, for that placealsowill thenpossess bovineness. Nor is
bovinenessevenproduced then and there, for it (a Genus) has been
observed to be eternal.\ Nor canit come fromelsewhere, for it (aGenus)
possessesnoactivity. No. .again doesoneeternal possess the character­
isticof appearinginmanyindividuals, for there is no proof that it (a
Genus) optionally appears in part and as a whole. For the whole
does not appear in a singleplace, sincethenit wouldfollowthat there
wouldbenoconcretecognitionof it inother places. Nor doesit appear
jjgBg gj____ K A N A d a SUTRAS 1. 2-3. ____
in part for a ‘class’is not confinedtoonepart- Soit has beensaid, “It
does not move, nor was it there. Nor is it produced, nor has it parts.
Nor does it leaveitsformer residence. Alas!thesuccessionof difficul­
ties.” Genus exists andthat is manifested by situation or organisation
only like bovineness, potness, etc. But it does not belongtoAttribute
andActionalso.” Suchis the quarrel of kindred thinkers.
Tothis it issaid, “Genus iseternal andpervasive; and pervasive­
nessconsists inbeingrelatedtoall placebyits ownform. It doesnot arise
that places shouldbetreatedintheterms of bovineness, for the use of
bovineness is obtained by therelationknownas combination; as ‘Time
possessesformorcolour’—suchcognition and use donot arise, because
Timedoesnot possesses formor colour, etc. Nor canit besaid that Time
verilydoes not exist, sinceit is foundthat it isonlyadifferentnamefor the
“five heads”(i. e., of the Bauddhas, e. g., Perception, Cognition, Feel­
ing, Conception with Naming, and Impression), because Time will be
established later on. Thus bovineness which pervades a particular
spot, combines with theorganismwhichisproduced in that very place,
as it isfoundthat *it isproduced’and “it is combined(withbovineness),”
refer tothesame moment of Time. Hereby “wheredoes it reside?”is
answeredby“whereit isperceived“whereit resides ;”and “what sort
of a body it was prior totheappearanceof bovineness?” by“It didnot
exist at all. ” Similarly“It does not move, nor was it there, etc.,” is so
muchcryof despair. The Genusof bovineness is nothing but non-diver­
genceofcognitionfromwhat it hasbeen, — this isobstructed or contradict­
edbythereal or positive cognition“It isacowor ox.” For the cogni­
tion also is not explained, as it has beensaid that thecognitionof areal
existence does not help the understandingof negation, nor does diver­
gencefromacowor oxcometolight in thecognition“It is acowor ox.”
Theoptionof whole andpart canariseonlyif asingle Genus appear as a
whole or as apart. Whole-ness meansmultitudeandinfinity, andit is
not provedinan individual. “‘This is acow or ox’—suchcognitions
arise in respect of non-entities and are not capable of establishing
entities ”—tothis thereply will be givenafterwards.
Thefollowers of Prabhakara (a thinker of the Mimaihsa School)
however say that Genusismanifested byits situation (i . e., the organism
where it resides). If it is evidenced byrecognitive understanding, then
what offencehavebeencommitted byGenerabelongingtoAttribute and
Action? For therearises consciousness of recognitionor knowingagain
inrespect of Colour, Taste, etc. ; and this consciousness surelyestablishes
a‘class ’(jati), since thereisnoobstruction. Asit isinthecase ofSky-ness
«
{(( |K| VAI&ESTKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
----------------- ------------------------------ S>L
''—^entity oftlieindividual ianot theobstruction ill the case of the class
attributes of Colour, etc. Nor is co-extensiontheobstructionhere as it
is in thecaseof Understandingand Knowledgeor inthecaseof the class­
es of water-pots and water-jars, becauseof the multiplicity of individual
Colours, Tastes, etc. For co-extension is denotationof neither morenor
less individuals1; and the class attributes of colour, etc., haveanarrower
denotationthan Attribute-ness, andhaveawiderdenotationthanblue-ness,
etc. For this reason also, there isnooverlapping or intermixture (which
is also anobstruction tothe existenceof Genus), asthereis inthecaseof
thecharacteristics of being material andponderable substances, because
although their mutual absolute non-existencesco-exist inthesame subs­
tratum, yet there isnoco-existence with any other class. Nor is here
instabilityor infiniteregression, becauseother GeneraincludedinColour­
ness, etc., are not recognised. Nor ishere loss of form or transformation
as in thecaseof species. If species, whileresidinginsubstances, possess
classes or jati then they will become either Attributes or Actions;if
whileappearinginUniversale (e. g., Time, Space, Ether, andSoul) they
possess classes or jati, then theywill become Attributes. The trans­
formationwhichthus takes place inthe case of the Predicable Species,
is absent in the case of the subject under enquiry. Nor ishere non-
relation, as inthe caseof Combination. Let therebe non-relation in the
case of Combination, seeing that thesuppositionofCombinationof Com­
binationwill entail infinite regression; but in the case of the subject
under enquirythe relationof Combinationitself isrecognised. Although
identityofthe individual itself is an obstructiontoCombination beinga
Genus, yet the view of those alsoshould beconsidered, whoholdthat
Combinations are manyinnumber and undergoproduction and destruc­
tion. Or it (absence of combinationor identityof the individual) is the
obstructiontoNon-existence, etc., being Genera.
Thelearned writer of the Vritti has said: “The point indispute,
namely, recognitive understanding, becauseit isan unobstructed, recur­
rent consciousness, isexplainedbyarecurrent property, as theconscious­
ness, ‘garland-flowers’(covers all the flowers making up a particular
garland and is explained by thecommonpropertyof belongingtothat
garland, whichrecurs ineveryoneof thoseflowers).” This requiresconsi­
deration.—3.
V ivriti :—The Nyaya teachers have recited the obstructions to
Genus: “Identity oftheIndividual, Similarity or Co-extension, Overlap­
ping or Intermixture, Instability or Infinite Regression, Transformation,
andNon-relation,—this is the collectionof the obstructions to Genus.”
'.{ M } '
K A N ADA SUTRA , - .
----‘-*--------- --------------------- ---'----W . I
1 2 5

How, Sky-ness is not a Genus, asit denotes onlyoneindividual. Pot-ness

andJar-ness are not twogenera, becausethe individuals denotedby the
oneareneither morenor lessthanbytheother. Material-nessandponder-
ableuess are not genera, because by appearinginthe same individual
thesubstrata of their respective absolute non-existence would then inter­
mix. Genus-ness is not aGenus, on account of infinite regression. The
transformationof Species whichis by nature exclusive, is an obstruction
to its beingaGenus, if ParticularitybeaGenus, then, itself possessing
Genus, it will not bepossiblefor it todistinguish itself and therefore its
special property of self-distinction will suffer. Therefore Particularity
or Species is not a Genus. Or transformation may mean change of
nature. Sothat if Species, whileappearinginponderable things, possess
Genera, then they would be either Attributes or Actions. If while
appearingintheuuiversals [e. g., Sky, Space, Time, andSoul) theypossess
Genera, thentheywould beAttributes. Inthis waychange of nature of
the Species is the obstruction toSpeciespossessingthecharacteristic of
Genus. Combinationor Co-inherence isnot aGenus, as the relation of
combination does not exist init, sincetheadmissionofcombinationinto
combinationwouldentail infinite regression. This applies to the view
that combinations are many in number and undergo productionand
destruction. Otherwisefromtheidentityof the individual also Combina­
tion cannot beaGenus. Similarly the absenceof the relationof Combi­
nationisanobstructiontoNon-existence beinga Genus; and other ins­
tances shouldbeunderstood.
Existence is Oenus only.
UTwrsgtitN tgtgrg mum w a n hi «»
vrnr: Bhavab, existence, being. g r i f t : Anuvritteb, of recurrence,
assimilation or extensive denotation. tig Eva, only, %g?gr;j Hetutvat, being
the cause. ?TT*TFt—Samanyatn, Genus, tig Eva, only.
4. Existence, being the cause of assimilation only,
is only a Genus.—35.
Upaskara.—Proving the two-foldness which has been stated above of Genus and
Species, he says :
‘Bhavah,’i.e., existence, is thecause of assimilationonly, andnot of
differentiationalso. Thereforeit does not takethe nameSpecies.—4.
Genera-Speeies.
IFF T^FTTSJ' II \ I ^ I X II
jfsat?g Dravyatvam, substance-ness. grpg Gunatvam, attributeness.
aRwfo, Kannmatvam, action-ness. ^ Cha, and. Samanydni, Genera.
fffrfT: Vi^esafc, species. ^ Cha, also,
• ■ •*

If f e ll VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (O T
--------------------------------------------------------: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Substance-ness, Attribute-ness and Action-ness are

both Genera and Species.—36.
Upaskara.—What Genera take the name of Species ? To meet this expectancy
he s a y s:
The word‘cha’collects Earth-ness, and other generabelonging to
Substance, Colour-ness, andother genera belongingto Attribute, Throw-
ing-up-ness, andother generabelongingtoAction. ‘Substance-ness, etc.,’
havebeen left uncompounded in order to indicate the absence of the
relationof that whichpervades andthat whichispervaded, fromamongst
them. ‘GeneraandSpecies’have not been compounded sothat it may
be understood that these are Species also even whiletheypossess the
characteristics of Genera. Otherwise (if the words werecompounded)
theremight beamistake that thecompound wasa genitive oneandthen
the being Species would not have been perceived in the presenceof
Genus-ness.
It might be objected, “Substance-ness cannot be something which
penetrates intoor inheres intheforms of substance and is beyond the
cognizanceof the senses, because ifit somehow exists in Earth, etc., its
existenceisimpossibleinthe caseof Air, Sky, etc. It cannot be estab­
lishedassomethingwhichconstitutes the combinative cause of aneffect
determined by Attribute-ness, because Attribute-ness, as it appears in
eternal andnon-eternal objects, is not thedeterminant of being aneffect.
Therejoinder that it is required for the sakeof Attribute-ness does not
improve the situation.” The objection however does not arise, for
Substance-ness isestablishedbythewayof constituting the combinative
causality of an effect determined by the characteristicof Conjunction.
This causalitycannot beconstituted bythe class attribute ofEarth-ness,
whichisofanarrowercomprehension, nor byExistencewhichhasawider
denotation; and there must be something toconstitute or defineit, as
otherwisesuddenness or chance would be the result. Now Conjunction
must necessarilyberecognizedinthecaseof ultimateatoms, assupplying
the non-combinativecauseof amolecule of two atoms; in the case of
molecule of twoatomseach, as supplyingthenon-combinativecauseof a
molecules of three atoms; inthecaseof the four universals (e.g., Time,
Space, Ether, andSoul), throughtheir beinginconjunctionwithall pon­
derable things; in thecaseof Mind, asthe groundfor theconjunction of
MindandtheSenses;inthecaseof Air, as the support for themovement
of grass, etc.; in thecase of perceptibleSubstances, throughtheir very
perceptibility. Ontheother hand, there is noun-originated Conjunction
sothat it couldbs saidthat the quality of Conjunction even, appearing.
 ( ( 9 W KAN AD A SUTRA I. 2-6.
ineffectsandnot-effects, couldnot be the determinant of beinganeffect.
Inlike manner, it is easilydemonstrable that substance-ness is established
alsobythe wayof constitutingthe combinative causality of Disjunction
also. Attribute-ness again, it has been already said, is provedbyits
beingthe determinant of thecausality which exists ina thingpossessing
Genus andnot containingthenon-combinative causality of the combina­
tivecausalityof Conjunctionand Disjunction. Theclass attribute of
Actions also, is, in thecaseof perceptible Substances, cognizable bythe
cognition, ‘It moves,’but inother placescanbe inferred from Conjunc­
tionand Disjunction, for Aetion-ness is required tobe established also by
itsbeingthe determinant of the non-combinative causality of both Con­
junctionand Disjunction. For this reason also it is possible to infer
themovement of thesunfromits reachinganother place. Here although
theother place, eg., ofSky, etc., isbeyondthe reachof thesenses, yet the
ConjunctionandDisjunctionof thesolar rays are perceptible bythesolar
zone, andit isfromthese Conjunctions and Disjunctions that the inference
of the movement of the suncan bedrawn. Thelearned Uddyotakara has
said: “Theinferenceof themovement of the sun is by its reaching a
different place, whichagainisalsoamattter of inference in thefollowing
way: Thesunwhichis perceivedbya man when facing eastwards, is
alsoperceivedbyhimwhen facing the west, and is recognised by him.
This fact together with the fact that the sun isasubstance andis not
destroyedandproducedagainat every moment, is proof that the sunhas
i reachedadifferent placefromwhere it was before.”—5.
Final Species excluded.

SFWvdwff II ^ i i < II
Anyatra, elsewhere. Antyebhah, final, f f w * : Vigesebhab,
than species.
6. (The statement of Genus and Species has been
made) with the exception of the final Species.—37.
Upaskara.—But is it the same Species which ha3 been enumerated as a Predicable,
which is here described as both Genus and Species ? Removing this curiosity of the
disciples he says :
The meaningis that the statement of Genus and Species is tothe
exclusionof thosefinalSpecies*residingineternal substances, whichhave
been mentioned above. ‘Antyah,’i. e., ‘final,’means those which exist
or appear at the end (of the divisionor dissolutionof compounds.) The
* It is the introduction of these “ final species,” which is the reason why the system

I
\l.[ gje)!' VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. VSJJ
ys / . .JL •" .....1• 1 •
~teachers say that they are ‘final,’because after them thereis no other
principle ofdifferentiation. Accordingtothe Vrittikara they are ‘final
Species,’because theyexist in eternal Substances, i. e., Substances which
exist at the endof productionand destruction. Theyare really Species
only, thecauses of theconsciousnessofdifferentiation, and not ofthe form
of Genus also.--6.
Existence defined.
w \ i * i vs u
Sat, existent, Iti, thus. zj?r: Yatah, whence. ysqJUJSRwfg Drnvya-
guna-karinasu, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. gr Sa, that,
Satta, existence.
7. Existence is that to which are due the belief and
usage, namely ‘ (It is) existent,’ in respect of Substance,
Attribute, and Action.—38.
that Existence is a Genus. So he gives itsproof:
Upaskara.—A good many men doubt
Bythe word‘iti ’he teaches the modeof belief and usage. Thus
Existence isthat which causes the belief inthis way that this isexistent,
that that is existent, inthecase of the triadof Substance, etc., or onwhich
depends theapplicationof the words inthe formof ‘it is existent,’‘it is
existent.’—7.
Existence not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.
STCTT. M I * I c; ||
Dravya-guna-karmmabhyah, from Substance, Attribute, and
Action, ssrsfrgrr Arthantaram, a different object, g'grr Satta, existence.
8. Existence is a different object from Substance,
Attribute, and Action.—39.
Upaskara.—But Existence is not perceived as being separate from Substance, Attri­
bute, and Action. Therefore Existence is nothing else than one or other of Substance, etc.
Because that which is different from something else is perceived by means of its difference
from that, as a water-pot from a piece of cloth. But Existence is not perceived by means
of its difference from them. Therefore it is identical with them. To meet this objection
he s a y s :
Substance, etc., are non-assimilative but Existence is assimilative.
Thus ‘Existence is adifferent, etc.,’ because its difference fromthemis
established by the considerationof the opposite properties characterised
by assimilativeness and non-assimilativeness. That, however, it is not
perceived elsewhere than in them, isduetothe virtueof their primary
or natural inter-relation, whereas therelationofapot, andapieceofcloth
isderivativeor artificial,
ft Ifffl I KANADA s u t k a T, 2-10. « 'l
\yV%
>>.\\ r’ll#*#/
& - ih;/ - . -----------------:------------------------------ ----------------
<4/
----------------- S s l _<
^
,4
''■
'“>"fTheintrinsic formcf tlie individual isnot Existence, for individuals
donot assimilate themselves or formthemselves intoclasses. If the inner
nature beassimilative, then the same is nothing but Existence. If non-
assimilative inner natures or essences be the means of classification, then
the class attributes ofbovineness, etc., are alsogone. This consideration
also dismisses theobjection, “Whenthe practice of classification isestab­
lishedbythosevery objects in whichas substrata Existence inheres, then
what is the useof Existence?” For the samereason alsoit is not valid
toholdthat Existenceis the propertywhich makes anobject and itsaction
possible, or that Existence is reasonableness orreliability; for the cogni­
tion‘It is existent,’arises even inthe absence of any enquiry in those
respects.—8.
Above continued.

j ^ * ^ \ O T: h t* \ t n
Guna-karmmasu, in Attributes and Actions. ^ Cilia, and.
Bhavat, fromExistence, ff Na, not 5;^ Karmma, Action. ^Na, not.
Gunah, Attribute.
9. And as it exists in Attributes and Actions, there­
fore it is neither Attribute nor Action.—40.
Upaskaru.—Ho points out another differentia :
“Neither Attributenor Action”—this beingthemattertobeexpressed,
(
their individual mention[i. e., the words beingnot compounded) indicates
that Existence is not Substance also. For an Action does not exist in
Actions, nor an Attribute in Attributes, nor does Substance exist in an
Attributeor Action. Existence however resides in Attribute and Action.
Therefore on account ofits Difference from Substance, Attribute, and
Action, Existence isreally different fromthem.—9.
Above continued.

%faP*Tmrqr*ri%TSamanya-visesabh&vena, byreasonoftbeabsence ofGenus-

Species. Cha, and
10. (Existence is different from Substance, Attribute,
and Action), also by reason of the absence of Genus-Species
in it.—41.
Upaskara.—He mentions another differentia :
If Existence beSubstance, Attribute, orAction, thenitwould contain
in it Genera which are Species also. But in Existence these Genera-
Species, namely, Substance-ness, etc., are notperceived. For nobodyever
has theperceptionthat Existence isSubstance, Attribute, or Action.—10 .
(ff M W VAISE8IKA PHILOSOPHY.
^
(A j

Substance-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

^ T ^ T g rE fT II \ I ^ I II
Aneka-dravya-vattvena, by means of its containing more than
one Substance, jjsJEf Dravyatvam, Substance-ness. TfR Uktam, explained.
11. Substance-ness lias been explained by means of
its containing more than one Substance.—42.
U p a s k d r a .— Having thus stated the distinction of Existence from Substance, Attri­
bute, and Action, he states the distinction of Substance-ness from them :
Anekadravyavat ’ means that to which belong more than one
1
Substance as its combinative causes. The term ‘morethanone’ here
denotes all. Hence it is distinguished fromEarth-ness, etc. Its *eter-
nality’ is obtained simply fromits beinga Genus ; hence its distinction
from wholes made up of parts. And ‘anekdravyavattvam’ means the
being combined with more than one Substance in general ; hence its
distinction from Existence. Therefore Substance-ness is eternal and
combinedwithmore thanoneSubstance ingeneral. Hence it is implied
that conjunction isnot desired. AndSubstance-ness alsolias beenverily
established. ‘Substance-ness explained’means that Substance-ness also
has beenexplainedintheverysame wayas Existence.—11.
Above continued.

it t i * i t * u
Samanya-visesa-abhavena, by reason of the absence of
Genera-Species. Cha, and.
12. (Substance-ness is distinct from Substance, Attri­
bute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-
Species in it.—43.
U p a s k d r u .— But Substance-ness is also a ‘class,’ and can be quite non-distinct from
its own ground. What is the fault here ? So he says :
If the ‘class’ of Substance-ness bereallyidentical withSubstance,
etc., then init will exist Earthness, Waterness, Fireness, andother Genera
whicharealsoSpecies. Thesense is that nobodyhas the perceptionthat
Substance-ness is Earth, Water, or Fire. Henceit is distinct, etc.—12.
Attribute-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

tun uutu ii i m i i i
jTSjr Tatha, in like manner. Gunesu, in Attributes, Bhavat,
from its existence, spilt* Gunatvam, Attribute-ness. 3 tK Uktam, explained.
j£ f
-?N\
\ P
'0\ f
^ i
|| : It AN A d a SUTRA I, 2-16.
13. (That Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance,
Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in
Attributes.—44.
V p u sk & r a .—He states Attributeness :
The meaning is that intheverysame wayas Existence, Attribute­
nessisexplainedto be distinct fromSubstance, Attribute, and Action,
fromitsexistencein(i. e., combinationwith) Attributes only.—13,
Above continued.

=5 u ? i * i ?« n
Sdmanya-visesabhavena, by reason of the absence of
Genera-Species. Cha, and.
14. (Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attri­
bute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-
Species in it.—45.
U p a s k d r a .—He points out another differentia :
If Attributeness be not something over and above Substance,
Attribute, and Action, thenit shouldbe perceived ascontainingSubstance-
ness, Attributeness, and Actiou-ness, and their sub-classes. This is the
meaning.—14.
i Action-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.

53% UT5T5 n ? I =t I n u
Karramasu, in Actions. Bhavat, from its existence.
[ Karmmatvam, action-ness. Uktam, explained.
15. (That) Action-ness (is distinct from Substance,
Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in
Actions.—46.
U p a s k A m .—Ho points out that which distinguishes Action-noss from Substance
Attribute, and Action:
Like Existence, Action-ness also, which is another ‘class,’ is
explained as distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action, from its
existencein(i . e. combinationwith) Actionsonly.—15.
Above continued.

j * r n * i * 1 u it j
wrcroTOntWftst Sainitoya-viiesabliavena, by reason of me absence of

I Genera-Species. ^ Cha, and.

 . r \
(!( |§?0)?) FA7SSS7ZA PHILOSOPHY. V 6J| ^

16. (Action-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute,

and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-
Species in it.—47.
V p a s M r a .—He mentions another differentia :
Themeaningis that if Action-ness beidentical withSubstance, etc.,
thentheGenus-Speciesof Substanceness, etc., will combineinit.
It should be notedthat thesefour aphorisms, identical inform,are
statedsoas toformonesectionfor explaining the distinction fromSub­
stance, x\ttribute, and Action, of the four classes, Existence, Substance­
ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness.—16.
Existence is one.

f s r g r n t w ? v r r a : uu<titv9ii
STt* Sat, existent. hi, this. Lingavi^esat, from the
non-particularity or uniformity of the mark. r^qri^fT*rraTrt Vi^esa-lingabhavat,
from the absence of a particular or distinctive mark, -sr Cha, and. Ekafo,
One. >TR: Bhavali, Existence.
17. Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the
mark, viz., that it is existent and because of the absence of
any distinguishing mark.—48.
U p a s k a r a .—But why should not Existence which is present in Substance, Attribute,
and Action, be rendered different by the difference of the determinants of Substance­
ness, etc. ? So he sa y s:
The knowledgeor the useof words in. this formthat it is existent,
isthemarkof Existence. Andit is thesame, i. e., non-particularized, in
respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Thereforeoneand thesame
Existenceresides inthem. Otherwise, Existencehavingthesamedenota­
tion or manifestationas Substance-ness, etc., either it wouldnot exist or
they would not exist. ‘Visfesalihgabhavat Cha’—means that there is
no difference, as inference whichis the markof vise§a, i. e., difference,
doesnot here exist. As in the judgment, ‘This lamp is verilythat,’
the mark of distinction is the difference of measure such as length,
shortness, etc., so here there is no suchmarkof distinction. This is
the idea.—17.
Hereends thesecondchapter of the First Book in the Commen­
tary by Safikara^ on the Vairfesika aphorisms of Kanada of great
\4
(!(' w ) i
— K AH ADA SUTRA II. 1 -1,
—------- —-------r
^/.A.J
(fiT

B ook S eco n d — C h apter F ir s t .

Characteristics of Earth.

II ^ I ? I 5 II
ROpa-rasa-gandha-gpargavatl, Possessed of Colour, Taste,
Smell, and Touch. ffSpft Prithivl, Earth.
1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and
Touch.—49.
U p a s k c tm .—'The subject-matter of the First chapter of the Second Book is the
description of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections : description of Earth,
Water, and Fire ; proof of God ; and inference of Ether. Of these he states the charac­
teristic of Earth -which has been mentioned first of a ll:
ManifoldColour such asblue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone.
Thus thecharacteristic is the possessionof the ‘class’pervaded bySubs-
tance-nessand co-extensive with blue colour. SimilarlymanifoldTaste
suchasbitter, sour, etc., residesinEarthalone. Thusthe(second) charac­
teristic isthepossessionof the ‘class’pervaded by Substance-ness and
co-extensivewithbitterTaste. Inlikemannerothercharacteristicsshould
beunderstoodbythesubstitutionor interpolationof thewords *sour,’etc.
Smell isoftwo kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant. Thus the (third) cha­
racteristicisthepossessionof the ‘class’pervadedbySubstance-nessand
co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore seenthat Earthis aSubs­
tance whichisthe substratum or locationof ‘class’whichisco-extensive
with Smell but not co-extensive with an Attribute which is not co­
extensive withSmell. It must not beobjectedthat asSmell andTaste
are not perceived in a stone, etc., therefore both of them fall short
of being universal here. For, though Smell and Taste are not per­
ceived there in the first instance, still theyare found to be present
in their ashes ; andthe vex-y same parts which originate the stone do
alsooriginate its ashes. Hence there is nowant of universality. How
then is there such perception as “The air is fragrant,” “Water
mixed with ‘Karavella ’ is bitter ?” The question does not arise
because that Smell and Taste are due totheexternal conditionformed
by (particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold
andwhichisproducedbytheactionofheat, belongs toEarthonly. Thus
the (fourth) characteristic is the possession of the ‘class’ pervadedby
Substance-ness and co-extensive with Touch producedbythe actionof
heat. Andthequalityof being producedby the actionof heat, whichis
| and‘adistinctivepeculiarity’isverymanifestinthepeculiarTouchofthe'
revealedbyadistinctive peculiarity, belongs totheTouchof Earth alone;
§7 jiim V 4 ISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.' (At
% m ...of Sirisa andLavafigi (clove-creeper);
flowers -------but it--— :—the T^ouch
isnot soin
of Water, etc. AlthoughinawholemadeupofpartsTouch,etc., arenot
produced directly through the conjunction of Fire, fromheating, yet there
tooaparticular heterogeneity should be recognised bythe way of its
beingthe product of aseries of parts and wholes.
“But,”it maybeobjected, “this mark or characteristic is what is
calledamarkof disagreement or anegativemarkwhichisthe proof ofits
differencefromothers or of the mode of its treatment. Now, Earth is
distinguishedfromothers becauseithasSmell. Thatwhichisnot different
fromothers, doesnot possess Smell, e. g., Water, etc. AndEarth is what
has Smell whichis counter-opposite of the non-existenceof thepervader of
the non-existenceof the differencefromothers than itself. Thereforeit is
different fromothers than itself. Here supposing that the major term,
the qitsesitum, namely, difference from others, is a well knownobject,
if the mark of inference disagree with it, then the inference will have
thefault of incommensurability, as the minor termwill in that case fall
outside the class of ascertained(similar objects and of un-ascertained
objects ; andif it does not disagreethen the mark will be what is calleda
markof agreement or a positive mark. Onthe other hand, if the major
termis not well known then the minor term will contain an unknown
major term. In that case there can be no expectation, nor anydesire
for inference, nor again any inference in the shape of knowledgein
particular about it. Moreover, absence of the mark or the middle
term and absence of the quassitum or major term are universally
related by agreement. Thus there will arise the contradiction that
the absence of the major term will not have the characteristic of
being the mark nor will the mark have the characteristic of being
the absence of the major term. By this alone the futility of the
minor premiss is explained, but not theobject, the universal relation of
whichhas not been obtained. Soit has been said: “The faults of an
inferencebydisagreement or bythe methodof difference, are ignorance
of the major term, contradiction, futilityof the minor premiss, andproof
bythe methodof agreement.” Soalsoif themarkisintendedtoestablish
usage. Herethe usage consists in being the object of reference of the
wordEarth, andthat belongs alsototheclass of Earth-ness and therein
themarkEarth-ness doesnot exist. Although therefore incommensurabi­
litymayappear to exist here, yet there is no incommensurability, the
qusesitumor major term being the characteristic of being the object of
referenceof the word Earth, whichis the occasion of the significance of
Earth-ness. Qr again Earth-ness being, as a class, provedin ageneral
 KAUADA SUTRA II. 1-1. ffinr
l| ; j f p ---------------------------------------------------------------;------- ;—
XsrajClikepot-ness, tobe the occasion of the significanceof anaccidental
word, the word Earthcontains the occasionof the significanceof Earth-
ness. If it contains theoccasionofnot signifyingothers—not-Earth-ness,
—then as it appears together with that whichisthe occasion of the
significance, it shouldbe provedin theway, viz., ‘That whichis not so,
is not so.’ Thushere too there is surely the fault of ignorance of the
qumsitum, etc.”
It is not so, the authorreplies, differenceofotherssuchasWater, etc.,
'beingmanifest inthe pot itself, becausethe difference, i. e., the mutual
non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects alsois provedby
sense-perceptionitself inthe pot, etc., inasmuchasonlythe fitness for the
locationor ground or substratum governs the apprehension of mutual
non-existence, as is seen in cases like “The columnis not apirficha(a
ghost-likebeing).
It shouldnot be said, “This is not the case. Let then thepot only
betheanalogueor example. What is theuse of anegativeinaik? Who
will prove in a roundabout fashionaconclusionarrivedat inastraight
way?” If £he non-negative mark be not a meresimulacrum,then this
pathtoo isunobstructed tohimwhois describedasarguing in a round­
about way; because with theremoval of the fault of ignorance of the
qurositum,all other faults whicharise*out ofit, arealsoremoved. There
is no contradiction, because the positive pervasion or the relation
inagreement isapprehendedalongwith thenegativerelation or because
the positivepervasionis inferredbythe negative pervasion. Noristhere
futility-of theminor premiss, because the very mark of which the per­
vasionhas beenobtained, is proved in the minor term; as has been
said: “Whatever relation of the determinable and. the determinant
subsists between two existences, just the.reverseofit istobe understood
in the case of thecorrespondingnon-existences. Usage againfollows
fromtheteaching “Earthpossesses Smell,” as what possesses a narrow,
twistedneck, etc., is theobject of reference oftheword ‘pot.’ Thus that
bywhich, anywhere andeverywhere, inthe case of claiified butter, etc.,
clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force of the word Earth is
derived, fromtheabove teaching, inEarth-nessbymeansoftheindication,
namely, thepossessionof Smell, alsooperates as a negativemark in this
way that that w hichis not this, is not this, because everything which
possesses Smell is theobject of referenceof thewordEarth, through its
possessionof Smell, bymeans of Earth-ness which is the occasion of the
forceof the word, v
f t f l l p . :U 0§1
(f(W K $ ' VAI$ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (n j
--------'— - — — -------------- ;-------------------% t i
Theobjector cannot say “ Inthe caseof thenegative mark or per­
vasionwhichwill provedifference, the differencemust be either difference .
inproperty, ordifferenceinnature, i. e., otherness, ormutual non-existence.
Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known by sense-
perception itself. Nor can it bethe third, because when the difference
of non-existence alsocomestobe the qumsitum, its mutual non-existence
isnot present there, andtherefore the difference of that which is other
than non-existence coming to be the quaesitum, the qumsitum is not
found.” For mutual non-existence, of which the counter-opposite is
non-existence, isalsoaqmesitum. So that if it is something additional
thenit verily exists ; if not thenbeing reducedtoitself, it is in reality
somethingdifferent, becauseits differenceinpropertyis pervaded by its
mutual non-existence. And here there is no unsteadiness or want of
finality, because the non-finality remains only so long as there is
perceptionor cognition, whereas in other cases finality is obtained by
perception.
It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well
knowninthirteencases arejointly provedin Earth. This is nonsense,
because the knowledge of every one of them being not In point, the
knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence
withcounter-oppositiondetermined by non-odorousnessshouldbe proved,
because the differenceof non-existenceby means of the difference of that
which determines counter-opposition is necessary and because it has
beenalreadysaidthat this difference ofnon-existence is provedby sense-
perception inthe pot etc., also.
If it is asked “What isthesolutioninthecaseof Ether, etc, ?” the
author replies that Ether is different from others than itself, by being
theseat of Sound. Although in “ That whichis not thus, is not thus,”
and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the quresitum,
i. e., them ajor term, isnot well known, still that whichpossessesdifference
Inpropertyfromsomethingelse, possesses the mutual non-existence of
which that somethingis thecounter-opposite. So that by virtue of the
pervasionbrought intoplayinthis general way, the mutual non-existence
thecounter-opposite of whichpossesses theabsolutenon-existenceofbeing
the seat of Sound, having been already proved, here it is only shown
as beingconnectedwiththe minor term, like firebeingconnectedwith the
mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference inqualitybeing
pervadedbyits mutual non-existence. If it is said that onlythe posses­
sion of the absolute non-existenceof beingtheseat of Soundis not found
inobjects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of Sound
(\( 9 jv kanAda sutras i
t.i-3.
----------------- —:“ I j
1
is neither the definitionnor the description, because it is attackedwith
thefearof belongingtounascertained objects.—1.
V ivriti.—The revered fW kara Midra himself knows what the
necessitywasofcarryingthe investigationhere, leaving aside the posses­
sionof Smell, up tothepossession of the ‘class ’ pervaded bySubstance-
ness co-extensive withSmell.
Characteristics of Water.

WPTT 5^T: TWWT: HR I ^ I % U

: ROpa-rasa-spar^avatyali, possessed of Colour, Taste, and
Touch, =5rpp Apafc, Waters, Dravafi, Fluid. fistin’: Snigdhah, Liquid,
viscid.
2. Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and
are fluid and viscid.—50.
Upasknra- —He states the characteristic of Water mentioned after Barth :
The Colour, Taste, and Touchare respectively White, Sweet, and
Cool only. Fluidness is constitutional but Viscidity is by nature or
essential.
But it isnot correct tosaythat the Colour of Water is only White,
becauseblueness is observed inthe water of theriver Yamuna, etc That
the Tasteis only thesweet is alsonot correct, becauseacidness, bitterness,
etc., areobservedinthejuice of the blackberry, karavira, etc. That the
Touch isonlythe Cool oneisalsonot proved, because at mid-dayhotness
alsois observed. Constiutional Fluidity again is too limited, as it is
absent in ice, hail-stone, etc. Viscidity alsois not proved as essential
and istoowide, as it is not perceived in Water, and is perceived in
clarifiedbutterandother terrene objects. Moreover Water-ness is not a
classeven, whichmaybethe characteristic of Water, because it is not
provedonaccount of the non-existence of that which will establish it.
Nor is it provedbythecharacteristic of the determinant of its being the
combinativecauseofViscidity, because the natureof Viscidity, appearing
inboth theeffect andwhat is not theeffect, is not the determinant of the
stateof beingthe effect. Therefore inthe absence of a differentia, Water
is not differentiated. AH this objection cannot be raised. For non-
luminouswhitecolour alone is really the differentiaofWater, the blueness
inthe Water of the river Yamuna, etc., is duetotheconditionor environ­
ment formedbythe receptacle, andwhiteness is observed in the Water
of the Yamuna whenthrown up in the sky. Hence the characteristic of
: ||56: v a is e s t k a p h il o so p h y .
^Vfili
■---- ■...... ..--..-------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- T m
""'W
-rt'ater is thepossessionof theclass whichis directly pervaded by Subs-
. . "

tance-ness andwhichis present in colour which is not co-existent with

other thannon-lurainous white Colour. TheTaste alsois onlythe sweet
one; the bitterness, acidness, etc., in the juice of the blackberry,
karavira, etc., are due tothe condition or environm ent supplied by the
presenceof particlesof Earth. It should not be said that sweetness is
not at all perceivedinWater, since it isrevealedafter the eating of some
astringent substance. Nor does this sweetness belong to the yellow
myrobalanitself andis capableofbeing revealed byWater, because only
the astringent Taste is observed in it. As in amalaki so in yellow
myrobalan, onlytheastringent istheTaste, the same alonebeingperceiv­
ed. Nor againis therenon-productionofTaste on account of theconflict
ofAttributes, becausetheparts also therepossess astrignent Taste. The
traditionof sixTastes is duetoitsproducingtherespectiveeffectsof those
Tastes. ManifoldTasteagainisremovedsimply bythe absenceofproof.
Jnthecaseof manifold colour however the observation of the canvas
itself is the proof. Theoriginationof fragrant and non-fragrant parts is
removedby the conflict of Attributes. In the case of manifold Smell,
there isabsence ofproof. Therefore thesweetness whichis observed in
Water immediately after theeatingof yellowmyrobalan, belongstoWater
only. Its manifestation however depends upon theproximity of some
particular Substance, as themanifestationof coolness in water arises
from its association with sandalwood. The bitterness that isperceived
immediately after the eating of karkati (a cucumber-like fruit) be­
longs to the harkat-i alone, becausebitterness is observed inits parts
even without the drinking of water, or it may be that the bitter­
ness of the bilious Substance present at the tip of thetongue isfelt
there. Hence the second characteristic of water is the possession of
the class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness and which is
co-existent withTastewhichisnot co-existent withother thansweet Taste.
In like manner the third characteristicof water isthepossessionof the
class which is pervaded by Substance-ness and which is co-existent
with cool Touch. The hotness that appears at mid-dayisreallyof Fire,
as it depends upon its presence and absence. Similarlyconstitutional
Fluidity is by itself the fourth characteristic; in other words, Water-
ness is the possession of the class which is pervaded bySubstance-
ness and which is present in what possesses constitutional Fluidity.
Liquidityor Viscidity, however, isaparticular Attribute, andnot aGenus
whichisalsoaSpecies, likemilk-nessandcurd-ness; becausethedistinction
of viscid, more viscid, andmost viscid, is observed, but suchdistinction
\ H ■ KAXAD A SUTRAS II. 1-3. J
turnis not possibleinthecaseof aclass. It cannot be said “Let Viscidity
bean Attribute. But what is the evidence that it is present in water?”
for it isinferredfromthemixingor compounding of barley, sand, etc.,
by water. A compound is a particular combination or conjunction
causedbyViscidityand Fluidity. It is not due to Fluidity alone, be­
cause no compounding is established by the Fluidityof glass or gold;
nor is it duetoViscidityalone, because no compounding is established
by condensed clarified butter, etc. Therefore bythe methodof agree­
ment anddifferenceit isprovedtobecaused by Viscidity and Fluidity.
And this compounding, being seen to take place in barley, sand, etc.,
bywater, confirms Viscidity in Water. This argument is based upon
wideexperience itself, as Viscidityis anobject of sense-perception. Vis­
cidity whichhoweverisfound in clarified butter, etc., is of the Water
whichis theoccasional cause of that clarified butter, and it appears as
though belonging to the clarified butter throughcombinationwith the
conjoint. Soalsointhecaseof oil, juice, etc. And Water which is the
occasional causeofclarifiedbutter, contains apreponderanceof Viscidity;
thereforeowingtothis verypreponderanceof Viscidity, this Water does
not counteract Fire. If Visciditywere a particular Attribute of Earth,
then, like Smell, it would have been present in all terrene objects.
Lastly, Water-ness isaclass whichisdirectlypervadedbySubstance-ness,
becauseit has beenprovedthat aclass which determines the being the
combinative cause of the conjunctionpresent onlyinobjects possessing
Viscidity, iscommontotheultimate atoms.—2.
Characteristics of Fire.

fteit n*i i^ n
Tejas, tire. Rupa-sparsavat, possessed of Colour and
Touch.
3. Fire possesses Colour and Touch..—51.
U p a u k u r a .— Following the order of enumeration ho states the characteristic of Fire :
Themeaningis that Fire possesses Colour whichis luminous, and
Touch which is hot. If it be objected, “Luminousness is thebeingthe
illuminator ofother bodies, andsuchColourisnot foundinheat or inFire
as it exists ingold, inafrying-pan, or in Water. White Colour also is
found nowhere inthese, nor ishot Touchfoundin moonlight or ingold.
Howthenisthis so?” We replythat there can be no such objection,
because luminous Colour may be inferred in hotness, etc., bymeans of
Fire-ness. If it beobjectedthat Fire-ness itself is not proved there as
such, we reply that it is inferredinthembytheir possessinghot Touch.
8
(|7 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (c T ,
\ .......................... "J 1 ■

If it be asked, “Howis it proved in gold?” our replyis that the author

desires tosaythat it isbecause, even intheabsence ofluminous Colourin
it, Fire-nessisinferredbythe negative mark, viz., the characteristic of
being the substratum or groundof Fluiditywhichisproducedbut not
destroyed bythe closest Conjunctionoffire. Andinthecase of Fire as
existingin thefrying-pan, etc., Fire-ness is inferredfromtheir possession
of hot Touch.
Fire is four-fold : that inwhichboth Colour andTouch are partly
developed, as thesolar, etc.; that inwhichColour ispartlydevelopedbut
Touchisundeveloped, asthelunar ; that inwhichbothColourand Touch
are altogether undeveloped, asthe ocular ; and that in which Colour is
undevelopedand Touchis developed, asof the summer season, and also
Fire present in Water, frying-pan, etc. He will prove theocular Fire
later on.—3.
Characteristic of Air.

^ II h i l« ii
w fa p l Sparsav&n, possessed of Touch. Vayuh, air.
4. Air possesses Touch.—-52.
XJpasknra.—He states the characteristic of Air which is the next in order:
Thecharacteristic of Air i3the possessionof the ‘class’ co-existent
withTouchwhichdoesnot co-exist withColour, or the possession of the
‘class’ co-existent with Touch whichis neither hot nor coldand which
does not co-exist with Taste, or the possessionof the1class’co-existent
withTouchwhichis neither hot norcoldand which does not co-exist with
Smell, or thepossessionof the ‘class’co-existent witha distinctive Attri­
bute which does not co-exist with any distinctiveAttribute other than
Touch.—4.
The above characteristics do not belong to Ether.
<T2TT3OT ?TT^F^f II ^ M l * U
Te, these. =
srre»rer Akdse, in Ether. sfNa, not Vidyante, are
observed or found.
5. These (characteristics) are not found in Ether.—53.
Upaskfira.—But why is not the possession of Colour, etc., the characteristic also of
Sky, Time, Space and Soul ? He replies :
Here theroot 1vid’in‘vidyante’means toperceive. The meaning
then is that because they are not perceived therefore theydonot exist,
inEther, andothersubstances, eitheruniformlyorbynature, or collectively,
or accidentally. If it be asked, “Howdoes the perception arisethat
Ether is as white as curd?” we reply that it is duetothe impression
 'Go%\
[S( J jV ________ KANADA SUTRA IT, 1-7._________
createdbythe perceptionof thewhitecoloursof the rays of the sun. If
it be asked, “Howthendoes theperceptionarise that Sky is blue? we
replythat it isduetothe impressioncreatedinthemindsof theobservers
whoarelookingattheradianceoftheemeraldpeaklyinglargelyextended
over the southsideof Suruerumountain. It has been opined that it is
duetothe impressioncreatedbytheeyewhenafter travellingtoalongdis­
tanceit turns backandreachesits ownpupil. Thisisnotasoundopinion,
becausethose whopossessjaundicedeyes alsohave suchimpressions.
From the perception, “Here nowthereare Colour, etc.,”it cannot
beargued that Colour and thethree other Attributes belong toSpaceand
Time also, becausethey have beenalreadystated tobethecharacteristics
of Earth, etc., only bytherelationofcombinationand not byanyother
relation also. “Here now there is absolute non-existenceof Colour”—
fromthisperceptionagainit followsthat SpaceandTimeare thesubstrata
or groundsor foundations of all things.—5.
Objection to Fluidity being a characteristic of Water, answered.

Sarpir-jjatu-niadhQchehistanam, of clarified butter, lac, and

wax. Agni-samyogat, through conjunction of Fire, Dravatvam,
Fluidity, srfijp Adviji, with Waters. OTHFSI Samanyam, similarity, Com­
monness.
6. The Fluidity of clarified butter, lac, and wax
through conjunction with Light, is similar to that of
Water.—54.
Upaak&ra.—If it be argued that it is not correct to say that Fluidity is the character­
istic of Water, because Fluidity is observed even in Barth ; so he replies :
The Fluidity which belongs to clarified butter, etc., results from
conjunctionof Firewhichis its occasion, andis not constitutional; where­
as constitutional Fluidityis the characteristic of Water. Therefore the
similarityof Earth toWater is in respect of mere Fluidity, andnot in
respect of constitutional Fluidity also. Hence the characteristic or the
definitionis not toowide. This isthe meaning.—6.
Above continued.

<iWMH.ll * I %I« »
o h Trapu-slsa-loha-rajata-suvarnanim, of tin, lead, iron,
silver, and gold. Aguisainyogat, through Conjunction of Fire.
Dravatvam, Fluidity, n f* : Advil?, with Waters, Samanyam,
similarity.
i?H I^ VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
•V:%>>&— Ly>y -------------------:----------------------------'SU,
7. The Fluidity of tin, lead, iron, silver, and gol
through conjunction with Fire, constitutes their similarity
to Water.—55.
Upaslcnro. But still because that condition,*, e., Fluidity, appears in tin, lead, iron,
and other modifications of Fire, therefore that condition itself is an instance that the de­
finition is too wide. To this objection he replies^
This is an indication; bell-metal, copper, brass, etc., arealsoim­
plied. The characteristic which is common to those whichhave been
mentioned and those which are implied, is that theyarethe foundation
of the Fluidity which is produced but is not destroyedbytheclosest
Conjunction of Fire. Thus the Fluidity of gold, etc., alsoisonlyocca­
sional, the occasion which is the Conjunctionof Fire, beingprovedby
the methodof agreement and difference. Moreover there isthis distinc­
tion; inthe last aphorismthe word‘agni ’denotes Light—tejas—possess­
ing anexcess or abundance ofheat, but'here it denotes fire.
If it be objected, “Gold, etc., also must be either modifications of
Earthordifferent Substances; because yellowness, weight, etc., establish
terreneness, andbecausethe non-annihilation of Fluidity whichconstitutes
their differencefromEarth, is perceived inthem, andbecausethis is cap­
ableofestablishingdifference ofSubstance.” We reply that gold is a
modification of Fire, and its fieriness is proved in the negative way,
namely, “That whichis not thus, is not thus, as Earth,”bythecharacter­
isticofits beingthefoundationof Fluidity whichis not annihilatedeven
at theclosest Conjunction of Fire.
Again there is no contradiction in the ultimate atoms ofWater,
because Fluidity should be qualified asbeingnon-eternal. Nor is there
incommensurability as the mark does not appear inthe lampandother
objects of the ascertained’class, because thefact whichis tobe provedis
that goldis not amodification of Earth. Nor is thereanyobstacle tothe
receptacle of weight becomingthe minor term here; thefoundationor
substratum will not be proved if somethingelseweretheminor term, as
the minor term must be the foundationof Fluidity. Nor is it hardto
ascribe ultra-finalityor absoluteness, because it is desired tobesaid that
it isthe foundationof temporary Fluidity which is not annihilatedeven
at theclosest Conjunction of Fire for threehours. If it beobjectedthat
the annihilation of Fluidity must be concludedfromthe destructionof
the foundation and the perception of moreandless, wereply that it is
not so, because the mark of inference is thepossessionofthe Fluidity
containingthe Genus of Fluidity which does not appear inthe counter­
opposite of the annihilationproducedbythat Conjunctionof Fire which
m W ) KANADA SUTRA II. 1-8. fc l
% ll—•--------------------— ------------------------^ 1 -
is not combinedwiththe totalityof non-existent Fluidity. Or thefounda­
tionof yellownessand weight, conjoined as it is withFluid Substance
whichexcludesall Colour different fromyellowColour, does not therefore
becomethefoundation of any Colour different fromyellowColour even at
the Conjunctionof Firefor three hours, like apieceof yellowclothplaced
inside Water whichisconjoinedwithFire. If it beobjected, “The Colour
of gold will then bevisiblein darkness as there will benothingtocloud
or overpower its Colour, becauseoverpoweringmeansthe non-apprehension
caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object,” wereply
that overpoweringdenotes themere relation with alikeobject which is
more powerful bythepower of the effect produced byit. Soit hasbeen
said, “Other Colour does not at all shine under the influenceof theasso­
ciationof theearth.” This is our view.—7.
Use of Inference.

braruft gretarecfe: ureiNiRifa

II R I %I q II ®
ftsrTUf! Visani, possessing horns. Kakudvfin, possessing a hump.
Prante-valadhiit, with a tail hairy at the extremity. qpareK ,
Sasnavan, possessing a dewlap. ?f?r, Iti, such. Gotve, in cow-ness,
of being a cow. %£, Dristam, observed, admitted. Lingatn, mark.
8. That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the
extremity, and a dewlap—such is the admitted mark of being
a cow.—56.
UpaskHra.—Having thus finished the section on the characteristic of the four Sub­
stances which possess Touch, the author, seeing that the characteristic of Air is not
proved by its foundation or with a view to avoid this, at the outset introduces the method
of proof by inference, and then first of all establishes the probative force or value of
inference itself, according to experience, and thereby begins the section of demonstration
of Air :
Theimport is that as horns, etc., are the marks, the pervasion, or
universal or invariable relation of which is well-known or recognised,
towards theproof ofcow-ness, so also the commonly-observedmarks of
the five super-sensuous Substances, Air, etc., assume the form of proof.
Here although the merepossessionofhorns is not the mark of cow-ness
since it isalsofound in the buffalo, etc. ; nor is the possessionof the
dew-lap, etc., the distinction or differentia since in that case the name
will becomesenseless; still with themwhocandiscern in the hornof the
cowdifference in characteristic in comparison with the horps of the
(K w S r i VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
—„yy
buffalo, theslieep, etc., all those distinctions truly assume the natureof
marks. And all those distinctions such as straightness, crookedness,
hardness, softness, shortness, length, etc., which are capable ofbeing
known by observers of superior skill, do really exist in horns also.
Thusinrespect of the bodyof a cowat adistancestandingbyitself, the
inference is altogether unobstructed that it is a cowbecause, like the
bodyof acowwhich has beenpreviouslyperceived, it possessespeculiar
horns. Similarly, the possession of a hump also is a mark of being
a cow. The possession of a tail hairy at the extremity is also a
truly independent mark of being a cow. ‘Prantevaladhih’ means
that in which hair are placed at the extremity, that is, a particular
tail. Fromtheuseof the aluk compound(i. e., that formof compound
words inwhichthe inflectionof the first word is not elided), the tail of
thecowonlyis denotedby the word1Antevaladhih.’ For the character­
isticof the tail hairy at the extremity, whichis found in the tails of
cows, does not belongtothetails of the horse, sheep, etc., as thesetails
arecoveredwith hair all over. In the tail of the buffalo, etc., there is
not so*much prolongation. From this difference in characteristic, the
possessionof atail hairy at the extremity is also a mark of being a
cow. The droppingof the inflection conveyingthe sense of possession
(i. e., the use of the w ordtail onlyinsteadof tail-bearing) shows that only
thebodyof the cow has been in view. Thus (theinference) “ft is a
cow”because, likethebodyof thecowwhichhasbeenpreviouslyperceived,
it possessesatail which is hairyat the extremity. The possession of a
dew-lap, again, is simplyawell-knownmarkof beingacow.—8.
Touch infers Air.

STTOT: II * I \ \ K II
Spar&ih, Touch. % Cha, and fpjfp Vayoh, of air.
9. And Touch, (is a mark) of Air.—57.
Upaskara.—Having thus pointed out, according to observation, the probative value
of inference by which all human affairs are carried on, he, intending to begin the section
of proof of Air, says :
‘Lifigam,’mark, is thecomplement of the aphorism. By the word
‘cha’Sound, upholding, and quiveringarebrought forward.
It cannot hesaid, “The Touch which is being perceived must be
of Earthitself of which the Colour is not yet developed,” because the
developedTouchof Earth cannot be separated from developed Colour.
Hence theTouchwhichisperceived, beingTouch, must residesomewhere,
likethe Touchof Earth, etc. Somefoundationof Touchbeingthusproved
(((W w ::- ' KANADA S&T8A I t 1-9. (fox
"'. -------------------- -—
J — JLJ
byinference, byanalogy, (Samrnyatodristam), the foundation of Touch
is not identical withthe triadof Earth, etc, because it doe3 not possess
Colour, nor isifidentical withthepentadofSky, etc., asitpossesses Touch.
Therefore bythe inference together with the exclusion of others a Sub­
stanceover andabovethe eight Substances is proved. In like manner
aparticular Soundalsois amark of Air. Thus in the absence of the
impact of SubstancespossessingColour, the series of Sounds (arising in
leaves, etc.) whichisheardamongst leaves, etc., must be occasionedby
the impact of substances possessing Touch and Impetus, like the series
of sounds producedinadrumbythepercussion of thedrumstick, because
it is aseries ofsounds which is in relation to a substance the parts of
whichare indivisible. Theabsenceof theimpactof Substances possessing
Colour, is, again, knownbythe non-perception ofwhat might beexpected
or the correlative. Andfromexhaustion, that SubstancepossessingTouch
andImpetus isverilyanaddition to the groupof the eight substances.
Similarly, aparticular upholding alsois amarkof Air. Thus the steadi­
ness or flotationofgrass, cotton, cloud, and air-ship inthesky, is due
tothe conjunction of some substance possessing Touch and Impetus,
since it istheflotation of substances whicharenot presided over bya
conscious being, likethe flotationof grass, wood, boat, etc., onastream;
whereas intheflotationof poison, etc., causedbythought directed towards
it, humanandother influence is without doubt present. So also in the
upholdingof thebird, the branch of atree, etc. Nor is the distinctive
mark not provedonaccount ofits being influenced by God, because by
theword‘conscious’all elseexcept God is meant. Similarly, quivering
toois amark of the existenceof Air. Thus this Action in grass, etc.,
without theimpact ofSubstances possessingColour, is due tothe impact
ofsomeSubstancepossessing TouchandImpetus, becauseit is anAction
whichis not producedby Weight and Conjunction of Soul exercising
Volition, like theActionof a cane-bush when struckby the wavesof a
river. Theword‘ weight ’ implies Conjunction of Soul attended with
adrktam ^invisible after-effects of past acts), Fluidity and Im pression;
hencethebeinganactionnot producedbythemis themark.
It cannot besaid, “Air is only an object of sense-perception and
that therefore thereis noneed of the investigation of its marksfor,
Air is not perceptible; only its supersensuousness is proved by the
inference: “Being a colourless external Substance, it is like Sky.” It
cannot bereplied “Its perceptibility is inferred inthis way that .being
theseat ofTouch Air isperceptiblelikethe water-pot;” for thepossession
of developedColour is here the condition, utp&dki. If it be objected,
[if g64)i;_____ VTA&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ^

u Inthe caseof Colour, etc., aswell as Soul, it is not pervasive of the

major term, since it pervades the major termwhenthelatter is determined
bythe beingtheexternal substance whichis the minor term containing
themiddle term, or is determinedbythemiddle term whichis the means
of inference. Nor does it governa body’s being anobject of visual per­
ception, becauseit is there that its presence and absenceareobservedas
arule. Onthe other hand, abody’sbeingan object of tactual perception
is governedby the mere possession of an adequate Touch.” Wereply
that boththe presenceand absenceof Colour governhere; for perceptibi­
lityonlybymeansof Touchprovedbybothpositive and negativemarks,
has not been observed without the perceptionof Colour. Moreover, if
Air were anobject of sense-perception, then it would govern also the
apprehension of general Attributes, e. g., Number, etc. If it be objected,
“ Perceptibility does belong to N umber in blowing by the mouth, etc.,
toMeasureor Extension, e. g., cubit, span, etc., and to Separateness as
well as toPriority and Posteriority of two Airs existing on both sides.
Ontheother hand, it is not therule according to youalsothat they are
perceptible bymeans of there beingindividual masses of Air, because
theyarenot observedin the cloth, etc., lying on theback,” We reply,
that it is the rule that they are perceived by means of there being in­
dividual masses of Air. Number, etc., are obtained in thecloth, etc.,
fixeduponthe back, if they lie straight; if theyare not obtained, it is
becauseof the defect that the latter do not lie straight. “Developed
Colour andTouchgovern the perceptibility ofexternal substances, only
whenthey1'operatejointly. Light, the yellow substance within the eye,
and theradiationor heat of the moonarenot perceptible because their
Touchisundeveloped. Hotnessasinsummer, heat andWaterySubstances
theparts of which have been dispersed (steam) are not perceptible, be­
cause Colour is undevelopedthere.” This is the viewof thecommentator
of Nyaya-Vartikas. “But light, etc., arereallyperceptiblealthoughTouch
is undeveloped. Therefore the Conjunction and Disjunctionof the bird
andthe branchof the tree are really perceptible inthesky under moon­
light.” Sosay those who know the traditions of the system. Nor can
it besaidthat thepossession of developed Touch (universally) excites to
the perceptibilityofuniversallyexternal Substances, for thenthe light of
the emerald would be non-perceptible. Nor is only the possession of
the developeddistinctive Attribute the governing condition, for thenSky
toowouldbecomeperceptible. Nor again is the possessionof thedeve­
loped distinctive Attribute co-existent with the ensuant or resulting
magnitude, such condition, for the bilious substance existing at thetip
( ( ( R a n An a s u t r a s t i , l- ii. / p |T
v( | f b v — 7 7 - 1— i— — — 7 ...........................— - y>L
VTqldiiihtongueis imperceptibleinspite of thedevelopment or manifestation
of bitterness. Thereforeonlythe possessionof developed or manifested
Colour governs the perceptibility of all Substances except Soul. And
this is not present inAir. Hence Air is not an object of sense-percep­
tion.—9.
Touch which infers Air, cannot be explained by visible objects.
5T ^ fSR T ^T§: II R I I ||
sf Na, not. ^
Cha, and. Dristauam, of the obrerved or visible or
seen. Spanish, touch. ? R hi, hence, A-drista-lmgalj, not-con-
taining-the-mark-of-the-visible. V&vuh, air.
10. And it is not the Touch of the visible (Substan­
ces) ; hence the mark (of the inference) of Air is not the
mark of the visible (Substances).—58.
Vpasknra.—It may bo objected, “ Here there is no mark which can be known by sense-
perception. For here the pervasion or universal relation is not obtained by sense per­
ception like that of fire and smoke. Moreover this will be also the Touch of one or other
only of Earth, etc.” Therefore he says :
The Touchwhich is made the subject of enquirydoes not belongto
visible Substances, viz., Earth, Water, and Fire, becauseit is not accom­
panied by Colour. Therefore the inference is that this Touch resides
somewhere. Henceinvirtue of themiddle-term,i. e., the markofinference,
beingcontainedsomewhere, weget Air although themarkis not the mark
of the visible Substances, i. e., although the markis observedinanalogous
Substances. This is the meaning. Although onlythe quartet of observed
Touch, etc., are the mark, yet because their relation with Air is not
apprehended, tbeiefore it is said that the markof Air is not the mark of
the visible Substances. For it is not possible to prove Air after first
proposingthat this whichpossesses this or that propertyis Air. Therefore
the impoit is that the proof of Air is byinference fromanalogy together
withtheexclusionof (possible) others (i . e., byhypothesis).—10.
A ir is a Substance.
3 oqjg( I) 3 I 3 | 3.3 I)
A-dravya-vattvena, by not containing Substance (as its support),
jfsq Dravyam, Substance.
11. Air is a Substance, because it does not contain or
reside in Substance.—59.
Upaskara.—Having proved Air as a whole made up of parts, which is the foundation
ofTouch of
capable being perceived, he says, with a view to prove Air
ultimate atoms:
characterisedas
 i n
(f(; M jy VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. [V T

‘Dravyavat’means that which has Substance as its support. ‘Adra-

vvavat,’i. e., not ‘dravyavat,’ means not resident in or supported by
Substance. Thus like Sky, Air characterisedas ultimate atomisaSubs­
tance, because the other Predicables reside in substances, becauseit has
been stated that the being resident, i. e., dependence, applies elsewhere
than ineternal Substances, and becausethe originationof alarge whole
made up of parts is capableof being demonstrated bythe evolution of
dyads, etc., from the formation ofa dyadby two ultimate atoms, andso
on.—11.
A ir is a Substance.—continued.
g rp v u n ll * I I it
Kidya-vaitvat, because of possession of Action. Guna-
vattvai, because ot pusses^ioi of Attribuie. Cba, and.
12. Air is a Substance, also because it possesses Actio
and Attribute.—60.
Upaskora. —Bringing forward two (more) marks or grounds of establishing the Subs-
tance-ness of the ultimate atoms of Air, he says :
‘The ultimateatomof Air isaSubstance’—this isthe complement
ofthe aphorism. Althoughthere is this mutual dependenceor correlation
that Substance-ness beingproved, the possessionof Actionand the posses­
sionof Attribute arealsoprovedandintheir proof theproof ofSubstance-
ness lies, yet the possessionof Actionisprovedbythisthat the ultimate
atomwhichis theconstituent element of thecompositewholewhichis the
foundationof the Touch whichis being perceived, cannot beestablished
otherwise than by the Conjunction of the non-combinative cause; and
the possessionof Attribute isprovedbythe rale that the Touch, Colour,
etc of the composite wholeare precededbylike Attributes inits cause;
and bythese two Substance-nessalsoisproved; sothat here there is no
fault namelyrepetitionorviciouscircle. OfthesethepossessionofAction
extends toaportionof the objects of the same ascertained class, while
thepossessionofAttribute pervades all theobjectsof thesameascertained
class The word‘cha’brings forward the characteristic of being the
combinative cause, whichprovesSubstance-ness.
Ifit beobjected, “There isnoproof (of the existence' ofthe ultimate
atoms themselves. Thenthe Substance-ness ofwhichis beingproved?,”
we reply that bythe maximof the division, etc., of the action of dense
effects abody whichis beingdividedandsub-dividedbecoming smaller,
smallest etc., that than whichnosmaller unit can beobtained, the same
is the ultimate atom. If the relationofpart andwhole were unlimited,
If W w , K A y AD A S U T H A S II, 1-13. fc l
r. \ M U 4 _______ ___________ !_____________S i j
then it would folllowthat the mountain Sumeru andamustardseed, etc.,
will have the same Measureor Mass, because in that case they would
resemble one another inpossessing infinite parts, and because without
the distinctionof the number ofcauses(t.e., constituent elements’), measure
and magnitude, mass and volume, donot rule the differenceof Measure.
Ttcannot besaidthat this relationof part and wholecontinuesonlyupto
the limit of destruction; for, that which remains at the end havingno
parts, its destruction is not possible; and il it contains parts, then non­
finality will be the result, and its defect has been already pointed out.
If it is said, “ J’ruti u e., a minute part is the limit, because it is visible
and there is no reason for the suppositionof sorn thing invisible,” we
rejoin that as it is avisible Substance it must possess extensionor large­
nessand manySubstances.
Hence as in the case of Earth, etc., so alsoin the caseof Air, the
part of the part of acombination of three atoms, is reallythe ultimate
atom. Thus the ultimateatomof Air is proved.—12.
Air is eternal.

II * I \ I \ \ II
Adiavyatvena, by not residing in or combining wiih other Sub­
stances. Nityatvam, eternahtv. llktam, said

13. The eternality (of Air) is evident from its no

combining with other Substances.—61. Jl ' '' .' A'.IlAv
Upaskdra. - I t may be said that because Air possesses Action and Attribute, therefore,
like the water-pot, etc., it should be inferred to be non-eternal. Hence he says :
Of Air characterisedas ultimateatom this is thecomplement of
the aphorism ASubstance is destroyed bythe destruction of the one or
the other of its combinative and non-combinativecauses. But the ulti­
mate atomcontainingnoparts, both of these causes do not belong to it.
Therefore there being nothingtodestroyit, it is not liabletodestruction.
Where thepossessionof Action and Attribute is the cause of non-eter-
nality, there the possession of parts is the condition, upadhi, and this
condition pervades the major termwhich is determined by the Substance-
ness of the minor term; whereas thecondition which is pervasiveof the
major termassuch, is thecharacteristic of being the counter-opposite of
prior non-existence.—13.
Vinpiti. Som eread the first wordof theaphorismas ‘adravyadravy-
atvena’ (instead of ‘adravyatvena (meaning “byits beingaSubstance
whichdoes pot containanyother Substance),”
(i ( • VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. VfiT
-----------------------------------------------:------------------------------------------ -----------------------------
A ir is manifold.

M n i )« «
Wr%: Vavoh, of Air. VayusariimOrchchhanarn, concurrence or
collision with Air. SfPTTrfTvTJf Nanatva-lingam, mark of diversity or plurality.
14. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its
plurality.—62.
Upas'luira.—In order to prove, in a different manner also, the plurality of Air which has
been already proved in the proof of its origination by the cburse of dyads, etc., he says :
‘V&yrisaihmurclichanam’meansthecollision, i. e., amodeofconjunc­
tion, of two or more Airs. It is theco-incidence, thefallingintogether,
of twoAirsof equal Impetus, flowinginopposite directionsandproducing
contrary Actions. And it is inferred from the flyingupwards ofgrass,
cotton, etc., becausetheflowingupwards and alsothe falling in together
of two Airs, are beyond the reachof the senses, whereas theperceptible
Actioncharacterisedasflyingupwardsof grass, etc., whichareperceptible,
is inferred to beproducedeither bythe impact or thevibration(i. e., the
molar or the molecular movement) of Substances possessing Touch and
Impetus. Thus theflowingupwards of Air the nature ofwhichis to flow
obliquely, not beingcapableofproof or possiblewithout mutual collision,
proves the mutual collision, the same being observedinthe caseof the
water and the wave of the river. Their going upwards also is to he
inferred by the going upwards of grass, etc. For thegoingupwards of
grass, etc., is not possible without either the collision or the internal
vibrationof Substances possessing TouchandImpetus.—14.
No visible mark of Air.

= n * ! / - u V + , M f % f * nrua iu i ? i n n
Vayu-sannikarse, in contact or association with Air.
PratyaksabhSvat, from the absence of perception. Dristam, visible.
Lingam, mails, ft Na, not. Vidyate, exists.
15. There being no perception of the association (i. e.,
universal relation) with Air, there is no visible mark (of the
existence of Air).—63.
Vpaskara.—It has been stated that the mark of Air is not like the mark of the visible
Substances. But how is it so ? Hence he says :
There the mark is said to he visible where theuniversal relation
is graspedbyperception, assmoke is of fire. But in the case of associa­
tion with Air, there is no perception ofthe appearanceof the mark in
VC&iJ/ K A N AD A SUTRAS I I, 1-16._____
accompaniment with Air. For Air itself not being an object of sense-
perception, nobody canLavethe perception, “Things which give Touch,
quivering, etc., are Air.” Therefore the meaning is that nosuchmark
exists the pervasionof which canbegraspedbyperception. 15.
A ir is inferred not as such but as a Substance in general.

w r i % iH u
?TT’TPT?n,£Sra; S&manvaio-dristat, from the method of inference known as
general inference or inference by analogy. =5f Cha, and. Avisesah,
not in particular. General
16. And, by inference by analogy. Air is not proved
as a particular substance, but as Substance only.—64.
Upaskara.—How then can there be any inforenee at all of Air ? Hence to strengthen
what has been already stated, he says :
Inferenceis three-fold: fromcause toeffect, fromeffect tocause, and
from the commonly observed tothe unobserved, or fromanalogy. Thus
this Touchwhich isbeingfelt, must reside somewhere, because it is a
Touch or because it is an Attribute. From this analogy or common
observation or experience, accompanied bytheexclusion of other possibi­
lities, its residence inaSubstanceinaddition to the eight Substances, is
proved. This is the meaning.
It cannot be said that the inference from effect to causeis then
gone. For, after the exclusion of other possibilities, where analogy
prevails, there proceedinguponthe provedqualificationof the minor term
that it does not reside in theeight Substances, the propositionthat this
Touchwhichdoes not reside in the eight, Substances must reside some­
where, does not result except ontheassumption of its beingresident ina
Substance inaddition to the eight Substances. Therefore the proposed
object beingnot explainedotherwise, it is proved byinference fromcause
toeffect alone. But whereanalogyarisesfromthe appearanceof exclusion
at the verybeginning, there the proposed object results at last and the
mode of inference is found tobeinferencefromeffect tocause. It is not
soundtoholdthat inference fromeffect tocause only shows the manner,
for in thecaseof beingaccompanied bythe exclusionofother possibilities,
inferencefromcausetoeffect itself comes toshow the manner. The rule
also that inference merely shows the manner which determines the
pervasiveness, is not valid, for the appearance of a different manner is
possible fromthe associationof particular materials.—16.
[t( ff^l) VAT&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY , \£JJ
The name A ir is derived from Scripture.
rTWr^MlMi^r^ || ^ I % I %^3 II
Fasmat, therefore. Agamikam, proved by revelation, t . e .,
the Veda.
17. Therefore the name, Air, is proved by th
Veda.—65.
Upaskara.—But if it is intended to be said that according to “ not as a particular
Substance” in the last aphorism, there is no inference in the form, “ This is Air,” but that
Air is inferred by way of the mark being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight
Substances, then, what is the evidence of that Substance being called by the name of Air?
So he sa y s:
Becausethereis noinference inthe particular form, therefore the
name Air isprovedbyagama, i. e., theVeda. Thisisthemeaning. “Air
is the moving deity,” “One shouldoffer a white goat to Air,” “And
this Air is all colour, thecarrier of all smells, andpure,”—fromtheseand
other recommendations which have acquired the force of regulations,
the name, Air, is obtained. As the name, heaven, is obtained from
the recommendation “That which is not pierced with pain nor is
clouded afterwards;” the name, barley, from the recommendation,
“The leaves of all crop-plants fall off in spring. But the barley
plants possessingears ofcorn thrive in it as if with joy the name,
cane “fromthe recommendation’ “caneis born inwater and the name,
bear. “fromtherecommendation”“cowsrunafterthe bear.” Otherwise in
the caseof suchinstructions as “Hewhodesires heaven should perform
sacrifice,”etc., inthenon-appearance of the particular happiness for the
timebeing, mendesiringheaven will not be inclinedtowards theperform­
anceofsacrifice, etc. Nor will there beanyarrest of activity according
tothe usageof theMlechchas, i.e. the impure, inrespect of “Hisbecomes a
mess of barley,” “Hekindles thecreative fireonacane mat,” “Shoeof
bear-skin,” etc., for the AHechchbas apply the words bailey, bear, and
cane, to yellow paddy, crow, and black-berry (or jackal/ respectively.
Thus there will be room for doubt without those recommendations.
Therefore their respective meanings are known from the Veda only.
This is the import. Onlythe nameisproved bythe Veda; theproof of
the Substance, however, is really byanalogy—17.
Existence of God.
u?tFtn4 erwfeftrsTfti il * M M e n
Sariijna-karmma, name and iff. ct. 5 Tu, on the other hand. But.
’Sretfiftreraf Asmad-vi&stanam, beings distinguished from, other than, or s«
perior to ourselves, fssjjt Lingarn, mark.
 KANADA SUTRAS II, 1-19. fl\T
v-W t------------------------------------- — —
Xv^ ^ / 18. But name and effect are the mark (of the ex­
istence) of beings distinguished from ourselves.—66.
Upaslmra.—Having thus finished the section on Air, he establishes that the Veda is
the revelation by the All-knower, in order to answer the objection, “ Is then the name,
Air, also like the names, dlttha and dabittha (i. e., the gibberish or abracadabra), uttered
by a mad man and with a view to open the section on Is vara or God, says :
The word4tu’ has the sense of differentiating from such other
marks as Touch, etc. ‘SamjrV’i. e., name, 4karnima’i. e., effect, e. g.,
Eartli, etc.—bothof themare the mark of the existence also of beings dis­
tinguished fromourselves, namely, Itfvaraand great sages.—18.
Existence of Ood— continued.
HeMUilTp'-irfl UstrqtWW: II st i r i n II
Pratyaksa-pravi ittvat, because they follow from perception.
Samjna-karinmanah, ofname andtffcct.
19. Because name and effect follow from perception.—
67.
Upaskara.—He explains how it is so :
Here alsothe singular formor the resolution into one, of ‘name’
and 4effect,’ from the copulative compound meaning collection, is
intended toindicate the identity of the author of the name and the
authoi of the universe. Thus he only is competent togive th*enames
‘heaven,’'apurva' (i.e., that which was not before, that istosay, udri$tam),
etc., with whom4heaven’,4apurva ’,etc., areobjects of sense-perception,
as in the giving the names, 4Chaitra,’ 4Maitra,’ etc., tothebodies of
| Chaitra, Maitra, etc.,’which are perceptible, by their father and others.
Similarly, the application of the names, 4pot,’4cloth,’etc., is onlyunder
the direction ofIrfvara. Theword whichhas been directed or indicated
by ItSvara inaparticular place, thesame is appropriate there; e. g., 4all
thoseherbs whichhave beentouched bytheedge of themongoose’s tooth,
counteract thevenom of the snake.’ Such directionis the mark, i. e., the
means of inference, of beings distinguished from ourselves. And the
name, 4Maitra’, etc., whichthe father gives tothe son, that alsoisgurely
directed by Wvara by suchrules as 44Thefather should give aname (to
theson; onthetwelfth day. ”
Thus it isproved that namingis amarkof the existence of Wvara.
Inlike manner action, i. e., effect, alsois a mark of the existenceof
Wvara, for, thus, Earth, etc., must have a creator because they are
[ effects likeapot, etc.
Here Earth, etc., donot mean a product producible by the body,
i nor aproduct produciblebythe volition ofanother product, nor aproduct1
1
 /C?" ' Cc*%\
VATSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ( qt
.\b'S^■*: -- I Ik._#
which has becomethe subject-matter of dispute as towhether it has been
produced byanagent or not, nor aproduct the productionof whichby an
agent has been thesubject of doubt, becauseEarth, etc., alsoareproducible
bythe volition ofanother product bymeansofadrista (i e., invisible after­
effects of voluntary acts , and because disputeanddoubt, beingtoowide,
donot determine the minor term. Moreover if by the expression thit
theyhaveacreator, it is meant that they are the products of an active
principle, then the production inquestionmaybe explained by reference
toourselves, etc., for the causalityof ourselves alsois productive of Earth,
etc., by meansof adrista (theinvisible after-effectsofpast acts). It isthe
samealsoif theproduct beproducible by an active principle operating
upon given materials, for the acts of ourselves, etc., alsoarerelative to
somegiven material. Then if the beingan effect, on the other hand,
means the being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence (or potential
existence1,then it will include annihilation also. But notwithstanding
all this, earthmust haveacreator becauseit is aneffect. Here thehaving
acreator meansthebeing theproduct ofanactiveprinciple independently
of adrista, and thebeingan effect means the being the counter-opposite
ofexistence determined by prior non-existence. In the case of sprouts,
etc., there is nofault of doubtfulness or multifariousness, for these faults
arisewhere there is doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the
middle term when the non-existence of the major termhas tobeascer­
tained;for otherwiseall inference will have tobeabandoned. Norshould
it besaidthat this is the fault beyondtheminor term, for it will entail
the command of the king; for it is not the gloryof afault that it does
not attack theminor term. Thereforeat thestage of sprouting, the proof
of Theexistenceof) the major term (in the minor term) by the mark
or middle term the universal relationofwhich is well ascertained, being
unobstructed, where is the doubtfulness or multifariousness? And a
fo rtio ri at the stage of non-sprouting, these faults verily do not exist.
Thus inbrief.—19.
* Marks o f Ether, according to'Sa filthy a philosophy.

fassRiraf fawq; n * n 1 11
f?pstFW3J Niskramanam, egress. Pravesanam, ingress. 5 ^ Iti, such.
Akasasya, of Sky. faj? Lihgam, mark.
20. Egress and Ingress—such is the mark (of t
existence) of Ether.—68.
Upaskara.—Having thus finished the section on Isvara, by the last two aphorisms,
and desiring to begin the section on Ether, he says :
M ft m KAN ADA SUTRAS II, 1-22. «QT
---- ~ ■---------- ------------ ----- — 3 D L j ?;
Theword‘iti ’signifies manner andbringsforwardActions, namely,
Throwingupwards, etc., also. Egress andIngress are the movement of
Substances possessingTouch. That is the markof theexistence of Ether,
whichisnot aneffect. This is theviewof theSafikhyaphilosophers—20.
The above are no marks.

trcfliW &Ejia w id . prefer: u 3 i 3 • 3 3 u

Tat, that, i. e., movement or egress and ingress. ^srfsrjf Alingam, no
mark. mcKgsqyqrq; Eka, dravyatvat, having but one Substance, SR’ iftp Karmmanah,
of an action.
21. That is no mark, as an Action has but one Subs­
tance (as its combinative cause)—69.
Vpaskcira.—To discredit this view, he says :
Actionssuchasegress, ingress, etc., donot at all infer Etherastheir
combinative cause, because Action 1has but one Substance, ’inother
words, hasonlyonecorporal Substanceas its combinative cause. Action
also, it has been already stated, does not simultaneouslyappear in more
thanoneplace, nor does it appear innon-corpoi-al Substances.—21.
Above continued.

n 3 i 3 i 3 3 it
KSranantaranu klriptivaidliarmyat, on account of
difference from the characteristic or sign of another cause. ^ Cha, and.
22. And also because they differ in property from the
characteristic of another (i.e., the non-combinative) cause.—
70.
Upasknra—Lest it might be said that egress, ingress, etc., will infer Ether as their
non-combinative cause, so he says :
‘Anuklripti ’meanscharacteristicor sign, bytheetymology‘that by
whichathingismadeknqpn.’ Themeaningis: onaccount of difference
fromthat whichis thecharacteristicof another cause, i. e.., the non-combi­
nativecause.
Substance does not surely at all become a non-combinative cause.
Nownon-combinative causality arises by proximity in the sameobject
with the cause, or by proximity in the same object with the effect.
The first is illustrated in the case of the colours of the yarns
towards the colour of thecloth. Andthis non-combinative causalityis
called‘great,’as it produces a larger effect. The secondisas that of the
conjunctionof Soul andMindtowards knowledge, or cognition, etc. And
10
[((fl Tfl) VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (gj
this non-combinativecausalityis called ‘small,’as it produces a smaller
effect. But Etheris neither thecombinativecausenor, again, the non-com-
binative causeof egress, ingress, and other Actions. HenceActionis not
amarkof the existenceof Ether.—22.
V ivfiti .—Hesays that Action doesnot infer Ether even as its non-
coinbinativecause.
Onthe maximthat a verbal affix signifies an object, ‘anuklripti ’
(agreement) means ‘anuklripta,’ i. e., that whichis agreedtobytheoppo­
site disputants ; and such adifferent cause is the non-combinativecause,
viz., A ttributeand Action. Therefore the meaningis that egress, etc., do
not warrant the inferenceof Ether as their non-combinativecause, because
differencefromAttribute andAction (which arenon-combinative causes),
in the formof Substance-ness, exists inEther.
The above are no marks— continued.

i u m i n n
^rwhUrf Samyogat, on account of Conjunction. 3r*TIT Abhavali, non-pioduc-
tion. gRWHEp Kat mmanah- of Action.
23. Action is not produced on account of Conjunc­
tion.—71.
Upasknra.—It may be said, “ LetEther bo the occasional cause of Action, for the
movements of birds and arrows, etc., are seen in Ether.” So he says :
The non-production of Action is duetotheobstructionof Impetus,
Gravity, etc., whicharethe causes of Action,-byConjunctionwithcorporal
substances, and is not duetothe non-existenceof Ether whichisall-per­
vasive. Therefore the meaningis that thepresenceof or agreement with
Skywhichshould bereallyexplained otherwise, does not prove that Ether
is the occassional causeof Action.—23.
Inference of Ether by Sound.

fS: II R I \ I I
Karana-guna-pOt vvakah, preceded by the Attributes of the
cause. gRpafcjfiT Karyya-gunab, Attribute of the effect, gs: Dristah, is seen or
observed.
24. The Attribute of the effect is seen to be preceded
by the Attribute of the cause.—72.
Upask&ra.—Having thus discredited the Sdhkhya view, and going to prove Sound as
the mark of Sky, he prepares the ground for inference by exhaustion, by saying :
The particular Attributes such as colour, etc., which exist in the
effect characterisedas Earth, etc., arefoundtobe precededby like Attri­
butes in their causes. Sound also is a particular or distinctive
(( ( ft 'll'; -----------------------
ZANADA SUTRAS II, 1 -26.
------------------ UST
^Lf
Attrisbute, for inspiteof its beinga ‘class,’it is, likecolour, etc., appre­
hended byonlyoneof the external senses. Thus the meaningisthat such
effect is not observedin which sound precededbyalike Attributein the
cause thereof mayappear.—24.
Sound not an Attribute of tangible things.

cfclr'rUPTfgW
NlvrK&ryyantarflpradurbhav&t, becauseof thenon-appearance
ofanother or a different effect. Cha, and. ^abdah, sound. tq^W rU1!,
Spanfovatam,of things possessingTouch, tsnpr, Agunah, not anattribute.
25. Sound is not an Attribute of things possessing
Touch, because of the non-appearance of (similar) other
effects.—73.
A

Upaskfira. It might be said that Sound is observed in a lute, flute, tabour, conch-
shell, drum, etc., which are effects and that consequently it is preceded by a like Attribute
in their causes. So he says :
It would have beenso, if, as whenColour, Taste, etc., areobserved
inyarns, potsherd, etc., other Colour, Taste, etc., homogeneous withthe
former, are also observed in a cloth, pot, etc., so the congener of the
sound whichis observed in theconstituent parts of alute, flute, tabour,
etc., were alsoobserved in the wholes made upofthose parts, i. e., lute,
flute, tabour, etc. But this isnot thecase, for, infact, it is seen that alute,
etc., are originated by constituent parts whicharedestituteof all Sound,
wheieas it is not seen that acloth, apot, etc., have their origininyarns,
potsherds, etc., which aredestitute of Colour. Moreover if Soundwerea
paiticular Attribute of tangible things, then the relation of high and
higher and lowandlower tones, etc.,, would not beobservedin it. For
Colour, etc., which appear inasinglecomposite whole arenot observedto
be varying in degree. ThereforeSound is not a distinctive Attributeof
tangible things.—25.
Nor of Sotd, nor of Mind.
^
qTTParatra, elsewhere, with other objects, Samavi aiyrflt,i sbiecau
hu
se
ofcombination. Pratyaksatvflt, because it is an object of sense-
perception ^ Cha, and; also. ffNa, not. STrufipj: Atma-gunah, anAttribute
ofSoul. HNa, not. Mano-gunah, anAttributeofMind.
26. Because it combines with other objects, and be­
cause it is an object of sense-perception, therefore sound is
neither an Attribute of Soul nor an Attribute of Mind.-—74.
Upaskara. But, it might be said, Sound will be either an Attribute of Soul or an Attri­
bute of Mind. So he says :
((( VAI&ESIK A PHILOSOPHY. VfiT
---------------- --—*". -- -—'i,'lM
' '■
•;— *——i. J■
If soundwere anAttribute of Soul, then there wouldbesuchstates
of consciousnessas“I amfiled(withAir),” “I amsounded,” “I giveout
Sound,” etc., as there are such states as “I am hppay,” “I try,” “I
know,” “I desire,” etc. But it is not the case; on thecontrary, the
experience of all men is that a conch-shell is filledwithAir, alute is
played upon, etc. Moreover, Sound is not anAttributeof Soul, because,
like colour, etc., it is apprehendedby theexternal sense. Alsoif Sound
were a particular Attribute proper to Soul, then it wouldbe, likepain,
etc., perceived by a deaf manalso. Therefore it hasbeenrightlysaid,
“Becauseit combines withother objects.” Hestates thereasonof its not
being an Attribute of Mind, bysaying“Because it isanobject ofsense-
perception.” Thefact that thewordsatman andmanas havenot beencom­
pounded, as theycouldhave been, in theform“na atmainanasor gunah,”
indicates that, bythe logicor lawof similars, the verysamereason, “Be­
causeit is anobject of sense-perception,” excludes the idea that Sound
might be anAttribute of Spaceorof Timeeven.—26.
Therefore of Ether.

u^ i ? i n
Pari^esat, from exhaustion, Liiigam, mark, uto to AkasSas-
ya, of Ether.
27. By the method of exhaustion (Sound) is the mar
of Ether.—75.
UpaaMra.—He states why this method of exhaustion has been applied :
‘Sound’isthecomplement of the aphorism. HeretooaSubstance,
over andabovetheeight Substances, is provedbyanalogous inference, in
this way that, being an Attribute, Sound, likeColour, etc., must reside
somewhere. Andit isanAttribute, because, like Colour, etc., it belongsto
a ' class’ capable of being apprehended by only one external sense.
Being non-eternal, it resembles knowledge, etc., both of whicharecom­
binedwith ‘Universal Substances.’ Andits non-eternalitywill be shown
later on. The Substance, proved byexhaustion, is eternal, as thereisno
reasonfor the suppositionof constituent partsinit, andis also universal,
becauseSoundisobservedinall places.—27.
Ether is a Substance, and is eternal.

» R I \ I ^c; II
Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eiernality. 3T3 *rr
Vayuna, by Air. Vyakhyate, explained.
 n__
Ra n A d a s u t r a s i t , 1 -30. VkJ^
----------------------------------------------------------------------- _____---------------------------------------

28. The Substance-ness ancl eternality of Ether have

been explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness
and eternality of) Air.—76.
Upaaknra.—To prove, by analogy or over-extension, the Substance-ness and eternality
of Sky of which the mark is Sound, he says :
As Air iseternal because it does not possess anyother Substanceas
its combinativecause, soalsois Ether. As Air isa Substance because it
possesses Attributes, soalsois Ether. This is themeaning.—28.
Ether is one.

II * I % I U II
xfvt Tattvam, that-ness. One-ness. Unity. Bhavena, by existence.
39. The unity (of Ether is explained) by (the explana­
tion of the unity of) Existence.—77.
Upaskfira.—Is there then one Ether or are there many Ether ? To this he replies :
The agreement of the wordsinthe aphorismis with‘vyakhyatam’
(orexplained), i.e., thesameword, asinthe last aphorism,withtheinflection
changed. The meaningis that as ‘Bhavah,’i.e., Existence, is one, soalso
Ether isonlyoneandnot many.—29.
Above continued.

ii *i i ii
I^abdalihgavi^esat, because there is no difference Sound in
which is the mark. rwqiW
JFPTTSfTFl
Visesalingdbhavat, because there exists no
distinguishing mark. Cha, and.
30. (Ether is one), because there is no difference in
Sound which is its mark, and because there exists no other
distinguishing mark.—78.
Upaskara.—It may bo asked, “ The unity of Existence is proved by the virtue of
assimilative experience. How will unity be proved in Ether, by comparison with that ? ”
So he say s:
Thesenseisthat theunityofEther isproved. Etherbeingubiquitous
or universal, all Sounds are explained by their havingthat oneand the
samefoundationor seat. Thereforeto suppose a different basis will be
shewing an exuberance of imagination. Besides the very same Sound
must bethemarkofthedifferent Ether whichistobe supposed, and that,
i. e.t Sound, is undifferentiated; nor is there any other mark which can
prove the differentiaor thedifferenceor division. It will bestated after­
wards that although the mark, e. g., knowledge, etc., of Soulsisreally
(*(§8)?: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (fiT
.

hon-differentiated, still the plurality of Souls is proved by other marks,

. . . . . ....

accordingto‘differenceofconditions’or circumstances.—30.
V ivriti .—Plurality of Souls is proved by the differences of the
products of the Soul, viz., pleasure andpain, seeingthat at oneandthe
same time aneffect inthe formof pleasure is producedinone Soul, while
inanother Soul aneffect intheformof painis produced. But inthecase
of Ether there isnodiffereneiation ofSoundwhichisits mark, whereby a
multiplicity of Ether might beestablished. Nor isthere anyother mark
whichcanestablishapluralityof Ether. Sothat onaccountof theabsence
of proof, andonaccount of simplicity, Ether is oneand not many.
Individuality of Ether.

II ^ I * I ** It
Tad-anu-bidhtmat, because it follows or accompanies that, e.
unity, Eka-prithaktvatn, separateness of one or individuality, "q
Clia, and. Iti, finished.
31. And individuality also belongs to Ether, since in­
dividuality follows unity.—79.
Upaslcura.—It may bo said, “ Let unity by all means belong to Ether. Let it also have
extreme largeness, as it is universal. Let Conjunction and Disjunction also belong to it
as it is the non-eombinative cause of Sound. But how can individuality belong to it ? " So
he says:
Individuality ia proved by this that individuality regularly gees
together withunity. ‘Iti ’indicates theendof thechapter.
The subject-matter of the chapter is the definition or statement
of thecharacteristics of Substances possessing particular Attributes and
which are not the objects ofmental perceptionor perception bytheinter­
nal organ. Hence thecharacteristics ofEarth, Water, Fire, Air, andEther,
and, in passing, of the divine Soul also, are stated in this chapter.
Thus Earthpossessesfourteen Attributes, and these Attributes areColour,
Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Measure, Separateness, Conjunction, Dis­
junction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity, andImpression. Exactly
thesamenumber of Attributes, with theexceptionof Smell and addition
ofViscidity, belongtoWater. ThesesameAttributes, withtheexception
of Taste, Smell, Viscidity, and Gravity, belong to Fire, and with the
exceptionof Smell, Taste, Colour, Gravity, A7iscidity, andFluidity, belong
to Air. With the addition of Sound, the fiveAttributes beginningwith
Number, belongtoEther. OnlythefiveAttributes beginningwithNumber
belongtoSpaceand Time. The fiveAttributes beginning with Number,
[{( J| }l) 1 KANADA SUTRAS II, 2-1. • (gjj
'—
together with Priority, Posteriority, and Impetus, belongtoMind. The
five Attributes beginning with Number, and Cognition, Desire, and
VolitionbelongtoLfvara.—31.
Hereends the first chapter of thesecond book inthe Comment­
arygiven by Sankara to the Vaijfesika aphorisms of Kanada of great
powers.
Vivviti. The subject-matter of this chapter is the definition of
Substances possessingparticular Attributes which do not appear in
which possesses ‘bhavana,’i. e., impressionor meditative understanding.
that
SuchSubstances are the fiveelements andGod.

