Risk Assessment Tutorial Presentation - Banff - 2021pptx

Pipeline Risk Assessment
Fundamentals
KATHY FOX P.Eng.

Dan Williams,
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
Principal Consultant, Dynamic Risk
2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

LOOKING FORWARD TO AN EVEN SAFER FUTURE
Agenda
 Introductions
 Risk Definitions and Concepts
 Pipeline Risk Assessment Concepts
 Guidance from Standards
Check on Questions?
 Pipeline Risk and Reliability Modeling

o Estimating Failure Likelihood
Check on Questions?
KATHYo FOX
Estimating Consequence of Failure
o Societal Risk and Individual
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY Risk
BOARD OF CANADA
 Risk Acceptance Criteria and Presentation of Risk
 Integrating Risk Results into Integrity Management
Check on Questions?

Risk Definitions
and Concepts
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Risk Defined
 Risk is “The chance of loss”

(Concise Oxford Dictionary)
► This definition involves:
Loss Adverse consequences
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Chance Uncertainty regarding the loss

Risk Defined
Risk of a person dying in a car accident 1 in 11,000 per year

Risk of a person dying in a plane crash 1 in 300,000 per year
Risk of a person dying by lightning strike 1 in 5,000,000 per year
 2018 Mariner East 2 Pipeline (NGL) report (public record) indicates that the
KATHY FOX
average person’s exposure to a fatal traffic accident (voluntary risk) is about
20 times greater than the fatality risk to someone standing above the
pipeline 24/7 in Delaware County (involuntary risk).

Risk as Defined in CSA Z662
 CSA Z662:19 – Clause 2.2
oRisk: a compound
measure, either
qualitative or quantitative,
of the frequency and
KATHY FOX severity of an adverse
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY effect.
BOARD OF CANADA

Risk as Defined in ASME B31.8S
 ASME/ANSI B31.8S
Risk: measure of
o
potential loss in terms of
both the incident
probability (likelihood) of
occurrence and the
KATHY FOX magnitude of the
consequences.

Risk Measure
 Risk = likelihood of failure x consequence of failure
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Likelihood of Failure
Likelihood: The chance of something happening, whether
defined, measured, or determined objectively or subjectively,
qualitatively or quantitatively, and described using general
terms or mathematically (such as a probability or frequency
over a given time period).
PHMSA Pipeline Risk Modeling Report 2020
o Likelihood index
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o Probability
o Frequency
o Reliability

Likelihood: Probability & Frequency

 Likelihood Index: a non-quantitative relative ranking or
rating number representing the likelihood of failure level
 Probability: likelihood, or measure of the chance of

occurrence expressed as a number between 0 and 1, where
0 is impossibility and 1 is absolute certainty.
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 Frequency:
CHAIR, Number
TRANSPORTATION of events
SAFETY BOARD or outcomes
OF CANADA per defined
unit of time. Frequency can be applied to past events or to
potential future events, where it can be used as a measure
of likelihood / probability.
Likelihood: Probability & Frequency

 Probability:
o 2/10 chance (0.2, 20%) of failing
 Frequency: 2/10 chance (0.2, 20%) of failing per year

o 2/10 chance of failing per year per kilometer
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Likelihood: Reliability
 Reliability: the probability that a component or system will
perform its required function without failure during a
specified time interval (usually taken as one year), equal to
1.0 minus the probability of failure.
 Reliability = 1- probability of failure

o 8/10 chance (0.8, 80%) of not failing
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Consequence of Failure
Consequence: Impact that a pipeline failure could have on the
public, employees, property, the environment, or
organizational objectives.
PHMSA Pipeline Risk Modeling Report 2020
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Pipeline Risk
Assessment
Concepts
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Risk Assessment as Defined In CSA Z662:19
 CSA Z662:19 – Clause 2.2

o Risk assessment: the
process of risk analysis
and risk evaluation.
KATHY FOX Guidelines for risk

CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY assessment: Annex B
BOARD OF CANADA

Risk Assessment as Defined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S
 ASME/ANSI B31.8S
o Risk assessment: systematic process in which
potential hazards from facility operation are
identified, and the likelihood and consequences of
potential adverse events are estimated. Risk
KATHY assessments
FOX can have varying scopes, and can be
performed atSAFETY
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION varying level
BOARD OFof detail depending on
CANADA
the operator’s objectives (see section 5).