B ook S eco n d — C h apter S eco n d .

Smell may be essential*or accidental.

htct ^
u ?. i ^ i \ n
Puspa-vastrayoh, ofafloweranda cloth, *jf?T Sati, existing.
Sannikarse, contact. JjurrsTOSTTfW: GunantaiApradurbhavah, non-
appearancefromanother Attribute. Vastre, in the cloth.
Gandhabhava-lingam, markofthenon-existence of Smell.
1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived
in the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from
the Attribute (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the
mark of the non-existence of smell in the cloth.—80.
Upaskara. Now the author desiros to examine tho characteristics, such as Smell, etc.
of the “ elements ” (bhdta). Therefore, by way of establishing that Smell, etc., may be
essential or natural as well as accidental or conditional, he says :

so
Where Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are produced from the
correspondingAttributesinthe cause, there they become essential
acquire the nature of being characteristic marks, and not
and
otherwise.
For, the fragrancewhichisperceived inthebreeze, or the cold which is
perceivedinatablet of stone, or the warmth whichis perceivedinwater
a
doesnot become a characteristic. Therefore he says. ‘Of flower
cloth.’ Forthefragranceofthegoldenketaki (Pandanus Odoratissimus),
a and
whichis perceivedinthecloth when the cloth has been brought into
contact with the golden ketaki flower, does not belong to the cloth
becauseit is not produced according to the (corresponding)
ofthecause{i. e., yarns). What, then? It is accidental or
Attritiobnalute,
condi
 1xJ101fe'x
fiv ^ n^\ ■ p_
fj( j|o)j] FAlfeZKA PHILOSOPHY.
‘ • *•
because due totheproximityof the goldenketalti; for the non-existence
of Snjell intheketalti is not the markof thenon-existenceofSmell inthe
cloth. What is themark? Soit has been said, “Non-appearance from
another Attribute,” i. e., non-production from the Attribute of the
cause. For, if theSmell, whichis perceived in the cloth, were essential
toit, then it wouldbeperceived in theclothalso before the constituent
parts, i. e., the yarns of the cloth, are brought into contact with the
ketaki ; but it isnot so. This is them eaning. ThustheSmell in question
isnot inherent inthecloth, because, like coldand hot Touch, etc., it isa
particular Attribute which is not produced by the Attribute of the
constituent parts.—1.
V ivriti. —It has been already stated that the possession of Smell,
etc., arethe marks of Earth, etc. But this wouldnot be proper. For
Smell beingperceived of Air, etc., combined with fragrant parts, the
markbecomes toowide. For this reason heshows that the perception
ofSmell, etc., in Air, etc., is accidental.
Smell is essential in Earth.
II * I * I ||
Vyavasthitafi, established. Prithivyam, in Earth.
ir«p Gandhafc, Smell.
2. Smell is established in Earth.—81.
UpaskAra.—He says that essential Smell is the mark of Earth:
‘Established inthe Earth’—i. e., determined byabsence ofconnec­
tionas well asconnectionwill other objects.* The meaningis that Smell
is the mark, because it serves to differentiate Earth from objects of
similar anddissimilar classes. For Eartli hasSmell onlyand only Earth
has Smell. It is therefore established that Smell which differentiates
Earthfromthe eight similars beginning with Water, and the five dis-
similarsbeginningwithAttribute, is essential toEarth. 2.
Yivviti .—‘Established,’i. e., ascertainedor undoubted, as there is
nothingtoopposeit.
Heat may he essential or accidental

II * I ^ I \ II
Etena, by this. LJsnata, Hotness. Warmth. suraHTHT
Vyakbyata, explained. _______________________________ __
* “ Absence of connection as well as connection with other objects,” i. Smell is

K
ys found in essential agreement with Earth and in essential difference from Non-
0
-
KANADA SUTRAS IT, 2-5. ______j S L

3. By this hotness is explained.—82:

Upaskdra.—Extending the mode of establishing Smell as an essential Attribute, to
Hotness also, which is the characteristic of Fire, he says :
This extensionor analogyshould be understood also in the case
of coldness, etc., whichare thecharacteristics of Water, etc.—
3.
Heat is essential in Fire.

cHTH II R I * I $ II
~?T5ra': Tejasah, of Fire. Usnata, Hotness.
4. Hotness (is the characteristic) of Fire.—83.
Upaskdra.—Ho examines the characteristic of Fire :
Themeaningisthat natural oressential Hotness is thecharacteristic
of Fire. Colour, whiteandluminous, is alsoimplied.—4.
Coldness is essential in Water.

S P jg sftrTrTT II ^ I R I V U
Apsu, in Waters itftfmr Shtata, Coldness.
5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water.—84.
Upaskdra.—He examines the characteristic of Water:
Themeaningisthat natural or essential coldness is the character­
isticof water; sothat it is not too wide by over-extending to a stone-
tablet, sandal-wood, etc. Colour and Taste also are said to be the
characteristics of Water in thesamewayascoldness which also implies
Viscidityandconstitutional Fluidity.
It cannot beasked, “Whyisthere this breachin the order of the
characteristics according to the enumeration of Earth, etc?” Because
it isintendedtoindicatethat theTouch of Fireovercomesor overwhelms
the TouchofEarth andthe Touch of Water, and so the examinationof
Fireshouldof coursecomein between them. Or, theorderhas not been
observedinorder tointroduce the examination of Air. Thus it should
be inferredthat Touch, whichis neither hot nor cold, andisnot due tothe
actionof fireor heat, isessential to Air, and, assuch, is itscharacteristic.
This istheimport.—5.
Vivriti .—Theorder of enumeration has been abandoned with the
object of indicating that the mark of Air, i. e., the possession of a
heterogeneous Touch, should be investigated in the same way. The
explanation, givenbythe learnedwriter of theUpaskara, namelythat the
violationof theorder is intendedtoshowthat theTouchof Fireovercomes
the Touches ofEarthand Water, isnot satisfactory. For it is knownto
11
 . -

(i( §2|jj VAI&ESTKA PHILOSOPHY. VSJJ ^

.... ' "J 1■I-"-. ’ ■'■""■ " "' .. ■"""l ■"""■r"."-'-- ..Ir.rM
l- -1- 1.•II" k
all that ingoldaswell as inmoon-light, etc., theTouches of Earth and
Water overcometheTouchofFire.
Marks of Time.

wnrfar$m g>ra^ftri: ^ P n g 'ifa ii * i * u ii

55Tnf?»t^. Aparasmin, in respect of that which is posierior. srqr* Aparam,
posterior. y r p r Yugapat, simultaneous. {%* Chiram, slow. f%jj Ksipram,
quick. hi, such. K&la-lingani, marks of Time.
6. *Posterior ’ in respect of that which is posterior,
‘ simultaneous’, ‘ slow,’ ‘ quick,’—Such (cognitions) are the
marks of Time.—85.
Upaskiira.—Thus it has been stated that particular Attributes such as smell, etc.,
of tangible things, which arc preceded by like Attributes in their causes, are the
characteristics of Barth, etc. Now ho begins tho section on tho characteristics of
Time, brought in by the order of enumeration, by saying:
The word‘iti’whichshowsthe modeof cognition, relates to each
individual word;so that the meaning is that the cognition‘it ispos­
terior,’thecognition‘it is simultaneous,’ the cognition ‘it is slow or,
late,’thecognition‘it is quickor early,’—are the marks of Time. By
‘posterior inrespect of that whichisposterior,’wearealsotounderstand
‘prior inrespectof that whichisprior.’ Therefore thesenseis this: If
wemakeayouth our point ofview or startingpoint, thenthecognition
of Priority is produced inanoldman, whosebirthhas beendistanced by
alargenumber of therevolutions of the sun; and this Prioritydepends
upon some non-combinative cause. Now, Colour, etc., cannot bethe
non-combinative cause, owing to their variable presence. Thethree,
beginningwithSmell, do not produce Priority inrespect of Air. Touch
also, rendered different by the difference of hot, etc., is ineach ease
variable inits presence. Nor is a fixed Measure thenon-combinative
cause, for it does not originate a heterogeneous object. Therefore it
remainsat last that, the revolutions of thesun beingconnected witha
different substratum, conjunction witha Substance determinedbythose
* revolutions is reallythe required non-combinative cause. And that Subs­
tance, beingconjoint both withthelump ofmatter onearth{e.g., thebody
ofayouth) as well as thesun, must be universal. If the characteristicof
that Substance besupposedtobebelongingtoEther, thenitwouldfollow
that the beatingofadrum at anyplacewill produce Soundinall drums
everywhere. Thus theConjunctionof Timealone, whichisconjoint with
thesun, withthelumpof matter inquestion, isthe non-combinativecause
ofPriority. It isTimewhichdemonstrates theactionof thesun, because,
 'G
°I^\ -
(if J | )Sj K A N A D A Sf J TRAS I I , 2-8. (fiT
, ' ' *" ' " ' ^ "
^................. '' ' -1-

for thepurposeof the determination of adifferentSubstance inthe caseof

theproperties of adifferent Substance, the Soul is dependent upon an
affinityinaddition toits own propinquity, otherwise the redness of a
kusumbha flow er at Varanasi (Benares) wouldentail redness in acrystal at
Patna also. But Timebeingsupposedtoheof that very nature, this (i.e.,
dependence upon another affinity) isno fault here. If it be asked, why
Time alsowouldnot transmit colour, we reply, it is because Time has
beenestablishedonlyasthat whichalways demonstrates action.
Inthesame way, the production of Posteriorityshould be ascer­
tainedinayouth, with an oldmanas the starting point. ‘Simultane­
ous’: ‘They are born simultaneously,’ ‘They exist simultaneously,’
1Theyact simultaneously,’—in suchcognitions, ‘simultaneously’means at
the sametime, during the same movement of the sun, inother words, at
the sametimeas determined by the movement of the sun. it is not
unconnected movements of the sun, which undergothe qualifications,
e.g., ‘simultaneously born,’ etc. ; nor are these connected bytheir own
nature. Therefore, thesespecific cognitions beingincapableofadifferent
proof, theSubstance whichestablishes the specification, isTime.—6.
Like Air, Time is a substance, and is eternal.

si-.tMfhsi^ cn§^T sqm nl ii *i r i vs u

Dravyatva-nityatvc, substanceness and eternality. ’fpjsn' Vayu-
»&, by A ir. s*n«5*ffiT Vyakhy&te, explained.
7. The Subtance-ness and eternality (of Time) are
explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and
eternality of) Air.—86.
Upask.ira.—It may be said, “ Let Time be proved. But there is no proof that it
is a Substance, nor that it is eternal.” So he says :
The meaningis that, as the ultimate atomof Air is aSubstance,
becauseit possesses Attributes, andiseternal, because it isa Substance
whichdoes not containanyother Substance, soalsois Time.—7.
Like Existence, Time is one.

II ^ I R I 5 II
Tattvam, unity. # Bbdvena, by(Existence.
8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explana­
tion of the unity of) Existence.—87.
UpaskAra.—“ Even then,” it may be said, “ there may be a plurality of Time*.” So he
says :
 '"if ■ p
(l( Jm)V( VAI&ESlKA PHILOSOPHY. (cj
1lieaphorismhasgrammaticalconnectionwiththeword‘vy&khyate’
inthelast aphorism, reducedto the form ‘vyakhvatam.’ The meaning
is: Time, likeExistence, isone, because, in spite of their multiplicity,
the marks of Time, viz., the cognition 1it is sloworlate,’etc., are the
samein all places, and because no distinguishingmark, like thoseof
Souls, exists.
It maybe.objected, “Time is manifold accordingtothe difference
of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-niglits,
fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How thencan it be
one? ’ Wereplythat it is not so, because theappearance of difference
isduetoup/idhi or anexternal condition. For, it is found, that as the
self-same Crystal appears to be different according to the reflection
thrownupon it by the external condition or upddhi of a China rose,
tdpinja (X anthochymus Pictorius), etc., soalsodoes the oneand indivisible
Time appear to bedifferent according to the limit set by the m'ove-
ment of theSun, etc., as well asaccording to the limit imposed by their
respective effects. Thus moment iksana) is the external condition of
Time, .which does not pervadeor cover another external condition of
Time, or it is Time whichis not the receptacleof the counter-opposite
of the prior as well as posterior non-existenceof what is placedor con­
tained in it; and this should be understood from the production of
something and the destruction of something at every moment. It is
proved by the Veda that a‘lava,’isanaggregate oftwomoments, and
soon.
“Yet,” it may be objected,” “Time must beat least three-fold,
according to the difference of the past, the future, and thepresent;
for it is heard, ‘Thethree times return,’ ‘The three Times are not
accomplishedor proved,’etc.” Wereply, it is not, fortheuseof three-fold
Timeis due tothelimits of(theexistence of)athing, its prior non-exis­
tence, andits total destruction. The Timewhich is determined or deli­
mitedbya thing, is its present; the Timewhichis delimitedbytheprior
non-existenceofathing, is itsfuture ; andthe Timewhichis delimitedby
thetotal destructionof athing, is its past. Thus the use of thethree­
foldness of Time depends uponthe three-foldness of thedeterminantor
that whichdelimits.—8.
Time, a cause of non-eternal Susbstances.

Nityesu, in eternal Substances. Abhavat, because it does

not exist. Anityesu, in non-eternal Substances, Bh&vat,
 KAN A D A RUTHAS II, 2-10.
Because it exists. Kfirane, inthecause. Kalakhya, the name
of Time, Iti, hence.
9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch
as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non­
eternal substances.—88.
Upathura.—Here he says that Time is the cause of all that is produced.
The word ‘iti’ is used inthe senseof ‘because.’ For this reason
the name Time is applicable to‘cause,’ i. e., the causeof all that is pro­
duced. He states the reason:—“Because it does not exist ineternals,
andbecauseit exists in non-eternals.” The meaning is this: Because
inthe case of the eternals such as Ether, etc., there do not arise the
cognitions, “produced simultaneously,” “produced slowly or late,”
“produced quickly or early,” “produced now,” “produced duringthe
day,”'*producedat night,” etc., whereascognitionsofsimultaneity, etc., do
arise inthecaseof the non-eternals suchas the pot, cloth, etc. ; therefore,
by the methods of agreement as well as difference, Time isprovedto be
a cause. It is tobe understood that Timeis the occasional or efficient
cause of all that is produced, not only in virtue of the cognitionsof
simultaneity, etc., but also invirtue of the application of the terms, hiber­
nal, vernal, pluvial, etc., toflowers, fruits, etc.—9.
V ixrriti.—In fact, scriptural texts such as “All isproduced from
Time”, etc., are proof that Time is the cause of every thingthat is an
effect.
Mark of Space.

fu w u ffrv fciwu. il s i * i ? ° n
f?f: Itali, from this, f f h. Idam, this. fj% Iti, such, Yatah, whence.
Tat, that, Disyam, relating to Space. f§rjj»|,Lihgam, mark,
10. That which gives rise to such (cognition and
usage) as “ This (is rermote, etc.) from this,”—(the same is)
the mark of Space.—89.
Upaskara.—Having finished the section on the mark of Time, and going to begin the
section on the mark of Space, he says :
‘Disyam’—that whichbelongstoSpace, i. <*., is the mark of the in­
ferenceof Space. Themeaning is this : ‘Space’is that substance ‘from
which,’ in respect of two simultaneously existing bodies which are
also fixed in (direction) and place, ‘such’ cognition and usage arise
that ‘this,’ i. e., the ground or substratum of the conjunctions of a
comparativelylarge number of conjoint things, is prior ‘to,’(other than or
 1 Ii| ' _ -
[( |j |s 0 i VAISESlKA PHILOSOPHY. (£ jT
x'-' ’ ■ - -I————————— . : • .' . —
distinct from) this i.e., the substratumofthe conjunctions ofacompara­
tivelysmall"number ofconjoint things, andalsothat ‘this’, i. e., the subs­
tratum of thecomparative smallness innumber oftheconjunctions of the
conjoint, is ‘posterior’ to 1this,’i. e., thesubstratumof thecomparative
largeness innumber oftheconjunctions of the conjoint. For, without the
existence of such a substance, there is noother means of establishinga
comparatively largo or small number of theconjunctions of theconjoint
inthe twobodies; nor, without suchestablishment, cantherebeanyparti­
cular or concreteunderstandingabout themrespectively; nor, withoutssuch
understanding, can Priority and Posteriority arise; nor, without their
appearance, canthere beconcretecognitionandusageabout them.
It cannot be said, “Let Timebe themeans alsoof establishingthe
conjunctions. What is the use of another Substance? hoi Time is
provedonlyasthemeansof establishingconstant or unchangeableactions.
If, on the contrary, it issupposedtobethemeans ofestablishingthe in­
constant or changing propertyof Remoteness, thenit wouldestablishthe
colouring of thepaste of thesaffronof Kadmira (Casmere) onthebreasts
of the womenof ICarnata(theCarnatic). The same will be theimplica­
tionif Ether andSoul alsoaresimilarlymadetobethemeansofcommuni­
catingtheproperty of Remoteness. Whereas Spacebeingprovedonlyas
the invariablemeans of communicatingthepropertyof Remoteness, there
is no such absurd implication. In this way Space, which establishes
conjunctions, isreallyseparatefromTime, whichestablishes actions.
Moreover, these cognitions, namely “This iseast of that,” “This is
southof that,” “This iswest of that,” “This is north of that,” “This is
south-east of that,” “This is south-west of that,” “This is north­
west of that,” “This isnorth-east ofthat,” “This isbelowthat,” “This
isabovethat,”—are brought together bythestatement “This fromthis,”
becauseit isnot possiblefor these cognitions tohaveanother occasional or
efficient cause. Further, Time establishesexternal conditions or upadhis
whichare constant, AvhileSpaceestablishes external conditions or upadhis
whicharenot constant. For, Avhenone thingis‘present’(inTime) with
reference to another thing, that other thingalsois‘present ’withrefe­
rence to the former ; but inthecaseof theexternal conditionor upddhi
of Space, thereisnosuch rule or fixity, because that which is east in
relation to aperson, theverysamesometimesbecomeswest inrelationto
the same person. Thesame is tobeobservedwithregard tonorth, etc.,
also. The direction or quarter whichisnearer tothemountain whereon
thesunrises, withreferencetoanother direction, is east inrelationtothe
latter ; the direction which is nearer to the mountainwhereonthesun
 !'vJ|>):/ kan A d a s o t d a s tt, 2-12. AfiT
f"

sets, with reference toanother direction, is west inrelationtothe latter.

Nearness, again, is the fewness of theconjunctions of theconjoint;and
theseconjunctions with thesun, whether theybea fewor many, are tobe
established bySpace. In likemanner, the direction, whichisdetermined
bytheportion of Spacefallingontheleft of apersonfacingtowards east,
is north ; the directiondeterminedbytheright division of sucha person,
issouth; whilerightness and leftness areparticular ‘classes’residingin
the constituent parts of the body. The direction, whichis thesupport
of the conjunction which is produced byanact of whichWeight is the
non-combinative cause, is below; andthedirection, which is the support
of theconjunctionwhichisproduced bytheconjunctionofSoul possessing
adridam (invisible consequences of conduct) or by the actionof fire, is
above. In this way, fromtheir reference aseast, etc., theyarealsoother­
wise referredto, as in the statement, “ Directions are ten innumber, as
marked out by their beingpresidedover byIinIra, Agni, Yatna, Nirrita,
Varuna, Vayu, Soma, Liana Naga, andBrahma.”—10.
Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal.
II * I R I \\ II
Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. yrg^Tr
Vayuna, by Air. Vyakhayate, explained.
11. The substanceness and eternality (of Space are)
explained by , (the explanation of the Substance-ness and
eternality of) Air.—90.
Substance-ness and also eternality belong to Space in the same way as
totheUpaskara.
ultimate atom of Air. So he says :
ihe meaningisthat it possessesSubstance-ness, becauseit possesses
Attributes, andeternality, because it isindependent of or non-resident in
any other substance.—11.
Like Existence, Space is one
u 3 i 3 i 13 ii
fTr* Tattvam, unity. Bhdvena, by Existence.
12. The unity (of Space is explained) by (the explana­
tion of the unity of) Existence.—91.
Upaaktim .—Extending or attributing unity (to Space), he says :
Unity isprovedinSpace, as inExistence, by the absenceof differ­
ence in the marks of Space together with the non-existence of any
differentiatingmark. Separateness ofone, i.e., individuality, also belongs
toSpace, because individualityconstantlyfollowsunity.—12.
 ^& )fj VATSE8IKA PHILOSOPHY. ' V ^| ^

Above continued.

ii ^m n ii
Karyya-visesena, owing to difference or distinction of
effects. frrffN' Nanatvarn, multiplicity or diversity.
13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of
effects.—92.
Upaskara.—l t may bo asked, “ If Space is only one, bow then can there be its cogni­
tion and use as ten quarters or directions ?" So he says :
Themeaning is that the attributionof multiplicity is due to the
divergenceof effects.—13.
Directions explained.

stt^ t irri ^su

Aditya-saiiiyogdt, from the conjunction of the sun.
Bhflta-pflrvvat, past and gone. Bhavisyatah, future.
Bhutat, what has taken place or come into existence; present. *sr.
Cha, and. sn^sft, Prachi, east. {lit. Orient).
14. (The direti on comes to be regarded as) the east,
from the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun.—93.
U p a ste d ra .—Showing the aforesaid divergence of effects, he says :
Theeast (prachi) is so called, because the sun first (pralc) moves
(ailchati) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first
conjunctionof thesuntookplace, or will take place, or is taking place,
inthecourseof itscirculationroundMount Meru.
Here the reference to the three times rests upon the difference
of theconceptions of thepersonii. e., the observer). For, withsomeone,
onthemorningof theprevious day, the conjunctionof the sun first took
place inthis direction; therefore it is the east ; so the use of the word,
east. Withsomeother, the next day, the conjunction of the sun will
first take placeinthis direction; so, in view of this, theuseof the word,
east. Withsomeother, again, at this moment, the conjunction of the
sunis takingplace inthis direction; so, in view of this, the use of the
word, east. In theword, ‘bhutat,’theaffix, ‘kta,’isusedinthe sense of
incipient action. Therefore, nofixedpoint beinginvariably necessary, the
repetitionof the useof the word, east, is provedalso in those cases, even
wherethereis noconjunctionof the sun, as at night, orat mid-day, ete.
This is the import.—14. ■ -
'■'ipp. • • / .. ■; '•
ff/B B M fr KAN AD A SUTRAS IT, 2-17.

—continued.
Above

frm qfcroT irfHT ^ ii * i r i 1 * ii

ffSTT hatha, similarly, ^f%3UT Daksina, south, snfWt. Fratichi, west.
3$Mt Udichi, north. *f Cha, also.
15. South, West, and North also are similarly (dis­
tinguished).—94.
Upaskfira, Extending the same method to the use of the other directions also,
he sa y s:
In theverysame way, the use of the term, South, arises from the
past, or future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountain
situatedin thesouth direction. The use of the West and North also
I istohesimilarlyunderstood. Rightness and leftness (havetheir technical
or recognisedmeanings, or) have beenexplained above.—15.
A hove—con tinned.

f t i p r u r a t f a s q u a i l d lPl II =t I =t I H II
q%H Etena, by this. feusrrerarrfr, DigantarAlAni, intervals of Space
or Direction. VyAkhyAtani, explained.
16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained.—95.
Upaskfira.—Extending the very same method to the intervals of direction also,
he says:
Tlxeuseof South-East arises from the intermixture of the mark
| of the East and the South direction. South-West, West-North, and
I North-East are tobesimilarly understood. <
Tt has been explained at length in Karidda-Rahasyam {lit., the
secret of Kanada) that Space or Direction is that universal Substance by
whichthe aboveconjunctionsof the sun are established.—10.
Causes of Doubt or Disbelief.

HTffT' qsuqgm t ilq i i F p i '- n q s tar u u ? .-

srmpprswril Samanya-pratyaksat, from the perception of the Genus
or general property. VisSesApratyaksat, from the non-perception
of the Species or special property or differentia. , VigSesa-smriteh
from the recollection of particulars, i. e., alternatives. % Cha, and.
Sai’mSayah, doubt.

I 17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object

containing) tbe general property, the non-perception of the
differentia, and the recollection of the alternatives, all at
once or in one act of thought.—96.
\ -o;•-1.' _/ < /
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 'VF
k y Bi 4
X^'<n-^y
V - : -'Z^rni ■<■ -■"•'■-------- -r„ r-mrT;vrv,r.;‘„;;,rj---...v.. ■, ■■ ■:v --- ■r.-.n.-
Upaskcira.—It has been already established that the characteristics, e. g. Colonr, etc.,
of the four ‘ elements ’ are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their
causes, and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the ‘ universal
substances* ’ which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now,
the mark of Ether, i. e., Sound, should be examined. And hore we meet with the contradic­
tory conclusions of the Tantrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call
it an Attribute. Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to some,
while according to others it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound
another Sound, which they call by the name, “ Sphota.” Accordingly, to begin the
examination of Sound, he first of all establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element
or member of an examination, by its characteristic and cause, and says :
‘Sftmanyapratyaksat ’meansfromtheperception, i. e., apprehension,
of the object which possesses the general property, the affix‘matnp,’
signifying possession, having been elided. ‘Vi^esApratyaksat ’ means
fromthe non-perception or non-apprehension of the property which is
themeans of mutual differentiation, e. g., crooked, hollow, etc., andalso
head, hand, etc. ‘Virfesasmriteh’ means from the recollection of the
particulars, i. e., the alternatives characterised as atrunkand as a person.
Recollection also includes apprehension by sense, because, in some
instances, bodies whichare beingperceivedalso become the alternatives.
The word ‘cha’ brings together adristam (invisible consequences of
voluntaryconduct) etc., whichare alsothecausesof Doubt.
It has not beensaidthat anindividual or particular property isthe
sourceof uncertainknowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular
or special property, beingthemeansof discrimination, issuchacause, and
that this differenciation from similar and dissimilar objects isreally the
common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two propositions
arising from two opposite conclusions; one being*Sound is eternal,’
and the other being‘Sound is non-eternal.’ Bothof them as well as
boththeformsof knowledge producedbythem, do not together become
the sourceof Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously. Hence it
has not been separately statedthat there the cause of Doubt is either
thenon-common property, such as Soundness, or the commonproperty,
suchas the beingexistent, thebeing the subject of proof, etc.
Uncertainknowledgefindsnoplaceinthekindred systemofGautama
[i. e., NyayaPhilosophy;, andsoanon-commonproperty has been men­
tioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, i. e., two opposite
propositions, containingasaruleapositiveand a negativestatement, has
been mentionedas a cause of Doubt. Tn the commentary onNyaya,
Doubt has been described as five-fold, accordingas the fact that som e­
thing isbeing perceived, or thefact that somethingis not beingperceived,
* *Universal .Substances’ are Ether, Space, Time, and Soul.
 ,1 KAN ADA SUTRAS 11, 2-18. _____ !_S L
is thecauseof Doubt. Thus Doubts may arise whether what is being
perceived beexistent, whether what is being perceived be non-existent,
whether this thingwhich is being perceived be existent or non-existent,
whether what isnot beingperceived beexistent, suchasaradish, alatch,
etc., and whether what is not beingperceived benon-existent, asalotusin
theair. Bat all thesearereallyof thesamekind, beingexplained in the
verysamewayby the expression ‘from the perception of the common
property.’ Again, the threefoldness of Doubt, according to differences
initsCause, as taught inthe Nyaya-Varttika, is alsonot possible, as the
three, viz., commonproperty, etc., themselves cannot be causes on account
of their variability. For heterogeneity should not be supposed heio,
likeheterogeneityin fire produced fromgrass, astrike-stick (arani)(i. e.,
i wherefireis kindled by striking two sticks against eachother), anda
gem,becauseex Kypothesi thecausalityconsists of the common property
of producing an effect defined by the characteristic of Doubt. Lhe
heterogeneitywhich issaid toappear in the formof referring primarily
tothepositivealternative, or primarily to the negative alternative, etc.,
does not servethepurpose of a differentia, as it is not sufficiently ex­
tensive, or wide.
Thus Doubt is neither three-foldnor five-fold, but is of one kind
only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its
two-foldness inanother respect.
It maybeobjected, ‘Doubt is knowledgewhichproduces thedesire
toknow.’—This isnot thedefinition, as it overlapsuncertainty. 1Doubt is
knowledge which does not produce impression(samskara).’—This toois
commontounmodifiedor undifferentiatedknowledgeor state ofconscious­
ness; for, if it isaconcrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces anim­
pression. Again, though it is a‘class, yet the quality of Doubt is
not acharacteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the
object containingtheproperty(the perception of which is the occasion
of theDoubt), the ‘class ' alsodoesnot appear there, since it is not found
that a‘class’appears elsewherethaninwhat it classifies.” To this our
replyis that fromthedefinitionof Doubt it follows that Doubt is know­
ledge of diverse and contradictory form s in respect of one and the same
object.—17.
Causes of Doubt or Disbelief—continued.

fS5=3 £S33. il ^ i * i ?= n
v.smni, that which is seen, s* Cha, and. drista-vat, Like
 VAISESIKA (fil
philosophy.
------------- ---------------------------------- -2U-<
18. And that which is seen, resembles that which
was seen—(this also is the source of Doubt.)—97.
Upasknra.—Doubt is two fold : that which relates to external objects, and that which
relates to internal objects. And that which relates to external objects, is also two fold :
where the object is visible, and where the object is not visible. Of these, Doubt, in which
the object is visible, may be illustrated as the uncertainty whether it be a post or a
person, which arises on seeing some objoct distinguished by height; and Doubt, in which
the object is not visible, is such as when on seeing the horns only in the body of a cow
or a gayal (Bos gavseus), etc., which is concealed by the intervention of a bush, etc.,
the uncertainty arises, “ whether it be a cow or a gayal.” In fact, in the latter case also
the Doubt really relates to the property of the horn, i.e., whether the horns are the
horns of a cow or of a gayal. The statement of the two-foldness of Doubt is, however,
a figure of speech. Now, the Genus (i.e., Common property) which is tho source of Doubt,
raises Doubt by being observed either in more than one object or in one object. He
explains the first kind :

Height, whichis seen, is the source ofDoubt. ‘Dristavat ’isformed

by‘vati,’ i.e., theaffix of similarity. Thus, something similar to the
previously seen post and person, lies before. The meaningis that the
height, whichis observed inwhat lies before, is asourceof Doubt, because
it has beenpreviouslyobserved(in morethanoneobject).—10.
•Causes of Doubt or Disbelief.—continued.
l U m U H
Yathfi-dristam, that which has been seen in a certain form.
y y tTT^g^ l? A-yathd-dristatvAt, because it is not seen in that form. ^ Cha, and.

19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been

seen in one form, is seen in a different form.—98.
Upaskara.—He illustrates the observed common property which relates to one
object:
“Thesourceof Doubt ”—this completes the aphorism. The word
‘cha’ understands what lias been said before. The meaning is that
because an object is seen inadifferent form, thereforethat whichwas
seen inacertainform, alsogives rise to Doubt, as Chaitra whowas seen
inacertain form, i.e., with hair onhis head, isat another timeseennot
inthat form, i.e., with the hair removed. Then afterwards when the
yery same Chaitra is seen with hisheadcovered withapieceof cloth,
Doubt arises whether this Chaitra has hair or not. Here the identity
of Chaitrais thecommonpropertywhich gives rise to Doubt, and it fe
seen in one object only. Therefore what is here thesource ' "
seen inone, undifferentiated old-
 ' KAN A d a SUTRAS 11, 2-20.
;X% g g j^ --------------------------------------- :---------------------------- --
Above continued.
f^TTsf^lTrr^r II R I ^ I u
RwitSPTOTrT VidyA-a-vidvatali, from science and nescience. ’TClia,
and. ^Tstr^; Samsayal.i, Doubt.
20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience. 99.
Ujiaskira.—He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the
objoot of thought is the cause of Doubt :
Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience, tor
instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly,
eclipsesof themoon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to
his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge issome­
times science, and sometimes nescience, it’., wanting in proof; and,
consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, inas­
muchasit isknown, it he existent oi non-existent.
Theretentionof the word, ‘Doubt,’inthe aphorism, indicates that
here tooDoubt arises only fromtheperceptionof thecommonproperty,
andnot fromany other source. Thus the opinion held by some that
theuncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded
tointhe definition ofGautama, “Doubt is deliberation in expectation
of adifferentia, due to the proof of thecommon properties as well as
of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of,
or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also theuncertaintyor in­
constancy of cognition and non-cognition,” (NyAya-Sutras f. 1. 22), is
adifferent sourceof Doubt, is herebyrefuted.—20.
V ivriti .—Heretheaffix‘tasi ’in‘vidya-avidyatas’ is used in the
genitive sense. Thereforethe expression means “of true knowledge and
false knowledge.” And the doubt is whether it he true knowledge or
false knowledge. From the word‘clia,’ ‘and,’ it follows that Doubt
as regards theobject of knowledgealsoarises fromtheperceptionof the
commonproperty. Thus, ‘The mountain contains fire,’ ‘Thelake con­
tains fire,’ intheseand other casesof true or falseknowledge, the Doubt,
whether suchknowledgebe true or false, arises from the knowledge of
the common property of their bothbeing knowledge. Inlikemanner,
after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountaincontains fire
or not, whether the lakecontains fireor not, etc., fromtheknowledgeof
the common property of their being objects of knowledge. Now, a
contrary certainty, the proof of whichhas not beenobtained, isopposed
toDoubt, andthe Doubt whether it betrue knowledgeor false knowledge
operates to dispel such contrarycertainty. Andnot' that suchDoubt of
itself givesrise toDoubt about theobject ofknowledge.
%
[i( H^S; V A I S E S I K A PHILOSOPHY. VfiT
^0^ " Z." ■
—what?
Sound,

*TTS^: ?T 5TS^: (Ul R I R3 II

—f^rotra-grahanaii, of which ear is the .organ of apprehension,
q:—Yah, which. g g : Arthah, object, g — Sail, that, g®?:—-S^abdah, sound.
21. Sound is that object of which the organ of appr
hension is the ear.— 1 0 0 .
Upaskfira.—Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt which
is the first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the
subject-matter of examination, and says :
‘Srotragrahanah’means that ofwhich ear is the organ or instru­
ment of apprehension. ‘Arthah’means that which contains properties.
So that the definitionhas not the defect of over-extendingtoSound-ness,
loudness, etc., Attrihute-ness, Existence, and other properties residing
in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the word
‘arthah’ meaning that which contains properties, the possession of a
class property is intended; hereby it is indicated that Sound called
‘Sphota ’ {i.e., by which the words of asentence canconveyacomplete
sense), inherent inSound, doesnot exist.
It maybe arguedasfollows: “Sphota must be postulated on the
strengthof the intuitions, ‘one word,’ ‘one sentence,’ for the intuition
of unity does not arise inaword composed of several letters, nor ina
sentence composed of several letters. And the wood sphota forms a
name or nominal on which the elucidationof thesense depends. The
letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning
of the whole sentence; their combination again is impossible, because
they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker; therefore the
intuition of the sense of the whole arises from sphota only, because
elucidation of the sense doesnot take place without the knowledgeof it.
Andthis sphota, althoughit ispresent inoneandall the letters standing
as words, yet becomes manifest inthelast letter.” Wereplythat it is
not so. Conventional letters formwords. Thusthe sense being intuited
from the word in virtue of conventionalone, what is the useofsphota ?
Theuseof the expression‘one word’is apretence, intended to denote
the oneproperty of making up onesense, possessedbyalarge number
of letters. Soalso in the case of asentence. If some inner meaning
of theword, beyondthat of its component letters, could be apprehended
by perception, then the same might have beenadmitted tobe sphota.
Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlookedthis doctrineof
sphota as beingof noconsideration. 21,
.| KAN ADA SCTEAS II, 2-23.

Causes of Doubt with respect to Sound.

VRTOT
3 RRRRI
Tulya-jatiyesu, in homogeneoustilings. ‘^brTOiri'i Arthantara-
bhQtesu, inheterogeneous things. Visesasya, of the particular, i.e., the
difference, or differentia. Ubhayatha, in both. Dristatvilt, from
the being observed ; because it is observed.
22. (Doubt arises in respect of Sound), because its dif­
ference is observed both in (from) homogeneous objects and
in (from) heterogeneous objects.—101.
Upask&ra.—Sound having thus appeared as an object ’which contains properties, its
being the mark of Ether depends solely on its being an Attribute. Therefore to establish
its Attributo-noss, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says :
“Doubt arises in respect of sound,”—is thoe complement of the
aphorism. Sound-ness andperceptibility bytheearareobserved inSound.
Andthis gives rise to Doubt whether Soundbean Attribute, or aSubs­
tance, or anAction, because the‘particular,’i.e., the difference or diver­
genceis observedbothin homogeneous objects, namely, thetwenty-three
Attributes, andinheterogeneous objects, namelySubstances, andActions.
But Doubt whether it beaGenus, or aSpecies, or aCombination, does not
arise, inasmuch as difference in point of beingexistent, beingproduced
byacause, etc., isobserved.
It maybesaid, “Anon-common property cannot be the cause of
Doubt bybeingthe causeof indecision or uncertainty. AndSound-ness
aswell as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-common property.”
Wesay: Trulyits differenceor divergence iscommontohomogeneousand
hetrogeneous things, and soonlythis commondifferenceor divergencehas
beenstatedtobe thecauseof Doubt. Differenceor divergence, which is
thecounter-opposite of Sound-ness, is the common property; and the
characteristicofbeingthecounter-opposite of the differenceor divergence
belongingtoboth, inotherwords, Sound-ness, isthenon-commonproperty.
Thereforeit has been said: “From the observationof thedifferencein
both.” Heretheobservationofparticular, i.e., thedifference, inboth, i.e.,
inhomogeneousandheterogeneousthings, constitutingthecauseofDoubt
it becomes reallythecommonproperty.—22.
Sound not a Substance.
II R I R I ||
Eka-dravyatv&t, because it resides in one Substance. Na,
not. fstj Dravyam, Substance.
23. (Sound is) not a Substance, since it resides in one
Substance only.—102.
(l VATTESTKA PHILOSOPHY. (gT
-'. .,
Upasledra.—Showing Doubt in this way, he says, in order to eliminate the alternative
K
of Substance-ness :
‘Ekadravyam’is that whichhas oneSubstanceonlyasits combina­
tive cause. AndnoSubstance whatever contains a single Substance as
its combinative cause. Therefore, owing tothis difference in property
fromSubstances, thisSound is not a Substance. This isthe meaning.—
23. Nor an Action.
II * I * I l
Na, not. Api, also Karmma, action, Achaksu-
satvftt, not being visible.
24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an objec
of visual perception.—103.
Vpasledrn.—It may be said, “ Action is surely uni-snbstantial. Therefore Sound may
be an Action.’’ So he says :
Becausethe intuition or perceptionof Sound is not visual, i.e., is
producedbyan external sense-organ other than the eye. So that the
import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness alsodoes not
reside inActions, becauseit isa ‘class’ which does not reside in the
objects of visual perception.—24.
' Sound is transient, and not, eternal.
5 ^ sFTtsrr'i: swnsin; h =t i ^ t u
ipppaf Gunasya, of Attribute. *r?f: Satah, being. Apavargah,
speedy destruction. Karmmabhib, with Actions. 5TnT>&*i Sadharm-
myani, resemblance.
27. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an At­
tribute, with Actions, consists in its speedy destruction. —104.
Vpaskdra.—l t it is said that, as it speedily disappears, like Throwing upwards, etc.,
therefore Sound is an Action ; so he says :
‘Apavargah’meansspeedy destruction. Andthis, eveninthecase
of Attribute-ness, is dependent uponthe incidenceof arapidlyappearing
destroyer, inthesame way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only its
resemblancetoActions, andnot its Action-ness. The qualityof undergo­
ingrapiddestructionwhichyou {i.e., the objector) advance as anargu­
ment, iflnot one-pointedi.e., multifarious, becauseit is found in Duality,
Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This isthe import.—25.
Above continued.
faffF'HRTd it r i * i h ii
tnf: Satah, of (Sound as) existent, fwjfrwre: bingabhavat, from the
absence of mark.
:(( ||Y§: KAN ADA SUTRAS II, 2-28.__________ ^
26. (Sound does not exist before utterance), because
there is no mark of (Sound as) existent (before utterance),—
105.
Upaaknm.—It may be said, “ Let Sound be proved as an Attribute. Still it cannot be
the mark of the existence of Ether. Eor it would justify the inference of Ether, if it were
an effect of it. But it is eternal instead. Its occasional non-cognition, however, is due to
the absence of something which could reveal it." With this apprehension, he says :
For, if Soundwereexistent (beforeandafter utterance), then there
wouldbefoundsome ‘mark,’i.e., additional proof, of it as existent. But
inthe stateof non-hearing, there isno proof that Sound exists. There­
foreit isonlyaneffect, and not somethingwhich requires tobe revealed
only.—20. Above continued.
II R I \ I Rvs ||
Nitya-vaiadhannmat, owing to difference in property from
what is eternal.
27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be
brought to light), because it differs in property from what
is eternal.—106.
Upuskdm.—He says that for this reason also, it (Sound) is not something which only
requires to be made known :
ThedifferenceofSoundfromwhat iseternal, is observed. Where­
as, as in “Chaitraspeaks,” theexistence of Ckaitra, Maitra, etc., even
thoughthey are covered from view, maybeinferred fromtheir voice;
andwhereas that which reveals, e.g., thelamp, etc., is never inferred by
that whichisrevealed, e.g., the water-pot, etc. ; therefoieSoundisonlya
product, andnot something which requires tobe brought tolight. This
is thesense.—27.
Above continued.

srfSrerard *Kura: i m i i; n
Anityal.x, non-eternal. Ctia, and. Ayam, it. Kdra-
natah, from its having a cause.
28. And Sound isAnon-eternal, (because it is observed
to be produced) by a cause.—107.
Upasfcdm.—Pointing out the objections to its being something to be revealed only,
he now states the ground of its being non-eternal:
“Becauseits productionis observed,”—this is thecomplement. For
Soundisobservedas issuingout of the (temporary) conjunction of the
drumandthedrum-stick, etc. Sothat it is non-eternal, because it has
23
 ^
Ay ^ m '
«( H ■ VATSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. VfiT (
,' ...................... — »-. --------------- —....---------------- ---------------
aproduction(or beginning). Or “Fromacause”tnayimply the reason
that it hasacause.—28.
Above continued.
sr fNitrrg; 11 * I I u u
«l Na, not. Cha, and. Asiddham, disproved. Vtk&rat,
fromchange.
29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause)
disproved by its modifications.—108.
Upaskdra.—Lest it might be said that the possession of a cause is disproved in Sound
by its very nature, so he says :
Fromobservingtheloudness, softness, andother modifications, it
shouldnot beconcludedthat thepossessionofacause by Soundis there­
bydisproved. For aloudor soft sound is perceived according to the
hardnessor softness of thebeatingofthe drumwith the drum-stick, and
thelike; whereas theloudness, etc., (i.e., theintensity) of that which is
made known, is not dependent ontheloudness, etc., {i.e., the intensity)
ofthat whichmakesit known. Hencefrom its undergoing modification
accordingtothemodificationof thecause, it is inferredto be a product,
andnot somethingtoberevealedonly.—29.
Above continued.
H M U o ||
Abhivyaktau, in (the theory of the) manifestation or revelation
(ofSound). Dosat, from defect. Because there will be a defect
30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it
requires to he revealed only, will entail a defect.—109.
Upaskdra.—It may be argued, “ It is the virtue of that which reveals, that it reveals
in the form of intensity, softness, etc. And it is Air impelled by the drum and the drum­
stick, etc., which, being intense and soft or slow (in velocity and volume), produces
like perceptions.” Hence he says :
Onthe theoryof therevelationof Sound, the defect will arise that
(ineachcase) an invariable relationof therevealer and the revealed will
have tobeadmitted inrespect of things co-existent andcapable of being
perceivedby the same sense. But the invariable relationship of the
revealer andthe revealedisnowhere observed of such things. If it be
not assumedhere, thenit will follow that on the manifestation of one
letter, sayha, all theletters will become manifest. The rejoinder that
aninvariablerelationof the revealer and therevealedis in fact observed
toobtainamongthe characteristic of being existent, the characteristic
I) of being a man, andthecharacteristicof being a Brahmana, which are
 ’6°^\ '
r( M 2-33.
K A S A d A SUTRAS 11, f e |
\ >»^ 1 ■■ ■ ^ "* *
alsooo-extensiveaudare revealed by their individual difference, situa­
tion, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in being co-extensive,
inasmuchas theextensionof thecharacteristicof beingaman, or of the
characteristicof beingaBrahmana, is not solarge as that of the charac­
teristic ofbeingexistent.—30.
Above continued (Production of Sound)
$TS#FTfrT: II R I H I \ 1 II
*T#rrp* Saiiiyogat, from Conjunction, ftvrrm^ Vibhagat, from Disjunction.
Cha, and. totst ^avdat, from Sound. ^ Cha, and. ST5?Pr«Tf^r: Sabda-nis-
pattib, production of Sound.
31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Dis­
junction, and from Sound also.—110.
Upaskdra.—He says that for the following reason also Sound is not something which
requires to be revealed only :
‘FromConjunction’—i.e., fromConjunctionof tbe drum and the
drum-stick. ‘FromDisjunction'—i.e., whenabamboois beingsplit up.
HereConjunction isbynomeans the cause of the first Sound, because
there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two
halves ofthebamboois theefficient or conditional cause, and the Dis­
junctionof thehalvesandEtheristhenon-combinativecause. Andwhere
Soundisproducedinadistant flute, and thelike, there Sound which is
producedintheorder ofacurrent, reaches theportionof Ether limitedby
thehollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard. Therefore Sound
isproducedfromSoundalso.—31.
Above continued.

11 * i * i ^ u
Ling&t, from its mark. ^ Cha, and. Anityab, non-eternal.
$ts?: ^abdafi, Sound.
32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark.—111. .
Upasletira.—Ho brings forward another ground of its being non-eternal;
Themeaningisthat Sound, consistingofletters{i.e., articulateSound),
isnon-eternal, because, whilepossessinga ‘class,’it is capaple of being
perceived bytheear, like tbeSoundof alute, etc.—32.
Arguments for the eternality of Sound.

gqfcg ii * i * i II
fqfr: Dvayah, of both, g Tu, but. sifr#: Pravrittyofi, of the activities
or occupations. Abli&vat, from the non-existence or absence.
|( gO)J: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. _____ V^j
33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occu­
pations of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out
of existence.—112.
Upaskdra.—Now, in order to confute the arguments, advanced by the conelusionist
(the Mim&msa thinker), in support of the eternality of Sound, he says :
The word ‘tu’cuts offconnectionwiththe context, and introduces
thestatement of anobjectionof thefirst party. The occupation or em­
ployment ‘of both,’i.e., of the teacher and the pupil in teaching and
learningrespectively, is observed. “Fromits non-existence or absence,”
i.e., fromthe entailm ent of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of
gift or donation. The teacher makes agift of the Vedatothe pupil. If
it is something constant or fixed, thenadonationof it is possible. The
secondparty maysay, “Acow,and the like whichare being given away,
areperceivedas standing between the donor and the donee; whereas
theVeda, etc., arenot perceived as lying between the teacher and the
pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation.” Our (i.e., thefirst
party’s) replyis that theyareperceived intheinterval betweentheteacher
andthe pupil bytheear of apersonstandingthere. Moreover, the etei-
nalityof Sound followsfromrecurrence also. Asin“Hesees the colour
for fivetimes,” therecurrence or persistencyofcolour which is constant
or permanent isobserved, sothe recurrence or persistency of Sound in
“ The anuvaka or paragraph has beenread ten tim es, twenty times,”
is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And constancy or
steadiness beingproved, sincenothing is known which can destroy it,
its eternality alsois necessarily proved, on the principle “What will
afterwards destroyit which isconstantor lasting all this time? This is
the import.—33.
Arguments for the eternality of Sound— continued.

snmms^rgf ii =* n i ii
SWHTSJ55TU Pratliamasabdat, from the word ‘ the first.’
34. From the word, ‘the-first,’ (it follows that Sound
is eternal).—113.
Upaskdra.—Ho translates another reason urged in favour of the eternality of Sound :
Themeaningis that the thrice recitation of the first and the last
mantra for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined inthetext, “The first
shouldberecited three times, the last three times,” is not justified or
accountable without thesteadiness of Sound.—34.
|( J|)j;
-jests'J~~
\ &\ ^ - -- -■■-■■-
KAN AD A SUTRAS II, 2-36.
..... .......... ........ ..... ......■■•■ ■ ................
(&JJ
1

Above continued.

Hwn^TTTlHreref Sampratipatti-bhavar, from the possibility or existence

of recognition. Cha, and.
35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the
possibility of recognition.—114.
Upagkura.—He-translates another reason advanced by the conclusionist for the eter­
nality of Sound :
‘Siimpratipattibliavat’—i. e.(fromtheexistenceofrecognition. The
word ‘pratipatti ’ (cognition) alonpwouldhaveconveyedthesenseof re­
cognitionwhichisaparticular kindof the former ; therefore the prefix
‘Sam’ (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus, “Heis
reciting thevery samepoemwhichwasrecited byMaitra,” “Heis read­
ingthesameverse over and over again,” “You are repeatedly saying
the samething whichhas beensaid before,” “Youare even nowmaking
the verysame statement whichwas made byyou last year and theyear
before,”“It is that sameletter ga,”---onthestrengthof therecognition
of Soundinsuchcases, thesteadiness orpermanenceof Sound is proved.
—35. \ ’
k.
The same refuted.
II H I R I H M
Sandigdhah, Doubtful. Uncertain. Inconclusive. Hfff—Sati,
existing. Vahutve, plurality.
36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments
are) inconclusive.—115.
Upasknra.—Confuting all these reasons, he says :
‘Sandigdhah,’i. e., not one-pointed. Soit has beensaid, “Kasyapa
taught that acontradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was nomark.”
Thus it is observed that there can be learning, repetition, andalsore­
cognition, alsoif thereis apluralityor diversityofSound, therefore these
arguments areinconclusive. For, “He learns dancing,” “Hepractises
dancing,” “Hedanced thesamedance twice,”“Youaredancingthe same
danceto-day, whichyoudanced theotherday,” “This manalsoisdancing
thesamedancewhich was danced by another dancer,”—in thesecases,
learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) areobserved. But you
(theconclusionist) toodo not on this account admit the permanence (or
eternality) of dancingwhichisaparticular kindof Action.—36.
(f( fc # VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (OT
__________________________ :_____________________________________^ j

Counter objection stated and answered.

fmmre: n*i*i^ n
HlSSPTTffs Sariikhyabbftvah, tlie existence or application of Number.
HWl^lrP—Samanyatah, from Genus.
37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with re
ference to the Genus.— 116. m
Upaskara.—It may be objected, “ Fifty letters ; an eight-lettered mantra ; a three-
lettered mantra ; the eight-lettered metre, anuftubh; etc.—How can there be such uses
of numbers, when, the letters being non-eternal, there is a possibility of their being infinite
in number according to the difference of utterance ?” So he says :
Themeaningisthat the existenceof the number, fifty, etc., arises
fromtheclass notionofka, cja, etc. Although there might beaninfinity
of Tea’s, etc., the letters determined by the notions of ka, ga, etc., are
fifty, three, or eight, in the same wayas Substances, Attributes, etc.,
arenine, twenty-four, etc., although there may he an infinity of them
accordingtodifferences within the groupof eachof them. This is the
import.
Theobjector maysay: “This is that ga,”—This recognition itself
proves theperujanence ofSound. Nor is it opposed by the perception,
‘Loud ga, soIt ga,' whichconveys, contrary properties ; becauseloudness,
etc., arethei©due toexternal conditions. Nor isit tobe maintainedthat
therecannot appear any difference fromthe difference of the external
conditionalso; for, then, the crystal alsowill not shineas different, deve­
lopinginthe formof blue, yellow, etc., fromtheconjunctionof the China
rose, tapinja, etc., nor will the facealso, when reflectedaselongated, etc.,
in the sword-blade, jewel, and looking-glass, appear to be different.
If it be asked, To what does this propertyof loudness, etc., belong,
whichinfluencesga ? We reply: It maybe the property of Air, or of
utterance, or of resonance. What isthe useof fixinguponthe particular
oneamongst them? You also admit that loudness, etc., are natural dis­
tinctions, asthe relationof highandlow amongst them cannot be esta­
blishedor explainedbythe notionsof ka, ga, etc. ”
Wereply: It isnot so. Because even whensuchcontrarypercep­
tionexists, viz., ‘ ga is produced,’ ‘ ga is destroyed,’‘ ga whichwasjust
heard, doesnot exist,’‘the noise has stopped,’etc., if this recognition
does not then cease, then it must be supposedtorelate toclass-notions.
Otherwisesuchrecognition comingtorest uponthe permanenceor steadi­
ness of individual Sounds, the above contrary perceptions themselves
Avouldnot be produced. Nor is this the property of Air, becausethe
propertiesofAir arenot the objectsof aural perception. Nor againis it
\((^\ ^tsmjt'r/fJ,
)5i,.^.........fl^.KA
:■N'lD
■ .:A
j|-'..SUTRAS II. 2-37. '
..-'v.-.'-:_______ .. ■
' ■ 1M
■■' *f
,■
thepropertyof the utterance; for if utterance isonlyAir, then the defect
has beenalreadypointed out; if it is something else, then nobody can
saywhat it is. Nor again is it the property of resonance, forloudness,
etc., are perceived alsointhe resonance fromthe conch, etc., eventhough
ga is not foundthere. The naturalnessofloudness, etc., how ever, doesnot
involveanintermixtureof classes, for its diversity is obtained from its
beingpervaded bytheclass-notion ofga, etc. Moreover, there is a very
distinct modeof distinguishing forms inthega’s, etc., utterered bymale
andfemaleparrots and man, as also inthose uttered byamale anda
female, as well as inthose utteredby those who are neither males nor
females; by whicha parrot, etc., concealedfrom vision by branches, a
screen, etc., are inferred. But their being producedby external condi­
tions does not arise fromexternal conditions which can be perceived,
as in“ayoungwoman lookingyellowwith saffron.” Nor is their being
producedby external conditions proved by argument, for no proof of
suchaconclusion exists. Sofar inbrief.—37.
Here ends the second chapter of the second book inSankara’s
commentaryonthe Vaiifesikaaphorisms.
Vivriti .—Some explain the production of Sound ontheprinciple
ofripples andwaves. Accordingtothem,the first Soundis producedfrom
theimpact ofadrum anda drum-stick, etc., within the limits of that
particular Space. Thenoutside that circle and within the confines of the
tenquarters thesecondSoundis producedfromthefirst, andextends it.
After that, beyondthis second circle, and withinthe confines of the ten
quarters, thethird Soundis producedfromthe second. And inthe same
waythe productionof thefourthandother Sounds should be understood.
Otliei’s, however, holdthat the productionof Sound takes place on the
principle of theball of thekadamba flower. In their view, the second
and other Sounds are neither single nor confined totheten quarterstaken
together, but are producedten-foldinten quarters. (Thus the oneis the
theoryof thesuccessiveproductionofsingleSounds, while theother is the
theoryof thesimultaneous production of multiple Sounds). This is the
difference.
((( glj)il PHILOSOPHY. Vfil
/ .....' ..... ..... . ..................-,....- ......—
—....i .■ — ^

B o ok T h ir d — C h apter F ir s t .

Objects of the senses.

srfagT II 3 I » I s> II
Prasiddliah, universally known, perceived. ?1%?RSrf:—Indri-
y&rthah, object of the senses.
1. The objects of the senses are universally known.—
117.
Upaskdra—Having thus in the second book completed the examination of the exter­
nal Substances, he, following the order of enumeration, now proceeds to construct a
basis for an inquiry respecting the Soul.
Theobjects of the Senses, e.g., Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and
Sound, are capable of beingapprehended bytheseveral external sense-
organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of Sound
having been shown by theaphorism, “Sound is that object ofwhichthe
organ ofapprehensionistheear” (II. ii. 21), it is inlike manner demon­
stratedthat Smell, etc., ending with Touch(he., Smell, Taste, Colour,
Touch) are universally known. Thus, Smell isthat object ofwhichthe
organofapprehension is the olfactory organ; Taste is that object of
which the organ of apprehension is the organof taste; Colour is that
object of whichthe organof apprehension is the eye alone; Touch is
that object of which the organ of'apprehension is the organoftouch
alone. Andbythe word, ‘object,’ there is, in all these cases, denoted
areal entitypossessedofproperties, and therefore the definitions cannot
be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., andtothenon-exist­
ence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession ofasub-class
of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the olfactory
organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently, supersensuous
Smell, etc., are not left out.—1.
Vivfiti.— ‘Prasiddliah,’ means subject of ascertainment by per­
ception.
Mark of supersensuous object.
ii 31 m i
— Iiidriydrtha-prasiddhih, the universal experience of the
objects of the senses. ?r^T3f2HT-— IndriyarthebhayaJi, from the senses and
their objects. qraN lffq—Arthantarasya, of a different object. %ij:— Hetuh,
mark.
2. The universal experience of the objects of the
senses is the mark of (the existence of) obj ect different from
the senses and their objects.—118.
 n__
K A N AD A SUTRAS ITT, K3.
upaskara.—Ho explains the application of the universal experience of the objeots
of the senses to the inquiry respecting the Soul.
‘Hetuh,’i.e., Mark, ‘Arthfmtarasya,’i.e., of the Soul. ‘Indriyarthebh-
yah,’ i.e., from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning is
that it is the mark of the Soul whichis adifferent object fromColour,
etc., as well asfromthose whichpossess them. Thoughit is implied here
that only knowledge is the mark of the existence ofthe Soul, yet inas­
muchas there beingauniversal experienceof the objects of the senses,
the immediate presentation tothe mindof Colour, etc., is morecommonly
known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted
by that universal experience. Now this universal experience must
reside somewhere, either as aneffect as awater-pot, or as an Attribute,
or asan Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in
the same manner ascuttingisanact, must beproduced byan instrument.
That whichis the instrumentof the universal experience is the sense;
and the latter, being an instrument, must beemployedbyanagent, as
anaxe-and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this universal
experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other organs
for its instruments, is the Soul.— -2.
The body or the senses are not the seat of perception.

IM I 1 I ^ II
W: Sah, that, ie., perception, AnapadesSah, the semblance or simu­
lacrum of a mark ; a false mark.
3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the
senses as its substratum) (is) a false mark.—119.
Upaskara.—Lest it be said, “ Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the
universal experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest
as determining perception. What is the use of the supposition of any other foundation ?
Thus, consciousness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, like its Colour, etc. The
same should be understood in the case of its being an attribute of the senses ; ” so he says :
‘Anapades&h’means theappearance or semblanceof an ‘apadetfa,’
i. e., mark. Thus the meaningis that the beinganeffect of thebody or
thesenses is the mere semblanceof a mark, inasmuch as it applies tothe
cognitionproducedbyalamp, and is therefore not-one-pointed, i. e., multi­
farious.—3.
Above continued.
n ^ i i i a ii
Karanajnanat, because the causes or constituents are devoid of
cognition or consciousness.
14
 V A I $EMKA PHILOSOPHY. (flT

4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of per­

ception), because there is no consciousness in the causes
(i.e ., the component parts of the body).—120.
Upaakdra.—It may he rejoined, “ By ‘ the being an effect of the body or the senses ’ is
meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the character­
istic of consciousness ; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp,
etc. Therefore there is no indeterminateness or fluctuation." So he says :
It is meant (that the body or the senses cannot bethe seat of
derception), becauseof the absence of consciousness inthehands, feet, etc.,
or in their parts, which are thecauses, i.e., components of the body. For
it isobservedthat theparticular attributes of Earth, etc., areprecededby
like attributes intheir causes. In like manner, if there existedconscious­
nessinthecomponents of thebody, it mightpossiblyexist alsointhebody.
But this isnot thecase. It cannot beurged that consciousness mayexist
also in the components of the body; for it would entail the absence of
uniformityinthe actions of the body, sinceuniformity isnever observed
amongst apluralityof sentient beings. It wouldthen alsofollow that,
after theamputation of the hand, therewill henomorerecollectionof that
which wasexperienced within the limit of thehand, according to the
maxim, “One does not remember that whichhas been experienced by
another.” Moreover, the supposition would entail that, after the des­
tructionof the body, there wouldbenoexperienceof the consequences of
the acts performed by the body, e.g., causinghurt, etc. ; for certainly
Maitradoesnot suffer theconsequencesof the sins committed byChaitra.
Andhencethere wouldbeanannihilationof acts performed, and anacces­
sionof acts not performed.—4.
The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

ITBTT^ Il I t k II
5in% Kflryyesu, in the effects. Jnanat, because there would
be consciousness.
5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the
effects.—.121.
Vpaskara.—It may be added in objeotion that consciousness exists in a minute degree
in the components of the body, whereas it is manifest in the body, arid that therefore it
cannot be said that it is not preceded by a like attribute in the cause, nor does there
arise the impossibility of uniformity. Anticipating this, he says :
If, asamatter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes
of, the body, namely the ultimate atoms, thenit wouldalsoexist inthe
water-pot, etc., whichare the effectsoriginated by them also. Moreover,
IMPii
[?
' kanAda sutras in , i 1. -
---------------------------------------------------------- --------- 3 S [
bohsbiousness wouldexist inproducts such as water-pots, etc., alsobecause
the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene existence. But
■consciousness is not observed toexist inthese products.—5.
The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

im i ? i * II
WJWTH Ajn&nat, because it is not known, n Cha, and.
6. And because it is not known (that any minute
degree of consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc.)—122.
Upaskara.—In anticipation of the further rejoinder that consciousness may in reality
exist, in an imperceptible degree, in the water-pot, etc., also, he says :
The meaningis that there is noconsciousness inthe water-jar, etc.,
inasmuchas it is not known byanymeans of knowledge. If you admit
that whichisbeyond therange of all means of knowledge, then you will
have to admit alsothat ahare has horns, andsoon. For, bynokind of
evidence, is it knownthat consciousness exists in the water-jar, etc.—6.
V ivriti. —It is more proper to conceive some one other substance
as the seat of consciousness thantoimagineapluralityof consciousness
invarious portions of matter. This is the import.
On the theory that consciousness resides in the body, recollection
of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible inyouth, etc., be­
causeof the non-existence of that which had the experience, since the
destruction of the infant-bodymust beobserved bythe destruction of its
( m aterial. Similarly, there wouldbe noactivityat sucking the breasts on
the part of achildjust born, because of the impossibilityat that stage of
theunderstandingthat this is the means of attaining the desirable, which
| is the cause of activity. Accordingtothe advocate of the existenceof a
separate conscious being, the activityis explained by the possibility of
reminiscence due tothe impressionproducedbythe understanding in the
previous birth that this is the means of attaining the desirable. Recol­
lection of other experiences in the previous birth does not take place
owingtotheabsenceof external stimuli.
Fallacious mark.
Igfoprcfa: II * I I I vs II
Anyat,, something else, ^ Eva, certainly, *3: Hetub, mark.
Iti, hence. Anapadefob, rio mark.
7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of
which it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with
the thing of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.)—123.
 ....
VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
—' ............. .................. i .1..,...,—
- I- i .i i
\$ |
...i. . "
Upask&ra.—It may be urged, “ It has been affirmed that (a presiding soul) an employer
is inferred from the organ of hearing and other instruments. But this is not a legitimate
inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced
by, the .Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there is no proof of the ^
universal concomitance or inseparable existence, of these organs and the Soul; and, unless
there be such inseparable existence, there can be no inference.” So he says in rep ly:
The markor meansof proof can but be something else than that
which is to be proved. It cannot be identical withthat whichis tobe
proved; for, wereit so, it would follow that the thing which is to be
proved, would have nodifference fromthe means of proof. Therefore, a
meansof proof, constitutedbyidentity witli that which is to be proved,
is nomeansof proof, i.e., nomarkat all.—7.
Faltadous mark — continued.

Wbrrt it * i ? i c u
srefart Arthantaram, any one thing, ft Hi, because. Arth-
ftntarasya, of any other thing. Sf-rKtr: Anapadesalj, not a mark.
8. (Although a mark is quite different from that o
which it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected),
for, any one tiling cannot be a mark of any other thing.—124.
Opaskdra.—It be may said, “ As the Soul is not identical with the auditory and other
organs of sense, »o there is no production of the latter from the former. For the sense-
organs of hearing, etc., are not producd from the Soul, as smoke is produced from fire.”
So he sa y s:
Because, as theeffect, <?.</., smoke, etc., is a different thing from
anass, soit is alsoadifferent thingfromits cause, e.g., fire, etc. So that
intheabsence of anydistinction inrespect of being adifferent object,
aparticular nature is theregulative principle here, whereby the smoke
does not infer anass, but onlyfire. Aud if that nature belongs toany
thingother than theeffect, thenthat too really becomes a mark. Thus
aneffect cannot bea mark, if it is devoid of the particular naturein­
tended here. Thus, identity and causation onlyconstitute inseparable
existenceor universal concomitance; these two are reduced into inse­
parable existence; or, it is co-ordinate with themas theprinciple ofin­
ference; or, its apprehension isdependent upon the apprehensionof the
abovetwoonly. Hencethe aphorismis onlythestatement ofanargument
for causing confusion to the disciples in the above way. This is the
import.—8.
Marks of inference.

tT|| \ I % I 5. II
I" ' 1, }
I/<A'Se■e°ix s''..
Vvjt )if ____ KAN A d A STRAS TIT, 1-10. JjjgT
" ^rarrr*t Samyogi, the conjunct. u w e i Sam aviyi, the combined or in­
herent. Ekarthasaniavayi, combined together in one thing, or
co-inherent. Virodhi, the contradictory.
9. The conjunct, the combined, the co-combined, and
the contradictory also (are marks of inference!.—125.
Upask&m.—Now, in order to make it clear that universal concomitance or inseparable
existence may bo found elsewhere than in the cases of identity and causation, he says :
“The body lias skin, because it is the body”—here the mark is
the conjunct or the contiguous. For skinis describedas a natural in­
tegument of matter capableof growthand decay. And it is neither an
effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the
bodyandininvariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is
alsoamark. For instance, “Ether possesses Magnitude or extension,
becauseit isaSubstance, likea water-pot, etc.”; here Magnitude or ex­
tensionwhichis tobeprovedis proved by the property ofSubstance-ness
whichis inessential combination with Ether. Or, to take another ex­
ample: Theextensionofanatom, aparticular formor limit of extension
or Magnitude is provedbythis that therelativity or degree of extension
or Magnitude must somewhere cease; whereby the ultimate atom is
inferredas that in whichthelimit of extensionrests.
Theinference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inferenceof the
Soul byknowledge, etc., are inferences of the causebythe effect;sothat
theyare not instanced here.—9.
Marks of inference —continued.
ii * i t i %° u
Karyyatn, an effect. K&ryyantarasya, of another effect.
10. One effect (may be the mark of inference) of
another effect.— 126.
UpamkCira.—The author of the aphorisms illustrates the co-inherent or co-existent
mark :
Aneffect, e.g., Colour, is the mark of another effect, e.g., Touch.
This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which isnot an effect, e.g., the
unityof Ether, isa markof the individual separateness of Ether, and so
inthe caseof its extremelargeness.—10.
Above continued.

M I U ! ! II
fw fa - Virodhi, the contradictory. Abhfltam, the non-existent,
or non-product, or that which lias not taken place, - Bhfitasya, of the
existent, or that which has taken place.
*( M1;® VAISES1KA PHILOSOPHY. VCT
\y^.' -■<<'/ ' '" L"'"1""■' ’ '■ ' ” "■.. : ■..r
11. The opposite, i.e., the non-existent (is a mark) of
the existent.—127.
Upaskiim.—He illustrates the contradictory mark.
That whichhas not takenplace, e.g., ashower, isa markof that which
has taken place, e.g., the conjunction of air and clouds, (whereclouds
beingdispersed byair, showers donot takeplace). Soalsois the recita­
tionof amantra whichis thecontradictoryor counter-agent of a tumour,
etc. Thus that which has not taken place, i.e., has not beenproduced,
e.g., a tumour, etc., is the markof that which has taken place, e.g., the
recitationof amantra or sacred text, (whereatumour is preventedbythe
recitationof theappropriate mantra).—11.
Marks of inference—continued.

II \ \ \ I II
^--BhO tam , that which has taken place. —Abhdtasya, of that
; which has not taken place.
12. That which has taken place, (is u mark) of that
Avhich has not taken place.—128.
Opaskdra.—Ho gives another illustration ot a contradictory mark :
That whichhas taken place, e.g., a tumour, etc., is amark of that
„ whichhas not takenplace, e.g., the recitationof a mantra. So also that
whichhas takenplace, e.g., theconjunctionof air andclouds, is amark of
that which has not takenplace, e.g., ashower. Similarly, that whichhas
taken place, e.g., a burn, is a mark of that whichhas not takenplace,
e.g., the application of a gem, etc., to destroy the burning power of the
tire. Similarinstances shouldbeunderstood.—12.
Above continued.

II ^ II
BhGtali, that which has taken place. — BhQtasya, of that
whichlias takenpiace.
13. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that
which has taken place.—129.
Upaskara.—He illustrates another contradictory mark :
Thereis sometimes inference ofan existing contradictory froman­
other existing contradictory ; as when, on seeingasnakeswellingwith
anger, it is inferred thatthere is an ichneumon behind ahush. Inthis
case, thesnakeexcited is that whichis, i.e., is existent, andtheichneumon
hiddenby thebush is alsoinexistence. There is, therefore, an existent,
[/(' W w 1-14.
K A N AD A SOT RAS III, BQT
---------------- -—* —l~~.--
as themark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower
cannot exist at the same time'as theconjunctionof air and clouds, nor
cantumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of mantras.—13.
Marks of inference — continue<1.

11 ^ i ? n « ii
iH%fg,g ^ »qT^r-PiasiddliipQivakatvat, because preceded by (the recol­
lection of) the ‘ pervasion ’ or universal relation. ^PTfpcrtq; —Apadegasya, of the
mark.
14. (These are valid marks),because the characteristic
of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollec­
tion of the) universal relation (of itself and of that of which
it is a mark).—130.
Upaskdra.—Now he shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation :
‘Prasiddhi’ means recollection of universal relation. ‘ApadetJa’
denotes amark. Therefore, the mark attended with the recollection of
universal relation, is described by that member of anargument which
states the mark, or bythat member which states the deduction; so that
the markis, ashas beenstated, precededbyrecollectionof universal rela­
tion. Thus universalrelation, (i.e., atruemajorpremiss) existsinall these
cases of inference of anagent by the instruments such as the organ of
hearing, etc., andof the Soul as their substratumby the attributes suchas
knowledge, etc.; whereas there isnouniversal relation inthe inference by
whichyou(i.e., theopponent) havesought to establish knowledge as an
attributeof the body, through the mark that it is an effect of the body.
This is the import.
It maybeasked, what is tliis universal relation? ft is not merely
inviolable relation ; for, inthecaseof inferencefromcauseto effect, it is
not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is thebeingnot the
groundof the co-existenceof theabsolutenon-existence of that which has
toheproved, andbecause ininferencefromcause to effect it is impos­
sible that invariable concomitanceis the not being the seat of that which
is not theseat ofthat whichhas tobe proved, and also because smoko,
etc., arethe seat of that which is not the seat of that, whatever it may
be, whichhastobeproved.
Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence
of the markintheabsenceof that whichis to be proved, or existence of
the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be
proved. It cannot besaidthat because sometimes there is non-existence
(f[ J |l^ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. \£JJ
\
\%^— P m— ■■■——'—m m ^ —■ — >— — mmmmmm——m m m m m m m m m m m m i urn ■ ■ ■ HI I «w . i.h ■ ■■■■■.< III ■ ■ ■ »p i I III

of smoke, alsowhere noass exists, and there is existence of smokealso

whereanassexists, therefore uniformagreement and uniform difference
areintendedhere; because the very same uniformity is tho subject of
enquiry.
Nor is it relationtoawhole. If it bethe relation of the whole of
themajorterm to the middle term, such relation does not exist even
inthecaseofsmoke, etc., whichare not equallypervasive as their corres­
pondingmajorterms. Let it berelationof the whole of the middle term
to themajor term; but this is impossible, for there does not exist inthe
whole of themiddleterm relation to a single major term. Let it be
relationof the wholeof the major termto the whole of the middle term.
Thisalsois not valid, forit is nowherepossible thatthereshouldberelation
of the wholeof themajor termtothewholeofthe middle term, inasmuch
as the individualsdenotedby themajor andthe middle term are related
eachtoeach. Andin the case of the terms being unequallypervasive,
there wouldbeawant ofpervasionorunivessel relation.
Nor isthe relation essential. For essencemeans either the nature
or condition of athing, or ('conditioninitself, or production by itself)-
Now, ifthenominal affixwhichconverts ‘essence’intotheform*essential,’
hasthe senseof productionthereby, thenthe definitionwill be toonarrow
to apply to universal relation Characterisedas combination. If theaffix
bears thesenseof dependence uponit or residing in it, in that case also
the definitionwill be toonarrowto applytoCombination, for combination
doesnot reside in, i.e., dependupon, anythingwhatever; andalsobecause
evenConjunctionneither resides in, nor isproducedby, smoke-ness, etc.,
whicharetheproperties of the middle term.
Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-conditional. For an
upddhi, accident orexternal condition, itself isdifficult toascribe, and were
it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it easy to
conceive, it wouldstill involve ‘mutualdependence’or‘reciprocity’or argu­
ment inacircle, for there beingpervasionof the major term, theconcep­
tionofthenon-pervasion, etc., of themiddletermwoulddependupon the
conceptionof the universal relation.
Nor isuniversal relationmererelation. For, thoughvariablerelation
also appears as universal relation, through its reference to particular
place andparticular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does not govern
the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to determine that
universal relation onlywhich, bybeingknown, will becomethe means of
inference.
ii ' K A N A d a SUTRAS III , 1-14. l/ST
i f -r NTor is -universal
- - - - relation
- - - - -co--ex
- -isten
- - -ce- w
- ith
- - the
- - -m-ajor
- - -term
- - -w-hich
- xisL
not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaining to
that whichcontains the middle term, (i.e., the minor term). For fire also
isthecounter-oppositeof the absolute non-existence present inthat which
hassmoke, since it is not thatinakitchenhearth there is not the absolute
non-existenceof volcanic fire. In suchan instanceas“This has conjunc­
tion, because it isaSubstance, the definitionwouldbecometoonarrow, as
the absolute non-existence of Conjunction would be co-extensive with
themarkor means of inference. It cannot besaid, “Universal relation
is co-extensionwiththemajor termwhichis not the counter-opposite of
theabsolutenon-existence whichisco-extensive with itself and which is ‘
thecontradictoryof thecounter-opposite, becausetheabsolutenon-existence
of conjunction falls short of being the contradictory of the counter­
opposite.” Fortheabsolute non-existence ofconjunction alsois the con­
tradictoryof thecounter-opposite;otherwise, it would beuseless toima­
ginedifferences ofdelimitingcircumstances, fordifferencesof delimitations
arenot imagined for the purposeof showing the states of beingproduced
andnon-eternal.
Nor is universal relation thenot being the foundationor substratum
of non-co-extensionwiththe major term; for, in the inference fromcause
to effect, thereisnot known any such non-co-extension with the major
term. It is in fact another formofbeingthe foundationof that whichis
not thefoundationof themajorterm.
Noristheuniversal relationof athing the possession of the form
which determines its relationto somethingelse, for thecharacteristicof
firealsohas thefunction of determining relation to or the co-extension
ofsmoke. It cannot besaidthat becauseof wider extension this is not
thecase; for it is observed that, that whichdetermines thepervasionfe.g.,
fire)has awiderextension(in other words, fire exists where there is no
smoke), and thecharacteristicofSmoke also has a wider extension inas­
muchas thereexists smoke pendant on the surface of the sky (e.g., in
clouds). If therefore, aqualificationbeaddedfor thepurpose ofexcluding
suchinstances, thenit must be allowedthat, that which determines the
characteristicofbeingthemiddleterm (vyapya), the sameis intended to
determine the characteristic of beingco-extended, and hence there is the
fallacyof self-dependence (atmasraya). Theviewalsothat twothingsare
universallyrelated, whenthe onepossessestheformofdeterminingthe co­
existenceoftheother; inacommonsubstratum, isfallaciousinthesameway.
In replytotheaboveobjections, we mayproceedtostate as follows:
pervasionor universal relationis a non-accidental relation; while bythe
15
 n
If .VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. [A j
vk|lt-v~~--------------------- ------------------------ D iJ
^^'Sefng non-accidental is meant co-existence in thesame substratum with
a variably present sddhya or that whichhas to be proved {i.e., the major
termwhichis predicated of the minor, inthe conclusion), of all those in
which the mark or middle term is sometimes present and sometimes
absent, or co-existenceinthesamesubstratum with a sddhya co-existent
with theabsolute non-existence ofthecounter-oppositesof all those which
arethe counter-oppositesof the absolute non-existence co-existing in the
same substratumwiththe mark. The meaning of the two expressions is
co-existencein thesamesubstratumwiththesddhya whichis not pervaded
byanything that does not pervade the sadhana or the middle term; in
other words, it is the characteristic of beingpervadedby all that whichis
pervasive ofthesddhya. It maybesaid that this is difficult to under­
standfromthe relativecompound which has been employed here. For
this reason there is need of observation and argument also. In other
words, pervasion, vydpti, isco-existenceinthe same substratum with the
sddhya w hichis not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence
co-existinginthesamesubstratumwith the sadhana. By absolute non­
existenceisintendedthat whichpossesses the counter-opposite determined
bythegeneraof fire-ness, etc. Therefore, eventhoughinthesmoke ofthe
kitchenhearththereisco-existenceinthesamesubstratumwiththeabsolute
non-existenceof mountainfire, yet it isnofault, because there never arises
the intuitionthat thereisnot fire in that whichhas smoke. Substance-
ness, however, is neverco-existent inthe same substratumwith the abso­
lutenon-existence of the characteristic of beingin conjunction, for we
never havethe intuition that substance is not conjunct, because, although
conjunctions singly do not appear in that which is the subject of
pervasion, yet the generic quality of being conjunct appears in that
whichis the subject of pervasion, and is itself pervasive.
Objection.— But the being non-accidental implies the absence
of accident or adjunct, upddhi; and upddhi itself is difficult toobtain.
Answer.— It isnot so. Becausethe characteristic of upddhi belongs
to that which doesnot pervade thesadhana, i.e., the middleterm, while
it does pervade thesddhya, i.e., the major term. Soit has beensaid,
“upddhi is that whichis dependent uponanother upddhi, (for determining
non-accidentality), inthe caseof the sadhana, andwhichis not dependent
upon another upddhi, (for determining non-accidentality), in the caseof
thesddhya.”
Objection.— But the definition does not includeanupddhi whichis
only non-pervasiveof thesddhya. For example, Air is perceptible, because
M*.| H IT) KANADA SUTRAS I I I , 1 -1 4. G»■r
A -i'. \ ■•;4r--w?y /
\.-% ^ ...... ....... ...... ...
.. ., ,, . ...... ..............
—--------------- ------ — .... .. ■ .....
■» 1 ....... Ly A J
.1

it is the substratumof touch whichis perceptible. Here the possession

of developed colour issuch anupddhi. Soalso is the characteristic of
beingproduced byeating herbs (which might produce blackness), in,
“Heis black, becauseheis the sonof Mitra” (alow-bornwoman). For,
thepossessionof developed colour is not pervasiveof perceptibility, since
it does not exist inthe perception of theSoul as well asof Attribute and
Action; nor is the characteristicof being producedbyeating herbs per­
vasiveof blackness, sinceit doesnot exist inthecase of the blackness of
theblackcrow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.
Answer.— The objectionis not valid. For, that whichis non-perva-
siveof thesddhana, whileit ispervasive of the sadhya as finally deter­
mined,—the same is intended as the upddhi. And asadhya becomes
finallydetermined, whenit is determined byaproperty, bydetermination
bywhichthe pervasiveness of the upddhi remains unbroken. Inthein­
stancesgiven, the possessionof developedcolour is pervasive of percep­
tibilitybythe determination or limitationofexternal substantiality, and
is apprehended byagreement and difference. As regards the second
instance, it has been ascertained inthe works of Oharaka, Suflruta, and
other medical writers, that thecharacteristic of being producedbyeating
herbs ispervasive towards thesadhya determined bythe blackness of a
person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases should be
similarlyunderstood.
Objecticni.— Still it is not the meaning of the word, upddhi. An
upadhi is som ething thepropertyof whichshines inanother object, e.g.,
aChinarose, etc., inreference toacrystal, etc. In the caseof an un­
equally pervaded upddhi, there being absenceof the characteristic of
that whichcanbepervaded, its property cannot shine inthe approved
sddhana.
Answer.— This is true. The primary use of the word, upddhi, is
onlywhere it is equallypervaded(as thesadhya), e.g., inthe possession
of fireproducedfrommoist faggots, (for wherever there issuchfire, there
is smoke, andvise versa). Inother places, its use is secondary. The
secondary senseinfers variation, or deviation, accordingtothe rule that,
that which deviatesfromthe pervader of something, alsodeviates fi-om
that thing. Andthere exists sddhana which deviates fromthe upddhi
whichispervasiveof thesadhya. Hence, that thesddhana deviates from
thesadhya, and that, that whichis not pervaded bythat whichpervades
anobject, isalso not pervaded bythat object, together infer that there
is noproof of the characteristic ofbeingpervaded, or brings forward a
iif ^\%\ M’
U , VAISESTKA PHILOSOPHY . vfi] .
contraryargament, satpratipaksa, * there being proofof the non-existence
of thesadhya from the non-existence of the upddhi, which is pervasive
of thesadhya, in thepaksa, i.e., the subject, {whichis the minor term).
Soit has been said, “The disputant may bringforward an upadhi, go­
verningthe sadhya finallydetermined, eventhough it be divorced from
the rule or determination of the sadhya maintained bythespeaker, such
upadhi beingequally (am eans of discrediting the conclusion, or) asource
ofsatpratipaksa." Andsuch upadhi is brought forward by arguments
adverse totheabsence ofarguments infavour of bddha, obstruction, [i.e.,
thecertaintyof the non-existenceof thesadhya), and deviation(i.e., the
non-co-existenceof thesadhana withthesMhya).
it has been held that by the non-co-existence of which thenon-co­
existenceof the sadhana withthesadhya arises, the same isupadhi. But
herethe instrumental case-ending is usedtoexpress neither instrument,
nor means, nor mode, nor mark. Nor is the constructionto becompleted
thus, By thenon-co-existence of whichbeing known, the non-co-existence
of the sadhana with thesadhya becomes known-, for the definition, not
applyingtoan unknownupadhi, wouldnot apply toupddhis in obvious
cases of non-co-existence. It is difficult to ascertain it {i.e., upadhi)
significativelyor byits significance, since it is impossible toformulateor
invent, anupddhi without (first; establishing the characteristic of being
themeans of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteristic of
beingother thanthepaksa (or thesubject of the conclusion), again, though
sufferingfromthecharacteristic of an upddhi, is yet not an upddhi ; for, it
wouldinvolveobstructiontoitself, e. g., dubiousness and nof-one-pointed-
ness inthe paksa. For, if thereis nodoubt about it, thenit is notapaksa ;
if it is apaksa, then doubt is necessary, andconsequently, dubiousness
and not-one-pointed-ness becomecertain. That which remains to besaid
onthis topic, maybesought in theMayukha.—14.
* A satpratipaksa has been defined as “ an argument which contains a counter-mark
capable of demonstrating the non-existenoe of that which has to be proved," (vide Tarka-
samgraha).
Enumeration of fallacies.

wnfagtarafrfbqffitufeuwru'm r: 11 3 i ? i 11
Aprasidhah, unproved, Anapade^ali, a fallacious mark.
* 1 ^ Asan, non-existent, Saudigdhah, dubious. =sr Cha, and. WT^t-"
Anapadesah, A fallacious mark.
15. The unproved is a false mark ; the non-existen
and the dubious also are false murks.—131,
 S KANADA SUTRAS III, 1-16. Vfl .
wggv'y -------------------------- ---------------- *— —
Upaskdra.—Now, with a view to distinguish (logical) marks (of inference), which have
gone before as well as those which will come hereafter, from fallacious marks, he begins
the section of fallacies, and says :
‘Aprasiddhah’means that which is not pervaded or in universal
relation, andthat the universal relationof whichhas not beenobserved,
andthat whichis in opposite universal relation, i.e., the contradictory.
Thewordincludes thetwo formsof the unproved, inpoint of universal
relationor being pervaded, and the contradictory. ‘Asan’means non­
existent in the pak$a or the minor term, i. e., that which has not the
propertyor possibility of residing in the pak$a or subject. Andthis is
duesometimes tothe unreality of the form(attributedtothe mark), and
sometimes totheabsence of uncertainty and the desire toprove (as) in
theproof of that whichhas beenalready proved. ‘Sandigdhah’ means
that whichcauses the doubt whether the sadhya be existent or non-exist­
ent (inthesubject of theconclusion). Andthis arises sometimes fromthe
observation ofacommonproperty, sometimes from the observationof a
non-commonproperty, andsometimes fromthe observation of the mark
accompanyingthesddhya as well as itsnon-existence. The first is general
multifarious, thesecond is particular multifarious, and the third is incon­
clusive.—15.
Fallacy illustrated.

cr^TT^: II ^ I 11 K\ II
Yaamat, because, f^qrnfl Visdni, (It) has horns. ?rWfl Tasmat,
therefore. A^vah, a horse.
16. Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a horse.—
132.
Upaskdra.—Of the above-mentioned false marks, he gives an illustration of a mark
which is fallacious because-it is not pervaded by the denotation of the major term, also
because it is contradictory, and also because it is not known to exist in the form attri­
buted to i t :
Where, the body of anass becoming the paksa or subject of the
conclusion, suchconfusion, as “This is what is a horse, because it has
horns,”due totheobservation of the negative co-existence (or, simply,
disagreement) that that whichis not a horse is not borred as a hare,
ajackal, a man, a monkey, etc., prevails, there it is an example of
the not-pervaded, the unreal, and the contradictory marks {i.e., the
fallacies of non-pervasion, unreality, andcontradiction).—16.
Above continued.
 5
A. * i 1■ ■ '
(!( § 4 ? VAI§ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. iflT
----------*------ ——
-——
--------——
---------- -1JX 1
^PTfil Yasmat, because. Rr^rruft Visant, (it) lias horns. TasraSt,
therefore. »rr: Gauh, a cow. 5 ^ Iti, such, this. ^ Cha, and.
Anaikdntikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark. Udaha-
ranam, an example.
17. And, “ Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is)
cow,” such is the example of a many-sided (mark).—133.
UpasMra.—Ee illustrates multifariousness:
Where,‘takingabuffaloas the pakm or subject, it is concludedthat
it isacowbecause it hashorns, there is general many-sided-ness. But
whenit is concludedthat Ether is eternal becauseit is the seat ofSound,
then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also insuch examples as
“Soundis non-eternal because it is sound,”therebeing no universal
relation, there is onlyparticular many-sided-ness. But when thesddhya
or themiddle termis proved(toexist) only in the pahsa or the minor
term, by bringingforwardarguments whichexcludevipaksa* orcontrary
instances, it is then, that is, whenco-existencewithsapak^af (or objectsof
thesameclassas thepak$a), becomes known, that the markof inference
is avalid mark, for apa/cjof alsomust be asapabsa.
There, (i.e., in the fifteenth Sutram above), the unproved is
that whichis not proved by pervaded appearance in the paksa. And
it is three-fold: (a) unprovedinpoint of being pervaded, <b) unproved
as such or by itself, (i.e., inrespect of the formattributed toit), and(e)
unproved bysubstratumor situation. Of these, the unproved in point
of being pervaded, is that of whichthepervasionor invariable co-exist­
ence hasnot beenobserved, whether fromthe non-observationof actually
existingpervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion. Hence the
non-existenceof favourablearguments, etc., are different kinds of the un­
proved. Andthis invalidmarkhas athousand divisions accordingtothe
diversityof impassibilityof predicate, impossibility of subject, impossi­
bility ofboth, uncertaintyandimpossibilityof predicate, uncertaintyand
impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility of both, andso
on. Andinall thesecases, onlyabsence ofproof canbediscerned.
Here theidea is this: Themarkof inference is of three kinds only,
according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and-
negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, thepurelypositive
* Vipaksci is. that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
| Sapakva is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
| Paksa or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is
doubtful.
/V=®'S$\
;■|| : K A N l D A SUTRAS III, 1-17.

isTan attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (i.e., objects) ;

e.g., know ableness, nameableness, qualifiability, predicability, absolute
non-existence of annihilation in attributes, etc., destructible by the
destruction of the substratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal
substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these
attributes do not exist. Thecharacteristic of the purely positive, there­
fore, isthat it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite
of absolutenon-existence. Though theseexist in themselves also, (and
so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and the
contained, is violated), that is no fault; for it has been said, “In the
case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse
should be had to proof, andnot tothat whichestablishes differenceand
non-difference.”
That markispurelypositive, of whichthesddhya ispurelypositive.
Of this there arefour forms, namely, existence of the pakm, existence of
thesapakm, unobstructedness, andthenot beingconfronted with asatpra-
tipakm or equally valid argum ent tothecontrary, whichare the means
ofleadingtoinference. Thesame, together withthe non-existenceof the
vipak^a, are the fiveform sof thepositive-and-negative. Withtheexception
of the existence of the sapaksa, theremainingarethefour forms of the
purelynegative. That mark, therefore, is a mere semblance, i.e., a false
mark, whichisvoidof oneor anotherofalltheformswhich, asatruemark,
it might possess as the means of leadingtoaninference. Accordingly,
thecharacteristicof beingafalsemarkor fallacy, is the beingvoidof one
or another of the forms which arethemeansof leadingtoaninference.
Hence doubt also, like certainty, about the voidnessof one or another
of these forms, is an obstructiontoinference, andproof of the inconchi-
siveness of the mark put forward by the speaker. But the purely
positive and purely negative marks do not become fallacies by being
void of one or another of their forms; because, in thecase of the
purelypositive, non-existenceof thevipaksu, andin thecaseof the purely
negative, existence of the sapakqci, lack the characteristicof beingthe
means of leading to aninference. Similarly, the unprovedbysituation
{e.g., acastle inthe air), the unproved by itself {e.g., agolden lion), and
the unproved in part, arefallacies byreasonof the absenceof that form
whichisexistenceof thepakm ; theunprovedinpoint ofbeing pervaded,
the contradictory, and the general many-sided, arefallacies byreasonof
defect in that formwhichis non-existenceof vipaksa ; theparticularmany-
sided and the inconclusivearefallacies byreasonof delect as regards ex­
istenceof thesapak§a ; the obstructed andtheconfrontedwithanequally
> ^ - st' ___

55 § 26f VA1&ESIRA philosophy. vCT

----------------- —....... <■ ■ .—- ..— ■■- Kf A- -1
valid argument to thecontrary, are fallaciesbyreasonof the absenceof
thecharacteristicsofnotbeingobstructedandof not beingconfronted with
an equally validargument tothecontrary. So also, accidental-ness and
inapplicability donot lead toinference, becauseof theabsenceofcertainty
of the non-existence of thevipaksa ; absenceoffavourable argument, and
unfavourable argument, alsodo not lead to inference because of the
absenceof certaintyof the non-existence of thevipaksa. Inlike manner,
apparent (but fallacious) examples, inadequate inregardtothesadhya, or
inregardtothe sadhana, or inregard toboth, if invalidasbeingfallacies,
are so through theuncertaintyof the existenceof thesapaksa. If they
are fallacious by themselves as being examples in appearance only,
yet they are somediatelythroughthe mark which is the same uncer­
taintyofexistenceofthesapaksa.
Marks of which thepositiveness or agreement is not manifest, and
marks of which the negativenessor difference is not manifest, however,
are resolvedonlyinto the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground
of defeat.
Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and
infiniteregression, byunsettlingthecertaintyof universal relationor per­
vasion, become deficient inrespect of oneor theother of the forms of
existenceof the sapaksa and non-existence of thevipaksa, and thereby
acquire the nature offallacies.
Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence,
which causes doubt alternating between the existence and the non­
existenceof the sadhya. The contradictoryisthat fallacy whichproduces
certaintyof the non-existence of thesadhya. Theunprovedisthat which
is void of pervasion, existenceinthepahsa, andproving. Accordingto
Karfyapa, obstructionandan equallyvalid argument to the contrary are
not independent fallacies. Of these, obstructionresolves itself either as
the unprovedby situation, or as the many-sided; as it has been said,
“In obstruction (bddha), the markis either non-existent inthepak$a, or
is many-sided.” An equally valid argument to the contrary, also, by
causingdoubt in respect of pervasion or invariable co-existence, etc., in
other places, reallyresolves itself intothe many-sided, etc.
The writer of thevritti, however, says that the word, ‘cha,’inthe
Sfitram, (Til,i, 15, ibid.), hasthesense
of bringing forward bddha (obstruction), and satpratipahsa (an equally
valid argument tothecontrary), andtherebyfollowsthe viewof Gautama
as expressedinthesAtram, “Fallaciesarefive, that whichis accompanied
■i H :5 KAN AD A SUTRAS III, 1-18.