Risk Assessment within Risk Management
 Risk Management is the integrated

process of Risk Assessment and
Risk Control
 Risk Assessment is a component of

Risk Management
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 Risk Assessment incorporates Risk
Analysis and Risk Evaluation
CSA Z662:19

Risk Assessment Objectives

 Identify highest risk pipeline segments
 Highlight pipeline segments where the risk is changing
 Identify gaps or concerns in data quality and
completeness
 Support risk management:
Calculate the benefit of risk mitigation activities
•
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• Support decision making and program development
• Improve system reliability
• Minimize risk to as low as reasonably practicable and
eliminate high impact events
Guidance from
Standards
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Guidance from Canadian Standards
Risk Assessment – Canadian Pipelines
 CSA Z662:19
• Annex B – Guidelines for risk assessment of

pipelines (proposed updates for 2023)
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• Annex
CHAIR, H - Pipeline
TRANSPORTATION failure
SAFETY BOARDrecords: provides
OF CANADA a
classification of the causes of pipeline failure
incidents that can lead to hazards

Guidance from Canadian Standards
 CSA Z662 Annex H

• Hazard — a condition or event that
might cause a failure or damage
incident or anything that has the
potential to cause harm to people,
property, or the environment
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Guidance from U.S. Standards

Risk Assessment - U.S. Pipelines
 49 CFR Part 192 (Gas Pipelines)
• Subpart O Section 192.917

(a)Threat identification. An operator must identify and evaluate all potential threats to
each covered pipeline segment. Potential threats that an operator must consider
include, but are not limited to, the threats listed in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by
reference, see § 192.7), section 2, which are grouped under the following four
categories:
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(1) Time dependent threats such as internal corrosion, external corrosion, and stress
CHAIR,corrosion
TRANSPORTATION
cracking; SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
(2) Static or resident threats, such as fabrication or construction defects;
(3) Time independent threats such as third party damage and outside force
damage; and
(4) Human error.
Guidance from U.S. Standards

Risk Assessment - U.S. Pipelines
 49 CFR Part 192 (Gas Pipelines)
• Subpart O Section 192.917 (cont’d)

(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that
follows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified
threats for each covered segment. An operator must use the risk
assessment to prioritize the covered segments for the baseline and
KATHY FOX continual reassessments ( §§ 192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to
determine what additional
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETYpreventive
BOARD OF andCANADA
mitigative measures are
needed ( § 192.935) for the covered segment.
• No specific changes to risk assessment from

Mega Rule.
Guidance from N.A. Standards

ASME/ANSI B31.8S – Managing System Integrity of
Gas Pipelines
 Provides general guidance on risk assessment

approaches
 Provides specific guidance on threats, safety
consequences and data elements to consider
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 FOX
Incorporated by reference in 49 CFR Part 192
 Referenced in API 1160 (Managing System Integrity for
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines)

Guidance from N.A. Standards

API 1160 - Managing System Integrity for Hazardous
Liquid Pipelines
 Provides general guidance on risk
assessment approaches
 Provides specific guidance on
threats, spill consequences and
data elements to consider
 References ASME/ANSI B31.8S
 Much overlap with API 1160 and
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ASME B31.8S; however, the fact
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
that there are both BOARD
physical and OF CANADA
regulatory differences between
gas and liquid pipelines makes it
necessary to alter the threat
categories to some extent.
Guidance from International Standards

International - ISO Risk Assessment Standards
 ISO 31000:2018, Risk management – Guidelines, provides

principles, framework and a process for managing risk. It
can be used by any organization regardless of its size,
activity or sector.
Using ISO 31000 can help organizations increase the

likelihood of achieving objectives, improve the identification
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of opportunities and threats and effectively allocate and use
resources for risk
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION treatment.
SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
 Adopted by Canada: CAN/CSA ISO 31000 Risk Management

– Principles and Guidelines


International - ISO Risk Assessment Standards (cont’d)
 IEC 31010:2009, Risk management – Risk

assessment techniques focuses on risk
assessment. Risk assessment helps decision
makers understand the risks that could affect the
achievement of objectives as well as the adequacy
of the controls already in place. IEC 31010:2009
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focuses on risk assessment concepts, processes
and the selection of risk assessment techniques.


“Coloured Books” – Dutch Government
 YELLOW BOOK
• Methods for the calculation of Physical Effects Due to releases of hazardous materials (liquids
and gases).
 GREEN BOOK
• Methods for the determination of possible damage to people and objects resulting from
releases of hazardous materials.
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 PURPLE BOOK
• Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment.
 RED BOOK
• Methods for determining and processing probabilities.
Questions?
KATHY FOX

Pipeline Risk
and Reliability
Modeling
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Pipeline Risk Modeling Evolution
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Pipeline Risk Modeling Overview

General Process Overview
 Risk Assessment
Determine failure modes which materially contribute to failure
Data collection, integration and analysis
Determine failure likelihood
Determine consequences
Conduct risk estimation
 Risk Evaluation and Risk Control

Determine risk acceptability
Identify segments requiring risk reduction

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Prioritize where to conduct risk mitigation
CHAIR,Perform
TRANSPORTATION
risk mitigation
SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
Establish performance metrics
Measure performance of IMP

Pipeline Risk Modeling Overview

Risk = f(Failure Likelihood, Consequences)
 Failure Likelihood
o Consideration of all viable threats
• External corrosion
• Internal corrosion
• 3rd party damage
• Manufacturing
• Incorrect operations
• Etc.
o Establish failure likelihood for each viable threat as function of design,
installation and operating environment
 Consequences
o Types of consequences:
KATHY FOX • Safety
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF
•
•
CANADA
Economic
Environmental
• Regulatory
• Corporate Image
• Etc.
o Utilize impact chart as means of equating consequences from
various sources and establishing quantifiable impacts
Pipeline Risk Assessment Scope
 Types of Risk Assessment:

o Site or project specific (e.g., QRA)
o System wide
o New construction; risk based design
o Asset acquisition; due diligence
o Support of engineering assessment

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TheTRANSPORTATION
CHAIR, risk assessment approach
SAFETY BOARD OFneeds to
align with the
CANADA
purpose of the assessment and the supporting data

available.

Pipeline Risk Assessment Scope
 CSA Z662 requires

consideration of
risk assessment as
part of engineering
assessments for
existing pipelines.
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Pipeline Risk Modeling Continuum
Risk Modeling Continuum:

 Risk modeling is a continuum utilizing a range of
qualitative and quantitative approaches and measures of
risk
 Recent guidance on risk modeling (PHMSA Risk Modeling

Work Group):
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https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2020-03/Pipeline-
Risk-Modeling-Technical-Information-Document-02-01-2020-Final_0.pdf


 Qualitative:
• Characterizes risk level without quantifying it
 Quantitative
• Calculates risk level based on quantified estimates of probability and

consequence
 Semi-quantitative (typical use of term in industry; Standards avoid

defining it):
KATHY
1.
FOXMeasure (Output): One of either probability or consequence is based
Risk
on quantified estimates
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION while the
SAFETY BOARD OF other
CANADAis not quantified (e.g., a
quantitative failure likelihood used with a consequence index).
2. Risk Method (Approach): A modeling approach that involves some

combination of quantitative and qualitative methods for obtaining the risk
measure.
Increased accuracy
Qualitative Quantitative
requires increased
Simple data availability, Detailed
accuracy,
Subjective resolution Objective
Relative Absolute
Judgmental Analytical
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Index Methods Probabilistic

Information
Subjective Objective
Risk measure Qualitative Quantitative
Qualitative
Typically based on subjective SME judgment
Objective data and models can provide guidance
Risk estimate
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Quantitative
Can utilize subjective judgment and/or objective information
Typically maximize the use of objective data and models, but
subjective judgment cannot be eliminated
Banff Pipeline Workshop 2019: WG7 Session D

Pipeline Risk Modeling - Qualitative
Qualitative Methods:
► Risk Indices or Categories
• Assign subjective scores based on pipeline
attributes, e.g.:
o Failure Likelihood:
• Probability Score 1-10
• Rare, Unlikely, Possible, Likely, Almost Certain
o Consequence:
KATHY FOX • Impact Severity Score 1-10
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY Minor,
• Insignificant, BOARD OF CANADA
Moderate, Major, Catastrophic
o Risk:
• Risk Score 1-100
• Low, Moderate, High, Extreme

Pipeline Risk Modeling - Qualitative
 Advantages:
o Easy to understand, use and communicate
o Useful for prioritization
o Readily accommodates a broad range of risk attributes
 Limitations:
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o Subjective assignment of attribute weights could be inaccurate
o Difficult to establish acceptability thresholds
o Provides relative measure only within a specific system; not
comparable outside of the system

Pipeline Risk Modeling - Quantitative
Quantitative Methods:
From
-1
1 x 10
► Failure Likelihood: From

1 x 10
-2
o Failure Frequency (failures/km-yr or From

1 x 10-3
failures/yr) From
1 x 10-4
► Consequences: From 0.0
o Numerical Consequences ($ Impact, ≤$100,000

$101,000 up to $1,000,001 up to $10,000,001 up to
>$100,000,000
Fatalities, etc.)
$1,000,000 $10,000,000 $100,000,000
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► Risk:
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY($/km-yr,
o Numerical Impact BOARD OF CANADA
fatalities/km-
yr, barrels/km-yr)


 Advantages:
o Maximizes use of inspection data
o Consistent basis for risk and feature response
o Impact of design, material and mitigation measures on
risk can be quantified
o Can better incorporate uncertainties
Can more readily compare with risk acceptance criteria
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 Limitations:
o Inaccurate or missing data has a large impact on results

o Difficult to combine different measures of risk


 Some typical approaches:
o Reliability approaches
o Fault-tree and event tree approaches
o Incident data-based approaches
o Like-in-kind
Exposure-mitigation-resistance approaches
o
KATHY
o FOX
Geohazard vulnerability approaches