"witli non-co-existence, thecontradictoxy, that whichis identical with the

paksa, that w hichis identical withthesadhyu andthat whichispast in
time,”(Ny&yaSutrain,,!. ii.4). But, fromsuchstatements as “Thecontra­
dictory, theunproved, and the dubious, declaredKadyapa, areno marks,”
it appears that the Sutrakara, (i.e., Kanada), himself was inclined to
uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word‘cha,’however, has the
object ofbringingforwardwhat has beenstated before.
This is the idea. I have not dilateduponit for fear ofincreasing
thebulkof the book. Moredetails should besought inMayukha.—17.
^ W f r T ^ c f MIU^H
Atma-indriya-artba-sannikarsat, from contact of the
soul, the sense, and the object, Yat, which. Nispadyate, is produced.
<T(jTat, that. Anyat, other, different.
18. That (i.e., knowledge) which is produced from
the contact of the soul, the sense, and the .object, is other
(than a false m ark)—134.
tlpaskara.—He now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies :
Fromthe contact of th,esoul, the sense, and the object, it is know­
ledge that isproduced. And it isamarkoftheexistenceof thesoul, and,
as suchamark, is different from the unproved, the couti-adictory, and
the many-sided, that is tosay, is not afallacy. Thus, knowledge is, in
two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul; either bythe infer­
ence that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is aneffect, like
colour, etc., or byassuming the formof recognition, e.g., “I who sawam
the sameasI whoamtouching.” Inthe former case, effectness belonging
to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion “(that) whichis
pi'oduced;”nor it iscontradictory, for here, as inall other instances of
analoguous inference or inference fromasamdnyatodrista or commonly-
observedmark, therecanbenocontradiction; nor is it many-sided, for the
very same x-eason. Sothat bymeans of the commonly-observed charac-
tei’istic, appertainingtoit, viz .,ofbeing an effect or an atti-ibute, know­
ledge truly becomesamark of the existenceof the soul. Recognition,
again, resiling fromother agents, resolves into havingbut one agent ox-
cause.
(TheBauddliatheoi-ycriticised.)
Objection.— Recognition maybealso due entirelytothe relationof
effect andcause subsistingbetweenunderstandingandconsciousness.
16
/.& >?t~ %•\ S ^
(f( g8fj; VA1SES1KA PHILOSOPHY. l£^[
.—This cannot be, as it would entail recognition alsoof the
Answer
understandings of the discipleand thepreceptor.
Objection.— But the relation of the matter (i.e., knowledge which
causes 'activityor inclination) and the formdoes not exist there; and that
relation is the excitingcauseof recognition.
Answer.— ‘Matter,’having the propertyofSubstance, cannotpossibly
exist in the understanding (which isanattribute). Evenif its existence
were possible, understandings beingmomentary, recognitionofwhat was
perceivedbefore, wouldnot bepossible. For, noimpression is thrust into
subsequent understandings byaprevious understanding, sinceyoudonot
admit the existence of anabiding impression. Andif it consists of the
formof astreamof temporary understandings, it cannot be the cause of
recollectionat another time, nor of recognition.
Objection.— The streamofsubjective consciousness, whichisreally
different fromthe streamofobjectiveconsciousness, isthat whichrecollects
• aswell as that whichrecognises.
Answer.— If it ispermanent, then our object isfulfilled. If it isof
the formof astream of temporary understandings, thenit has not yet
freeditself fromthe fault alreadypointedout; for theneventherecanbe-
nopermanent impression. Moreover, proof is*wantingthat it is something
different fromobjective consciousness.
Objection.— Proofissuppliedbythestreamofunderstandings, ‘Iam,’
‘I am,’and soon.
Answer.—Maybe. But if here statesof objective consciousness take
inor receiveas their matter, only the subjective consciousness, then, in
the absenceof the characteristic of being the matter, from the statesof
objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will disappear; for
efficient causalityis derivedfromthe characteristicof being pervadedby
thecharacteristic of thematerial cause.
Objection.— Let therebenoefficient causalityalso.
Answer .— In that case, their existence alsois gone. For the cha­
racteristicof anentity or real substance isthat it is the means of serving
necessarypurposes.
Objection.— Boththe streams are received, as material, jointly by
the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective
consciousness.
Ansicer.— If it is so, thenwhat fault has beencommittedbyconjunc­
tionof wholes madeupofparts, etc., when you also admit that acause
canoperate at adifferent place?
(* ( f i P i
• ..____ ;_____ ;
KAN AD A SUTRAS i n , 1-19. 1S T
__ _ _ _ ____ ____________________ m 1

Therefore, recognitionproves, asbeingpermanent, thesoul whichis

inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains
unproved.
Or, thesutram, iscalculatedto
refute the Samkhyatheory that the understanding, being eternal, is not
fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted thus :
what you call the principleorentity, »i&,the understanding, is nothing
but knowledge; for, there is the statement of synonyms, namely, “under­
standing, comprehension, knowledge.” And it is produced from the
contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than the inner sense the
existenceofwhich youadmit. This is the meaning. The import, there­
fore, isthat that does become the markof theexistenceof the soul.—18.
Vivriti .—Hegives another proofof theexistenceof theSoul:
From ‘contact,’i.e., of the mind with the ‘object of the sense,’
whichis the ‘soul,’inother words, fromtheconjunctionof the soul and
themind, the ‘knowledge whichisproduced,’intheformof“I amhappy,”
etc., is ‘different,’ i.e., other than inference, as a proof of the existence
of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge
produced bythe cognitionof the soul and the mind, is perceptual, since
the definitionofperceptionis knowledge produced fromthecontact of the
senses and objects. Although such perception does not prove the soul
asdifferent fromthe body, etc., yet, as it proves the soul ingeneral, it is
unobstructed. This is the import.
Or, the sutram states that the mark which infers the soul, isnot a
falsemark.
n lit tRST II? It l « H
STffrTf^fTft Pravritti-nivritti, activity and inactivity, occupation and
withdrawal. =ar Cha and. Protyag-atmani, in the in-going or
in-dwelling soul, in one’s own soul. 3$ Driste, observed, Paratra,
elsewhere, of other souls, fa fu Liftgam, mark.
19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one’s
own soul, are the mark of (the existence of) other souls.—135.
Upnskdrn.—Having described the inference of one’s own soul, he now shows the
inference of other souls :
‘Pratyag-atmani’means inone’s own soul. ‘Pravritti-nivritti’ are
particular volitionscausedbydesireandaversion. Bythemareproduced
bodilyactions, characterisedas or muscular motion, of whichthe ob­
jects are the acquisition of the agreeable and the avoidance of the
((f # 2 ^ V A ISE STK A PHILOSOPHY. |n j
'i:^£,i-"'f‘ r ■ ■■■ ■
“‘■■yr I,.—-— ■■ '.---- '
' dtSagreable. Sothat, onobserving muscular motionin anotherbody, the
inferenceofanother sonl takesplace inthe followingmanner : This mus­
cular motionmust havebeenproduced by volition, because it is muscular
motion, as ismymuscular motion. Andthat volition, is th product of a
soul, or is seated ina.soul, because it is volition, as is myvolition.—19.
Here ends thefirst chapter of the third bookinthe Commentaryof
Sankara upon the VaisfesikaAphorisms.
B ook T h ir d — C h apter S eco n d .

Mark of the existence of Mind.

inuuii
Atmendriy&rthasannikarse, on contact of the Soul with
the senses and their objects. Jnanasya, of knowledge. *rpr: Bhavah,
existence, production, appearance. ^PTPf: Abhavah, non-existence, non-
productionlnon-appearance. ^ Cha, and. Manasah, of the Mind.
Lingam, Mark.
1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge
on contact of the Sonl with the senses and their objects, are
the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.—136.
Vpaskdra.—Distinction ot real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the
(preceding) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Sonl to a close, the author,
by a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (vide F.i. 5), introduces
the examination of the Mind, and says :
He will saythat themovement of theMindis themark(of the Soul).
If, therefore, Mindis foundonexaminationtohethe instrument or means
of knowledge, andasbeing dense, moulded, or ponderable (5SJ%), then it
becomes provedthat the Soul is that, beingdirectedbywhich, the Mind
comestobeconnected with thesenseapprehensiveof the desiredor agree­
able object., rather than withanyother sense. This is the reason of the
violationof theorder ofenumeration. The meaning isthat the Hindis
that which, therebeingcontact ofthe Soul withthe senseand its object,
beingconnectedwith the sense, there is production of knowledge, and
whichnot beingsoconnected with thesense, there is non-productionof
knowledge.
Objection.— Mindisall-pervadingor universal. Nevertheless, non­
simultaneityof knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind
possesses theproperty of an instrument. Moreover, Mind is universal
because, likeTime, it isa substance void of any distinctive attribute;
[I j|; 'Jy K AN ADAw STBAS HI, 2-lT * l^ jj^
because, like theSoul, it is the substratumof Conjunction which is the
non-combinative causeofknowledge; andbecause, like Ether, it possesses
the absolute non-existenceofTouch; and there are similar other proofs
\

ofits universality.
Answer.— It is not so. If Mind were universal oi all-pervading,
thenas it wouldbeconnectedwithall thesenses, there would be onlyone
cognitionincludingall the senses (i.e., omni-sensuous). If it-be replied
that (objection) suchisnot thecase, becausethere is acontrariety amongst
the effects; wedeny this, (answer) for a complete cause does not take
noticeofcontrarietyandnon-contrarietywherebyit might beapprehensive
of thecontrarietyof thecharacteristics ofbelongingto perception bythe
eye, theorganof taste, etc. It cannot be said, (objection) “Or, it (cogni­
tion) maybeof avariegated form like variegatedcolour, as it is inthe
caseof eating some pudding,”(where perceptions oftaste, flavour, etc.,
takeplace all together); for, (answer) even thereattention or attachment
toaparticular object (i.e., tasteor flavour, etc.) is observed. Nor can
it beasked, (objection) “Howthendoes the complex belief arise, viz., ‘ I
perceiveColour, Taste, Smell, andTouch simultaneously’?”; for, (answer)
it ismerelyasenseofsimultaneity inrespect of the five cognitions, pro­
duced bythe swiftlymoving Mindand presented in memory. It cannot
beobjectedthat attention to particular objects is also dependent upon
thepropertyof the instrument, for the answer has already been given.
If it bemaintained (objection) that attention depends uponthe desireto
understand; wedenythis, for, (answer)onthat supposition, it wouldfollow'
that when there was a desire to understand all, there would be atotal
presentation of all objects, whereas the onlyresult of a desireto under­
standisconnectionof Mindwiththesensepercipient of the object desir­
ed. Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise
impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility.
Consequently, themarks of universality are obstructed by proof which
comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-per-
vading, thentherewouldnot besuchlocal character of pleasure, etc., as
in“pleasure in my foot,” “pain inmy head,” etc,; for, the effectsof
‘universal substances’uniformlyappear in places delimited bytheir non-
combinativecauses. It cannot besaid that in our view also it follows
that pleasure, etc., areconfined tothe placeof the atom; for, therule is
that anon-combinativecausereallyproduces anextensiveeffect at its own
place, so that thereis nooppositiontotheir productioneven beyondthe
limits of their instrumental causes, e.g., sandal-wood, etc. It cannot be
urged, “Mine toois request for remoteness fromtheinstrument causes; ”
 /'A
[i( V AT SERI K A PHILOSOPHY. _____________

for, it wouldentail abreachof theabove uniformity. Further, how will

thorebeconjunction of the universal Mindwith the Soul? It cannot be
replied that it is without beginning, for thendisjunctionwill alsoneces­
sarilybecome beginningless. It cannot be said that owingto the differ­
ence of their limitations (be., substrata wherein they take place), both
of themremain uncontradicted; for, the differenceof the limitations of
conjunctionand disjunction depends upontheir own causes, whereas in
thecaseof the difference ofthings which haveno beginning, suchdepen­
dencedees not exist. This is thedirection.—1.
Mind is a substance, and is eternal.

3TT|?rT il Hi r i ii
ACT Tasya, its, of the mind. Dravyatva-nityatve, substance-
ness and eternality. Vayuua, by Air. sjrmsifff Vyakhyate, explained.
2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind ar
explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and
eternality of) Air.—137.
Upaskdra.—Now, it may be asked, “ The perception of pleasure, etc.,is producible
by an instrument, because it is an act, like the perception of Colour : from inference in this
way, or by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, Mind is proved as the instrument
of that perception. But whence does it derive its Substance-ness, and eternality ?” Hence
he sa y s:
As the ultimate atom of Air, inferredfromSubstance made upof
parts, isaSubstance, because it possessesattribute and action; so Mind,
inferred by the non-productionof simultaneouscognition, isa Substance,
becauseit posseses attribute. For it is not productiveof cognition, without
conjunctionwiththe sense, wherebyit might appear that possession of
attribute does notbelongto it. Moreover, the presentation of pleasure,
etc., (tothe Soul) must have a sense as its instrument, because it is a
presentation, likethe presentationof Colour, etc. Hence Mind is proved
as an instrument or sense. And the beingasense means thebeingthe
foundationor seatof theconjunctionof the Mindwhich is the instrument
ofcognition ; sothat the Subtance-ness ofMindis proved without much
ado. And its eternality follows fromits not being made up of an­
other Substance. And this latter characteristic follows fromthe absence
1 of anyproof for thesuppositionof its beingmade upof parts.—2.
Mind is one.

I l l H MU \ II
a x
R
\
Ilk KAN AD A SUTRAS I I I , 2-3.
''"'"... " "''
13\fiT
'■ '
tTQSIT^*T^T(l Prayatnayaugapadyaf, from the non simultaneity of voli­
tions. 5rprrlf»T'FErrfl Jn&nayaugapadyat, from the non-simultaneity of cogni­
tions. ^ —Cha, and. <rqR«l Ekam, one.
3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from
the non-simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is
only) one (Mind) (in each organism)— 138.
Upasfatra. —Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than one Mind,
existing in each individual body. He states the means of decision :
“Mindineacli organism” isthecomplement of the Sutram.
If there were many Minds in a single organism, thencognitions
and volitions would besimultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that
manyvolitions are producedat oneand the same time, because simulta­
neous actions are observedin the fingers of the hands and the toes of the
feet of a dancing girl ;for, that beingexplained or possible bytheswift
movement aloue of the Mind, simultaneity of the necessaryor correspond­
ing particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state, is not
obtained. Hereby {i.e., by the non-simultaneity of the necessaryparti­
cular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state), the theorythat
inoneand the samebodythere arefiveMinds, and that on theconjunc­
tionof two, three, four or fiveof themwith their respective senses, two,
three, four or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted,
as it would entail a superfluity of supposition ; while the sense of
simultaneity is upheld fas an illusion). The implicationof the simul­
taneity of two cognitions, e.g., the cognitions “bittertreacle,”produced
bytheconnectionof the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, under the
limitationof thesense-organof Taste, alsodoes not exist in view of the
property{i.e., of rapid transition) of theinstrument or internal sense, (i.e.,
Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into
two or three pieces, arises from the impact ofthe chopper, etc., or the
rapid transition of the Mind, or theinvisible operationof another (and
barren) Mindwhich hasjust slippedofffroma liberated Soul.
The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a
leech, and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of aleech,
simultaneity andnon-simultaneityofcognitions arerespectivelyproduced,
is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the suppositionof its parts.
| This is the direction.—3.
Marks of the existence of the Soul.
q wHut-in J c-h twina ifourr-a j hi mr:
fasrfir i n u i m
 ............ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
...... vfiT
...............:__k_y JL^
Prana-Apana-Nimesa-Unmesa-
Jivana-Manogati-Indriyantaravikarali, ascending life-breath, descending
life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the movement
of the Mind, and affections of the other senses. Sukha-
Dliupkha-lchchha-Dvesa-Prayatna-Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and
Volition. Cha, and. sgrpW Atmanah, of the Soul. LingSni,
marks.
4. The ascending life-breath, the descending lif
breatli, the closing of the ey.e-lids, the opening of the eye­
lids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affections of
the other senses, and also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion,
and Volition are marks (of the existence) of the Soul.—139.
Upaskura.—Now, showing the purpose of the violation of tho order of enumeration,
lie says, With a view to complete the enquiry into the Soul:

| ■ It must not beimaginedthat cogn_ition itself is the only mark of ;

the Soul. There are also the ascendinglife-breath, etc., whicharc the
marks of the Soul. Thus that is surelythe Soul in consequence of the
volition of which the upward anddownwardmotions intheair moving
within thebody andcharacterisedas the ascending and the descending
life-breath, take place, not being possible otherwise than byvolition,
just as the throwing upwardandthe throwingdownward of apestle, etc.,
(ina mortar, etc.), arenot possible without volition. For, Air, the nature
of whichis to blowobliquely, cannot undergo such change of nature
without volition. It cannot be said that two bodies of Air flowingin
opposite directionsandproducing different effects may, like two similar
bodies of water, havean upwardmotion. For, were this thecase, there
wouldbe thenthe upward motion only but not the downward motion,
nor the oblique motion as in exsufflation or blowing by the mouth.
There is thenabeing, who, by his volition, impels theair upwards or
downwards. It cannot beaskedhowthere could be upward and down­
wardmotions of the ascendingand descending life-breaths inastate of
deep or dream-less sleep; for, at that time, though volitionproper does
not exist, thereexists another kind of volition which is called volition
the source of vitality. In like manner, theclosingandtheopeningof
the eye-lids also infer apresiding agent in the organism. Thus the
closing of the eye-lids (n 'mesa) isanactionwhichpi'oduces the conjunc­
tion of tirelids of theeye; unmesa or the opening of the eye-lids is an
action which produces their disjunction. These two actions, being
constantlyproduced without anyvisible cause, such as molecular motion,
(Kw^l KAVADA SUTRAS III, 2-4. ltfrr
s\y
\J j^
& 4/■ -:4~~------------------ — ----------------------------------- 3kyJU
fsl ,
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impact, etc., arenot producedotherwise thanbyvolition. As thedancing
ofawoodenmanikindependsuponsomeone’svolition, so also does the
dancingof theeye-lids. Therebyanentity, possessingvolition, isinferred.
Similarly, lifealsois a markof the Soul. Thus by the word ‘life’ the
effects of vitality, such as growth, thebuildingupof wounds, fractures,
etc., areindicatedbyimplication. Sothat as the owner of ahouse builds
up a broken edifice or enlarges abuilding which is toosmall, sothe
presiding agent of theorganism effects, by food, etc., the increase or
enlargement of the organism which is to him.in thesteadof ahabita­
tion, andwithmedicineandthelike, causes what is wounded to grow
again, and broken hands and feet to grow together again. Thuslike
themaster ofahouse, aguardian of the body is also proved. In the
same way, the movement of the Mindalsois a markof the Soul. Thus
it hasbeenproved, intheforegoing section, that the Mind is something
moulded or ponderable [murta) and that it is indivisible. Its applica­
tiontoasensepercipient ofthe desiredobject is dependent upon desii-e
and attention. So that the inference is that the Soul is that being
whose desire and attention direct the Mind, as aboy standing at the
corner of aroomsends atop or aball of lac hither and thither within
theroomitself.
It maybeobjected, “The dancer of the woodenmanikin, the master
ofahouse, or the boy (referred toabove) isnot different fromhisbody,
sothathe couldbe adduced as an example. Moreover, it is the body
which is theseat ofconsciousness inasmuchas it is theobject of thesense
of I-ness (ahathlidra) ; for, there are “ I amfair,”“ I amstout,”*andthe
likeintuitions whichareco-extensivewithI-ness. It may be urged that,
on this theory, aman would not recollect in his youthor oldagewhat
heperceivedinhis boyhood, because as in the case of adifference of
bodies, like those of Chaitra and Maitra, sohere toothere wouldbeno
recognition, onthemaxim, “Onedoes not remember what another saw.”
Here we may point out that Chaitra and Maitra being twodifferent
currents, theremaynot beanycorrelation, whereas (inthecaseof asingle
individual) inspiteof the differences of boyhood andyouth, the current
being the same, correlation by means of therelationofcause andeffect
will bepossible.” Tothis argument wewill reply that it would follow,
on the above theory, that the son also would remember what was
perceivedbythefather. If it berejoinedthat perceptionof the difference
ofbodyprevents this, wereplythat correlation(intheformofrecollection)
will not bepossiblealsointhe case of an old man who perceives his
| present body only as different fromthe body whichhe hadasaboy
I 17
(?(s^7^1______ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY._____________ l^L
andalsothat thereis noperception of the difference of body for aboy
wholias never lcnownhis father. In “My body,” the sense of I-ness
appears as identical with the sense of *My-ness’(andnot as identical
withtheintuitionofthe body). If it herepliedthat thesame holds good
in the case of “My Soul” also; we replythat it does not, becausethe
useof ‘My’is theretropical, since the genitivemaybe used even where
there is nodifference, asin “The headof Raliu” (Rahubeingall head).
Theconsequences of killing, etc. (i.e., Merits and Demerits) also will
not result to theagent or doer, ashis bodywill bedifferent and different
(at everystageof transmigration). Further, (on your theory), conscious­
ness beinglimitedtothebhutas or elements (which constitute the body
andaredifferent at every new birth), if aman desires asinful act, he
will escape the consequences of his ownacts, and there will be alsothe
defect of the acquisition of the results of acts not done by him who
experiences them. This is thepoint.
“Fromthe affectionsof theother senses.”—For surely is observed
an overflow of thesalivaryjuice, induced byastrong desirefor the taste,
of onewho, after experiencingthe particular taste, accompanied by the
particular colour, of anorangeor achira-oillva, observessuchfruit again.
Now, this cannot takeplacewithout the inference of the acid taste; nor
the inference, without the recollectionof theuniversal relationorinvari­
ableco-existence (of the tasteandthecolour); nor the recollection, with­
out impression (Samsk&ra); nor the impression, without theexperience
of theuniversal relation; nor theexperience, without repeatedobservation.
This concatenationof cognitions, standingtoone another in the relation
of cause and effect, cannot be possible without (the existenceof) aself­
sameagent. Thus thereistheSutram of Gautama. “Fromthe affections
of theother senses.” (Nyaya-Sutram, III. i. 12).
Pleasure andthelike also are to be regarded, like cognition, as
marks of the Soul. Thus pleasure and thelikemust reside somewhere
or must reside in some substance, because they are things which are
produced, or qualities like colour, etc. Hence aninferencebyanalogy,
accompaniedbyanexclusionof other possibilities, takes for its subject
inherence or residence inaSubstance other than the eight Substances.
For the proposition that desirewhichdoesnot reside inEarthandseven
other Substances, resides inaSubstance, isnot complete unlessit assumes
as itsmoodthebeingresident inaSubstanceother than the eight Subs­
tances. Where, however, exclusionof other possibilities does not appear
at first, there the being resident inaSubstance other than the eight
substances, will have to be proved byargument fromeffect tocauseor
 _______ KAN AD A SUTRAS , 2-6. ______
'^Tnegafive reasoning. This is the distinction. It is absurd to say that
inferencehas onlythe moodof that which determines the universal rela­
tion; for that alone is the mood there, without whichtheintuitionor
inference wouldnot result. Otherwise, in “A dyad not being resident
in an effect, must reside somewhere, because it is a whole made up
of parts,” and such other cases, there would benoinference havingfor
its moodthe beingresident in a non-effect.—A.
Soul ie a substance, and is eternal.
^TT IU i * i HII
Tasya, its, of the Soul. Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness
and eternality. Vfiyunfi, by Air. Vyakhyfite, explained.
5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by
(the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of)
Air.—140.
Upaskara.—Well, granted that there is proof of a fixed Soul. But whence is it eter­
nal, and whence is it a Substance ? To meet this objection, he says :
As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate
atomofAir, andthereforeAir is eternal, soalso in the case of the Soul.
As the ultimate atomof Air is aSubstance, because it possessesattributes,
soalsois theSoul. This is the meaning.—5.
Objections : 1. Marlt of the Soul, not visible.

jUcR tT :
Yajnadattah, He is Yajnadatta. Iii, this. uHlSisf Sannikarse,
there being contact. Pratyaksfibhavfit, from the absence of per­
ception. Because there is no perception. ^ Dristam, visible. Lingam,
mark, tj Na, not. Vidyate, exists.
6. There is no visible mark (of the existence of the
Soul), because there being contact (of the senses with the
body of Yajnadatta), perception does not arise that this Soul
is Yajnadatta.—141.
Upaskara.—He cites an objection of the opposite party to the foregoing conclusion :
Therebeingcontact, if nosuchperception take place as “ This is
Yajnadatta,” then there is no visible mark, i.e., nomarkthe universal
relation of which with the sadhya or what has to beproved, has been
grasped by perception. The meaning is that as smoke, perceived as
accompanyingfirewhichis perceptible, isavisiblemarkinthecaseoffire,
sothere isnosuchvisible markwhichcanestablish the existence of the
Soul—6.
I • *
 ______ VAJSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (gj
-^ 2. Analogy does not prove Sold as such.

H* i * i « ii
grqr^ Hrggrt Sainanyato-dristat, from a commonly-observed or analogous
mark. t* Cha, and. : Aviiesah non-particular. Not a thing in particular
or as such.
7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no
(inference of anything in) particular.—142.
Upas/cniv.-Lest it might be urged, “ Although no visible mark exists, the universal
relatio.1 of which has been observed by perception, yet a siminyatodristam, or commonly-
observed or analogous mark, will be the mark, for it is not that there can be no inference
from that,” therefore the objector says :
Acommonly-observedmarkalsobecomes a mark of inference, but
it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above
the eight Substances. It wouldonlyprovethat desire, etc., must be resi­
dent somewhere. Andthisdoes not suggest the thought of a Soul. This
is the meaning. Thereforeit isstated, “Not athing inparticular.”—7.
3 —Therefore Soul proved by Revelation.

iu i * i * H
frerrit Tasmat, therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by
reasoning. srPTUrar Agamikali, scriptural, proved by the revealedtexts.
8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation.—143.
Upasktira.—Are then the texts of the Vedas, for instance, “He is the Soul, in whom all
sins are killed,” etc., meaningless ? Apprehending this, the same objector says :
TheSoul isreallyprovedbyRevelationonly, but not byinference,
since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore,
mental visionof theprinciples oressencesofthings resultsfromthe,proper
hearing of the Upanmds, and not fromthe course of intellection. So
that this Regulation(i.e., the Vai^esika system), which teaches intellec­
tion, is no regulation. For, it is observed inthe caseof “tenghosts,
swimmingacross theriver,” etc., that thecognitionof the person whohas
representationof thesethings in his consciousness, arises only from the
veryinstructions (that tenghosts dwell onthis tree, that such and,such
anobject floatsacross theriver, etc.;.—8.
Objections answered.
IUI^ l Ml
Sf^ A h am , I. fm hi, this. ^abdasya, of the word.
Vyatirekat, exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence, sf Na, not,
Agamikam, Seriptural. Proved by Revelation,
 jCn
l!'( & KAN AD A SUTRAS III, 2-9. .
:
......... — - j— ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- --------- : ■

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is) not (solely)

from revelation, because of the non-application of the word
‘ I ’ (to other designates or objects).—144.
Upaskdra.—To this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing shtras,
the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies:
Revelationaloneis not the proof of the existence of the Soul; but
theSoul isprovedalsoby the inference that theword I, or the woid
‘Soul,’must havesomedesignate (or objectivereality correspondingtoit),
becauseit isaword, likethe word, water-pot, etc. Lest it might be said
that it isEarth, etc., which are its designates, so he says, “Because of
non-application,”inother words, becauseof thenon-applicationor diver­
genceof the word‘I’from Earth, etc. For, there never arises anysuch
useof language orintuition as “I amEarth, I amWater, 1am
Fire,” “I amAir,” I am Ether,” “I amTime,” I amSpace,” “I am
Mind.” If youobject that such intuition or usearises with respect to
thebody, wereplythat it does not, for it wouldthenentail such intuition
orusewithrespect to the bodies of others; if, that it arises withrespect
toone’sownbody, wereplythat it is not so, for 1ones own or onesself,
as different fromthe Soul, has nomeaningor isnot provedby etymology,
and because the intuition, “Mybody,” proceeds upon a difference of
substrata. It cannot besaid, (objection)“Well, but thistooisaninference
byanalogy whichhowever doesnot end with a particular thing, andis
therefore defective for, (answer) in the word ‘1, f-ness or Soul-ness
itselfforms the specification or distinction. Sothat on thestrengthof
theproperty ofits beingan attribute of the subject of the argument
(pak^a), it follows that I-ness is thecauseof the inferenceofthe Soul, and
as it is not common toany other object, therefore theparticular object
(or theSoul inparticular) is proved. Similarly, thereis proof of theparti­
cular object from the analogous inference or commonlyobservedmark
accompanied with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection
whichhasbeenmade, namely, “From‘hearing’ aloneresults realization
or intuition of the Soul; what is the need of all this proof?”, is not
sound. For, without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in
waveringminds cannot be purged away; without this purification, there
canbenoaptitude inthemfor constant meditation; and without constant
meditation, therecanbe no realization of truth or intuitionof the Soul,
whichis capable of uprooting falseknowledge together withdesires or
appetencies, as it is fromhabit only that a sadlover suddenlycomes to
have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and because verbal or
Hi g r n v a i Se s i k a p h i l o s o p h y . ^

inferential knowledge is not capable of uprootingfalse knowledge, as is

seeninthe caseof delusion in respect of direction inSpace, etc. This
is the import.
If it be asked, “Still howcanasignor indication (of its existence)
beapprehendedinthe Soul whichisimperceptible?”, wereply, “Whohas
ever saidthat theSoul is not perceptible? On thecontrary, the Soul is
apprehended byits proxmity through orinthe formofconjunction, to
theMind. Otherwise, howcanthere besuch intuitions as ‘I amhappy,’
*I know,’‘I desire,’‘I will,’‘I feel pain,’etc. ? For these intuitions are
neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, becauselike that of
theperceptionof blueness, their substantiality is undoubted. Nor arethey
inferential or derived frommarks, for theyarise evenwithout anyknow­
ledgeof marks. Nor againaretheyderived from verbal informationor
authority, for they donot followupon enquiryfor that.” If it beurged
that they are appearances of perception (and not true perceptions), we
replythat they must have then for their object somethingwhichis not
apparent (i.e., real), for it will be shown in the sequel that that which
is not anobject ofcertainknowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to
or superimposedupon, another object.—9.
Vivriti.— Thesutram is illustrative. It should be known that in­
ferences, as described above, bythe marks of knowledge, etc., arealso
proofsof theexistenceof the Soul.
Counter-objection stated.

^TrT ** ' *i «
Yadi, if. fsr Dristam, observation, Anvaksam, sensuous.
Ahain, I. Devadattalj, Devadatta. ^ £ Ahani, i. Yajnadattah,
Yajnadatta. ^ Id, such.
10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or pe
ceptions) as ‘ I am Devadatta,’ ‘I am Yajuadatta,’ (then
there is no need of inference).—145.
Upaskdra.—“ If this bs so ( i.e., if the Soul can be known by sonse-porcepbion),” the
objector says, “ then what is the need of inference ? ”
The word ‘iti ’ marks the form ofknowledge. In ‘dristam,’the
affix ‘kta’ is used in apassivesense. ‘ Anvaksam’means sensuous or
perceptual. Therefore themeaningis: if there is perceptual or sensuous
observationintheformof ‘This is Devadatta,’‘This isYajnadatta,’then
what istheuseof taking thetrouble of making an inference? “For an
elephant being in sight or observation, those whoinfer, do not infer
it byits screaming.”—10.
■e°5^x
z a n A d a s o t r a s i n , 2- 1 1.________________

Above answered.

% £ Driste, (lit. Seen), grasped by perception, Atmani, the soul,

fsijf Linge, being accompanied with marks, tr^f: Ekah, one. tjf Eva, only.
Dridhatvat, because it becomes more firm or fixed, srervT^t Pratyaksavat,
like other percepts or perceptions. qr?*W Pratyayali, intuition. Belief.
11. As in the case of other percepts, so, if the Soul
which is grasped by perception, is also accompanied with, or
comes at the top of, marks (from which it can be inferred),
then, by means of confirmation, the intuition becomes
fastened to one and only one object.—1 4 6 .
U p a ska rci. —To this the advocate of inference says :
‘Driste,’i.e., grasped by perception ; ‘atmani ’; ‘li/ige,’i.e., having
all its marks orcausesdeveloped; ‘eka eva,’i. e., having oneobject only
as its matter; ‘pratyayah’. ‘Pratyayah’ implies the expulsion of all
apprehensionof error. “Howcanit beso?” Hencehesays, ‘drridhatvat,’
i.e., because thecurrent of proof iscapable of rem oving the apprehension
of its beingotherwise. Hegivesan example, ‘pratyaksavat’; i.e., as even
whenthere isperception of water froma distance, yet inference of water
bythemarkof thebaldkds (water birds) is madefor the purposeof corro­
boration. Soit hasbeensaid, “Skilful logicians desire to understandby
inferenceevenwhat isgrasped byperception.” The import here is this:
Although at times the Soul reallyshines inmental perception, yet, like
knowledge, produced by the flashoflightning, it does not derive somuch
fixityor permanence, being overclouded bysuchother conflictingpercep­
tions as “I am fair,” “lam lean,” andthelike. Hereanother formof
knowledgeproducedbymarks whichcannot but lead totheir proper in­
ference, confirmsor fixes the very knowledge previously obtained from
perception. Moreover, inference must be applied tothe Soul owingto
the desire toinfer the knowledge that intellectionof theSoul as taught in
theprecepts “(TheSoul) shouldbe heardabout, reflected upon,”and the
like, isameans towards the realizationof that which is desirable, i.e., the
SupremeGood. Becauseif therebeno intellectionof theSoul, thencons­
tant meditation would be impossible, and consequently there wouldbe
norealizationof theSoul in theunderstanding, and sosalvationwould be
impossible. This is thepurport.
The statement of the twoseparate intuitions, ‘I amDevadatta,’and
“I amYajnadatta,” in the foregoing Sfitram, is intended to show that
therecanbeonlyindividual intuition of everySoul.—11.
[H VAI&ES1KA PHILOSOPHY. V^j
Counter-objection stated and answered.

q^TT vw
%?3TtT:— Devadattah, Devadatta. *T^$1H Gaclichhati, goes. a ^ T p —
Yajnadattah, Yajnadatta. »T5j?f?r—Gaclichhati, goes. Iti, such. These.
^T^nTT?! —Upacharat, by transference. sorCt^ —dartre, in the body. ST3HI:—
Pratyayah, intuition. Belief.
12. ‘Devadatta goes,’ ‘Yajnadatta goes,’—in these
cases, the belief (that their respective bodiesgo) is due to
transference.—147.
Upaskara.—“ Well,” it may be objected, “ if the intuition, ‘I am Yajnadatta,’ refers
to the Soul, then the appearance (of the notion Yajnadatta) as co-existing in the same
substratum with Going, as in ‘Yajnadatta goes,’ is impossible.” So he says :
For there are such intuitions as “1 amfair,” “I amstout,” and
there isalsosuchdifferential intuitionas “Mybody.” Now,in“Devadatta
goes,”theperceptionof co-existencewith motion, and the useof language
toexpress it, are tropical, whereas theintuition “my” is real ascarrying
its ownmeaning. Although thepropertyofbeingDevadatta is a jdti, kind
or genus, existinginthebody, whereby theuseoflanguageas“Devadatta
goes”is inthe primary sense and the intuitionis true initsown mean­
ing, yet if the termDevadatta be appliedtothe Soul delimitedbyit, it is
thentobe understoodas atransferredepithet.
Another objection.

H*i « ii
UfH!**?: Sandigdhah, doubtful, g Tu, however. Upacharah,
Transference.
13. The transference, however, is doubtful.—148.
(Jpcisk&ra.—Here he apprehends (an objection):
Theword ‘tu’points out the opponent’s view. The intuition and
the useof the word, ‘I,’are observed both inrespect of theSoul and the
body. Therefore thedoubt arises which intuitionandexpressionbe the
primary, and whichthesecondaryones.—13.
A hove answered.
stdbfu lutih iwi- h : iuri
^n»n. Aliam, I. Iti, this. Pratyag-atmani, in the in-going or
individual Soul. Bhavat, because it exists. Paratra, otherwhere.
 KAN^ DA slATltAS m > 2-u - ___ fer
?W3nf Abhavat, because it does not exist. w gw fa g lW Arthautara-piatyaksah
(Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of perception.
14. -Because the intuition ‘ I ’ exists in one’s own soul,
and because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the
intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.
—149.
Vpaskdra.—He solves the doubt :
*Arthantara-pratyaksah’isthat intuitioninwhich‘arthantaram,’i.e.,
the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows: Since the
intuition 11’arises inrespect of ‘pratyagatma,’ i.e., one’sownSoul, and
sinceit doesnot arise ‘paratra’ i. e., inrespect of other Souls, therefore it
isproper toregard thereference to‘arthantaram’ or one’s own Soul as
theprimaryreference. If, onthe other hand, theprimary reference were
to the body, thenthe intuition wouldbeproducedbythe external senses,
for the bodyisnot anobject of mental perception, andthe intuition ‘This
isI’ismental beingproducedeven without theoperationof theexternal
senses, sincethemind takes in as its object the Soul as modified by
appropriateparticular attributes in theformof ‘I amsorry,’‘I amhappy,’
‘I know,’11will,’‘I desire.’ This intuition is not inferential, as it is
producedevenwithout seekingany markof inference. Nor is it verbally
communicated, sinceit is producedeven without theapprehensionof any
authoritativetext. Thereforeit is onlymental, further becausethemind,
asit is not anindependent agent outside its ownsphere, does not apply
intothe bodyand other external objects. Moreover, if it be urged that,
if it referred tothebody, it would refer tothe bodies of others, and
if it referredtoone’sownSoul, it would alsorefer tothe Souls ofothers ;
wedeny this, for the Soul of one manis beyond the senses of another,
sinceits particular attributes have nofitness for or relation to, them, and
since its fitnessfor or relationto, themarises fromthe takingonor super­
impositionof appropriate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature
of the Soul only, but of every Substance. For Substance becomes
perceptibleonlybythe takingonof appropriate particular attributes. If
it issaidthat Ether alsoshould, for thesame reason, become perceptible
bytheaccompaniment of Sound, wereplythat suchwouldbe thecase, if
theear were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed
colour. If it isrejoinedthat the Soul alsois equallydevoidof colour, we
replythat it isin thecaseof external Substances onlythat possession of
colour is arequisite with regard to perceptibility. The word‘pratyag,’
in18-going, points out divergencefromothers.—14.
§8)V VAJSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. \£j|
* ’ ’

Another objection.

II ^ I RI II
Devadattali, Devadatta. Gachchhati, goes, Iti, this.
Upachai at, from transference. ^rfsrcpTRf Abhimanat, from fancy, re­
ference to Soul, Conceit, Egotism, or Self-identification, TSvat, because,
therefore. Sarirapratyaksali, having the body as the object.
Ahaiik&rah, ahamkdra. The intuition of 1. I-ness
15 The intuition of ‘ I ’ has the body for its object.
Therefore to say that, in ‘ Devadatta goes,’ there is a trans­
ference (of epithet), is a mere fancy.—150.
Upaskara.—He apprehoncls another objection :
‘Ahafikftrah,’i.e., the intuitionof ‘I. ’ It is ‘Sarirapratyalqab,’i.e.,
that which has the body as the percept orsubject-matter. Youhave
determinedthat the intuitionor, for the matter of that, the expression,
“Devadatta goes,” is due to transference. Now, this transference isa
fancied one, because such intuitions andexpressions as “ I am fair, ”
“I am lean, ” “1 amfortunate, my brith isamererepetition,” andthe
like, cannot be reconciled on the theory of transference. This is the
meaning.—15.
Above answered.

m IRI \ \ II
Sandigdhah, doubtful, g Tu, but. 37^ : Upachlfafc, trans­
ference.
16. The transference, (as characterised by you), how­
ever, is doubtful.—151.
Upaskara.—Ho gives the solution :
The word ‘tu’ here points out the solution(of the foregoingob­
jection). Themeaningis that there is doubt eveninwhat has been said
(by you, i.e., the opponent), namelythat thetransferenceisafanciedone,
whereas the intuition of ‘I’ is in respect of the body itself. Since,
therefore, the intuition is a false witness oneither side, we must en­
deavour to find out a distinction. Sinceonmaking this endeavour, we
observe that evenaman, whoseeyeshavebeenclosed, still has the intui­
tionof ‘I,’ wemust holdthat it refers to an object different from the
body, andbeyondthecognizance of theexternal senses. If it referred to
thebody, it wouldrefer tothe bodiesof others, and also would not take
if
f# )V: KANADA SUTRAS ITT, 2 -17.' IgT
X A ^ J A ------------------------ — ------------------------------------------- m j
place in independenceof theeyes. If it beasked howthere canbesuch
commonmeasureor co-extension as in “I who am stout or thin, am
hoppy we reply that in this case it ispossible that the bodywould
appear as the condition of pleasure,.etc., asin “This forest is resonant
with the roar of a lion” (there is suchappearance). MereI-ness, pre­
sentedbythe Mind, is superimposeduponthebody, just asheat, presented
by the organ of touch, in the judgments, “Thewater ishot, ” “The
bodyishot, ”etc.—16.
Above answered— continued.

u 5 nfueiaiui-; f e w » * i **»
H Na, not. <j Tu, but. sjfltmrqrfr ^anra-vigesat, perceiving the difference
of bodies. Yajnadatta-Visnumitrayoh, of Yajnadatta and Visnu«
mitra. j-rm JMnam, knowledge, thought. Visayah, object.
17. But the thoughts of Yajuadatta and Visnumitra
do not become objects of perception to them, while they
perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore cons­
ciousness is not an attribute of the body).—152.
Upaskdra.—By elaborating the solution ho says :
‘Jnanam’impliessensiblepleasure, pain, andother attributes ofthe
Soul. Asthebodiesof Yajnadattaand Visnumitra are mutuallydifferent,
soarealsotheirknowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like, different. Accor­
dingly, as is this body of Yajnadatta, soalso, though noknowledge, or
pleasure, etc., beproduced in Yajnadatta, will the knowledge, etc., “I
feelpleasure, ” “Iknow,” “I will, ” “1desire, ”beobjects(ofperception);
because the sensible bodybeinganobject of perception, knowledge, etc.,
which are (ex hypothesi) its properties, likeits colour, etc., will havethe
possibilityofbeingperceptible. But this is impossible. Therefore, such
is theimport, it shouldbe saidthat the seat orsubject of knowledge, etc.,
issomethingreallydifferent fromthe body. ‘Saviravitfesat ’ means from
difference of body. The fifth case-ending has beenusedinthesenseof
theinfinitive. Sothat the meaningis that knowledge or thought is not
anobject of perception, whiledifferenceof bodyisbeingperceived.—17.
Proof of Soul not from Revelation only.

^H . ..
’S ri* Aham, I. 51% Iti, this. Mukhya-yogyabhyam, by innate
or self-evident and perceptive or sensible cognition. sas^H ^abdavat, like sound.
\ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. .

s*ir%t=Rrs*lf%^UT5r Vyatirekabyabhicharat, from the invariability of absence or

divergence, ffsrsrfHST Visesa-siddheh, from proof in particular, h Na, not.
3rr*THT3v Agamikah, scriptural, proved by revelation.
18. (The soul is) not proved (only) by revelation, since
(as Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in
particular, by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in
the form of ‘ I,’ accompanied by the invariable divergence
(of such cognition from all other things), as is the case with
Sound.—153.
Upaslcdra.—It may bo objected as follows “ The Soul is not perceptible, ,41nee, like
Ether, it is a colourless Substance, or a Substance without component parts. Therefore
the body itself should be affirmed to be the object of the cognition “ I am thin, pale." If
occasionally there arises also the consciousness ’’ “ I i t i i pleasure,” it is proper to suppose
that pleasure and the like, becoming manifest without a substratum, are transferred to or
superimposed upon the body. As in “ Hot, fragrant water,” heat and fragrance appearing
without a substratum are superimposed upon water, but for the sake of this the intuition
of water also does not contain as its object anything except common water; so I-ness in
“I am ” is real only in reference to the body, whereas pleasure and the like are sometimes
superimposed upon it. There is then, in respect of the Soul, no knowledge of it in the
form of perception. That which has to be supposed as the substratum of pleasure, etc.,
must be established by revelation. There is no perception of it.” In reply to this
objection, he sa y s:
This is the meaning: The cognition, “I feel pleasure,”or “I am
inpain,”isneither scriptural, nor verballycommunicated, nor inferential,
since it arises even without the help of verbal communication or
an
of marks of inference. Whereas ithas beensaidthat colourlessnessand
simplicity(or the not being aggregate of component parts) areobstacles
tothe perceptionof thesoul, this holds true inthe caseof perceptionby
external senses, forof thisthepossessionofcolourandthepossessionofmore
thanonesubstancearethenecessary conditions or exciting causes, while
mental perception is independent of these. It maybe objectedthat this
would be the case werethereproof of the existenceof the Soul, but that
there is none. Accordinglyit has beensaid, Fromproof in particular by
invariable divergence, asis the casewithSound.” Asin theSubstances,
Earth, etc., theabsence of Soundisinvariable, i e., uniform, and there is
therebyproofof aparticular Substance, namelyEther, in addition to the
eightSubstances, asthesubstratumofSound, soonaccount oftheinvariable
divergenceofdesire fromEarth, etc., thesubstratumof desirealsomust be
different fromthe eight Substances. Lest it bearguedthat all this goes
toshowonlythat the Soul is asubject of inference, not anobject of per­
ception, the words “bythe innateaswell as the sensible cognitioninthe
/ d$“ !—
■- \

[ K ltr i
VVS^-^V/ - - , AD,. A SUTRAS III, 18.
-KAN 1\C T
^s-'
formof ‘I’”areemployed. Bythe word‘iti’theformofthe cognition is
indicated. Therefore the cognition, inthe formof ‘I,’whichisproduced,
without thehelpof verbal communication andmark of inference, in one
whoseeyes areclosed, shouldbeexplainedbytheinnate idea of Egoityor
I-ness anditssensible or perceptible attributes,.andnot byreference tothe
body, and thelike, sincethe divergenceor absenceof desire is invariable
there. After “bythe innateas well as thesensible cognition” the words
“Shouldbeestablished”are tobesupplied. There are many proofs of
theexistenceof theSoul. Theyareomittedherefor fear of increasingthe
volumeof thetreatise. Theyshouldbesought intheMayilkha— 18.
Vivriti.—Ye d& ntins, however, hold that the soul is nothing but
eternal knowledge (vijn&na) accordingtothe Sruti,
JTRIRwr “Lo!theSoul, imperishable, is truth, knowledge, in­
finite, andall-pervading,”(Brihadaranyalia Upani$ad IV. v. 14). Although,
inreality, it isone, yet, owingtothe diversityofits upddhi or adjuncts in
the form of the inner sense, whichare products of Mdyd, i.e., limitation,
it appears as manifold. That it is so, follows from such Srutis as
“ ^ne only > without a second,” (Cliliandogya Upanisad,
VI. ii. 1), “Sothe one innerSelf
of ail beings, for every form,becameits counterform” (Katha Upanisad,
II. v. 9).
Hediscredits this view.
The words, ‘object ofperception’arethe complement of ‘ahamiti,’
‘I’—this. Thus, theobject of suchpopular mental perceptions as ‘I feel
pleasure,’etc., is not ‘agamika,’i.e., identical with Idvara, the probandum
ofsuch‘agama’or text of the5,Vedaas“truth, knowledge, infinite, and all-
pervading,”(Taittiriya Upanisad, II. i. 1). Hestates the reasonof thisby
etc. because difference fromIdvarais established
bypleasure and pain, which, thoughprimaryor instinctive or original or
innate, areyet sensible. Theinstinctivenessof pleasureliesin agreeables
or desirables, sinceit is there the object of desirewhichis not dependent
upon any other desire; whereas the instinctiveness of pain lies in
disagreeables or undesirables, since it is there the object of aversion
whichis not dependent upon any other aversion. Sensibleness, again,
isthe being the object of perception(he. by the inner sense). This is
mentionedfor the purposeofremovingthe (possible) apprehension that
the markis an unprovedor unknown mark, and alsotoprevent over-
extension, inthecase where eternal bliss is attributedtoIdvara, because
eternal bliss can never beanobject ofperception. Pleasure andpain,
j§YjH ill VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. InT
viv^7~/----1---' ~ u lj ?
therefore, beingproducts, are proof ofthe difference between theJiva
and Wara, This argument is illustrative: it should be observed that
knowledge, volition, desire, and also aversion, as products, establish
differencefromIslvara.
It maybeurgedthat insuch inferences as, “The soul whichis the
object of the perception,1 I am,’ is different fromIsfvara, because it
possesses pleasure which is aproduct,” there being no example, and
consequentlynoobservationofcongruityof similar instances, knowledge
of the universal relationisimpossible. For this reason, it has beensaid
i.e., fromthe uniformity of difference. The use of
theablativeinflexionhasthe object of denoting the(necessary; condition
leadingtothe inference, and the syntactical connectionof the word is
withtheword fMtqfahg: The import, therefore, is, that, eventhough
thereisno example by wayof agreement, yet, lifvara beinganexample
bywayof difference, aninference with respect to thematter inhand is
possible, through the observationof the universal relationof difference,
dependent upontheconcomitanceor congruityof difference.
It may be urged, again, that a mark can establish difference
fromWara, bythe universal relationof difference, has not been known
before. To remove this apprehension, it has been stated he.,
like Sound, etc. The meaningisthis: As the differenceof Ether from
Igvara is proved bythe mark, namely Sound, whichis known by the
method of the universal relation, or uniformity, of difference, so the
differenceof thesoul fromWvara is provedbythe possessionof pleasure,
etc., whichare products.
Unity of Soul, as an objection.

jpjf^iig^fff^qTjri^lfr^r^'Sukha-duhkha-jnana-nispatti-avifSesat, because there

is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.
Aikatmyam, identity or unity of Soul.
19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in th
production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.—154.
Upciskdm.—Having thus Unis lied the section on .the investigation of the Soul, he
now begins the section on the plurality of Souls. Therein the following aphorism sets
forth an adverse doctrine.
There isonly one Soul, inspiteof thedifference of the bodies of
Chaitra, Maitra, andothers. Why? Becauseof the non-distinctioninthe
production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, i.e., because the originof
 ■6o^\ • ,

(if J | jlj KANADA SUTRAS III, 2-20. lf a j

pleasure, pain, and knowledgeis really undifferentiatedin this that it is
determinedby, orconfinedto, thebodyas a whole. If there wereanother
marktoprove thedifference of the Soul, the differenceof the Soul might
beproved, but thereis nosuch mark. As Ether is onlyone, inspite of
the productionof Sounds within the limits of particular spaces, since
there is no distinction in Sound whichis its mark; asTime is only one,
sincethereis no distinctioninthe intuitionof simultaneity, etc., which
isits mark; as Spaceisonlyone, since there is no distinction in the
intuition of East, West, etc., whichis its mark; (so the Soul is only
one).—19.
V ivifti .—It maybe urged that the identityof Jiva andwara must
beadmitted, onthestrengthof the texts of the Veda, “Oneonly, without
a second,”clearer “Thou, 0 Svetaketu, art that,”(Chhandogya
Upanisad VI. viii. 7), etc. It cannot beheld that differenceis proved by ,
theaforesaidinference; because pleasure, pain, etc., being properties of
theinternal organ, areunprovedbythemselves (■i.e., have noindependent
existence). Thus, says the BrihadaranyakaUpanisad, I. V.3., spur
srg-rssrscr “Desire, Inten­
tion, Doubt, Faith, Unfaith, Patience, Impatience, Modesty, Intelligence,
Awe,—all this isverily Mind.” Herethe word Desire denotes pleasure,
and the word Intelligence denotes knowledge in the form ofafaculty.
Moreover, painalso, appearing, as it does, inco-existence with pleasure,
cannot be anattribute of the Soul.
This he apprehends :
The meaningis that, i.e., because the differenceof the
Jlvatma (the embodied Soul) fromIdvara is not proved, fSpjqqqf, i.e.,
bythe certaintyor ascertainment, gqigtqqneimf, «•, ofpleasure, pain,
andknowledge; inother words, they, being provedinthe mindbythe
aboveSruti or Vedictext, are therebydisprovedin theSoul.
Its diversity explained.

n^ i\ i H
Vyavasthatah, from status, sfprr Nana, many,
20.—Plurality of Souls is proved by status.—155.
UpasMra. He states the solution or conclusion :
Soulsare many. Why? Because of status. Status means several
conditions, as one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another un­
happy, one is of high, another of low,birth, one is learned, another
ignorant. Thesecircumstances being impossible without a diversityof
W W W VAISHS1KA PHILOSOPHY. (gT
Souls, prove a diversityof Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the
status ofoneandthe sameSoul is diversified bythe differenceof birthor
bythedifferenceofchildhood, youth and oldage, soalso it will beinthe
caseof the differenceof the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, andothers, forit is
possibletoimposecontradictoryattributes (ononeand the samesubject)
bymeans of changeof Time (i . e., at different times).—20.
VivrUi .— Heremoves theapprehension. 5UHTmeans noidentity of
the Souls, inother words, that the Jivatina is not identical withIslvara.
Whence? becauseof thecertaintyof the existenceof pleasure,
pain, and .knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc. arenot properties of
themind, because themind not havinglargeness or largesize, pleasure,
etc., wouldbeimperceptible; andminuteness or atoui-ness or subtleness
must beaffirmedof the mindasdeterminingthe non-simultaneityofacts
of knowing. TheSruti, “Desire, Resolution, etc.”, however, like “Lifeis
clarifiedbutter,”etc., demonstrates that themind is thecause of desire,
etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that it is identical withthem.'
Its diversity explained —continued.

w \ \ r i ii
strrercrm^rar Sastra-samarthyat, fromtheauthority(or forceor significance)
ofthefeastras. xfCha,and.
21. (Plurality of Souls follows) also from the authority
or significance of the Sdstras.—156.
Upasktira.—He gives another proof :
‘Sastram’ meansVedaor revelation. Becausedilferenceof Soul is
provedbyit also. For it is heard, “TwoBrahmans (i.e., Souls) havetobe
known, ” etc.; andalso“Twobirds, friends and kindred, embrace the
sametree, etc.” (MundakaUpanisadIII, i. 1.)—21.
Hereends thesecondchapter of the third bookinthe Commentary'
of Sj‘i Sahkara onthe Aphorisms of Kanada.
Vivriti .—It cannot be asked, “What thenwill bethe fate of these
texts, vie., “Thou art that, 0 Svetaketu!” “One whoknowsBrahman,
verilybecomes Brahman,” etc. ?• For thetext, “Thouart That, ”conveys
the senseof identityinthis sensethat what is devotedto, or belongs to,
That, is not different fromThat. Thetext, “Onewhoknows Brahman,
verilybecomesBrahman,” doesnot conveythesense of identity, but that
of similarityof theJiva {i.e., theembodiedSoul), toIsfvara{i.e., the Great
Soul), in point of freedom fromsuffering, etc.; for, otherwise, the text.
“Thestainless oneattains tosupremesimilarity,”can have no meaning.
if m \V \ KAN ADA SUTRAS IV, 1-1. (k y
V, --------------------------------------------------- ^evl .
vii 4kpopular languagealso there isthe tropical use of identity in thesense
ofresemblance, as when there is an abundance of wealth, it is said,
“this priest has becomea king,”and soon. Nor shouldit bemaintained
that identity is produced in the state of salvation, onthe cessation of
ignorance or falseknowledge, since difference, beingeternal, is incapable
of destruction, andeven if weadmit the destruction of difference, then
since thereisnecessityfor the existenceof twoindividuals. So much in
brief.
B o ok F o u r t h .— C h apter F ir s t .

' The eternal defined.

ii a i i i ? ii
?f5r Sat, existent. Akfiranavat. not having a cause, uncaused,
c a u s a su i. Nityam, eternal.

1. The eternal is that which is existent and uncaus

ed.—157.
Upasknra.—Having finished the enumeration, definition, and examination of the nine
Substances, Earth, etc., and desiring to refute the doctrine, held by the Sainkhya philoso­
phers, that prakriti or Matter is the prime cause, and to establish that ultimate atoms are
the prime causes and enter into the composition of earth, etc., he first of all gives the
definition of the Genus, eternal ity.
‘Akaranavat,’means not having aprecedent cause, on the maxim
of thepurityof words ^whichexcludes other interpretations of the term).
Herebythe vater-pot, andthe likeareexcluded. Still the definitionmay
betoowide by including previous non-existence; sohesays, ‘existent’
i.e., having connection w ith existence. In the case of the Predicables,
CombinationandSpecies, connectionwith existenceisnothingbut combi­
nation or inherence inoneandthe same object with existence. In the
case of any other Genus and of existence, connection with existence
consistsonlyin beingthe object of the cognition that it exists. This
cognitionisnot inrespect ofathing as such. “ Let it beso,”it cannot
beobjected, “inother cases also. What is the use ofexistence?” For,
existence has already been proved as the cause of assimilative under­
standing.—1.
Vivriti .—Some hold that the existent isproduced from the non­
existent. What theyhave inviewis this: Seeds, etc., arenot productive
of effectssuchasshoots, etc. Werethisthecase, then seeds, etc., lying
inagranary, wouldalsoproduce shoots, etc. But. since shoots appear
onlyafter the destruction of seedssown on afield, bythe disjunctionof
% .19 . . ) ■> ■
’ w--GTf'v-;'"V
Vy!>\
(t^ ^6)|j_____ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
their parts, it followsthat it is the destructionof seeds, etc., whichis the
causeofshoots, etc. Sowehave thesutram of Gautama, statingthe argu­
ment of anopponent, “Production of existence (is) from non-existence,
as there is no appearance without destroying.” (Nyaya-Sutram, IV. i.
14).
Onlyto refutethis view, hestrengthensthe theory of progressiva
originationbytheseries of ultimate atoms, etc.
‘Sat,’means something inthe form of existence; ‘ak&ranavat ’
means anon-product; ‘nityam.’means anentity which opposes annihila­
tion. The meaning is: the primarycause of compound bodies is not
non-existent, that istosay, because, if causalityof destruction wereadmit­
ted, then it wouldentail the production of shoots oven from powdered
seeds.
Mark of existence of ultimate atoms.

fawn I! 8 I SI SI
Tasya, its. Of the ultimate atom. Karyyam, effect, fjtjf Lingam,
niark.
2. The effect is the mark (of the existence) of the
ultimate atom.—2.
Upas/cdra.—After describing the Gtenus, eternal, ho now says with reference to ulti­
mate atoms.
‘Tasya’, i. e., of the ultimateatom; *karyyam,’ e. g., the water-pot
andthelike; 1lifigam.’ Accordingly the sutramof Gautama: “Fromthe
evolvedis the production of theevolved, onthe evidenceof (experience
by) perception,”(Nyaya-sutratn IV. i. 11). Now the inter-relation of
parts andwholes is perceived. If it were unlimited, there wouldbe no
difference in size or measurement betweenmount Meru anda grain of
mustard seed; for, they wouldbewithout distinction,bothbeingorginated
byinfiniteparts. Nor canit besaid that difference will be causedby
the differences of the sizeof each part, andof the aggregation of parts ;
for, without adifference of number, these also would be impossible. If
it besaidthat pralaya or destruction of the creation, may be thelimit
(of theseries of parts and wholes); (we replythat) the final something
(exhypothesi)havingnoparts, pralaya itself would beimpossible, for it
isonlydisjunctionanddestruction ofparts whichcan destroysubstances.
Nor is disjunction thelimit, for it is impossible for it to have onlyone
substratum. Therefore, asubstance without parts, must be the limit,
and this isthe ultimate atom. Amote isnot the limit; for, beinga
if W m v ’ KAN A DA. SUTRAS IV, 1-3. jffiT
\-V Ery^J-------------------------- — -------------------- -------- ^ 1 ,
viriiblesubstance, it possesses magnitude, and is composed of more sub­
stances thanone; magnitude, as thecause of visual perception, presup­
poses, ovisdependentupon, multiplicityofsubstance; elsetherewouldbeno
magnitude even, what then would bethecause? Nor are the constituent
parts of themote atoms, for wemust infer that they also, as originative
of asubstancepossessing magnitude, are composedof parts, like thread,
andlikepotsherd. Therefore, whatever substance is an effect, is com­
posedof parts, and whatever substance is composed of parts, is aneffect.
Sothat fromwhicheverpart the natureof being aneffect goes away, from
it goes awayalsothe natureof beingmadeupof parts. This is the proof
of the existence of indivisible ultimate atoms. Soit has been said by
Professor Pratfcitadeva, “Earthistwo-fold, eternal andnon-eternal.”—
-2.
Law of Causation.

WTCTUCrT?! iRTsfour: II I ? I 3 II
^TrnEPTT^lw Karana-bhavSt, fromexistenceinthecause. Karyya-
bhavaff, existenceintheeffect.
3. The existence (of colour, etc.) in the effect, (follows)
from (their) existence in the cause.—159.
Upaskcira.—Now he states an argument or proof, to prove that there are colour, etc.,
in the ultimate atom : ,
Theexistence of colour, etc., intheeffect, is due totheir existencein
thecause. For the attributes of theeffectresult fromtheattributes of the
cause, the same being observedinthecaseof thewater-pot, canvas, etc.,
This is the meaning.—3.
Vivriti .—Hepoints out anobjectiontothe primarycausality of non­
existence.
‘Bhavah,’ i.e,. the existence, of the ‘effect, ’ i.e., compound
bodies, follows fromthe existence of the ‘cause,’i.e., theprimarycause
{viz., ultimateatoms). Otherwise, likethe qualityof beingclayey, of that
whichis madeof clay, it wouldfollowthat effects, i.e., compound bodies,
would be non-existent, because they are constituted bywhatr is non­
existent. _’ )
The eternal exists.

SrfSteT ffrf WtarT: II I \ I 8 II

Anityah, non-eternal, hi, such, i.e., suchintuitionand expres­
sion. Virfesataft, of the particular, i.e/, the eternal. Prati-
sedha-bhavab, theformofnegation.
 foT
• ----------------:--------------------------
f i f W V A 1 S E S 1 K A PHILOSOPHY.

4. “ Non-eternal”—such (intuition and expression)

can be accounted for only as the negation of the eternal.—160.
Upaskara.—With a view to silence the advocate of the doctrine of the transiency of
all things, he now says:.
In 1visfesatah’theaffix‘tasi ’isused in thegenitivesense. There
would be negation of ‘virfesa,’i.e., theeternal, if there werenot suchin­
tuition, andapplicationof the word as 1non-eternal,’, because the prefix
nan (non) has the forceof negatingthe m eaningof thewordnext to it.
Thereforehowcanthere be the intuition and expression, ‘non-eternal,’
intheabsence (ofthat) of the eternal ? Henceit isprovedthat the eter­
nal exists. Or, (the meaningof the SiXtram maybe), the negationof the
eternal must bemadebyyouin this way that (it is) “not eternal,” i.e.,
that the ultimate atom is not eternal. Bat negationinthis wayis not
successful, since it is frustrated byproof and disproof. (In this inter­
pretation), thesutramshould berendered thus: The word (not) will
be a negative term byitself, as there is therule, “ jjr, and*TTare
negativeterms.” Thus “non-eternal ”will mean not eternal. ‘Pratise-
dha-bhavah’means thenature or formofnegation. Hence“not eternal”—
this is theform.of the negationof ‘vi^esa,’; i.e., theeternal, andit isnot
possible. This closes the argument.—4.
V ivriti .—He refutes the viewthat all is non-eternal, that there is
nothing whichiseternal.
U(inthe aphorism is anindeclinable, havingthesamemeaning as
rfST(non). Thus, ‘not eternal’—such negation is 1videsatah’, i.e., with
reference to particular things. So that, theremayb? thenegationthat
compound bodies are not eternal, but such whole-sale negation as every­
thingisnot eternal, is not possible, because the eternal, which is the
Counter-opposite, isfrustratedbyproof and disproof. This is the whole
meaning.,
The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous.
SfCK U II * M I V. II
3TROTAvidya, ignoranc^, error.
5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom
is not eternal.)—161.
Upaskara.—lb may be objected as follows : The ultimate atom is not eternal, since
it is corporal or ponderable, like a water-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the
possession of taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by
simultaneous conjunction with six (or.nor ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts ;
so that from its possession of parts, ant from its being the substratum of the conjunction
appearing in objects which it cannot ptjrvade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not
Bag&
sf*;i • \, i 1 .• • 'v-v
k ' ' . it. ' .
(f(W % KANADA S&TKAS rv, i - e . __________ i § r
\ y' , I
eternal). Moreover, if there be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must
have parts ; if there be no Ether inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not pene­
trate everywhere. Further, (the ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow,
and possesses circulation. Again, the non-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also
from the inference which establishes transiency, <?.{/., the inference, that all that exists is
momentary. If then there be such a series of inferences, how can it be maintained that
the ultimate atom is eternal ?
To meet these objections, he says :
Everyinference, wliiclr hasfor its subject the non-eternality of the
ultimate atom,isignorance, i-e., isof the form of error, since it springs
fromafallacy. This fallacy isoccasionally obstruction or oppositionto
theproof whichcomprehends the subject; alwaysabsenceof thecharacter­
istic of beingpervaded (or being the mark), due to want of evidence
preventiveof itsexistence inthevipakm (i.e., in whichthe non-existence
ofthat whichhas to beproved, iscertain); sometimes unproof byitself;
andothers whichshould be learnt from the kindred system {i.e., the
Nyaya-Sutramof Gautama).—5.
Requisites of perception.

it « i i ||
HKrH Mahati, in respect of an object possessing magnitude.
Aneka-dravya-vattvat, by means of its possession of what is composed of more
than one substance, Rupat, by means of colour. =q- Ciia, and. sqsirsM:
Upalabdhih, external perception.
6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an
object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession
of that which is composed of more substances than one,
and by means of its colour.—162.
Upaskdra.—U may be objected, “ Well, if tb.e ultimate atom exists, why is it not per­
ceived by the senses'/ It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the
possession of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility.” Hence he says :
‘Mahati ’meansinrespect of asubstance possessing magnitude, the
affixe, matup, denotingpossession, among affixes denoting quality, being
elidedafter the word, mahat, denoting measure. ‘Anekadravyavattvat ’
means fromthenatureor state ofcontainingthat ofwhichmore substances
than oneare the substrata. This beingso, Air alsowouldbe perceptible.
Hence he says, “And by means of Colour,”i.e., as will be later onsaid,
developed and uneclipsedorunobscured colour. “llpaladhih” iscomple­
mented bythe words, “bythe external senses.” Thereforeit goes with­
out sayingthat there isnoexternal perception of theultimate atom, since
((( VAlSHSlKA PHILOSOPHY. (gT
it doesnot possess magnitude. “The possession of that tvhiehis com­
posedof morethanone substance” means either the being constituted
byacompoundof more than onesubstance, or thebeingthe substratum
of themagnitude whichis due toamultiplicityof component parts.
It cannot be saidthat the possessionof that which is a compound
of morethanonesubstance, is renderedfutile (as a condition precedent
of perception), bythe very possession of magnitude; since the reverse
is alsopossible. Nor canit be said, “Futility of the producer iscaused
bythe producible, but not that of the producible by the producer;”
for theagreement andthe differenceof the producible andthe producer
beingsimultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise
it wouldfollowthat the futility of the staff, etc., will be causedbythe
whirlingof it, etc. Nor can it besaid that there isadevelopment of, or
rise in, perceptibilityat adistanceduetodevelopment of, orrisein, magni­
tude; for adevelopment of, or rise in, the possession of a compound of
moresubstances thanonebeingalsopossible, therecanbe no discrimina­
tion. Moreover, while aspider’s web measuringfour cubits, etc., is not
perceptible froma distance, the perceptibility of the spider itself is
certainlydue toadevelopment of the possessionof a compoundof more
substances thanone, since a preponderance of magnitude exists in the
web. Soalsoit should beobserved that whilea piece ofcloth, consti­
tutedbyfiveyarns, is not perceptibleat adistance, inspite ofapreponder­
anceof magnitude init, aclubof a very small magnitude is perceptible
there.—6.
Cause of non-perception.
usrfa srs^m fcn
II 8 I » I vs U
^frTSati, there being. tsrfaApi, even, in spite of. Dravyatve, sub-
stance-ness. 7 3 ^ Mahatve, magnitude. ^ 7 Rflpa, colour. ^ 5 7 * Samskdra,
impression, evolution, reformation. Abhdvat, on account of the ab­
sence or non-existence of. Vayoh, of Air. Anupalabdhih, non­
perception.
7. The non-perception of Air, in spite of there being
substance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence
of the evolution of colour.—163.
paskdm.—Sacli being the case, there should, it might be urged, also be perception
of the light of a shooting star at midday, of the light of the eye, or of Air, as well as of
magnitude which combines with colour by means of its combination with Touch. Hence
ho says :
(h W W i KANADA SUTRAS IV, 1-8. __________ ijKy
By the term “evolution of colour” are intended combination or
inhesionof colour, thedevelopment of colourtothe degree of appreciabi-
lity, and the non-obscurationof colour. Though, therefore, in thecase of
Air, the selfsamecombinationof touchis alsothe combination of colour,
yet it is not qualifiedor determined bycolour, for there is in it absolute
non-existenceof colour. Inthelight of the eye, there is noevolution, that
is, appreciability, of colour. In thelight of the shootingstar at midday,
there is no evolution, that is, non-obscuration, ofcolour. Of these, there­
fore, there is noperceptibility. Inlikemanner, evolutionof colour is to
be analogouslyappliedtothe heat of the summer, the fire in a frying-
pan, gold, etc.
The writer of the Vpitti has, however, said that 18a com­
pound of the words and formed bythe elisionof one of
the two ^q’s, andthat, therefore, the non-perception of Air is in conse­
quenceof the non-existence ofcolour init, while the non-perceptionof the
ocular light, etc., is due to the non-existence of the evolution of
colour.—7. »
Requisites of perception of colour.

ii n ic ii
Aueka, more than one. gsq Dravya, substance. Samavayfit,
from combination in. ^ 7 RQpa, colour, Visesat, from some special
characteristic of. ^ 7 Rupa, colour. 375n^7 ‘- Upalavdhih, perception.
8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination
with a compound of substances more than two, and from (its
possession of) some special characteristic of colour.— 164.
• Upaskdra.—In this way having, immediately after the section on the eternality of the
ultimate atoms, finished the section on the perceptibility of external objects, as a subsi­
diary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to
set forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes, he
says :
‘Rfipaviflesa’ means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour,
andthat consists of the characteristics of beingdevelopedtothe degree of
appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From this,
perceptionof colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such being
thecase, the colour of the ultimate atomas well as of the dyad would be
perceived, so it has been,added—‘anekadravya-samavayat.’ The word
‘aneka denotes multitude1hence ‘anekadravya’ means that to which
manysubstances belongas its substratum, e.g., amoleculeof three atoms,
and the like. The term1anekadravya-samavflyat,’therefore, means from
\
•.. VATSESTKA PHILOSOPHY.

combination withsucha compound substance. The water-pot, etc., al­

though they are originated by two parts, {i.e., potsherds, etc.), really
contain a multitude of substances as their substratum, in the serial
arrangement of the parts of these parts, andsoon. As taste, touch, etc.,
lack in the characteristic of colourness, so there isnoocular perception
of them. In thecase of ocular fireor light, non-visibility is due to the
absence of the degreeof appreciability. Development or appreciability is
only a particular universal entity or ‘class’belongingtotheparticular
attributes of colour, etc., and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness,
etc.
Objection :—This beingso, norelationofhigher and lower (classifica­
tion) will be at all establishedevenbywhiteness, fragrantness, sourness,
etc. If, however, yousupposeamanifoldnessof development or appreci­
ability, pervadedby, or includedin, themrespectively, thenthere will be
aredundancyof supposition, and the termdevelopment or appreciability,
alsowill have various meanings.
A n sw er :—It is not so; for,.development or appreciability denotes the
upadhi or condition, nam elythecharacteristic of the attributecapableof
beingapprehendedbyeachindividual external sense, while non-develop­
ment or non-appreciabilitydenotes onlythe absence of theupadhi or con­
dition, Some say that appreciability is simply thenon-existenceof non-
appreciability. This should be considered, sincenon-appreciabilityalso
cannot besimilarlyestablished. It may be said that non-appreciability
isaparticular attribute beyondthecognizance of thesenses. If it be so,
then it would follow that appreciability is aparticular attribute within
thereachof thesenses. If it be asked, “ What is the determinant of sen­
suousness ?,” wereplythat bothof us, (i.e., the disputants) are equally
at adisadvantage here. Theyalso saythat appreciabilityis the one and
only one‘class’present in all particular attributes, and that the non­
establishment of the relation of higher andlower is nofault inthe case
of theclassinheringin attributes.—8.
Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch.

ha rmpapfifry *tr sqraamq n « i ? i «. u

Tena, by this, Rasa-gandha-spaisSesu, in respect of taste,
smell, and touch, ffR Jnauam, knowledge. s?ire3Tfr*l Vyaktiyatam, explained.
9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in t
case of Taste, Smell, and Touch.—165.
(f(x)l '
\v ..—
.... .CANADA. ■
"■
SU TRAS IV, 1-9.
—
———
Upaslcdra. Of the attributes other than Touch, co-oxsistence in the same substratum
with colour is itself the necessary condition of their being perceptible by the external
senses. For this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he
now extends them to other cases, and says :

‘Tena’means by thepreceptual knowledge of colour. As percep-

{ tionofcolour arisesfromsomespecial characteristic of colour, viz., colour­
ness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of tastearises
from some particularityof taste, characterisedas tasteness, non-obscura­
tion, andappreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Com­
binationwitha compound of morethan twosubstances, should be also
extended. From inappreciability tothe organs of the ear, the tongue,
andtheskin, resultsnon-apprehensionof smell, taste, and tonch. Being
undevelopedor inappreciable, smell andtaste are not perceived inastone,
etc. ; for theyareperceived intheir ashes. Somemaintainthat theyare
perceivedindeedin the stone, etc., but not distinctly. Thenon-apprehen­
sionof the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which have been
disjoined fromone another, is due tonon-development of the colour. So
alsois the non-apprehensionoftaste. Inhot whter, there is non-apprehen­
sionof the colour of the fire, in consequence of its non-development, and
oftouch, in consequenceof its obscuration. In comminuted camphor,
thechampaka flower, etc., non-apprehension of colour, taste, and touch
isdue totheir non-development or inappreciability. In gold, and the
like, colour is indeed developed, but whiteness and luminousness are
obscured. Someholdthat colour alsois obscured, whereas the apprehen­
sion, of goldtakes place with the help of other colour. Obscuration
again, isnon-apprehensioncausedbytheapprehensionof amore powerful
likeobject, andnot merely relation or connection witha powerful like
object. For, since connection witha powerful like object has to be
ascertained by non-apprehension, it is the non-apprehension which is of
primaryimportance. Whereas thepowerful likeobject is not of primary
importance, as the necessary condition of non-apprehension; because
neither non-apprehension, nor antecedent non-existenceof apprehension
nor its absolute non-existence is subject toits operation, whilethe an­
nihilationof apprehensiondoes not exist there. If it beobjected, “Then
your proposition also, that obscuration is non-opprehensioncaused by
the apprehension of a more powerful like object, isnot proved,” we
reply, “Let it beso. Still apprehensionandnon-apprehension aloneare
thenecessary conditions of the strength or weakness of alike object or
of theexistenceof sucharelation; and the same is the meaningof 'tire
wo20rd, obscuration.”-—9.. .. . . . . . .
i §5^ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (jj| ^
"" "
Gravity , no£perceptible.
rtwmwRsqfiRR: » a i ? i ?» u
■

Tasya, of this, i.e., the genus of colouruess, etc, and development or

appreciability. ^PTRI?r Abhavdt, because of the non-existence.
B Avyabhicharah, non-deviation. No breach of uniformity or of the rule.

10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is n

violation (of the above law of perceptibility in the case of
Gravity.)—166.
Upaslccira.—It may be asked, “ Since Gravity also is combined with a compound of
more than two substances (i.e., atoms), and appears in the same substratum with colour
and magnitude, why then is it not perceptible?” Hence he says :
Gravityisnot perceptible, becauseof the non-existence, inGravity,
of this, viz., the genus of colourness, etc., and development or apprecia-
bility. It might besaid that grantedthat, colourness, etc., donot exist
there, yet there maybe perceptionof Gravity. Toprevent this, headds
‘avyabhicharah’ There is ‘non-deviation’i.e., unbroken uniformity of
the five‘classes’or universals, e.y., colourness, etc., towards apprehensi­
bilitybyeachindividual sense. Wherever there exists oneor another of
thepentadofcolourness, etc., therealsoexistsapprehensibilitybythe res­
pectiveexternal senses, as shownbythe methodof difference(that where
the former are not, there thelatter does not exist). Thisisthemeaning.
Gravity, by reason of its being left obscure inthesfitram, as the
topicof discussion, byPra^astadeva classed among things supersensuous,
is byVallavacharyasaidtobeperceivedbytouch.—10.
Where Numbers, etc., are objects of visual 'perception.

rp*rr: Thvrurrfs udmBrsnrr qrvtrqt^

•fro m^qrftr ii « i t i u n
5P53T: Samkhyah, numbers. HrbnunTH Parimanani, magnitudes, extensions.
Pritliaktvam, separateness. Sarnyoga-vibhagau, conjunction
and disjunction. q w iW f Paratva-apaiatve, piiority and posteriority.
Karmma, aciion. ^ Cha, and. ^dpi-dravya-samavdyat, through
combination with substances possessing c dour. ^T^n'ror Chaksusani, visible,
objects of visual perception.
11. Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunctio
and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, and Action
become objects of visual perception, through their combina­
tion with Substances possessing colour.—167. • v/
\ / ~
}'*,
—
.—_— i^ in... . I,■ .._ \& >J
KANADA SUTRAS IV, 1-12.

Upask&ra —Having thus stated objects perceptible by the senses individually, he now
enume ates objects perceptible by two senses jointly :
The words have not been, formedintoacompound inorder toindi­
cate their mutual independence in respect of their visual or tactual
perceptibility. Although there is dependence upon i.e., largeness,
yet it is not asupona modeof extensionor magnitude. The word‘cha’
has the forceofinvolvingtheadditionofViscidity, Fluidity, and Impetus.
The word implies tactual perceptibility; or the word ‘cha’
should he applied after the word also. The plural number in
Numbers, comprehends all numbers, from unityupwards. If it he held
that unityis onlya Genus, andnot anAttribute, then if it appear in
substances only, its denotationwill beneither morenor less thau that of
substanceness; if, ontheother hand, it bepresent inattributesandactions
also, then its denotationwill be neither more nor less than that of exist­
ence. “How, then,” if it be asked, “canthere be perceptionof unity,
etc., inattribute, etc. ?,”it may be answered that it is by means of
attributedunity; or that by reasonof theproximity knownascombina­
tionor co-inherence inoneand thesame object, theperceptionof unity
is quite justified. This unityis eternal ineternal substances, and in
non-eternal substances it has causal unity for its non-combinative cause.
Ontheother hand, duality, etc., are theproduct of relative understanding.
Relativeunderstanding is themental basis or support of various unities,
whentwo homogeneousor heterogeneoussubstances are in contact with
the eye.—11.
Where they are not.

h n i ^ ii
Arfipisu, in substances not possessing colour. Achiksii-
sani, not objects of visual perception.
12. In substances not possessing colour, they are no
objects of visual perception.—168.
Upaslaira.—Having in view all the above things up to action, he says :
Numbers, etc, uptoaction, are not objects of visual perception,
whentheyarepresent insubstanceswhicharedevoidofcolour. It should
beobserved that theyare not objects of tactual perception also. It has
not beensaidthat theyareimperceptible; for, if it wereso, thentheunity
of theSoul alsowouldnot beanobject ofperception.—12.
Attribute-ness and existence perceptible to all the senses.
IK'®5 , VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. Vf i l
...........-— --------------------------------------- '................ ................. -
qf^ff Etena, by this. ;p j?f Gunatve, in regard to attributeness. *n% Bhdve,
in regard to existence, 'ey Cha, and. Saivvendriyam, omni-sensuous.
Relating to all the senses, jjrnr jnSnam, knowledge. Cognition.
VyakliyAtam, explained.
13. By this it is explained that knowledge in regard
to attributeness and existence, is omni-sensuous or of all the
senses.—169.
Upaskdra.—Colour, etc., are uni-sensuous or perceptible by the senses individually.
Numbers, etc., are bi-sensuous or perceptible by two senses jointly. Pleasure, etc., are
mental or perceptible by the inner sense. So that it results that the two Genera, Attribute­
ness and existence, are oinni-sensuous. So he says :
Capability to apprehend the individuals, isitself thecapabilityto
apprehendthe class. Andif the individuals arerespectivelyapprehended
byall thesenses, thenit results that also the classes, viz., Attribute-ness
andExistence, areapprehensible byall thesenses. This is the meaning.
—1o.
Hereends the first chapter of the fourth bookinthe Commentary of
Safikaraupon the Vaiifesika Aphorisms.
B ook F o u r t h .— C h apter S eco n d .

Three-fold division of Earth, and other produets.

ud+R ii a i =1 i ? ii
tp* Tat, that, 3^: Punah, again. Prithivi-adi-karyya-dravyam,
earth, and other product-substance, Tri-vidham, three fold,
iTSjratl Sarira-indriya-visaya-sarhjnakam, named as body, sense, and object.
1. The aforesaid product-substance, Earth, etc., i
again, three-fold, under the names of body, sense, and ob­
ject.—170. x
Upaskara.—In the fourth book, of which the subject-matter is the examination of
tangible substances, intending to examine only tangible substances by their effects, imme­
diately after the examination of the ultimate atoms which are the root causes, he
says :
Here corporeity or the characteristic of the body is a kind of
upddhi oradjunct, nam ely, the characteristicof beingconstitutedby final
parts (i.e., atoms), possessingactivity, of whichthe non-combinative cause
is theconjunctionof thesoul exercising volition. But corporeity is not
q,classor universal entity, sinceinthat case Earthness, etc., will establish
'l f| KAN AD A SUTRAS IV, 2-2.
------ i—-------------—— —----------------------------- •—1
CfiT^
norelationof higher andlower divisions. The characteristic of being a
sense, is thebeing theseat dl theconjunction ofthe mind, which is the
causeof knowledge whichproduces noreminiscence, or the beingaseat of
the conjunctionof the-mind, whichis the cause of knowledge, while at
the sametimeit is not a substratumof appreciable particular attributes
other thansound. Ontheother hand, the light of the eyeof animals that
prowlat night, is really another kind of light. In regard to its being
treated as formingthe visual sense, the words “not being a substratum
of appreciable particular attributes other than sound and colour”
shouldbeadded. Thecharacteristicof beinga sense, however, is not a
*class,’for thenthe characteristic of Earth, etc., will not establish the
relationof higher aud lower divisions ‘without entailing cross-division).
Andobjectivity, or thecharacteristic of being anobject, although it is the
beingthe meansofphenomenal experience, that is tosay, thebeingthe ob­
ject of ordinaryperception, commontosubstance, attribute, action, genus,
andnon-existence--yetshouldbe, inaccordancewiththeaphorism,observed
tobe thecharacteristicof beingaproduct-substance whichis theobject of
ordinaryperception, for theaphorism is this only that Earth and other
product-substances are three-fold. Objectivity also, therefore, is not a
class or universal entity.—1 .
Body is not a compound of five elements.

u9iq iru
srergPWvrrari Pratyaksa-apratyaksSnam, of perceptible and non-percep-
tible objects, hwnTO Sariiyogasya, of conjunction. Api atyaksatvat,
on account of imperceptibilitv. gjjrcfn; Tinchatmakam, Peuta-substantial,
Constituted by five elements. ^ Na, not. Vidyate, exists.
2. (Nothing exists, which is constituted by five ele­
ments, or) the body is not constituted by live elements, for
the conjunction of things, perceptible and imperceptible is^ •
imperceptible.—171.
U pa sled ra }: —Now, in order to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three
elements or four elements, he says.
Werethe body, by reason of its odour, moisture, digestive heat,
breath, andporosity, composed of fiveelements, thenit wouldbe imper­
ceptible. In the same manner as the conjunction of perceptible and
imperceptible objects, e.g., air and trees, is imperceptible, the body
alsowouldbe imperceptible. Thus the aphorism employsan example
[![ ||i5i___ VAISESTKA .PHILOSOPHY. (OT
P^—
Tlie word‘body’is theComplement of “penta-substantial does notexist.”
Moisture, digestive heat, etc., however, belongtothe efficient causesor
conditions of the body, namely, water and fire. The theorythat the body
is composedof four elements should bealsosimilarly understood. Let it
then, itmaybeurged,containthreeelements, asthereis perceptionof three
elements. This cannot be, for anoriginationout of heterogeneous elements
isdenied. Oneattribute ina wholemade upofparts is not originative
of similar other attributes. If, therefore, theproductionwerefromEarth
and Water, thenthat whichtheyoriginate would be void of smell and
taste. Inlike manner, if it originatedinEarthand Fire, it would not
possess smell, colour, andtaste; if inEarthand Air, it wouldbedestitute
of smell, taste, colour, and touch. Other cases should besimilarly under­
stood.—2.
Nor a compound of three elements.
n 2 i r i ^ 11
Guna-antara-apradurbhavat, by reason of the non-ap­
pearance of another attribute. ^ Cha, and. h Na, not. 1'ri-atina-
katn, tri-s ibstantial. Composed of three elements.
3. And by reason of the non-appearance of another
attribute, it is not composed of three elements.—172.
U p a s k d r a .—He continues the same topic :
Abodyoriginated byEarth, Water, andFire only, whichare objects
of perception, might beperceived, if there weremanifestedinit another
attribute havingfor its antecedent alike attribute in thecause. But this
cannever be thecase, as it has been already statedthat asinglesmell,
etc., is not originative. Thereforethe bodyis not composedofeventhree
elements, i.e., is not originated by the three elements possessing colour.
9
---o.
Conjunction of various atoms, not denied.

n8iri n
Anu-sanyogah, conjunction of atoms. 5 Tu, but. STnferPra:
Apratisiddhah, not denied.
4. But a conjunction of atoms is not denied.—173.
U p a s k d r a . —How then is there perception of digestive heat, etc., in one single body ?
He gives the answer :
Amutual conjunctionof the five elementsas \the basis or) condi­
tional causesof oneanother, is not denied But it is not desired that the
• conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms can be the riou-combinative
■G
ov\
KAN AD A SUTRAS IV, 2-5. ,
causeof asubstance. Tims, asitsconditional or efficientcauses, digestive
heat, etc., areperceivedinthe body. If it beasked, then, of what nature
the human bodyis, the answer isgiven by theaphorism of Gautama,—
“(The bodyis) terrene, thedistinctive attribute of Earthbeingperceived
(in it).” (Nyaya-iSutramIII. i. 28(?)). Smell whichis the distinctive
attribute of Earth, isobservedinthe human bodyas not departing from
it till its dissolution, whereas digestive heat, etc., are not observed in
the decayed body. These attributes, therefore, are accidental while
Smell isessential. Henceits terrenness is established.—4.
Body is two-fold : sexually produced, and a-sexually produced.

rrar w i fla%vT u$ \ \ \ y. \\
rjW I'atrr, therein, amongst terrene, aqueous, and other bodies. stfCtt
SWiram, body, terrene body, ffftq Dvividham, two fold. Yonijam, sex-
begotten, sexually generated, ^r^rf^rsj Ayonijnm, not sexuall}’ generated ^ Cha,
and.
5. Of these, the body is two-fold, sex-horn and not-
sex-born.—174.
Upaskiim.—He divides the body :
Of these, i.e., amongterrene, aqueous, andother bodies, the terrene
bodyis two-fold. What are the two kinds? Inanswer, hesays, ‘sex-
bornand not-sex-born.’ Aqueous, igneous, andaerial bodies, well-known
in the'spheres of Varuna, Aditya, and Vayu, are entirely a-sexual.
A-sexuality means independence of thecommixingof semenandblood.
Thebodiesof gods andsages arealsoa-sexual, according to the text of
revelation, “Manuandothers, themind-bornor desire-bornof Brahma.”
If it beaskedhowthere canbeaneffect without a cause, we reply that
thefemaleorganof generation is not acause essential to or determining
corporeity, asit does not applytothebodies of worms, mosquitoes, etc.,
producedbywarmth. Thepossessionof aparticular constitution alsois
not proved, sinceour bodiesare different in appearance in comparison
withthebodiesofgodsandsages.
The sexual body, again, is two-fold, womb-bornandegg-born.
Womb-bornarethe bodies of menand animals, wildanddomestic, the
womb beingthenamegiven tothereceptacleof theembryo. Thebodies
ofbirds and reptilesareegg-boi'n. Snakes, worms, fishes, etc., also are
reallyreptiles, sinceit istheir nature tocrawl about.
Treesandthe likealsoarenodoubt somany kinds of bodies, being
theseat ofexperience (i.e., the fieldwhereinparticular soulsreapthecon­
sequencesof their acts Inprevious births). Forwithout thecharacteristic
 1 /n
fl( g 160 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY. VfiT
" ..... vN.;, fy
of beingtheseat of experience, life, death, sleep, waking, useof medicine,
propagationof the seed, approaching the agreeable, avoiding the dis­
agreeable, etc., would be impossible. Andgrowthand the healingupof
wounds and fractures, which prove experience, are manifest inthem.
There isalso the sacred text :
5*35131•T'TTSf'TTi I
“The Sarala and Arjuna trees, which growon the banks of the
Narmada, from contact with the waters of the Narmada, attain tothe
highest state hereafter, ”etc. Andalso,
f$i: g p f i
“Inthe cemeterygrowsatreehauntedbyheronsandvultures, etc.,”
etc. Yet germinant bodies donot evidentlypossessactivityor movement,
andsenses, and theyarethereforenot treatedas bodies.—5.
Vivriti.— That trees, etc., are bodies (i.e., ground of the experience
of theconsequences of acts) is evidenced bythetext of Manu, viz., “A
manacquires theconditionof animmovable existence, by faults of action,
bornof thebody.”
• A-sexual bodies, how 'produced.

A-niyata-ciikpdeia-purvakatvat, because it (/>., a-sexual

body) has foi its antecedent ultimate atoms which are not constant in direction
and place.
6. Because a-sexual bodies are formed by ultimate
atoms inconstant in direction and place.-—175.
Upaskdra.—tie states the cause from which as-exual bodies are produced :
Ultimate atoms, inconstant indirectionand place, possess activity
or movement produced byaparticular dliarma or virtue. And they are
theantecedents of a-sexual bodies.—6.
Vivriti.— In the worldsof Varuna, etc., thereexist a-sexual, aqueous,
igneous, aerial, andmental bodies, which are not dependent, for their
production, upon semen, blood, etc. Whence comethe ultimateatoms
whichorignate them? In thecaseofsexual bodies, it is observed that
only the ultimate atoms of semenand bloodare their originators. To
remove this apprehension, the present aphorism has beenformulated.
Terrene, aqueous, igneous, andaerial ultimate atoms exist in all direc­
tions and inall places. Since thereisnothingtoconfinethemtodirection
and place, therecan be noscarcityof ultimate atomsintheproduction
' Go^\
KANADA SUTRAS IV , 2-8. (tjjfr
of a-sexual bodies. For it is not the casethat ultimate atoms other than
the ultimate atoms of semen and blood, are not originative of bodies,
seeingthat inthat case there wouldbenoproduction ofgnats, mosquitoes,
trees, shrubs, etc.
A-sexual bodies, hoio produced—continued.

ii $ i h i vs u
Dharmma-visesat, from a particular dhartna or virtue.
Cha, and.
7. And (the action of the ultimate atoms arises) from
a particular d h a rm a or virtue.— 176.
Upaskara.—I t may be objected, how there can be production of a substance (i.e., a
body), without conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of substance, seeing that
there can be no conjunction without the action Of the ultimate atoms. Hence he says :
Thesenseisthat, at the beginning of creation, action or motion
arises inthe ultimate atoms in consequenceonlyof the conjunctionof the
soul carryingwithit theinvisible (adrislam) consequences of its previous
acts, and that the ultimate atoms, havingbythat actioncometogether,
originate, intheorder ofbinaryatomicaggregates, etc., thea-sexual bodies
ofgods andsages.
Theaphorismisillustrative. It should be also observed that, in
consequence of particular adharma or vices, the tortured bodies of mos­
quitoes and
* other small insects, generated, byheat, are produced.—7.
Proof of their existence,
II« i * 11; I
Samakliya-bhavat., because names or detinitions exist.
•i* Cha, also.
8. Also because names or definitions exist.—177.
Upaskara.—He gives another proof that the bodies of gods and sages are a-sexual :
5HTO! means a significant name, or definition, such as is well-
knowninSruti, Smpti, Itihasa, Pur&na, etc. Thus, Durvass, and other
sages werebornfromthe mind(of Brahma); Abgiras wasproduced from
ahaihkdra (thesenseof ‘I am’); andsoon. Fromthis also it is know n
that therearea-sexual bodiesof gods and sages.—8.
Vivriti. —But whence do a-sexual bodiesderive their names, inthe
absence of parents, etc. ? For it is observed on earth that thenames
Chaitra, Maitra, etc., areaffixed by parents, etc. Lest there be such an
apprehension, sohe says:
21
 ____ VAISESIKA P H IL OSOPHY. ______ ___jET
‘Bhavat’, i.e., fromtheexistence, of‘Samakhyu,’i.e., the name;‘even
in the absence of the procreativeparents, etc. ’is the complement. For,
all namesare not affixedonlybyparents, etc., as it is rot thecasewiththe
names, water-pot, canvas, etc. Therefore, the import is that thenames,
Mann, Marielii, etc., have been put upon a-sexual bodies, by the very
same Isvara by whomnames have beenaffixedtothe water-pot, canvas,
andother unconscious objects.
A-sexual bodies, how produced—continued.

ii«i ^ 11. H
HsffUr: Sahijnayah, of name. Aditvat, because of the primitiveness.
9. (The existence of a-sexnal bodies is proved) from
'the primitiveness of the name.—178.
(Jpaskura.—He gives another proof :
By means of the name, Brahma, etc., whichcametobethe begin­
ning, i.e., primordial, at thebeginningofcreation, it is known that a-sexual
. body exists. For then there were not parentsof Brahma, bywhomthe
nameBrahma, etc, should be given.—9.
V ivriti. —But there being no proof of the existenceofIt!vara, how
canit beaffirmed that the names ofthe water-pot, the canvas, etc., have
beengivenbyHim? Sohesays.
Because Isfvara, which is the complement of theaphorism, is the
beginning(Adi), i.e., the causeor source, of names. Thus, the? proof of
Isfvara having been alreadystated, bythecharacteristic of His beingthe
author ofnames, intheaphorism, “But name and effect, are the mark
(oftheexistence) of beingsdistinguishedfromourselves” (II. i. 18Ibid),
Isfvara’s being the author of names remains unobstructed. This is
the sense.
Conclusion : A-sexual bodies exist.

n«i ri *©n
Santi, exist. 3T%f%sir: Ayonijah, a-sexual bodies.
10. A-sexual bodies exist.—179.
Upaskdm—He concludes :
The words “particular formsof bodies”are thecomplement of the
aphorism.—10.
Another proof that a-sexual bodies exist.

H#i ^ i u H
'=: | | ; KAN ADA SUTRAS IV, 2-11. ( fi|
V-X Sg / 7____________________ _________________________________ -QJL j
Veda-iingat, from the texts which throw light upon the mantra
portion of the Veda, i.e., from the Brahmana portion of the Veda ,«r Cha, and.
11. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) als
from tlie Brahmana portion of the Veda.— 180.
Upaskdra.—In order to strengthen the above conclusion all the more, he gives another
proof:
‘Veda’means mantra. That bywhich it is lihgyate, i.e., made
known, is ‘ved-alihgam,’i.e., Bvahmanam. Fromthis alsoa-sexual body
isproved. This is the meaning. Thus there is the Brahmariam :
snTTTfa: stiff 51 cTfrScPSRT ST3Tf 51g^f^T
grfsrniinjsTri;siTjwir
“Prajapati {i.e., the lord of creation) creatednumerouscreatures :
Hepractisedpenance, with the desire, “I maybeabletocreatecreatures.”
He created the BrahmanafromHis mouth, the King fromIlia arms, the
Vaitfya from His thighs, theSudrafromHis feet.”
Thereis alsothe Veda :
anrSffS5?Tg^nrrtft^isffg5ra?q: tm* aracr^5qq^q: q$wri
55fm?r i
“His mouth became the Brahmana ; thearms weremadethe King
(i.e., ksattriya) ; it w as His thigh, whichbecamethe Vaidya ; the Sftdra
wasbornfromthefeet, etc.”
Thus terrene body, sexual anda-sexual, has beendescribedinthe
above way. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies can_beonlya-sexual,
sincesemenand bloodare, as arule, terrene, and a terrenesubstance does
not originate anaqueous one.
The terrenesenseis the organof smell, commontoall livingbeings.
Theorganof smell isoriginated by terrene particles unoverpowered or
unobscured by water, etc. The organ of smell is terrene, because it
causesthe manifestationof smell, whileit does not causethe manifestation
of taste, etc., like the excrement of the fowl which causes the mani­
festation of the perfume of the musk. Similarly, the organof taste, the
tongue, is theaqueoussense, as it causes themanifestationof tasteonly,
whileit does»ot cause the manifestationofcolour, etc., like water which
causes themanifestationof the taste of the pudding. In like manner,
theeyeis theigneous sense, becauseit causes themanifestationof colour
only, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., likelight.
The skin is the aerial sense, because it causesthemanifestationoftouch
only, while it does not cause the manifestation of smell, etc., like the
windblownbythefanwhich causes the manifestation of the coolness
of the water (perspiration.) stickingtothebody.
 f ^
Y \W $ t) VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. v fil

The object which is terrene, is characterisedasearth, stone, and

the immoveable. Therein the modifications of earth are the,divisions
of theland, wall, brick, etc. Stones are the mountains, jewels, diamond,
red-chalk, etc. Theimmoveableare grass, herbs, trees, shrubs, creepers,
and trees bearing fruits without flowers. Aqueous objects are rivers,
seas, dew, hail-stone, etc. Igneous object is four-fold, differentiated as
terrestrial, celestial, abdomenal, and mineral. The terrestrial is that
which is produced from fuel, such as wood. The celestial is not pro­
ducedfromfuel ; e.g., lightning, etc. The abdomenal is the stomachic,
capable of extracting the juice of rice. etc. And the mineral, isgold,
etc. The aerial object is the wind which is theseat or support oftouch
whichcanbefelt. Thefourtheffect of Air, which is called Prana, i.e.,
the life-breath, andwhichisthemeans of disposingof the essences (rasa),
excreta, and thehumours orvital fluids (dhatu) within the body, though
it isone, still acquires thenamesof Apana (i.e., the air which throws out),
etc., accordingtothediversityofits functions.—11.
Hereends thesecondchapter of thefourthbookinthe Commentary
of kWikarauponthe Vaidesika Aphorismsof Kanada.
B ook F I fth — C h apter F ir s t .

Action in the hand, how produced.

?ir?rl5r4f;'T!rqar*^r Atmi-samyoga-prayatnabhyftrn, by means of conjunction

with, and volition of, the soul, f ^ Haste, in the hand, g;*>| Karmma, action.
1. Action in hand (is produced) by means of conjunc
tion with, and volition of, the Soul.—181.
Upaskdm.—The subject of the fifth book is the investigation of Action. The investi­
gation of Action, producible by volition, is the subject of the first chapter. In this there are
sections treating of (l) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without
volition, (8) action which has virtue or merit as its cause, and (4) actions, good, bad, and
indifferent.
Withreference to a particular form,of muscular or bodily action,
he saysr
By means of conjunction and volition of thesoul, Action(ispro­
duced) inthehand whichisitscombinative cause. And of this Action,
conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative
cause, andvolitionis theefficient or conditional cause. It is this which
iscalledmuscular action; for muscular actionis action whichhas for its
non-combiuativecauseconjunctionwith the soul exercising volition, or
 - _
|( ,J | )1J K A N AD A SUTRAS V, 1-3.
---- — • ~ —" t3Tm_J
actionproducible by volition other than that whichpossesses touchand
whichisnot co-inherent inand is excludedfromitself.—1.
Vivriti .—Here ‘in thehand,’is an illustration. Themeaning
is that bytheconjunction, andvolition, of thesoul, action, inthe formof
muscular motion, is causedinthebodyas well as in the parts thereof.
Soit has beensaid,
y Tcg a ren fssraRTT i
$frT3T*7T fsR^TT li
That whichisproducedbythe Soul, may be called Desire. That
whichisproduced byDesire, may becalled first Impulse or stir. That
whichis produced byImpulse, maybecalled muscular motion. It is that
which is producedbymuscular motion, that may be called Action or
physical change. Action in the pestle described.
rTm g«r£r m h ^«
5TZIT Tatha, similar, Hasta-samyogat, from conjunction with the
hand ^ Cha, and. Musale, in the pestle, zgrf Karmma, action.
2. And, from conjunction with the hand, a similar
Action appears in the pestle.—182.
Upaskara.—After describing the throwing upwards of the hand, lie describes the
throwing upwards of the pestle, which depends upon the formor :
The word‘cha’implies ‘gravity,’which is another efficient cause.
‘Tatha’ means ‘like that,’i.e., of the form of throwing upwards. Or
‘tatha’ and ‘hastasamyogat’maybetaken*asconstitutingasingle term,
whichwill then mean ‘fromconjunctionwith thehandpossessingupward
motion.’ Here, again, conjunctionofthe pestle with the hand conjoined
withthe soul exercisingvolition, is the non-combinative cause ; the pestle
is thecombinative cause; volitionandgravityare theefficient causes.—2.
Above continued.
uffivnait jjrmfr ywr-
«<o 11
irfwsffini Abhighata-je, produced by impact. §sr5Tr?I Musaladau, in the
pestle, etc. Karmmani, in action. Vyatirekat, because of
absence (of volition). sraRrcij Akaranam, not cause. ^cT5T^f*T: Hasta-samyogah,
conjunction with the hand.
3. In the action, produced in the pestle, etc., by
impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because
of the absence (of volition).—183.
*TM681!---------------- -- ,-...'--- -------------i-i_____ ■-Vfil
VAI&E8TKA PHILOSOPHY.
' kJ-A-J
Upaskdra.—He states the cause of the sudden upward motion which is produced in
the pestle when struck by the mortar :
Here, though there isalso conjunction, of the handwith the rising
pestle, yet that conjunctionpossesses nocausality. Onthe other hand, the
impact of themortar onlyis the non-oombinativecause. It may beasked,
“Whyso?” Therefore he adds, ‘vyatirekat,’which means “because of
the absenceor opperativeness of volition.” Ifthere were volitionat that
moment, there would surelybe nosudden upward motioninthe pestle.
Byavolitiontohold fast, there wouldbe rather sustention'ofthe pestle;
or, the upward motion againof the pestlewouldbecaused bymuscular
action. This is theimport.—3.
Vivriti.— -Conjunction withthe hand is not the combinative cause.
‘Conjunction’ is indicative. Volitionandmuscular actionalso, it should
beunderstood, are not the efficient causes.
Action in the hand.

rnqr^l#it*T: II * I % I 2 II
Tatha, the same, i.e., not a cause. Atma-samyogah, conjunc­
tion with the soul, Hasta-karmmani, in the action of the hand.
4. In the case of action of in the hand, conjunction
* with the soul is not a cause.—184.
Vpaslalra.—With a view to specify a particular cause of the action of the hand, as it
flies upwards with the pestle, and for the purpose of disproving the non-combinative
causality of conjunction with the soul exercising volition, ho says :
Inthecaseof theactionof the hand, as it springs upwards withthe
pestle, ‘conjunctionwiththesoul,’i.e., conjunction withthesoul exetcis-
ingvolition, is ‘thesame,’i.e., not acause. Theterm‘not-a-cause’which
* appears inthe preceding aphorism, is carriedover hereby ‘tatha,’ the
same.—4.
Vivriti. —This too is illustrative. It should be understood that
volitionalsois not a non-commonefficient cause.
Above continued.

srfasn \m u*i*i*u
=5rfSpTRTiT Abhighatat, from impact, Musala-sariiyogat, from
conjunction with the pestle. Haste, inthe hand, Karmina, action.
5. The action (i. e. upward motion) in the hand is
from impact, and from conjunction with the pestle.—185.
Upasktira.—“ Whence then at that time the upward motion in the hand ” ? In answer
to this, he says;
I -KANADA SUTRAS V, 1-7. fc j
'^2^/'*/ ic_,W^JL_^i
? x - As, when thepestleflies upwards, the iron-ringat the endof the
pestle rises upwards, sothehandalsoat that timespringsupwards. Here
by the word, ‘impact,’ re-action (he., recoil) produced by impact, is
expressedbytransference. Bythe vigorous actionof theup-goingpestle,
accompaniedwith the impact, re-action or recoil is produced inthe pestle
itself whichis thesubstratum of that action. Subject tothe re-actionso
effected, upwardmotion appears in thehandalso, in consequence ofthe
conjunctionof thehandand the pestle, as its non-combinativecause; and
not that this upward motion has for its non-combinative causeconjunc­
tion with the soul exercising volition, for thehand rises involuntarily
together withthepestle. This is the idea.—5.
Action in the lody.

WUU-TaU II v i i II
Atma-karmma, action of the body, and its members. ^T^nrTT^
Hasta-samyogat, from conjunction with the hand. =5* Cha, and, a so.
6. Action of the body and its members is also from
conjunction with the hand.—186.
Upaakdra.—“ Well,” it may be asked, “ conjunction with the soul exercising volition
is the cause of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body. Why
is it not so in the present instance ” ? Hence he says :
The word ‘atrna,’ bytransference, means the body and its parts.
For, impossibility of order or coherence inthe text, is thegerm of a
transference of epithet. Thus theactionwhich appears inapart of the
bodyalso, that is, inthe hand, arises fromtheconjunction of thehandand
thepestle. Theword ‘cha’ implies also impetus. In the action of the
hand, conjunction with the hand is really the non-combinative cause.
There is nodeviationor breach of uniformityinthis respect. Thiscon-
I junction is sometimes conjunctionwiththe soul exercisingvolition, and
sometimes conjunction of thehandwithpestle, etc., possessing impetus,
asis the casewiththe actionof the bodyand its parts, ofamad man.—6.
Falling how produced-
1 ii *i \ i vs n
dAfMWN Sariiyoga-abhave, in the absence of conjunction. Gurutvat,
from gravity. < ^ * 1 Patanam, falling.
7. In the absence of conjunction, falling (results)
from gravity.—187.
Upaskdra.—He begins the section on action independent of volition :
I■A) ■> * .y. .
({ (W N ffl
r. v <$& -&
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
------------ ---- --------------------------------- ^ 1 .
(CT
X5^ Bytheterm, ‘conjunction,’ every kindof impediment is indicated.
Hencein theabsenceof impediments, in consequence of gravityas its
non-conxbinativecause, falling, i.e., anaction resulting in conjunction
below,isproduced. Hereinfruit, etc., possessinggravity, the impediment
isconjunction; ina bird, etc., however, volitiontohold upis the impedi­
ment tofalling; inan arrow, etc., whendischarged, it is the re-action
that isthe impediment tofalling. Themeaningis that, inthe absenceof
these, falling is causedbygravity. Inthe caseof holding upofpoison,
etc., in the air, by thought-transference, etc., conjunctionwith the soul
endowedwithadridam (invisibleafter-effects ofprevious acts), or mantra,
andthe like are reallythe impediments. Thesealsoare included bythe
term‘conjunction.’—7.
Falling how produced— continued.

* br-qmriuu n v. i ? i c ii
%g’Tfa%(Tf»Trer«3( Nodaua-visesa-abhavSt, owing to the absence of a particu­
lar molecular movement or impulse. ff Na, not. Urddhvam, upward,
q Na, not. Tiryyak, oblique, sideward. Gamanam, going.
8. Owing to the absence of a particular molecular
movement, there arises no upward or sideward motion (in
the fruit, bird, and arrow).—188.
Upaskdra.—Well, if falling is caused by gravity, then how can there be sometimes an
upward, and sometimes a sideward motion in a stoue, etc., when thrown up ? To meet this
objection, lie says :
The upwardor sidewardmotionwhichtakes placeinastone, arrow,
etc., though theypossessgravity, results fromaparticular, i.e., aviolent,
molecular movement- Sothat in thecaseof thefallingof afruit, abird,
anarrow, etc., intheabsenceof conjunction, volition, andre-action, there
doesnot exist aparticular molecular movement, andconsequentlythere is
noupwardor sidewardmotion. This is thesense.'—8.
Above continued.

Prayatna-visesdt, from a particular volition. sfasiRsitr: Nodana-

vi^esah, particular molecular movement or
impulse.
9. Particular molecular movement (results) from
particular volition.—189.
Upaskdra.—But whence is particular molecular movement itself produced ? He gives
the answer:
 'G
°Sx
(l( JJ )i) KAN AD A SUTRAS V, 1-11.
Particular volitionis causedbythe desire “I will throw sideward,
upward, far, or near. By this particular molecular movement is pro­
duced, fromwhichupwardor sideward motion is possible or produced
inasubstancepossessinggravity, e.g., a stone, etc.—9.
Throwing fa r away , how produced.

Nodaua-vigesat, from a particular molecular movement.

HteHftsfPSITS
Udasana-vi^esah, particular throwingaway.
10. From particular molecular movement, (results)
particular throwing away.—190,
Upaskdm.—‘Udasanam’ means throwing far upwards.
Vivj'iti. froma heterogeneous molecular move­
i.e.,
ment produced by the aforesaid volition, i.e., throwing high
upwards, going upwards, W 3TfrT,i.e., takes place, which coinDletes the
aphorism. Thus, by agreement and difference, the causality of aparti­
cular molecular movement towards upward motion, is proved.
goingupwards, isan indication. Sideward motion, etc., also shouldbe
understood.
Non-volitional action, not a cause of virtue or vice.

II V. I \ \ \ \ II
Hasia-karinmanS, by the action ofthehand. D&raka-
karmma, theactionofachild. sjirastTfPI.Vyakhyatam,explained.
11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child
(has been) explained.—191.
UpaskAra. The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle, by
the impact of the mortar, is nob at all preceded by volition, nor is it the source of virtue
and vice. He extends a similar nature to the playful movements of the hands and feet,
etc., of a child :
Although a child’s movemeut of its hands, feet, etc,, is surely
preceded byvolition, it has not for its result the acquisition of the good
andtheavoidanceof the evil, nor is it asourceofvirtue and vice. This
is the meaningof the extensionor analogy.—11.
liv r iti. But howis action, in the form of sidew ard and upward
motion, of the hands and feet of a childlying onthe lap, produced, in
theabsencetherefromofthe particular molecular movement or.impulse?
Sohesays: \
22 "
(|Vjjjg*/ .___ V^jJ
-VAI8E8IKA P
SY
O
IL
H ^
Bytheactionof the hand, of the formoi throwing upwards, etc.,
simultaneous withthe throwing upwards of a stone, theaction, i.e., the
throwing upwards of the hands and feet, of a child, is explained, i.e.,
proved. Thus, a particular molecular movement is not the cauce of all
throwinghigh upwards, but onlyof particular acts of throwinghigh up­
wards. Hencethe throwing upwards of the hands and feet of ach.ld
is not unproved. Otherwise, the throwing upwards of the hands of ont
whothrowsupastone, etc., will bealsounproved.
Certain volitional actions also, not a cause of virtue or vice.
rrar Ptmirca n n i ? i u
?|trT Hatha, the same Dagdhasya, of a burnt person. f^eFTiW
Visphotone, in the case of a boil.
12. The same (is action directed towards the killing
of a felon), when (a house being set on fire by him) the body
of a person burnt therein, is torn open by fire.—192.
Upaskdra.—Now, extending similarity to tlie action of a child to action which, though
preceded by volition, is yet not the cause of virtue and vice, he says :
Ahouse beingset onfire byafelonand in it boilsbeingcausedtoa
personburnt bythe fire, action which is produced inthe hand, etc., by
v volitiondirected towards the killing of that felon, is neither a cause of
virtuenor acauseof vice; as it has beensaid, “Inthe slayingof afelon,
thereisnosin in him that slays openly or covertly: wrath encounters
wrath. Anincendiary, apoisoner, an assassin, athief, aravisher of wife
andfield,—thesesix arefelons.”—12.
Vivpiti.—Sometimes throwingupwards, etc., result alsofrom parti­
cular molecular movements which are not dependent upon particular
volitions produced by the desires, “I throw upwards.” etc. Ibis he
points out:
ofa burnt body, building, fruit, etc.; in the going
sidewardandupwardof their parts; cT«JT,molecular movement, causedby
aparticular volition, is not the cause. This is themeaning.
Non-volitional action in the body described.
uyaSi 11 *. 1 1 11
ggtPTR Yatna-abhave, in the absence of volition. ggHW Prasuptasya, of
the sleeping. Chalanam, movement.
13. Movement of the sleeping (takes place) in the ab­
sence of volition,—
—193.
Upaskdra.—Now, he points out actions which take place without volition :
 ' n
tf( II 4) KANADA SUTRAS 7 , 1-15. _______

The word‘prasupfasya’implies the state of absence of consciousness.

Therefore, the movement caused by air in the unconscious state of a
person inswoon, whileliving, should beobservedhere.—13.
Vivriti. —Evenin the absence of volition caused by the desire, U1
throw up,” etc., ‘movement’ of the body, i.e., action such as the
sideward and upward movements of the limbs, of aperson‘sleeping’or
attendedwithdeepsleep, is produced. Therefore, a particular volition is
not everywherethecause. This isthe import.
Action in things other than the body.

<1 % ^ it * i ? i ii
Trine, inthegrass. Karmma, action. Vayu-sariiyogat
fromconjunctionwithair.
14. Action in the grass (arises) from conjunction
with air.—194.
Upaslulm.—Having explained the actions of the body, he treats of other actions :
Bytheterm‘grass,’heimplies trees, shrubs, creepers, and all such
other objects.—14.
Vivriti. —Hepoints out similar other actionsalso.
Evenintheabsenceofaparticular volition, fromconjunctionwithair,
actionisproducedinthe grass.
Actions produced by adfistam.

*rfW R ii h i k i ^ ii
Mani-gamanam, movement of thejewel. Suchi-abhi-
sarpanam, approach of the needle. Adrista-karanakam, have
adrisiam, {i.e., theinvisible consequencesofpreviousacts) as their cause.
15. The movement of the jewel, and the approach
of the needle, have adristam as their cause.—195.
Opask&ra.—Enumerating actions dependent upon adristam, he says :
Bytheterm‘jewel’, bell-metal, etc., areimplied. In the going,
takes place, therefore, ofthejewel, bell-metal, etc., informed withmantra or
which
incantation, towards the thief, there, of that movement, thejewel, etc.,
are the combinative cause, conjunctionof the jewel with the Soul of the
thief possessedof adfistam, is the non-eombinativecause, and the vice of
thethief is theefficient or instrumental cause. Bythe word, ‘needle,’in
‘the approach of the needle,’ all metal as well as grass are implied.
Thus intheeaseof themovement of theneedle, etc., towards that
is attractive of iron {i.e., the magnet), and of the movement of grass
which
. M 72: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPPY. v fiT
y^Nv.n,jfT'T^ ’ • ■■•
’" _ v JL—i«

towards tliat whichis attractive of grass, theneedle, etc., are the combi­
nativecause, conjunctionwiththe soul of the personpossessedofadristam,
wffiois affectedfor goodor for bad bythat movement of the grass, the
needle, etc., is the non-combinative cause, and his veryadristam is the
instrumental cause. Other instances, e.g., the flaming upwards of fire,
the sideward motionof air, the actionof the ultimate atoms at thebegin­
ningof creation, etc., shouldbe similarlyunderstood.—15.
V ivriti .—Bythe term, ‘jewel, ’areintendedvesselsmadeof gold, etc.,
andfilledwithwater. Tosuchavessel magicians applyincantations for
the recovery of stolen property. Thetradition of the ancients is this:
Thevessel isset onthe ground, andsomeother personlayshisright hand
upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, inconsequenceof the
efficacyof the incantation, moves towards thespot wherethestolenproper­
tyhas beendeposited, andonreaching that place, stops.
Thereasonof the movement of sucha vessel is not a particular voli­
tion, but theefficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or the
demerit ofthethief. Thenon-combinativecause isconjunctionof such a
vessel with soul possessing such adristam (or results of actions donein
previous states of existence) ; and thecombinativecauseis such a vessel.
In like manner, adristam is also the cause of the attraction towards a
loadstonewhichtakes placeinneedles, i.e., iron-rods, when in proximity
•withthemagnet. If it beasked, inconsequenceofwhoseadritfam motion
takes placeinneedles, etc., thereply, is that it is the adristam of him to
whombenefitorinjuryaccruesby themotion, that isthecause. The term,
‘needle,’ is indicative, iron ingeneral attracted bytheload-stone being
intended. It is tobe understood that adriptm, is thecause of the motion
of grass attracted by that which is attractive of grass (amber ?), of the
upwardflamingof fire, ofthesidewardmotionof airs, andof theactionof
theultimateatomsat thebeginning ofcreation.
Plurality of action.

tcrmfirimr: f<j: u u u u
Isau, of the arrow. A yugapat, n on-sim ultaneous. ^5RT*T^$5tt:
Sam yoga-vi^esab, p ecu liarities o f conjunctions. K arm m a-anyatve,
in resp ect of d iv ersity o f action, f g : H etub, cause. Mark.
16. Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions o
the arrow, are the mark of the diversity of its action.—196.
Upaskdra.—It may be doubted whether an arrow, a bird, a wheel of burning charcoal,
etc., have only one action, or many, till they come to a stop. To remove tips doubt,
he says ;
® o ^
KANADA SUTRAS V, 1-17. (o3T
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----— _ —

In 1isau’the locative inflection has beenused inthe senseof the

genitive. The sense of the aphorismisas follows: After conjunction
witha wall and thelike, of anarrow, etc., moving with impetus, acessa­
tionof motionisobserved, eventhough thearrow, etc., still exist. Here
it is not the destructionof the substratum whichcauses the destruction
ofthemotion, for the substratum continues toexist. Any contradictory
attribute is alsonot observed. It is, therefore, inferred that it is conjunc­
tionproducedbyitself, that destroys the action. Andthis conjunction,
produced at the fourth moment, destroys action of the fifth moment.
Thus, first there isproduction of action, then disjunction, next destruction
of the previous conjunction, after it subsequent conjunction, andlastly
destructionof action. The meaning, therefore, is that peculiai'ities of
non-simnltaneous conjunctions make known the diversityof theaction.
1Saniyoga-viifesah’means peculiarityinconjunction, which is nothingbut
self-produced-ness. Otherwise, were conjunction, as such, destructive of
action, actioncould not abide anywhere.—16,
Action produced by Sarhskdra.

ati 11 *
Afarr?! Nodanat, from impulse or molecular movement, Adyam, ori­
ginal, first, fiff: Isofi, of the arrow. | Karrnma, action.
Tat-Karinma-Karitat, produced by that action. =<t Cha, and. Sams-
karat, from resultant energy. 3 ^ Uttaram, the next, Tatha, similarly.
Uttaram, the next. Uttaram, the next. =qr Cha, and
17. Ihe first action of the arrow is from impulse ; th
next is from resultant energy produced by that (i.e., the
first) action ; and similarly the next, and the next.—197.
Upaskura. After the section on Action producible by impulse, he begins the section
on Action producible by resultanl energy.
Of the first action, whichis producedinanarrow, when discharged
from abowstring, drawn bythe volition of aperson, the arrow is the
combinativecause, volition andgravityare the efficient causes. Andby
this first action, resultant energy, called impetus, and having the same
substratum, is produced. It is.provedeven byperception, viz., “It {i.e
thearrow) moves with velocity.” By that resultant energy, action, is
producedin that arrow; of which the non-combinative causeis theresult­
ant energy, the combinative cause is the arrow, while theefficient cause
is an intense formof molecular movement. I11 like manner, asuccession
w m % \ * ■ n
VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY.

ofactionsoneafter another is produced by the resultant energy which

continues until the arrowfalls.
Since, on an action being destroyed by subsequent conjunction
produced by (the action) itself, another action is produced byresul­
tant energy, therefore a single resultant energy only is productive
of asuccessionof actions; whereas, on the ground of redundancy, it
is not proper to assume a succession of resultant energy, similar
tothe successionof actions. To point out this, he says “similarly the
next, andthe next,” andalsouses thesingular number in“fromresultant
energyproducedbythat action.” In the Nyayadoctrine, however, which
admits asuccession of resultant energies like the succession of actions,
there isredundancy. Thereason, again, that oftwoarrows, simultaneous­
lydischarged, theimpetus of the oneis swift and that of the other slow,
is the swiftness andslownessof the impulseor molecular movement.—17.
Vivviti .—The original action itself of a discharged arrow, etc.,
destroys, at thethird momeift from its own origin, its owncause, viz.,
molecular movement or impulse, given by the bow. Therefore, there
beingabsence of impulse, howwill other actions beproduced at the fifth,
and succeeding moments ? In view of this objection, he states the
aphorism.
Falling of arrow, how caused.

a i r c r a f t ihhivH
5R3ilflEPTT% Sariiskara-abhave, in the absence of resultant energy (or pro­
pulsive energy generated by action), Gurutvat, from gravity. TcFPl
Patanam, falling.
18. Iii the absence of propulsive energy generated b
action, falling (results) from gravity.—198.
Upask&ra.—But if only a single resultant energy be productive of a succession of
ctions, then there would be, under no circumstances whatever, a falling of the arrow,
because of the existence of the resultant energy which is productive of action. To this
objection, he replies :
Gravity, whichis thecause of falling, invariablyfollows(the arrow),
at everymoment. That gravity, beingcounter-actedby resultant energy,
could not cause the falling(ofthearrow). Now,inthe absence of the
counter-active, the very same gravity causes falling. This is themean-’
ing.—18.
Hereends the first chapter of the fifth bookinSafikara’s Commen­
taryontheVaisfesikaAphorisms.
 •GOfcV

\i[ jj^ V*; kan A d a s u t r a s V, 2-1. ^

B ook F if t h .— C h a p t e r S eco n d .
' Yg9
Causes of action in Earth. *
im^uu
^TSFTTT^n'ctni Nodana-abhighatat, from molecular movement or impulse,
ana from impact. Samyukta-Samyogat, from conjunction with the
conjunct, ■q- Cha, and. <jtfTS3fT Prithivyatn, in Earth. Karmma, action.
1. Action in Earth (results) from impulse, impact,
and conjuntion with the conjunct.—199.
Upaskara.—This is the section on the examination of Action producible by impulse,
etc. Therein he says :
is a particular form of conjunction: conjunction, action
produced bywhich does not become the cause of the disjunction of
conjoint things fromeachother; or, conjunction whichdoes not become
the efficient cause of Sound. That particular form of conjunction is
calledimpact, which becomes the efficient cause of Sound, and action
produced bywhich becomes the cause of disjunction of conjoint things
fromeachother. Byeach of them alsoactionis producedin Earthcalled
clay. In Earth action is produced from impulse given bythefoot, as
well as fromthe impact of the foot. Hereclayis thecombinativecause;
impulse and impact are respectively non-combinative causes; gravity,
impetus, and volition are, so far as they are necessary, efficient causes.
“FromconjunctionwiththeconjunctBecause actionissimultaneously
observedina water-pot, etc., lying on clay, when actionis produced in
that clayfromimpulse or fromimpact.—1.
Above continued.

um iui
?{g- Tat, that, i.e., action in
Earth, fssrr^ir Visesena, with a particular
consequence. Adrista-kdritani, caused by adristam or destiny.
2. (If action in Earth happens) with a particular
consequence, it is caused by adristam.—-200.
UjxisMra.—But what is the non-combinative cause of earthquake, etc., which take
place without the intervention of impulse and impact ? He gives the answer :
‘Tat ’ alludes to action in Earth. Action in Earth alone, if it
happens withaparticular consequence, i.e., under the tendency (vasana)
oftransmigratorysouls towards birth, life, and experience(bhoga), is then
causedby adristam. Therefore, the non-combinativecause of earthquake
isconjunctionof the soul, possessing adristam, of apersonwhosepleasure
if
------------ 1
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
----- ----- ------------------------ jJLLj
VfiT
or pain is produced by the earthquake; the earth is the combinative
cause; andadristam i$theefficient cause.
Or, ‘tat ’alludes to impulse andimpact. ‘Vislesah’means absence.
Sothat, themeaning is, action in Earth, whichis produced intheabsence
of impulseandimpact, iscaused byadristam.—2.
Cause of rain.
w q r #it*T m T w im ^ n
^Ptf Apdm, of waters. Sariiyoga-abhave, in the absence of con­
junction. Gurutvat, from gravity. Patanam, falling.
3. The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunc­
tion, is due to gravity.—201.
Upaskdra.—Now, in the section on the examination of action combined with fluid
(which includes liquid) substance, he says :
Thefallingof waters, in the formof ashower, iscausedbygravity,
which is its non-combinative cause. It takesplace in the absence of
conjunction, i.e., conjunction withthe cloud. Therefore, absenceof con­
junctionisthe efficient cause. This is the meaning.—3.
Causes of flowing of water.
s[^errg( w r ^ n r iivrisii
Dravatvat, from fluidity, Syandanatn, flowing.
4. Flowing (results) from fluidity.—202.
Upaskdra.—But how is action, productive of mutual conjunction amongst the drops
of water themselves, produced ? He gives the answer.
By themutual conjunctionof drops of water fallen on earth, a
largebodyof water, intheformof astream, isproduced. Andtheflowing
or distant progression, which takes placein it, isproduced fromfluidity
as its non-combinativecause, andfrom gravity as its efficient cause, in
water drops whichareits combinativecauses.—4.
Cause of evaporation of water.
srr^ fr ^ u q m w i r T f v r a ; iivrivii
Nadyah, the sun’s rays. VSyu-sariiyogat, through con­
junction with air. Arohanam, ascent.
5. The sun’s rays (cause) the ascent (of water), through
conjunction with air.—203.
Upaskdra.—But the falling in rain, due to gravity, would be possible, if water lying on
earth went up. But how does this take place ? So he says :
Theword, ‘cause’(verb), is thecomplement of the aphorism. The
rays bf thesuncausethegoing upof-water, throughconjunctionwithair.
-"' S-B——— %a n A d A SUTRAS V, 2-7. ______ (gj^
in thesummer, the sun’srays, being impelledby air, cause the ascent
of water. This is themeaning.
Wherethereadingis there it should beinterpreted
asconjunctionwithair, related tothesun’srays.—5-
Cause of evaporation of water, continued.

HHfHPTrSHrrl—Nodana-apidanat, from concussion, or being violently

shaken by or through the impulse. Samyukta-samyogat, from
conjunction with the conjunct. =sf Cha, and.
6. (Particles of water fly upwards), by means of
concussion with impulse, and of conjunction with the con­
junct.—204.
Upaskdra.—Bat how do the sun’s rays come to possess such power that they carry
up water lying on the earth ? Hence he says.
Particles of water fly up, being conjoined with the sun’s rays,
which are, in tarn, conjoined with air, through concussion with the
impulseof strongwind; inthesameway as the rays of fire, bestirred
byair, carry up particles of water boiling in a cauldron. The word
‘cha’conveys the senseof 1as.’ Andhere onlyparticles of water boiling
inacauldronshouldbeobservedtobethesimile.—6.
Note : Upaskdra com pares the two processes of evaporation and
ebullitionof water
Cause of circulation of water in trees.
iu i rivs ii
Vriksa-abhisarpanam, circulation in trees. Iti, this.
3T5?cRlTCTH. Adrista-kdritam, caused by adngtam or destiny.
7.
The circulation (of water) in trees is caused by
cidristam.—205.
Upaskara.—Water poured at the root, goes up in all directions, through the interior
of a tree. Neither impulse and impact, nor the sun’s rays prevail there. How, then,
is it caused ? He gives the answer.
‘Abhisarpanam’means flawing towards or all over. That takes
place inatree, of water pouredat its root. It is causedbyadristam, i.e.,
ofthosesouls whosepleasureor painisproduced by the growth of the
leaves, branches, fruits, flowers, etc. Themeaning, then, is that action
bywhichwater rises up and causes the growth of trees, arises from
conjunction with the above-mentionedsouls, possessingadpi^tam, as its
non-combinative cause, and fromadristam, as its.efficient cause, iuwater
whichis its combinativecause.—7.
23
(i;.-v,i/IIIN t VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
® - p --------------------------- :__________ ______________________ ^ i l ,
Cause of condensation and. dissolution of ivater.

m j m **t ii y. u iqn
W Apflm, of waters. HflrP Sanghatah, condensation, PTStapi—Vilaya-
nam, dissolution. ^ Cha, and, %5f: - ^trUT^---Tejali-samyogrit, from conjunction
with fire.

8. Condensation, and dissolution, of water, are due

to conjunction with fire.—206.
Upaelcnra.—Constitutional fluidity lias been stated to be the characteristic of water.
Upward, downward, and sideward motion of such water only has been proved. The
aqueousness of snow, hail, etc., also are proved without a dispute, since they possess
coldness. Therefore, how do these possess condensation, i.e., hardness, and how disso­
lution ? Hence he says.
Aqueous ultimate atoms, originatingabinary atomic aggregate, in
consequence of beingimpededbycelestial fire, do not originate fluidity
in these binaryatomic aggregates. Snow, hail, etc., voidof fluidity, are
, thus originated, inthecourseof binaryandother atomic aggregates, by
constituent parts voidof fluidity. Therefore hardness is observed in them.
Such being the case, it may be asked, what proof is therethat
snow,hail, etc., are modifications of water? Accordingly it has been
said, “Dissolution also fromconjunctionwithfire.” Byamorepowerful
• conjunctionwithfire, actionis producedin theultimateatoms originative
of snow, hail, etc. Action produces disjunction. Fromthe successive
destructionthereby of originative conjunctions follows the destruction
of thelarger compounds, snow, hail, etc. Inconsequenceof the departure
therefrom of conjunction withfire, which wasau impediment tofluidity,
theverysameultimate atoms originate fluidity in binary atomic aggre­
gates; whence dissolution takes place of snow, bail, etc., thus endowed
withfluidity. Herealsothesubsequent ingress of a more powerful fire
is theefficient cause.—8.
Above continued.

33r I) V, I ^ | 1)
WW l atra, there, t.e., in the case of the ingress of fire into water,
Visphurjjathufi, the pealing of thunder. fsrfU— Lingam, mark.
9. The pealing of thunder is the mark of that.—207.
UpasM.ru.—But what is the proof that there is subsequent ingress into water of a
more powerful fire present in ether ? So be s a y s :
‘Tatra,’i.e., inthe matter of the subsequent ingressof fire, present
in ether, intowater floatinginether, ‘visphurjjathuh lifigam,’ i.e., the
|| K AN AD A SUTRAS V, 2-11._________ ( g ^
pealingof thunder itself is the mark. This is the meaning. Far-reach­
ingflashoflightningisclearly perceptible ; thunder which immediately
followsit, is also really perceptible. By this it is inferred that fire
present in ether, in the form of lightning, has enteredintothe cloud
fromwhichhailstones appear. By its presence, as acondition, impedi­
ment is caused to the fluidity of water-particles originative of hail­
stones. 9.
Cause of condensation of water, continued.
II * I * I II
Vaidikam, Vedic, Derived from Veda, ^ Cha and.
10. (There is) Vedic (proof) also.—208.
Upaskara.—Of this he gives yet another proof.
Themeaningis that the ingress of fire into water is proved by
the Vedaalso. Thus
“fTOT miSimpsftat
“Those watersheldfire in their womb, which held fire in their
womb,”etc.—10.
Cause of thundering.
srof bdmrfkunrrer n* i m ? ii
'SPIT Apdm, of waters. Samyogat, from conjunction. r%Hr*Tni
Vibhagat, from disjunction. ^ Cha, and. Stanayitnoh, of cloud.
11. (Thunder-clap results) from conjunction with,
and disjunction from, water, of the cloud.—209.
Upaskara.—Bat how is thundering produced, since conjunction and disjunction, which
are the causes of Sound, are not observed ? Hence he says :
.‘‘Visphurjjathuh”is the complement of theaphorism. Conjunction
with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud, bybecomingefficient
causes, produce sound, i.e., thundering, inether as the combinative cause,
throughthe conjunctionof the clouditself with ether, as the non-combi-
nativecause. Sometimes, again, conjunctionwith, and disjunctionfrom,
air, of thecloud, are the efficient causes, and conjunction of the cloud
with ether, and its disjunction therefrom, are thenon-combinative causes.
This is collaterallymentioned inthe topic of the causes of action. Or,
sinceaction is the leadingtopichere, it is indicated that, conjunction of
thecloudand ether, or their disjunction, beingthenon-combinativecause
of sound, the (efficient) cause is action producedfromthe impulse and
impact of water alone—11.
 —<V\ ^
f*( lly j________ V A lS m iK A PHILOSOPHY. jfil
' ■^ V ivriti.—Thunderingtakesplacefromthe conjunction, ofwater, i.e.,
fromthe impact ofair withit, and fromits disjunction fromthe cloud.
Causes of conflagration, tempest, etc.

^ sqxwxm
ii v. i * i u
Prithivl-karmmapa, by tlie action of Earth. %3(:ef;w? lejah-
karmma, action of fire. gT35fi»T Vayu-karmma, action of air. ■ q Cha, and.
Vyakhyatam, explained.
12. The action of Fire, and the action of Air are
explained by the action of Earth.—210.
UpasMra.—It has been stated that conjunction with soul possessing adriftam is a
cause of earth-quake. As there, so in the case of the action which is produced in fire which
causes a sudden conflagration, and in air which causes a sudden agitation of trees and the
like, conjunction with soul possessing adrigtam is also the non-combinative cause; air
and fire are the combinative causes ; and ad riytam is the efficient cause. This is the
’ meaning.
The[twicerecurrenceof theword action inthe aphorism, has the
object of indicatingtheactionofmeteors, etc.-—
12.
qrqrrH^4-rqxxqmf xwwmr
Causes of initial action of fire, air, atoms, and mind.

^mlgg^rfiriq ii y i =t i n h
Agneb, of fire. (Jrddhva-jvalanam, flaming upward. qrab
Vayofc, of air. Tiryyak, sideward, qq* Pavanam, blowing. SHU-TT
Atjunam, of atoms. qqu: Manasali, of mind. ^ Cha, and. Adyam, initial,
first. Karmma, action. qrssrsRmfPl Adrista-karitam, caused by adrtf'am.
13. The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial
sideward blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms,
and of mind are caused by adristam.—211.
UpasMra.—He mentions other actions of which conjunction with soul possessing
adriftam is the non-combinative cause.
‘Adyam’meanscontemporaneouswith, or existingat, thebeginning
of creation. At that stage, impulse, impact, etc., being non-existent, con­
junctionwithsoul possessingadfi^tam is inthese cases the non-combina­
tivecause. Theadjective, ‘initial,’ qualifies upward flaming, and side­
wardblowing. It is propertohold that impetus isthe non-combinative
causeof other (than initial; actions of fireandair, for there being a visi­
bleor known causethere is nooccasionfor the suppositionof aninvisible .
or unknowncause—13.
m K M , KANADA SUTRAS V, 2-15.
---- -— --------------- ~ ■
Cause o f action of mind.
4 F?wfwT 3FR*T: zq w m * II V. I R I II
ffjjfmr Hasta-karmmana, by tbe action of the hand. JHHP Manasah
or the internal organ. gRwf karmma, action. sansWr1!. Vyakhydtam,
ined.
14. The action of mind is explained by the action of
the hand.—212.
Upaskara.—With reference to non-initial action, he says :
As inthe throwingupward, etc., of the pestle, theactionofthehand
hasforits non-corahinativecauseconjunction withsoul exercisingvolition,
sotbeactionof themindalso, for the purposeof coininginto contact with
the(external)sensereceptiveof theobject desired, really has for its non-
combinativecause conjunction with soul exercising volition. Although
mind, the sense, is not directlysubject tovolition, still it shouldbeobserved
that actionisproducedinmindbyvolition which can bereached bythe
nervous process bywhichmindtravels. That the nervous processcanbe
apprehendedby the tactual sense-organ, however, must be admitted;
for, otherwise, assimilationof food, drink, etc., alsowill not be possibleby
volitionwhichcanbereachedbythe nervousprocess through which life
or thevital energytravels.—14.
Pleasure and 'pain are marks of actioti of mind.

Atma-indriy^mamih-ai'tha-saimikarsat, from contact

of soul, sense, mind, and object. JJtSjfulr Sukha-duhkhe, pleasure and pain.
15. Pleasure and pain (result) from contact of soul,
sense, mind, and object.—213.
Upciskara.—But, it may be objected, there is no proof that action is produced in the
mind. Hence he says :
‘Pleasureand pain’is indicative; cognition, volition, etc., aretobe
understood. Theuniversalityor ubiquityof mindhas beenalreadyrefuted
and its atom-ness established. It has also been stated that thenon­
production of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of mind. There
could, therefore, be nopleasure and painat all, without the conjunction
ofmind with therespectivelocalities of the senses. The meaningis that,
didnoactiontakeplace inmind, therecouldbe no feeling in theformof
“Pleasure inmyfoot,” “Paininmyhead,”etc. Although all theparti­
cular attributes of the soul depend upon contact of mind, yet pleasure
andpainare(alone expressly) mentioned, because, on account of their
intensity, theyareverymanifest.—15,
((( ______ V AI&ESIK A PHILOSOPHY. iCJ
Yoga described.

mrfh |:^rrwr^:
II V I R M i II
<T«RtR«T:Tat-anarambliah, non-originationofthat, i.e., pleasure ana
or actionofmind. Atmasthe, steadyinthesoul. *rt%Manasi,mindbe..
srifaRI £$arlrasya, ofbody, i.e., of theembodiedsoul. f:?Sfr*ra: dufrkha-abhavah,
non-existence ofpain. Sah, that. %*r: Yogah, yoga, communion.
16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind be
coming steady in the soul; (after it, there is) non-existence
of pain in the embodied soul. (This is) that yoga.—214.
Upaskara.—Well, if the mind is so fickle or restless, then there being no inhibition
or restraint of the internal organ there can be no yoga or communion, and without yoga
there can be no intuitive knowledge of the soul, and without it, there can be no mokfa
or salvation. Therefore, the undertaking of this treatise is futile. In anticipation of
• this objection, he says :
Whenthemindof anindifferent who lias come to believe in the
vanityofall objects of enjoyment, comestostayonly in the soul, at that
stage, owingtotheabsenceofvolitioncorresponding to its action, action
is not producedinthe mind which then becomes comparatively steady.
It isthis(state) whichis(called) yoga, since the characteristic of yoga is
theinhibitionorrestraint oftheinternal organ, chittam.
‘Tat-anarambhah’ means non-origination of action of mind. Or, by
the word, ‘tat,”‘that,’ onlypleasure and painare denoted, being in the
context. ‘Dulikha-abhavah’: Beingthe means of the non-existence of
pain, Yoga itself is (spokenof as) non-existenceof pain, as is theexpres­
sion “ Foodis life.” Or, it is arelative compoundword meaning where
thereis non-existence of pain. ‘Sarirasya’means thesoul aslimitedor
determined by the body. ‘Sahyogah’: here the word, ' that,’refers toa
universallyknownobject, (themeaningbeing) this is that Yoga.
Or, bythe word, ‘fttma,’life isheredenotedby transference, since
soul is inferred bylife. Sothat, by actionin the nervous process which
is thechannel of the life-breath, action of the life-breatli, (respiration),
is alsoproduced. Or, theactionof thelife-breathhas, for itsnon-combina-
tivecause, conjunctionof thelife-breathwith soul exercisingvolitionthe
source of vitality. And volition, whichisthe sourceof vitality, is super­
sensible, and hastobe inferredbythemovement of thelife-breath. Other­
wise, howcanthere be inspiration and expiiation of air, even in the
stateof deepsleep? This is the import. 16.
:H •
: KAN A d a SUTRAS V, 2-17.
—‘Atmasthe manasi,’ i.e., when, quittingthe senses, etc.,
V ivriti.
invirtue of thesix-limbed Yoga, mind abides in the soul alone, then,
‘tat-anarambhah,’ i.e., ‘anarambhah’ or non-production of action of
mind. The mindthen becomes fixedor steady. In this state, ‘Sarirasya
duhkhu-abhavah,’ i.e., pain in relation to the body is not produced.
‘Sat,’i-e., conjunction of mind, resiling from the outside, with soul,
iscalled Yoga.
Thefollowing verses of the Skandapurdvam also prove the same
thing:
mclTfcTcTOrTOtTcIWtUPTST I

«IR ^TTTTf^rrTRmnr$*Tf«TW?fwT'STgI
“So also, (i.e. restless) is Ghitta, (i.e., the.internal organ), smitten
withair. Therefore, do not trust it. Accordingly, restrain air, for the
purpose of steadiness of Ghitta. For the purpose of restraining air,
practise Yoga, of whichthere aresix ahgas or limbs. Posture, Regula­
tionof breath, Abstractionor Inhibition of the senses, Concentrationof
mind, Meditation, and Absorption,—these are the sixahgas or limbs of
Yoga or com munion.”
Therefore, there being cessationof false knowledge, etc., brought
about by the manifestation of intuitive knowledge of soul, after the
attainment of Yoga, final emancipation remains unimpeded. Conse­
quentlya systemof thinking about things (like Kargdda Sutras'* is not
fruitless. This isthe import.
Other actions of mind, etc. independent of volition, and dependent on adri^tarn.

H VM R l H
STTOTO— Apasarpanam, going out, egress. 3<T*TTOi~Cpasarpanam,
coming into, ingress. AsJita-pita-sariiyogah, conjunctions
of what is eaten and drunk. - Karyya-antara-sarhyogafi,
conjunctionsofother effectsor products. =qr Cha and. Adrista-
karitani causedbyadriftam.
17. Egress and ingress (of life and mind, from and
into, body), conjunctions {i.e., assimilation) of food and drink,
and conjunctions of other products,—these are caused by
adristam . —215.
/r/Wv\
I\ iV.F.r■i.-i>/A-----------------------------------------------------------
Z S & S Z O PHILOSOPHY. p
VCI
jl.
.xss^-- 'X / —-------------------- — j

Upaskdra. But, if volition were the efficient cause of the action of life and mind,
then, when life and tnind go out from the body, in the state of death, and, on the produc­
tion of another body, re-enter into it, there being no volition, both these actions would be
impossible. How, again, can be produced action, productive of conjunction of even what
is eaten and drunk, i.e., food and drink, which conjunction is the cause of the growth
of the body and its limbs, as well as action which causes conjunction and disjunction
during life within the womb? In anticipation of this objection, he says :
Herethe neuter gender in the word 1ndrista-karitani ’ is according
totherule that awordof the neuter gender, appearingtogether witha
word of another gender, may optionally entail neuter gender in both.
The word, ‘Samyoga,’ again, secondarily denotes action which is its
cause. !Apasarpartam,’ i.e., the going out of life and mind from the
bodyalone, onthe wearing awayof action whichoriginated thebody;
‘Upasarpanam,’i.e., theentrance of lifeandmind into another body as
it is produced; actionwhichis the causeof the conjunction (i.e., assimi­
lation) offood, drink, etc.; andactionwhichis thecaitseoftheconjunction
(i.e., pulsation, etc.) of another product, i.e., thefoetus ;—all these have
as their non-combinativecauseconjunctionwith soul possessingadristam.
The word, ‘iti,’ implies that theactions of the humours and excreta
of the bodyare also,causedbyconjunction withsoul possessingadristam,
as their non-combinativecause.—17.
Vivpiti .—Hementions other actions dependent onadristam :
* ‘Apasarpanam,’i.e., egress of mindfromthe bodyat death; ‘Upa­
sarpanam,’ i.e., the ingress of mind into another body when it is
produced; action from which conjunctions of what is eatenanddrunk,
i.e., foodand w ater, are produced; action fromwhich conjunctions of
other effects, i.e., the senses and life, with the body, areproduced;—
all these arecausedby conjunction with soul possessingadristam, as the
non-combinativecause.
Moksa described.

u*i^i^ n
Tat-abhave, in the non-existence of that, i.e., the causal body, or
potential body, or the subtle body of impressions and tendencies, acquired
during life, which becomes the cause of re-birth, and in re-birth, becomes
encased, as it were, in the gross, physical body. *r%»n*r?r; Samyoga-abhavab,
non-existence of conjunction, i.e., with the existing physical body. %T!ir|*!T5r!
A-pradurbh&vah, non-re-appearance, or non-re-birth. Cha, and. utg:
Moksab, salvation. Mok$a.
18. Moksa consists in the non-existence of conjunc­
tion with the body, when there is, at the the same time, no
i

____ OxViZM SHTT^S F, 2-18.________

|^~ ^potential body existing, and consequently, re-birth cannot
take place.—216.
Upaskara.—But, it may be urged, if the production of another body were necessary,
how would there be Mofcsa ? Hence he sa y s:
Here the idea is as follows: The powerof Yoga produces intui­
tiveknowledge of the self; false knowledge, attendedwithdesire, is there­
byannihilated; consequently, attraction, aversion, stupidityor irration­
alityor spiritual blindness (moha), and other faults due toit, disappear ;
theninclinationor activity goes away; birth, due toit, therefore, does
not take place; and, consequently, pain, bound up with birth, also
vanishes away. This, then, is the nature of things. Now, in virtue of
thepower born of yoga, a yogin, considering the entire mass of virtues
andvices, or merits anddemerits, whichare the uncommonor particular
causes ofpleasureandpaintobeenjoyed, at particular places and times,
inthebodies ofahorse, anelephant, aserpent, a bird, etc., in accordance
withthosemerits and demerits, and then going through those several
forms of physical existence, thereby wears away or exhausts his pre­
viously producedmerits anddemerits byexperiencing them. His faults
beingthus neutralised, whenother merits and demerits arenot produced,
and when there is in consequence no productionof another future or
potential body, at that time, it is the non-existenceofconjunction, which
thenexists, withthe former body, that is (called) mok$a. ‘ Tat-abliave’
meansintheabsenceof conjunction, in the non-production of a future
body.
Tomeet the objection that this state iscommonto all at pralaya,
or periodical dissolution of creation, he adds ‘apiadurbhavah’. The
meaning is, after which manifestation of body,' etc., does not again
take place. ‘Sahmoksahthat is. anhilatiou of pain, which results in
that state, isftiohsa.—18.
Vivriti .—It maybeobjectedthat thestreamof bodies beingwithout
beginningandwithout end, the impossibility of emancipationis alsothe
same. Hencehesays:
‘Tat-abhave,’i.e., intheabsenceof adristam, that is tosay, where
future adristam is exhaustedbyintuitive knowledge of self, andexisting
adristam, byexperience, bhoga ; ‘sam yoga-abhavah,’i.e., a severancetakes
placefromconnectionwiththe streamor successionof bodies; following
it, is ‘apradurbhavah; i.e., non-production of pain, since the causes,
vie., bodyandadristam, donot exist. It is then and there that em anci­
pationbecomespossible. Therefore, emancipationis not chimerical like
thehorns ofahare. This is the import.
24
{ ( ( v a i &e s i k a p h il o s o p h y . (q j
\ «>
& ■^—tT n ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ~~ 1 ~ j
Darkness is non-existence.

iikrihii
?5Jigi!i5F*:»TRsqfTftww2iri: Dravya-guna-kannma-nispatti-vaidbarmmyat, be­
cause of difference in production from Substance, Attribute, and Action, ajvrrsr:
Abhavah, non-being, non-existence. Tamah, darkness.
Darkness is non-existence, because it is different
19.
in its production from Substance, Attribute, and Action.—
217.
Vpaskdra.—Ifc may be o b j e c t e d T h e action of a substance is observed also in
darkness, there being the perception, “ The shadow moves.” Here there is no volition,
no impulse or impact, no gravity or fluidity, no resultant energy. Therefore, another
efficient cause should be enumerated ; but it does not fall within observation. Accordingly
he sa y s:
Bythis aphorism, the determinationor delimitation that substances
are nineonly, alsobecomesestablished.
Now, the production of substance is dependent upon substances
possessingtouch; but in darkness, touch is not felt. It cannot be that
touchisonly undeveloped here; for development of touch is essential
todevelopment of colour.
Objection.— This is the rule in case of Earth, whereas darkness is
thetenthsubstance.
Answer.— It isnot. For no other substance is substratum of blue
colour, and gravityis inseparable frombluecolour, as alsoaretasteand
smell.
Objection.— Assoundis theonlydistinguishingattribute of Ether,
soalsowill blue colour bethe onlydistinguishingattribute of darkness.
Answer.— It isnot so, as thereis contradiction toits visibility. For,
if darkness were something possessingbluecolour, or wereit blue colour
itself, then it would not be perceived bythe eye without the help of
external light.—19. t--
Above continued.
?rerdt ii * i r i =*° u
Tejasab, of light. Drayya-antarena, by another substance.
SHTOOTil Avaranat, because of obscuration. Cha, and also.
(Darkness is non-existence), also "because (it is
20.
produced) from the obscuration of light by another subs­
tance.^—2 1 8 .
Upaskdra.—-What, then, causes the perception of motion (in darkness) ? He gives
the answer:
(!( Jg )IJ KANADA SUTRAS V, 2-23. \^ \
------ —------------ :--------- *—--- ^ «L l j
Light being obscured by another moving substance, non-existence
oflight isnot observedin theplaces falling behind, and isobservedin
the placeslyingbefore. It is from this resemblanceof thenon-existence
oflight tothe movingsubstance, that motionis mistaken in it, but not
that motionis real init. This is the meaning, the perception appearing
so(i.e., erroneous) fromagreement and difference. (That is, whenever
a bodyin m otionobscureslight, theshadowcaused thereby also moves;
and wherethe obscuring bodyis not inmotion, the shadowalsodoes not
move).
Darkness, (then), isnon-existence of everytrace of light possessing
developedor appreciable colour.—20
Space, Time, Ether, and Soul are void of action.

UV,I RR \ II
Dik-kalau, space and time. Akfifiam, ether. ^ Cha, and
also. Kriyavat-vaidharmmyat, because of difference from that
which possesses activity. RrSifRrRI NiskriySni, inactive.
21. Space, Time, and also Ether are inactive, because
of their difference from that which possesses activity.—219.
U p a s k & r a Having thus finished the parenthetical section on darkness, in two aphor­
isms, he begins the section on voidness of action :
The word‘Oha’brings in the soul. Difference from that which
possesses activity liesin the imponderableness or incorporietyof space,
etc., for activityalways accompaniescorporeityor form.—21.
Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, and Combination are void of action.

Twfftr ptpr ^w jrai: II * i * i « II

Etena, by this. cRRTrar Karmmfini, actions, jjujp Gunah, attributes.
=ec Cha, and. ssiresiRT: Vyfikhyatah, explained.
22. By this, Actions and Attributes are explained (as
inactive).—220.
Upaskara.—He points out the inactivity of actions and attributes:
‘Etena’means by difference from that which possesses activity.
Differencefromthat whichpossesses activity, inother words, incorporeity
or imponderableness, belongs toattribute andaction. Theyare, therefore,
explainedtobeinactive. 22.
Vivpiti.—The word‘Cha’implies Genus, etc.
Combination has no beginning, and so is independent of actions.
fhr%qn;rr turarc-. sjvjSrt I n vu * i ^ u
(/( VATSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
-----------------------------------------------
i%%ainilf Niskriyanari), of the inactive. Samavayah, combination.
Karmmabhyah, from actions. Nisiddhah, excluded, beyond, inde­
pendent-
23. (The relation) of the inactive (i.e ., Attribute and
Action), (to Substance), is Combination, (which is) indepen­
dent of actions.—221.
Upaskara.—It may be urged:—If attribute and action are inactive, how then can
there be relation of substance with them ? Connection by conjunction may be possible ;
but that is dependent upon action. Hence he says :
It is combination whicli is the relation of attributes and actions
(to substance). It is excluded from actions. The meaningis that this
relation, i. e. combination, has noproductioneven, andthat its dependency
uponaction, therefore, remains at alongdistance. 23.
Attributes are non-combinative causes.

JSWT: II * I 3 I 33 II
Kdranam, cause. g T u , however. A-samavayinafi, non-
combinative. jjjjjp Gunah, attributes.
24. Attributes are, however, non-combinative cau­
ses.—222.
Upasluira :—It may be objected : If attributes, being imponderable, are not the com­
binative causes of action, then how are attributes and actions produced by attributes ?
For causality, save and except in the form of combinative causality, is not possible. To
meet this objection, he says :
Attributes arenon-combinative causes but not combinative causes
also, whereby they might be receptacles or fields of action. And that
non-combinativecausality arises, insome cases, fromcombinationinthe
sameobject withthe effect, as that of the conjunctionof soul and mind
inthe particular attributes of the soul, andof conjunction, disjunction,
and sound insound, and, inother cases, from combination in thesame
object withthecause, as that of thecolour, etc., of potsherds, etc., inthe
colour, etc., ofthewater-pot, etc.—24.
Vivpiti.— The useof ‘cause’insteadofcauses, isaphoristic.
Space is a non-eombinative cause.

g%%pqrT^TTrTT II 3 I R* II
Gunaih, by attributes, Dik, space. ssn^Jirarr Vyakhyatafi, ex­
plained.
25. Space is explained by Attributes.—223.
it ' K A N AD A SUTRAS VI, 1-1. raSy
' — ------ -------------------------------------
, Upaskdra.—It may be objected :—Action is produced here. Action is produced now.
On the strength of such perceptions, Space and Time also are surely combinative causes of
action. How, otherwise, could they be assigned as the seat of action in these cases ?
Accordingly he sa y s:

The meaningis that as gravity, and other attributes, being im­

ponderable, are not the combinative cause of action, sospace also, being
imponderable, is not the combinative causeof action. As to being the
seat or receptacle, however, it can arise evenwithout combinative causal­
ity, as in “cotton-seeds inabowl,” “curd inabowl,” “the roaringofa
lionintheforest,”andother instances.—25.
Time is an efficient cause.

3>tuiN s&ra: u * i hi H ii
'KTOlFT KAranena, by cause, i .e ., by way of efficient causality.
Kalafi, Time.
26. By wav of efficient causality, (the reference of
action to Time as its seat, being explained), Time (is ex­
plained to be inactive, so far as combinative causality is con­
cerned).—224.
Upaskdra.—With the same ebject as already stated, he says :
The syntactical connection of the aphorismis with“explained to
he inactive,”—correspondingwords in the preceding•aphorism, with ne­
cessarychanges. The use of ‘Karanena, ’instead of ‘nimittakaranena,’
is an instance of denoting an object principally as an existence, (i.e.,’
without qualification). The meaning, therefore, is that Time, beingthe
efficient cause, isonlytheseat of action, hut isnot itscombinative cause-
—26.
Here ends the second chapter of the fifthhookin the Commentary
ofSahkaraupontheYaiilesika Aphorisms.
Book S ix t h —C h a p t e r F ir s t .

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative.

ifegpfl ii t m
Buddhi-pQrvva, preceded by understanding. Vakya-
Kritih, composition of sentences. %% Vede, in the Veda.
1. In the Veda the conrposition of sentences has been
preceded by understanding.—225.
Upaskdra.—The subject of the sixth book is the examination of dharma, virtue or
merit, and adharma, vice or demerit, which are the root causes of transmigration. Dharma
\I f fM ? VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
- — : ;:; ----- _—I-- (OT
an<1 udharmu, again, have to be supposed on the strength of such precepts and prohibitions
as “ Lethim who desires heaven, perform sacrifices,” “ Let him not eat tobacco,” etc., and
their existence depends upon the authoritativeness of these preceptive and prohibitive
texts. And that authoritativeness can be possible or arise from the speaker’s previously
possessing the attribute characterised as knowledge of the accurate meaning of the sen­
tences ; since authoritativeness per se is excluded. Hence the author, in the first place,
commences the demonstration of the attribute which clothes the Veda with authoritative­
ness.
‘VAkya-kritih, ’ i.e., composition of sentences, is ‘buddhi-purvvV
i.e., preceded by the speaker’s know ledgeof theaccuratemeaningof the
sentences, because it is composition of sentences, like composition by
ourselves and others of such sentences as “There lie fivefruits onthe
bankof theriver.’
‘IntheVeda’meansin theaggregateof sentences. Here thecom­
positionofaggregated sentences is the pah$a {i.e., the subject of thecon­
clusion). It cannot be otherwise established (as authoritative), namelyby
the characteristicof beingprecededbyth6understandingof ourselves and
others; for, in such instances as “Let himwhodesires heaven, perform
sacrifices,” the fact that performance of sacrifices isameans ofattaining
the desiredobject, orthat securingheavenisaneffect, is beyondthereach
of our andothers’understanding. It is, therefore, provedthat theVeda,
asan effect, has for its antecedent an Absolute or Independent Person.
Andthecharacteristicof theVeda is that, while the subject of itsmean­
ing is not certainknowledgeproducedbyproof other thantheproof sup­
plied by words and all that which depends upon them, it is wordof
which the proof or authorityis not produced byknowledgeofthe mean­
ingof sentencesproducedbywords.—1.
Y ivriti. —By this aphorism, the doctrine of Mimamsa philosophy,
that word is eternal, isrefuted.
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.

aisnir hwsr” ! fcrfefbgy u n i =*11

HTfW Brahmane, in the portion of Veda, so called. Samjna-Karma,
attribution or distribution of names, Siddhi-lingam, mark of know­
ledge of things named, or of the conclusion that the Veda is an intelligent
production.
2. The distribution of names in the Brahmana (por
tion of the Veda) is a mark of knowledge, (on the part of the
framer of the names), of the things named (therein).—226.
Upaskara.—He shows in another manner that the sentences of the Veda have been
preceded by understanding;
(ifw W i A vi, - . ' i(fjT 15
i \jV »■_....--------------------------------------
kan da sutkas
^(L
" Here ‘Brahmanam’ denotes‘a particular portion of the Veda.
‘SamjnA-Karmma,’ i.e., the distribution of naines, whichappears there,
points tounderstandingon the part of theframer of the names, as inthe
world the distributionof such names as Long-ear, Long-nose, Long-neck,
does—2.
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.
1\ i \ n
: Buddhi-pQrvvab, preceded by understanding, Dadatih, gives,
to give, gift.
3. (Precepts enjoining) gift (are) preceded by under­
standing.—227.
Upaslcara,—Ho mentions another form of proof:
The injunction ofgift (asasource ofdharma), whichhas beenestab­
lishedinsuchtext as “Let himwhodesires heaven, giveacow,”has been
madefromthe knowledgethat it is themeans of attainingthe object de­
sired. The conjugated form, ‘dadatih,’ gives, tropically denotes ‘gift ’
whichis the meaningof theroot ‘togive.’—3.
A hove continued•
3WT JlirWf: n i ? I II
rpqrr Tatha, so, tbe same. sn%*T?: Pratigrahah acceptance.
4. The same is acceptance (of a gift.)—228.
Upaskara.—He gives yet another proof :
Texts of theVeda, enjoining acceptance of gifts, arealsopreceded
byunderstanding. The word, “pratigrahah” indicates aVedie text of
whichit is the subjeet Thus, texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptanceof
land, etc., implyits efficacytothe welfare of theacceptor. Texts of the
Veda, of whichthesubject-matter is theacceptanceof theskinof a black-
and-white antelope, point out or bring to light its efficacy towards
that which is not desired by the acceptor. And efficacy towards the
desiredandefficacytowards theundesired, or potencies for good and for
evil, cannot, in these cases, appropriately fall withinthe cognizanceof
the understandingof persons later born.—A.
Vivriti. —Although all these have been already explained bythe
first aphorism, still this muchundertaking is for the purposeof pointing
out someof the dharmas or duties.
Attributes of one soul do not produce effects in another so u l: he
reaps, icho sows.

a i R w g q rMw iw I K 111 * il
 M
(l( m ■
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.

STrnTFTOJWPTr A tma-an tara-gu nan am, of the attributes of one soul.

Atma-antare, in another soul. A-karanatvat, because there is no
causality.
5. [“Result (of action) indicated by the ib'astra, (accrues
to the performer”], because there is no causality of the attri­
butes of one soul in (the attributes of) another soul.—229.
Upasledra.—Now, in justification of the aphorism of Jaimini, “ Result (of action),
indicated by the t astra, (accrues' to the performer, ” (Pfirva-Mimarnsa Sfitram) he says :
Becatisethe attributes of onesou], e.g., merits and demerits arising
fromsacrifice, slaughter, etc., arenot causes of the attributes, in theshape
of pleasureandpain, of another soul. This beingthe case, pleasureand
pain areproducedbyclharma andadharma appertaining to each indivi­
dual soul, andnot bydharma andadharma existingin different substrata.
Otherwise, the fruits of sacrifice, slaughter, etc., will accrue tohimby
whomthese werenot performed, andhence, lossof thefruits of actsdone,
andacquisitionof thefruits of acts not done will be the result.
Objection.— There is nosuch universal rule, sincethere isaviolation
of it inthe sacrifice for the birth of a son, sacrifice in favour of the
departed ancestors, etc. Thus, it is heard that thefruits of Srdddha or
performance of obsequies, etc., performed by the son, accrue to the
departed ancestor; it is also heardthat the fruit of the sacrifice for the
birthofason, performedby the father, accruestotheson. Nor canthere
benothingbut co-existence of the performance and itsfruit in the same
subject, theagent-enjoyer, bymeans of the fruit accruing to the sonand
thedeparted ancestor; mtheonecase, the Srdddha being intendedas the
means ofenablingthe departedancestor to participatein the enjoyments
of heaven, and, inthe other case, the sacrifice being intended as the
means ofsecuringthebirthof avigorousson.
Answer.— This viewcannot be maintained, since, it conflicts with
the Veda; for, it isheard that the fruit is only the satisfaction, etc., of
the departed ancestor, and the vigorousness, etc., of the son, thesup­
position ofanyother fruit beingprecludedbyredundancy.
Objection.— Let then apdrvam or adristam accrue to the agent as
thefruit, while heavenaccrues tothedepartedancestor.
Answer.— It cannot be so, sinceactivitymust uniformly co-exist in
thesame subject with the fruit. Otherwise, immediatelyafter the per­
formance of the Srdddha, the sonbeingfreedfromhis obligation, heaven
will not accrue tothe departedancestor.
Objection.-—It cannot be said that it “w ill not accrue, ”sinceit is
the same in the other way, for, when the departedancestor isliberated
 s~>t
{(( W ] V t Ati ADA SUTRAS VI, 1-5. {(0T
'■ SL-+--------------------------------------=--------- m j
(i.e. freedfromthe bonds of all enjoym ent and sufferingwhatever), then
nosuchfruit will issue from the Sraddha, however perfect it may he in
all its parts. But this is not the case. For, the declaration that “Result
(ofaction\ indicated bythe f^astra, (accrues) totheperformer, ”being a
general rule, admits ofexception, in the presence of a strong contradic­
tion, and, inthematter inhand, it is the traditionof the fruit accruing
to the departed ancestor and the son, whichis the contradiction. This
being so, there isproving toomuch.
Answer.— Not so, for, the corresponding texts of the Vedathem­
selves prevent anysuchtoomuchproving.
Objection.—Inthe case of the greatest gifts (mahadanam, a technical
term which denotes sixteen kinds of specially meritorious gift), heaven
only is the certain fruit, and in the nameof whomsoever person they
areperformed, the fruit theyproduce, accrues tothat person.
Answer.— This is an absurd argument. For, here there beingno
contradictionto the general observation, the general observationaccom­
paniedwiththeabsence of contradiction or exceptional instance, becomes
therule, andhence, it wouldnot followthat kings andsuchother persons
needobservefast, etc., for observance of such and such acts would be
possiblefor thembymeans of other persons, withthe intentionor prayer
that the fruit of those acts mayaccrue t(|the former. Moreover, it is the
rule, that the thoroughperformanceof thedutiesof ahouseholderproduces
fruit in theformof attainment of the world of Bralima, and thus the de­
claration in general termshas beenmadewiththe object of showingthat
fruit accrues to eachindividual agent.
The writer of the Vritti, however, says: “Result (of action), indi­
catedbytheSastra,”etc., is really a rule without anexception. Onthe
other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departedancestor, etc., results
from the influence of benedictory mantras pronounced by Brahmanas
entertained at the Sraddha, etc., the mantras in questionbeingin the
caseof sacrificefor the departed ancestor, “May thy pifrris or departed
ancestors have their objects fulfilled, ”and, inthe case of sacrificeforthe
son, “Mayasonbebomuntothee, whowill bevigorous, beautiful as the
moon, and thefeeder of all, ” inthe same way as neutralization of the
effect of poison on the body of aperson bitten byasnake, is produced
fromthe recitationof mantras or incantations byforesters.—5
V ivriti .—“Result (of action), indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) to
theperformer,”—this aphorismof thesystemofJaimini shouldbesupplied
25
(i{ ^ 1 9 4 ______________ VAISES1KA PHILOSOPHY._____________ V j^ |

*at the endof thepresent aphorism; for otherwise, the ablative init will
remain unconnected.
Entertainment of impure Brahma nas at a Sraddha is useless.

sfiswNft ?r ii $.i u H
5Tfl 1at, that, i.e., thefruit ofbenediction. §5ThI"5RDusta-bhojane, (fhAddha)
inwhich impure(Brahmanas)are entertained, q Na, not Vidyate, exists,
accrues.
6. That does not exist where the impure are enter­
tained.—230.
Vpask&ra.—Those fruits accrue from the benediction of Brahmanas who have been
satisfied with the entertainment, and who are not wicked, in other words, whose conduct
is in accordance with the Stistra, but not from the benediction of the wicked who have
been excluded from the category of recipients, e,g., an illegitimate son born during wed­
lock, an illegitimate son born after the death of the husband, etc. This is what he says
here :
‘Tat, ’alludes totliefruitof benediction. The meaningis that where
at a Sraddha {i.e., the observance of obsequial rites) evil or impure
Brahmanas are entertained>there the fruit of benedictiondoesnot accrue
tothe departed ancestor, or the meaning is this that the fruit of the
Sraddha itself does'not accruetothe departed ancestor.—6.
Implore explained.

iu i ? i ^ ii
& dustarii wickedness, impurity. ffgTSTPl. himsay&m, inkilling.
7. Impurity (lies) in killing.—231.
Upaskdra. —Who are they that are called impure? Accordingly he states the
characteristic of the impure.
Here ‘kimsayam’ is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever.
The meaning, therefore, is that aperson, giventoor occupied inapro­
hibited act, shouldhe knownas impure.—7.
Association with the impure is sinful.

TO rmnWTrfW?TT # t: iu u i c u
Tasya, his, of the wickedor impureBrShmana. Sa-
mabhivyaharatab, from companionship or association. |psr:—
Dosah, vice,
demerit, adharma,
8. Demerit results from association with him.— 232.
Upaskdra.—He says that not only non-existence of fruit accrues from entertaining
an impure Brahmapa invited at a Sraddha, but sin also accrues.
if P ■ KANAOA SLJTRAS VI, HO. Pr
'i\•v
a \ ‘-w--I-'1' y , /
j
____________________________ ^ 1 _uA,
7> The meaning is that ‘dosah,’ i.e., sin, accrues, ‘Samabhivyaha-
ratah,’i.e., fromassociation, characterised as eating in the same row,
sleepingincompany, reading in company, ete., witha Brahmanaengaged
inforbiddenacts.—8.
Entertainment of a •pure Brahmana is not sinful.

* firerh ik K m>
?TriyTat, that, i.e., sin. — Aduste, in the case of (entertaining) one
whoisnot impure, st— Na, not. rfdlT-Vidyate, exists, accrues.
9. This does not accrue in the case of (entertaining)
one who is not impure.—-232.
Upask&ra.—Does thou sin accrue also from association with one who is not impure?
He says, No.
Themeaningis that ‘tat,’i.e., sin, ‘na vidyate,’i.e., does not accrue,
whereaBrahmana, whoseconduct is inaccordancewith the precepts and
prohibitions of theSastra, is entertainedat a Srdddha.—9.
Preference should he given to worthy recipients afterwards.

gaMferg Sffrt: ik i ? i ?°u

gsfs Punah, again, afterwards, Visiste, in or to a superior, or
a qualified or worthy person, i.e., recipient. STffrT: Pravrittifi, inclination,
attention, preference.
10. Preference (should he given), to a worthy reci­
pient (who is available) afterwards.—4134.
Upaslcara.—It may be asked, what should the rule of conduct be in a case where
worthy recipients being not available, unworthy ones are at Qrst invited, but gradually
worthy recipients become available. To this he replies :
At aSrdddha, or where gifts have tohe received, ifqualifiedpersons,
i.e., thosew hodonot transgress therales ofthe Sastra in their conduct,
are obtained, then one should entertain them only, leaving aside the
censurable ones, although invited. The rale, “One shouldnot reject
persons invited,” refers toworthyrecipients only. Oneshould, however,
gratifycensurable persons, who have been invited, by giving money,
etc.—10.
Vivpiti —But what is to be done where Srdddha, etc., have beeu
performed through the services of an impure Brahmana? He gives the
reply:
Attentionshouldbe given again to the thing of quality, i.e., the
re-performance of the Srdddha, etc., by a pure Br&hmana, etc. The
Srdddha, previouslyperform ed, isall useless. Thisis theimport.
| ( ||W _________ V A 1S E S IK A PHILOSOPHY. j^ J
^ Equals or inferiors, if pure, should be accepted as guests or recipients.

*iir sn f% : ik i m H
Same, in or to an equal. Hine, in or to an inferior, Va, or.
Pravrittih, inclination attention, preference.
11. Preference (should be given) to an equal, or to an
inferior, (if he is free from impurity or fault).—235.
Upaskdra.—He lays down the rule of conduct where, at a Hruddhu, distribution of
gifts, etc., recipients superior to the agent himself, are not obtained :
Tliemeaningis that at aSrdddha, charity, etc-, attention or prefer­
ence should be given toarecipient, free fromfault, whois equal, i.e.,
like oneself, or inferior, i.e., less than oneself, in point of merit, etc.,
because happiness accrues, to the departedancestor, fromblessings pro­
nounced by them only. Theimport is that persons prohibited arebyall
means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether theybeequals or infe­
riors.—11.
Reception of gift is also a source of dharma, or, stealing is not sinful, in
certain circumstances.

fpHHIf o^TWT-
TO IKI t l**ll
Etena, by this. Hina-sama-vi&sta*dharmmike-
bhyah, from inferior, equal, superior virtuous persons. Parasva-adA-
nam, reception of property. Vyakhyatani, explained.
12, By this is explained reception of property from
virtuous persons who are inferior, equal, or superior (to one­
self).—236.
Upaskdra.—Having described the production of dharma by the meritorious character
of [the-donation at a Srdddha or charity, he extends production of dharma from reception
also of a similar nature :
The excellenceof dharma isintheorder of its mention. Themean­
ing is [that dharma accrues fromthereceptionofagift ofland, etc., from
a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal, or superior tooneself.
‘Parasviklanam’means receptionofpropertyfromanother.
The writer ofthe Vritti, however, says: “Tarasvadanam,’ i.e., the
takingof another’s property, bytheft, etc., isexplained. Thus, according
to the Sruti, to
savehimself or his family, sufferingfrom starvation, a man may steal
the food of a ^udra, when he has not obtained food for seven days.
i(( ______ KAh1ADA SUTRAS VI, 1-14.__________
Similarly, when liehas not obtainedfoodfor tendays, or whenhehas not
obtained food for fifteen days, or when life isindanger, tosteal food
fromaVaisfya, aKsatriya, or aBrahmana respectively, does not tend to
adharma or sin.”— 12.
Killing is not sin f ul in certain circumstances.

m r ftrw R f i K \% i u
Tatha, likewise. f^vgpTTVirOddhandm, of those who stand in the
way. snw:Tydgah, themakingawaywith.
13. Likewise the making away with those who stand
in the way, (is justified).—237.
Upaskdm.—Not only is the taking of another’s property, when life is in danger,
not forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do not give anything to take away,
should even be put to death. By all this ttiere is no loss of dharmu, or appearance or
production of adharma. This is what he says :
Themeaning is that theyaretobeput todeathwhoact inthe con­
trary manner, (i.e., who playthe enemy), insuchcircumstances. Soit
has beensaid:
5JTI
vaAttanvmpf qdmFe&q, 11
“Let amansavehis poor self by whatsoever deed, mild or cruel.
Whenheisable, let himpractise dharma or righteousness.”—13.
Vivriti. —Hepoints out that certain censurable deeds also do not
producesin:
The meaningis that the killingof those whoare about totake one’s
life, is likewise not forbidden, according tothe saying“Let onekill an
aggressive felonwithout asecondthought.”
Note.— Theauthorof the Upaskaragives up his own"context, and
here follows the Vritti quoted byhimunder theprecedingaphorism.
Above continued.

<1% q f s u m ik 111 ^ ii
Hlne, inaninferior, Pare, inanother, jqm:Tydgalj, makingaway
with, killing.
14. Making away with another (is not sinful), if (he
is) inferior (to oneself).—238.
UpasMm.—But is the making away with another to be resorted to without any dis­
tinction whatever ? He says, No :
If another whodoes not give anythingto take away, is inferior to
oneself, he, the Sudra, or the like, maybe put todeath.—14.
Vivriti. — ‘Para’means anenemy, (andnot one who does not give
anythingtotake away),
; f !§ 9 ) l VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ( s j| ^
........... " ...... ' -'" ' ' 1. ' . ." . ■
- -»........ ■■ ■ . . ^
K illing is not sinful in certain circumstances, continued.

*rir ^ tt \ \ i i% \ \ i w
Same, in the case of an equal. 3m*Tsm*T: Atma-tyagah, self-abandon­
ment. Suicide. ’Ktsmr Para-tySgah, destruction of another, gr Va, or.
15. In the case of an equal, either suicide or destruc­
tion of the other (may be resorted to).—239.
Upctakdra.—With reference to an equal, he says :
Whereit, isaBrahmana, equal tooneself, whobecomestheadversary,
thendestructionof oneself only by starvation, etc., is to be committed.
Or, if thereappear no other means of preservingoneself orone’sfamily,
and theopponent beanequal, heis tobe then madeawaywith.—15.
Above continued.

h ru c ir s rru re rn r f f b i K i ? i H u
Vi^iste, in the case of a superior. Atma-tyagah self-des­
truction. ffar Id, finis.
16. In the case of a superior, self-destruction (is to
be committed).—240.
Upaskdra.—If, then, a person, superior to oneself, become the adversary, should lie
even be put to death ? He says, No :
Inthecase of a person, superior to oneself, i.e., excellent bythe
studyof the Veda, etc., becoming the opponent, destruction of oneself
onlyislawful. Themeaningis that even when lifeis indanger, a man
maydesignonly his owndeath, but must not slayaBrahmana.
‘Iti ’indicates theendof thechapter.—16.
Here endsthe first chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary
of Safikarauponthe Vais'esikaAphorisms.
B ook S ix T H .— C h a p t e r S e c o n d .
Exaltation is the motive of actions of which ' no visible motive exists.
m im r m i
Drista-adrista-prayojananam, of which the motives are
visible and invisible, Drista-abhave, where no visible motive exists.
Prayojanam, motive, Abhyudayaya, for the purpose of exal­
tation or knowledge of reality.
1. (Of actions) of which the motives are visible and
invisible, the motive, where no visible (motive) exists,
(tends) to exaltation.—241,
 K a n A d a s u t r a s v t 2-2 . ,
------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upaskdm. Thus, in the first chapter, because the proof, supplied by the Veda, is
produced by some attribute or quality, therefore, in connection with its production,
a description of the attribute or quality, then the consideration that « Result (of action),
indicated by the *%'astra, (accrues) to the performer,” and also the consideration of this
that under certain circumstances there is non-production of demerit, even on the per­
formance of forbidden acts, have taken place. Now, the author, with a view to explain
the second aphorism, “ Dharma is that from which (results) the attainment of exaltation
and the Supreme Good ” (1. i. 2, above), is going to make an examination of the production
of dhurtha or merit, in particular cases, and accordingly he says :
Actionsof whichthemotives arevisible, are agriculture, commerce,
seiviceunder theking, etc. Actionsof which themotives areinvisible,
aie saciiiice, charity, bvahmacharya orcelibacy anddevotion to learning,
etc., Amongst theseactions, whereno visible object isobserved, there
aninvisibleobject has to besupposed. Andthat isconducive to‘exalta­
tion,’i.e., knowledgeof realityor truth. Or, in‘abhyudayaya,’the dative
has beenused inthe senseof the nominative. Themeaning, therefore,
is that the fruit (of the action) is exaltation. The invisible fruit is
nothingbut adristarh (orpotential after-effects of past acts). If it is pro­
ducedbyyoga orjiolycommunion, then the exaltation is spiritual intui­
tionof the self. If it is produced by sacrifice, charity, etc., thenthe
exaltationisheaven. Here, again, unlike the actions milking, cooking,
etc., whichbear fruit thenand there, but like the actions sowing, plough-
ing, etc., which bear fruit after awhile, the actions sacrificing, giving
alms, practising bvahmachavya, etc., by no means bear fruit thenand
there, for nosuch production of fruit is observed. Nor are gain, etc.,
throughbeingknownasvirtuous, themselves the fruit ;*for thosewhoprac­
tisebvahmacharya have no eye to such fruit. Therefore, heaven, etc.,
whichwill accruein thedistant future, are the fruit. And this is not
immediatelyconnected with action which by nature speedily vanishes
out of existence. Hence it results that there is an intermediate common
substratumof theactionandthe fruit, and this is apurvarh or adr^tam.
Actions of u hich the motive is invisible.

IK R R ||
Abhisecha-
na-upav&sa-brahmacharyya-gurukulavasa-v&riaprastha-yajna-dana-proksan'a-dik-
naksatra-kala-niyamab—Ablution, Fast, Brahmacharya, Residence in the family
of ^ preceptor, Life of retirement in the forest, Sacrifice, Gift, Oblation, Direc­
tion, Constellation, Seasons, and Religious observances. ^ Cha, and,
Adristaya, conducive to adpiftam, or invisible fruit.
(f( J j M V A TSE SIK A P H ILO SO P H Y. ^

2. Ablution, fast, brahmacharya, residence in th

family of the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sac­
rifice, gift, oblation, directions, constellations, seasons, and
religious observances conduce to invisible fruit.—242.
Upaskara—He enumerates actions of which the fruits are invisible:
1Adristaya’means for thepurpose ofthefruit characterisedasadris-
tam, or for thepurposeof the fruit, characterisedasheaven and salvation,
through the gate of adfistam. Herebyare included all actions or duties
enjoined in the Veda and the Smriti andhavingadristam as their fruit.
Here ‘abhisechanam’means ablutionas enjoinedinsuchprecepts as “One
shouldbathe inthe Gafiga(Ganges).” Fast denotessuch as is enjonied
insuchprecepts as “One shouldabstainfromfoodontheeleventh day of
themoon. ” ‘Brahmacharyyam’meanscultivationof dharma in general.
‘Gurukulavasah’isthat of Brahmacharins or students for the purpose of
studying theVeda, thetwelve-year vowcalledMahavrata, etc. ‘Vanapras-
tham’means thedutyof those whohaveretiredtotheforest on theripen­
ing of age. ‘Yajilah’denotes Rdjasuya, Vajpeya, and other sacrifices.
‘Danam’is asenjoinedbysuchpreceptsas“Oneshouldgive awayacow.”
‘Proksanaih, is as enjoinedbysuchprecepts as “One shouldoffer rice. ”
‘Dik’denotessuchasis enjoinedbythe precepts, “One shouldperform
sacrifice on an altar inclined towards the east,” “One shouldeat rice,
etc., facingtowards theeast,”etc. ‘Naksatrarii ’issuch as Magha (thetenth
lunar asterism), etc., onthe occasionofasraddha, etc. ‘Mantrah’denotes
“O,yewaters, whoarethesourcesof pleasures,” etc. (Rig VedaX. ix. 1),
and other sacred hymns. ‘Kalah’ is as is enjoinedbysuchprecepts as
“Monthafter monthfoodshall begiventothee” where one should offer
food in the afternoon of the day of newmoon, “In summer let onebe
surroundedwithfivefires, ” “In spring let one deposit the sacrificial
fires, ”etc. ‘Niyamah’ means conduct, in accordance withtheAtstra, of
thosewhoobservethedistinctionsof caste and the four stages of holy
living, i.e., Vania andAsrama.
Now, it will beseenthat of thedharma, soproduced, the soul is the
combinative cause, conjunction of thesoul andthe mindis thenon-com-
binativecause, andfaithand the knowledge of the motives or objects
characterisedasheaven, etc., are the"efficient causes.—2.
Other sources of dharma, and sources of adliarma.
IK II
Chatura^ramyam, the observance of the four A^ramas or stages of
holy living, viz., the life of continence and scholarship, the life of a householder,
 KAN AD A SUTRAS V l, 2-5. J
—* - - ' ' " 7T
the life of retirement in the woods, and the life of absolute self-renunciation,
(lit. living on aims). 3<rwi: Upadhah, defects in respect of faith, misbeliefs
and disbeliefs, srgqqr An upadhah, non-defects in respect of faith, beliefs
Cha, and. A
3. The observance of the four Asramas (has been already
mentioned). Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are
also (sources of advistam or dharma and adharma). 243.
Opa-jkdra.—Having thus mentioned the sources of dharma, he now mentions them
along with the sources of adharnui also :
That which is the means ofdharma, commontothefourAsramas,
lias been, andthus thesentenceshouldbecompleted, exhaustivelydenoted
bythe precedingaphorismalone. ‘Upadhah’means defects of hhava (i.e.,
sentiment) or faith; ‘anupadh&h means non-defects of hhava oi faith.
Theytooshouldbe understoodtobethesources of dharma and adhavma,
according to themselves. By the word, ‘upadhah, all the means of
adharma havebeen included.— 3.
Upadha and anupadha explained.

•umfr sv'usU'frsguur ik m 8n
*TR?T5r: Bhava-dosah, defect of feeling, impurity of emotion, or of the soul.
Upadha, (ety.) that which is placed, or settles upon anything. Impurity,
srtrsr Adosah, non-defect. Purity of emotion, or of the soul. qtjJTTr Anupadha, *
purity.
4. Upadha or Impurity (denotes) impurity of emotion
or of tbe soul; anupadha (denotes) purity.—244.
Upaskdra.—Distinguishing upadha or impurity, and anupdha or purity, as regards
their characteristic, he says :
Feeling, desire, attraction, inattention, unfaith, vanity, conceit,
envy, and other impurities of tbe soul are denotedbythe wordupadha
or impurity. Faith, complacence of mind, perseverance intheperform­
ance of prescribed actions, determination of what should bedone in
particular situations, (or presence of mind), and certitude are called
anupadha or purity of the soul. The efficient causality of all these
towards dharma andadharma, isheredeclared.—4.
What objects are pure, or holy.

IK i si * ii
jpj Yat, which. ista-rQpa-rasa-gandba-spar&im, pos­
sesses prescribed colour, taste, smell, and touch. qtr%?f Proksitam, aspersed.
Sprinkled with water together with the pronunciation of mantras orsacred
26
•(“Swkj;
/0 W

----------------------------------------------- *—
VAISESJKA PH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- —
ILOSOPH
Y
n
VfiT
----------------------------------------------------------- *

hymns. ^EP-glijJH Abhyuksitarii, sprinkled with water without the pronunciation

of mantras. The above rendering of the two words, ‘ proksitam ’ and ‘ abhyu-
ksitarh ’ is in accordance with the view of Sankara Migra. But,

“ Sprinkling of water with the pronated hand is called proksanain;

that with the supinated hand is called abhyuksanafri) and the same with the
inclined hand is known as avoksanarh.” —
From the above saying of the Sm riti, it would appear that the correct
translations would be, sprinkled with water with pronation, in the case of
‘ proksitam,’ and sprinkled with water with supination, in the case of ‘ abhyuk-
sitarn,' Cha, and. ^ Tat.' that. |jf% j^uchi, pure, clean, holy.
5. The pure is that which posseses prescribed Colour,
Taste, Smell, and Touch, and is sprinkled with water
along with the recitation of sacred hymns, and also with­
out it, or is sprinkled with water both with pronation and
with supination.—245.
TJpctskclru. (Purity and impurity may be internal as well as external, that is, may
relate to thought as well as to things. In the preceding aphorism, purities and impurities
of the soul have been mentioned. With regard to external objects it is said as follows).
Things pure and impure areLalso called upcidhu or purity and cinupadhd or impurity. Here
, he distinguishes between pure and impure objects :
Whatever Substance possesses suchcolour, etc., as are ‘ibtam,’i.e.,
prescribedby theVeda andthe kSmriti, thesame is of that character (i.e.,
pure). Therein, Colour (is prescribed) in suchtexts as “Hebuys the
soma drink for a cow , ruddy, one year old, withtawnyeyes “He
should obtain a white goat,”etc. ‘Proksitam’ means sprinkled with
water duringtherecitationofsacredhymns; ‘abhyuksitam,’ meanssprin­
kled with water without any sacred hymn. The word*cha ’implies
that whichislawfullyacquired, and that is brought out by suchrestrain­
ingprecepts as ABralimana, should acquire wealthby performing
sacrifices, byteaching, andbyreceiving presents,”etc.—5.
What objects are impure or unholy.

ik m f, ii
AsSuchi, impure, frit Iti, this. Such. ^uchi-
pratisedhab, the negation or exclusion of the pure.
6. Impure,—such is the form of the negation of the
pure.—246.
Upaskdra.—He states the characteristic of impure objects :
ill M );y k a n Ada s u t r a s vt, 2-8. \ffiT
'"—;— ——
—------------- ---------- -;■■■'■■-■
—--- :—k‘7*ri"
The meaning is that the contraryof suchsubstance as ispure, is
impure. Inother words, a substance of unpraiseworthy colour, taste,
smell, andtouch, or not aspersed, or not sprinkled, or sprinkled with
forbiddenwater, orunlawfullyacquired, as the substanceof a Bnihinana
acquiredbyagricultureandcommerce, isimpure.—6.
What objects are impure or unholy, continued.

|
II1 I 3 IV9II
Arthantaram, something else. Another thing. =q- Cha, and.
7. (It is) also something else.—247.
UpasMra.—He mentions other impure objects:
The meaningis that wherea thing possesses praiseworthy colour,
taste, smell, andtouch, andisat the sametime aspersed, sprinkled, and
lawfully acquired, even there that thingalsois impure, if it is vitiated
byspeechor vitiatedbyintention.—7.
To produce exaltation, purity must be coupled with self-restraint.

ik m cn
Ayatasya, of the unrestrained. ^uchi-bhojanat, from
eating that which is pure. Abhyudayah, exaltation. ^ Na, not.
Vidyate, exists. Accrues. f%apTRrfr<l Niyama-abhavat,' owing to the absence
of self-restraint, ftsjir Vidyate, exists.’ Accrues, err Va, and.
Artha-antaratvat, being a different thing, apret Yamasya, of self-restraint.
8. To tue unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue
from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence
of self-restraint; and it accrues, (where there is self-res­
traint), inasmuch as self-restraint is a different thing (from
eating).—248.
Upaskdra. Now he poiuts out another contributory cause of dharmct and adharma:
‘Ayatasya’means voidof restraint, or unrestrained. The eatingof
one, voidof therestraints brought out in suchprecepts as “Amanshould
take food after washing his hands and feet, and rinsing his mouth,
restrained in speech; while taking food, though restrained, he should
twicerinsehis mouth,” does not tend to exaltation, but tosin. It may
be asked, Why? Hence he says, ‘niyama-abhavat,’i.e., owing to the
absence of self-restraint, which is a contributory cause. That which
takes place whereself-restraint exists, is nowstated. ‘Vidyate va’, i.e
((( j 4iV: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.

exaltation verily accrues from eatingby means of the accompaniment

of theself-restraint mentionedabove. It may be asked, How? So he
says, ‘Artha-antaratvat yamasya’, i.e., because self-restraint is something
elsethaneating. Thereforethe meaningisthat without the contributory
causethereisnoproduction of the fruit, andthat withit, there is pro­
ductionof thefruit.—8.
Self-restraint alone, again, is not sufficient for the purpose.

srafrr =sr iwrerat IK I h i m i

3rcrr?r Asati, non-existing. ^ Cha, and. srurert Abhavat, because of
non-existence.

9. (Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation),

for there is non-existence (of exaltation), where (the eating
of pure food) does not exist.—249.
Upuskdra.—It may be objected, “ If self-restraint alone is the governing element, then
eating is not a governing element at all’.’ Accordingly he s a y s :
‘Of exaltation’is thecomplement ofthe aphorism. ‘Abhavat,’ i.e.,
since exaltation does not exist, ‘asati,’ ie ., where the eating of pure
food does not exist, although there is self-restraint. The meaning,
therefore, is that it is both of them, namely self-restraint and eating,
whichis the causeof merit. The word, eating, is illustrative. Fama
and Niyama, i.e., self-restraint, external and internal, are accessories
alsoof sacrifice, charity, ablutions, oblations, andother actions prescribed
bythe VedaandtheSmriti.—9.
Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma.

ffiHSUI? II i I HI 3o II
maTij SukhAt, from pleasure. u*T: R.agah, (Lit. Colouration), Desire.
10. From Pleasure (arises) Desire.—250.
UpasM ra—Having thus stated self-restraint as a contributory towards the pro­
duction of dharma, he now-points out the origin of fault, with a view to specify fault
as an accessory to adharma :
• gukhat,’i.e., from pleasure derived from theenjoym ent of gar­
lands, sandal-paste, women, and other objects, ‘ragah,’ i.e., desire, is
producedsuccessively for pleasure ofja similar kind, or for the means
ofattainingit. It isalsoto be considered that from pain begotten by 1
snakes, thorns, andthe like, aversionarises withregard to such pain, or
withregardtoits source. Desire, aversion, and infatuation are called
faults, inasmuchas they areincentives toactivity (which serves tobind
i f ' W )it $ KANADA SUTRAS VI, 2-12. (@ T
:i M if - - - - - - - - - - - — —— - - - - ;- - - - - :- -- 1—- - - -
dl° agent down to this world). Accordingly there is the aphorismof
Gautama, “Faults have for their characteristic incitement to activity
(or worldlyoccupations).” (Nyaya-Sutrarh, I. i. 18). 10.
Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma, continued.

rRjSRcTTW IK Ul U II
fat-mayatvat, from transformation] into, absorption, or entire
occupation of mind with, or habituation to, that. Cha, and.
11. (Desire and Aversion arise) also through habitua
tion to that.—251.
Upaskdm. “ Now,” it may be objected, “ if only pleasure and pain produce desire
and aversion, how then can the latter oxist after the destruction of the former ?” Hence
he says :

‘Desireand aversionarise’—thisis the complement oftheaphorism.

Tat-mayatvam means aparticular kind of comparatively powerful im­
pressionproduced byconstant or habitual experience of objects,— -through
the influence of which, asad lover, whodoes not winhis mistress, sees
his belovedineveryobject-; and hewhohas been once bittenbyasnake,
in consequence of the strong impression regarding that, sees snakes
everywhere. So it has been said, “Tat-mayatvarti {lit, full-of-that-ness)
meansthe manifestationof that bothinternallyandexternally.”—11.
Above continued.

II * I HI? HII
Adristat, from destiny or a d r is ta m . ^ Cha, and. Also.
12. (Desiie and Aversion arise) from ddristcurn also
I —252. ' '
Upaskdm.—He brings forward another source (of desire and aversion):
‘Desireandaversion’—this forms thecomplement of the aphorism.
Although adrifjtaih is a universal cause, still particularcausality, towards
desireandaversion, sometimes attends it. For instance.it shouldbe in­
ferredbysuchcasesas ofdesire for a(mistress or) womanonthe breaking
forthofyoutheveninone whohas not in that birthenjoyedthe pleasures
of love, and of aversion towards snakes eveninthosewhohave not ex­
perienced the pain of snake-bites. Nor is it onlysaihskara or impression
produced in apreviousexistence (that is tosay, instinct), whichsupplies
themissinglink inthesecases. For there beingnoproof for the suppo­
sitionofits existence, or for the suppositionof its resuscitation, the suppo­
sition of adrit^airi becomesnecessary.—12,
f ______ VAISESrKA PHILOSOPHY. _____ (|j^|
,
Origin of desire ichich, being a fault is an accessory to adharma, continued.
US.
Jati-visesat, from particularity of race or racial distinction.
Cha, and.
13. (Desire and Aversion arise) also from racial di
tinctions.—253.
Upaskdra.—He mentions another contributory cause (of desire and aversion):
Thus, human beings have desire for rice, etc.; animalsof thedeer
class, for grass, etc.; thoseof.thecamel class, for briers. Inthesecases
also, adritfarh whichproducesbirth insuchandsucharace, isthegovern­
ing principle, while race, i.e., distinction of birth, is onlyameansor
--medium. Similarly, pigeons, etc., possess desire for crops. In the same
way, animals of the buffalo class possess aversion towards thehorse;
dogs, towardsthe jackal; ichneumons, towards snakes ; andfromother
instances, it istobe inferred(that racial distinction is a means of desire
andaversion).—13.
Desire and aversion produce dharma and adharma through inclination.

'
fg;qqfc£K
£>V
T IK K K 3 II
ichchha-dvesa*p(irvvika, preceded by, or having for its
antecedents, desire and aversion. Dharma-adharma-pravrittih,
Activity, tendency, inclination, or application to dharma And adhatma.
14. Application to dharma and adharma has for it
antecedents Desire and Aversion.—254.
Upaskdra.- Having thus enumerated the efficient causes of desire and aversion, desire
and aversion being the efficient causes of dharma and adharma, he now points out that
the causality of faults towards dharma and adharma operates through the medium of
activity or inclination:
‘Pravrittih’ or employment in a prescribed action, is due to the
linkof desire, and in aprohibited action, e.g., killing, is due tothelink
of aversion. Employment, due to the link of desire, insacrifices, etc.,
begets dharma; employment, due to thelinkof aversion, inkilling, etc.,
begets adharma. These same desire and aversion cause the wheel of
transmigrationtorevolve. Accordinglythereis theaphorismofGautama,
“P ravritti or employment is the operation or exertionofspeech, mind,
and body,” (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 17). Verbal employment is exertionof
speech; it is meritorious, if it is for theexpression of what is true, kind,
andbeneficial; it issinful, ifit is for theexpressionofwhat is untrue, un­
bind, andbaneful, By ‘Buddhih,’(mind), ismeant that byvyhicli objects
if || 'V K AN AD A SUTRAS VI, 2- 16.
arecognised, i.e., mind. Thereforemental employment is compassionto­
wards all creatures, and other activities. Bodily employment, such as
almsgiving, ministration, etc., is tenfold as sinful, and tenfoldas meri-
V ivirti. —The aphorism has beenframedinageneral way. Hence
noharmhas beendonetotheproductionof dharma, etc., alsofromchance
contact withthewater of the Gatiga(the Ganges) and suchother sources,
eventhoughdesire andaversiondonot exist here.
Dharma and adharma are causes of birth and death.

ftsTFT: l U U I U H
rt<lUUT*T: Tat-sariiyogah, conjunction produced by them, f^vrrn: Vibhagafi,
disjunction.
15. Conjunction (of soul with, body, sense, and life),
produced by them (i.e., dharma and adharma), (is called
birth ); Disj unction (of body and mind, produced by them,
is called death).—255.
Upcislcdra.—Now he states the end or object of dharma and adharma, i.e., re­
appearance after passing away:
Fromthese, namely dharma and adharma, conjunction, i.e, birth,
results. Connection withnon-pre-existing body, sense, and life is here
termed conjunction. ‘Vibhagali’ again, denotes disjunction of body
andmind, characterisedas death. The meaning, therefore, is that this
| systemof births and deaths, saihsdra or ceaselessflowof existences, other­
wisetermedpretya-bhdva or re-appearance after passing away, is caused
b} dharma and adharma. Ihe \edic name of this verypretya-bhdva is
ajarhjart-bhava or non-decrepit decrepitude.— 15.
How mck$a is attained.

JTTwft IK u | ^ ||
Atma-karmmasu, actions of the soul taking place. : moskah,
salvation, ssmsurw: Vyakhyatali, declared.

16. (It has been) declared that the actions of the

soul taking place, salvation (results).—256.
Upcislcdra.—To ascertain, therefore, what moksu is, in which there is an end of this
re-appearance after passing away, of the system of births and deaths, he says :
I ’l p VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
--------------------:---- ------------------------- ajJu
Vfil
practice of holycommunion, or yoga, constant meditation, posture, regula­
tionof breath, {lit. lengtheningof life), the acquisition of the control of
the external senses and of the control of the internal sense, spiritual
intuitionof one’s ownsoul andof the souls of others, accurate knowledge
of previouslyproduceddharma andadharma whichhave tobeexperienced
mother bodies andplaces, the building up of various bodies suitable to
such experience, theexhaustionof that dharma and adharma by experi­
encingthem, and ultimate successor emancipation, characterised as cessa­
tionof pain, onthecessationof birth, whenthereiscessationof tendencyto
action, inconsequenceof the non-production of subsequent dharma and
adharma, due to the overcom ingof the mists of faults characterised as
desireandaversion. Ofthese the prime actionof the soul is knowledge
of the real nature oressenceofthe sixPredicables.—16.
Hereends thesecond chapter of the sixth book inthe Commentary
of Sahkara upontheVafflesika Aphorisms.
Vivripi.— Spiritual intuition of the reality of the selfsteals away
falseknowledge, sprung from spiritual blindness, of which the subject-
matter isthat thesoul isnot distinct fromthe body, etc. Thereuponthere
is cessation of faults, characterised as desire and aversion; fromwhich
follows destruction-of activity or inclination productive of dharma and
, adharma. Andfromthe non-existence of inclination results annihilation
of birth inthe formofthe initial conjunction oflife witha future body.
Andhencethere results final annihilationof the threefoldafflictions. It is
inthisthat mohsa consists. Therefore, thistreatise is useful, as asystem
of thought intended for the purpose of intellection or thinkingabout
things.
WllJt*' KANADA SUTRAS VII, 1-2. for
B ook S e v e n t h .— C h apter F ir s t .

Allusion to I. i. 6.
gun: II vs i i n
3 tRt: Uktah, stated, mentioned, enumerated, ujuit: gunafi, attributes.
1. Attributes (have been) mentioned (above).—257.
Upaskdra.—Having examined dharrna and adharma, these being the root causes of
Samsdra or transmigration, the efficient causes of all that has a production, the means of
bhoga or worldly experience, and uniformly attaching to each individual soul, from their
origin, as well as the adristam of others as conducive to fruits to be experienced by those
others, the author now calls bach to the mind of the disciples the enumeration and defini­
tion of Attributes with the intention of examining these Attributes.
The meaningis that Attributes have been enumerated and defined.
Of thesecolour, etc., seventeeninall, havebeenverbally stated, andseven
have been brought forwardbythe word cha, and. Accordingly all the
twenty-four Attributes have been mentioned. Now, Attribute-ness con­
notes possessionof the ‘class’directlypervaded by existence appearing
ineternals present intheeternals, or possession of the ‘class’ directly
pervadedbyexistenceappearingineternals whichdonot appear in com­
binativecauses, or possessionof the ‘class’directly pervaded byexistence
appearingineternalsappearingin non-combinative causes, or possession
of the ‘class’not appearingin actionwhichdoes not co-exist inthe same
I substratumwith .
theeffect.—.
1. •- v.
What attributes are non-eternal.

iivsip^ u
prithivi-adi-rQpa-rasa-gandha-spartfah, The Colour,
Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth, etc., i.e., of Earth, Water, Fire, and A ir.
dravya-anityatvdt, on account of the non-eternality o f the sub­
stances in which they reside. stHSIT: Anityab, non-eternal. ^ Cha, also.
2. Tbe Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth
Water, Fire, and Air, are also non-eternal, on account of the
non-eternality of their substrata.— 258.
Upaskdra.—Now, the examination of Attributes, as Attributes,is the subject of the
seventh book. Of this, in the first Chapter, there are five sections, vis., (1) the examination
of Attributes as eternal, (2) th e examination of Attributes as non-eternal, (3) the exami­
nation of Attributes due to the action of heat, (4) the examination of Attributes which
appear or function in more substances than one, e.g., Number, etc., and (5) the examination
of measure or extension. Herein he states the non-eternality of the four Attributes,
colour, etc.
27
glOf VAI&ESTKA PHILOSOPHY. ______ (&yf ^
Of the wholes madeupof parts, beginning withEarth, and ending
withAir, the fourAttributes, colour, and the following, are non-eternal.
Althoughother Attributes also, beingpresent inwholes made upof parts,
arereallynon-eternal, yet (theyare not referred to here, because) their
destructionis alsoduetoother causes. The four Attributes, beginning
withcolour, disappear onlyonthe destruction oftheir substrata, andnot
in consequence of another, and contradictory, Attribute. ‘Dravya-
anityatvat:’ Themeaningis that the non-eternalityof the dependents is
on account of the non-eternality of substances upon which they
depend.—2.
What attributes are eternal.

p R S R q g rP H II i ti ^ n
q%?T Etena, by this. Nityesu, in eternals. f?r?PSr Nityatvam, eter-
nality. Uktam, stated. Implied.
3, By this is implied eternality (of Colour, etc., which
reside) in eternal substances.---259.
Upaskdra.—Ii the non-eternality of substrata governs the non-eternality of colour',
etc., then; he says, it is obtained from necessary implication, that those colour, etc.,
which reside in eternal substrata, possess eternality.
* Ofthesamefour Attributes, colour, etc., present ineternal substrata,
eternalityis implied‘bythis,’which means,. by the declaration of non-
eternalitybyreasonofthenon-eternalityof thesubstrata.
Thewriterof the Vritti, however, explains thus:
-—this is the reading, with the addition of an u, (so that insteadof
‘eternality,’the readingis‘non-eternality.’) Thus, colour, etc., residing
jnterreneultimate atoms, disappear onthe.conjunctionoffire.— -3.
Above continued. -

h a f a w ra t ^ f a s i r s r s u ftw i^ td . l i « I f 1 8 n
Apsu, in w a t e r . T e j a s i , int fire, qr& Vayau, in air. ^ Cha, and.
f^qx: NitySh, eternal. Dravya-nityatvat, in consequence of the
eternality of substrata.
4. And also in consequence of the eternality of their
(respective) substrata, (Colour, etc.) are eternal in Water, Fire,
and Air.—260.
UpasMra.—Does, then, eternality belong also to colour, etc., which reside in terrene
eternal substances;? Accordingly he specifies (the eternals referred to in the preceding
aphorism.) _ . j
: g . ___ KAUADA SUTRAS VII, 1-5.______i^L
In-aqueous ultimateatoms,. Colour, Taste, and'Touch are eternal;
inigneous ultimate atoms, Colour and Touch; in ultimate atoms of Air
Touchis eternal. “But,”it may beasked, “what is the contradiction, if
colour, etc., present eveninthings eternal, be themselves non-eternal like
Sound, Understanding, etc. ?” Accordingly, an additional reason, viz.,
non-appearance ofanother attribute{vide IV. ii. 3ante), isindicatedbythe
word gr, .‘and.’ For, in Sound, themanifestationof a different attribute
isobservedintheformof tones, high, low, etc.; and in knowledge, etc.,
samskara, im pression or habit, etc., contradictory of, or which oppose,
knowledge, etc., (areobserved). Inaqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate
atoms, other attributes, contradictory of colour, e.tc., do not appear. If
theyappeared, then Colour, etc., heterogeneous from the antecedent ones,
wouldbe observedalsointhe aqueous andother wholes madeup of parts,
orcompounds, originated by the.same ultimate atoms, in the order of
binaryandother atomicaggregates. But colour, different in kind from
white colour, does not belongtoWater andFire ; nor doTouches, different
inkindfromcold and hot Touches. “Hot water,” “Cold ait,”—such
intuitions are, however, duetothe influenceof upddhi oradjunctorexternal
condition. This is the import.—4.
V ivriti. — “But Colour, etc., residing in aqueous ultimate atoms,
beingdestructible bytheconjunctionof fire,”it "may be objected, “why
this generalisation, namely, “in eternals” (in, the precedingaphorism) ?”
Hencehe specifies theeternals.
Themeaningis that Colour, etc., inherent intheeternal earth {i.e.,
ultimateatomsofearth), are not certainly eternal, but that it has been
statedinthe precedingaphorism that those only are eternal, which in­
hereintheeternal Water, Fire, and Air {i.e., aqueous, igneous, andaerial
ultimateatoms).
What attributes are non-eternal.

n **>i y.u
STFf&S Anityesu, in non-eternals, sn^rr: Anityah, non-eternal,
Dravya-anityatvat, in consequence of the non-eternality of
substrata.
5. In non-eternals, (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal, in
consequence of the non-eternality of their substrata.—-261.
Upuakara.—Already it has been stated that (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal in non
eternals among terrene substances. Now he states it in the case of aqueous and other
npn-eternals also.
(if
^ ---------------------ir--------------------
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (CT
Themeaning is that Colour, etc., of aqueous, and other wholes
madeupof parts, disappear onlyonthe dissolutionof substrata, but not
in consequenceof other, contradictory, attributes.—5.
V ivriti .—Are Attributes, inhering in non-eternals, and other than
Colour, etc., eternal ? If so, then Conjunction, etc., also will be eternal.
Toremovethis apprehension, hesays:
The meaning is that Attributes whichexist innon-eternal substan­
ces, are, all of them, non-eternal, because their substrata are non-eternal,
sothat eternal Attributes donot at all exist innon-eternal substances.
Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning.

wuiigwspkn sfosri qr*vsm u ^ i i ^ »

Karana-guna-pQrvvakalq preceded by, or having for ante­
cedents, the attributes of
the causes (jRrsiT
Prithivyam, in earth.
Pakajah, produced by burning. Due to the action of heat. Thermal.
6. In Earth, (Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch) ha
for their antecedents (like) attributes in (its combinative)
causes, (and are also) due to the action of heat.—262.
Upuskara—In earth, appearing in the form of wholes made up of parts, (i.e., in
terrene bodies), also, Colour, etc., appear and disappear only on the conjunction of fire.
How, therefore, are they destructible only by the destruction of their substrata ? To
remove this apprehension, he says :
‘Pakajah’means Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, due tothe action
of heat, *Karana-guna-purvvakfih’ means preceded by the attributes
of that, e.g., potsherds, etc., whichis the combinative causeof the subs­
tratumof Colour, e.g., a water-pot. Thus, the Colour of thepotsherd is
the non-combinative causeof the colour of the water-pot, bymeans of the
proximity knownas combination inthe same object withthe cause. So
alsointhe case of Taste, etc. Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch possess
thejdti or ‘class’ directly pervadedby attribute-ness suchas colour­
ness, etc.
Objection.— Colourness, whichis nothingbut apprehensibilityby the
eye, is theupadhi or external condition (of colour-perception).
Answer.— It is not. For, this would entail non-appearance of the
intuition of colour immediately on the fallingof the sense, since an
upadhi or external condition w hichisnot adjacent, is unfit for producing
the intuition of that which is conditioned or super-imposed. Here the
upadhi, again, is the eye, and the sam e—theocular sense—is supersensu-
ous. And apprehensibility is the being the object of apprehension.
r # KAVADA SUTRAS V Il, 1-6.
----------- --— ----------- —* b L
This too is not an object of ocular perception, since perception dis­
tinguishedor determined bycolour-ness isocular. Colour-ness, therefore,
is thecharacteristic of the attribute perceptible by the external sense
of theeyealone.
Objection.—-But it does not pervade or include supersensuous
colour.
Answer.— Theobjection does not arise; for, the possessionof the
jati or class apprehensible by the external sense of the eye alone, is
intended. Suchajati is colour-ness; as alsoareblue-ness, etc.
Objection.— The manifestations of blue, yellow, etc., areeternal,
onlyas eachof them is a single, individual, manifestation. Thereare
not blue-ness, andother classes, inasmuchas their denotation is asingle
individual.
Answer.— This isnot thecase, as it wouldentail thenon-appearance
of theintuitionofdeeper blue, deepest blue, etc.
Objection.— But the use of the comparative and the superlative
maybecaused here by the absence of inter-peneti’ationof whiteness,
etc.
Answer.— It cannot, sincethere is noproof of it, and alsobecause
oftheintuition, “Dark colour is gone, redproduced.”
Objection.— But such intuition iscaused by the production and
destructionof combination.
Answer.— No, since there is no trace of combination there, and
sincecombinationiseternal. The same (i.e., production and destruction
ofcombination) beingapplicable alsoin the case of the non-eternality
of the water-pot, etc., the result would he non-finality, since Anyatha-
siddhi, production byother m eans, or pluralityof causes, canbe easily
ascribedthere bywayof the verynon-eternalityof combination.
Objection.— Theattributes, blue, yellow, etc., are not different from
substance, since there is no difference between aproperty and that of
whichit is aproperty.
Answer.—'This cannot be the case, as it w ould entail such usesas
“Colour is water-pot,” “Touchiswater-pot,”etc.
Objection.— But there isnoharminit, inasmuchas there arereally
suchintuitions as“Whitecloth,” “Bluecloth,” etc.
Answer.—1The analogy does not hold, because the intuitions are
explained by the supposition of elision of the affix, matup, denoting
possession, or bythe suppositionof transferenceof identity.
Objection.— This supposition would be somewhat probable, were
there proof of difference.
(f( ^lji VAISESTKA PHILOSOPHY. (^|
Answer— But difference isprovedbymeans of suchpredicationas
“Colour of sandal-wood,” “ Smell of sandal-wood,” etc. If the cloth
wereidentical with colour, then, like the cloth, colour also wouldbe
perceivedbythe sense-organ of the skin, and beingasked tobringthe
cloth, onewouldbringsome colour whatever, and being asked to bring
colour, one would bring somesubstancewhatever.
Objection.— Let, then, there beidentity indifference, seeingthat inthe
caseof absolute differenceas well as of absolute identity, co-existencein
thesamesubstratumwouldnot be possible.'
Answer:— Thiscannot be, for it is impossible for identityanddiffer­
ence, which are contradictory to each other, toappear together inthe
sameplace, without the differenceof their situation.
Objection.— But thecharacteristic of mutual non-existence (or non­
existence whichis the counter-opposite of identity, e.g., a waterpot is
not acloth) appears inthat' whichappears inwhat is not pervaded or in­
cluded, since it is the characteristic of beingthepropertyof that which
appears in eternal non-existence, like thecharacteristicof absolutenon-
existence(or non-existence whichisthecounter-oppositeof.connectionwith
the past, thepresent,, andthefuture, e.g., there is nowater-pot insidethe
earth). .
• Answer.— This is not the case. For, in virtueof theintuitionof
conjunctionand.its absolute non-existence, thecharacteristic of appearing
in that which is not pervaded, is observed of absolute non-existence,
but, in the case of mutual non-existence, such intuition does not
exist. t . ...
Now, this colour isof various kinds inEarth ; in Water and Fire, it
is'only white. Sometimes there is one morecolour, i.e., variegatedor
compound colour, also in acloth, etc.; for, otherwise, theywouldnot be
objects of visual perception, sinceonlysubstances possessingcolour can
beobjectsof perceptionbythe eye.
Objection.^But there can be nooriginationof colour byheteroge­
neous colours. , ■ ,
Answer. — This is not theease; for, homogeneity, onlyasconstituted
by the characteristic of being-colour,, is required-in theoriginationof
blue, yellow, etc., since otherwise, as has been already stated, they
wouldnot be objects of visual perception.
Objection.— But tire apprehensionof thecolour of awholemadeup
of parts is possible bymeans ofthe apprehension of the colours of those
parts.
*
 : KAXADA SUTRAS VII, b'6. ^
Answer.—rlt isnot, as it would,entail that the parts’also, possessing
variegatedor compound colour, are themselvesvoidof colour. Moreover,
wherever, in consequence of theactionof heat, variegatedcolour appears
in ultimate atoms, there alsovariegatedcolour is producedinthe cloth,
etc., originatedbythemsuccessively, •
Objection.— In theyellowmyrobalan, then, taste alsoisvariegated.
Answer.— No, for no harm would be done; even if the yellow
myrobalan were Void of taste. ' The traditionof sixtastes, however, is
due to the causality which produces the effects or propertiesof those
tastes.' ■; ; ;. \ /;■• : :
Similarly, smell also isnot variegated, sincea fragrant andanon-
fragrant part arenot its.originators.
Objection.—Inthe parts of akarhati or cucum ber, there issometimes
bitterness, andsometimessweetness. Whichtaste, then, existsinkarhati ?
Answer.— Onlysweetness.
Objection.— Thereexisting a conflict of attributes, how can it
he so?, , ' ; ;. .
Answer.— On account of thenon-existenceof bitterness in theparts
thereof. . ' ; -. ..... '; . :!
Objection.— How, then, does,suchsensation (ofbitterness) arise? ./
■Answer.— It arisesfromthebitter taste of thebilioussubstanceexist­
ing at the tipof the tongue irritated by theeatingof thekarhati. It is
fromthiscausethat sometimes themouth alsobecomes bitter. -
: Objection.—But how does not this explanationapplyinthe caseof
theyellowmyrobalanalso?
.Answer.—Because, in the parts of the: yellowmyrobalan, various
tastes are felt, e.g., sour, sweet, salt, etc. There is noneedof further
argumentationor elaboration. . ' ....V
Andthis colour isanauxiliary totheeye. . l>
Objection,—Such beingthecase, howdothenon-existence of C olour-
inair, anddarknessbecomeobjectsof ocular perception?
Answer.— Thequestiondoesnot arise, sincecolour isanauxiliaryto
the.eyeinthe apprehensiononlyofexistences or objectiverealities. The
colours of all thethree, viz., the object, the.light, and theeye, areexciting
causesof ocular perception.
Taste, again, isthat which possesses thejati or ‘class,’ taste-ness.
.Taste-nessis thejati .or ‘class’whichis theobject ofimmediatecognition
produciblebythesenseof tastealone. Andthe possessionof suchajati
or *class’is taste-ness. It is this, thesource of.vitality, growth, strength,
lK£Kf 5|S:' ' ■ " ' ■■' '
glffl VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. V<^J ^
and health, that is an auxiliary to the tongue. Thus, taste-ness being
possession of the jati or 4class’pervaded by attribute-ness capable
of being apprehendedby the organof the tongue, there isnonon-perva­
sion, i.e., exclusion, ofsuper-sensuous taste.
Attribute, apprehensible bythe nose alone*, is Smell. Smell-ness is
thepossessionofthejati or ‘class’pervadedbyattribute-ness apprehensible
bythe noseonly. It is two-fold, being fragrant and non-fragrant. Or
Smell-ness denotes the possessionofthejati or ‘class’directlypervadedby
attribute-ness appearingonlyinthat whichis present in Earth.
In like manner, Touchalsois the attribute possessing the jati or
‘class,’touch-ness. Touch-nessdenotes thepossessionof thejati or 4class’
directlypervaded byattribute-ness apprehensiblebythe organ oftheskin
only. Inheringin the quartet of substances, (namely, Earth, Water, Fire,
Air), it is, again, three-fold, accordingtothe differences of neither hot nor
cold, cold, andhot.
Now, inpassing, theprocess due tothe actionofheat, is considered.
Here, accordingtothosewhoholdthe theoryof the burningof an earthen
pot (as awhole), thewholeof the effect andthecauseisburnt. Thosewho
hold thetheoryof the burning of the ultimate atoms (constituting the
whole), maintain that it is the ultimate atoms whichareseparatelyburnt,
that it isinthemthat there takeplacedestruction of the previous colour
and production of the succeedingcolour, etc., and that, following the
course of theattributeofthecause, colour, etc., areproducedin theburnt
(wholesmade upagain) of(burnt) parts. Here the sense is as follows:
From the impulse or the impact, givenbyfire, toa raw substance, e.g.\
awater-pot, etc., thrown in a kiln, disjunction, which is thecounter­
opposite of conjunction originative of a compound substance, appears
among the ultimate atoms originativeof that rawsubstance, and on the
destructionof originativeconjunctionby that disjunction, destruction of
the substance must takeplace. For, it isseenthat of rice, etc., placedin
a pan, destructiontakesplaceat oncefrom frying, onlybythe application
ofheat frombelow, andthat, (under similar conditions), intense ebullition
takesplace inmilk, water, andthe like. Therefore, it ishoping too much
that substances, smitten withflamesoffire on all sides, in a kiln, will
endure. Moreover, if therebenodestructionofsubstances, thenburningat
their centrewill not bepossible. For, thereisnopossibilityofconjunction
offireat thecentre whichis enclosedwith harder other constituent parts.
Sothat therewill be this great incongruitythat theparts are darkbut the
wholemadeupof thoseparts isred.
If KAN A d A SUTRAS VlT, 1-6. IffiT
\ ■ "■ ----------- :-------------- *—’" o L
XC!:- Objection.—Substances which are wholes made upofparts, arecer­
tainlyporous. Plow,otherwise, canoil, clarified butter, etc., pouredinto
a jar, etc., ooze out, andhowalsocanthese beboiled? Hence, at the
centrealso, therecanbeconjunctionof fire.
Answer.— This cannot be, inasmuchas, on account of theexclusion
ofponderable or corporal or dense substances invirtue of thepropertyof
impenetrability, conjunctionof fire is impossible at thecentre which is
alreadyconjoinedwithother (constituent) parts.
Objection.— If thereis destructionof the substance, how, then, can
therebetherecognition, “ This is that verywater-pot?” Howagain, in
all changes ofconditions, inthekiln, etc., are thewater-pot, etc., observed
inoneandthe someform? Howisit that apan, aplate, etc., placedonthe
burning water-pot, etc., are observed in the same position? For they
shouldfall downonthedissolutionof thewater-pot, etc. How,again, are
exactlythesamenumberofwholes asareplacedinthe furnace, afterwards
obtainedfromit? For, duringthe process of burning, theoriginationis
possible, of moreor lesssubstances, bythe (dissolved) ultimateatoms, in
theorder of binaryandother atomic aggregates. How, again, are water-
pot, etc., of exactlythesame dimensions, observed to comeout fromthe
furance? How,again, will not themarks of lines andprints be obliterat­
ed? Burning, therefore, takes place onlyin the wholes.
Answer.— Suchisnot the case. For disjunction of three or four
tertiaryatomicaggregates beingeffectedfrom a water-pot, etc., withthe
point ofaneedle, therebeingdestruction of substanceasa wholein con­
sequenceof the destruction of conjunction originative of substance, all
suchcontradictionsappear in, or areexplainedon, boththe theories. Fox-
eventheywhoholdthe theoryof theburningof the water-pot as a whole,
cannot venture tosaythat substance as a whole is not destroyed inthe
caseofthe aboveinstance.
Eveninthat casethewatei*-pot, etc., are not destroyed, sinceit is
possiblefor aneffect tocontinue toexist by inhering in the remaining
constituent parts evenwhentherehas beendestructionofsomeconstituent
parts. Wereit not so, recognition, etc., wouldbereallyimpossible. This
is theview of the Mimdmsakas. But they should be asked how the
water-pot, etc., bearingrelation tothe situation or arrangement of all the
constituent parts, canappear inasmaller number of consituent parts. If
it betheir replythat it is possibleinthe same way asispossible contrac­
tionofmeasureor extensionor quantityinaclothwhichisnot yet destroy­
ed; Avereplythat there canbenosuchanalogy, for thereisnoobservation
28

y
 ? I W (n r '
Va is e s ik a phtlosopuy. Vki
4/----------------------------------------------
of contraction and expansion in the case of wood, stone, joillar, earthen
jar, etc., madeup of harder constituent parts. It cannot berejoinedby
themthat what is said to destroy the water-pot, etc., destroys only its
measureor extension; for, measure or extensioncanbe destroyedonly by
the destructionof its substratum. Moveover, like the recognitionof the
water-pot, etc., measureor extension also is recognisedinthe caseof the
needle-scratch, whereas in their viewits destruction also is impossible.
Thisis thepoint.
Onthetheoryof thosewhoholdthatdisjunctionwhichisthecounter­
oppositeof conjunction originative of substanceas well as disjunction
whichisnot itscounter-opposite, areproducedbyoneandthesameaction
inthe constituent part, there is production of red colour, etc., at the
ninthmoment countingfromthe destruction of the binary atomic ag­
gregate, in anotherbinaryatomic aggregate, since actionisconceived to
exist in the verysameultimate atom. Thus, there is first action in the
ultimateatomoriginative of the binary atomic aggregate, fromtheim­
pulse givenbyfire; then, disjunction; then destruction of conjunction
originative of substance; then, destructionofthebinaryatomicaggregate;
then, in consequenceofconjunctionof fire, disappearance of darkcolour,
etc., fromthepureor singlyexisting ultimate atom,afterthe destruction
, of the binary atomic aggregate ; after destruction of dark colour, etc.,
productionofredcolour, etc., fromanother conjunctionoffire; after pro­
duction of red colour, etc., cessation of action in the ultimate atom;
followingit, actionin theultimate atom, fromconjunction of soul posses­
singadristam or destiny; then, disjunction; then, cessation of previous
conjunction; then, conjunction, originativeof substance, withanotherulti­
mateatom; then, productionofthe binaryatomicaggregate'; afterthepro­
ductionof thebinaryatomic aggregate, production of red colour, etc.,
intheprogressive order of theattribute of the cause. Theseare thenine
moments,if adifferent actionis producedjust at the moment of thecessa­
tionof theprevious action. If, on the other hand, a different actionis
producednot at themoment of the cessation of the previous action, then
therearetenmoments. Evenifdisjunction, etc., producedbydisjunction,
beadmitted, still therearetenmoments, if disjunction producedbydis­
junctionhas referenceto the time in which destruction of conjunction
originative of substance takes place. If, onthe other hand, disjunction
produces another disjunction withreference tothetimein whichdestruc­
tionof substance takes place, then there are eleven moments in the
process. Thus, destructionofthe binaryatomic aggregateanddisjunction
M V&
N
"***siV{“ ^i ’5 ; . v?;ii. . J •*■'tty.'' -•■ .' .

^ n
' • KANADA S&TRAS VII, 1-7. ^
producedbydisjunction, at one moment; then, destruction of previous
conjunction, andcessationofdarkcolour, etc. ; subsequent conjunctionand
productionofredcolour, etc. ; cessation of disjunctionproducedby dis­
junctionandofaction, bymeans ofsubsequent conjunction; then, action
intheultimate atom,favourabletoorigination of substance; disjunction
fromaction ;cessationofprevious conjunction from disjunction; thence,
conjunction originative of substance; thence production of substance ;
productionof redcolour, etc., inthe produced substance. Thesearethe
ten moments. Where, however, production of disjunctionbydisjunction
depends upon the passing of the time containing the destruction of
substance, thereare, bytheincreaseofonemoment, elevenmoments. Thus,
destructionofsubstance; thendisjunction produced by disjunction and
cessationof darkcolour, etc. ; thensubsequent conjunctionandproduction
of redcolour, etc. ; thencessationof disjunction produced by disjunction
andof action;thenactionintheultimate atom, favourable tothe origina­
tionof substance; then disjunction; cessation of previous conjunction;
production of conjunction originative of substance; production of the
binaryatomicaggregate; production of red colour, etc. These are the
elevenmoments. Suchistheprocessontheconceptionofactionandcessa­
tionof actioninoneandthesame ultimateatom. If action favourable to
theoriginationof substance isconceived to take place inadifferent ulti­
mateatom, thenthe productionof redcolour, etc., should beunderstoodto
appear at thefifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth moment commencing from
destructionof thebinary atomicaggregate. Thesamehas beenexplained
inKatiLada-Rahasyam.—6.
Colour, ole., of Earth, produced by burning, continued.

'S I \ I VS ||
q«*i**«rar*Ek<i-drcivy3.-tv«itj Bccquscofthechcirscteristicofinheringinone
substance.
7. Because their substratum is the same.—263.
VpusMm .- I n order to establish that the Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms have
conjunction of Are as their non-combinative cause, he says :

The expression, of (attributes! produced fromburning,” jg the

complement of theaphorism. “Being attributes,” and “being effects”
are also intended here. The whole sentence, therefore, means: Colour
etc., of terreneultimateatoms, have conjunctionfor their non-combinative
cause, inasmuchas these, beingproduct-attributes, are at the same time
non-abhorrent or non-incongruent attributes inhering in eternals, like
 VAI&E8IKA PHILOSOPHY. (g T
Sound, and like Understanding, etc. Or, the sadhya, or wliat has tobe
proved, ismerelythe characteristic of being produced fromconjunction.
Hence there is no undue extension to, or inclusionof, Soundproduced
fromdisjunction, since conjunction of Air is the efficient cause of all
Sounds whatever. Andfromtheobservationofthe presenceandabsence
of fireinrelation tothem, the non-combinativecausalityof conjunction of
fire, towards terrenecolour, etc., is provedbythe forceofpaksa-dharmatd
i.e., the characteristic of the vydpya or the m iddle term, the mark of
inference, existingin the pakija or the subject ofthe conclusion.—7.
V ivriti. —The question mayarise, howtheattributes of the cause,
as theydonot exist inthe effect, canbeproductiveof the attributes of the
effect, when thereis thusa difference of substrata. Apprehending this,
hesays:
Becausetheyhaveone substance as their substratum, that is tosay,
because there isco-existence inthe same substratum. Thus, eventhough
the attributes of the cause donot exist in theeffect bythe relation of
immediate combination, yet, inasmuchas they exist inthe effect by the
relationof co-existenceinthesamesubstratuminthe formof combination
withthat which is incombinationwiththem, their productiveness of the
attributes of theeffect is not unproved. This is the import.
Non-cognition of Minuteness and cognition of
Magnitude, explained before.

II W I \ I q II
^parf: Ane>li, ofyhe atom or atomic. *153: Mahatafi, of the molecular or the
dense or the extended, •q Cha, and. STSWHIji’TSTS'fl' Upalabdhi-anupalabdhT,
cognition and non-cognition. FCT Nitye,j in (the book treating of) the eternal.
Vyakhy&te, explained.
8. Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and th
extended or massive, respectively, have been explained in
(the booh treating of) the eternal.—-264.
U p a sk& rci. —Having elucidated Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, by long discourses, and
going to begin first the examination of Measure or Extension, in violation of the order of
enumeration (of the Attributes), following the maxim* of the needle and th e'k ettle, inas­
much as Measure or Extension is proved by common consent, whereas there is a wide
range of divergent views on the question of Number,—he says :
* The maxim of the needle and the kettle is that when a man has got to turn out a
needle and a kettle, he first makes the needle, the smaller and easier piece of work, and
then devotes his whole attention, energy, and time to the manufacture of the kettle, the
larger and more difficult piece of work,
 Yy_____ KAN ADA SUTRAS VJT, 1-8.______ ^
The term, ‘in the eternal,’ signifies thefourth book, demonstrative
of theeternal, i.e., the container, bythe contained. 1Cognitionand non­
cognition’: The application (of these words) will be according to
relevancy, on the maxim, “When one thing is relevant toanother, it
belongs tothat other, even though lying at a distance.” So that the
proposition, “Non-cognitionof the atomic,”is obtained. Inlike manner,
in the perceptual cognition, therefore, namely, “A large, blue jug,”
Measure or Extension alsois asmuch anobject (ofperception) as blue
colour. Andbymeans of this Measureor Extension, Measureor Extension
terminatinginthe ultimate atom, is inferred, as alsofromSubstance-ness.
Moreover, in theperceptibilityof Substance, Measure or Extensionalsois
acause, likecolour; for, without magnitude, substancecannot be percep­
tible. It is, therefore, ascertained that, as beingacause of the percepti­
bility of Substance, and being itself perceptible, an attribute, called
Measure or Extension, exists. For, were the distinctive formof a water-
pot, etc., its Measureor Extension, aman would bring any water-pot,
whenhe was told tobring the massive or the extended, andthus
therewould be acontradictionbetween theorder of themaster and the
apprehension of it by the servant. Likewise fromthe term water-pot,
Measure or Extensionwouldbeunderstood, or fromtheterm, Measure or
Extension, awater-pot.
Measure or Extensionis the non-common or specific cause of the
usage or applicationof measures, or auniversal attribute inhering inthe
object which is the cause of the perceptual cognition of Substance.
Application ofmeasures is theapplicationofcubits, spans, etc., but not
the applicationof weights, numbers, etc. This Measure or Extension
is offour kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness.
Of these, extreme largeness andextremelengthexist inthefour *univer­
sale’ (i.e., Space, Time, Ether, andSoul) ; extremesmallness andextreme
shortness exist in the ultimate atoms; the next (higher) degree of
smallness andshortnessexists inbinaryatomic aggregates; largeness and
length exist in substancesfrom tertiary atomic aggregates upwards to
composite wholes (or compound bodies as theyexist innature). In this
manner, all substances whatever possess twoMeasuresor Extensions. The
attribution of smallness to a vilva or abael fruit, amalaka (phylanthus
amblica), etc., andof shortness tofuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is relative.
Andrelativityhere denotesthe non-existenceof bulkiness. The bulkiness
that exists in the amalaka (emblic myrobalan), does not exist in the
jujube; the bulkiness that exists in the vilva, does not exist in the
\ VAI SESI KA PHILOSOPHY. iS J L

amalalta. It is tliis bulkiness, which is the denotation of the term,

relativity, inasmuchas it partakes of both theprimary and secondary
uses.
Somemaintainthat length and shortness donot exist intheeternal
substances. Others holdthat these are not evenmodes of Measure or -
Extension; for, what theymeanisthis: Asinthecommand, “Bringthe
longer onesfrom,amongst thosebodies,”soalsointhe command, “Bring
thespherical and thetriangular ones fromamongst those bodies,” discri­
mination beingequallypossible, sphericityor roundness, etc,., also will
have tobeadmitted as modesof Measureor Extension.—8.
Largeness or magnitude how 'produced.

n,\sm u
K&rana-vahutvSt, from a multiplicity of causes. ^ Cha, also.
9. Largeness or Magnitude is produced, from a
multiplicity of causes also.—265.
Upaslcdra.—He now enumerates the causes of measure or extension.
Theword‘cha-’implies the additionof magnitude andprachaya, i.e.,
looseconjunctionamong parts. “Measureor extension is produced”—
this is the complement of the aphorism. Among these, multiplicityof
causes alone produces largeness or magnitude and length in tertiary
atomic aggregates, since magnitude and accretion do not existin their
causes. That multiplicityis produced by the relative understandingof
God, and the apprehension of particular adristam or destinies, deter­
mines this pluralityof objects insuchrelative understanding. Likewise,
it will be stated hereafter, dualityexisting in twoatoms is productive of
measureor extensionin abinary atomic aggregate. Inapieceofcloth,
originated by two non-coalescent threads, it is magnitude alonewhich
is the non-combinative cause, since multiplicityand coalescence donot
exist there. Where again, a ball of cotton is originated by two other
balls of cotton, inthis case, inasmuchas anincreaseof measureor exten­
sionis observed, therefore accretionis thecause, since multiplicity does
not exist, andsince magnitude, though existing, is not a condition or
occasionfor increase of measure or extension. Suchbeingthe case, were
magnitude acausehere, there wouldbe no defect inthe argument, for it
has beensaid, “Bytwo, byone, or byall.”
Prachaya, coalescence or accretion, is originative conjunction, and
isdefinedas conjunction in an object ofsomeof its constituent parts to­
wards itself, in which object some of the constituent parts werenot in
|y K A U D A SUTRAS VII, 1-11. ^

conjunctiontowards itself. And this conjunction ofconstituent parts, it

has beenobserved, is dependent upona loose conjunction among their
own constituent parts, is productive of measure.or extension, and is
involvedin theorigination of Attributes andActions.—9.
The atomic is the opposite of the large or massive-, the short, of the long.

II VS \ % M o II
3W: Atah, of this. Rrqfhr Viparltam, the contrary. =5pg Anu, the atomic,
small, or minute.
10. The contrary of this is the atomic.—266.
Upaskaru.—Having demonstrated magnitude and length, he now demonstrates
atomic-ness or minuteness.
‘Atah,’i.e., fromlarge or massivemeasure or extension established
by perception; ‘viparitam,’{i.e., divergent). Themeaningis that that is
atomic measureor extension. Thecontrarietyarises fromimperceptibility,
andfromcontrariety of causes also. .For in the case of magnitude or
massiveness, magnitude, multiplicity, andaccretion are the causes, while
inthe caseof atomic-ness or minuteness, dualityinheringin thecause and
producedbytherelative understandingof God, is the cause. By this is
alsotobeunderstood that the contrary of length is shortness, andhere
toothe contrariety isasaforesaid.—10.
In what sense the same thing appears both small and large.

J T f U v S H I II
Anu, atomic, small, minute, Mahat, large, massive. Iti, such.
Tasmin, in that, i.e., in respect of one and the same object.
Vigesa-bhavat, from the existence of the species, or of the peculiarity. PrcpmTTfR
Vi^esa-abhavat, from the non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity.
11. ‘ (It is) smaller,’ ‘(It is) larger,’—such affirm­
ations, in respect of one and the same object, arise from the
existence of the species, or of the peculiarity, and from the
non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity. —267
Upaskaru.—lie now shows that in the case of a jujube, an amilaka, etc., the attribu­
tion of smallness is secondary or relative.
The word, ‘iti,’indicates the senseof attribution or usage. There
is, then, alL this usage that ajujube is small inrelationtoa 6«eZ-fruit,
that an emblic myrobolanislarge in relation toajujube, that a bael-fruit
is large in relation to an emblic myrobalau. Amongst these, ‘(It is)
large ’—suchusagewith regard to themis primary. If it be:askedhow
If rn tyr, VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (flT
---------- -------------- ------ -—.—*------ ------- - -9 JL
it Isso, liesays, *vitfesa-bhAvat,’i.e., becauseof ‘bhava,’ i.e., the existence
of ‘virfesa,’ i.e., the very species, magnitude, by ‘bhava,’ i.e., the
relationof more, most, etc. Onthe other hand, the treatment of themas
beingsmall, is secondaryor relative. If it be asked how this is so, he
says, ‘virfesa-abhavat,’i.e., becauseof the non-existence in them of the
species, smallness. For, smallness, as an eifect, resides onlyihbinary
atomicaggregates, and, as eternal, residesin the ultimate atoms, and
consequentlyit doesnot exist inajujube, etc.
Or, themeaningmay be, that the treatment of a jujube, etc., as
small is secondary, because of the ‘bh&vfi,’ i.e., the existence, inthe
constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the ‘videsa,’ i.e., the causeof
magnitude, namely, multiplicity of constituent parts, magnitude, and
accretion, and because of the abhAva, i.e., the non-existence, in the
constituent parts of thejujube, etc., ofthevidesa, i.e., thecauseofsmallness,
namely, dualitywhich does not co-exist in the same substratum with
magnitude.—11.
In wliat sense the same thing appears both small and large, continued-

n vs i %i ii
Eka-kala-tvftt, from sim ultaneity (of the cognitions of largeness
and smallness).
(The attribution of smallness is secondary), be­
12.
cause of the simultaneity (of the cognition of largeness and
smallness in respect of the same object.)— 2 6 8 .
GpasMra.—He gives the reason why the attribution of smallness is secondary:
Magnitude and minuteness are perceived at oneandthe same time.
And these, magnitude and minuteness, beingmutually contradictory,
cannot appear together inoneand the same substratum. The intuition
of magnitude, therefore, is there primary inasmuch as the cause of
magnitude exists there, and theintuitionandapplicationofminuteness
are secondary. This is themeaning.—12.
Above continued.

UV9 | 3 | U
Drist&ntat, from example, or analogue, "sr Cha, And.
13. Also because there is the analogue.—2 6 9 .
Upuskdra.—He states the reason for the primariness of the intuition of magnitude :
The meaning is that it is seenlikewise that inthe natural order of
things the practical recognition, i.e., the application, of large, larger,
If ft Ji KAN A D A SUTRAS VIT, 1-15. fegT
fysnd largest, must be with regardonlytotilings possessingmagnitude,
namely, thejujube, the emblicmyrobalan, andthe bael fruit, just as the
applicationof white, whiter, andwhitest, is, according to the nature of
things, with regard only to white objects, namely, apieceof cloth, a
conch-shell, acrystal, etc.—13.
Minuteness and magnitude do not exist in minuteness and magnitude.

i w i%a u
I Aputva-mahattvayoh, in minuteness and magnitude.
Anutva-mahattva-abhaval;, non-existence of minuteness and
of magnitude. Karmma-gunaih, by Actions and Attributes,
Vyakhyatah, explained.

14. The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude,

in minuteness and magnitude, is explained by (the explana­
tion, already given, of the non-existence of Actions and
Attributes, in) Actions and Attributes.—270.
UpasMm.—It may be objected : In virtue of the usage, “Small Measure or Extension,"
11Large Measure or Extension, it is known that there is magnitude also in magnitude as
a measure or extension, and that there is smallness in smallness also. How, then, can
these be said to exist in Substance alone ? How, again, does not the contradiction result,
in Attribute, of being existent in Attribute ?

Tothis hereplies :
Themeaningis that as AttributeandActiondonot possessminuteness
andmagnitude, soalsodonot minuteness and magnitude possess minu­
teness andmagnitude. The usageshouldberegardedas derivative._14.
Above continued.

gmr ^n^ncTT: || vs I ^ | 9 vc ||
K arm m abhih, by actions, Karm m ani, actions. Curtail;
by attributes. =ar Cha, and. Jjujr: Gunah, attributes. s?irw<TT: V ya kh ya ta h '
explained. y •'

15. Actions have been explained (to be void) of

Actions, and Attributes, of Attributes.—271.
Upuak&ra. It may be urged that as Attributes are possessed of Attributes,—and
how else could there be such uses as “ Large (i.e., extensive) Sound,” “ Two Sounds One
Sound," “ Twenty-four Attributes,” etc. ?-an d as Actions appear to be possessed of
Actions,—and how else could there be such uses as “ It goes quickly,1’ “ It goes swiftly
so minuteness and magnitude must also be possessed of minuteness and magnitude
29
^ |g2$f VATSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ____ S l

' With this in view, hesays :

By Actions, Actions are not possessed of Actions. By Attributes,
Attributes arealsonot possessed,of Attributes. In like manner, minute­
ness and magnitude arealsonot possessedof minuteness and magnitude.
The usage, however, is, inall these cases, derivative. This is the mean­
ing.—15.
Minuteness and Magnitude do not exist in Attribute or in Action.

'-iU’V7Rr: n « m II
Anutva-mahattvabhydm, by minuteness and magnitude.
Karmma-gunah, actions and attributes, =*1 Cha, and. sqnsqrrTT.' Vyakhyd-
tah, explained.
16. By minuteness and magnitude, Actions and
Attributes also are explained (to be void of minuteness
and magnitude).—272.
Upashcira.—It may be urged that usage such as “ Large Actions,” “ Minute Actions,"
“ Large Attributes,” “ Minute Attributes,” etc., entails that Actions possess minuteness
and magnitude, and also Attributes possess both of them. In anticipation of this, he
says :
Themeaningis that as minuteness and magnitude are not possessed
of minuteness and magnitude, so Actions are not possessed of either
of them, nor areAttributes possessedof either of them. Their treatment
as such, however, isderivative as aforesaid. This is the import.—16.
Length and shortness do not exist in length and shortness.

urpr il vs i ? i il
Etena, hereby. Dirghatva-hrasvatve, length and shortness.
Vydkhy&te, explained.
17. Hereby are explained Length and Shortness.—273.
Opaslcdra.—He extends the process of minuteness and magnitude to length and
shortness.
Lengthandshortness alsoare not possessedof length andshortness.
Whatever isproductive of magnitude, thesameis productiveof length;
whatever isproductiveot minuteness, the sameis productive of shortness.-.
If it beasked, the cause beingthesame, howtherecanbe this difference
intheeffect, the replyis that it is proved or explained, like attributes
produced by burning, by the difference of antecedent non-existence.
Wherever there is minuteness, there isshortness ; where thereiseternal
minuteness, there is eternal shortness, etc. This isthe meaning of the
extensionor analogy.—17.
 KAN AD A SUTRAS VIT , 1-19. fgT
I r<*;2!>' How Measure or Extension is destroyed.

ii « i ^ i ii
Anitye, in the non-eternal. ?n%T»l Anityam, non-eternal, perishable.
] 8. In the non-eternal, (Measure or Extension also is)
j non-eternal.— 274.
Upaskara.—Eo now points out that which destroys (Measure or Extension) :—
All this four-fold Measureor Extension, beingpresent inperishable
substance, disappears onlyonthe destructionof the substratum, andnot
onaccount ofcontradictory, other attributes.
Objection.— But theMeasureor Extensionof a water-pot is destroyed,
although the water-pot still exists; how else, eren after the breakingof
theneckofthewater-pot, cantherebe the recognition, “This is that very
water-pot ”?
Answer.— This isnot the case, inasmuch as the destruction of the
water-pot is necessaryor inevitable, bythe destruction of the substratum.
For, it stands neither toreason nor toexperience that, the binary atomic
aggregates being destroyedonthe destructionof the conjunction of two
ultimateatoms, there isnon-destructionof the tertiaryatomic aggregates
constitutedbythe binaryones, andof limestone, etc., constitutedbythe
tertiaryatomicaggregates.
Objection.— Howthendoes the recognitionarise?
Answer.—It isan error, like The recognition, “This is that very
flameof the lamp.”
Objection.—But the recognitionof thelam p iscertainlycorrect know­
ledge; whereas minuteness and magnitude undergoproduction and des­
truction.
Answer.— This cannot bemaintained, because it has been already
mentionedthat their destruction is not possible without the destructionof
their substratum.—18.
What Measure or Extension is eternal.

n vs \ % i h n
Nitye, in,the eternal. Nityara, eternal.
19. In the eternal, (Measure or Extension al
l eternal.—275.
Upaskara.—Is then minuteness, inhering in ultimate atoms, destroyed, as are Col
etc., of terrene ultimate atoms ? Is magnitude also, inhering in ether ote., destroy d°Ur’
i)re Sound, Understanding, etc. ? In anticipation of these objections, he says :
if : VA.TSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (n j
l(vV ------------------ ------------------------------
^ Measureor Extensionwhich exists ineternal substances, e.g., ether,
etc., and alsointhe ultimate atoms, is eternal, since thereisnothing to
destroy it.—19.
Eternal Measure or Extension is called Parimandalam.
h r n vs i * i * © h
Nityam, eternal. Parimandalain, P a r im a n d a la , the all­
round, or the spherical. Measure or Extension of the ultimate atom.
20. Parim andala is eternal.—276.
Upaskdm.—He states the name by which the Measure or Extension of the ultimate
atom is denoted in the Vaisesika system :—
ParimarLdalyain has the same denotationas ‘Parimandalam.’ Soit
has been said, “Elsewhere thaninPdrimandalya, etc.”—20.
Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness.
srfN fT ^ u 's i i k? u
=!rf^€ir Avidya, false knowledge. Nescience. ’sr Cha, moreover, and.
frorfsrjpi Vidya-lingam, mark or
indication of knowledge.
21. False knowledge is, moreover, tlie (inferential)
mark of (true) knowledge.—277.
Upashara.—It may be asked : If minuteness, or shortness, as applied respectively to
a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcend­
ental or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental ?
Accordingly he sa y s:
‘The mark of knowledge’ is ‘false knowledge.’ The meaning,
therefore, is this : Thecognitionor consciousness ofminutenessinrespect
of ajujube, anemblic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousnessof shortness
inrespect of sticksfor fuel, sugar-canes, etc., areall avidya or false knowt
ledge, inasmuchas real or transcendental minuteness and shortness do
not exist there. Moreover, it is admittedbythose whohold the doctrine
of anyathct-'hhydti, illusionof thesenses, that everywhereunscientificknow­
ledgeisjust precededbyscientificknowledge. Sothat true consciousness
of minuteness, as well as true consciousnessof shortness, shouldbein­
ferred. This isthe meaning. In like manner, secondary useof words
being impossiblewithout the primary use, minuteness andshortness, in
the primarysenseof the terms, must be thought of tobe present some­
where.—21.
Vivriti.— But why should substance, in the formof the ultimate
atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible tothe senses? On the
other hand, substancewhichis perceptible tothesenses, suchas a tertiary
atomicaggregate, etc., should berecognised,
'*: W ) f _____ KAN AD A S&TIiAS VTI, 1-22.
he
Tomeet tliisobjection says:
‘Avidya,’i.e., unscientific knowledge, inother words, cognitions,
suchas “Earth iseternal,” “ Water iseternal,” etc., of whichthe objects
are wholes made upof parts, is the inferential ‘mark,’ of ‘Vidya,’i.e.,
scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of whichtheobject is
(i.e., inrespect of), the ultim ate atom; because everywhere scientific
knowledge, is preceded by unscientific knowledge, for nowhere it is
possible for amantohave the erroneous ideathat Earth is eternal, if he
does not knowwhat eternalityis. This is an indirect proof. Themethod
of proof of ultimate atoms as realities, which has beenpointedout before,
should bepreferred.
Ether and Sold possess infinite Measure or Extension.

u vs i ? i ** n
Vibhavflt, in consequenceof omnipresence, infinite expansion, or
universality. »T3R.Mahan, vast. Immense. Infinitelylarge. Akasafi,
Ether. ?r*TfTatha, so. Thesame. =*rCha, and. Also, Atma, Soul.
22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is
infinitely large. So also is the Soul.—278.
Upaskara.—He describes the nature or proper form of the Measure or Extension of
Ether, etc., which has been already inferred by the mark of their'substanee-ness.
‘Vibhavah’denotes capacityforconjunction, or the characteristicof
beinginconjunction, with all dense bodies; and this, beingimpossible,
or incapableof proof, without vast magnitude, leads to the inference of
vast magnitude. It is alsoobservedby usthat Sounds are produced, just
at oneand thesame time, both at Bardyasi (Benares) and at Pdtaliputra
(Patna) ; it is oneand thesame Ether that is here the combinativecause.
Consequently the pervasion of Ether is proved. Pervasion, again,
consists only in connection with infinitely vast Measureor Extension.
Tosuppose adiversityof Ether would be superfluous; hence only one
Ether shouldbe recognised. Such reference as “Aportion or division
of Ether,” is, however, relative, being due toconjunction withthe water-
pot, etc., (occupyingalimited space, or)possessinglimits. And the rela­
tivityconsists inthe characteristic ofbeing mconjunction with substances
possessinglimits.
‘TathS, atmil ’: As Ether is immensely vast, since it possesses
universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction
with all dense bodies, sois alsothe Soul immensely vast. Didnot
characteristic of beinginconjunction withall dense bodies belongto
the
the
1.£30 VA1&ER1KA PHILOSOPHY. ___ (^J
~Soul, then action would not beproducedinthe respectivedense bodies,
asaresult ofconjunction of theSoul carryingits adristam ordestiny, in­
asmuch asadristam, beingpresent inadifferent substratum, is dependent
upon or standsin needof, ‘proximity,’ (or acommon platform), inorder
that it maybe productive of action; andthat ‘proximity’isnothingbut
conjunction of the Soul carrying its adristam. Likewise, as the body
moves on, the productionof knowledge, pleasure, etc., inparticular situa­
tions, is impossibleor incapable ofproofexcept onthetheoryof theuniver­
sal pervasionofthe Soul. Consequently, the Soul alsoispervasive. The
Soul, however, isnot onlyone, likeEther, since, ashas beenalreadypoint­
edout, difference of status or condition isobserved. This is the import.
Inthese cases, the magnitude is infinite, andis also eternal, likethe
minutenessof the ultimateatom.
In like manner, should he inferred infinite length inthecaseof
Ether, etc., andinfiniteshortness in thecaseof theultimateatoms.—22.
Mind is infinitely small.

uyffTmvrg *R: 'a l t i n »

ii
Tat-abhfivfit, in consequence of the non-existence of that, i.e.,
universal expansion, Anu, atomic. Minute. Small. Manah, mind.
The internal organ.
23. In consequence of the non-existence of univers
expansion, Mind is atomic or infinitely small. 279.
Upuskdra.—It may be asked that Mind being all-pervading, inasmuch as it is always
a touchless substance, like Ether, and inasmuch as it is, like the soul, the field wherein
takes place the conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge, etc., why
has it not been mentioned along with Ether and the Soul ? Hence he says :
‘Manah,’ is ‘anu,’ in consequence of the non-existence of ‘that,’
fe universal expansion or thecharacteristic ofbeinginconjunctionwith
all densebodies. Did the characteristic ofbeing inconjunctionwithall
densebodiesexist (init), then, therebeing simultaneous conjunctionwith
more than one sense, simultaneity of cognitions wouldfollow,withthe
result that there would he no particular attachment or act of attention.
The two inferences, (namely, that Mindisall-pervading, becauseit is a
touchless substance, andthat Mindisall-pervading, becauseit is theseat
of conjunction which is thenon-combinativecauseof cognition, etc.) are,
however, unproved in point of their subject matter, solongasMindis
not proved (to exist), while in thestateof Mindbeingproved(toexist),
theyarecounter-opposed byproof whichleads to the cognizance of the
object (i.e., Mindas anatom.)
(i KANADA SUTRAS V II, 1-25. (»T
■ # - ^ --------------------- :------------------------— ------------------% L
Objection.—Minuteness cannot be thus provedfromnon-existence
of universal expansion, since the inference wouldheunduly applicable to
the water-pot, etc.
Answer.— It wouldnot, inasmuchas non-pervasion is proved in the
caseof thewater-pot, etc., bynon-existenceofuniversal pervasion.
In one body, therefore, there isjust one mind, since the
suppositionofpluralitywouldentail redundancy. To imagineparts even
ofasinglemindwouldbe showingexuberanceof imagination. Moreover,
being touchless, they cannot originate. By such arguments, (infinite)
minuteness isproved. This istheimport.—23.
Space is all-pervading.
ins m ^ n
5%: Gunaih, by attributes, fegfi Dik, space. Vyakhyata, ex­
plained.
24. By attributes, Space is explained (to be all-per­
vading).—280.
Upaskara.—He states the argument for the infinite magnitude of space :—
The meaningis that, ‘gunaih,’ i.e., by attributes characterisedas
priorityand.posteriorityinherent inall dense bodies, and appearing,iri the
forms of the intuitions of the East, ithe West, etc., commontoall persons
inhabitingall the islands or divisions of the globe, space alsois explained *
under the aspect ofpervasion. For, it will be mentioned later onthat in
theproductionof (the notions of) priority and posteriority, the cause is
relative understanding having for its subject-matter larger andsmaller
number of conjunctions with the conjunct. Moreover, the supposition of
a plurality of space iscontravenedby (the fault of) superfluity of sup­
position.
Objection. How, then, cantherebe the intuitionand the expression
or reference, namely, “Tenspaces {i.e., quarters)”?
Answer.— Theobjectiondoesnot arise, sinceit hasbeenalreadystated
that theyaredue toparticular npadhi or external conditions.—24.
Time is all-pervading.
II vs i t l hvmi
gRTUff Kdraije, in cause. To a specific cause, or to a universal cause.
gCT5r: Kalah, time.
25. Time (is the name given) to (a specific, or a univer
sal) cause. (Hence, in either case, it is all-pervading).—-281.
Upaskdra.—He explains the universal expansion of Time
'k S W l VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. Y H ,
' ...... ..............................................................................................

Timeis the namewhichfully designates the substance whichis the

cause of the intuitions of reciprocal prior and posterior, simultaneity, nom
simultaneity, slow, and fast. Suchan intuition, commontoall persons in
all countries, wouldbeimpossible without the universal pervasionoftime.
Universal pervasion, that is to say, connectionwith infinite magnitude,
therefore, belongs toit.
Oi, inviitue of suchintuitions as bornnow,” Time is knowntobe
the efficient or occasional cause of all that isproduced; andthis is depen­
dent uponuniversal pervasion, for anoccasional causemust be, as a rule,
inproximity withthe combinative andnon-combinativecauses.
Or, the use or applicationof past, future, and present is universal:
consequentlytime is all-pervading.
Or, time is thename of the substance which is the cause of the
application or use of moments, lavas (thirty-six winks), hours, watches,
days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc.
Consequently, such use or application beinguniversal, time is universal,
and, therefore, infinitelylarge.
The supposition of its manifoldness is, as has beenalreadystated,
contravened by(the fault of) superfluity of supposition.—25.
Here ends the first chapter of theseventhbook in the Commentary
& of Sa/ikara uponthe VaiseUka Aphorisms.
(If ft )!|
\-N x ^ —
k a n a d a s u i 'r a s v i i , 2 -1 . tell
1---------------------------------— — ------------- -------------------- .....Zq lJLj

B ook S even th — C h apter S eco n d .

Number : Proof of Unity.

II VS | ^ | ^ ||
—Rupa-rasa-gandlia-spar^a-vyatirlk&t, because of
difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. ^PTRlTO. Arthantaram, a
different object, n ^ q Ekatvam, unity.

1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste

Smell, and Touch, Unity is a different object.—282.
Upaslcdm. In the second chapter there are five sections : («) the section on the
examination of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object; (b) the section on
the examination of attributes existing only in more than one object; (c) the section, in
passing, on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (i.e., of words and
their meanings); (rl) the section on the examination of attributes existing in one object
and having for their non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of
particular or distinguishing attributes; and, (e) the section on the examination of combi­
nation. Now, the perceptibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the
same object with magnitude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also
separateness, immediately after the determination of measure or extension, in violation of
the order of enumeration, he says :

Rupa-rasa-gandha-spar^a is indicatory of all attributes other than

the pentad beginning with number, (i.e., number, measure or extension,
separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). ‘Vyatirekat ’^because of
differenceor divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this: “One water-
pot Such particular intuition can heproduced bysome particularity.
Andthat particularityis not colour, etc., for, the intuition is produced by
difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the beingawater-pot, etc.,
that is theconditionor occasion f.of the intuition), for such intuition is
produced in respect of a pieceof clothalso. Nor is unity a Genus, like
existence, for its denotationis neither less nor more than that ofexistence.
Nor, again, isit aGenusconfinedtosubstance only, for it is neither less
nor more extensive than Substance-ness. Nor does the difference or
mutual distinction (of Unity andSubstance-ness) arisefromdifferenceof
intuition, even though theyare neither less nor more extensive thaneach
other; for, if difference of intuition werecausedbyitself, existencealso
wouldbe differentiated; if, ontheother hand, it were to be caused by
differenceof subject-matter, then, differenceof subject-matter, as has been
stated, is not possible, since, otherwise, there would bedifference of the
characteristics ofbeinga small water-pot andof beinga large water-pot.
80
(if _____ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (g j
/ *** ' Vjy M
r*k
r 5^ !8 the view>held by Bh&m a, that unityis non-differencefrom(or
identitywith, itself, areasonableone. Were self-identityof the water-
pot its Unity,^thenthere wouldbe nointuitionofUnityinthecaseof a
C° . etc- Blltim a 's other view, namely, that difference from itself
constitutes Duality,^etc., isalsonot valid; for, varietyof uses of difference
romitself or self-distinction, asbeingcommontothree, four, and so on,
is not possibleor capableof proof. This is theimport.—1.
Proof of Separateness.
rRTT II vs M I R II
?T^r I atha, similarly. Prithakatvam, separateness. Individual­
ity.
2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different obiect).—
283.
Upaskara. With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to
Unity, be sa y s:
The practice of discrimination or separation verilyexists, inthe
form, namely“This isseparate from, other than, a different object from,
this. for, separation means definite apprehension or grasp, having
regardtocertainlimits. Here, again, Colour, etc., arenot thecause, since
they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because thelimits (of
« them) areundefinable.
Objection. Separateness is nothing but anyonya-abhdva, m utual
non-existence, non-existence which opposes identity; for, like “ This is
separatefrom, other than, a different object from, this,” the intuition
(This is) different fromthis) rests onanyonya-abhdva.
Answer. It is not so. A lthough the terms, separate, etc., are
synonymous, they do not convey the sense of anyonya-abhdva, since in
that casetheuseof theablative (‘from’) wouldnot feepossible or reason­
able, because the intuitions, “This is separate fromthis,”and “This is
not this,”containdifferent subject-matter. Nor isseparateness an object
or entity whichpossessesanyonya-abhdva, for, then, in “Aclothi8anot-
water-pot,” there wouldalsobe the useof theablative.
Objection. The intuitions, “It is separate,” and “It is distinct,”
havingthe sameform, Separateness is nothinghut distinctness.
Answei.--It is not. For, in that case, w hileMaitrapossessedthe
distinctionof astaff, theintuition, “This Maitrais separate fromMaitra,”
wouldalsoarise. Likewise it wouldentail the applicationofseparateness
toEther where it isdistinguished bySound, and to the Soul when it is
distinguished byUnderstanding.
'f; )*) KAN AD A SUTRAS VII, 2-3. J
For tlie samereason, dissimilarityor difference in property also is
not Separateness, inasmuch as it wouldentail, inthecaseof a water-pot,
which has been burnt to redness, such usage as “This water-pot is
separate fromthe darkwater-pot.” For, it is thepossessionof properties
repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in propertyfromthat
thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately after
darkness.
Nor is it Genus itself, whichis Separateness. For, the limits of a
Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it wouldentail inter-mixture ofclasses;
for, if it exist onlyinexistent things, then its denotationwould beneither
less nor more thanthat of existence, and if it exist in substance only,
then, than that of Substance-ness.—2.
Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separateness.

II VS | * \ i ||
Ekatva-ekaprithaktvayoh, in Unity and Separateness
of one, or Individuality. Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhavak,
non-existence of Unity and Individuality. Anutva-mahat-
tvabliyam, by minuteness and magnitude. s*p?!ir?r: Vydkhydtah, explained.

3. The non-existence of Unity and Individuality, in

Unity and Individuality, is explained by minuteness and
magnitude. —284.
Upaskara. It may be argued that inasmuch as there is this usago, namely “ One
Unity,” “Separateness is separate from colour, etc.,” therefore there is Unity also in
Unity, Separateness also in Separateness, and similarly, in other and other instances.
Accordingly he says :

Themeaning is that as minuteness andmagnitude donot possess

minuteness andmagnitude, theapplicationof which tothemis derivative
soUnityand Individuality donot possess Unityand Individuality, the
applicationof whichtothemis derivative.
“By Actions, Actions,” “By Attributes, Attributes,”—these two
aphorisms (vii. ii. 24, 25, infra ) also, which employanalogy, here seem
tocarrythe same import as the preceding {i.e., the present) aphorism
employingananalogy. The meaningis that as Actionsarenot possessed
of Actions, nor areAttributespossessedof Attributes, soUnityand Indivi­
dualityare not possessedof Unityand Individuality.—3.
 ■ ; *■ ' ■
________ UAJSNN/JA PHILOSOPHY.________
Unity is not universal, but is confined to Substance only.

W ^W r<% ?T II vs \ R I $ II
Nihsamkhyat vat, being void of Number. Karm-
ma-gun&nam, of Actions and Attributes. Sarvva-ekatvam, Uni­
versal Unity. ?r Na, not. r%t% Vidyate, exsists.
4. Actions and Attributes being void of Numbe
universal Unity does not exist.—285.
Up&skam.—It may be asked : The application or use of Unity is indeed common to
Attributes and Actions. What does here lead to the conclusion that Unity exists only
in Substances, and not in Attributes, etc. ? To this, ho replies :
Unity of all—that does not exist. On wliat ground? So he
says.—1Nihsamkhyatvat karmma-gunaiiam.’ ‘Nihsamkhyatvam’ means
the state or condition of standing away from Number. Thus Actions
andAttributes are voidof Number. Number being anattribute, Number
bynomeans exists in attributes; nor, again, inActions, becauseAttri­
butes are excludedfrom, or denied to, Actions, since, otherwise, Actions
wouldpossess Substance-ness. And theattributenessof Number has been
proved, and alsotheNumber-ness of Unity. This is the import,—4.
Cognition of Unity in Attribute and Action is erroneous.
STFrf II VS | \ | * ||
Bhrantam, mistaken. Erroneous, Tat, that, i.e., the cogni­
tion of Unity in Action and Attribute.
5. That (i.e., the cognition of Unity in Action and
Attribute) is erroneous.—286.
Upaskara.—How, then, do such cognitions arise, as “ One colour,” “ One taste,” etc.?
To this, ho replies :
Themeaningisthat thecognitionof Unitywhicharises in the case
of Attributes and Actions, is erroneous. ‘ Cognition’—this is the com­
plement of the aphorism, becausean objectionof the opponent has been
thrown intoit. The application (of Unity inthese cases) is, however,
derivative, and it is non-differencefromitself, or self-identity, which con­
stitutes the derivation. Nor is Unitynothing but that (i.e., self-identity),
for thereplyhas beenalreadygiven.—5.
Indirect p?’oof of Unity.

ii \s» i * ii
Ekatva-abhavat, in consequence of tbe non-existence of
Unity. *rfrf!: Bhaktih, derivative function. Secondariness, jj Tu, but,
However. % Na, not. Vidyate, exists,
;f( g ) V;_____ KAN AD A SUTRAS FIT, 2-7.______ (g| ^
^ 6. In consequence of the non-existence of Unity,
however, secondariness would not exist.—287.
Upuskara.—It may be asked : “ Let this application of Unity be secondary in the case
of substances also, and the intuition of it erroneous, what is the use of unity at all ? ”
To this, he replies :
If Unityinits transcendental or real sensebe nowhere tobeobserv­
ed, thentheapplicationof the termcouldnot besecondary, for thesecond­
ary, has for its antecedent theprimary, use. Nor, again, couldtheintuition
beerroneous, for error has for its antecedent certainknowledge. For it
is thecertainlyknown that is '.erroneously) attributed, and not theerro­
neous, for the intuition of the non-existent has been disproved, and the
intuitionof theotherwise (i.e., the existent) has beenproved.—6.
Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause.

II v i r i vs II
Karyya-kdranayol), of or in effect and cause.
Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-ablidvat, in consequence of non-exist­
ence of identity and non-heterogeneity. Ekatva-ekapritlia-
katvam, Unity and Individuality, Na, not. Vidyate, exsits.

7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor simila

(in being equally distinguished from all other things);
therefore, Unity and (single) Individuality do not exist in
them.—288.
Upaska ra.—Effect and cause, e.g., threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Indivi­
duality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which
Unity belongs to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself.
For when a piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another,
a piece of cloth different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from
the threads, then it should be observed under the characterstic of being different from
them, like a water-pot. In like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with
the two potsherds (which compose it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over
and above the two potsherds is observed. Accordingly it has been said, “ A whole made
up of parts is nothing else than the parts.” This is the view of the Samkhya thinkers.
And for the purpose of controverting it, he says :

Effect andcause—thesetwoarenot one. Why? Sohe says: from -

non-existenceof ‘ekatva,’i.e., from non-existence of non-difference, and
because co-existenceof pluralityand unityinthe samesubstratumis not
therefore, possible, as would berequiredbythe propositionthat the very
 ' /- (ny
r:V ------------------------- - - —
VAISESTKA PHILOSOPHY.
- —— ................ ..................... — ■ •■ ■ ■ -
VVJ^
same tilingwhichis the effect, isalso the cause, e.g., that threads area
pieceof cloth.
Objection.— But there is as a matterof fact such co-existence inthe
samesubstratum, seeingthat the term, waters, is applied to a drop of
water only, andalsoseeingthat theterm, wives, is applied to a single
woman.
Answer.— Such is not the case. For such applications can be
possible byreference tomultiplicityof constituent parts. In the caseof
theultimate atomof water, however, such application takes place, ac­
cording to some thinkers, bymeans of multiplicityof colour, etc., natur­
allybelongingtoit; while, accordingtoothers, it is duetothe character­
isticforceof sound or language which should not be found fault with.
Nordofibres present ina salvinia cucullata and honey-comb obtain the
appellation ofcloth. Nor dothreads singlyprevail tocontainand todrag
anything.
Nor, again, canthetwo, effect and cause, become the substratum
ofsingle Individuality, for it is seen that they become thelimits of each
other. How? Sohesays, ‘eka-prithakatva-abhavat,’i.e., in consequence
of the non-existence of ‘eka-prithakatvam,’or non-heterogeneity or non­
differenceinproperty; in other words, because, of effect and cause, dif­
ference inpropertyisobserved, for it is universal among mankind that
thenotionsof threadandcloth, as well as of water-pot and potsherds, are
embraced bydifferent acts of understanding.
Objection.— Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch,
cognisedbytheir difference(or separatelyfromoneanother, ie., one after
another always)?
Answer.— Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, i.e.,
modes of m anifestation. And when sometimes, as-in a piece of clothof
variegatedcolour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because
the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most mani­
fest there.—7.
Only non-eternal unity and separateness of one proceed from like
attributes in their causes.

Etat, this, i.e., the characteristic of having theattributes of cause the

as antecedents. Anityayoh, of the two non-eternals, namely, Number
and Separateness. Vyakhyatam, explained,
 A s* : _
/^ H fN \\ KAN A d a SUTRAS V I l , 2-8. $ U tT
^ ^------------------- :--------- •--------------------------------------^ S l ,
8. This, (as) explained in the case of the two non­
eternals (namely, Number and Separateness, should be under­
stood only in the case of non-eternal Unity and Separateness
of one).—289.
Upaskara.—He points ont that non-eternal Unity anrl Separateness of one have for
their antecedents attributes of their causes.
Thecharactersticof having attributes of the cause as antecedents,
whichhas beenexplainedinthecaseof non-eternal Number and Separate­
ness, shouldbeunderstoodtoapplyonlytonon-eternal UnityandSeparate­
ness of one, since other Numbers and Separatenesses are produced by
relative understanding. As the characteristic of having attributes of the
causeas antecedents belongs tonon-eternal'colour and touch of Fire, so
it belongs also to non-eternal Unity and Separateness of one. This is
theimport. It follows, therefore, that Numbers beginning with twoand
endingwith thehighest arithmetical number, possess or reside in more
thanonesubstance. It also follows that separatenesses beginning with
Separateness oftwoandendingwithSeparateness of thehighest arithmeti­
cal number, co-exist in the samesubstratumwith those Numbers. Now,
theprocesses of the production and destruction of Duality, etc., are as
follows: When two homogeneous or heterogeneous substances are in
contact with theeye, cognition of the attribute qualified with the notion ’
or characteristicof Unity, whichis the genus of the two numbers, Uni­
ties, inheringinthe two substances, are produced immediately after the
eliminationofdifferences in thought (i.e., theassimilationof the twosub­
stancesunder the notion of Unity); and it is this cognition which is
called relative understandingor the conceptionof the one in the many.
By it Duality is producedinthetwosubstances. Thenthere takes place
reasoningabout thenotionor characteristicof Daulity which is the genus
ofthe Dualityso produced. After it, simultaneously there appear des­
truction of relative understanding by means of that reasoning, and a
qualifiedor concreteunderstanding having for its content the attribute
Dualityas qualified with the notion or characteristic of Duality. And
inthenext moment there aresimultaneously produced destructionof the
attribute Dualityinconsequence of the destruction of relativeunderstand­
ing, and cognition, in the form of “Two substances,” qualified with
Duality. Thereafter, results Sarriskara, impression or a fixed idea, from
theabovecognition ofsubstances qualified with Duality. Thus, tosum
up Beginningwith contact withthe sense and endingwith SamsMra
orimpression, there areeight moments; viz., contact of the sense with
l( IfNf: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
----------------------------- ------------------------— — ........."•■ --------------------— ------ ------
\CT
|| Hdtesubstratumof Dualitywhich is goingto beproduced, thencognition
of thegenusinherent inthe attribute Unity, thenrelative understanding
intheformofcognizanceof the manyalong withthe attribute Unityas
qualifiedwiththegenericnotion or characteristic of Unity, then produc­
tionof the attribute Duality, then cognitionof the genus inherent in
Duality, then cognitionof the attribute Duality as qualified with that
genus, thencognitionofsubstances as qualifiedwiththe attribute Duality,
andthenSarnskara or impression. Theorder of destruction, again, is as
follows: Destructionof thegeneric notion or characteristic of Unity, from
relativeunderstanding; destruction of relative understanding, fromcog­
nitionof thegeneric notion or characteristic of Duality; destruction of
the generic notion or characteristic of Duality, from cognition of the
attribute Duality; destruction of cognitionof the attribute Duality, from
cognitionof substances as qualified withthe possessionof Duality; and"
destructionof thelatter, fromSamskara or impression, or fromcognition
ofother objects.
Objection.— Whyis not cognition of substance qualified with the
possessionofUnity, itself produced after the cognition of Unity, when
all the causes of its production are present there? For, cognitionof
attribute taking place, there can be no delay in the cognition of
substance. Fromthat samecognition(ofsubstancesoqualified), therefore,
there beingdestruction of relative understanding, from its destruction
will follow, at its very next moment, destruction of Duality. Hence
destructionof Dualityresultingat thevery moment prior tothe qualified
or concretecognitionintheformof “Ttoo substances,” the production of
cognition of substance as qualified with the possession of Duality,
becomes impossible.
Answer.— Theargument isdefective; for, it is relative understand­
inguninfluenced or unobstructed or unobscured by the causes of the
productionof Duality, etc., whichinvariably produces cognition qualified
withthecontent ofsubstance, the abovesuppositionbeing made on the
strength of theresult.
Objection.— But still destruction of relative understanding being
causedbytheverysatnshira or impressionproduced by itself, the fault,
pointedout above, againappears all thesame, since thereis possibilityof
destructionof Dualityat the verymoment prior tothe cognition qualified
withDuality.
Answer.— It does not, since cognition of pure attribute, or of
attributeunassociatedwithsubstance, is not productiveof sar\iskara or
zfy* _
/"#' 'V K AN AD A SUTRAS VIT, 2-8. gW|
x::::Hfrpression. For pure attribute can benowherecalledbacktomind, since
everywhere it is onlybythe backgroundof, or as containedin, substance,
that therecanberecollection of attribute.
Objection. -Let it be so; still inasmuchas even at the time of the
production of qualifiedor concretecognition, there may bedestruction of
Duality, thepossibilityof non-production of qualified cognition remains
intheverysamestate. For qualified or specific cognition, illuminative
of that whichispresent, cannot possibly appear at the moment of the
destruction of thequalificationor that whichservestospecify, since there
is nosuchobservation.
Answer .— This isnot thecase. For, cognitionof that which serves
tospecify, contact of sense with that which is specified, andnon-appre­
hensionof non-association of theabove two, which make up the whole
causeof specific cognition, arepossiblealsointhecaseofthesubjectunder
discussion. If, however, contact ofsensewith that whichserves tospecify,
is alsorequired, thenthis tooexisting at the preceding moment, thevery
contact, whichexists at the preceding moment, is observed to be the
cause. That whichserves to specify, or a qualification or distinction,
whichisbeyond thecompass of specified cognition, mayalsoexist; for, it
is onlythe beingthe object or content of cognitionproductive of specified
cognition, whichdetermines thecharacteristic of being a distinction or
that whichserves tospecify, but thebeingtheobject of specifiedcognition
does not alsodetermineit.
Objection.— In this view, anupalak$awm orindicationalsowill come
tohave thenature of a visetjanam or distinction.
Answer. -B y no means; for, existence in the same substratum,
whichis invariable and whichdoesnot cause specified cognition, deter­
mines thecharacteristicof beingadistinction, whereas anindicationexists
inadifferent substratumfromthat whichit indicates. Thus, whenthere
ispossessionof araven inthehouse of Devadatta, then the raven is a
distinction. But when, flyingover thehouse, it does not exist in it, then
theravenis anindication.
Objection.— This beingso it would follow that in such cases as
“There is taste inthat which possesses colour, ” etc., colour, etc., also
would be distinctions.
Answer.— This is not anobjection, sinceit is desiredtobeso.
Objection.— Then there tootaste willexist.
Answer—N o, sincethat whichexists in something distinguishedby
thepossessionofsomething else, does not necessarily exist in that by
31
 --$V\ 1 __
VAISESTKA PHILOSOPHY.
y <4
^^--wmich it is so distinguished. For a distinction andthat whichis dis­
tinguishedarenot oneandthe samething.
Objection.— At thetimeof the destruction of Duality, there exists no
connection withthe distinction. Howcanspecifiedcognition, or cognition
of that whichisdistinguished, be produced?
Answer.— The questiondoes not arise, for themeaningof theterm,
the beingdistinguishedor qualified, isonlynon-variationor non-deviation
or non-divergencefromthat (i.e ., the distinction); whereas themanifesta­
tionof that(i.e,, thedistinction) existsthere (i.e., inspecifiedcognition) also.
Hence, the teachers say, nothingremainsunproved.
Inlikemanner, onthe analogyof the productionanddestruction of
Duality, should be understood the production and destruction of
Triplicity.
Dualityisdestructible bythe destruction of relative understanding,
for anexisting attribute cannot be destroyed intiie absence of another
attribute opposedtothe destructionof its substratum, like ultimate cogni­
tion, sinceultimate cognitionis destroyed bydestructionof adristam. In
somecases it is destroyedalsofromdestructionof substratum, e.g., where
there is knowledgeof the genus, unity, simultaneouslywithaction in the
constituent partsof thesubstratum of Duality. It is inthis way: Action
inconstituent parts andcognitionof the genus; Disjunctionandrelative
understanding; destruction of Conjunction and production of attribute
Duality; destruction of constituted substance andcognitionof thegenus
Duality;—here destruction of Duality results from destruction of
substance, anddestructionof relative understanding from cognition of
the genusDuality; since, destruction of relative understanding taking
place at the same time with destruction of Duality, there existsno
relation, resembling the relation of effect and cause, between them.
Where, however, there is simultaneityof actioninthe constituent parts
ofthesubstratumof Duality and relative understanding, there destruc­
tion of Duality results from both destruction of substratum and
destruction of relative understanding. It is in this way: Actioninthe
constituent partsand relative understanding; pi’oduction of disjunction
and production of Duality; destruction ofconjunction andcognitionof
the genus Duality; destructionof constituted substance and destruction
of relative understanding; destruction of Dualityfromboth, thecapacity
ofeachfordestroyingbeingobserved. Thisprocess properlyfits in with
the theory of two cognitions being related as the destroyed and the
destroyer ; andit is this theorywhichislegitimateor established byproof,
§ W W KAN ADA. SUTRAS VII, 2-8. ku .
V $igr-+^4--------------------------------— ------------------- -----------*------------------- J p U
' - '' Objection.—Theentiregroup ofcauses beingthe sameinthe cases of
Duality, Triplicily, etc., how is it that there is this difference in their
effects, namelyDualityis constituted bytwoUnities, Triplicity by three
Unities?
Answer.— The questioncannotari.se, since Duality, etc., do not exist
inUnity.
Objection.— It is Duality, Triplicity, etc., inhering inthe combinative
cause, whichdeterminecognitions of Duality, Triplicity, etc.
Answer.— This isnot thecase; for, prior totheproductionof Duality,
etc., Duality, etc., being absent therefrom, the enquiry after the cause
of Duality, etc., does not cease even there, and the existence of such
differenceinrelative understanding, and inUnities, orinthe supposition
of that onthe strengthof theresult, is contravened by non-observation.
Objection.— Let theusealsoof Duality, etc., proceed fromthe same
source; what isthe need of Duality, etc.? Difference will result from
differenceof adristayi.
Answer.— Wereit so, Triplicity, and Four-ness, wouldbe sometimes
producedalso by theset of causes originative of Duality. Hence it would
entail non-uniformity. Moreover, it maybe said in this connexion that
differenceinthe effect is explained by differencein prior non-existence;
as in thecaseof colour, taste, smell, and touch, produced by burning,
differenceis produced under the sameset of causes.
Objection. —Prior non-existencealso iscommon toall, or isthe same
inall cases.
Answer. - It is not; for, eachprior non-existence ineach particular
case has beenascertainedtohave causalitytowards its owneffect only.
Or, the processshould be carried on in this way that Duality is
produced by pure relative understanding, and Triplicity by relative
understandingaccompaniedbyDuality, fnsuchcases as “I have killed a
hundred of ants,” Dualityis not at all produced in consequence of the
non-existence of combinativecause. Accordingly, it shouldbe observed,
the useofnumber is there derivative orsecondary.
ProfessorSridhara opines that inthe caseof anarmy, a forest, etc.,
in consequence of the non-existence of constant relative understanding,
only multiplicity is produced, but not hundred, thousand, and other
numbers. With regard to this view, Professor Udciyana observes that if
suchbethecase, then in thesecases no doubt could arisewhether it be
hundred, or thousand, etc., nor couldthere be such cognitionas “Alarge
army,” “Alarger army,”and that hence this is not the case. Here the
J|44|____ FAr^S/A'4PHILOSOPHY. ^SL
matter should be discussed in the following manner: Multiplicity is
either nothingbut number commencingfrom Triplicity, and terminating
withthe highest arithmetical number, or another number different from
them. It cannot be the first, since in thecasealso of an army, a forest,
etc., thereis asaruleproductionof hundred, thousand, andothernumbers.
Nor canit bethe second, sincemultiplicitydifferent inmark from Tripli­
city, etc., is not observed. Multiplicity, therefore, isonlynumber, namely,
hundred, etc., produced by relative understanding which is uniformly
constant ineachcaseand whichdoes not dependuponUnity. The mani­
festationof hundred, etc., does not, however, take place there, since no­
thingexists therewhichcanmanifest it.
We, on the other hand, say that multiplicity isreallya different
number, existinginthe samesubstratumwithTriplicity, etc., andprodu­
cible byrelative understandingproductiveof Triplicity, etc. It is so in
consequence of the differenceof prior non-existence. How else can such
astatement bepossible as “All 1cansayis that there aremany. I donot
knowparticularlywhether they bea hundred or athousand”? Asmag­
nitude or largeness and length co-exist in the same substance, so do
Triplicity, etc., andmultiplicityco-exist inoneandthe same substratum.
For, to the query, “Shall 1 bring a hundred or athousand of mango
fruits?” thereplyis given, viz., “Let a largenumberofthembebrought.
What is theuseof inquiringabout aparticular number?” This beingso,
Triplicityis produced byrelativeunderstandingaccompanied by Duality,
Fourness byrelativeunderstandingaccompaniedby Triplicity, and soon,
one after the other. In theproductionofmultiplicity, onthe contrary,
there is nosuchuniformityor lawthat therelativeunderstandingmust be
qualifiedwith thepossession or accompaniment ofall thenumbers which
stand behindit. Lieneeinthecaseof anarmy, aforest, andthe like, only
multiplicityis produced, butnot anyothernumber; andsothe alternatives
amongst whichDoubt has toswingalsobecomereally non-existent.
Separateness, again, exists in the same substratum with that <i.e.,
number). Hence as is Duality, so is also separateness of two; and
soon.
Objection.— Theuse ofseparateness of two, etc., being possible by
means of separatenesses of one existing in the same substratum with j
Duality, Triplicity, etc., what is theuseof Separatenessof two, etc.?
Answer.— Thequestioncannot beraisedinview of the discrepancy
that while inthecaseof “Aclothanda clod are separate from awater-
pot ” thereis nopeceptionoftheseparateness of the dual (cloth and clod)
 KAN AD A SUTRAS VTT, 2-8. &fi|

K
beingproducedbythedual and the single limiting each other, there is
suchperceptionin the case of their individual separateness. Nor does
this theory entail and explain Priority of two, for Priority of two is
explainedandpossiblebymeans of two priorities existing in the same
substratum, or co-extensive, withDuality. Thecontradiction in respect of
onebeingthe limit of the other, whichexists in the case of separateness,
does not exist inthecase of Priority; since the intuition, “These two
areprior,”is possibleor proved inthesame wayas the intuition, “These
twoare blue.” For, thoughtwobodies occupying the same part of space
possess equal manifoldness ofconjunctions with theconjunct, yet produc­
tion of different effects is possible by means of the difference of the
conjunctionof spaceandbody, whichis the non-combinativecause. More­
over, as twoUnitiesjointly become thenon-combinative cause of Duality,
it being, inlikemanner, possiblefor twoseparatenesses of one or single
individualities, jointly operating, to possess non-combinative causality
towards theproduction of separateness of two, or dual individuality, it. is
not observedthat morethan one, he., many, conjunctions are, bytheir joint
operation, originative ofone effect, which is not a constituted substance,
bymeans of theproximityknownascombinationinthe same object with
the effect. On the other hand, by means of the proximity knownas
combinationinthe sameobject withthecause, alargernumber of conjunc­
tions of threads andthecylinder ofwoodin a loomdo really originate a
singleconjunctionof aclothandthecylinder of wood in a loom. This
isthedirection.
Onthe analogyof destructionof Duality, etc., should be understood
alsodestructionofseparatenessof two, etc.,—8.
V ivriti. —It may be objected: “The thread i' distinct fromthe
clothand is dissimilar tothecloth”—such intuitions aresimplyerroneous,
sinceit is threads conjoint among themselves, which becomes thecloth,
andsincenoproof existsthat the cloth is distinct from the threads. It
cannot besaid that differencefromthe thread can be proved to exist in
theclothby meansof its dissimilarity tothe thread, for dissimilarityitself
is not proved. For, thenature of thecloth does not constitute its dissi­
milaritytothe thread, inasmuchas in thestateof the manifestation of the
cloth, thenature of the cloth is recognised in the threads themselves.
Accordinglyit hasbeentaught byProfessor Ikavakrhna ;—
(1( J^V, VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (^ |
^ 1" 11 I'll ' 11 " 111 "" *' ' ' ......... . '" 1>M" j| 1111111 ' ........... m
m
The effect is existent (inthecause, inanenveloped state, prior toits
production); For, there canbenoproduction and manifestation of that
whichisnon-existent; therecan benoconnectionof the cause with the
effect (ifthelatter honon-existent) ; (someconnection must exist between
theCauseandtheeffect, since) the production ofeverythingis not possible
fromeverythingelse; therecanbeproductionofonethingfromanother, if
the twoare mutuallyrelatedas theproducer andtheproducible (and such
relationcannot bepossible if the effect be non-existent); and the cause
and the effect are identical, (so that the one cannot be non-existent,
whiletheother isexistent). {S&mkhyaharika, verse 9).
This being the case, the non-existence of non-differenceand non-
dissimilarity between the cause andthe effect remainingitself unproved,
howcanit establishthe relationof Unityand of Separateness of one or
single individuality?
Tomeet thisobjection, theauthor says:
‘Etat,’i.e., thepossessionof thenon-existence of Unityand Separa­
teness of one in consequence of the possessionof the non-existenceof
non-differenceandnon-dissimilarity, has been observed, ‘anityayoh,’that
is, inthecaseof non-eternal cause and non-eternal effect. This is the
meaning. Accordingly on the hypothesis of the non-difference of the
threads andcloth, it wouldfollowthat in the state of the production of
the threads, there would arisethe intuitionanduseoflanguage that the
cloth isbeingproduced ; inthestate of the productionof the cloth, that
the threads are being produced ; in the state of the destructionof the
threads, that thecloth is beingdestroyed; inthestate of the destruction
of the cloth, that thethreads arebeingdestroyed; and soon. Norcan
it bemaintained that productionanddestruction are not themselves en­
titled to acceptance, inasmuchas such intuitions areexplained onthe
verytheoryof development or appearance andenvelopment, or disappear­
ance; for the hypothesis ofan appearance ofanappearance, will entail a
regress toinfinity. If, ontheother hand, the production of theappearance
is admitted, then howdoes the theoryof theproductionof thecloth, etc.,
becomeoffensive? If, again, theproductionof appearance in appearance
be not admitted, thenappearance wouldbecomeomniferous, or all-sided,
(whichis not desiredbytheobjector). For, theall-sidedness of appear­
ance is not recognised even by the Samkhyathinkers. Inreality, the
commonconsent ofhumanitythat theclothisproduced, theclothis des­
troyed, and so forth, is proof of production and destruction; for, if
experience of one thing beadmitted tohaveanother thing as its object,
we must deny alsothe water-pot, cloth, etc.
Ig : K A y AD A SUTRAS VII, 2-9.
^ , Conjunction, how produced.
HRR^TST H*TR: II vs R I 5. II
Anytara-Karmma-jah, produced by the action of either of
two things. Ubhaya-karmma-jah, produced by action of both.
HJlptTsr: Samyoga-jah, produced by conjunction. =^r Cha, and. ?fcw*T: Samyogah,
conjunction.
9. Conjunction is produced by action of any one o
two things, is produced by action of both, and is produced
by Conjunction, also.—290.
Upciakara.—He begins another section or top ic;—
Unobstructed intuition that tilings areconjunct is proof of conjunc­
tion. So alsoareeffects; e.g., substance, inthe ease of conjunctions of
constituent parts ; colour andother attributesproduced byburning, inthe
case of conjunction of lire; particular measure or extension, inthecase
ofaccretion; sound, inthecaseof Conjunctionof the drum and ether;
such other instances shouldbe understood. Nor is Conjunctionmerely
productionwithout the intervention of empty space. The theories of
transiency and transformation of things having beenthrownaway, Con­
junction is the coming together which has non-coming together for its
antecedent. Andit isproduced bythe action of oneof twothings ; as is
the conjunction of a motionless post with a hawk in motion, or the,
conjunction of one inmotion, whenthemotion is not directed where the
conjunction takes place, e.g., conjunction of a runner with thebackof
another runner. Conjunction produced bythe action of both the
conjunct is that of two rams or of two wrestlers, sinceit is producedby
both of them exercising strength towards each other. The third
(conjunctionproducedbyconjunction) is the conjunctionof the handand
thetreeresulting from the conjunction of the linger and the tree. And
it results sometimes fromone conjunction even, as the conjunction of
clothandre^l may result fromthe conjunction of thread and reed. In
somecases, oneconjunction isproduced fromtwo conjunctions, as from
twoconjunctions of ether with two threads mayresult onlyoneconjunc­
tionof atwo-threaded cloth with ether. Insome cases, again, asingle
conjunction is originated even by aplurality of conjunctions, as ten
conjunctions of ether with ten threads mayoriginate onlyoneconjunc­
tion of a ten-threaded cloth and ether. Sometimes, onthe other hand,
twoconjunctions are produced even fromasingle conjunction as their
non-combinative cause. For example, there having first taken place
non-originative conjunction betvyeen tvyo ultimate atoms, terrene and
(*( J ||s )}j VAI S ES I KA PHILOSOPHY. (fil
aqueous, subsequently two conjunctions, originative of two binary
atomicaggregates, areproduced, namely, onein theterreneultimate atom
withanother terrene ultimate atom, andanother in the aqueous ultimate
atom with another aqueous ultimate atom. By these two conjunctions
inhering inhomogeneous things, twobinaryatomic aggregates aresimul­
taneously produced. Therein by that one non-originativeconjunction
alone, produced between the terrene and the aqueous ultimate atom,
one conjunctionof the terrene ultimate atom with the aqueous binary
atomic aggregate, and another conjunction of the aqueous ultimate atom
with the terrene binary attomicaggregate, areproduced simultaneously
withthe productionof the colour, etc., of the two binary atomic aggre­
gates.
Inasmuchas theconjunctionofcauseandnot-causemust necessarily
produceconjunctions of effect andnot-effect, theconjunctionof all pervad­
ing substances (viz., Space, Time, Ether andSoul) withdenseor corporal
bodiesis produced byactionof one of thetwoonly. Of twoall-pervading
substances, however, there is no conjunction, since there is no cause
(of conjunction). For in them there is no action, nor is there any
(combinative) cause; hence there cannot beinthis casealsoconjunction
of effect and not-effect resultingfromconjunctionof cause and not-cause
Eternal conjunction, ontheother hand, is not possible, for conjunctionis
thecoming together oftwothings, whichhas the not-comingtogetherasits
antecedent, andeternalityisopposedtoit. Andwereconjunctioneternal,
Disjunctionalsowouldbe, without production; and eternalityof conjunc­
tionwill not beobtained, since it wouldbeimpossiblefor Conjunctionand
Disjunction, which are contradictories, to exist side by side in their
indestructible states. Moreover, yuta-siddhi or uncombinedor naturally
unassociatedexistence is anecessary condition of Conjunction, and it is
not possible inthecaseof twoall-pervading substances. For yuta-siddhi
is merely theseparate existenceoftwoor ofone of two(unrelated) things,
or therelationofonethingbeinginherent in another, as its substratum,
whenthe twohavebeenexternallybrought intorelationwitheachother.
Destructionof Conjunction, however, results fromDisjunctionhaving
acommonsubstratumwith Conjunction. Insome cases it results from
destructionof substratumalso. For example, action is produced in the
constituent iibre of athread immediately after the Conjunction of two
threads; therebyiscausedDisjunctionfromanother fibre; fromDisjunction
results destructionof originativeconjunction;fromthis followsdestruction
of the thread; and front destruction of the thread results destruction
I
Yif KAUlDA SUTRAS VII, 2-10.
..
of Conjunction, where~~~ " been long co~njoined, actio
two threads having yni j
is not produced inthem. Some, onthe contrary, maintain that Conjunc­
tion is destroyed by simultaneously produceddestructionofsubstratum,
and Disjunction, inasmuch as action is conceived to exist in another
threadat the moment whenbyactioninthe constituent parts of a thread
there is effected destruction of Conjunction originative of the thread.
This is impossible; for there canbenoproduction of Disjunction at the
moment, of destructionof thecombinative cause, since the rule is that the
combinativecause isof equal duration with the effect.
This same Conjunctionwhichis anindependent agent in the origi­
nationof substances, andadependent agent in the origination of attri­
butes and actions, is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence
existing in the same substratumwith itself, since it is observedtobeso.
For it is perceivedthat there is conjunctionof anape inthe Banyantree,
although conjunctionof the ape present inalarge Banyantree islimited
to a branch only. Were such mere limitation toa part not sufficient to
account for it, then conjunction would come toexist in ultimate atoms,
and so would not be cognizable. In the case of the all-pervading
substances also, it is the differenceof upadhi, adjunct or external condition
which serves tolocalise them. Conjunctionpresent bylimitation tothat
isnot pervadedinits denotation. Of Conjunctionresidinginthe ultimate
atoms also, directioninspace, and the like should be regarded as deter­
minants.—9.
Disjunction, how produced.
137mbmun 11 vs 1 11 %o 11
Etena, by this f^*T*r Vibhagafi, disjunction. Vydkhydtah,
explained.
10. By this Disjunction is explained.—291.
Upuskdra.—By extending the mode of the production of Conjunction to Disjunction he
says:
LikeConjunction, Disjunctionalsois producedbyactionofeither of
twothings, byactionof both, and byDisjunction. Disjunctiontakesplace
between a hawkandapost bythe actionof the hawk ; disjunctionof two
wrestlers or of tworams fighting witheach other, by the actions of both.
And Disjunction in these cases has its production at the moment
immediately following theproductionof action, inasmuchas there exists
nothing elsetobe waitedfor or dependedupon. Accordinglyit has been
said, “Actionis anindependent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction”
(vide I. i. 17, above),
n
i
 C VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. oL
Objection.— Thereis dependence uponsubstratumwhere Disjunction
has tobeproduced, andupon destructionof antecedent Conjunctionwhere
Conjunctionhas tobeproduced.
Answer.— This is not the case, for action is independent sinceit
does not depend uponanything intheformof anexistence which has its
productionimmediatelyafter the productionof itself.
Disjunction, produced byDisjunction, however, is two-fold, accord­
ing to the difference of Disjunctionof cause and not-cause, produced by
Disjunctionof cause alone, andthe differenceofDisjunctionof effect and
not-effect, produced by Disjunction of cause and not-cause. Therein
DisjunctionofpotsherdandEther, resultingfromDisjunctionof the two
potsherds, is anexample of Disjunctionofcause and not-cause, resulting
fromDisjunctionofcausealone; andDisjunctionofbandandtreeresulting
fromDisjunction of finger and tree, and Disjunctionof bodyand tree, re­
sulting from Disjunction of handand tree, are examples of Disjunction
of effect andnot-effect, resultingfromDisjunctionofcauseandnot-cause.
Objection.— Thereis noproof of Disjunctionitself, the term,Disjunc­
tion, beingusedtodenote onlynon-existenceofConjunction.
Answer.— It is not so. For, if non-existenceof Conjunctionbeabso­
lute non-existence, then it wouldfollowthat thetermDisjunctionwould
be usedtodenoteattribute andactionalso.
Objection.— Absolute non-existence ofConjunction, beingpresent in
twosubstances, is thesourceoftheintuitionof thedisjunct.
Answer.— It cannot be, since it wouldinthat casefollowthat abso­
lute non-existenceof Conjunction, beingpresent alsoin aconstitutedwhole
and its constituent parts, would be the source of the intuitionof the
disjunct.
Objection.— The term“ twosubstances” should be qualifiedbythe
expression “not beingrelatedtoeachother as effect andcause.”
Answer.— Inthat case, absolute non-existenceof Conjunction, being
present intheVindhyaandHimalayamountains also, wouldbe the cause
of the intuitionof thedisjunct.
Objection.— Indeed thereit is.
Answer.— It isnot. For therebeingexistenceoferroneousintuition,
due toit, in the case ofattributeandactionalso, it shouldbeconsidered
howfar it will be validtomake it thesourceofconvention or usage with
reference totheaccurateintuitiononly.
(if C 3 p i ' K a n A d a s u t r a s v i i , 2-10 . se& t
-V
, il&Lj-V _________ 1_____________________ J
Objection.— Destructionof Conjunction is Disjunction.
Answer.— Were this the case, it would entail theuseof theterm
DisjunctiononConjunction beingdestroyedbythe destruction of any one
ofthe twothings inConjunction.
Objection.— “Things inConjunction”should be qualified as being
existent.
Answer.— In that case, it wouldentail the intuition of Disjunction
even in the state of Conjunction of ajujube andan emblic myrobalan
which become conjunct again immediately after the destructionof one
conjunction.
Objection.— Disjunctionis the destructionof all Conjunctions.
Answer.— If it be so, thenthere wouldbenon-existenceof Disjunc­
tion in thecaseof destructionof one Conjunction, since the denotationof
‘all ’finds noplacethere.
Disjunction, therefore, exists, andit isanadditional attribute.
This atttribute, again, is destructible byanother contradictoryattri­
bute, inasmuch as, so long as the substratum exists, destruction of
attribute cannot be possible without a contradictory attribute existing
inthe samesubstratum.
Objection.— Actionitself maybe destructive of Conjunction.
Answer.— It cannot be, sinceonlyacontradictoryattributeisdestruc­
tiveof attribute. Moreover, although wherefinger, hand, arm, and body
cometo have conjunction with the tree, by means of their respective
actions, there ispossibilityof destructionofconjunctionof the finger and
thetree, bymeans of the action produced in the finger only, yet there
would not follow destruction of conjunctions of the handand the tree,
ofthearm andthetree, andof the body and the tree, since the hand, etc.
areinactive, andtheactionof the finger rests inadifferent substratum.
If it be supposed that even action resting in a different substratum
maybedestructive of conjunction, it wouldthenfollowthat therewould
be destructionof all conjunctions at oneand the samemoment of time,
byactionwherever it maybeproduced.
Objection.— What then is thesolutionhereonyour theory?
Answer.— Disjunction of thehand and the tree, producedbyDis­
junctionof the finger andthe tree, is destructive of conjunctionof the
hand and thetree. This is amatter of observation.
Sarvajna has said that there m ay very well be destruction of
conjunctionof thehand andtree, bythe veryactionof the finger, resting
inadifferent substratum, and that there will be no undue extension
 'G
°%\
I Jg^l VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (gj| j
1 .' '' '"T ‘n’ "il" ... ...*Tii-v^tr. »,J
(of thecausalityof action), inasmuchas it isobserved that mutual non­
conjunctionof the container and the contained is itself destructible by
actionrestinginadifferent substratum. This toois not asoundopinion;
for, destructiveness is everywhere observed to belong onlyto acontra­
dictoryattribute appearing in the substratum, andit is not reasonable
toabandonthat without someargument tothecontrary.
boundand Disjunction, again, are effects of Disjunction. Therein
weshall ponder over the non-combinative causality of Disjunction to­
wards theproductionof Sound. For, of the Sound whichis produced,
whenabamboois beingsplit up, andoneof the twohalves is helddown
bythe pressure of the foot, and.theother is drawn upwards, wefindno
other non-combinativecause than the disjunction of the half andether
(or of the ether withinthehalves). Nor do wefind anynon-combinative
causeover andabove Disjunction in the caseof the soundingforthof a
bamboobursting out while it is being burnt in a conflagration. We
alsoinfer the Disjunction of the effect and not-effect fromthe Disjunc­
tionof the cause a.nd not-cause. Howelse, where conjunction of the
finger andthe tree, conjunction of the handand the tree, conjunction
of the arm and-the tree, and conjunction of the body and thetree
areproduced by the respective actions of the finger, etc., canthere be
destruction of theconjunction of the hand and the tree, and of other
*conjunctions, even onthe destruction of the conjunction of the finger
and the tree, consequent onthe disjunction of the finger andthe tree
produced byaction produced in the finger alone ? For, in this case,
it is theseriesof disjunctions, produced by disjunctions that is, as has
been already stated, destructive of the corresponding conjunctions.
There is, however, no clear evidence in the case of disjunction of the
causeandnot cause, of which the antecedent is the disjunction of the
two(constituent) causes (i.e., thetwo halves of the bamboo); for, it i$.
observedthat, production of the disjunctionof ether, etc., like the dis­
junctionof oneof the two halves of the bamboo, being also possible
bythe action produced in the other half, disjunction is produced by
the actionof that 'other half from all those withwhich that half was
conjunct. For it is not that disjunctions are not produced alsofrom
particular parts of ether, etc., by action produced ina finger, equally
as disjunction from another finger. Nor is it that disjunctions from
particular parts,of ether, etc., are not originated byaction producedina
lotus-leaf, evenas disjunctionfromanother lotus-leaf isproduced. We
maintain, “Let asingle action originate even a hundred disjunctions
whicharenot opposedtothe conjunction originative of substance. But
ft &M I KANAD A SCJTRAS VII, 2-10. fo j
that action which originates disjunction which is opposedtothecon­
junction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction
whichis not opposedto theconjunction originative of substance. And
that whichoriginates disjunctionwhichis not opposed totheconjunction
originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which is
opposedtothe conjunctionoriginativeof substance.”
Objection.— Is there anyreason for taking suchaview?
Answer.— Yes, there is, diversityofcausebeing renderednecessary
bydiversityofeffect.
Objection.— Variety is necessary in action, sothat oneactionmay
produce disjunction which is opposed to conjunction originative of
substance, as inthecase of flowering lotus-blossoms, etc., and another
actionmay produce both, i.e., disjunctions whichare opposedandnot
opposedtoconjunctions originative of substance.
Answer.— This cannot be. For contrariety of effect is theorigin
of the supposition of diversity of cause ; and that contrariety arises
bywayof the characteristic of the one being the counter-opposite of
conjunctionoriginative of substance, but by way of the characteristic
of the other not beingthecounter-oppositeof conjunction originative of
substance, inasmuchas diversityalso ought tobe supposedbythosevery
ways.
This sameaction, present in the one half of thebamboo, produces ’
onlydisjunctioncf the two halves. And this disjunction first originates
disjunction fromtheparticular parts of ether, etc.,—disjunctionwhichis
not the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance. x\nd
if it produced disjunction byitself, it wouldthenbear the characteristic
of action ; henceit depends upon time which is distinguished with the
possessionof destructionof substance.
Objection.— At that moment also let that action itself produce
Disjunction.
Answer.— ft cannot doso, being past in time. In the production
of Disjunction, Time follows immediately after the productionof action
itself.
Objection. — But subsequent Disjunction being thus produced by
antecedent Disjunction, action cannot produce conjunction with other
places.
Answer.— This is not the case; for towards the productionof con­
junction, actionis not past in time. Otherwise, action will be never
destroyed, it beingdestructibleonlybysubsequent conjunction.
\f{ VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. V£f[ ^
‘ ” —-------------- —-———
ThissameDisjunction, destructiblebysubsequent conjunction, lasts
for three moments only. Sometimes it is destructible by destruction of
substratum. It isinthis way: Actionisproduced inthe fibre whichis
aconstituent part of the thread; Disjunction of two fibres followsit; at
the same moment, action is produced in another thread;thenthereis
destructionof conjunction, originative of the thread, by disjunction of
twofibres, andDisjunction is produced by action in the thread; then
there is destruction of the thread fromdestruction ofconjunctionorigi­
nativeof substance, andfromdestructionofthe thread results destruction
of Disjunctionproducedbyactioninanother thread.
Objection.'— Suchbeing the case, there will be no destruction of
action produced in another thread, since thereisnothing todestroyit.
For, it can be destroyed by subsequent conjunction, but Disjunction
beingdestroyed, thereisnosubsequent conjunction.
Answer.— Theargument is not valid. As Disjunctionof the thread
in the state of beingdestroyedis producedby action whichis produced
inthe thread, sobythe same action should be produced Disjunction of
the threadfromthefibre also. Such Disjunction also is really opposed
to originative conjunction. By *his Disjunction of the fibre and the
thread is produced Disjunction of the thread and ether, which produces
subsequent conjunction, andthis, inits turn, causes destructionof action.
Or whenever action is produced in athread, actionisproduced inits
fibrealso. That action, again, inthe thread in the state of being des­
troyed, originates simultaneous Disjunctions from theconstituent parts
of the thread, andparticular parts of ether, etc., all these Disjunctions
being not opposed to originative conjunction. There is, therefore, des­
tructionof actioncombinedor co-inherent in the thread, by conjunction
whichhas its production immediatelyafterthe Disjunction of the effect,
e.g., thread, from the not-effeet, e.g., ether, etc., producedfromthe D is­
junctionofthe cause, e.g., the fibre, andthe not-cause, e.g., ether, etc.
Sometimes Disjunctionis destroyedjointly by subsequent conjunc­
tionand destruction of substratum. It is in this way: There being
conjunction of athread andareed, actionisproducedinthe constituent
part of the thread, namely, the fibre, and action is produced in the reed.
This is one moment of time. Byaction inthe fibreisproduced Disjunc­
tionfromanother fibre, and by this there is destruction of conjunction
originative of the thread. By the actioninthe reedalso, there is Dis­
junctionof the threadandthe reed, andthere is also destruction of the
conjunction of the thread and the reed. Destructionof thethread imme­
diately follows destruction of conjunction originative of the thread.
 KANAD A SIJTTUS VII, 2-13.
m '
etionof the reedwith another portionof space immediatelyfollows
destructionof conjunction of the thread and the reed. Jointly from
both of them, viz., destruction of substratum, andconjunction, results
destructionof Disjunction.—10.
Conjunction and Disjunction do not possess Conjunction and Disjunction.

sqrws: II V9 M I H II
Samyoga-vibh&gayoh, in Conjunction and Disjunction.
Satnyoga-vibhaga-abhavafi, non-existence of Conjunction
and Disjunction. Anutva maliattv&bhyam, by minuteness and
magnitude, vyakhyatah, explained.
11. The non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction,
in Conjunction and Disjunction, is explained by Minuteness
and Magnitude.—292.
Upaskam.—It may be said, “ Let there bo Conjunction in Conjunction also, and
Disjunction in Disjunction also.” To prevent this he says:
As Minuteness and Magnitude are not possessed of Minuteness
and Magnitude, so also are not Conjunctionand Disjunctionpossessed
of Conjunction and Disjunction.—11.
Actions are void of actions, and Attributes of attributes.

ggNfciT f ^ w g ^ i ^ tfafa iw m m i
qiwffir: Karmmabhih, By actions. Karmmani, actions. 5%:
Gunaih, by attributes. jj UH: Gun ah, attributes. Anutva-
mahattvabliyam, by minuteness and magnitude. Iti, this.
12. Actions are (void) of Actions; Attributes are
(void) of Attributes. This (is explained) by Minuteness
and Magnitude.—293.
Upaskam.—This second aphorism has been already explained. ( Vide VII. i 15,
supra)
Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause do not exist.

hTuPmuif * hm-h
ii i9 i %r*vu
Yutasiddhi-abhavat, in consequence of the absence of
separate or independent existence. Karyya-Karanayob, of effect
and cause. ^#*rf?j*nr*Tr Samyoga-vibhagau, Conjunction and Disjunction, h Na
not. fqtnj Vidyete, exist.
 xiS*'g°“5x
(if: J f p jS j VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (C T
.\K i-cJ1"-'- ■
1'~J<P - / • ^ ^ ^

13. In consequence of the absence of separate exi

tence, there exist not Conjunction and Disjunction of effect
and cause.—294.
Upaskdra.—If it be asked why there cannot be conjunction of two substances,
namely of constituent part and constituted whole, so he says :
‘Yutasiddhih’means thestateofbeingexistent, of twothings which
havenoconnection with each other, or the characteristicof beingsup­
portedbyseparatesubstrata. Aconstituent part andaconstitutedwhole,
however, donot possess this. This is the meaning.—13.
Vivriti. —‘Yutasiddhih’ means the existence of two uncombined
things. Of cause and effect, e.g., of constituent part and constituted
whole, conjunctionanddisjunction do not exist, becauseof the absence
of their uncombined existence. For constituted wholes such as awater-
pot, etc., do not exist having no relation to constituent parts such as
potsherds, etc., whereby their conjunction and disjunction might be
possible.
The relation between o, word and its meaning is neither conjunction
nor combination.

II VS | R | ||
GunatvSt, because it is an attribute.
14. (There can be no conjunction of Sound or Words
with Objects), because (Conjunction) is an Attribute.—295.
Upaskdra.—Now follows from the context another section intended to establish the
conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argument.
‘Of conjunction ’—this is the complement. Thus, themeaningis,
howcanthere beconjunctionwhich is anattribute, of anattribute, e.g.,
Soundor Word, withobjects suchasawater pot, etc. ?—14.
Above continued.

gtffsftr ii i i ?* n
gut: i.; h, attribute. =arfg Api, also. Vibhavyate, is known or
established.
15. Attribute also is known (to be an object denoted
by Word), or is established (by word).—296.
Vpaskuru.—Moreover the object also is sometimes characterised as colour, taste,
etc. Therefore, conjunction is not possible, inasmuch as the existence of attribute in
an attribute has not been admitted. This is what he says :
 VX'■
< ..
yTS) / £ANlDA S&TRAS VIT, 2-18.________ ^
‘Attributealso, object ’—this is the complete sentence. Attribute
also, e.(/., colour, etc., isanobject denoted by Word, but with that there
is norelationof conjunction. This is the meaning. Or, themeaningis
that attribute alsois established (by being denoted) byWord andthat
with that there is norelationof conjunctionof Word. -15.
The relation between a word and its meaning is neither conjunction
nor combination, continued.
n ^ i * i * < a
Niskriyatvat, because of inactivity or inertness.
16. Because Word and Object are inert.—297.
Upaskdra.—Further, conjunction (of Word and Object) cannot bo produced by the
action of either or by the action of both, because any substance whatever, e.g., Ether, etc.,
as well as Word are inert. This is what he says :
Of Wordandof any Object whatever’—
-Suchis the complement of
theaphorism.—16.
Above continued.

w n fa ?rrc#rrrT ^ w vs i * i n
3TCTR Asati, not existing. *nr% Ndsti, (It) does not exist, Iti, such.
=«r Cha, and. srzffnnx Prayogat, because there is application.
17.(Word and Object are not in conjunction), also
because in the case of a non-existent object there is such
application (of word) as “ (It) does not exist.”—298.
anotherobstruction totheinter-relation (of Word and O bject):
Upaskdra. He states
Ibvenintirecaseofa non-existent water-pot, cloth, etc., such appli­
cation(of word) is observed as “There isno water-pot in the room,”
Cloth does not exist, The letter ga whichwas heard before, nolonger
exists,”“There was acloth,” “Therewill beacloth,”etc.; therefore(there
is nointer-relation). This is the meaning. The import accordinglyisthat
there is no conjunction, nor again combination, of Word withanon­
existent water-pot, etc.—17.
Word and Object are unrelated.
II \S I * I $=; II
srerrof fSabda-arthau, sound and sense. Word and object, Asam-
bandhau, unrelated.
18. (Therefore), Word and Object are unrelated.-—299.
Upaslcdro.—What then ? He gives the answer :
If Conjunctionof Word and Object does not exist, it then comes to
this that WordandObject are unrelated. This is the meaning.—18.
88
m § t% \ n
:l( g58S; VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.

Word and object are unrealed, continued.

u vs i r i u u
Samyoginah, which is in conjunction. The'conjunct. tJUSfrf Dan-
d&t, from the staff. U'Wfilsr: Samabhyinah, which is in combination. The
combined, ffstfani Vi^esat, from a distinction or distinguishing element, n
Cha, and.
19. (Cognition of Conjunction results) from (that, e. g.,)
the staff, which is in conjunction (with the hand of a man),
and (of Combination) from a distinguishing element which
is in combination (with the whole).—300.
Upaskam.—It may be asked why one or other of the relations of Conjunction and
Combination should not exist (between Word and Object). Accordingly he says :
“This personiscarryingastaff,”“Theelephant possessesatrunk,”
—these intuitions takeplace. Of these, the first results fromconjunction,
and thesecondfromcombination. The intuitioninrespect of the trunk
which is aparticular member of thebody, is dependent uponits combina­
tion withthe elephant, since it arises fromthedistinction that that is an
-elephant towhich belongs atrunkasbeingincombination with it. The
distinction itself, viz., the trunk, etc., is distinctive in consequenceofthe
relation of combination. But there is nointuition of threads, etc., also
< suchas “Aclothpossesses threads ”etc., under the relation of distinctive
possessionof the parts. Likewise, “The object, water-pot, isthat which
possesses the word, water-pot,”—suchintuitiondoes not take place. Of
Wordand Object, therefore, thereisneither conjunction, nor againcombi­
nation. Thisis the import.—19.
Intuition of object from word proceeds from convention:

OTWrasrUUT: II V9 I 3 I Ro n
UFfUbfi: Samayikal.1, conventional. According to direction. sqsqrfothgqi—
Sabda-artha-pratyayah, intuition of object from word.
20. The intuition of Object from Word (takes place)
according to the direction (of God).—301.
Vpasknra.—If there is neither conjunction nor combination between Word and Object,
then by what relation does a word establish a determinate object ? To this, he gives
the answer:
“‘Samayikah:’‘Samaya’means the directionof God, in the form
that such an object shouldbe understoodfromsucha word. Whatever
wordhasbeen assigned byGod toaparticular object, denotesthat object.
It isthenthewill of Godwhichsupplies the linkbetween wordandobject.
 ■60!%\
| ( j } l ________ K A B IL A SUTRAS VII, 2-20._______ ^
The same isconvention, dependent uponthe will of God; as, for example,
“Whatever plant theichneumontouches withits teeth, is an antidote to
poison.” Thisisthemeaning.
This convention is learnt sometimes from usage; e.g., when an
employer givestheorder “Bringthewater-pot,” andanemployee brings
an object possessinga tubular neck, aboy standing near byinfers the
knowledge of the latter in this way. This his activityis producedby
knowledge, becauseit isactivity, like myactivity; that knowledge again
isproducedbythe wordsof this order, because it follows immediately
after it; andthe subject-matter of this knowledge, namely, this object
withatubular neck, is the denotation of the term, water-pot. Bysuch
processes of transposition of verbs andcases, the boybecomes informed
inrespect oftheobjects, water-pot, cloth, etc.
Sometimes the convention is learnt directly fromtestimony alone;
e.g., that this tubular-necked object is designated bythe term, water-pot.
Sometimesit islearnt fromcomparison; e.g., fromacomparisonofresem­
blancein such cases as, that a gayal is that whichis like a cow, that
as is mudga, so is mudga-parrii (a kind of bean), that as is mdsa, so
is ma^aparm (a leguminous plant), etc. Sometimes (knowledge of
objects is derived) fromcondemnatory passages also; e.g., “ 0, the camel
with too pendulous upper lip and long neck, the eater ofhardthorns,
thevilest ofanimals”—when after hearing this condemnatory sentence,
onesees abodyof this description, knowledgearisesinone, viz., “This is
that camel.” Sometimes it springs fromcommunity of substratum, or
synonymy, withwords of knownimport; e.g., “The honey-bee issipping
thehoneywithincloven lotus-blossoms’’—after hearing this proposition,
(the knowledge arises), “This is what is designatedbythe term, honey­
bee, becauseit isthe sipper of honey within cloven lotus-blossoms,” or
as in the case of the proposition, “The cuckoo sings sweetly in the
mango-tree.” Here, intheaboveinstances, it is either acaseofinference,
or a case of worditself beingproductive of knowledge throughtheforce
ofsynonymywith words of known import, or only a particular mode
of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the beingtheagent indrinking
honeyinfers resemblancetoother individuals suchasthebee, etc.
Theconvention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals
beingbrought home bymeans of special characteristics,—suchistheview
ofthe followersof Tuttita. According to the followers of Prabhdkara,
theforce of wordis inrespect of boththeclass andtheindividual, but so
far asit refers to the class, it denotestheobject by the word, by being
known, andsofar as it refers tothe individual, bybeingits proper form.
 'G ".. .
;f: ||y ; v a i s e s i k a p h i l o s o p h y .________ yCT

TEe teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention is the force

itself andthat classes appearinginthe forms of the individuals are the
objects denotedby words. This is the case with words like cow, etc,
but the objects denoted by wordsexpressiveofattribute andactionare
both classes and individuals, as detailed inthe Maijiikha.—20.
Vivriti. —He now points out the connection between words and
objects, whichis the means of verbal knowledge.
* w * ‘Samayah’is arbitrament or convention. It is two­
fold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament iscalled force(of words),
andmodern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has for its
form, This object is to be understood fromthis word, or Let this word
conveythis signification. Accordinglyit has beensaid,
facfsnsj: i

Conventionhas beendeclared tobe two-fold, original and modern.

Therein the original is the eternal, which is calledforce; whereas the
modernisthe occasional, imposedbyscientific writers andothers.
Theapprehensionof the force of words proceeds from conduct,
etc. Soit hasbeensaid,

qwra stqifatM^fwr 11
Theelders declarethe apprehensionof theforceof wordsto proceed
fromgrammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy,
fromlexicography, fromauthoritative sayings or testimony, fromconduct
(of the employer whogives anorder whichiscarriedout bytheemployed),
fromcontiguitytoawordof well-knownimport, from context, and from
explicationor description.
* «■ *- * The doctrine of the force of the word to denote
primarilythe class is not sound, for, in such instances as “Bring the
cow,”thefact whichisestablishedbyexperience, namely, that the indivi­
dual is the object o) verbal cognition, cannot beexplainedexcept onthe
theoryof theforceofthewordprimarily to denote the individual. Nor
doestheknowledgeof theindividual arisefromimplicationorderivatively,
for in theabsence ofaprimary useaderivative use is impossible. Nor
is the knowledgeof theindividual possibleevenbytheequivalence of the
act andthe object of cognition (in verbal knowledge); for, inasmuch
■I H °i_____ KAN AD A StfTRAS VTI, 2-21. ^

M the being an object of verbal cognition, standingin the positionof an

effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of theact andthe
object of cognition (inverbal knowledge) which is supposedtobe the
condition, cannot betheconditionthere, asisdesired. Weshould, therefore,
respect thedoctrine that the forceof the words cow, etc., lies in denoting
the individual characterised by, or possessing, thegenericformand the
class or the universal. It has beenaccordinglylaid downintheaphorism
of Gautama, “The individual, the generic form, and the universal are,
however, theobject of theword.” (Nyaya-Sutram, II. ii. 63).
Priority and Posteriority, how produced.

n \91 q M t n
SaKT^RTWlf Eka-dikkabhyam, lying in the same direction. qaRtfiMnqf Eka-
kalabhyam, existing at the same time. Sannikrista-vipkrarista-
bhyatn, near and remote, P.u am, prior, sptf Aparam, posterior. Cha, and.
21. The Prior and the Posterior (are produced b
two objects) lying in the same direction, existing at the
same time, an d being near and remote.—302.
Upaskara.—Now he explains Priority and Posteriority, the next in the order of
enumeration, in one context, as these are the causes of mutually involved uses, and for the ‘
purpose of clearing up the understanding of the disciples as well as for the sake of brevity.
‘ThePriorandthePosterior’—thereference here is principally ina
substantivesense. “Are produced”—such is the complement. Or, the
word“usage”or “convention” is to be supplied after ‘The Prior and
the Posterior: such’ The word “such” should be understood. ‘Eka-
dikkabhyaip’ means by two bodies which have the same direction in
space. Twobodies occupyingequal place (i.e., equally distant) may also
have the samedirectioninspace, but by them Priority and Posteriority
are neither produced, nor come intouse. Accordingly it has been said,
‘Near andremote,’whichexpressionmeans, possessingnearness, i.e., the
qualityor state ofcontaining a smaller number of conjunctions with*the
conjunct, andremoteness, i.e., the qualityor state of containing a larger
number of conjunctions•with the conjunct. Hereby combinative cause
(of PriorityandPosteriority) is stated; whereas conjunctionof bodies and
direction inspaceis thenon-combinative cause. Priority and Posteriority
arethus producedinaman standingwith his face towards the east, by
observingarelativepaucity of conjunctions withthe conjunct in one of
twobodieslying intheeast andalelative plurality of conjunctions with
( jfffS ^ VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. (g j

conjuct in the other. The ncn-combinative cause is thus stated.

Near andremote’—thetermimplies intuition, as thecontainedmetaphori­
cally denotes the container. Relative understanding or cognition of
relativityis thusstatedto be the efficient cause. Priority and Posteri­
orityareproducedinrespect onlyof twobodies lying in the same direc­
tioninspace; hence thereis noproductionof themin allplaces. Relative
understandingisproducedinoneandthesame observer only; lieneethere
isnoproductionof theminall circumstances. Beingregulatedbyrelative
understanding, there is noproductionof themat all times. There is no
mutual dependencebetweenthem,inasmuchas, beingproduced fromthe
capacityor powerof thecause, theyare provedby sense-perception. For
otherwise theywould beneither produced nor perceived. For in caseof
mutual dependencethere wouldbe non-production as well as non-percep­
tionof bothof them. But PriorityandPosteriorityareperceived, andtheir
perceptioncannot be possiblewithout their production
‘Existing at the same time’—this has reference to Priority and
Posteriorityintime. Now‘existingat thesame time’means, by twobodies
oneyoungandtheotherold, whichoccupythesame, i.e., thepresent, time.
Herenearness isthe state ofhavingthebirth intervenedbyafewernumber
ofrevolutions of thesun, andremoteness is the state of havingthe birth
intervenedbyalarger number ofrevolutions of the sun. Here toounder­
standing, i.e., thecontainer, isimpliedby thecontained. Thus the young
andold bodies are the combinative causes. Conjunction of timeand
bodies is the non-combinativecause. The understanding of the stateof
havingthebirthintervened by afewer number of revolutions of thesun
istheefficient causeinthecaseof Posteriority, and the understanding of
thestate of havingthe birth intervened by a larger number of revolu­
tionsofthesunistheefficientcausein thecaseof Priority.
These, Priorityand Posteriority, again, are produced evenin respect
ofbodies indeterminate inplaceanddirectioninspace.
Nvwthere isa seven-fold destruction of Priority and Posteriority
ir space, but their production issimultaneous, elsethere wouldbe mutual
dependence. PriorityandPosteriorityinspace thenare destroyed from
thedestructionofrelative understanding (1) fromthe destruction of con­
junctionwhichis thenon-combinative cause, (2) fromthe destructionof
substance whichis thecombinativecause, (3) fromthe destruction of the
efficient and non-combinative causes, (4) from the destruction of the
efficient andcombinativecauses, (5) fromthe destruction of the efficient
cause, (6) fromthe destruction of the non-combinative cause, and (7)
fromthe destructionof thecombinativecause. Now,fromthe destruction
W'fw m ™ • K A N l D A SflTRAS VII, 2-21. |PT
III m -k — :-------:-------------------- — -------
of- relative understanding, thus: Production of Priority; knowledge
of thegenus Priority; then destruction of relative understanding; after
its destruction, at themoment of knowledgeof substance distinguished by
Priority, destructionof Priority,—theprocessshould be understood in the
samewayas inthecaseof destructionof duality. Destructionof Priority
andPosteriorityfollowsalsofromthe destruction of the non-combinative
cause. Thus, as soonas thereisrelative understanding, actiontakesplace
in thebody whichis the substratum of Priority as soon as Priority is
produced therefrom, disjunction takes place between direction in space
andthebody;afterit, whenthere is knowledgeof the genusPriority, then
thereis destructionoftheconjunction of directioninspaceand thebody;
then, destructionofrelativeunderstandingfollowsknowledgeof the genus ;
at the verysame moment, destruction of Priority and Posteriorityresults
fromdestructionofconjunctionof direction in spaceand thebodies. And
inthiscase destructionof relative understanding does not destroythem,
inasmuchas it issynchronous withdestructionof Priority.
Objection.— Onthe theoryof destructionof atti-ibute even from de­
structionof non-combinative cause, great confusion will result fromthe
thus possible destructionof Samskara (tendencies, impressions), adriftarn
(invisibleafter-effectsof acts performed), etc., alsofromthe destruction of
theconjunctionofMindandSoul.
Answer.— It is not so. For Priority being pervaded by the char­
acteristic of beingremote, theremust needs becessationof Priority conse­
quent onthenon-existence of remoteness ontheremoval of thesubstratum
of Priority to someother place. Nor is there at the time any other
agent ofdestruction; hence, such destruction beingotherwise impossible,
destruction of conjunction alone is conceived to be the destroying-
agent. On the other hand, samskara, adristam etc., as well as their
effects, e.g., recollection, pleasure, etc., cannot be supposed to beso
destroyed, inasmuchastheyareobservedevenafter a longtime.
This alsoimplies that Priorityand Posteriorityare destroyedalsoby
the destructionof theconjunctionbetweenthat particular place and the
standardlimit as well as the observer, the argument being the same as
above.
DestructionofPrioritysometimes results also from destruction of
combinativecause. Thus, relative'understandingarises at the very same
moment that actionproduced ina portion of a body causes disjunction
• fromanother portion; fromdisjunctionresults destructionof the conjunc­
tionoriginative of thebody, andthenproduction' of Priority; at the next
moment, destructionof substance results fromdestruction of conjunction
( i f p & i . VATSESTKA PHILOSOPHY. (C T
V-\ ----------------------- —— ___-________ ,
and there takes place knowledge of the genus Priority; destruction of
Priority follows destruction of substance, and destruction of relative
understandingfollows knowledgeof thegenus. Sothat, beingsynchronous,
destructionofrelative understandingdoes notdestroyPriority.
Destructionof Prioritysometimes takesplace by the destructionof
substanceanddestructionofrelative understanding. It happens in this
way: Productionof actionandrelative understanding in aportionof the
body; then, disjunction fromanother portion, andproductionof Priority;
next, destructionof originative conjunctionand knowledge of the genus ;
thereafter, destruction of substance and destruction of relative under­
standing; andfollowing them, there isdestruction of Priority.
Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destructionof
substanceand destructionofconjunction. It is in this way: Simultane­
ouslywithdisjunction amongst theconstituent parts of substance, there is
productionof actioninthebody andof relative understanding; following
it, appear destruction of conjunction of constituent parts, disjunction
betweenspaceand body, and production of Priority; thereafter there
are destruction of substance, destruction of conjunction of space and
body, andproductionof knowledgeof the genus; thereafter destructionof
Priorityresults fromdestructionofsubstanceanddestruction of conjunc-
' , tion of spaceand body, and destruction of relative understanding from
knowledge of the genus.
Destructionof Prioritytakes place sometimes fromdestruction of
conjunctionanddestructionof relative understanding. It isinthis way:
Productionof Priority, andaction inthebody; knowledge of the genus,
and disjunction; destruction of relativeunderstanding, and destructionof
conjunctionof spaceandthebody; then, destruction of Priority.
Destruction of Priorityresults sometimesfromdestructions ofcombi­
native, non-combinativeandefficient causes. It isinthis way: Produc­
tion of Priority, disjunction among constituent parts of the body, and
action inthebody, take place simultaneously; knowledge of the genus
Priority, destructionofconjunctionof constituent parts, and disjunction
betweenspaceand the body followthem; thereafter results destruction
of Priorityor of Posteriorityinspace, fromdestruction of relative under­
standing, destructionof substance, anddestruction of conjunctionof space
andthe body, whichdestructions aresimultaneouslyproduced.
Of Priorityand Posteriorityintime, however, there is nodestruction
due to destruction of non-combinative cause. Asinthe case of Priority
andPosteriorityinspace, there is destructionof nearness and remoteness
 KAN ADA S&TRAS V U , 2-22. &
y -R ------------------------—_____!_________ VHl
JiM the destruction of conjunctionofspaceand the body, so it is not the
case with Priority and Posteriorityintime. The three cases, therefore,
of their destruction, namelyfromdestruction of combinative cause, from
destruction of relative understanding, and from both jointly, should be
understood in the waydescribed above.—21.
Vivriti. It should be observed that, according to the w riter of
Muktavali, destructionofrelative understandingis destructive of Priority
andPosteriorityinboth their forms (i.e., inspace andintime), whereasin
theCJpaskara it is statedthat it is the destructionof their three-foldcauses
whichis destructiveof Priorityand Posteriority.
Priority and Posteriority in Time, how produced.

II ^ \ R I * R I)
Karana-paratvSt, from priority of the cause. Karatja
aparatvat, from posteriority of the cause. =s( Cha, and.
22. (Temporal Priority and temporal Posteriori
are said, by suggestion, to arise respectively) from Priority
of the cause and from Posteriority of the cause.—303.
Upask&ra. He states a peculiarity in the case of temporal priority and posteriority.
ThecauseofPriorityandPosteriorityistime. PriorityandPosteriority
belongtoit Conjunctionof time which is the non-combinativecauseof
priority, andconjunctionof time whichis the non-combinative cause of
posteriorityarestated, byimplication, as otherwise, the result would be
want of congraityor syntactical connexion. For, priorityand posteriority
cannot be producedbypriority and posteriority themselves. The terms,
priorityandposteriority, therefore, denote, by implication, conjunctions
of timewhichareproductiveof them.—22.
V ivriti. —If the uses ofprior (remote) and posterior (near) are pro­
ducedby cognitions of remoteness andnearness, then, inasmuch as the
cognition, KM(Benares) is near inrelationtoPrayaga (Allahabad), refers
alsotoPrayagaasits object or subject-matter, whydoes not there arise
theuseof Posteriority (or nearness) inrespect of Pray&ga? Likewise,
whyis there not the use of Priority (or remoteness), inrespect ofKM,
etc., whichalsobecomethesubject-matter of the cognitionof remoteness?
He removesthis incidental doubt.
‘K&rana-paratvat,’ i.e., owingtothe priorityor remoteness of the
combinativecause; and alsoowingto its posteriority or nearness. The
usesofpriorityand posteriority are only in respect of the combinative
cause, but not inrespect of anything else, simply becauseit becomes the
84
if v a is e s ik a p h il o s o p h y . (ot
% 0 W ----- ---- — ---- -----'y :......... ;,"~:“ Aerl_j
subject-matter of relative understanding. For useis determinedbythe
object inrespect ofwhichtheusearises. This is theimport.
Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and Posteriority.

o^nw^T: II vs | \ I \ \ II
Paratva-aparatvayoli, in priority and posteriority. —
Paratva-aparatva-abhavah, non-existence of priority and posteriority.
Anutva-mahattvabhySm, by minuteness and magnitude, satfEFUhi
Vyakhyatah, explained.
23. The non-existence of Priority and Posteriority,
in Priority and Posteriority, is explained by mintuteness
and magnitude.—304.
Actions are void of actions.
w
s&wfrH: h vs m I n
Karmmabhih, by actions. Karmmani, actions.
*
24. Actions are (void) of Actions.—305.
Attributes are void of attributes.

gSr&JTT: II ^ | * | W II
Gunaih, by attributes, spir: Gunafr. attributes.
25. Attributes are (void) of Attributes.—306.
Upaskara —These aphorisms, being virtually explained above, are not explained
here.—28,24, 25.
Combination described.

*RT: SRF&FTVPTt: H WINN: II V9 I 3 I H II

lira, here, i.e., in the cause. f^ I d a m , this, t'.e., the effect, fnt Iti, such.
Yatah, whence. Karyya-karanayofc, of effect and cause. ?r: Sah,
that, qqqrq: Samavdyah, combination. ■;
26. That is Combination by virtue of which (arises
the intuition) in the form of “ This is here, ” with regard to
effect and cause.—307
Upaskara.—I t has been stated that priority, posteriority, etc., are combined in dense
or corporal substances only, and that knowledge, pleasure, etc., are combined in the soul.
Now, what is this combination itself? Having regard to this inquiry of the disciples, he
steps over Understanding which is the next subject for treatment according to the order
of enumeration, and describes the examination of Combination.
( ( f W w K A N AD A StJTRAS VI I , 2-26. f^Tr
‘Karyya-kSranayoh’is anindication; non-effect andnon-cause also
are implied. Soit hasbeen saidin the sectioncalled the Localityof the
Predicables, “Combination is that relation of things mutuallyinvolved or
associated in nature and bearing to one another the relation of the
containedand the container,—which is the source of intuition in the
formof “(It is) here.”” Ayuta-siddhih, inseparable association, is thenon­
existence of things unrelated. As in thecaseof “There is curd here inthe
bowl,” “Thereare jujubes here inthe bowl, ”so inthe caseof “There is
clothhere in the threads, ” “Thereismat herein the reeds, ”“There are
substance, attribute, andaction here insubstance, ” “There is bovineness
here inthe cow; ”“There is knowledge here in the soul, ”“There is
Sound here in Ether, ” the cognition of here which is thus produced,
cannot be produced without some relation; whereby it is inferred
that some relation exists. And this relation is not mere conjunction.
For the causes of conjunction, namely, actionof either of the two things,
p;c., are absent here; it does not terminate in disjunction; related things
dp not exist unrelated; it canbe inferredas auniform substratum; it is
not perceptible tothe senses; it is one;and it is eternal.
3 Objection.-—If combinationbeone, it wouldthen entail intermixture
o’P^ubstance-ness, etc., since combination of action-ness, etc., wouldbe
possible insubstance.
Answer.— This cannot be the case, since non-intermixture follows
from the veiy rule of the container and the contained. Although the
same combination whichis the combinationof substance-ness, is alsothe
combination of attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., still substance is not their
container or substratum, since theyare not observedthere. Substance-ness
is observedinsubstancesonly, attribute-ness inattributesonly, action-ness
in actions only, but not elsewhere. It is from the observation of this
agreement and difference, that the uniformity(of the container and the
contained) results. As even in the absence of aparticular conjunction
between the bowl andthecurd, it is the bowl whichis the container, and
not the curd, and hence there is the uniformityof the relation of the
cont^ner andthe contained, sothe uniformityis valid in this case also
fromthe very differenceof the powerof the revealed and the revealer
for action-ness, etc., are not revealed by substance in the same wayas
substance-ness is. Accordinglyit has beensaid
i qrejwr*: snpn^ii
All-powerful consciousness isverily our resourcein the apprehen-
i sionof things. For consciousness inrespect of the being the container
 ■
'fofex- n
;lf gesji) PHILOSOPHY. \CT
is not reversible; nor is there the intuition that substanceisaction; nor,
again, that threads areinthe cloth. It isfor this reason that, notwith­
standing the combination of colour inAir, “There is colour in Air
such characteristicof being the container is not observedinthe caseof
Air. It is natural capacity, therefore, which everywhere determines the
relationof the container and the contained.
This combination, again, is eternal, inasmuchas it is uncaused.
For therule of production fromcombinativecauses applies to existences
or beings, and. efficient andnon-combinativecauses aresubsidiarytothose
causes. Therefore that whichwouldbe the combinative cause of com­
bination wouldbe either another combination, 01 that combinationitself.
It cannot be the first, asit would,entail non-finality; nor the second, asit
would involve self-dependence, for that verycombinationcannot produce
combination withitself.
Objection.— How does the intuition arisethat thereiscombination
of clothinthreads, andthat there is combinationofcolour incloth?
Answer.— It is bymeans of the relation of their intrinsic form,or
essential relation, as thesuppositionof another combination would entail
non-finality.
Objection—The intuitionof here, e.g., “There is colour here mthe
cloth,” will, then, arisebymeans of the same essential relation. What
is theAnswer—It
useof combin isatio
notnso?, since there is
. noobstruction
. .. ,hereto . the
,, ad,mis­
.
sionof anadditional relation.
Objection.— If itbe so, then“Hereinthisplacethereis non-existence
ofthewater-pot,”—inthis case alsotherewill beeithercombinationor any
other relation.
Answer— No, asthe intuition can be possiblebymeans of essential
relationitself. For, onthecontrarysupposition, the absoluteand mutual
non-existencesof the water-pot, which are eternal and combined with
more thanone substance, would have the characteristicof being Genera,
subsequent non-existence also, being an effect incombination, would be
perishable or destructible, and antecedent non-existence also, not being
produced, thoughcombined, wouldbeindestructible.
Nor is the qualityof existence the determiningfactor there, for the
qualityof existencecanbe producedat anytime.
The Bhattas maintain that innon-existencethere reallyis present a
different relation called distinguishedness or qualifiedness._Nowif this
distinguishednessbeone andthesameinthecaseof all individual mani­
festations of non-existence, thenit wouldfollowthat thereisnon-existence
4*
 7 KAN AD A StfTRAS VII, 2-28. |©T
■--------:------- :------ :----------- :------- r> l.
-ofthe water-pot eveninthat which containsawater-pot, inasmuchas the
distinguishedness of the non-existenceof the water-pot would exist by
meansof thesamedistinguishedness ofthe non-existenceof thecloth.
Objection.— But the water-pot itself will inthis case prevent the
cognition of thenon-existence ofthewater-pot.
Answer.— It cannot do this, since the non-existenceof that which
will prevent suchcognition is itself present there bymeans of therelation
ofdistinguishedness. Noristhe verynatureof the substratum(i.e., where
thewater-pot lies) suchthat onaccount of it therecanbe nomanifestation
of the non-existence of water-pot inthat place, for immediately after the
removal of the water-pot followsthe intuitionofthenon-existence of water-
pot inthat veryplace.
Objection.— Inyour viewalso, whyistherenot intuitionofpossession
ofcolour after the destructionofcolour, since Combinationis, as you say,
eternal andone?
Answer.— Because non-intuition of colour isproved from the very
destructionof colour.
The arguments against Combination have been demolishedinthe
Mayukha under Sense-Perception, Sow estophere.—26.
Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action,
Genus, and Species.

5STTWRT: II V9 I \ I II
Dravyatva-gunatva-pratisedhah, negation or exclusion of
substance-ness and attribute-ness, (in or from Combination). HfipT Bhavena,
by existence. <mngqRP Vyakhyatah, explained.
27. The negation of Substance-ness and Attribut
ness (in Combination) is explained by Existence,- 308.
Upaskdra.—By way of proving its difference from the five beginning with Substance
(i. e., Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species), he says :
‘Bhavah’means Existence. As Existence is not identical with
substance, etc., beingcognised by adifferent form of understanding, so
combination alsois different fromthe same Substance, etc. ‘Dravyatva-'
gunatva’ isanindication; Action-ness, etc., alsoshould be understood.
—27.
Combination is one.

II | RI ||
i ^ T a t t v a m , that-ness. One-ness. Unity. Bhavena, by Exis-
iff ______ VAI&ESIKA p h ilosoph y.

^ 28. The Unity (of Combination, is explained) by

Existence.—309.
Upaskara.—He proves Unity :
‘Explained’is thecomplement. ‘Tattvam,’ i.e., Unity, ‘bhavena,’
i.e., by Existence, is explained. A sone Existenceeverywhere induces
thecognitionof theexistent, sooneCombination everywhere induces the
cognitionof thecombined. Moreovertheinferential markof Combination
is not differentiated, nor is there anyother particular mark. For, we do
not find anyparticular mark, i.e., differentiatingmark, of Combination,
whereby wecould recognise its diversity. For the very same reason,
Combination iseternal ; for, as in the caseof Existence, non-eternality
cannot appropriately belong to it which is undifferentiated eveninthe
differenceof Space, Time, etc.
Objection.— If combination is nothingbut this relation, then there
maybedisunionof threads andcloth, or of theclothandits colour.
Answer. This cannot be, for in the absenceof (previous) uncorrelat­
edexistence, disunionis not possible. For, there is nounrelatedexistence
ofcolour andthat which possesses the colour, or ofthe parts and the
whole, that theremaybea disunionbetweenthem.
Objection.— But their uncorrelated existence may be brought to
, pass.
Answer.— It cannot,, for the effectuationis contravened by being
never soexperienced.
Thefollowers of Prabhakara hold that Combinationismanifoldand
also non-eternal. But this is not areasonable view to take, for the
intuitionis “Colour is destroyed,” whereas it is the intuition ofnobody
that the Combinationof colour is destroyed.
The viewof theschool of Nyaya that Combination isperceptible to
the senseis also not valid. Combination is supersensuous, for being
different fromthe Soul, it is at thesametimein astateofbeinguncom­
bined, likethe Mind, or like Time, etc.—28.
Here ends thesecond chapter in the seventh book of Sahkara’s
Commentaryonthe VairfesikaAphorisms.
[[( W X)V v __________ k a n a d a -s $ t r a s . V l u , 1-1._____________ § L

B ook E i g h t h .— C h apter F ir s t .

III. i. 2, 18.
Cognition explained by allusion to

s[;% qTR sqmTcT^ II c; | % \ % II

5fs$5 Dravyesu, among substances. frPT Jnanam, knowledge. Cognition.
Vyakhyatam, explained.
1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substan­
ces.—310.
Upaskdra.—The order of enumeration, was violated in favour of the curiosity of
f, the disciples. The author now embraces the order of enumeration. Therein the exami­
nation of understanding is the subject of the eighth book. Understanding has been
already mentioned for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says :
By the term, “Among substances,” the author implies the third
book, as thecontainer bythecontained. Themeaning is that cognition,
jnanarji, has beenexplained by the tw o aphorisms, namely, “Theuni­
versal experience of theobjects of thesenses is themarkof (the existence
of) anobject different fromthe senses andtheir objects ” (III. i. 2), and
“That (i.e., knowledge) whichis produced fromthecontact of the soul,
the sense, and theobject, is other (thanafalsemark)”(III, i. 18).
Now inthe kindred system (i.e., theN yaya-Sutraip, of Gautama),
under the definition of understanding, there has beenmadeadeclaration
of synonyms, namely, “Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition, Intui­
tion—theseare synonyms,” (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 15), for thepurpose of
demolishingtheSaAkhya doctrine. For the Safikhyas maintain adiffer­
enceinmeaningof the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus Prahriti, Matter,
is thestateof equilibriumof Sattva, Rajas, andTamas, theprinciples of
purity, passion, anddarkness, or theprinciplesof illumination, evolution,
andinvolution, respectively. Prahriti is one, andone only, whilePuru-
$as, Spirits, are divided toinfinity. They are seated in the cave, (i.e.,
retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal, immutable, andcharac­
terisedbyeternal consciousness. They arecalled lame, as it is not their
nature toundergo, modification or transformation, while Prahriti is said
tobeblind, being stupid or insensate. When there arises inPrahriti
adesirefor the enjoyment of sensuous objects, or a desire to see the
differencebetweenPrahriti andPuruga, at that moment Prahriti is modi­
fied, or transforms, under the influenceor osculationof Puruga. Andits
first transformationis understanding, aparticular formof theinner sense
Understandingit is that is calledthe principleof Mahat, the great one•
accordinglyit has been said, “Thegreat one evolves from Prahriti ”
1
I Jg2^' VAJSE81KA PHILOSOPHY.
■ "T :~ [ . - •" ' ■'. '/ "'iii ■ —
—■'■■'"I*■i"—
———
■■»—■
cLnd this understanding is pure or stainless like amirror. And that
particular transformationof it, which takes theformof anobject insuch
shapesas “It is awater-pot,” “It is acloth,”etc., through the channel
of the external senses, is called cognition, jndnam, and faculty, vritti.
Apprehension, upalabdhi, is the same as akindof abhimana, egoityor
self-consciousness, intheformof “I know,” which arises inconsequence
of the non-perceptionor non-apprehension of the distinctness or differ­
enceofPurina which is consciousness, by cognition present intranspa­
rent or pureunderstanding. Pratyaya, Intuition, is that particular trans­
formationof understandingitself, whichtakes theformof pleasure, pain,
etc., throughthechannel of the sensesalone, inconsequenceof thecontact
of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of sense. Hence is it that
cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, reminiscence, virtue,
andviceare, all of them, particular transformationsof understanding,
and beingpresent inPrakriti itself, in subtle forms or in minutepro­
portions, appear anddisappear, accordingtodifferenceof circumstances;
while Purutja is as free from adhesion or affinity or attachment as a
lotus-leaf, but casts its shadowinthe understanding. This theorywhich
theSahkhyas hold is thrown away by theproof indicated inthe above
declarationof (these terms as) synonyms. Thus, if the term, under­
standing, bederived inthe instrumental sense, viz., as that by whicha
*thingisunderstood, thenit comes tobe nothingelsethan themind. Nor
is the mindanobject of perception, whereas understandingis surely cog­
nizablebyperception inthe formof“I understand.” Nor are cognition,
etc., theproperties of the internal sense, inasmuch as they areproved
toexist onlyasbeing the properties of anagent. For the manifestation
of “I know,” “I intuit,” “I apprehend,” takes place as having commu­
nityof substratumwithI-ness or egoity. If theyreplythat thisphenome­
nonis abhimana or conceit, we rejoin that it cannot be so, since thereis
noobstructiontoits beingreal. It cannot be contended that suchob­
structionis suppliedby the very characteristic of the Purina as being
seatedinthecave, that is tosay, byits not beingthe receptacle ofadven­
titious properties orchanges ; for, we would then replythat eternality
iscompatible withthe nature of being the substratum of adventitious
modes. For that which possesses aproperty and the property are not
one andthesamereality, sothat theproduction anddestructionof the
propertyshould themselves be the production and destruction of the
substratumof the property. It is onlyhe, then, who is conscious, that
alsounderstands, cognises, apprehends, andintuits. Hencethehypothe-
sis of distinct entities isnot reasonable. This isthepoint.—1.
/'5'f ■C
l;'V\ ^
|| KAqADA-StiTRAS. VIII, 1-2.______(g|J
Son?-, Mind, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms are not
('ordinarily) perceptible.

rT^r^TT w s n s re r# n s; \ % \ r n
cTW Tatra, therein, among: substances, Atmfi, soul. *r?f: Manas,
mind. =et Cha, and others, e.g, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms,
SPTST% A-pratyakse, non-perceptible, not objects of perception.
2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and others
are not objects of perception.—311.
Vpaskara.—This cognition, again, is two-fold, Vidya, Science or true knowledge, and
A-vidyd, Nescience or false knowledge. Vidya is of four kinds, characterised by perception,
inference, memory and testimony. A-vidyd also lias four kinds, characterised by doubt,
error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above
four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced as the senses.
Why this is so, is explained here.
Theword, soul, inthe aphorism denotes thesoul of another or one’s
ownsoul. That evenone’s own soul isnot an object ofperception, has
been already declared, inasmuch as thecasual mental intuitionof theI,
aham, inone’sow nsoul, isrepudiatedbysuchintuitions as “I amfair,”
“I amthin,” “I havelongarms,” etc. The word, “cha,” extends the
applicationofthe predicate tothe substances, namely, ether, time, space,
air, and ultimate atoms. Sense-born cognitionagain isof two degrees,
beingthat ofthe omniscient andthat of thenon-omniscient. That of the
omniscient is thecognitionof such andsuchcomplements of objects by
means of the proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily
supersensuous objects) characterised byvirtue or merit springing from
Yoga {i.e., inhibitionof the activityof the internal organ, the mind, and
consequent freedom of the all-pervadingsoul, inother words, the steadi­
nessof themind in thesoul. Vide v. ii. 16 above.) Thus ultimate atoms
fall within its sphere, (or possess conjunction), being demonstrable,
nameable, andexistent.
Objection.— Sincethere isnomaterial or dataof suchcognition, how
canthis be thecase? Magnitude alsois acause of sense-perception, but
ultimate atoms donot possess magnitude. Thepossessionof colour, again,
is the causeof visual perception, but space, etc., do not possess colour.
Howthencantherebeperceptioninthesecases?
Answer.— 'The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is
possiblebymeansof themindaloneas an auxiliarytothe virtueor merit
bornof Yoga, orbymeans of theeye andother senses under thefavour­
ableinfluenceof suchmind. For thevirtueor merit producedbyYoga is
q£inconceivable efficacy, anddoesnot standinneedofanyother auxiliary.
l! % m f VAT&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. vfiT (
--------------------- —................................^
“Theman whoseomniscienceis the subject ofcontroversy, is not
omniscient, because he isamanlikemyself,”—such reasonings, however,
are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would render
impossible the propositionof the other side (maintainingtheexistenceof
omniscience inthe man inquestion), as is thecase withthe reasoning,
“Afollower of Prabhakara (awriter of theMimamsaschool) is not versed
inMimamsa, becauseheisamanlikemyself.”
Perception of the non-omniscient, again, is two-fold, discriminative
and non-discriminative. Discriminativecognition, accordingto Dharma-
kirti and Dihnaga and others of the Bauddha school, is not certain
knowledgeor proof. Thustheyargue: Suchcognitionowesits manifesta­
tionor apparent realitytoconnectionwith words. Buttheconnectionofan
object withaword, aname, is not possible, that there shouldbe such
intuition, colouredwithaname, as it were, as “Awater-pot,”or “Apiece
of cloth.” Nor is jati, the universal, reallyexistent or objectively real,
that the being distinguished with the possession9of it shouldbeappre­
hended in objects by the sense. Nor is possible connection of the
existent characterised by itself withthat whichis non-existent. Nor is
thenon-existentwithinthecognizanceof the senses. Therefore, excitation
(alochanam) isproduced Bythe senses, andwhileinthe processof being
produced, and leading tocorresponding objects, by the power of the
excitation, discriminative cognitionis called perception and also proof.
(Tothis the commentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative
cognitionmay be objectively unreal, because it owesits manifestation or
apparent realityto connectionwith words, it may be at the same time
real, because it is the product of contact ofsense and object. Henceit is
doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the being
distinguished with the possessionof a namemayverywell bea possible
object invisual cognition, its appearance inconsciousnessbeing possible
from presentationbymemory, as is thecase withtheperception “Frag­
rant sandalwood.” Or, it may be, the being distinguished with the
possessionof aname doesnot cometolight inperceptual cognition, and
there is only recollection of the name, whichas soonas it isrecollected
serves todistinguish its correspondingobject, liketherecollectionof the
counter-oppositein thecase of the cognitionof non-existence. Alsoit
has beenproved that jati, the universal or class, etc., areimmanent in
objects or entities. Hence, discriminative or modified cognition also
is perception, inasmuchas it is producedfrom contact of senses and
objects.
’|( kanada-sutras vm , 1-3._______________

Objection.—*N on-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither

excites toactivity, nor is anobject ofcurrent use. What thenis theproof
ofits existence?
Answer.— The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognitionitself;
for, this is aspecialized cognition, or the cognition ofa thingas possess­
ing, andbeing accordinglydistinguishedby, somethingelse. Nor canit
beproduced without thecognition of that whichis possessedand serves
todistinguishor individualize, that is, the distinctive element. For it has
beenascertained above that thecause ofspecializedcognitioniscognition
of that whichserves tospecialize, contact of senseand that whichisgoing
to bespecialized, and non-apprehension of non-connection ofboth.—2.
Cognition, how produced.

STHfalu II Q I * I ^ ||
ScTHRfw Jnaoa-nirddese, in the differentiation of a particular cognition.
5cTT5THwTr%T%rtf: Jnaua-nispatti-vidhih, mode or process of production of cognition.
3 tR: uktafi, stated, described.
3. The mode of the production of Cognition is bein
described, in connection with the differentiation of a parti­
cular Cognition.—312.
Upaskara.—In order to elucidate how Cognition is produced, in what circumstances,
and from what causes, he says :
A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from ether
cognitions, inrespect of themode of its production, inrespect of its sub­
ject matter, and in respect of its property. Now7, differentiation of
cognition having to be made, the processof theproductionof cognition
is going to be described. This is the meaning. In ‘uktah’ the past
participle affixhla is usedinthe sense of incipient action.—3.
Vivriti.--W hat isthecauseof cognition? Therebeingthis expect­
ancy, hesays:
‘JMna-nirdderfe, ’ i.e., in the third book, where enunciation of
cognition has been made. There too the process of the productionof
cognitionhas beendescribed. Themeaningis that the causes of cogni­
tion have been mentioned in the aphorism, “That [i.e., knowledge)
whichisproducedfromthe contact of the soul, the sense andthe object
is other (thana false mark) ” (III. i. 18.) Thus, the soul is thecombi­
nativecauseofcognition, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the
non-eombinative cause, and contact or contiguity of the object is the
efficient cause, This has been mentioned ip that very aphorism. It
(((W m VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
---------- ;------------------------ -------------S L
VCT
' should be observed that the causality ofcontact has beenstatedunder
the topicof perception.
Substance is the cause of cognition of Attributes and Actions.
11 s i ? ia u
SPJSKwtlJ Guna-karmmasu, Attributes and Actions. uf?TgiK!S Sannikristesu,
being in contact. 5TT^r;T57%: Jnananispatteh, of the production of cognition,
£5% dravyam, substance, Karanam, cause.
4. Substance is the cause of the production of cog­
nition, where Attributes and Actions are in contact (with
the senses).—313.
Upaskara. —He describes the mode of production (of cognition):
Substanceisthecauseofthecognitionwhichisproduced inrespect
of attributes, e.g., colour, etc., and inrespect of actions, e.g., throwing
upwards, etc. Bothof them are apprehended only in so far as they
inhere in substances appropriate or perceptible tothe senses. Hence
it is theappropriateness or perceptibilityof the substances which deter­
mines their perceptibility. It is by substance, moreover, that their
contact with the senses is constituted, theybeing apprehended bymeans
of their combinationwiththeconjunct (i.e., Substance whichis conjunct
with the sense). Although there is apprehended the odour of dispersed
' particles of champaka flower, andofportions of camphor, which are all
imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be, which
effectstheir contacts. Althoughperceptibility ofsubstanceis not arequi­
sitein the apprehensionof sound, yet soundis apprehendedonlyas it is
combinedor inherent therein, andhence this itself is the requisite. If
it be asked, whyismade this suppositionof contact whichis invisible?
wereplythat theproductionof cognition, beingan effect, necessitates the
suppositionof acause. This is the import.—4.
Substance is the cause of cognition of Oenus and Species also.
t r=ri mi iv ii
^»TI?atmrsrS Samanya-visesesu, in genera and species. ^awrwqTHFTTrl
S&manya-v'isesa-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and
species, fnr: Tatah, thence, from substrata, Eva, alone. Jnanam,
cognition.
5. In consequence of the non-existence of Genus
and Species in genera and species, cognition (of them) is
due to that alone.—314.
Vpaskcmi.—He describes another fnode of the production pf knowledge;
;(( | | )); _________ k a k A d a -s u t r a s v m , 1 -6 .______________

Existence is the (summum) genus, itsspecies aresubstance-ness,

attribute-ness and action-ness. Theseagainaregenera, andtheir species
areearth-ness, etc., colour-ness, etc., throwing-upward-ness, etc. Among
these, omnisensuouscognitionof thegenerainheringinsubstance is due
to that only, that is, due onlytoappropriate or perceptible, particular
substratum, andalsotocombinationwiththe conjunct, combination with
the combined with the conjunct, and combination'withthecombined,
all thesecombinations beingrelatedto that substratum. Omnisensuous
cognition, again, is produced, in thecaseof attribute, fromcombination
with the combinedwiththeconjunct; inthecaseof sound-ness, ha-ness,
etc., fromcombinationwiththecombined; inthe caseof existence, from
combination withthe conjunct, fromcombinationwiththecombined with
theconjunct, andfromcombinationwiththe combined. In the case of
attribute, the proximity or contiguity whichis the conditionofpercepti­
bility, isnot constituted by combination with the conjunct, or combi­
nation.
It may be objected: ‘Tatah eva, ’ i.e., from contact with, or
contiguity to, their substrata alone—such delimitation or exclusionis
not valid. Becauseingenus andinspecies alsothere doexist other genus
and species. Contact with, or contiguity to, them also is acauseof
cognition. Inanticipationof this objection, he says, ‘In consequence of
the non-existence of genus andspecies. ’ For genus andspecies donot ’
exist ingenusand species, since that would entail infinite regression.
The intuition of their mutual distinctions arisesfromtheir ownforms or
natures alone, or inthis way, for instance, that the genus, bovine-ness,
is cognised from the distinctness of the upadhi, adjunct or external
condition, characterisedby being present in all bovineanimals, while
being absent fromother thanbovineanimals. Similarly withregardto
pot-ness, etc., also.—5.
Oenus and Speices are causes of cognition of Substance, Attribute and
Action.

HWMfayturW n=i i 11
Samjtnya-visesa-apeksam, dependent upon genus and species.
Dravya-gqna-karmmasu, in respect of substance, attribute and
action.
6. (Cognition which, is produced) in respect of Subs­
tance, Attribute and Action, (is) dependent upon genus
and species.—315.
[l{ |g^i VAISLSIKA PHILOSOPHY. (^|
^ Upaslcdm.—It may be asked : As, iu consequence of the non-existence of genus and
species, cognition of genus and species is absolutely independent of them, is it likewise
absolutely independent of them in the ease of substance, attribute and action also ? He
says, N o:
“Cognition is produced”—this is the subject in discourse. In
respect of substance, attribute and action, there is no doubt cognition
specialized with the content of substance-ness, attribute-ness andaction-
ness. Suchspecializedcognition, again, cannot beproduced without the
contact of the subject specified, that which serves to specify, andthe
sense. Hence dependence upon genus and species is there necessary.
For there issuchspecializedcognitionas “This is substance,” “This is
attribute,” “This is action.” This is the import.—6.
Substance, Attribute and Action are causes of cognition of Substance.
spat II q l ? I ll
gs^ Dravye, in substance. Dravya-guna-karrnma-apeksam,
dependent upon substance, attribute and action.
7. (Cognition), in the case of Substance, (is) depen­
dent upon Substance, Attribute and Action.—316.
Upaslcdra.—Is, then, iu tho case of substance also, cognition dependent only upon
genus and species ? To remove this curiosity, he says :
“Cognitionis produced”—this is the subject indiscourse. “Awhite
cow, possessinga hell, is’going,”—this is acognition. Here substance,
the bell, is the distinction or that •which serves to specify; *white’
denotes an attribute; ‘is going’ denotes action. Thus in specialized
cognition or intuition of a thing distinguished with the possessionof
somethingelse, therecannot be non-apprehension of the distinction or
that which serves to specify, nor can such specialized intuition take
place without relation tothat whichserves tospecify. Hence inthe cog­
nition of substance there is dependence upon substance, attribute and
action. Suchis the import.—7.
Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition o f Attribute
and Action.
?r ferir nc i \ \ q 11
Guna-karmmasu, in attributes and actions. Guna-
kannma-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of attribute and action. -
Guna-karmma-apeksam, dependent upon attribute and action.
Na, not. Vidyate, exists.
8. (Cognition), dependent upon Attribute and Action,
does not exist in tbe case of Attributes and Actions,
 k a n A d a -s u t r a s vm , -.
1 9 2^
inasmuch as Attribute and Action do not exist in Attribute
. and Action.—317. p'.yV
Upaskdra.—Is there, then, dependence upon attribute and action, also in the case of
attribute and action ? He says, No :
“Cognition”is thecomplement of theaphorism. Since there is no
cognition of attribute as distinguished with the possession of another
attribute, and since there isnocognitionofactionas distinguishedwith
thepossessionofanother action, there is no cognition thereof, which is
dependent upon attribute andaction. For thereexistsnoattribute inan
attributenor actioninactions, wherebytheymight appear as distinctions
inthem. This isthe import.—8.
Combination (as well as: Attribute) is a cause of Cognition.

II C I 1 I S. II
SamavSyinah, of that in which combination exists, the substra­
tum. ^vaityat, from whiteness, SJvaitya-buddhefi, from cognition
of whiteness. Cha, and. ^vete, in a white object. grsp Buddhih, cog­
nition. % Te, they, ijh Ete, these. . SRrc&RUUIW Karyya-karana-bhate, related
as effect and cause.
9. The cognition, (‘ It is white ’) in respect of a white
object, (results) from whiteness of the substance in which
combination of whiteness exists, and from the cognition of
whiteness. These two, (cognition of white object, and cog­
nition of whiteness), are related as effect and cause.—318.
Upaskdra.—Lest it might be asked that since there is manifestation of attribute and
action (in the cognitions thereof), why there should not bo dependence upon attribute
and action in the cognition of attribute and in the cognition of action, so he begins an­
other topic in reply to that:
Byusingtheterm‘Samavayinah’hestates thecausalityofrelation.
Thus, inasmuchascombinationofattribute does not exist in attribute,
and inasmuch as combination of actiondoes not exist inaction, in their
respectivecognitionsthere isnodependence uponattribute andaction as
distinguishing marks or qualifications; but there does exist dependenae,
uponattribute andactionas the subject-matter or objects of cognition.
This beingso, it is statedthat inthecaseof suchintuitions as “A white
conchshell,”the combinationof whiteness, the attribute whiteness, and
thecognitionof whiteness asadistinctionor that whichservestospiecify,
are the causes. So that relation with the distinction, the distinction.,
2 V
 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. * j

andcognitionof themare the causesof specialized perceptual cognition.

Herebyisprovedall that has beenstatedbefore.—9.
Exception to the above : In the case of Substances, Cognition is not
a cause of cognition.

I) 5 I \ I II
Dravesu, in substances. ^rqtHrRqFitOTr: An-itara-itara-karanSh, not
causes, one of another.
10. In* the case of Substances, (cognitions are) no
causes of one another.—319.
U p a s M r a . —It may be objected : As in the case of. “ Possessing a bell,” cognition
of substance (e.g., the cow possessing the bell) is dependent upon substance (e.g., the
bell), so also in the case of (the serial cognitions of) “ It is a pillar,” “ It is a jar," etc.,
where the cognition does not embrace another substance as a distinction, cognition
of (the first) substance, (the pillar), is the cause (of the cognition of the second substance,
the jar), (and so on). Thus nowhere can there be cognition of substance in the first
• instance or at first hand :
Accordinglyhe says:
“Cognitions”isthe complement of the aphorism. Cognition of
thejar, eventhottghit takes place immediately after the cognition of
the pillar, is yet not the effect ofthecognitionofthe pillar, inasmuch as
thepillar cannot properly be the distinction of, or that which serves
tospecify, bybeingcontainedin, thejar.—10.
The exception explained.

w m iq h iq q i?! sre 'u ifsffra i garr

ft II q i ? I \ ( II
Karana-ayaugapadyat, from non-simultaneity of causes.
9>rWPFW^ Karana-Kramat, from succession of causes. Cha, and.
Ghata-pata-fidi-buddhinam, of the cognitions of. the water-pot, the cloth,
etc. a w Kramaii, succession, a Na, not. IjpFRWrfRr Hetu-phala-bhav&t, in
consequence of the relation ot cause and effect.
11. The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot
the cloth, etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes,
due lot the non-simultaneity of the causes, and not in conse­
q u e n c e of the relation of cause and effect (amongst the cog­
nitions.)—320.
U pasMra.—It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the
cloth, <Stc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and
cause. Sohesays: ................. . . . ...; 0 ..;
 k a n Ad a - s u t r a s VIII, 1-11.
Thesequenceof thecognitions ofthe water-pot, the cloth, etc., is
dependent upon the sequenceof their causes, and not dependent upon
therelationofcause and effect. If it be asked where the sequence of
causes itself comes from,sohe says, ‘fromthe non-simultaneity of the
causes.’ Simultaneityof cognitionshas beendeniedor disproved. Hence
there is not simultaneityalsoof diversecauses of cognition. If, on the
otherhand, there were simultaneityofcauses, it wouldentail simultaneity
alsoof effectand thus theargument that non-production of simultane­
ouscognitions is the markofthe existenceof themind, wouldbeshattered.
This is the import.—11.
Hereends the first chapter of the eighthbook in the Commentary
ofSahkarauponthe Vai^esikaAphorisms.
Vivriti. —Thesequenceororder, intheformofantecedence and sub­
sequence, of thecognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, notfromthe
relationofcauseandeffect amongst them,but fromtheorder, or the ante­
cedenceandsubsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot, cloth,
etc., (with thesenses), whichcontacts arethecauses of those cognitions.
Theword ‘cha,’ and, implies the addition of non-simultaneity which
isnot mentionedhere, and this wordis to be construed after the word
sequenceor order. Themeaning, therefore, is this that the non-simul­
taneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is due to the
non-simultaneityof their causes, e.g., contacts with senses, etc. Where
however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot, and the
clothexists, thereis simultaneously produced a collective cognition of
all the objectsincontact withthesenses for the time being. Hence it
isalsotobe understoodthat simultaneity of effects follows fromsimul­
taneityofcauses, andnon-sequenceof effectsfromnon-sequenceofcauses.
Understandingor Intelligence, buddhi, is primarily divided into
presentation, anubhdti, andrepresentation, smriti. Presentation, accord­
ingtothe doctrine of Kanada, is again two-fold, being divided into
perception, j.oratyak$a, and inference, anumana. Perceptionis ofsixkinds
as derivedfromsmelling, etc., {i.e., fromthefiveexternal, andthe internal
senses); andis two-fold, asdiscriminative, savihalpaka, and non-discrimi-
native, nirvikalpaka ; andtwo-fold, asordinary or popular, Icmkika and
super-ordinaryor hyper-popular alauhika. Inference, again, is three-fold
asproducedbyillation from only positive conditions, kevala-anvagi, or
purelyagreemental ; fromonly negative conditions, kevalavyatireki, or
purelydifferential; andfrombothpositiveandnegativeconditions, Saman-
yato-drista, or inferencefrom com monly observed marks. For example
“This is expressible bywords, inasmuch as it is knowable,” etc., are
 FATS£!S!X1 PHILOSOPHY. ^ j} j

illations frompurelypositiveconditions (or by Mill’s method of agree­

ment). Earth differs fromother substances, inasmuchas it ispossessed
of odour, and the like are illations from purely negative conditions,
tor byMill s methodof difference); and “Themountainis fiery, inasmuch
asit smokes,”andthe likeare illations from both positive and negative
conditions tor byMill’s methodof agreement and difference.) Bepresen-
tation, reproductionor memory, onthe other hand, isuniform, dependent
on that formofSamskara which iscalled Bhdvami or permanent mental
impression, havingthesameformas theoriginal presentationand depen­
dent uponcertain cognition in which inattention played no part. In
another point ofviewalso, understanding is two-fold, science or correct
knowledge, prama, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, aprama.
Scienceiscognitioninacertainformof that which has that form. Nes­
cience iscognitioninacertainformofthat in which there is non-exist­
ence of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold,
accordinglyas it is dividedintodoubt, samsaya, and certitude, nischaya.
Doubt is acognitionwhereof theformis (mutually) repugnant existence
and non-existenceinoneand the sameobject; certitude in regard to a
thingiscognition intheformthereof, and not in the form of the non­
existence thereof. Inthis doctrine, inthe caseof cognitionof similarity,
andinthat of knowledge of terms, aninference takes place by the pro­
duction of a judgment respecting the inferential mark, subsequently
thereto. Evidenceor proof, pramam, is of two kinds, perception and
inference; and science is exact experience or correct presentation or
presentationinaccordancewith reality. This will be explained by the
author of theaphorismshimself inthe sequel.
V |j| ;V; K ANADA-SUTRAS VIII, 2-2.______ fej
*'**’ * ~ * ” —— ^ '

B ook E ig h t h .— C h a pter S eco n d .

Cognition of a doubly specialized nature, illustrated.

sraiw vt*ttfrff ufthfafaft uc i hi \ u

^RwAyara, this, trcr: Esat, that. TvayS, by you. Kritam, done.
HTSTJT Bhojaya, feed q?Rr Enatn, him. Iti, such. Buddhi-apeksam,
dependent upon understanding or cognition.
1. ‘ This,’ ‘ That,’ ‘Done by you,’ ‘ Feed him’—such
(cognitions are) dependent upon Understanding.—321.
Upaskara.—Having described tho mode of production of perceptual cognition, both
discriminative and non-disc ri mi native, now the author, with a view to describe the per­
ception of (a donble specialized nature, or) the being specialized in the specialized, gives
a few examples:
Thecognition, ‘this,’arises in respect of an object which is near,
and, ‘that,’inrespect ofanobject whichis distant. ‘Byyou’—suchcog­
nition, colouredwiththecharacteristicof beingan agent, presupposes or
depends upon the cognition that he is independent inthe action. The
cognitionof theact, namely, ‘done,’ depends upon the cognition that it
isthe subject of the operation of the instrument of the action. The
cognition, ‘feed,’ depends uponthecognitionthat heis theagent inthe
act of feeding, andalsotheemployer of the instrument. The cognition,
‘him,’depends uponthecognitionthat heisthe subject of the operation
or relationof thefedandthe feeder. Similar other instances ofcognition,
dependent uponcognition, shouldbe understood.—1.
Dependence of cognition upon cognition, explained.

11 =; 1 1 * 11
Dristesu, in the case of objects seen. HTTrat Bh&vat, from their exist­
ence or appearance. A-dristesu, in the case of objects unseen. spTTWTiT
Abhavat, from their non-existence or non-appearance.
2. (Such cognitions depend upon previous other cog
nitions), inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen,
and do not appear in respect of objects unseen.— 3 2 2 .
Upaskdra.—He says that this (i.e., the dependence of cognition upon cognition in
gome cases) is proved by induction from agreement and difference :
Whenthe contiguous object of the cognition ‘This,’ the object,
though distant yet presented in consciousness, of the cognition*That,’
the object, i.e., the contiguous agent, of the cognition‘Byyou,’theobject,
i.e., the action, of the cognition ‘done,’ the object, i.e., the em ployer
;: J 23 | VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. ^ |L

and the employed, of thecognition 1Feed,’theobject, i.e., theoccupation

of bothof them, of the cognition ‘Him,’—when these objects come into
contact with the senses, thensuchcognitionis produced. Whereas with
leference tounseenobjects these cognitions do not appear. Hence this
(i.e., the dependence of cognition upon cognition) can beinferredfrom
agreement anddifference. Thisis the meaning.—2.
Substance, Attribute and Action are called artha or object.
m i ffir nq i hi ii
sjpf. Artbah, object. $r?T h i, such. Dravya-guna-karmmasu,
in respect of substance, attribute, and action.
3. (The Vaisesikas apply) the term, object, to Sub­
stance, Attribute and Action.—323.
Upaslcam.—Ho now begins another topic :
Of these, i.e., Substance, Attribute and Action, thecharacteristic of
beingsought after or apprehended(bythe senses) or objectified in such
and such ways, hasbeenstated. Hence, ‘(It is) anobject,’—suchis the
terminologyofthe Vaisfesikathinkers withregard to them, inasmuch as
as they are presentedby the term, object. Accordinglyit has beensaid
by Professor Pra'sastadeva, “The characteristic of being denoted by the
term,object, belongs tothethree.”—3 .
IV. ii. 2, re-called.
£o^i| II q I R 1 $ ||
js llij, Dravyesu, under substances. Pancha-dtmakatvam,
penta-substantiality, the characteristic of being a compound of five substances.
Pratisiddham, denied, contravened.
4. In (the topic dealing with the ascertainment of)
Substances, (the theory) that bodies, etc., are a compound
of five elements, has been refuted.—324.
Upaglcara.—Ho introduces another topic :
Under substances thetermindicates thetopic of the determina­
tion ofthepredicable, substance. Bytheaphorism(IV.ii. 2, supra), “ Of
things perceptibleandimperceptible, etc,,”thepenta-substantialityof the
b°dy, etc., that is to say, (the theory) that they are compounds of five
elements, ‘pratisiddham,’has been refuted. As a variety of constituent
causes doesnot belongtothe body, soalsoit does not belongtothesenses
of smell, etc., which are going to be described. It, therefore, becomes
proved that the senses are uniformly percipient of their corresponding
attributes. This istheimport.—4,
■l | j v k a f A da -s&tras v m , 2-6. 2^ S L

The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth.

BhQyastvftt, by reason of preponderance or predominance.

Gandha-vatvat, by reason of possession of smell. Cha, and.
Ppithivi, earth, Gandha-jnane, in (the constitution of) that by
which smell is perceived, i.e., the olfactory sense. Prakpitih, matter,
material cause, essence.
5. By reason of its predominance, and of possession of
Smell, Earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense.
—325.
Upaskdra.—He states tlie proposition for which the topic was begun :
That bywhichsmell is cognised, is ‘gandha-jn&nam,’ that is, the
olfactory sense. Therein‘prithivi,’Earth, aloneis ‘prakritib,’ themate­
rial cause. It maybeasked, whyit isso? Accordinglyhe says ‘ganda-
vatvat,’for it hasbeensaidalreadythat that which possesses smell can­
not beoriginatedbythat whichis voidof smell. Thepossessionofsmell
(bythe olfactory sense) or its odorousness is proved fromthe rule or
well-known uniformity of nature that theexternal senses themselves pos­
sessattributes similar inkindtothose whichare apprehensible by them.
If it be urged, howthen cantherebe suchuniformity that the charac­
teristicof beingtherevealer ofsmell does not belongtotheothermembers
of the bodybut onlytothe olfactory sense-organ, even whenterrene-ness
belongs toall of them without distinction? So he says ‘bhuyastvftt.’
It isthe beingconstitutedor originatedby terrene particles uninfluenc­
edbyother substances, which is called ‘bhuyastvam,’ ‘predominance.’
This, ‘bhuyastvam,’is atechnical, term, and has been so used in the
kindredsystem(i.e., the Nyaya-Sutrani) also.—5.
Similarly the Senses of Taste, Colour and Touch are respectively
constituted by the Elements of Water, Fire and Air.
amm&itoigar u =: i i s. n
flTTrTatha, inlike manner. =grg: Apah, waters. #at: Tejah, fire. ^3 :
Vftyuli, air. Cha, and. Rasa-rQpa-sparsa-avisesat, be­
causeofthenon-differenceoftaste, colour andtouch.
6. In like manner, Water’ Fire and Air (are the
material causes of the sense-organs of Taste, Colour and
Touch), inasmuch as there is no difference in the Taste,
Colour and Touch (which they respectively possess, from
what they respectively apprehend).—326.
B
va - .. p
2#) VA1&ESTKA PHILOSOPHY. vfii
.■
■";'.... ..... ..■
—>*■
—••
Upasltara.—He extends the argument to the other senses:
‘The material causesof the organs of the tongue, the eye, and the
skin’—this is the complement of the aphorism. Water, etc., are then
respectivelythematerial causes of the tongue, etc., inasmuch as the latter
respectively apprehend theobjects withwhichtheyareuniformlyrelated.
Here tooit is ‘bhuyastvam,’‘predominance,’whichgovernstheuniformity
(that thecharacteristics of beingtherevealer of taste, etc., belong respec­
tively to the tongue, etc.) It has been declared that it is theruleor
uniformitythat thetongue, etc., possessparticular attributes of the same
kindas areapprehensible bythem, that is the proof of the possession of
taste, etc., by the tongue, etc. Likewise the organofhearingisonlya
portionor divisionof Ether confined within the hollowof the ear and
favourablyinfluenced byaparticular adristam or destiny.—6.
H§reends thesecondchapter of the eighthbookin the Commentary
ofSafikarauponthe VaisfesikaAphorisms.

:*
if W W ' KANlDA-SUTRAS IX , 1-1.
--------------------------------- -------------- t H j
Book Ninth.—Chapter First.
Perception, e.g., of antecedent non-existence, is produced by other means
than conjunction or combination.

STFTRcXII S. I \ M U
Kriya-guna-vyapadesa-abhav&t, in consequence of the
non-existence of application or predication of action and attribute, trrfi prak,
prior, antecedently, wtPS; A-sat, non-existent.
1. In consequence of the non-application of Action
and Attribute (to it), (an effect is) non-existent prior (to its
production.)—327.
Upaskara.—After the determination of popular or ordinary perception produced
from contact or contiguity in the form of either conjunction or combination, the author
begins the ninth book of which the object is to demonstrate ordinary or popular and super­
ordinary or hyper-popular perception produced from proximity or presentation due to
other causes:
‘Aneffect,’—suchisthecomplement of theaphorism. ‘Pnik,’ i.e.,
prior to the productionof the effect, ‘an effect,’ e.g., awater-pot, cloth,
etc., ‘a-sat,’ (i.e., non-existent), that is to say, the counter-opposite or
contradictory of the contemporaneous non-existence ofits ownproducer.
Herethereason is the impossibility of the application of action and
attribute. If the effect, e.g., a water-pot, etc., werereallyexistent during
that time also, thenit wouldbeaffirmedto possess action and attribute.
As in the case of awater-pot alreadyproducedreferencecanbemadeto
it insuchforms as “The water-pot is at rest,” “The water-pot is in
motion,” “Thewater-pot is seentopossesscolour,” etc., therecanbeno
reference madetoit inlike manner also prior to its production. It is
therefore inferred that the water-pot is, during that time, non-existent.
Onthe other hand, whilestrawsareinthecourse of weaving or threads
in the course of joining, or when clayisplacedonthepotter’swheel,
whilethe activityof thepotter, etc., isyet goingon, thereisa universally
experiencedperceptual cognitionthat therewill beinthat placeamat, or
apieceofcloth, or awater-pot, inasmuchas suchcognitiontakesplaceas
soonas the eyesareopened. Hereproximity or presentation constituted
either by conjunctionor bycombinationcannot bethecause of thecogni­
tion. Henceproximityorpresentation in which the thing in itself is
connected with the sense, is here thenecessaryconditionof perception.
It cannot besaidthat inthis explanationthere is mutual dependence of
cause and effectinasmuchas theproper formofantecedent non-existence
8
|( ft^1| vAi &e s i k a p h i l o s o p h y . i§ L
Thingexistent, there isperceptionof it andtheperceptionbeing existent,
there also existsits proper form; for, the thinginitself whichisnothing
but theproper or essential formof boththesenseandthe object, is capa­
ble of producing perception involving or embracing both, andthat is
reallyexistent evenprior totheperception, asit has beendeclared in the
Nyaya-Vdrttika, “Incom binationas well asinnon-existence, thereexists
therelationofvise$apa that whichserves tospecifyandvise§ya that which
is specified.”
This same antecedent non-existence is productiveof its counter­
opposite(that is, theobject not yet existent). For whena water-pot is
produced, it is not producedjust at that verymoment. Even though the
other (partial) causes existedat the time, the imperfectnessof thecause,
beingpursued, shouldpursue only the imperfectness consisting of the
antecedent non-existence of the water-pot itself. If it beobjectedthat the
(antecedentlynon-existent) water-pot itself wouldthenbe an impediment
to its ownproduction; our replyis that (since, asamatter of fact, it does
not operate assuchan impediment) its causalitybywayofits not operat­
ingas animpediment shouldnot bethrownaway. Nor canit beobjected
that thewater-pot itself constituting the non-existence of its antecedent
non-existence, it wouldfollowthat its antecedent non-existencewill again
appear whenthe water-pot is destroyed; for, thedestruction of the water-
*pot also is repugnant toits antecedent non-existence, sothat therecan be
no appearance of a contradictory also during the existenceofanother
contradictory. For thecontradictionbetweenthemis not merelyspatial,
so that they might be simultaneous like (thegeneraof) bovine-nessand
horse-ness. The contradictionis temporal also, and thereforehowcanthey
be existent at oneandthesame time?—1.
Note.—In this and the few following aphorisms, the author deals with the topic of
non-existence. Now, non-existence is primarily divided into two kinds, samsarga-abh&va
and anyonya-abhfiva. Auyonya-abMva or reciprocal non-existence is characterised as non­
existence of which the counter-opposite (i.e., the object non-existent) is determined by
the relation of identity ; in other words, it is equivalent to absence of identity, that is,
difference. Samsarga-abhavu or relational non-existence is non-existence other than
reciprocal non-existence, and it is sub-divided as antecedent, consequent, and absolute
non-existonces. .
Consequent non-existence also is proved by perception and inference.
h t. i ? i =t n
Sat, existent, srerg; A-sat, non-existent.
2. The existent (becomes) non-existent.—328.
Upashara.—He States that another (form of) non-existence is established by the
force of perception;
{ || / KAlfADA-SU TRAS I X , 1-4. 3$
. - . I'1-1'11.."1. "-1111' l""1"'
As the non-existenceof theeffect, prior totheoperationofthecause,
isprovedbyperception and inference, sois it proved by perception and
inference, after theoperationofaclub, etc., whichdestroysit, that areally
existent effect, e.g., awater-pot, etc., isnownon-existent. And this same
non-existence is commonly described as annihilation or destruction(or
consequent or emergent non-existence.) For there arise such cognitions
as that the water-pot is nowdestroyed, annihilated, that theletter ga
whichwas heardbefore, nolonger exists, etc. This is theimport.—2.
The existent is a different thing from the non-existent, so that
after annihilation there can be no continuation of existences

V tm i II 5. I ? 1 \ w
sran: A-satah, from the non-existent. Kriya-guna-
vyapadesa-abhavat, in ^consequence of the non-existence of reference by, or
predication of, action and attribute. ’srsfrnTC* Artha-antaram, a different object.
3. (The existent is) a different object (from the non­
existent), inasmuch as Action and Attribute cannot be
predicated of the non-existent.— 329.
Upask&ra.—It may be objected: It is the same water-pot that under a particular
condition gives rise to the idea, or conventional use, of annihilation; and not that the
annihilation of the water-pot is different from the w ater-pot: „
Accordinglyhesays:
“Theexistent ’’—such is thecomplement of the aphorism. The
existent isadifferent object fromthe non-existent. If it be asked, How?
So hesays, ‘kriya-gima-vyapade&i-abh&vat.’ For there canbe no such
predication, duringthe period of annihilation also, as “Thewater-pot
remains,” “Thewater-pot existsat thismoment,” “Thewater-potpossesses
colour,” “Bring the water-pot,” etc. Inconsequenceof this difference,
therefore, theexistent isadifferent thingfromthe non-existent.—3.
Reciprocal non-existence or absence of identity, explained.
usarag; ii «. i ia ii
Sat, the existent. Cha, and, also, vqw A-sat, non-existent.
4. The existent also is non-existent.—330.
Upasltara. —Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the present
aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-existence :
Whereareallyexistent water-pot, etc., are spoken of as beingnon­
existent, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For there arise
suchcognitions as “The horseisnon-existent bythe nature of the cow,”
“Thecowis non-existent by the natureof thehorse,”“Apiece ofcloth
 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.

isnon-existent bythenature of awater-pot,” “A pieceof clothisanot-

water-pot,”“Acowis anot-horse,” “Ahorse is a not-cow,” etc. Now,
“Acow possesses reciprocal non-existencewith ahorse,” “Awater-pot
possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth,”— -it is this
reciprocal non-existence, otherwise calledabsenceof identity, that appears
inthe above cognitions. Here identity is that which determines the
counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of identity). Andthis
(reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum or denotation or
extension asits counter-opposite (i.e., identity) ; for there is such cogni­
tionas that thewater-pot isnot the ground (on which it lies). It is
also eternal, for it is impossible that there should be at any time
identity betweena water-pot andapiece ofcloth.—4.
In addition to antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existence,
there is absolute non-existence.
II 5. I \ I V. 11
*1^Yat, that which. Cha, and. ar?ngr Anyat, different. =8rcr?rA-sat,
non-existent. Atab, from these, ie., antecedent, consequent, and reci­
procal, non-existents. Tat, that. sncRTA-sat, non-existent.
5. And that which is a different non-existent from
these, is (absolutely) non-existent.— 331.
UpasUcira.—Now lie describes the fourth (kind of) non-existence called absolute
non-existence.
‘Atah,’ from the three forementioned non-existences, ‘yat anyat
a-sat tat a-sat,’(that which is a different non-existent is non-existent)
i.e., that is absolute non-existence. The w ord ‘a-sat’ (non-existent) is in
boththe placesusedinasubstantivesense. Of these, one‘a-sat,’is the
subject and the other ‘a-sat’is the predicate in apposition withthe
subject. Themeaningof theaphorism, therefore, comes tobe this that
non-existence which is different from the three fore-mentioned non­
existences, is absolute non-existence. Amongst these, antecedent non­
existence is limitedinthefutureor at theend, consequent non-existence
islimited inthe past or at thebeginning, and reciprocal non-existence
has the same substratum or extension as its counter-opposite; but
absolute non-existence differs from all the three. Henceit is thefourth
(kindof) non-existence.—5.
V ivriti .—Thereare three things repugnant to absolute non-exist­
ence, viz., thecounter-opposite or the object non-existent, its antecedent
non-existence, and its consequent non-existence. The ancients teach
that thecognitions that darkcolour doesnot exist in aredwater-pot, and
Xj#■ ' ' . ■ ■v"
•¥S ;| •/ ____ KANADA-SUTRAS IX , 1-6. .[
that redcolour doesnot exist inadark water-pot, are conversant about
consequent andantecedent non-existences, but not absolutenon-existence.
Themoderns, on theother hand, maintain that consequent andantece­
dent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute non-existence, and
hencethat theremaybe absolute non-existenceeven during the timeof
consequent andother non-existences. They holdthat whena water-pot,
etc., previously removed, are brought backtoaplace, therecan be no
cognitionof the absolute non-existenceof the water-pot, solong asthe
water-pot exists, inasmuch as the time duringwhichthe water-pot is
existent does not constituteconnection withnon-existence. Some, again,
teachthat whenthere has formerlystoodin any placea water-pot, and
this hasbeenremovedand brought back again, there arises in thiscase
cognitionof afourth kindof non-existenceunder theaspect ofconnection
(Samsarga-abhava), called tem porary non-existence, andnot of absolute
non-existence.
Causes of the perception of consequent non-existence.

iu n iU
STCff A-sat, non-existent. hi, such. BhQta-pratyaksa-
abhavat, because oT the non-existence of the perception of a past object,
BhOta-stnriteh, because of the recollection of a past object.
Virodhi-pratyaksa-vat, similar to the perception of the contradictory or
opposite.

6. “ (It is) non-existent”—such (perceptual cognition)

is similar to the perception of the counter-opposite (of non­
existence), because (in both cases) there is non-existence of
the perception of that which is past and gone, and there is
recollection of the past.—332.
Upaakdra.—He now begins another section and therein states the canses of the
perception of consequent non-existence:
‘A-sat iti ’: By the word, ‘iti,’ heindicates cognition inthe form
of perception. Thereby (it is obtained that) there is such perceptual
cognitionas “Thewater-pot isnon-existent,” “The water-pot has been
destroyed,” “The water-pot is nowin a state of annihilation.” An
exampleof this cognitionis givenby ‘virodhi-pratyaksavat ’: as thereis
I VA1$ES1KA PHILOSOPHY. (Cl
~ 11 v j *1
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clear perception of the counter-opposite (of non-existence), e.g., a water-

pot, etc., sothere is of its annihilationor consequent non-existence also.
The reasonof this is statedas ‘bhuta-pratyaksa-abhavat,’which means,
because there is non-existence of the perceptionof ‘bhuta,’i.e., awater-
pot, etc., which having been first produced have been subsequently
destroyed. Hereby the non-apprehension of the (once) apprehensible is
stated. There, again, the following argument is confirmatory (of the
perceptual cognition): If there were a water-pot here, it would beseen,
as the placeis seen; but it is not visible; therefore there is none. He
mentions another auxiliarycause: ‘bhuta-smriteh,’which means, because
thereis recollectionofthe counter-opposite, e.g., awater-pot, etc., whichis
past and gone. Herebyrecollectionof thecounter-opposite is stated.—6.
V ivriti. —The four kinds of non-existence beingexplained, theper­
ceptionof consequent non-existence is explained.
‘A-sat iti ’: “The water-pot is non-existent,” “The water-pot is
destroyed,” “The water-pot is annihilated,”—suchperception, ‘virodhi-
pratyak§avat,’ issimilar tothe perceptionof the water-pot whichis the
counter-opposite (of its non-existence), that is tosay, is provedby sense-
experience and produced fromthe ordinary or popularly understood
contact (of sense and object). Between them there is, however, this
differencethat theperceptionof thecounter-oppositeis producedfromthe
conjunctionof theeye, etc. (with their objects), while the perceptionof
consequent non-existence is produced fromthe determination or intrinsic
form(of theobject perceived) beingconjoint with the eye, etc. He men­
tions another point of difference, viz., ‘bhuta-pratyaksa-abhavat. Ihe
meaningis that perception of consequent non-existence is producedfrom
acause in the formof the non-apprehension of the apprehensible conse­
quent on the non-existence of the perception of the past, i.e., the
counter-opposite, e.g., the water-pot, etc., andalsofromthe recollection of
the past water-pot, etc., inother words, fromcognition of the counter-
opposite, whichcognition is here identical with recollection. Thus the
perceptionof consequent non-existence isproducedfromthe non-percep­
tionof its counter-opposite as well as fromthe cognitionof the counter­
opposite, whereas theperceptionof thecounter-oppositeis not soproduced.
There is, therefore, differencebetween themin this respect also. This is
the import. It should beobserved that recollectionassuchis notintended
(inthis aphorism, though the wordhas beenused), but merecognition is
intended. That beingso, the idea is this that as the water-pot, etc., are
provedbyperception, soalsoare their consequent non-existences,
fS‘ - KAKADA-80TBAS IX. 1-7. ' WT
—------------:----- ------------------------- JfU
Causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.
m g sR q w iw u s. i ? i vs u
gtn Taiba, similarly. gprrf A-bhave, in thecase of (antecedent)
existence. Bhava-pratyaksatvat, inconsequenceofthe perceptibi­
non­
lityoftheexistent. ^ Cha, also.
7. Similarly (there is perceptual cognition) of (ante
cedent) non-existence, in consequence also of the perceptibi­
lity of the existent.—333.
Upaskdra.—Extending to antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent
non-existence is an object of perception, he says :
Althoughthis Word, non-existence, is ageneral term, still fromthe
context it signifies antecedent non-existence. As there is perceptual
cognition inthe caseof consequent non-existence, soalso inthe case of
antecedent non-existence. Q.—How? A.—‘Bhava-pratyaksatvat’: ‘praty-
aksatvat,’ inconsequence of the characteristicof being madeanobject of
cognition byperception, ‘bhavasya,’ of straws, etc., while these are in
thecourseofweaving (for amat whichis thenantecedentlynon-existent.)
Or, the meaningis this: ‘pratyaksatvat,’ in consequenceof the ‘fitness’
(for thesenses) or apprehensibility, ‘bhavasya,’of the substratumas well
asof the counter-opposite (i.e., the mat after production); inasmuch as
the apprehensibilityof the substratumas well as the apprehensibilityof
the counter-opposite govern the apprehension of Saijisarga-abhava or
relational non-existence. The word ‘cha,’ also, brings forward the
recollection of the counter-opposite and the argument alreadystated (in
the preceding aphorism, as contributory causes of the perception of
antecedentnon-existence.) (It istobeobservedthat), although antecedent
non-existence has nobeginning, and although consequent non-existence
has no end, yet they areperceptible under particular conditions only.—7.
Vivfiti.— It maybe asked, inasmuchas antecedent non-existence has
nobeginning, howisit that there is no perceptionof it longbefore the
production of the conjunctionof the two halves of a water-pot, etc., the
fore-mentioned causes (ofsuch perception) being possible at that time
also? Hence theauthoradds, ‘bhava-pratyaksatvat.’ ‘Bhava’means the
final collocation of causes, accordingtoits derivationfromtheroot bhti, to
be,bytheaffixghan, intheablativesense thatit springs fromthis. ‘Bhava-
pratyaksatvat ’ means thestate or condition of that whereof perception
takes place by means of ‘bhava.’ The resultant meaningof the term,
therefore, is, because it must be manifestedjby the final collocation of
causes. Thus, the import is, intheinstance inquestion, therecanbeno
K %\ ■: ' n
294 VAISESTKA PHILOSOPHY. ifil
.^7------------------ -------------------------------3uL
perceptionof antecedent non-existence inconsequenceof thenon-existence
of thefinal collocationof causes.
Causes of the perception of reciprocal non-existence.

sqrcqmi n «. i ? i c n
Etena, hereby. ^rqer: A-ghatafc, not-water-pot. 3r»rb A-gaufi, not-
cow. A-dharmafi, not-dharma. ^ Cha, and, also. sEtpEsqrcn Vyakhyatafi,
explained.
8. Hereby also are explained ‘ not-water-pot,’ *no
cow,’ ‘ not-dharma.’—334.
Upaskara.—He shows that reciprocal non-existence is an object of perception :
‘Etena’—bythis termheextends (thecausalityof) the recollection
of thecounter-opposite, apprehensionof thesubstratum, and theargument
statedbefore. Non-apprehension of the apprehensibleis thesamein all
cases. The word, ‘cha,’ also, has the object of bringing forward what
has been statedbefore. ‘A-dharmah’: By saying that the reciprocal
non-existenceof dharma, merit, thoughit issupersensible, is anobject of
perceptionin its substratum, e.g., pleasure, knowledge, etc., he suggests
that inthe apprehensionof reciprocal non-existence, apprehensibility of
tbe counter-opposite is not the governing condition, but that only the
apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing condition. How
<otherwisecould thereciprocal non-existenceof afiend, intheform that
the pillar is not afiend, be apprehended inthe pillar ? For, thenon­
apprehensionof a fiendas beingcoincident or identical withthe pillaris
the cause of the apprehensionof the reciprocal non-existenceof afiend
(inthepillar), and, it is againimpossible, were thepillar identical with a
fiend, that thereshouldbe suchnon-apprehension(of afiendinthepillar),
since such non-apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by,
the existenceof the entity{e.g., afiend) whichis the counter-opposite(of
its non-existence.)
Objection. -Identityw ithafiendis not inthis instance the counter-
.opposite. Is it thenafiend? But it may bethat though it is present
inthepillar, yet, likeits gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its non­
apprehension would not be contradictory to theexistenceof theentity
whichis thecounter-opposite, (viz., afiend.)
Answer.— It isnot so, for, like thenon-apprehensionof the counter­
opposite, thenon-apprehensionof that whichdeterminesthe characteristic
of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of non-
existence.
[f( )\j _____ KAhjADA-SUTRAS IX, 1-9.______
Objection.—Theapprehensionof reciprocal non-existence is depend­
ent upontheapprehensionofcounter-opposite-ness, and counter-opposite-
nessisidentitywiththeabsenceof reciprocal non-existence;and hence it
follows that theapprehensionofreciprocal non-existenceisreallydepend­
ent upontheapprehensionofreciprocal non-existence.
Answer.— This is not thecase; for, ashas beenalreadystated, it is a
property whichis cognised as beingnot present inanygivensubstratum,
that determines the characteristic of beingthecounter-opposite, but the
apprehension of that property also as that which determines counter-
opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (oi the apprehension of
reciprocal non-existence.)—8.
Vivriti. —Thecausesof the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence
are determination(or possessionof attribution, or intrinsic form) in rela­
tionto the senses,—indriya-sambaddha-visesariata,—non-apprehension of
the counter-opposite, and cognitionof thecounter-opposite. The differ­
ence, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counter-opposite is
the conditionof apprehensionof Samsarga-abhava or relational non-exist­
ence, whereas it is theperceptibilityof the substratum that is the condi­
tion of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus, inspite of the
super-sensibility of dharma or merit, there is noimpediment tothe per­
ceptionof its reciprocal non-existence inthe sensible substratumthereof,
e.g., pleasureandthelike. W hereas some have taught that perceptibi­
lity of both the counter-opposite andthesubstratumistheconditionof
apprehension of relational non-existence, this is inaccurate; for, were
this the case, the perception of non-existenceof fragrance inastone, of
non-existenceof bitterness in treacle, of non-existenceof colour in air,
andof non-existenceof touchaswellassoundin ether would be impossi­
ble, inasmuch as their respective substrata are not perceptibleto the
several sensescognisant thereof respectively. It is from this considera­
tion that Pahqadhora Mikra has maintained that the perception of the
destruction(orcessation) of thetouchofair is producedby determination
thereof inits intrinsicformbytimeconjoint withthe skin.
Perception of absolute non-existence, how produced.

U * I * I * u
5EP3rT A-bhtitam, not produ;ed. ^ Na, not. Asti, exists. Iii, tins.
SRefretW. An-artha-antaram, not different objects.
9. That which has not been produced, does not exist
—this is an identical proposition.—335.
4
! VAI St i SI KA PHILOSOPHY. (g ^
Upaskara.—Now in this aphorism he says that absolute non-existence is an object of
perception:
That whichwasproduced, at present does not exist—suchcognition
rests upon annihilation, and is not conversant about, or doesnot bring
out, ' the having been produced; whereas perceptual cognition which'
embraces simplythis that it does not exist, reposes upon absolute non­
existence. ‘A-bhutam,’(that whichhas not been produced), denotes non­
cognizanceof productionanddestruction. The being ‘an-artha-antaram,’
not different objects, means also purporting that only. For example,
Eartli-ness does not exist in Water, and Water-ness does not exist in
Earth. For, were there Eartli-ness in watery wholes, it wouldbe per­
ceived, but it is not perceived, therefore it does not exist;—a reference
to such argument is to beobservedinthis case also. Wemust, inlike
manner, holdthat there isabsolutenon-existence of athing where sucha
thing will never be, norevenhas been, produced. The cognition, on the
otherhand, in theformthat it does not exist, of the non-existence in their
substratum, of that which has been, and that whichwill be, depends
upon consequent non-existence and antecedent non-existence. Hence it
is that this (absolute non-existence) is designated as absolute or illi­
mitableandas of trinal time or eternal.—9.
Vivriti. —‘Na asti iti,’ perception intheformthat somethingdoes
not exist, whichis ‘abhutam,’not conversant about the past, ‘an-artha-
antaram,’ that is, has for its object nothingbut absolutenon-existence,
such as consequent non-existence etc.'*** The word ‘bliuta’ or
past includes thefuture also.
The 'perception, “The water-pot does not {now) exist in the room,” explained.

q Na, not. Asti, exists, qq: Gliatah, water-pot. qg Gehe, in the

-room, fra Id, such, qq: Satah, existent. q??q Ghatasya, of water-pot.
ifg^rraira^r Geha-samsarga-pratisedhah, negation of association with the
room.
10. The water-pot does not exist in the room—suc
is (the form of) the negation of association of the existent
-water-pot with the room.—-336.
Upaskara.—I t may bo objected : The non-existence of the water-pot in the room
is not absolute non-existence, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some
time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-existence or consequent non-existence,
for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-oxistence undergoing
production and destruction, for the expression‘absolute non-existence undergoing pro­
d u ctio n and destruction ’ involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind
n( i k a n A d a - s &t r a s t x , m o . C fil
.
............................ " ■■■■» — 'm i .............. ................. — .I...— - .1
..... ... — i i .!■■ ' '. ...'v . li m i Mi ^

of satpsurga-abMpa or non-exisfcence of association, since in that case the three-fold

division of the non-existence of association would be disproved.
To meet this objection, ho says :
(‘Geha-samsarga-pratisedhah’means) thenegationorprivationof the
association or conjunctionof thewater-pot with theroom. And it would
besimplyabsoutenon-existence, if the water-potdonotexist at any time
whatever, antecedent non-existenceinthecase of thewater-pot whichwill
exist, and consequent non-existence in the case of the water-pot which
hadits existenceinthepast.
Objection.—That beingso, the cognition should have beenin this
formthat connectionofthe water-pot does not exist intheroom.
Answer.— What ismeant by1thecognitionshould have been’? If
it means ‘the cognitionof whichthe objector content is theconnection
of the water-pot, should havebeen,’andsoconveys thesenseof inclusion,
thenwhat isdesiredis obtained. If, onthe other hand, it means ‘(the
cognition) whichrefers toor suggests that (i.e., connection of the water-
pot),’then (wereplythat), it is the reference to the substratum, viz., in
theroom,which leads to, andresults in, the referencetotheconnection,
inasmuchasit is the being the substratumthat appearsin theformof
connectionof theproperty(orconjunctionof the contained.)
Objection.— Does then thewater-pot reallyexist there?
Answer.— What doyoumeanby ‘reallyexist’? Is it combined or
conjunct ? It cannot be the first, sincethereisin theroomnon-existence
of thewater-pot ascombinedwithit. Northelatter, since thereis denial
ofconjunction.
Objection.— It wouldthenfollowthat the water-pot, etc., are always
present, inasmuch as there iseverywhere denial onlyof the oneor the
other of their conjunctionandcombination.
Answer.— This wouldnot follow,since the denial itself of bothof
themis idential withthe denial ofthe water-pot. Are then the water-pot
andits conjunctiononeandthe samething, wherebydenial ofconjunction
of thewater-pot wouldbethe denial ofthewater-pot ? Arethenthewater-
pot and its combinationoneandthesame thing, wherebytheadmission
itself of its combinationwouldbetheadmissionofthewater-pot? For
thereisnot presenceof the water-pot therewhere both of them(conjunc­
tionandcombination) aredenied, wherebythe water-potmight beincons­
tant agreement. Thuswherethereisadmissionoraffirmationofsomething,
thedenial or negationof this is itself thedenial or negationof that.
Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of the
water-pot inthe roomin therelationof beingin combination, and that
I —"Tv \
{[ §9^1 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. _________
it is this (absolute non-existence) that is the object of thecognitionthat
thewater-potdoesnot exist intheroom; as, forexample, (thereis absolute
non-existenceof thewater-pot) inthepotsherd inthe relation of beingin
conjunction.
Objection.— Suchbeingthecase, thewater-pot wouldbe non-existent,
beingthecounter-oppositeoftheconstantlypresent absolute non-existence.
Answer.— It wouldbeso, were it everywhere non-existent by the
relations or characteristics of beingin conjunction andbeingincombi­
nation.—10.
Perception of the Soul, how produced, in the yogins ivho are (called)
united.
II 5. I I
ssncHR Atmani, in the soul. Atma-manasoh, of soul and mind.
Sarnyoga-visesat, from a particular conjunction. Atma-
pratyaksarn, perception of the soul.
11. Perceptual cognition of the Soul (results) from
particular conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul.
—337.
UpasMra.—Having thus ascertained popular perception having for its object exis­
tence and non-existence, he begins a new section in order to ascertain the perception of
the yogins :
“Knowledge isproduced”—suchis thecomplement (of the aphor­
ism.) Now, the yogins or ascetics are divided into two classes: those
whose internal organs havebeensteadiedinsamddhi or deepmeditation,
andthey arecalledunited ; andthosewhoseinternalorgans are no longer
steadied in samddhi, and they are calleddisunited. Thereinthosewho
areunited, havingwitheagerness fixedtheir mind on the object to be
presented to it, are engagedinconstant meditation; andin themcogni­
tionof the soul, of their ownsoulsas well as of the soulsof others, ispro­
duced-. ‘Atma-pratyaksam’ means in themanner of the cognition in
which the soul is the percept or object of presentation to the sense.
Althoughinourselves and others also, cognition of the soul sometimes
existsor appears, yet, as it is obscuredbyavidya or nescience, it has been
declared to be virtually non-existent- ‘Atma-manasohsamyoga-visfesut’
meansfromaparticularcontiguitybetweenthesoul andthemind, namely,
afavourableinfluencebyvirtuebornof yoga or holycommunion.—11.
V ivfiti .—Havingexaminedperceptionproduced throughordinaryor
physical presentation or contiguity, henowexplainsperceptionproduced
throughsuper-ordinaryorkhyper-pbysical presentationor contiguity.
 '% KANADA-SUTRAS IX , 1-12.
...r. I.-:.:: ... !-- i--- ............. .— — -s-»-- --.
‘Atma-manasohsamyoga-virfesat,’fromthe conjunction of the soul
andmind, accompaniedby thepower or virtuebornof yoga, or holycom­
munion; 1Atmani,’therebeingeffort orvolitiontowards the originationof
understanding, (atma meaningvolition) onthe authority of thelexicogra­
phy: “Soul orAtma, Volition, Patienceor Continence, Understanding(are
synonymous),”—that is tosay, whenthere arises thethought produced by
volition towards the origination of understanding; ‘Atma-pratyaksaxp,’
pex'ceptionof one’sownsoul as well as of the souls of others; “takes
place,”this is thecomplement of theaphorism.
Now, super-ordinaryor hypher-physical presentation or contiguity
is three-fold, according to its division as Samanya-lak?and, havingthe
formof the genus, jndna-lak$ar<a, having the form of cognition, and
yogaja-dharma, virtue or pow er born of holy communion. Therein
yogaja-dharma is aparticular m erit or virtueproducedbythe practice of
yoga or holy com munion, and totheexistenceof whichthe Vedas, Pura-
nfts, etc., testify. It is again two-fold according to the two-fold-ness of
the yogins as those who are united or haveattained toholycommunion
andthosewhoare in the process of being united or are in the course of
attaining to holy communion. Amongthemthose arecalled theunited,
whohavesubduedtheir mindor inner sensebythepractice of yoga and
have achieved thesiddhis or‘powers,’or perfections or attainments by
means of Samadhi or meditation. It is they that are also called the
specially united, on account of their possessingconspicuousor advanced
yoga. Those w ho are in the process of being united are they whose
minds are turned awayfromobjects of thesensesandwhoareimmediate
beholders of all objects through the accompaniment of contemplation.
Thepresent aphorismhasbeenlaiddownwithreferencetosuchyogins only.
Note.—It would seem that the word viyukta has been differently used by Sankara
Misra and Jayan&rfiya■>«; by the former in the sense of the disunited, and by the latter
as denoting those who are specially united [through the possession of highly advanced
yoga. Tide IX. i. 13 infra, Upaskara. Sankara Misra obviously does not recognise the
distinction, made by Jayavdrdyana, of the united and those in the process of being united.
According to him, yogins are of two classes, namely, the united and the ultra-united or
dis-united.
unitedyogins, how possible.
Omniscience of the
rrar sfsqreug s tw n ii e. i ? i \ * u
flqr Tatha, similarly, Dravya-antaresu, in the case of other
substances. JTSignPratyaksam,perceptual.
12. Perceptual (cognition is) similarly (produced) in
the case of the other substances.—338,
/ i v l (A
(?lM m i ------------------------------- — --------------—
VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Upaskdm.—Do thou the united have cognition in respect of the soul only? How
therefore can they possess omiscience ? In reply to these possible queries, he says :
“Cognitionisproduced”—this is impliedbythecontext. ‘TathtL’
meansbythe mindonly as favourably influenced by, or accompanied
with, the virtue or power, bornof yoga or holycommunion. ‘Dravya-
antaresu’means inrespect of thefour kinds of ultimate atoms, the mind,
air, space, timeandether. Bytheterm, substance, are includedattribute,
actionandgenus inhering in substance, the predicable, species; com­
bination; also gravity, elasticity, etc., appertaining toperception; and
also volition, the source of vitality (or spontaneity), non-discriminative
thought, dharma, adharma, etc., residinginthesoul. For the favourable
influence of the virtueor power bornof yoga isequivalent toaperceptive
apparatus; otherwiseomnisciencewouldnot beaffirmed(of those whoare
united.)— 12.
Omniscience belongs also to those yogins who are (called) dis-united.
wuTfturenTTTTT u s. i ? m it
Asamahita-antahkaianSh> whose internal organs are not
attached to meditation. S'ruirfH'TRJi: Upsamhrita-samadhayah, who have
given up meditation, qqf Tes^m, their, "sr Cha, also.
13. They whose internal sense-organs are not attached
to meditation, are those by whom meditation has been
given up. They too (have perception of hidden and distant
objects.)—339.
Upaskdm.—Having described the perceptual cogni tion of the united, he now describes
that of the disunited.
‘Upasamhrita-samsklhayah’ is simplyanexplicationof ‘asamahita-
antahkaranah.’ Or, to the question, why they are called 1asmahita-
antahkaranah’? the reply is given by ‘upasamhrita-samadhayah, ’
meaning, becausetheyare thosebywhom‘Samadhi ’ofwhichtheessence
is constant meditation, ‘upasamhrita, ’has beenthrownaway. For they,
beingable totranscend the senses through the influence of Samddhi)
absorptionor intentnessof mindononeobject only, and, acquiringSarira-
Siddhi, pow ers over, or perfection of, the physical organism, e.g., the
power ofattenuation, etc., andIndriya-Siddhi, powersover, or perfections
of, the senses, e.g., thepower of hearingat adistance, i.e., clair-audience,
etc., andthenfeelingthe insufficiencyofSamadhi itself, realise theneedof
other practices as referredtointhefollowingandother textsof theVeda:
ferr srRSr Theie is need for it solongas
J amnot freedandfulfilled. Learning, therefore,that everyformof bhoga
 "-v.

8
>)}j KAtalDA-SUTRAS IX , 1-14. WI

or experience, whether agreeable or disagreeable, shouldbe undergone,

and that theyundoubtedlystandonfirmground so long as they go on
experiencing Karnia-dsaya, vehicles of karma, i.e., physical organisms,
previously merited or acquired, in different countries, divisionsof the
land, peninsulas, etc., by different births as horses, elephants, birds,
serpents, etc., as well as by existenceascelestials, sages, or men, they
make thewhole universe of things, hiddenand distant, the objects of
their perception, the powers of their senses having been enlargedor
heightenedbythe forcecf thevirtueor power bornof Yoga,—13.
Vivriti .—After describing the perception of the yogin whois in
courseofunion, he describes that of the yogin whohas attained union.
‘Asamahita-antahkaranah,’ those whoseinternal sense is destitute
of Samddhi or meditation; ‘upasamhrita-samadhayah,’ those bywhom
samddhi or deep m editationhas been consummated, that is, carried to
fruition, in whomare produced thevarious siddhis, perfections orattain­
ments whichare thefruit ofsamddhi or deep meditation;—such united
yogins attain perceptionof souls and other substances. Suchis the sense
tobe gatheredfromtheaphorism. In fine, inthe perceptionof the yogin
whois in course of union, there isneed for dhyana, thought or contem­
plation, while in theperceptionof the yogin who is united, there is no
needofsamddhi or meditationinvolvingthought or contemplation.
Note.—According to the vivriti, the word ‘ asam&hita-antahkaranah ’ would seem
not to have syntactical connection in the aphorism. The classification of yogius, made
by Jayundrayaiict, is, therefore, so far unsatisfactory.
The Yogins’ perception of Substance, Attribute and Action,
popularly explained.

II s. I \ I II
rraqHdmTUTat-saniavfiyfit, fromcombination with that, i.e., substance,
karmma-gunesu, inrespect ofactionsandattributes
14. (Perception) of Actions and Attributes (arise
from (their) combination with Substance.—340.
VpatM ra.—It may be objected : In them (i.e., substances, etc.) cognition (of the
Yogins) is not mental, inasmuch as the mind is not self-dependent outside its sphere.
Nor is it a product of the external senses ; for, they apprehend objects present as being
connected with them, depend upon the development of colour, etc., as the case may be, to
the degree of perceptibility, and particularly depend also upon light, etc.
In anticipation of this objection, he proves ‘proximity ’ (i.e., the medium of cognition)
in the case of certain predicables, and says :
“Perceptual cognition Is produced’’—this is the complement (of
theaphorism.) If the elemental senses, is dependent upon: some pre-
IhH|§302l .
VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. Ol i
Q r

sentationor contiguity(of objects tothemfor the apprehension of those

objects bythem), thenfromthecombinationinthat whichis in conjunc­
tion withthe mind of theperceiver, of attributes andgeneracombinedor
inheringintheultimate atoms, ether, space and time, and from com­
bination inother substances, of that which is conjoint with sterile minds
through the various conjunction of sterile minds, favourablydirected
towards the experienceof mortal coils, cognition is produced in respect
of those substances, attributes, etc. This isdeclaredhere, regardbeing
hadto, orinviewof, easy demonstration. In fact, in the case of the
external senses as well as of the mind, it isthe virtueorpower bornof
yoga that constitutes the ‘proxim ity’ or presentation to the senses,
inasmuch as all uncertainty or impossibility of proof isset at rest byit
alone. The drinking up of the ocean by Agastya (the sage), and the
conversion of the kingdom of Dapdaka into a forest are examples in
point.—14.
V ivriti .—It maybe urged that omniscienceis not possibleor proved
in the Yogin, for though there beperceptionof substances, there isno
suchcognition ofattributes, etc. Accordinglyhe says:
The meaning is that fromcombinationof ‘that, ’ i.e,, conjunction
of mindfacilitatedbythe power or virtue born of Yoga or holy com­
munion, there is produced inthe Yogin, whether unitedor in courseof
union, perceptionofattributes and actions.
* * * The term ‘of actions and attributes ’ is indicative, and
genus, etc., also are to be understood. In a like manner, should be
understood perception produced fromsuper-ordinary or hyper-physical
presentationor contiguity intheformof Samclnyadaksana or general im­
plication, andjndna-lak^am or implicationof cognition.
The Yogins perceive the attributes of their own souls in the popular way.
wuuuwmRTtugws i m 11 u
w au+HMrg Atma-Samavayat, from combination in the soul.
Atma Gunesu, in respect of the attributes of the soul.
15. (Perceptual cognition) of the attributes of the
Soul (results) from (their) combination in the Soul.—341.
Vpaskara.—ls it then, it may be asked, combination with that which is conjoint
with some other substance, that constitutes the presentation or *proximity ’ to the mind1
even in the case of one’s own understanding, etc. ? He replies, No :
“ Perceptual cognition of the yogins is produced ’’—this is the topic.
Perceptual cognition of understanding, etc., combined in the soul are,
on the other hand, produced simply from combination in the conjoint,
I m (S t
V'VLsSH9 K A N A D A S tiT B A 8 IX , 1-15. ^ JL
— .— ------- : -____________________ __________________________

thesoul which is conjoint with the mind!, as it is with ourselves

and others. .Lhemeaning, therefore, is that in such cognition there is
nodependence upon anyother formof contiguity or presentation. Now,
ordinary or popular perception is cognition, which is never changing,
produced fromthe contact of thesensesand objects. It may besaid tobe
produced by objects. The sensuous or immediate cognition of non-
yogins is perception. A nd this is common toordinary or popular and to
super-ordinaryor hyper-popular cognitions.—15.
Hereends the first chapter in the ninth book of the Commentary
ofSafikaraonthe Vailedka Aphorisms.

5 '
if( ||^# VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. i^J
B ook N in t h .— C h apter S eco n d .

Marks of inference enumerated.

surcur ftfiRr unwrfir

ii «. i * i ii
%
3HE*T Asya, of this. Idam, it. g;rd} Kdryyam, effect. Karanam,
cause, *pqtfn Samyogi, conjunct, fw fa Virodlii, contradictory. Sania-
vayi, combined. Cha, or. I ti, such, Lamgikam, produced by the
mark of inference, mediate.
1. “ It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, con­
tradictory to, or combined in, this,”—such is (cognition)
produced by the mark of inference.—342.
Upasltam.—Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of yogitis and non-yogins
has been determined according to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the
two kinds into which pramdw or proof has been divided, viz., perceptual or sensuous and
inferential or produced by marks, he now commences to determine that which is produced
by means of marks :
‘Cognition’—this is the topicinhand. ‘Laihgikam’ means pro­
ducedfromlifigayi or mark. Lihgatn is apropertyof the pakm, possess­
ingvydpti, pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term.
Therein vydpti has been already declared. (Vide III. i. 14, supra.)
Onethingispak§a in relation to another, when there is in the former
non-existence of proof or evidencerepugnant tothe desirefor provingthe
latter. Suchevidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative
as well as obstructive, for apak$a or minor term is that which contains
non-existenceof bothof them. For, there existing either demonstrative
or obstructive evidence, no onefeels doubt or desireof demonstration.
It isfor this reason that the ancients defined the paksa to beanobject
wherein the existence of thesadhya, that which has to be established,
the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existenceof the
sadhya, is desired to be dem onstrated. According to Jivanatha Misra,
apakqa is that inwhichthere is non-existence determined by the being
evidence preventiveof the appearanceof doubt terminablebythe ascer­
tainment of the possessionof producible sadhya. Some others say that
that is apa/tja.in whichthere is non-existenceof demonstrative evidence
accompaniedwith absenceof desireof proof. In this view, the nature
of the pak$a will exist eveninthe case of obstruction (i.e., evenwhere
obstructive evidence, in other words, evidence which disproves the
* : \
' '
f(] p B | kanadas &tras tx , i i -i .
AX. '.H.i / / ' '.......----■;- ■
\%>'—’'J y ■' > .... "'
s|
existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be
seeninthe Anumana-Mayukha.
It thenbecomesapparent that the propertyor characteristic of this
paksa is the lihga or m ark of inference. And the cognition, intheform
of a presentative state ofconsciousness, which the mark, whether it bea
visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is 1laihgikam’ or that
whichis producedfromamark. Accordinglyit has beensaid,
sr$rg^=r i
rT^7T%g iTPErN li
That markis themediumof inference, whichisconnected with that
which is to be inferred, is knowntoexist inthat whichisaccompanied
with that which is tobe inferred, and doesnot exist at all wherethat does
not exist.
It is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential cog­
nition, and not its pavdmarsa, subsumption, inasmuchassubsumption,
being destitute of function, lacks causality, whereas it is the samethat
is the functionof the mark.
Objection.— Howcan there beillationor inferential cognition, where
thesmoke, etc. (i.e., marks) are either past or future?
Answer.— This is not avalidobjection, as inthiscasethesadhya or
that which is tobeproved, isalsoinferred aspast or future.
Objection.— How can there be illation where, in consequence of*
an impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether thesmoke, etc.,
bepast, futureor present?
Answer.— There can be by no means, since in suchaninstance
thereis uncertaintyalsoas tothesadhya, that whichis tobeproved.
Objection.— Howcan an illation take placewhere there iscertainty
as to the existence (of the mark) onaprevious andafollowingday, and
uncertaintyastothe intermediateday?
Answer.—In such a case, the inferential cognition results fromthe
inference of fire, etc., limited tothose days, bymeans of smoke, etc., limit­
edtothosedays, such having been ascertained to be the causuality of
vyapti, pervasion or the universal concom itanceof the major and minor
terms, (intheprocessof inference.!
Objection.— How does inferential cognition arise from a cloudof
dust mistakenfor smoke?
Answer.— It isbecause that whichisunderstoodto bepervaded (i.e.
the cloud of dust, supposedtobesmoke, and thereforepervaded byfire),
isthe markvof inference), and becausethe inference iscorrect or incorrect
!-I WP----------------
(if ! TMZ&5.S TO (OT
i ------------------------- \SI ^
PHILOSOPHY.

according to thecorrectness or incorrectness ofsuchunderstanding; else

howshould your own paramarsa or subsumption be the instrument (of
inferential cognition) insuchacase?
Objection.— In the caseof asupersensible mark, paramarsa or sub­
sumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have the
function(ofbeingthemeansof inference)?
Answer.— Such function is effected by there being apractical or
saving argument demonstrative of its existence(or of its relationtothe
major and minor terms); for, otherwise, the functionof combinationin
thecaseof hearing, etc., wouldnot bepossible.
Inference results fromamark which isaneffect, as theinferenceof
fire, etc., fromsmoke, light, etc. ; alsofrom(amarkwhich is) a cause, as
the inferenceof soundbyadeaf man fromaparticular conjunctionof the
drum and the drumstick, or the inference of dharma or merit, heaven,
etc., byapious manfromthedueperformance of sacrifice, ablution, etc.,
or the inference of rain from the due performanceofkariri orSacrifice
for rain, or the inference of the efflux of water froma channel which
menarediggingout fromariver, etc., full of water, or theinferenceof the
rising of a streamfromthe observationof rainoverhead. This is, then,
a single connection, characterised as the relation of effect andcause,
whichhas beenstated in two ways. Inference froma conjunct object is
3ueh as the inferenceof the sense-organof the skin fromthe observation
of the physical organismwhich is inconjunctionwith it. Inference from
acontradictory or repugnant object is suchasthe inferenceof anichneu­
mon concealed by bushes, etc., fromtheobservationofanexcitedsnake
which is its natural antagonist. Inference froma combined object is
such as the inference of fire connected with water by means of the
warmthof the water.—1.
Viviriti —® s ®Cognition by means of marks isof three kinds,
according as it contains a cause, or aneffect, or a co-existent thingas
the mark, and is called purra-vat. sesa-vat, or sdmdnyato-dristam. Pdr-
va-vat m eans that which contains as the markthe antecedent, that is, the
cause. Sesa-vat means that which contains as themarkthe consequent,
that is, the effect. Samanyato-dristam. means that which contains as
the marksomethingother than acauseor aneffect. Theauthor explains
theseformsofinference, whichhavebeenalsoexplainedintheaphorismsof
Qautama (i.e., the N yd ya-Siitra m;. ‘A syaidamkaryyarn’: ‘Asya,’of this,
i.e., of the sddhya or that w hich is tobeproved, ‘idam,’ this, thesddhana
or that w hichwill prove thesddhya, is ‘karyyam i.e., theeffect—where
suchusagearises, there it is thecaseof inference bymeansofaneffect as
||j|^_____ K A N AD A S&TRAS I X 2-2. foj
the inferential mark, e.g., the inference of fireand the like, bythemarkof
the smokeand the like ‘Asyaiciamkaranam’: that is, inferenceof which
the mark is a cause is as, e.g., the inference of a shower bymeans of a
particular ascent of clouds. Sdm&nyato-dvistam or that whichappears
in the formof that of whichthe inferential markis somethingother than
acauseor an elfect, is manifold; as, for example, the inferenceof the iron
ringas being inconjunction with themortar and the like, by means of
the markof aparticular pestle which is conjoint with the iron ring(at its
end) ; so also is the inference of anichneumonconcealed behind bushes
and the like, bythe sightof aparticular excitedsnake whichis the enemy
of the ichneumon; andalsothe inference of fire and the like (asexisting)
inafrying panand the like, bymeans of the hot touchcombining infire,
inthe formof thecounter-opposite of combinationfavourable to fire.
Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related.

wfht vrefa u &l a i =ui

Asya, its, to it Idam, it. Karyya-karana-sam-
bandhcih, (The suggestion or introduction of) the relation of effect and cause.
^ Cha, and, whereas. Avayavat, from a member of the argument or
syllogism. *rqrtr Bhavati, arises. •
2. ‘ It is its ’ (—-this cognition is sufficient to cause an
illation to be m ade); whereas (the introduction of) the
relation of effect and cause arises from a (particular) member
(of the argument).—343.
Upaskara—It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since
it does not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the moon,
of the rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation Argo navis) from
the tranquillity or clearness of the waters, of the rising of the moon from the expansion
of the Nymphsea, of the setting of the fourteen lunar mansions or nabfatras from the
rising of the other fourteen, of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular
colour.
In anticipationof this objection, he says:
‘It is its’—this much only becomes the instrument of illation.
‘Asya,’i.e., of the means of illation, e.g., smoke, etc., ‘idam,’ i.e., (it is)
that which is to be established, e.g., fire, etc. ; or, ‘asya,’i.e., of the
pervader, e.g., fire, etc.,‘idam,’i.e., (it is) that which can be pervaded,
e.g., smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being that
which can be pervaded, that governs (the processof illation), and not
also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might beobjected that
the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorismis
 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
____________i_;________ ________ P I\£JT j

consequently futile, he adds ‘the relationof effect and cause.’ Other

relations [i.e., of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined),
mentioned above, arealsohereby implied. In the word‘relation, there
is the tropical suggestionofthat inwhichrelationis the thing contained.
‘Relation’accordinglymeans theintroductionortalkofrelation. Whence
does the introductionor talkof relation arise? Hegives the reply by
saying ‘avayavat,’i.e., fromapart or member (of the argument), that isto
say, only fromthe udaharana or example or illustration. Ihe fifth case­
ending or the ablative inflection (in‘avayavat’) bears the senseof the
infinite. The meaning, therefore, is that, inthis Darsano. or philosophy
as well as intheS&mkhya and other Darsanas, the introductionof the
relationof effect and cause, etc., has been made inconformity with, or
regard beinghadto, theudaharam or illustration.
Thus, then, vyiipyatva, thebeingthat whichcanbepervaded (asthe
mark, bythat of whichit isthe mark) denotes the possessionof anatural
connection, the natural beingthat whichis not accidental or adventitious.
This qualityofbeingnon-accidental isknownsimply fromits beingascer­
tained that someperceptibleobjects donot pervade (or are not invariably
concomitant with) that whichis tobe.proved(or that which is denoted by
• themajor term), and fromthecertaintythat others pervade the instrument
of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects established by
proof, some are pervasiveof both (that whichistobe proved, and the
instrument of inference), ornon-pervasiveof both, or pervasiveonlyof the
instrument of inference,ornon-pervasiveonlyof that whichistobeproved.
Amongst these, thequalityof being non-accidental is tobeascertained, in
the first case, fromtheir being pervasiveofthe instrument of inference;
inthe second case, fromtheir being non-pervasive of that whichis tobe
proved; andinthe fourth case also, from their beingpervasiveof the
instrument of inference. Inthe thirdcasealso, there beingroomfor the
further inquiry that whileit is not possible or proved why that which
pervades, shouldpervadeonlythis much(i.e., the instrument of inference)
and not more, howit is at the sametime possiblefor that which does not
pervade, topervade evensomuch (i.e., the instrument of inference), and
thus acquisitionandpreservation(orlossandgain) beingcounter-balanced,
and fromother considerations, the qualityof being non-accidental should
beadhered to. Theattitude of mind that the demonof apprehensionthat
some upadhi, accident, adjunct, or external condition, may exist in these
cases, attacks all rulesofconduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, shouldbe
rejected, inasm uch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental
(ifWjl! K A ^ A D A SO'TRAS IX, 2-2. M9T
— ;------ — --------- ;---------------- - ^ S L i ■
nature. Thedefinitionsofupadhi andvyapti (pervasion) havebeenalready
stated.
This inference is of two kinds, self-satisfyingor logical, and other-
satisfyingor rhetorical. Therein inference for the sakeof, or originating
from,oneself, arises fromthe investigationbyaperson himself of vyapti,
pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle terms, and
paksadhavmatd, thebeinga property or characteristic of them inor termor
theexistence of themiddle inthe minor term; and inferencefor thesake
of, or originatingfrom, another, results fromthe knowledgeof vyapti and
pak$adharmata producedfroman argum ent{vydya, enunciated byanother.
Anyaya argument or syllogismis aproposition productiveof verbal
cognition which leads tothe recognitionor sub-sumptionof themarkof
illationin the third member of thesyllogism. The members thereof are
five; andmembershiphere denotes the being, a proposition productive of
verbalcognition, whichagainisproductiveof anotherverbal cognitionlead­
ingto the recognitionorsub-sumption of theinferential mark inthethird
member. Such propositions are: pratijna, enunciation; hetu, mark or
reason; udaharana, illustration; upanaya, application, ratiocination, or
deduction; andnigamana, conclusion Of these thepratijna, enunciation,
isaproposition whichisamemberofthe argument or syllogism,conveying
verbal cognition theobject whereof is neither less nor greater than that
of the inferential cognition desired; the hetu, mark or reason, is that
member of the syllogism, ending with the ablative inflection, which is
applied to the instrument of inferenceor the middle term under consi­
deration; the uddharana, illustration, is that member of the syllogism
which is declaratory or demonstrative of the inseparable existenceofthe
given major and middle terms; the upavaya, application or deduction,
isthat member of the syllogism which establishes that the hetu which
is so distinguished bythe possession of inseparable existence, is adistin­
guishing characteristic or content of the pah$a, the subject of the conclu­
sion, i.e., the minor term; and the nigamana, conclusion, is that member
of the syllogism which declares that the object denotedby the given
major term is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the pakqa.
Thus the syllogismproceeds as follows:—
Soundis non-eternal,—pratijna,
Becauseit is aneffect,—hetu,
Whatever is aneffect or producibleis non-eternal,—uddharana,
It (sound) possesseseffectness or producibilitypervadedbynon-
eternality,—upanaya,
Therefore, (it is) non-eternal,—nigamana.
 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. V§J| J
— —-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The significant appellations givenbythe Vaisedkas tothese very

members arepratijfia (enunciationof that whichis tobeproved), apadesa
(reason), nidarsana (instance), anusandhdna (investigation), and pratydm-
naya (conclusion). In this connection, the m odeof theapplicationofvada,
theoryor discourse, jalpa, disputationor demolitionof theargumentof the
opponent andestablishment ofone’s owntheory, and vitai.ula, controversion
or only destructive criticism, and the characteristics of chhala, mis­
construction, jdti, futile or adverse reply, and nigraha-sthana, groundof
defeat, i.e., misapplication or non-applicationof the argument advanced,
maybesought inthe Vadi-vinoda.—2.
Inferential Cognition includes Verbal Cognition.

xrrs# 5!ire«iTctn u s. i =s i 3u
Etena, hereby, sirs? fUbdatp verbal. S3fn3^r?rw Vyakhy&taui ex­
plained.
3. Hereby verbal (cognition is) explained.—344.
Upagkcira.—With the purpose of including other forms of proof into the inferential, he
commences another topic.
This cognitionis ‘Sabdam’(verbal), producedbytheinstrumentality
of sound or word—this doctrine, maintained by the Nyaya school, is
also, ‘vydkhyatam,' explained, ‘etena’ (bythis), by the characteristicof
beinginferential, that is tosay, simply as being produced frommarks
(ofinference.) As inferential cognition depends uponvyapti, pervasion,
pak$adharmata, the existenceof the m iddle in the minor term, andre­
collection, so does verbal cognition also. Thus, e.g., “These objects
denotedbywords, or meaningsof words, are mutually connected, since
theyarerepresentedinmemorybywordspossessingexpectancyfor, or de­
pendence upon, oneanother, etc., as are themeanings of words in *Drive
awaythecow,’ Here it is by observingor apprehending the character­
isticof being represented in, or calledto, memorybyanumber of words
possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one another, which
characteristic is pervaded by the possession of mutual connectionby
these meaningsof, or objects denoted by, those words, that one infers
thepossessionof connection. What then is the use of the supposition
of soundor wordor language asa'formof proof?
Objection.— There can be no inference in cognition producedby
words, inasmuchas such inference fails where the words are spoken
byanuntrustworthyperson, e.g., that there are five fruits on the river
bank.
 KANADA St/TR A S IX , 2-3.
- - - - - - -— -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - % L
Answer .—The objection does not arise, as the words must have
the qualification of coming from the mouth of an apta or trustworthy
person. For trustworthiness denotesthe possession of knowledge of the
meaningof the statement corresponding to objective reality within the
reach of the meaning of the given statement, and not merely that a
personis not adeceiver.
Objection.— But this is hard to apprehend, prior to theintuition
of the meaningof the statement.
Answer.— Not so, foreven those whoholdthe theoryof the autho­
ritativeness ofword or language, admit the apprehensibilityof the quality
of beingspokenby a trustworthy person, which serves todifferentiate
fallible or falselanguage.
Objection — They depend upon tint (i.e., the quality of being
spoken bya trustworthy person) for the apprehension of authoritative­
ness, whereas verbal cognition is produced even without the apprehen­
sionof that quality. But in your case the apprehension must be in
accordancewith the nature of the inferential mark; and that whichis
pervaded {i.e., the middle term), is qualified with the possessionof the
qualityof beingspokenbyatrustworthyperson.
Answer.—The objection is not successful, since it is possible to
have suchgeneral apprehensionas “It is here infallible.”
Objection.— But the term‘here’ ultimately means the same thing
as the term‘theconnection under consideration.’ Sothat to apprehend
that (i.e., the qualityof being spoken by a trustworthy person), previ­
ously, is simplyimpossible.
Answer.— It isnot, in consequenceofthepossibilityof ascertainment
of the inferential mark by means of the possibility of ascertainment
inageneral wayof the quality of being spoken byatrustworthy person,
fromthe force ofassociation with the topic and other circumstances. If
eventhen discrepancy sometimes appears between them, the inferential
process proceeds as bythepropertyofsmoke .mistaken) invapour, etc.
Objection.— What isinthis casethesadhya or the majorterm? Is it
that the meanings of words are in fact connected, or that their connec­
tionis somethingpossible? It cannot be the first, as it is not the case
with thestatement of anuntrustworthyperson. Nor can it be thesecond,
for, even thoughmere connectibilitv or coherence of words be proved,
still inferencecannot proceed unshaken, inconsequenceof the uncertainty
of actual connection. Moreover, coherence beingpreviouslyknownas the
qualificationof the inferential mark, what is the use of inference?
6
(!( J|4*/ V Al&ESlKA PHILOSOPHY. v£jJ
' ■ ’. ■'"'"*....*■'"."r‘V
'........ m
-, JS<r ■
A??sw;er. >8not a valid objection, inasmuch as it is thegene-
ial propositionor uniformity which is the sddhya or the thing tobe
pioved, and, as has beenalreadystated, there canbenoexception toit in
consequence of the qualification by the characteristic of beingspoken
' byatrustworthyperson.
Objection. Expectancy or interdependence of the w ords of asen­
tenceis equivalent toantecedent non-existencein the hearer of the cogni­
tionof connection (ofthemeanings ofwords) produciblebyit. It isonly
solongasit existsas such that it can be the inferential mark. The
futilityof inference (in verbal cognition), therefore, follows fromthis
that in order tothecognitionof expectancy, thecognitionof connection
must takeplace beforehand, andnot at anyother time.
Answer. Ibis is not the case, for w edo not saythat expectancy
is merelyantecedent non-existenceof thecognitionof connection. Onthe
other hand, expectancyis distinguished withthe possessionof inseparable
existenceor universal agreement of what ispresentedtoconsciousness by
the wordsheardandwhat isrepresentedinmemory, as it is fromthecog­
nitionof this adjective element that thecognitionof expectancyresults. i
Objection. Let then inseparable existence itself constitute ex­
pectancy.
Answer.— Bynomeans. For, “The water of the river is pure, ”
“Thebuffalograzes inthe basinof the river in these cases also it
wouldentail the consciousness of the agreement or co-existence of the
river andthebasin by meansoftheirinseparableexistence. Andinsuch
instances as “Thewater-lily isblue, ”eveninthe absenceof inseparable
existence of the water-lilyandblueness, it would make the inseparable
existence of the substance and attribute presentedtoconsciousness by the
words, possible.
Or, it maybe that expectancyis nothing but the desire to know
or enquiry with reference tothe object recalled by words, or that it is
thecomplement of theconnotation. Still thecognition ofit is necessary,
inasmuchasinacausewhich isbeingknown, there must appear diver­
genceincharacteristicfromwhat is not a cause, appropriate to such
cognition, as is thecase with pervasionor universal concomitance. It is
for the verysamereason, whether connectibilityor coherenceof the words
of asentence niean theabsence of certainty ofnon-agreement, or the non­
existenceof contradictoryevidence, or the observationofagreement with
similar other words, or that inthe connectionof the meaning of the one
wordie.g., fire) withthat ofanother [e.g,, wets', there exists, as something
(*(§)*) K A M I ) A sdT RAS IX, 2-3.

contained therein, certain knowledge that the one (e.g., fire) is not
thecounter-opposite of absolute non-existenceinherent in the other (e.g.,
wets), that cognitionofcoherenceis necessary. Cognition of adjacencyof
the words of asentence, inthe formof recollection without interval, is
alsoiacondition. It maybe that differences or peculiarities of connection
of words result onlyfromthe peculiarities or differences of the words
whichare goingtobe connected; and the proof of the peculiarity or
differenceinthis way, is not undesired. Or, the desired peculiaritymay
beprovedbythecharacteristicof its sodetermining cognition, inasmuch
as the inferencetakes placethat these words, being acollection of words
possessingexpectancy, co-herence, andadjacency, areprecededby, orhave
for their antecedent, cognitionof the connectionof the ideas or meanings
representedinmemory, as is thecasewiththegroupof the words Drive
awaythecow.” The oppositionthat, the sadhya or thingtobe proved
isthat thesewords haveconnectionwith the meanings recalled, and that
that possessionbywords ofconnectionwiththe meanings of thosewords,
is impeded, isbetter left unnoticed. Nor is it the beingexpressiveof, or
the meansofmakingknown, connection, by beingthe inferential mark,
that is the possessionofconnection by the words, since the mark not
beingprovedtoexist prior totheinference, therecanbe no apprehension
or cognitionof the pervasionthereof.
Somesaythat expressivemovementor gestureis anewformof proof.
Tothis it isreplied: Gesture isof two kinds, conventional and non-con-
ventional. Therein that, whichis conventional, calls back to mind the
soundor wordlyingin'the understandingor intent or common consent,
but does not also produce certain cognition of connection (between
gesture anditssignificance), as letters do. It, issound or wold, risingup
inmemory, that is the means of proof here, and it lias been already
declared that thecharacteristicof being a mark of illation belongs to
soundor word. Nor isrecollectionof the wordacollateral or secondary
functionofgesture, inasmuchas, inordertoexercisesuchfunction, gesture
wouldhavetobe uniformly present in all cases, whereas there takes
place intuition of meanings fromwords even without the interventionof
gesture.
Objection.— Thisbeing so, how does the conduct of adeafperson
come to depend'upon, or spring from , gesture? For, it is impossiblefor
himtohave knowledgeof theconvention inagiven instance.
Answer.— The objection cannot prevail, for it is tobeconsidered
how he derives certain knowledge of the meaningor idea even, from
 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. _ _ S Ij
gesture, whenit is impossible for him to grasp the sense or connection
of the meaningor ideaalso. His conduct, again, springs fromtheappre­
hensionoi inseparable existence (or serviceable associated habit\ inthe
same wayas particular adaptations of conduct are possible inthe caseof
the elephant and thehorse inaccordance with thepricks of thorns and
strokes of sticks.
Onthe other hand, non-conventional gesture,—that kindof it which,
furthei, is in agreement or associationwithaction,—causesactivity in the
employeebyremindinghimof the intentionof the employer, but doesnot
produce sure cognition in any case. For example, asaccordingtothe
instruction“Youshould come, on the blowing of the conch-shell, ”the
manturns uponhearingthe blowingof the conch-shell, so amanstrikes
another at the proper time according to the pre-ordination “You should
strike him when I shall raise my forefinger, ”but this does not prove
anything. Non-conventional gesture, again, which isin agreement with
cognition, is either prominent on its subjectiveside, as in “By the rais­
ingof the ten fingers, it shouldbe understood byyou that thenumber of
coins, (or contortions of thelimbs inasceticposture), or of thePurdnas is
ten;”or it is prominent onits verbor predicate side, as in “Youshould
come up, after seeingcontraction of thehand.” Thus, by this form of
gesturethe meaningsof words are no doubt recalled, but only severally
or eachindependently of the rest; but their mutual association or con­
currence alsois not illuminatedbyit, as it isbynominatve, objective, and
other case-endings whichexplain that inter-relation, inasmuch as in the
caseunder consideration, invariable or constant components of gesture
donot exist.
Objection.— Howdothen activityand inactivity proceed from gesture
inthe absenceof cognitionof connection?
Answer.— Youmaytakeit that thesefollow fromeither the one or
theother of doubt or uncertainty andpratibha or inventivegenius.
Gesturealsois, therefore, noproof.—3.
Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning.

few w i u s. i =* i 2 11
Hetufi, reason. gsr^r: Apadesah, description. Sound, Liiigam,
mark. spiral Pram&nam, proof Karanam, instrument iti, these.
An-artha-antaram, not different things.
L Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument—
these are not antonyms.—345.
(if 9 Yl) KAN A d A S&TRAS IX, 1-4. 4©T
— Upaskdra.—It may be asked, how sound (or word) could be a mark of illation, when
its difference from the mark appears from its possessing the nature of an apadem or a
description. Anticipating this, he says :
‘Apadeslah’ means' sound (or word), accordingtoits derivationthat
byit objects arereferred to, i.e., affirmedor described. Andit isreallya
synonymof hetu, reason, andliriga, mark. ‘Pramanam’means the instru­
ment of truecognition inthe manner of the inferential mark. In like
manner, theword ‘karanam’ alsoisequivalent tothe mark itself which
is the instrument {Parana) of inferential cognition. For the operation of
karana or the instrum ent is two-fold: Somekarana operates or exercises
its functionunder or subject tocontact or contiguity, and somekarana
exercises its function on the strength of inseparable existence. Sound
(or word), on thecontrary, has neither contact nor inseperable existence
with the object or meaning; hence, howcanit leadtotheobject ?
Objection.— It leads tothe object withthe helpof arbitrament or
accordingtodirection.
Answer.— Tt cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with
referencetothemeanings of words, and not totheir connection.
Objection.— There m ay be arbitrament or directionwithreference
tothat also.
Answer.— No, for thatconnectionbeingofamanifold nature, it is im­
possiblethat itcouldbetheobjectofreference byarbitrament or direction.
Objection.— But it is from the forceof arbitrament or direction in
the case of words and meanings that the meaning of a sentence also
becomesmanifest.
Answer.— This isnot thecase, as therewouldbethenover-extension
or undue application of theprinciple, if somethingisbrought forward or
called upbyarbitrament or direction withregardtosomethingelse.
Objection.— Invariableantecedenceor pervasion ofconnectioninthis
'case will bethat of connectionasrecalledbysound.
A nswer.— If itbe so, then, bythat admission, inference itself finds
admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion.
Arbitrament or direction also, if it impliedmereintentionor desire, would
beundulyappliedor toowide.
Objection.— But the desire of Islvara, God, cannot besaidtobe too
wide..
Answer.— Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even intheabsenceof
divine will, thewords, river or Gafiga(Ganges), etc., suggest or call up the
ideas of thebank, etc.
This isenoughofover-forwardness inalogician.—4.
m W \W vaisesika philosophy. (c t
— ------—............................^ JL <
Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition
are all included in Inference.
fs^r%crefr<5[ 11 * i r \ *n
Asya, its. 53 Idam, it. Iti, such. This. Buddhi-
apeksitatvSt, because of the cognition or notion being needed.
5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Priva­
tion,' and Tradition are all included in Inference by marks),
because they depend, for their origin, upon the cognition,
namely, “ It is its.”—346.
Upaskdra.—For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised by
others (as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of
inseparable existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential
cognition, he sa y s:
The words “of comparison, presumption, comprehension or sub­
sumptionandprivation complete theaphorism. ‘Asya,’ofthepervader,
‘idam’(it is)thepervaded,— -thecognitionisinthisform. Theyare depen­
dent uponit, bywhichit is depended uponas their orginator. ‘Buddhi-
apeksitatva’means the state of beingso dependent. Inconsequenceof
such dependence,—this is the meaning of the term, it beingarelative
compound formed similarly to ahita- agnil} (by whom fire has been
deposited), or beingformed withtheaffixita (which signifies that some­
thing, e.g., dependence upon the cognition, has been produced in the
something else, e.g., comparison, etc.), accordingtotherule that it is
applied to the words star, etc., (so that taraka-P ita=taraIdta= starry,
heaven).
Upamana, com parison,or analogy, is in every respect nothing
but anumana, or inference, bymeans ofwords. Nowthe sentence, “A
gavteus or gayal looks likeacow,” is spokenbyaforester inreplytothe
enquirybyatownsman, viz., “What does agayal look like to?” Here
immediatelyafter hearingtheabovesentenceat adistant place, thetowns­
man determines the meaningof the name, gayal, on thestrength of the
community of substratum, namely, that whichis likeacow is theobject
of reference by, or designate of, the word,gayal. Then whenhegoes to
theforest andmeets ananimal bodyof that description, herecognises
that that is that whichis the designateof the word, gayal.
Objection.— At the timeofhearing thesentence at adistant place,
thegeneric nature of thegayal, which is the condition or occasion of the
recognition or application of thename, isnot known. How then can
there be suchdeterm inationby, or applicationof, thename?
 K AN AD A SUTRAS IX, 2-5.
______________________________________ LXi^i .
*fil ,
Answer .—There canbesuch rleterroination, as thecognitionthereof
(i.e., of the generic nature) ispossibleby m eans ofsuggestionor meta­
phorically.
Objection.---But where is the room for suggestion, when in the
sentence, “Agayal looks likeacow,” there is no want of proof of the
agreement or oppositionof thesubject andpredicate?
Answer.— There is roomfor suggestion, inasmuchas completeequi­
valenceof the twoterms still remains tobe proved. ,For it is not proper
toholdupbefore one, whodesires tobeenlightened inthe matter, like­
ness toacowasthe conditionor occasion of partial application of the
name. Therefore, it (thename) refers toaparticular genus or class in its
entirety. Hencearises the possibilityofsuggestion. Or, the word, gayal,
is denotativeof the animal, gayal, beingapplied theretoby the elect, and
there existing no other application of it. Other applications being
non-existent, whatever word is applied by theelect toacertainobject,
thesameis denotative of that, as the word, cow, is ofthecow. It is from
this inference that the applicationof the name, gayal, comes tobe deter­
mined.
Andthe reasoningwhichyou may set forth as being auxiliary to
vpamana, com parison, rvould better go withanumana, inference, which
has beenestablishedas amethod of proof. What is theuse of upamdnq
which, asa methodof proof, isyet tobesupposed?
Moredetailed consideration onthis subject may be sought in the
Anumdna-Mayukha.
Arthdpatti, Presum ption or Explanation, also is nothing but infer­
ence. Thus, (J.) presumptionfromtheobserved, arises whereby means of
thenon-existences of Chaitra whoisliving, in the house, ascertained by
stronger evidence, (e g., perception), his existence outside it is presumed.
Here thecognitionof Chaitra’sexistenceoutsidethehouseis whollydepen­
dent upontheascertainmentoftherelationofthepervadedandthepervader
betweenthe demonstrableandthedemonstrator. For, as a matter offact,
thenon-existence of a livingpersoninthehouseisaccompaniedwithhis
existenceoutsideit, or therearises thecognitionthat thenon-existenceof a
livingpersonin the houseisimpossible without his existence outside it.
In the first case, there isapprehensionofpositivepervasionor concomit­
ance, and, inthelast, of negativepervasion.
Objection.— Pervasiondoesexist, but the apprehension thereof does
not here take place.
«;
■
fl7 l§3l)?l: VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. \fi|
----- r— ---- N----S-~ ' ...!—1
............ ... 1
Answer. —Werethis thecase, then, inthe absence of the apprehen­
sion of pervasion, there wouldbe noscope or occasionfor the mainfesta-
tionof presumption, and there wouldconsequently be supposition of only
that which, as anentity, woulddemonstratepervasionexistinginitsproper
formor assuch. Thisis thedirectionor point.
Theinclusionofpresumptiondue totheinstrumentalityof doubt or
uncertainty as well as of that due tothe instrumentalityofcontradiction
or contrast or opposition, ininference, shouldbealsounderstood or infer­
red; for, contrast o#opposition, characterised as uniformity of non-co-
existence, alsoisconstitutedbypervasionor (negative) concomitance.
(2) Presumptionfromwhat isheard, is alsoinferencebymeansof the
inferred. “Deva-datta, whois stout, does not eat byday”—By this pro­
position, stoutness isinferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there
takes place inference of eating at night in this waythat Deva-datta
eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot
otherwise appear inhim.
Sambhava, C omprehensionor Sub-sumption, alsoismerelyaformof
inference. For, the examples of it are: Adrorja (astandard measure)
does not exceed a khdri (one hhari—4dronas); an adhaka does not
exceed a drona tone drona=A ddhakas ); a hundred does not exceed
a thousand ; etc. Here a Ichari contains a drona, beingconstituted by
it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is
possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot ispos­
sessed of its components. Other instances should be similarly under­
stood. That learningisprobableinaBrahmarja (because Brahmanas asa
class arelearned), that valour isprobableinaKsalriya (becauseKsatriyas
as a classarevaliant), etc., ontheother hand, donot at all becomemeans
of proof, inasmuchas theydonot produce certainty.
Abhava, N on-existence or Privation, alsoisnot adifferentformofevi­
dence; for, beingsimilar tothe inference of thecause by means of the
effect, the inference of thenon-existenceof thecausebymeansof the non­
existenceof the effect, is includedwithininference itself, aspervasion or
universal concomitance is thegroundof suchinference bymeans of non­
existence.
TheBhattas (Prabhakara and other Mimdmsakas\ however, maintain
that theevidence whichcauses the apprehension of non-existence in the
ground, etc., (e.g., The water-pot does not exist ontheground), iscalled
non-perception. Now,this evidence or proof isinsomecases included in
perception, and, in other cases, inference, inasmuchas non-existenceis
apprehendedbytheeye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot besaidthat the
*( S ) !J KANADA SUTRAS TX, 2-6. Ifil
___________ :___________’_____ ________ I IL j
senses are exhausted just inthe apprehensionof thesubstratum(of non­
existence, e.g., the ground), since their function continues up to the
apprehensionof non-existence.
Aitihya, Tradition, isasuccessionofsayings of w hich the authorsare
not known. Itiha —thiscollectionofexpletives appears in the narration
of past events. The stateof beingsuchnarrationof past events is called
aitihya, traditional sajung. If it is not im peded in its meaning, then,
comingunder theclassofverba! cognition, it is amodeof inference. For
example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a Yaksa, There is a Gaari (a
BuddhisticSpirit) inthemadhilha tree, etc. Now, if thetraditional sayings
comefrom the mouth of trustworthy persons, thentheyareas has been
alreadydeclared; if theydonot come from the mouth of trustworthy
persons, thentheyareno evidenceat all.
Accordinglyit isestablished that proof or evidence is of two kinds
only, perceptionandinference.—5.
Vivyiti—Sambhava or Probability is cognition dependent upon a
plurality of concomitances; e.g., learningis probablein aBrdhvnapa ; a
hundred is probably contained inathousand.
Note.— The construction put by Jayariaroaymj upon the word.
Sambhava is explicitlyrejected by Satkara Misra. In the lexicon Medivi
also we find that the meaning of theword is Adheyasya ddharavatirik-
tatvarn, i.e., the state of tvbat is contained not exceeding that w hich
contains it. or, simply, the relation of thepart not being greater than the
whole. Reminiscence, how produced.

WTUUwdr. mjuTfaymur im U ii
Atma manasoh, between the soul and the mind.
Samyoga-vi^esat, from a particular conjunction. SamskSr&t, from
impression or retention or latency, •q- Cha, and. t^r^: Smritih, Reminiscence.
6. Reminiscence (results) from a particular conjunc­
tion between the Soul and the Mind and also from Impression
or latency.— 3 4 7 .
Upaskara.—Inferential cognition having been explained, he now begins another
topic.
“Results”—This is the complement of the aphorism. ‘Sainyoga-
vitle§ah’meanscontactor contiguity such as reflection or meditation or
inter-penetration, etc. Fromthis as the non-combinative cause, in the
soul as thecombinativecause, ‘Smritih,’ (reminiscence), aparticular kind
7
 .. h i

VAI&EHKA PHILOSOPHY. vST .

ofcognition or knowledge, is produced. Hestates the efficient cause by
‘Samskarat.’ Bytheword‘cba’ beimplies past experience whichtoois
operative hereas the object recalled. Reminiscence or recollection imi­
tates the correctness or incorrrectness of the previous experience, such
alonebeingthe recollection of himwhohas mistaken a rope for a snake
andhasconsequentlyfledfromit. It doesnot, moreover, followthat remi­
niscence should takeplace at all times or continually, sinceit depends on
theresuscitationof themental impression. Accordinglyit hasbeensaidby
therevered Prasastadeva, “Reminiscence, caused bytheinferential process
fasin inferringfirefromsmokethereisrecollection of the universal con­
comitanceof fireandsmoke), desire, re-production (or suggestionof one
idea byanother), and aversion, and havingfor itscontent the past, among
objectsseen, heard, andotherwise experienced, (results) fromaparticular
conjunctionbetweenthe soul and themind, due tothe .observation of a
suggestive mark, voluntaryattempt at recollection, etc., andfromimpres­
sionor latencyproduced by intuitions constantly repeated and attended
towithinterest.”-
Thecognitionof highlyadvancedsages, ortheir intellectual intuition
has not been separately noticed by the author of the aphorisms. It is
included within perception by Yogins or ascetics. In thetreatise, called
tirePadartha-Pradesa, anaccountofit has beengiven, whichis asfollows:
"Prescient orinventive cognition which is produced from conjunction
betweenthesoul and the mind, andalsofromaparticular dharma, virtue
or merit, independentlyof inferential marks, etc., iu advanced sages, the
promulgatorsof theVedas, inrespect of objects, supersensible, orpast, pre­
sent, andfuture, or inrespect of dharma, etc., as preservedinbooks,—that
is called sagely cognition.” This form of cognition at times arises
inordinaryorwordlypeoplealso; aswhenayoungmaidensays, “Myheart
assures memybrother will depart to-morrow.”—6.
Dream, how produced.
cf^TT: II & I 3 I V9 II
spjj, I'atha, so. f w Svapnali, dreaming.
7. So (also is) dreaming.—348.
U p a s M r a .—Thus
four-fold v i d y d , or true cognition, or knowledge, having been
explained, it now becomes proper to explain a v i d y a or false cognition or knowledge.
T herein doubtor uncertainty and error have been incidentally ascertained before. For
the purpose of ascertaining dreaming, he says :
Themeaningis that as reminiscenceresults froma particular con­
junctionbetween thesoul andthe mind, andfromimpressionorlatency, so
•U K At? A d A SIJTRAS TX, 2-8. ' 4 .
also does cognition in dreaming. Cognition indreamingisthemental
experience, through the channels ofthe senses, belonging to one, when
one’ssenses haveceasedtobe active and one’s mind is in a quiescent
state. And this is of three kinds. It partly arises fromacutenessof
impressionor facilityof reproductiveness; asina manwho, in loveor in
anger, thinks intentlyonsomeobject, whenhegoes tosleep, inthat state,
cognitionresemblingperception, in the form, “This is the contest be­
tweenKarna and Arjuva ”(twoheroes of the Mahahharata), is produced,
throughtheinfluenceofimpression, reproductiveness or latency, produced
byprevious hearingof thePurayas, etc. It arises partly from derange­
ment of the humours or affectionsofthebody, vis., wind, bile, andphlegm.
Therein, inconsequenceofdisorder of the wind, one dreams of moving
about inthe sky, wanderingabout on the earth, fleeing with fear from
tigers, etc., andthelike; under theinfluence of an unwholesome excess
of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire, embracingflamesof-fire,
goldenmountains, corruscations of flashing lightning, sudden extensive
conflagrations, etc.; while, throughpredominance of phlegmatic derange­
ment, onedreamsof swimmingupon the sea, immersionsinrivers, sprink­
lings with showers of rain, silver mountains, etc. Dreamsappear also
under the influence of adristam (the invisible after-effectsof past acts)
or deserts. Thesearecognitions, producedin one whose internal sense
has been lulled to sleep or overpawered with sleep, inrespect of thd
experiences of thepresent or previous statesof existence. Therein somnial
cognition, signifyinggood, results fromdharma or merit, and hasfor its
object the ridinguponelephants, ascendingon mountains, acquisition of
the royal umbrella, feastinguponpudding, interviews withthesovereign,
and the like; whereas somnial cognition, signifying evil, arises from
adharma or dem erit, andhas as its object unction with oil, fallinginto
blind wells, ridinguponcamels, immersion in mire, the seeing of one’s
ownnuptials, andthe like.
Theabove three, onlyasjointly operating, have causalityhere{i.e.,
inthe productionof dreams). It should be further observed that this
divisionof causes, isbasedonthepredominance of one or another of the
qualities of thesecauses intheir effects.—7.
Cognition accompanying dreaming, how produced.
n s. i ^ i e ti
PfffTRPRI. Svapna-antikam, that which intervenes in, or lies near to, or
accompanies, dream.
8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams.—349,
(t( Jlp^fj VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. \i^|
Upaskara.—It may bo objected : —The cognition which springs up in the midst of a
dream, in the form of recollection of the very same object which is experienced in somnial
cognition, does not possess the nature of dreaming, inasmuch as dreaming takes the
form of perceptual experience. From what cause, then, does it arise ?
To this ho gives the reply :
Theword‘so’comes infromthe precedingaphorism. Themeaning,
therefore, is that asdreaming, soalsoconsciousness accompanyingdream­
ing arises from a particular conjunction between the soul and the
mindandalsofromimpressionor retention. The difference betweenthe
twocasesextends onlythus far thatsomnial cognitionresults fromimpres­
sion or retention produced by former experience, while consciousness
accompanyingdreaming results from impression or retention produced
byexperiencearisingat theverytime (of dreaming.) It has been accord­
ingly stated by Professor Prasastadeva, “Somnial cognition is merely
recollection, inasmuch asit results fromlookingbackuponpastcognitions.”
The writer of the vritti alsosays, “Somnial cognition, its function being
the illumination of experienced objects, is not a different thing from
recollection.”
Someteachthat ‘consciousnessaccompanyingdreaming’is cognition
amountingtocertitude, inthemidst ofdreams, as, for example, “I amin
astate oflyingonthebed,”etc.—8.
Another cause of dreaming and of cognition in dreaming.

w rf^ r n * i * i u
qsqrg; Dharm at, from dharma or m erit. ^ Cha, also.

9. (Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dream

ing result) from dharma also.—350.
Upaskdra.—He adds another cause of dreaming and consciousness accompanying
dreaming.
Theword*cha’isusedwiththepurposeofaddingadharma, demerit.
Thishasbeenalreadyexplained.—9.
V i v n t i ®Som e think that this aphorismhas beenlaid
downfor the purposeof showingthat insome cases dreaming, etc., arealso
producedfromdharma, etc., alone, evenwithout theactionof Sarnskara or
impression, andthat thepoetic observationof Srihar$a that themaidSleep
brings before the vision of man, through the all-pervading efficacy of
adristam, evenobjectsw hichhave not been observedbefore, accordingly
becomesexplained.
V.CS'/Jy
\, » S , /
KAWADA SUTRAS IX, 2-11.
, I ___________
IfiT
Causes of Avidya or Incertitude.

Indriya-dosat, from imperfection of the senses.

Samskara-dosat, from imperfection oi impression, Cha, and. ^nf^cir A-vidya,
false knowledge. Incertitude.
10. False knowledge (arises) from imperfection of
the Senses and from imperfection of Impression.—351.
Upusk'Ava.—Now, referring to the series (of doubt, dream, incertitude) he sa y s:_
The word1A-vidya,’ thoughageneral term, applies toincertitude,
accordingtothe context, doubt, dream, and incertitudehavingbeenmen­
tioned. Thereinimperfectionofthe senses is inefficiency caused by pre­
dominanceof thebile, etc. Imperfectionof impressionisthebeingaccom­
panied with non-observation of distinctions; for under such non­
observation, falsecognitionis produced.—10.
Vivriti. —Understandingaccordingto another mode is divided into
twokinds, certitude arid incertitude. Of these, he, states the cause of
incertitude.
‘Indriya-dosah,’issuchasopthalmia, etc. ‘Samskara-dosah’ is the
beingtheeffect oferroneousexperience, etc. The word‘and’ implies the
additionof suchimperfections as remoteness, etc., and alsosub-sumptions
offalbemarks or middle-terms, etc. Ihe cause, then, of false knowledge
or incertitudeis imperfection; andimperfection, as consisting of bilious­
ness, remoteness, etc., isofdiverse kinds.
The characteristic of Avidya.
it * i * i n li
HU I'at, that A v i d y a . false knowledge. Dusta
cogniton.

11. That (i . e A v i d y a ) is imperfect knowledge.—352.

Upaskdra.—He states the characteristic or definition of avidya in general :
‘Tat>’ an indeclinable word, conveying the sense of a pronoun,
alludes toavidya. That, avidya, is‘dustajnanani’, i.e., cognitionwhich is
undulyapplied, cognition that athingis what in fact it isnot, in other
words, cognition determinedin the manner of a divergent object and
having themode whichdoes notresideintheobjectinquestion. Imperfec­
tion consists alsoofcognition taking the formof uncertainty. Doubt
therefore, evenwherethereisonlyonealternative, is vicious, being identi­
cal withnon-assurance or non-ascertainment,
(*( VAT&ESTKA p h i l o s o p h y . l£Jj
~ -- ■ — ,••■1.,' ■''"X.’. ."■■'.—'■
"*' *-1—: '. ■--it'~Ay#j, •
Thefour (forms of avidya), therefore, namely, Doubt, Error, Dream,
andRegressionorIndecisionareincluded inthisaphorism.—II.
The characteristic of V idya.
ftsTT II i I * I SR II
iJTjpr Adustam, not imperfect. Free from imperfection, Vidya, true
knowledge. Vidyd.
12. (Cognition), free from imperfection, is (called
Vidyd or scientific knowledge.—353.
Upaskdra.—(He declares what scientific cognition is :)
The word “Cognition” comes in (from the preceding aphorism).
‘Adustam’meansproducedbyorgans ofsensewhich arenot inefficientor
defective (in consequence of any derangement mentioned above). The
meaning, therefore, is that vidyd is the experience of athingin itsproper
place, or the experience of athingin the same manner inwhich another
thing havingacommon substratum with the former is experienced, or
experienceof athiifg not havingthemode which does not reside in the
thinginquestion. It is oftwokinds, immediate or sensuous, and mediate
or inferential.—12.
, Cognition by Sages and Siddhas, how produced\

wl qriMn n «. i * i a
VT$ Arsam, sagely. Of advanced sages, Siddlia-dar&mam,
vision of the Perfected Ones. Cha, and. : Dharmmebhyah, from
dharm a or merits.

13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of

the Perfected Ones, (results) from dharma or merits,—354,
Upaskara.—It may be objected: The cognition (of objects beyond the reach of senses),
by advanced sages, also appears in the very same form in which other cognitions, having
a common substratum with the former, take place. It is again not produced by the senses,
inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced
by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in the absence of any investigation o f such
marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and infe­
rence) which is the instrument of such cognition.
In view of this objection, he says :
‘Arsam’orsagelycognitionisthe cognitionof sages suchasOalava,
etc., havingforitsobject thingspast andyet tocome. ‘Siddba-danfenam’
means die visionbythose who have attained successinthe direction of *
cognitionapprehensive of objects remoteaswell as screenedfromview,by
((( M > ) h KANADA SiJTRAS TX, 2-13. fe|
meansofmantra or incantation, herbs, eye-salveprepared fromcocoon, etc.
Bothofthem arise fromdhavma or merit, such that, there is cognitionof
objects in their true light. The author of the Vritti observes that this
cognition is not a different kind of vidya or scientific knowledge, asit is
included in Yogic or ascetic perception. Sagely cognition is really the
fourth kind of vidya, and it occursto sages as well as to worldlypeople.
Andit is simplyaformofmental perception, beingproducedbythe mind
accompanied with inattention (to internal and external objects), or pro­
duced by inferential marks such as faithful observances of therules of
conduct. The cognition of pervasion which is the ground of inference
is here solelydependent upon or due to Samsl-cira, or impression having its
origin inaformer stateof existence (i.e., instinct), inthe same way asisthe
pervasionoruniversal concomitance of suckingthe breast andthecognition
that this is the means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the ins­
tinctiveapplicationofthebabytosuckingthebreast).
The revered Professor Prasastadeva, however, says that ‘Siddha-
darifanam,’cognition of the Perfected Ones, isnota different formofcogni­
tion. His reasoning is as follows: If it is said that cognition, by the
Perfected Ones, of objects remoteandhidden fromview, takes itsrisefrom
conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared fromcocoon,
andthelike, then it is nothing butperception. If itbe, on the other hand,
cognition which apprehends objects belonging to the earth, the region
lyingbetween the earth and the vault ofheaven, and the space beyond it,
and which is dependent upon theconditions or inferential marks such as
the movements, etc., of planetsand the lunar mansions i,nak^atras), thenit
is nothing but inferential cognition, inasmuch as pervasion, or universal
concomitanceofthethingtobe inferredand themark ofinference, isdeter­
minedbytheobservationofsuchaccompaniment.—13.
Hereendsthesecondchapter of theninth book in the Commentaryof
SafikaraupontheVaHesikaAphorisms.
i( 9 326 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. VEl
-------------- ------------------------------------- S t L
B ook T en th — C h apter F ir s t .

Pleasure and pain are two different things.

fHTRSSh :W -
TWcTC?TTW: II I ^ I ^ II
?STRKSfirUHM%7PT Ista-anista-kffrana-vi^esat, in consequence of the differ-
i ence of causes, (in tlie foims of) desirables and undesirables. Virodhat,
on account of opposition. sg Cha, and. fro: Mithah, between them, towards
each other, mutual. ^g<|:<33fr.-
Sukha-dtihkhayoh, between pleasure and pain.
SPWSfmTTff: Artha-antara-bbavah, relation of different objects.

1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes

in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account
of (their) mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the
relation of objects different from each other.— 355.
Vpasltara.—The purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the
attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of Gautama, which
enumerates or classifies the provables or objects of certitude, vis., “ Soul, Body, Sense,
Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emanci­
pation are the provables” (Nyaya-t'Atram, I. i. 9.), there being no mention of pleasure, the
error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of
dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure
and pain themselves.
‘Sukha-duhkhayoh,’ (between pleasure and pain, there exists)
‘mithah,’ mutual, ‘artha-antara-bhftvab,’distinction. Whence (does this
distinction arise)? To it hereplies, ‘mta-anirta-karana-vijfes&t,’i.e., in
consequenceof ‘visfesah,’distinction or difference, of their causes which
have, in the onecase, theformof‘istam,’desirableobjectssuchasgarlands,
sandal-paste, women, etc., and, in the othercase, theformof ‘anistam,’
undesirable objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of
effect necessarily depends upon heterogeneity of cause. He lays down
another principleofdistinction, vis., ‘ virodhat,’on account of opposition
characterised by non-dwelling together. For pleasure and painarenot
experienced in one and the same soul at one andthesametime. The
word, ‘cha,’ and, brings forward the differenceof theeffectsof pleasure
and pain as afurther means of distinguishing between them. Thus,
graciousness, the embrace, clearness of the eyes, etc., are the effects of
pleasure, whiledespondency, a sulliedcountenance, etc., are the effects
of pain; hence on this ground alsopleasure andpain must differfrom
lvJg?H XANADA SUTRAS X, 1-2.______ ^
e^chother. Accordinglyit has been stated by Profossor Prasasta-deva,
“Pleasurehas thecharacteristicof agreeablefeeling. In the presence of
garlands and other desirable objects, fromthecontact of thesensesand
objects in therecognitionof somethingdesirableproduced, andfromcon­
junction of the soul and the minddependent upondharma or merit and
thelike, that whichis producedandis thecauseofcomplacence, embraces,
and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure.” Now, inthecaseofgar­
lands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyedin the past, pleasurearises fromsm?iti,
reminiscence, andin, the case of future objects, it arises fromSankalpa,
desireor appetencyor imagination.
The non-enumerationof pleasureinthe aphorismof Gautama is to
promote indifferenceor dispassion, inother words, toteach that dispassion
wouldariseinonewhoshould accountevenpleasureaspain. (Gf. Nyaya-
Sdtram, IV . i. 58, ^^sTTfaJlRR^, The idea of pleasure takes
placeinanalternativeformofpain).—1.
Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.

Mwift&jremwrrar u io i ? i s h
^raifjn&*ir?fHT»TTW: Samiaya-nirnaya-antara-abhava, non-inclusion in
doubt and certainty. ^ Cha, and. ftRFrTC# Jnana-antaratve, in the matter
of being different from cognition. Hetuh, reason, mark.
2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain)
in.Doubt or Certainty is the mark that they are other than
cognition.—356.
Vpaskdra—It may be urged : Let pleasure and pain be mutually distinct. But they
may be non-diflerent from cognition, like recollection and perception or sensation.
Accordingly he s a y s :
The meaning is that non-inclusion in doubt or certainty is the
markof inference that pleasure and pain are other than, i e., different
from, cognition. The idea is this : Were pleasureorpain akind ofcog­
nition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have theformof
certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which must
be present in doubt) donot exist; nor can it bethe second, as the single
alternative does not exist. Andthespecies or parts being thus excluded,
the genus or w holeis necessarilyexcluded. For thespecies of cognition
aretwoonly, thecharacteristic of doubt and thecharacteristic of certainty.
Andbothof themare excluded from pleasure as well as from pain;
hence thecharacteristic of cognitionalsofinds noplaceinthem.
8
(i C i V AI&E S IK A PHILOSOPHY. (fij

" ^ The word, ‘cha’and, adds onthe exclusionof external sensation

or perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i.e. by
theinner sense, in the form, “I feel pleasure,” “I feel pain”; whereas
perceptionof themdoesnot take such shape or form as in “I know,”
“I amdoubtful,” “I amcertain.”—2.
Vivriti. —* * * Neither pleasurenor painhas the formin w hich
tworepugnant alternatives arepresent together, that it shouldbeprobable
that they have the nature of doubt, nor has either possessionof agiven
formtogether with absence of negation of that form, that it should be
likely that they have the nature of certainty. The supposition of a
third form of cognition is chimerical like thehornofahare. Conse­
quentlyneither pleasurenor paincancome under knowledge.
Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition— continued.

w i o \ % \ \ \\
jppqt: Tayoh, their, of doubt and certainty. Nispattih, pro­
duction. ^gtrrjfaKTmnr Pratyaksa-laingikabhyam, by means of perception
and inference.
3. The production thereof (i.e., of Doubt and Cer­
tainty) is by means of perception and inference.—357.
Upaskara.—He lays down another principle of differentiation.
‘Tayoh,’ of doubt and certainty, ‘nispattih,’ production, (is) from
perceptionand from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is
produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks, ifor,
pleasureis four-fold, beingobjective, subjective, imaginativeor sympathe­
tic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess the
characteristic of takingtheir origin fromthe contact of the(outer) senses
(withtheir objects). Shouldit be contended that the first iscognition,
inasmuch as it is generated by contact of thesenses andtheir objects,
wereplythat it is not so, for part only of the whole cause, (being the
same), cannot entail homogeneityintheeffect; else all andsundryeffects
wouldcometobehomogeneous as havingspaceandtime as their common
antecedents. Moreover (if pleasure were cognition), the pleasurewhich
is not produced through contact of thesensesandtheir objects, would
be either non-discriminative or indefinite, or discriminativeor definite.
But it cannot be the first, for then it wouldbe supersensible; nor can
it be thesecond, inasmuchas it doesnot consist ofa judgment respecting
two objects in the relation of subject and predicate. Again, apleasure '
and painarenecessarily accompaniedwith sensibility; (were they forms
 K A N l D A S&TRAS X, 1-4.
ofcognition), there would be involvedin the (consequent notion of a
sensibilityof cognition a regression to infinity. ‘Laihgikarri’ (the
adjective) meansmerely‘lifigam’(the noun), mark, asthe word, objective,
(meansanobject).
The author of the Vritti, ontheother hand, explains the aphorism
thus, that the origin thereof, i.e., of cognitionandpleasure, is explained,
‘pratyakga-laiftgikabhyam,’ i.e., by the explanations of perceptual and
inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition
is produced by the senses, andinferential bymarks of illation, it is not
sowithpleasure, etc.—3.
V ivritti .—It maybe urged that as non-discriminative cognition is
neither doubt nor certitude, so toomaybepleasureandpain. Accord­
inglyhe says:
Theproof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and
inference. In one’s own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by per­
ception; inother souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes,
etc., and pain by paleness of the face, etc. Sothat, had theytheform
of non-discriminative cognition, there could be noperception, nor could
it bepossiblefor themtobethesubject of inference by such marks as
brightness or paleness of the face, andthelike. Hence, the import is,
theyarenot includedincognition.
Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.'—continued.

n \ \ i s u
AbhOt, (it) was. Iti.'such modal distinction, ssrn' Api, also.
4. “ (It) w as” —such (modal distinction) also (estab­
lishes the difference between pleasure or pain and cognition).
—358.
Upaskara.—He points out the difference of pleasure, etc., from inferential cognition,
depending upon a difference of their modes or forms of appearance.
Theword‘iti ’indicates theform. Theword‘api’implies another
form, viz., “(It) will be.” Thus, ininferential cognition, e.g., “There
was or will befirein the mountain,” the modal distinction of the past,
etc., isobserved; but pleasure or pain, producedunder thisform, hasnever
beenobserved.—4.
Vivriti .—* * 0 ® C ognitionis conversant about object^ past,
future, and present. But of either pleasureor pain, noobject whatever
exists. Therefore, by the application of contradictory properties, viz.,
objectivity and non-objectivity, it followsthat pleasure and painarenot
identical withcognition.
 gyi]_____ VATSESTKA PHILOSOPHY. ______^j|
■

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition —continued.

uftr =5r gRTc^Rig; m «MU«
*rf?T Sati, existing. ^ Cha, also ^fTsgnWRts Karyya-adar&inat, because
of the non-observation of the effect.
5. Also (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cogni­
tion), inasmuch as the effect, (pleasure or pain), is not ob­
served, where (the antecedents of cognition) are present.
—359.
ZJpaskara.—He brings forward a further ground of differentiation :
Pleasureor pain is not merelyperceptionor merely inferential cog­
nition, since the effect, pleasure or pain, isnot observed, wherecontact of
the sensesandobjects exists, or wherethere isrecognitionoftheuniversal
concomitance (which is thegroundof inference!, of the markof inference
being a property of the minor term, etc. Themeaning, therefore, is as
follows: *thasbeenalreadystatedthat pleasureandpainarenot cognition
ingeneral, (i.e., non-discriminativecognition). Should theybe cognition
inparticular (or discriminative cognition), theywouldbe eitherperceptual
cognition or cognition in the form of inference. (Pleasure and pain
cannot be the former), inasmuchasthereis (sometimes) noexperience of
theelement ofpleasureintheperception of garlands, sandal-paste, etc.,
during the contact of the senses andtheir objects; nor cantheybethe
latter, since there is (sometimes) noexperienceof thepleasurable or the
painful, as thecasemay be, where there exists an inference respecting
sandal-paste, etc., or an inference respectingfire, etc. Inlike manner,
pleasure andpainbeingnot (always) experienced in particular instances
of perception or in particular instances of inference, theyare alsonot
thoseparticulars of perceptionor inference.—5.
Above continued : Causes of Pleasure and Pain.

cstwigui i s i * it
Eka-artha-samav&yi-karana-antaresu, there existing
other causes co-inherent in one and the same object. Dristatvdt, from
the being observed. Because they are observed.
6. (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition;,
because they are observed, when there exist other causes
co-inherent in one and the same object, (i.e., the soul).
—360.
Upaskctra,—He mentions another differentiating characteristic,
( i f 1 1 \Y) ' KANAD A sf iTRAS X, 1-7. (8 U
I * # —-----------;------------------------------ 7% L
“ o f pleasure and pain”— suoli is the complement (of the aphorism),
in relation to pleasure, uncommon or specific causes co-inherent inone
and the same object aredharma or merit, attachment to, or attractionfor,
pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure, volition or striving tosecure
the material (cause) of pleasure, and cognition of garlands, sandal-paste,
etc., whileinrelationtopain, they are adharma or demerit, and cogni­
tion of thorns and other undesirable objects. The meaning is that
(pleasure and pain differ fromcognition), inasmuchas theyareobserved
ontheco-inherenceofthese causes inoneand the same object. But cog­
nition which is non-discriminative, does not at all stand inneed of an
uncommoncauseco-inherent inthesameobject (with it). Discriminative
cognition, of course, depends uponacognitionof predicationorattribution
(or judgment), but this is not another cause, that is, acauseheterogeneous
tothecause of the cognition itself. Conjunctionof the mind, as beinga
cause common (to pleasure and pain with cognition), does not require
mention. Though reminiscence requires sarriskara, impressionor repro­
ductiveness, as its specific or uncommon cause, yet thedifference there­
fromis quite obvious, as it is for this reasonthat the difference (of plea­
sure and pain) has been investigated withreference onlytocognitionor
perceptual experience. Althoughininferential cognition thereis depend­
enceuponthe recollection of pervasion or universal concomitance, the
cognition that the mark is a property of theminor term, etc., yet it is
thrown overboardbythe very word ‘antara,’ other, (in the aphorism).
Iheprobativesense(of the aphorism) is, therefore, that pleasure and pain
are different fromcognition, inasmuchas theyare the productsof uncom­
mon or particular causes of their ownkind, co-existinginthesamesubs­
tratumwith them, as is the case with reminiscence, and with the first
sound(inaseries of sounds).—6.
An objection answered.

11 i 3 i vs u
Eka-desejin the part. Iti, such. This. qtRfwi Ekasmin, in
one (body). j^irah, the head. Pristham, the back. 35$ Udaram, the
stomach. Marmmani, the vitals, r r fs w Tat-vi^esah, their distinctions.
Tat-vigesebhyah, from the distinctions of their causes.

7. The head, the hack, the stomach, the vitals are

in the parts of one and the same (body); this their difference
f®( VATSEZIKA PHILOSOPHY.
! I.'. . .;...... '.[. .. ~ ■•' - L||.-..|
.1^;.'^.;._ ■'■■■ I. I..'II.I>
VS]
-Ii•'•'! (||‘.-' in-r-iir JL ^

(results) from the differences thereof (i . e., of their causes).

-3 6 1 .
UpaaMra.—It may be objected : If the difference of pleasure and pain from cognition
depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from
each other be ju3t like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then
there can be no mutual difference between the body and its parts, such as the head, the
feet, the back, the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to these, no difference in their
causes, whether they be the ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and
semen.
To meet this objection, he says :
‘Eka-desfoiti’means, inthe part. ‘Ekasmin’means inthe body.
‘Sirah’—this is one part; ‘udaram’; ‘prist-hamand. ‘marmm&ni,’
i.e., the sinew s, etc.; their ‘vitfesah difference in kind, (results)
‘tat-vWesebb/ahfrom the difference in kind of their causes. There,
again, {i.e., inthe caseof the heterogeneity of thecauses), heterogeneity
results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes);
for, the combinative causes of the stomach, the back, etc., also are
not just of the same kind as that of the head; just as the hetero­
geneity of a piece of cloth, a water-pot, etc., results fromthehetero­
geneityof threads, potsherds, and other material causes; heterogeneity
beingpossibleinthemalso, the heterogeneityof threads, potsherds, etc.,
also, results from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity
is, in like manner, tobe sought in the successive material causes; for,
while the ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the
respective material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in^
their respective effects); wheras homogeneity of thematerial causes, con­
stitutedbytheir substanceness, doesnot causesuch heterogeneity. This
i is the point.—7.
Here ends the first chapter of the tenthbookin the Commentary
ofSahkara uponthe Vaisesika Aphorisms.
B ook T enth — C h apter S eco n d .

Substance is the only combinative cause.

^■jjj Karanam, cause. Iti, such, jreli Dravye, in substance.

K&ryya-samav&yAt, from the com bination of effect.
1“ (It is the combinative) cause ”—such (intuition
| and usage), with regard to Substance, (arise) from the com­
bination of effect (in it). 362.
i
 ■ n
|§ f KAN AD A SUTRAS X, 2-2.
~,rrrv--;----------------------- M
X6.J1 4
- ■■-■-.,■,«■-■■-■■---r--.-r 1rnm
Upaskdra.—As a collateral topic, lie now commences a special discrimination of the
three causes :
‘Karanam that is, that it is the combinative cause; ‘itisuch
intuition andusagearetobeobserved, ‘dravye withregard toSubstance.
Whyso? Hegivesthereply ‘karyya-samavayat,’ because effects, viz.,
substance, attribute, and action, combineinit alone.—1.
V ivriti .—®* * * The definition of a cause in general is that
causalityconsists inconstant antecedence, thereexisting at thesametime
voidness of failure toproduce theeffect (that is to say, in Mill’s phra­
seology, causality consistsin invariable and unconditional antecedence). *
Thereare three kindsof causes, according totheir division into thecom­
binative or material, non-combinative or formal, and instrumental or
efficient. »* ® * *
Substance is efficient cause also.

eqhTRCT II i° i * i * II
U^RTrTSamyog&t, fromconjunction, Va, or, and.
2. And, through conjunction, (Substance becomes the
efficient or conditional cause also).—363.
XJpaskam.—It may be asked : Do then substances possess only combinative causa­
lity?
So he sa y s: .
Ascombinativecausality, soalsoefficient causality, belongs tothe
threads, inthe production of apieceof cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction
of theshuttle andthethreads isalsoacauseof thecloth, the shuttle and
the thread, are, mediatelythroughthat conjunction, alsoefficient causeof
the cloth. Theword ‘va’ is used in a collective sense, inasmuch as,
thoughthe thread possesses combinativecausality towards theconjuction
ofthe shuttleandthe thread, yet it possesses efficient causality towards
thecloth, mediately throughsuchconjunction. -2.
Vivffiti.— Hesaysthat combinative causality belongs tosubstances,
not onlybecause, effectscombine inthem, but alsobecause theyarefields
for the operationofnon-combinative causes.
‘Samyog&t,’ means because they are the support or substratum
whereintakesplaceconjunction which isthe non-combinative cause.* *
Note.— Ii will beobservedthat Vivfi^i takes va inadistributivesense.
 n
VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY.
— -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actions are non-combinative causes

u u q w T q im®ir i ^ 11
^SlUST Karane, in the cause. Samava.yat, from combination,
armro Karmmani, actions.
3. Through, combination in the (combinative) cause,
Actions (are non-combinative causes).—364.
Upaskara.—He explains what causality resides in Action:
. “Noil-combinativecauses”—suchisthecomplement (oftheaphorism.)
Non-combinativecausalityiscausalitycombinedor co-inherent inoneand
the sameobject connectedwiththerelation ofeffectand cause. Suchcaus­
alityresultseither fromcombinationinthe sameobject with the effect, or
from combination in the same object with the cause. Of these the
former is called, intheterminologyof theVaisesikas, the slighter or minor,
andthelatter, thegreater or major, proximity. If it beasked, bymeans
of which proximity, then, actions possess non-combinative causality
towardsconjunction,' disjunction, and samsltara or impression; it ishere
replied, ‘karane samavayat,’ (that it is) through combination in the
combinative cause of conjunction, etc. The meaning, therefore, is that
non-combinativecausalityis exercised by action in(the production of)
conjunction, etc., by means of the minor proximity characterised as
combinationinthesameobject withthe effect.—3.
Certain Attributes are non-combinative causes, and occasionally
efficient causes also.

ur n n ®i * i « n
ffirr Tatha, so. ^ RQpe, in colour. Karana-eka-artha-
samavayat, through combination in the same object with the cause. ^ Cha,
and, also.
4. So also in Colour through combination in the
same object with the cause.—365.
Upask&ra.—In anticipation of the question as to what kind of causality pertains
to colour and other attributes residing in the (constituent) parts, in relation to the
attributes of the wholes, he says :
Theexpression ‘in colour’ indicates colour, taste, smell, touch,
number, magnitude or quantity, separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity,
etc. The term‘so’extends (theapplication of) non-combinative causality.
‘Karana-eka-artha-samavayat’: (This non-combinative causality ofcolour,
etc.) originates the colour, etc., of the wholes, bymeans of the major
[( f _____________KAN A d a SUTRAS X, 2-6, ___SI

proximity(constituted) by(their) combinationinthe sameobject withthe

whole, whichis the combinative causeof thecolour, etc., of that whole;
as, for instance, the colour, etc., of the potsherds originate the colour,'
etc., inthewater-pot, and similarly it should be observed in all other
cases. The word ‘cha’ implies that occasionally colour, etc., possess
efficient causalityalso.—4.
Conjunction is a non-combinative cause.

n i*i*u
atffipspwrarg KArana-samavAyat, through combination in the cause.
Samyogah, conjunction. Patasya, of thecloth.
5. Through combination in the (combinative) cause,
Conjunction (is a non-combinative cause) of thecloth.—366.
Upaaknra.—He states that the minor proximity belongs to conjunction while it is
».nonrcombinative cause in the origination of substances:
Themeaningisthat, throughcombinationinthe combinativecause,
conjunction alsoisa non-combinativecause, intheproduction of effects
suchas apiece of cloth, etc., by meansof the proximity characterised
ascombination in the same object with the effect. The word ‘cloth’
indicates product substance as such.
Acertainauthor maintains that if, onthe other hand, conjunction
ofpart with part bealsoa non-combinative cause of a pieceof clotharid
the like, then combination in the same object with the cause is also
(anon-combinativecause).—5.
Above continued.

Mo m <mi
KArana-kArana-samavAyAt, through combination in the
cause of the cause. ^ Cha, and, also.
6. And, through combination in the cause of the
cause, (conjunction becomes a noil-combinative cause by
means of the major proximity) also.—367.
Vpaskdret.—He says that causality sometimes pertains to conjunction by means of
the major proximity.
The conjunction, technicallytermedprachaya, (loose) coalition, and
residingintheconstituent parts ofa baleofcotton, originatesmagnitude
inthebaleofcotton. Here the proximityis constituted by combination
inthesameobject withthe cause. This is themeaning.—6.
• 9
V.{ W 3- ) VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. V£]
—----------- -----;........ r..,.y .
Efficient causes declared.
u \* i * I vs n
^Tf^R^fT^rq; Samyukta-samavaydt, through combination in the conjunct,
W&: Agneh, of fire. Vai^esikam, distinctive attribute.
7. The distinctive attribute of Fire, (■i.e., heat), (be­
comes an efficient cause), through combination in the con­
junct.—368.
Upuskara,—Having thus ascertained causality determined by the combinative cause,
he begins a new section for ascertaining efficient causality.
‘Vaisfesikamdistinctive attribute, ‘agneh,’ of fire, in other word,
heat, becomesanefficient causeinrelation to theeffects(colour, etc.) pro­
duced byburningor baking, through combination (ofcolour, etc.) inthe
conjunct, (i.e., the water-pot placed infire.) This isindicative; inrelation
to cognition everything possesses efficient causality. Understanding,
pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, andimpression
possessefficient causalityonly. It should beobservedthat this systemor
elaborationof thought has thepurposeofestablishingthe mutual differen­
cesof pleasure, etc.—7.
Vivritti .— * ® 15 * Thegeneral definitionofanefficient causeis
tobe understood to be a cause other than the combinative and non-
combinativecauses. ** * * •
Observances produce adiistamas their fruit, on the authority
of the Veda.
3srt lusffibwiHi spruits
*3?upt IM ° R I q II
Drist&n&m, of acts observed or known to be productive of good.
ICTSfaWW Drista-prayojaiianam, of acts the purpose of which has been
taught. Unsta-abhave, in the absence of visible or observed faults or
defects. sran«T: Prayogah, performance. Abhyudayaya, for the pro­
duction of exaltation or adrigtam.
8. The performance of acts of observed utility and
of acts the purpose whereof has been taught (in the
sacred writings), is for the production of adristam, (as these
teachings are authoritative, being the word of God in whom)
the defects found in ordinary speakers do not exist.—369.
Upaskdm.—Now, in order to confirm the authoritativeness of the Vedas, he repeats
the very same statement which has been made by him before :
‘Dribtanarp’means, ofactswhichhavebeenprovedtobeusefulbythe
evidenceof experience, e.g., sacrifices, almsgivings, ablution, andthe like.
 KANADA SUTRAS X, 2-8. 337 '

‘Drista-prayojananfim’means, of acts thepurposewhereof has beentaught.

For, thus, insuchprecepts as “He who desires heaven, shall perform
sacrifice, ” “Hewhodesires heaven, shall offer oblation in the agnihotra
sacrifice,” etc., the fruit or purpose is mentioned at once along with the
injunction; insomecases, thepurpose is givenout bywayofarecommen­
dation, as in“The pitris or departedancestors ofhimwhostudies during •i
thesenights, pour down upon, or send down to, himstreams of clarified
butter andstreamsof honey,”etc.; in other cases, the purpose isleft tobe
imagined, asin“He shall performtheVisvajit sacrifice, ’ etc., for, herethe
purpose isneither mentionedalongwiththe injunction nor presentedby
wayof arecommendation, andis, therefore, suppositional, and(it cannot be
anythingbut heaven,), for heavenaloneshould besupposedas thepurpose
or fruit whichischarminginitself. That being so, it does not standto
reasonthat these acts which so shortly come to their end, shouldhave
causalitytowardstheproductionof fruits or results in thedistant future.
Hence, the meaning is, ‘prayogah,’the performance, of these acts, is
‘abhudayaya,’ for the purpose of ap&rvam, that is, adritfarn or deserts.
It might be objected as follows: This would have been the case,
werethe authoritativeness of the Vedas a fact. But that is hard to
maintain. For the authoritativeness of the Vedas as being eternally
freefromfaults or defects in themselves, is not desiredbyyou, (i.e., the
Vaisesika), as it is by the Mimamsa school, inasm uchas you recognise
them as the production of a person, andin that case, it is possible
that mistake, absence of mind, intention to mislead, and other defects
existed intheperson. Tothis the replyis given bythe phrase, ‘drbta-
abhave’ whichmeans, therebeingnon-existenceofpersonal defectssuchas
error, absence of mind, desire tomislead, and thelike, whicharefound
in other persons, namely, in ourselves andothers; inasmuch as the
Supreme Person, inferred whether as the Creator of theearth or asthe
Speaker of the Vedas, ispresented tousentirely under thecharacteristic
of freedomfromfaults or defects. So that His wordscan neither have
nomeaning, nor conveyacontrary meaning, norconveyauselessmeaning.
It is only impuritiescausedbyerror, absenceofmind, inefficiencyof the
senses, andthelike, due todisorder or defectiveness of the elementscon­
stituting the physical organism, the external senses, andthemind, that
may possibly vitiate speech. But theycannot possiblylurk intheword
of L$vara. It has beenaccordinglydeclared
a ||
W rS ^\ ■ r
| V A I& E S IK A P H IL O S O P H Y . v ^ |

--Being’influenced by passion, ignorance, andthelike, aspeaker

may tell untruths. But these do not exist inIdvara. HowcanHespeak
otherwise(thantruthfully) ?—8.
Note—Cf. VI. ii. 1, supra.
Vivriti.— Thus the Predicables have been ascertained, as also
Resemblance and Difference. This Sastra or SystemofSelf-culturefaci­
litates manana, intellectionor thinkingabout things, inthemonlywhose
chitta, or inner sense or m ind, has beenpurifiedbytheperformanceof
acts, and not inthemwhosechitta has not beensopurified. Observances
are productive of purity of chitta, as declared bysuch text of theVeda
as “Theydesiretoknow,”etc. Thesamehasbeen mentionedbefore. He
repeats it for further confirmation.
® ® * Observances, *** when performed disinteres­
tedly, donot produceelysianbliss, etc., astheirfruit, but produce astheir
result purityof chitta or intellect, etc., accordingtothetext of theofVeda,
“Theydesire toknow,” and theSmri.ti, “When worldly attachment has,
byobservances, borne-its fruits, knowledgeisafterwards produced.”
Authoritativeness of the Veda established.

s u m m fu ffr u ° i* i s. ii
Tat-vachanftt, from being the word of Him, God. srraraTO
Amnayasya, of the Vedas, Piamanyam, authoritativeness, Iti,
finis.
9. The authoritativeness of the Veda (follows) from
its being the Word of God.—370.
Upaskura.—It may be urged : The Veda has been revealed by God,—it is here
that there is conflict of opinions.
Accordingly he says :
‘Tti ’indicates theconclusionof the Sastra or system. Theauthori­
tativeness, ‘amnayasya,’ of the Veda, (is derived), ‘vachanat,’fromits
being the composition, ‘tena,’ by Isvara. For, thus, we havealready-
proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuchas theyarea
collection of sentences or declarations. Nor canweandothers possibly
bethespeakersof them,divided andsub-dividedastheyareinathousand
branches, for theytreat of objects whichtranscendthesenses, andbeings
of our nature cannot beholdobjects whichtranscendthesenses. More-
/ oydr, theV edas must havebeenspokenbyatrustworthyperson, inasmuch
i s they are accepted by m en of light andleading. That whichisnot
spoken by a trustworthy person, is not accepted by menoflight and
leading, the Vedas are accepted by men oflight andleading, therefore
u( % > j h 1
\ -& x. “N* * y a,
/
J
K AN AD A S&TRAS X , 2-9.
____________ ______________
fel ,
k y tk m

theyhave beenspokenbyatrustworthyperson. Tobespokenbyatrust­

worthypersonis tobedeclaredbyaself-governedor independent person;
and to be accepted bymenoflight and leadingis tobebelievedin, and
acted upon, by persons attached to all thesystems of thought. It has
been stated before that non-appearance of the fruit or result, which
occasionally happens, is due todefect or flawinthe act or performance,
the agent, and the means or requisites. If it be deniedthat this isso,
there being no recollection on the part of theagent; wereplythat the
denial has no value, it having been alreadyprovedthat there isrecol­
lection on the part of the agent. The composition thereof byHimis
proved, inasmuchastheycould bedeclaredonlybyan independent person,
while such independent power to declare the Vedas intheir thousand
branches is, as has beensaid, impossiblefor beings of our nature. More­
over, since certitude must be the product of excellenceor superiority,
the certitude derived from the Vedas must alsohaveexcellencefor its
condition, and the excellence must inthis casebe pronouncedtobeonly
the speaker’s accurate knowledge of the true meaningof thesentences.
The speaker of the Veda must, therefore, beoneof that description, one
who has immediate cognitionof heaven, adri$tam andlikeother objects;
andthere isnonesuchbut Itfvara alone. This is well said.—9.
Note.—Cf. I. i. 8, Bupru.
--1--
The fortunate Sankara, whois thesonof Bhavanatha by Bhavdni,
and who isdevotedto the worshipof $iva, has written this commentary
onthe Aphorisms of Kariada.
Even though this production of mine may not findfavour with
others, nay, may be an object of ridicule withthem, yet, (it ishoped),
it will beadoredathousandtimes andover bymypupils, out of respect
for their teacher.
Here ends the secondchapter of thetenthbookinthecommentary
on the Vaiilesika Aphorism by Sri &afikaraMirfra, sonof Mah&mahop&-
dhy&yaBhavanatha Mislra.
Andcompleteis alsothis treatise.
^ -- V\ 7 U-Xl «

A P P E N D IX A.

Index of Aphorism s.
N . B . —Words left out by some editors are shown within brackets.

P age.
qr^rfer&rfqqwjjqf n^^rar
W^TT^ ... III. i. 6 ... ... ... ... 107
^ng^ir^f^^i^rfl^raTer:wfiyM'Rna: ...vii. i. u ... 225
...vo, i.16 ... ... 226
affcrac.fr&wqrftRtqnrrqr^...vi1. i. 11 ... 223

sqmicir ...vii. i. 8 ... ... 220

nfr faM€tani...vii. i. 10 ... ... ... ... 223
STOI%rST*ff ...I. i. 1 ... ... ... 3
sifs* firanr ...ix. ii. 12 ... ... ... ... 324
3Tg<€HH...VI. ii. 12 ... ... ... ... 205
itiyafqf^T%gqq. ...11. i. 11 ... ... ... 65
H5toZfx%*T H^Tr^i^TRH. . . 11. i. 13 ... ... ... 67
%$( fodder*af^mre:... v. i. 4... ... .. 147
uPlW^IFf gRTTtgrTi ...II. ii. 28 ... ... ... 97
...VII. i. 18 ... ... ... ... 227
?TW^iW^l ^Tpt^^ITri; ... VII. i. 5 ... ... ... 211
...IV. ii. 6 ... ... ... 160
...r ii- 11 ... ... ... 18
iRfcR=Ki6Rr e^Frsnf^ ...vii, ii. 9 ... 247
...I. ii. 6 ... ... ... 45
%dftgHqfrEE ...111. i. 7 ... ... ... 107
gqqrsa*f^rafofcr qrasi&ffrF*...if. ii. 6 ... ... 32
qn^TRr^rqmr^?r- ...
fi^FjftcfTFT...V. ii. 17 ... ... ... ... 183
^ *nari%t cfcH^WT^.:.V.ii. 8 ... ... i7g
?iqt^%TiraT%3|W^,IcRH....V-ii 3... ... ... 176
 ^TTWr: ...V. ii. 11 ... ... 179
^nira^CTqt5tr^t^TP^JVT^^qt5T: ...HI. i. 15 ... ... 116
ctafe qrqi =qHgngajfigjari^...vii i. 4 ... ... 210
(W^5)#RRIT ...II. ii.'5 ... ... ... ... 81
^fasncrsr g^r|r ^ 1%arfcr^Fr^Rw ...v,;. 3 ... 165
^sncfFg^^mre^ ^ ...v. i. 5 ... ... ... 166
$nm*...II. ii. 30 ... ... ... 98
...vi. ii. 2 ... ... 199
^JRJcf ...IX- i. 9 ... ... ... 295
...X. i. 4 ... ... ... ... 329
iroaRi Hq^rorarfesR’
qTS^RR^ ...VI. ii. 8 ... ... ... 203
fT^^WL—VllI. ii- 1 ... ... 283
^fWarsj»5JTRi ...IV. i. 12... ... ... ... 155
W&*fcTspqgjflwfis ...VIII. ii. 3 ... ... ... 284
mftRtf 9 ...VI. ii. 7 ... ... .4. ... 203
vnfaflC*SI$WR»lTS*TOfcp...HI. i. 8 ... ... ... 108
uflraT...IV. i. 5 ... ... ... ... 148
?!ft,«ITi?r^lfefq....VII. i. 21 ... ... ... 228
^g€lfcf gfewfcT^V T:...VI. ii. 6 ... ... ... 203
^RTfcT!qmR!^...Vl. ii. 9... ... ... ... 204
*nsricTqrcStfosr S&PTR|;...ViLii. 17 ... ... ... 257

5Tf«iu3r ...I. i- 26 ... ... 33

3WEcram^Ri^if sr ...ix. i. 13 ... ... 300
444^1^fafcT ...IX, ii. 5 ... ... ... 316
<W -iqqfjRSGFyW*-qV=*|iRi<*(,#<4lei ...IX- ii. 2 ... ... 307
^*T^T^T^f^l...lX. ii. 1 ... 304
...111. ii. 14 ... 132
...Hi- ii- I8 ••• ... ... 139
5Vfrf^nWT#T^...III. ii- 9 ... ... 132
...v. i. 6 ... ... ... 167
*HcmyggK*ftg ftTgft sqreqren ...vr. ii. 16 ... ... 207
*lU*HUtH*war*^qwiN^MI^TcUng^Tqr ...IXi, 11, ... ... 298
 ' m,
PaGE^^
ilW R ^ T i flgE HCr e ...IX. ii. 6 ... ... 319
[ WeHWMiqiqUMgfrg ...IX. i. 15 ... ... ... 302
^ itw i^ n r a q n w r fg ^ 1 graft ...v . i. 1 ... ... ... 164
^ > ^ M ig <lilHWr<^IT»rl^3gRT!C ^ T^ ...VI- i. 5 ... ... 191
...V . ii. 15 ... ... 181
rT^siri; ...HI. i. 18 ... ... 121
tfrrozr fo ff* 0 ...III. ii. 1 ... 124
( STT# ) ...H ii. 4 4 ... 88
t o w : ...IX. ii. 13 ... ... ... 324
s>ais.1* ^ I ^Irl5 ...V I ii. 14 ... ... 206
-..Il-'ii- 10 ... ... 85

t g i ...n i, i. 2
... ... 104
...V. i. 16 ... ... 172
8w t ... X. i. 1 ... 326
*Tcr- *r (^franr;) ...v n . ii. 26 ... ... 266
1SRRT 5PBT1 ...VII. i. 1 ... ... ... ... 209
3rtgr W ffqgrW f f f g-%3 5WK«i TrfprflTfrr (aFWTtW) ...T. i- 7 ... 20
^TUSTT ?pBT: ...1. i. 13 ... ... ... ... 26
Ufl><U<AHT^...VII. i. 12 ... ... ... ... 224.
m><*U+H5T^fctre| *T ...VII. ii. 6 ... ... ... 236

anW rP ...VII. ii. 3 ... ... ... ... 235

...VII. ii. 21 261
QTf^T wwftftr r rf^ h tF r ^ t^ T t ...X. i. 7 ... 331
...VII. i.7 ... ... ... ... 219
H3^5?T?grr5r 5[^?ni ...II. ii- 23 ... ... ... 95
...1. i. 17 ... " 29

^g<ffi<a^r^Wn a ^ ...v i i . ii- 8 ^ ... ... ... 238

?|»nT^ STT^TTrlT: ...V . ii. 22 ... ... 187
JpJr% ¥TT^ xT fTFT sqfT^ir?rn ...IV. i. 13 ... 355
q^R f^il'rKI&Tpt aiR^naTH ...U . ii- 16 ... ... ... 89
H?jR idc4J<q3gTh*l...VII, i. 3 ... ... ... 210
saiTWcP ...VII. ii. 10 ... ... ... 249
qgft sqnsqra^...TX. ii- 3 ... ... ... 310
ojta w w i^ i4 ^ i^ r a q i ...v i. i. 12 ... 196
\ nyfo.Ti*
. / T>.ki.^ i«
— vy ’ x AGrft.
^"*tcfrr g3SRq$taf35TP3^ ...VTI. i. 17 ... ... ... 226
5*nWcT: ...TX. i. 8 . . ... ... 294
t^TwimTs^msirrm...n. ii. 3 ... ... ... so
^ sfi^rrar ^ ...i-i-li .. ... ... 25
wftfa: Wftlftj ...VII. ii. 24 ... ... ... 266
w#fo: w;*£tf!tg%fw ^rirgw^xmwftrfrr...vn, ii. 12 ... 255
wrirra s^aar ?pir sqrewcro ...vn, i.15 ... ... 225
W&f ¥T R T r^...I- ii. 15 ... ... ... 49
wrofi^w’ij: wfrgfrrg-g; ...ir. i. 24 ... ... ... 74
#i^rt »rrwrr: ...vjr. i. e ... ... 212
WTOWTOsmerrore ...x, ii. 6 ... ... ... 335
WTOMC^Iri;WTOTW^T*! ...VIF. ii. 22 ... ... ... 265
W^anfSTW...VII. i. 9 ... ... ... ... 222
wtotot^ w^rraTsn ...iv. i. 3 ... ... ... 147 .*
WTOfafcT SRm?TJT^Fnt!;...X. ii. 1 ... ... ... 332
WTO^HTF# sFT^^rt ^wfowTOJfTh.1...I- i. 31 ... ... 36
wro ?jw; ...v. ii. 24 ... ... ... 188

...I. ii. 1 ... ... ... 36

wroTErmw^ wro?fiffra wri
5r^p«wraf^...vin. i. 1 1 ... ... ... 280
TO&W55? ...VII. i. 25 ... ... ... ... 231
WTO*W355...V . ii. 26 ... ... ... ... 189
WTO*W*FJr*;W#n%...X- ii. 3 ... ... ... 334
wt^ w** ...x. ii. 5 ... ... ... 335
WE#W&TRT^ ...III- i. 10 ... ... ... 109
w^wrm^wl^^cerraRitwI^yw^ * fireret ...yii. ii. 7 ... 237
W#ff=P^TW# ...Ll 'u ... .". ... ... 26
*T*Tc*H...II- ii- 13 ... ... ... 88
w^H'crsrrg'fl^ra 51^: ^Wawg'UK...11. i. 25 ... ... 75
Wt#5W^...m. i. 5 ... ... ... ... 106
fforereTTg ...II. i. 12 ... ... ... 66
Wm^^^m^Tf#w^’m#rfcr ...I. i. 15 ... ... ... 27
f5R^HjW4q^lMWI^!TFT^...IX. i. 1 ... ... ... 287
jpnw#5gfpnwfimT^-3?nw6T^f ?t ...vnr. i. 8 ... 278
^ w*ra w&* jjju: ...i. ii. 9... ... ... 47
 l*cv
| i I <■> ¥ l
P age.
3<ti-CT6ig..^Tfsr^,E 3 SilTini^...VILi. i. 4 ... 276
g aic?r^.....vii. ii. J4 ... ... ... ... 256
a p tlw ^ ...!• i. 24 ... ... ... 32
gpn^j ^TS^^Ti 5F?ftfrT; *3rp*B*U^... II. ii. 25 ... ... 90
^ u M 'u arf ^fcrra * ...iv . ii. 3 ... ... ... 158
aTf^g'^UTi ...VII. ii. 25 ... ... ... ... 266
...v. ii. 25 ; VII. i. 24. ... ... 188, 231
Jpntsfa f%*TTaT% ...VII. ii. 15 ... ... ... 256

^T jjw aj ...VI. ii. 3 ... ... ... 200

snfa fai r e r ...v i. ii. i s ... ... ... ... 2m
^ F T ^ ^ ^ R f^ frl^ reT R ': ...VllL i. 3 ... ... ... 275
gr 4<PfiTCt «T ...II- i- 5 ... ... ... ... 58
?fr# ...II. i. 29; II. ii. 8; II. ii. 12 ; VII. ii. 28 ... 77, 83, &7, 269
rT^r: f^fovr . . . iv. ii. l ... 156
gra ...V. ii. 9 ... ... ... 178

cf^ngnT iwssrrggq# . ..v in . i. 2 ... ... ... 273

cTg^Trm^Tg( ^ ^ 5 ...IX. i. 14 ... ... ... 301
cTf^mFtT f^tVTnr: ...VI. ii. 15 ... ... ... 207
gr«iT3»nTs ...l i - 19 ... ... ‘i.. ... 30
...I. ii. 13 ... ... ... 48
?T>4TrTFraFtT ...V. i- 4 ... ... ... 166
eTZIT firw grt ...V. i. 12 ... ... ... 170
gpjr ( sffgnnT stftm i s^rsrt) g ...ll. ii. is ... ... 89
gr«rrs[arRi^3 ngq^wi,...ix. i. 12 ... ‘ ... ... 299
grarrefrstT srepar ...v r u . ii. 6 ... ... 285
?TOT «pW r^...VII. ii. 2 ... ... ... ... 234
i-TElT Slfctai: ...VI. i. 4 ... . ... ... ... 191
cT^TWTT% ...IX- i - 7 ... ... ... 293
cT?lT ^ ...X. ii- 4 ... ... ... 334
?ror ftpi; ... v i . i. 13 ... ... ... 197
<T«IT ^ren ...IX. ii. 7 ... ... ... ... 320
gr«3T ...v. i. 2 ... ... ... 165
?Tf5SSWH...IX. ii. 11 ... ... ... ... 323
gr fesrfr ...v i. i. ... ... ... 194
?! foqfl ...VI. i. 9 ... ... ... ... 195

- * ■**i
® • J l

SJTOFrcm)—T- 1 3 ; x. ii. 9. ... ...7, 338

d f e f r > W g ^ ( lt rqi ...v . ii. 2 ... ... ... 175
ii. 16 ... 182 r
r T ^ m i V d l ^ ^ ^ - T ^ f r r ...II- i 31 ... ... ... 78
dqqW WflgiW ...VII. i. 23 ... ... ... ... 230
?r<?wr% ?r%r*mn^TOTf¥i^R ft m ...v . ii. is ... ... 184
...ll i. 21 ... ... ... 73
eRKJdlPH ...VI- ii. 11 ... ... ... ... 205
d^lfd^frO Utfl*&fyf4;FRITH>...X. i. 3 ... ... ... 328
...II- i. 17 ... ... ... ... 70
wrisrofow?* ...in . ii. 8 ... ... ... ... 132

fe fq . ...IV. i. 2 ... ... ... ... 146

■ ctct -^ c ^ w gir^ srrjdT ...n r, ii. 2 . 1 1 1 . ii. 5 ... 126, 13 1
cTW ...VI, i. 8 ... ... ... 194
...iv . i. 10 ... ... ... 154
...n . ii. 22 ... 95
3 % ^ 5 | T ^ % » T T ^ . . . V . i. 14 ... ... ... 171
( rlFSra ) 3WcTT .. .II. ii- 4 ... ... ... ... 81
cfar#r sfyjw^rercTnra ,..v . ii. 2 0 ... ... ... 1 8 6
(^ ) «TOWra^...-lT-i. 3 ... ... ... ... 57
& ‘T^TrTll. ...IV. i- 9 ... ... 152
^ »«114 . 3 ... i i . i- 7 ... 59
...V. ii. 21 ... ... 187
5 5 * f^?in n n ....vi. i. 7 .... ... ... ... 194
££* Sr ...u . ii. 18 ... ... ... ... 91
fo f ^ ...in . ii. 1 1 ... 135
ftCT?2H%FjRHf ?ST«T% ...VI. ii. 1 ... ... 198
? 2 Ht ...x . ii. 8 ... ... 336
f^Fd T ^ ...VII. i. 13 ... ... ... ... 224
ySg ...VIII. ii. 2 ... ... ... 283
TT^SfcT SRSR: ...111. ii. 12 ... 136
^ T ft (sggFPS) ...111. ii. 15 ... 138
5^c(it(1 4^. ...^ • 11. 4 ... ..<• ... ... 176
(3[s^«n ^irr) 3fai ^T^sr srr«T a^...l. i. 18 ... ... 30

sren ...I. ii. 8 ... ... ... 46

i. 9 ^ ... ... 24
^ N .
Page.
s^sr jpj^* gafer* ^ *nw*rrft fr&sra* ...1 . ii. 5 ... ... 43
jfcq^Sni^STflr^ ¥n%?(anWrP ...VIL. ii. 27 ... ... 269
STPJ^rotn^sAir^r ...II. i. 28; II. ii. 7; II.ii. 1L 76, 83, 87
saipntsr^ ftfOTi «wr*m...r. i 23 ••• ••• ••• 32
^TTptise^rrerorrr^ »pirer jprereq.... I. i.10 ... ... 24
(3^5!^^) ...I. i. 16 ... ... ... 28
sF* ^rfig4lW»wft^IH>...VllI. i. 7 ... ... ... 278
3[%5rT5r55nrwcn^...vTi]i. i. i ... ... ... 271
5T%q«srrawrai|‘ ...VIII. ii. 4 ... ... ... 284
se^rfen7Rf»RW5...vm. i. 10 ... ... ... 280
3$Rg STff^KflT^...If. ii. 33 ... ... ... 99
wmt ^T^mfiraFTra ... I. i. 25 ... ... 33
OTqrqtsnajWrr ...[.i. 4 ... ... g
...IV. ii. 7 ... ... ... ... 161 )|
...IX ii. 9 ... ... ... ... 322
* * ggHt ^ WglL^ (qtgt) ...IT. i.10 ... ... 65
^SiT&nSC*fcWTO^...II. ii. 29 ... ... ... 98
...I. ii. 2 ... ... ... 138
faros...m.ii. 17 ... ... 139
^ g[ai ^ rofa...r. i. 12 ... ... ... 25
31
irrft qRWrb^T^TTri;...II. ii. 24 ... ... ... 96
5Trf€!s£t ffa ...IX. i. 10... ... 296
^Tqft*R3R53...YiL. i. 20... ... ... ... 228
ii. 27 ... ... ... 97
fafafaW*...VII.i.l9 ... ... ... ... 227 „
...II ii. 9 ... ... 84
fatsprri sr%^T^ftTfer(^qrT^nr5T€5rtefn.)...n. i. 20 ... ... 72
ftforon^...VlI.ii, 16 ... ... ... ’** 257
^1T^; ...V. ii. 23 ... 187
...vii. ii. 4 ... 236
^dfa^lf^HfadFS ...V. i. 10 ... ... J^gg
«k*ArT^A«KTft;dm^wki^tuc
e^ra^grrc^ ...y. i. ]7 ... ... m
I l l <- ’ <SL
P age.
...v, n. g ... ... ... 177
^T^^FTr^T^t ...v. ii. 1 ... ... 175
^^nr^-..7 i-8 ••• ••• 168
^mgrr^si^i^rr^ ...n. i. 26 ... ... ... 75
wqrroqftrt m<h i *ji3iy *<5T3T*qf arrwcr; ...vn. ii. 23 ... 266
JprffftTCE STffen...VI. i. 10 ... ... ... ... 195
ijwr^T: JHUPrlTTSITf^T3P5T ... II. ii- 1 79
gpjssrrf^^M^'W^iwd^raft i:M\ Pr sr r aj . . . v n. i. 2 ... . . . 209
^T&7f^TTrJTTJR*fcT(jpaiTfol) ...I- i- »■ ... 17
tan srrgaR*fc=srapaoraq[ ...v. ii. 1 2 ... ... 180
sr^RfriRT^ ^aragfeiR...n i- 1 9 ... ••• •••
^PTCqTSaHISRlTf^qSBTRBfr * •••1V-11 “
smrrra^T^...ii-ii-34 ... ... ••• •••
sR^rr%naimwT^Fmm':5^q; ...iii-‘i-3 ... •••
=5TSRPTTRfafa>«pr^ 119 ... ••• '“•)
st%3t t ...in. i. 1 ... ••• ••• ••• ^
^ gTfsr^Twrsr
(mmStt fofTfa) ...in. ii. 4 ... ••• ••• 127
5^r<jogT ...VI-i-1 ••• — ••• }* 9
Sjf^jsgff S^fcTi ...VI. i. 3 ...
srrfras^TRuft ...VI-i. 2 ... ... ••• 190
3PPiHs^rc3Tra T...v i- i i - 4 •*• ••• ••• 2t)*
|fJrcrTr^t1l«tr<4ft^...I- “• 1••• ••• ”' 4°
rospraCT ...III- i- 12 ... ... ••• "• 110
V$1 ...HI- i- 13 ... — — — ll0r
Jj^^T^JI^drSTPit ^n^TTTTrqgT^ ...VIII. ii. 5... ... 285
«RT?n^...VII. ii. 5 ... •••_ ••• —^
WlNlJR^5?lfiTOr^<U'HSsi'M<*o<l>*Iv... V 7.i- 15 ... ... 1
' ...iv. i. 6 ... ... ... 149
...IX- i- 5 ... ... —290
^ ^5Er^TmarT?;?^'feff* ...Hi- ii- 6 ... 131
z& IS fg F & iW W 'M z-i STsufr ...I. i. 2 ... ... 5
*Rcrm%sr^i^5^...v. i. 13 ... ... ••• 170
...II. ii*I9 ... -•• ••• 9i^
I I I ’S L
■ P age.
errTS^li ...VI. ii. 5 ... 201
?rf^ ffcT...III- ii. 10 ... ... 13^
tTCTT?»gn...III- i- 16 ... ... ••• 117
cRflTf ^jNirRT' ?^^im•*•17 ... H7
^f^'=TOT^TfT^RT^RJiy^r! *T{cRI%...VII. ii. 13 ... 255
(^ralT)...lL i. 1 ... ... ... 51
ii. 1 ... ... 233
^rcsasmqli'MRuPr
qrccmw% ^551$^ $RWT%r(gyrr:) i. i. o ... Id
rei*«»T:...II.i. 2 ... ... 55
^TRt W^...P i- 28 ... ... ... ... 34
fefraTFRJO«mp...II. ii- 32 ... ... ... 99
SR^T^STTefI'<$.££ *1RHJ^...n. i. 15 ... ... 68
5tRTr%f^^...lL i-14... ... ... 68
f^5^TTcrsr ^^...n. ii. 20 ... ... ... 93
^FiT^F!8^1HI^TOWqT!gTcgff...VIT. i. 22 ... .*. ... 229
{^TS^rf ¥*^...111. i- 11 ... ... ... 109
firfcr^3ncH9TPT?%...VI. i. 16 ... ... ... 198
firm# sRf«ara:srF%^T^i: snrerraTpjfcr
II. i. 8 ... ... .., 61
§qfe$ra...IV. ii. 11 ... ... ... ... 162
^...V. ii. 10 ... ... ... ... 179
i- 22 ... ... ... ... 31
ssfsr*sTcft vrntr...Tii. ii. 20 ... ... ... ... 143
SW&rT: (^raart)*^?...!!. ii. 2 ... ... ... 80
..II. i. 30 ... ... 77
5l^«rW^TR^Il...Vn. ii. 18 ... ... ... 252
siTnp*njmra...Hi. ii. 21 ... ... ... ... 144
^Nrrp!rr%Ts^:^T(^;)...It- iJ- 21 ... . ... ... 94
*rararf..JX. i. 4 ... ... ... ... 289
srfcr^ i. 5 ... ... ... 330
ii. 26 ... ... ... ... 96
grerfirg[W%?t%t%wra^RWNi&^re$q,3f^...iv. i. 7. ... 150
i. 1 ... ... ... ... 145

gfejtt*...!. i. 8 ... ... ... ... 23

f( I | <* > ^ )[
V\ P age.
w p a ^ .i,ix . i. 2 ... ... ... ... 288
5T%fcT ^n~ ( ^TtlT )...I. ii. 7 ... ... 46

q ^lfrlCtegp ...IV. ii. 10 ... ... ... ... 162

«fiH»V|^UWTO ...III. ii. 13 ; III. ii. 16 ... ... 136,138
SI&PW STfcT ...II. ii. 36 ... ... ... 101
«wRm!%*irarar...ii. ii- 35 ... ... ... 101
H w m : s s l^ r r ^ ^ p r s r ^ ... v i i i . i. 9 279
Q raqrarara ...iv . ii. 8 ... ... ... ... i e i
^ WRtrm? ipsiFtT ...v i. i. 15 ... ... ... 198
Hf%: ...VI. i. 11 ... ... ... 196
*rmissrqt...H. i- 6 ... 59
gnnEre>: ^fs^ja^rir: ...v n . ii. 20 ... ... ... 258

) .. . 11. ii. 17 ... 89

sm gJinaftg v i i i . i. 6 ... ... ... 277
qW W faflqraFfa 5T ...I. ii. 10; I. ii. 12; I. ii. 14 ; I. ii. 16 47, 48, 49
’W *n*«ilei£Pil*U'ilTl?T<MH,...V1I1. i. 5 ... 276
^nUF^T ^fcT ...i- i i - 3 ••• ••• ■•• 39
ii. 19 ... ... 142
^<ai%P6 ...V I. ii. 10 ... ... ... ... 204
^TCTqtsr* ...III. i- 3 ... ... ... ... 105
^rrarsicn ...n . ii. 37 ... ... ... 102
qfcm-unfa ywif^TThT ^
...IV. i. 11 ... ... ... ... 154
-HWR**! cci-JbMfeJLl^.1CTWT ...P . i- 18 ... ... ... 70
#9raT4HlRrSrT^...lV. ii- 9 ... ... ... 162
...X . ii. 7 ... ... ... 336

an w cr: ...VII. ii. 11 ... ... ... ... 255

yinoPj-HF'I'^TRT i- 20 ... ... ... 31
...I. i. 30 ... ... ... 36
...II- i- 23 ... ... ... 74
^ F I I5T ...X . ii. 2 ... ... ••• •** 333
...H* ii- 31
^FlTR tsea?R ...I- i - 27 - — — — 34
?a^FT T W % !F^’F R T i...V . i. 7 ... ... ... 167
C-
<*
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\\,%
\'v>-----i--.=.y.<<!•/ / (' xi
. © r
7) j l .—a

P age.
fqRfrfm ...V II. ii. 19 ... ... 258
...i n . i. 9 ... ... 108
^ R r ^ 6 r 6 g r ^ r a iw s r 9 R P r n ^ ^ [: ...X . i. 2 ... ... 327
#^RTCT¥rr% g ^ r^ qrRH,...v , i. 18 ... ... ... 174
...IT. i. 4 ... ... ... ... 58
STOKT ?n%: ...II. i. 9 ... ... ... ... 62
^ m ^ i* H ....I X .ii. 8 ...# ... ... ... 321
ILKEKTfoingrRSR^ anWrTH,...v. i. 1 1 ... ... ... 169
Hwwiku JRH5 *3$anwcru... v. ii. 14 ... ... 181
q t s m u ...V I. i. 14 ... ... ... ... 197
STOTO „*IX. ii. 4 ... ... 314

V\ ; . •"■ ' ■;■ :.v;v

It iii
* . *•i)•.:
 A P P E N D IX B.
Different Readings and Interpretations, as given by Professor Chandrakanta
Tarkdlankdra of Calcutta.

Jrofessor Chandrakanta
--------observes, under I. i. i : The classification of Dharma, Merit or
eritorious acts, is not shown by Kandda, as it does not fall within the scope
i his philosophy; for, he has undertaken the &dstra with the purpose of
eaching tattva-jndaarip,, knowledge of truth, only.
------- -comments on I. i. 2 : Wherefrom does the production of the Good and
he Ultimate Good result ? The production of the Good and the Ultimate
iood results from Pravritti, activity or employment, that is (observed in the
/orld as) exertion of speech, mind, and the body, [herein, it is said, that
person cultivates Dharma with the speech, by telling agreeable and whole­
some truths and studying the sacred writings; with the mind, by showing
ompassion, contentment, and faith; with the body, by practising charity and
elieving the poor and the distressed and those who are in danger. SRfa
1SOTPWT vw fl% This text of the Veda also shows that Dharma is
le designate of the word, ‘ Yajati,’ to perform (sacrifices, &c.)
--------introduces I. i. 4 : Dharma presents two* aspects, that is, under
he characteristic of Pravritti or worldly activity, and the characteristic of
Nivritti or withdrawal from worldly activity. Of these, Dharma, characterised
by Nivritli, brings forth ta/tva-jfidnam or knowledge of truths, by means of
emoval of sins and other blemishes. Hence.
-— — and observes : (1) Here the separate enumeration of Sdmdnya, etc., is
unnecessary, on account of their non-divergence ; for, Sdmdnya, etc., falling, as
'hey do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their separate
mention, Jiowever, is justified on the possibility of difference in the mode of
reatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing in their methods, are taught
for the benefit of embodied souls, differing from one another. This is, then, the
Vai&esika System, of which the distinctive features are Sdmdnya, etc,, as are,
in the other (Nydya) System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof
and the Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand
apart by means of Sdmdnya and the other Predicables; and so it is called
the Vaiiesika System. Otherwise it would be merely an Upanisat teaching
Adhyatma-vidyd, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * * * Samanyam ’
means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error arise from
observation of) Sdmdnyam and from non-observation of Vigesa or (distinctive)
peculiarity. Observing the common properties, altitude and extension, of a
pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant of their differentia, one feels the
loubt whether it be a pillar or a person; error also arises in this w a y : observing
 n (ci
* , _ *' ■
sXy_ the^commun property only and in consequence of fault or .imperfection
one mistakes a pillar for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece ot silve
False cognition, again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason tha
‘ S&manyam’ has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is include
in Substance, etc. ‘ Vi^esa ’ is that by which a thing is reduced to itself
False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common propert
is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property: whence arise
correct knowledge, which is called taftva-jftdnam. * * 8 For this reaso
1 Vi^t-sa ’ is separately mentioned, although it is included in Substance, eti
If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined in particular ways, come
to be used as ‘ Sam anyam ’ and ‘ Vi^esa,’ then it falls within (the class ol
A'tributes. Or, if these are mere technical names, then they are not additions
Predicables. * Samavaya ’ means complete approximation, i.e., identification
as it lias been said, ‘ SarnavSya ’ is inseparable existence. * * * ‘ SamavAyr
is an attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either character
ised as plurality or characterised as difference.in kind. It inheres in Substance
and does not possess Attribute ; nor is it a form of Action. Now, birth mean
a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body, the senses, and th>.
feelings. Thereafter the Jiv a errs that the S elf has no separate existenc.
from the body, etc,, in consequence of which a person transmigrates an,
Suffers a multitude of pains, and on the cessation of which he is liberated, th,
stream of his sufferings being dried up. Hence 1 SarnavSya,’ though inciudt
in Attributes, is separately mentioned.
(2) There are other Predicables also, viz., pramana, Proof; prameyu
Provables; samSava, Doubt; prayojana, Purpose ; dnpdnta, Instance ; siddhdnta
Tenet; avavava, Member (of a syllogism ); tarka, Confutation (or Reasoning)
nirnaya, Ascertainment; vada, Discussion; jalpa, Wrangling ; vitandd, Cavilling;
hetvabhdsa, Fallacy ; chhala, Equivocation ; jati, Showing the futility of the mark
of inference ; and nigrahn-sthana, Ground of Defeat or Opponent's Error.
These too come under the Predicables of Kandda,
(3) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the
Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. Falst
knowledge about the Seif, etc., is of various kinds, e.g., the sense of Non-Egc,
in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego.
--------observes, under I. i. 5 s The separate mention of Time and Space
is intended to indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according to
the difference of the effects. Kka&a, though it is one, still admits of a variety
of names and uses, according to the difference of effects. It is not that Time
and Space are essentially different objects from Akaga, Ether.
------- interprets I. i. 13, to mean that an attribute sometimes destroys its,
cause, (e.g., in chemical compounds), and sometimes does not destroy i
(e.g., in physical compounds or masses).
-------- observes, under I. i. 1 5 : Although the S elf is void of action, i.e.-
change, still it appears to possess action by the action of the mind or interna
r[ ^ )'Jy i» VST
'Vv5g1'jjgan of sense, in the state of its phenomenal existence; and hence it is called
a Substance.
------- -reads I. i. 19, as Ubhayalhd gundh instead of as Tathd gunah and,
interprets it to mean that Attributes sometimes become the cause of Substance,
Attribute, and Action, and sometimes do not.
--------reads I. i. 21 and 22 as one aphorism,
and interprets it thus : Action does not become the immediate cause of
substances. Why ? In consequence of its cessation. For, when a Substance
becomes what it is, at that moment cessation of Action takes place. Action
n the constituent pares of a Substance ceases on conjunction, and the
Substance becomes what it is. Action, therefore, is not an immediate cause
in the production of Substances. What the author means to say is, as the
expression shows, that the mediate causality of Action in the production of
Substances is not refuted.
_____ introduces I. ii. i,a s follows : Predicables called Substance, Attribute,
d Action have been mentioned. Their Sam dnya or common characteristic
been stated. Their Videsa or distinctive ctiaracteristic, again, follows from
contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for the pro-
jtion of tatlva~jfldna. The Supreme Good results from tativa-jfidna. This is
mvarga, Salvation. But what is its characteristic form? How does It
ipear ? —All this is now being described.
And explains the same to mean: Non-existence of the effect, e.g., the
mils (namely, desire, aversion, and infatuation), etc., (results) from non-
xistence of the cause, e.g., false knowledge (e.g., the idea of the Self in the
lot-Self), etc. “ Thus, Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false knowledge,-on the
uccessive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one
ext before the other,” (Nyaya Sutram, I. i. 2), the ultimate consequence being
emancipation, the return of the Self into its own nature.
--------introduces I. ii. 2, as follows: The aphorism is meant for them who
hink that apavarga is mere absence of pain.
And explains it thus: Non-existence of the cause, vte., birth, etc., does
not follow from non-existence of the effect, viz., pain. Birth, etc., therefore, may
still take place even when no pain exists. If birth, etc., are thus possible,
then there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of the
causes of pain. Apavarga, accordingly, does not lie in the mere absence of
ain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting in the order of the
ccessive non-existence of false knowledge, etc.
--------explains I. ii. 8, thus: Existence is a different ‘ object’ from Substance,
\ttribute, and Action. Substance, Attribute, and Action are called objects (VIII.
ii. 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it is not contained
n the ascertained classes of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Hence it is
lid to be a different object from them, (the known classes).
-------- reads I. ii, 17, with the omission of the word linga in vifcga-linga-
hdv&t.
/rx'- V\ ’ __

f ( |) | - §L
reads 11. i. 2$ as. two aphorisms, via., Also because of the non-
appearance of different effects {kdrya-antara-aprddurbhdvdt cha), and Sound (is)
npt an attribute of tangible things (iSabdah sparsavatdm agunah),—the meaning,
however, remaining the same.
------- observes, under II. i. 27, that the idea of Kandda is that Time as well
as Space are really identical with Ether.
—observes, under II. ii. 1 2 : According to Kandda, it appears, there is
but one Substance, variously called as Ether, Time, and Space. For, he has
taken much pain to establish the difference of Ether from tangible things, Self,
and Mind, but die has made no attempt to prove the difference of Ether from
Time and Space as well. Nor has he attempted to prove the difference of Time
and Space themselves from any other Substance. It may be, therefore, con­
sidered that with the difference o f Ether, the difference of Time and Space also
has been established. But it may be asked, if there be one Substance only,
how does it come to be variously called as Ether, Time, and Space ? He replie
that this is due to the variety of effects produced by it (II. ii. 13) and also
the varieiy of external conditions attending it (II. ii. 14, 15, and 16).
—.— reads II. ii. 34 as Pralhamd-ddi&abddt while the meaning reinr
unchanged. (Adi=and others, e.g., the second).
--------reads ll. ii. 36 as simply sandigdhdh. supplying for himself the reasf
for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of if to II. ii 37, and interpre
-it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enunv
ration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types.
--------interprets III. i. 3 to mean that the sense or the object cannot be
mark for the inference of the Self.
—----- reads HI. i. 5 and 6 as one aphorism, and explains it in the sense tin
as cognition is found within one effect, e.g„ the body, and is not found withii
another effect, e.g., a ja r, therefore, it follows that there can be no cognition ii
their combinative causes (which must be the same in both cases).
--------explains III. i. 7. thus : Something quite different is the mark 01
inference of the S e lf; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this
‘something quite different’ is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism of this
chapter.
------- -splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms : “ Aprasidhah anapadedah ”
and “ Asansandigdhah cha anapadedah."
--------reads the words ‘ bhdvah ’ and ‘ abhavah ’ in III. ii. 1 in a compound
form as 1 bhdvdbhdvah.’
— __— observes that in III. ii. 6—17, the author gives, in the form o f .
dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the Self be an object of perception
only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own conclusion in III. ii. i?
------- -Interprets III. ii. 19, 20, and 21 in the monistic sense, namely, th
there exists only one Self, variously differentiated on the phenomenal plane,
witnessed by such texts as “ One only, without a second,” “ One shining Bei
v .
:f(\jC--■%<*/ ...
1 1
' v '<"s l
is immanent in all created things,” “ All Selves become one,” “ All Selves em&-
nate from this, same Self,” “ Two birds,” etc.
•--- —prefers to read IV. i. 3, 4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, viz., kdrana-
bhavat kdryabhavo' nilya id,’ and Videf atah pratifedhabhavo'vidya,' and interprets
them to mean, respectively, “ The nature of the effect, (though) following from
the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is non eternal,” and “ It is an error
to suppose that because things (eg., atoms) exist as effects (e.g , compound
bodies), therefore they cannot exist in the causal (or atomic) state,” —in order to
explain the application of the word “ non-eternal” in I. i. 8 where the reference
is to things which are products.
.,
-------- reads IV. ii. 3 as two aphorisms, viz “ Gundntarapr ddurbhdvaehcha,"
and " N et trydtniakam."
-------- reads in V. i. 7, Saniskdra in the place of Samyoga .
--------explains adrigta in V. ii. 2 in the sense of unseen natural forces, the
causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the terrestrial globe round
the sun, and of other actions in Earth.
-------- splits up V. ii. 8 into two aphorisms, viz., Apdm Sahghatal}, and
Vilayanancha lejah samyogat.
------- cuts off Vidyatevd'rthdntaratvdt yatnasya from VI, ii. 8, and reads it
as a separate aphorism.
-------- interprets V II. i. 16 to mean that minuteness and magnitude may be
predicated of action and attribute.
-------- takes the word partmandala in VII. i. 20 in the sense of perfect
sphericity,
and introduces VII. i. 22 as giving examples of it, which may be both small
and large.
?>— —— e x p la in s VII. ii. 5 as demolishing the view contained in VII. ii. 4,
and explainsmAl, ii. 6, in support of the above interpretation ofV II. ii. 5,
thus! Did not u n i|^ x ist everywhere, ther$ would be no ohaltfi, production, of
things at all. F o ^ an y one thing is the joint product1 of several things; but
ther§ can be no such production in the absence of one-ness or unity; unity,
therefore, exists in all places. v
----- —reads VII. ii. 12 as two aphorisms, viz., Karmabhirkarmdni gunair-
gttndlj, and Ayutvamahallvdbhyamiti, and explains them in the same way as
X VII. i. ,6.
------- reads VII. ii. 24 and 25 as one aphorism.
------ -interprets VII. ii. 28 to mean that Combination is proved to be an
attribute in the same way as is existence, and further, that, like existence, Com­
bination also is produced by itself, i.e„ deos not depend upon any other Combi-
tation for its production.
— — observes, under VIII. i. 2, that among substances, Self, Mind, and
ther are not objects of perception. i
-------■ reads VIII. i. 9 as two aphorisms, viz., Samavdyinah Svaityachchh-
ya buddhe&cha ivete buddhili, and Ta ete karyakdranabhdte. f .
 - ■ (2 t
Ik J tjl w j
*— — introduces the topic of Non-Existence with the observation that Non-
Existence is not the seventh predicable, inasmuch as absolute non-existence,
e.g., a castle in the air, is not a predicable at all, while non-existence of the
existent, in the forms of non-production, destruction, and absence of identity,
cannot exceed the number of the six predicables.
--------interpreter IX . i. 2 and 3 to mean that whatever is non-existent prior
to its appearance as an effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but
is really existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is
essentially different from absolute non-existences.
--------concludes the first chapter of the ninth book with the observation that,
in the view of Kandda, there are only three independent and ultimate predicables,
namely, Substance, Attribute, and Action, for, while describing the process of
yogic cognition of all realities, he deals with these three predicables only, and is
entirely silent with regard to the other so-called predicables.
--------reads Salt cha of X . i. 5 as a sepaiate aphorism, and explains it thus :
Cognition arises, Sati, ie., in respect of objects actually existing at the moment.
Cognition accordingly relates to past, present, and future objects. But this is
not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein also, therefore, there is difference
between cognition, oh the one hand, and pleasure and pain, on the other.
-------- reads Ekadeie iti of X . i. 7 with X. i. 6, and explains it as giving an
additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms of cognition, the
meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised in the body, whereas cogni­
tion is not so localised.
_____ reads X. ii. 4 as two aphorisms, viz., Tatha rupe, and K aranai-
kartha-Samavdyachcha.

A c c . f\)o - -

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