Pipeline Risk Modeling – Data Integration

 Accurate data essential to achieving
objectives
 Need to understand the uncertainties
around the data:
Data
Tool
 Default values are very limiting and

distort risk-prioritized focus
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 Data
CHAIR, needs to support
TRANSPORTATION risk modeling
SAFETY BOARD and
OF CANADA
actionable results
 ILI data supported by validation programs
(API 1163)
Estimating
Failure
Likelihood
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Pipeline Threats and Hazards
 Threat: Potential cause of failure, failure

mechanism.
Hazard: Hazard — a condition or event that might


cause a failure or damage incident or anything that
has the potential to cause harm to people,
property, or the environment. [Used synonymously
KATHY FOX“threat” by some references.]
with


Threats to Gas Pipelines (ASME B31.8S):
Time Dependent:
► External Corrosion
► Internal Corrosion
► SCC
Stable (Resident):
► Manufacturing-Related Defects
► Construction-Related Defects
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► Equipment
CHAIR,
TimeTRANSPORTATION
Independent: SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
► Third Party/Mechanical Damage
► Incorrect Operational Procedure
► Weather Related and Outside Forces


Threats to Gas Pipelines (ASME B31.8S):
 Interactive nature of threats shall be considered
 Pressure cycling and fatigue shall be considered
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Interactive Threats - Gas
Gas: DOT Incidents from Interacting Threats
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US DOT PHMSA Task III.B.3 Final Report, December 30, 2016


Threats to Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (API 1160):
► External corrosion
► Internal corrosion
► Selective seam corrosion
► Stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
► Manufacturing defects
► Construction and fabrication defects
► Equipment failure (non-pipe pressure containing equipment)
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► Immediate failure due to mechanical damage
► Time-dependent
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION failure
SAFETY due toOF
BOARD resident
CANADA mechanical damage
► Incorrect operations
► Weather and outside force
► Activation of resident damage from pressure-cycle-induced fatigue

Interactive Threats - Liquids
Hazardous Liquids: DOT Incidents from Interacting Threats
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Pressure Cycling Considerations
 Impact on resident
features
 Impact on crack
growth
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Pressure Cycling Considerations
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Estimating Failure Likelihood

Threat Assessment:
 Pipeline System Review
• System Maps (alignment, proximity to HCAs)
• Installation Eras (modern vs. vintage materials)
• Products Transported (liquid, gas, crude, refined, sour,
sweet)
• Design Variables (diameters, grades, w.t., stress levels)
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• InstallationSAFETY
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION Procedures
BOARD(welding, NDT, etc.)
OF CANADA
• Operating Factors (stress, pressure cycling, environmental
conditions, Inspection data)


Threat Assessment (cont’d):
 Review Threat Attributes in Consideration of Data and
System Review
• External Corrosion
o Coating type, CP history, Inspection data, Interference, etc.
• Internal Corrosion
o Product composition, Hydraulic regime, Inspection data, etc.
• Third Party Damage
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o Land use, patrol frequency, damage prevention measures, etc.
 Quantitative
• Calculate risk level based on quantified estimates of probability and
consequence


Quantitative Methods based on Incident Data:
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Quantitative Methods based on Incident Data (cont’d):
o In application with appropriate system-specific filtering
(e.g., similar pipe age categories)
Natural Gas Pipelines (PHMSA 2010-2017)
Failure Frequency
Threat (failures/km*yr) 2010- Leak Fraction Rupture Fraction
2017
External Corrosion 1.347E-05 0.49 0.51

Internal Corrosion 5.844E-06 0.57 0.43
Stress Corrosion Cracking 5.082E-06 0.35 0.65
KATHYManufacturing
FOX Defects 5.844E-06 0.43 0.57
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION
Construction Defects SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
8.131E-06 0.69 0.31
Equipment Failure 1.575E-05 0.95 0.05
Third Party Damage 3.202E-05 0.87 0.13
Incorrect Operations 3.049E-06 0.92 0.08
Natural Forces 5.336E-06 0.76 0.24


Quantitative Methods based on Incident Data (cont’d):
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (PHMSA 2010-2017)
Failure
Frequency Leak Rupture
Threat
(failures/km*yr) Fraction Fraction
2010-2017
External Corrosion 5.897E-05 0.9437 0.0563
Internal Corrosion 3.281E-05 0.9873 0.0127
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Stress Corrosion Cracking 3.738E-06 0.5556 0.4444
Manufacturing Defects SAFETY2.741E-05
BOARD OF CANADA
0.8333 0.1667
Construction Threat 1.869E-05 0.9111 0.0889
Equipment Failure 1.059E-04 0.9922 0.0078
Third Party Damage 4.361E-05 0.9429 0.0571
Incorrect Operations 4.195E-05 0.9406 0.0594
Natural Forces 7.060E-06 0.8235 0.1765

Incident Data Approaches:
 Useful when a reliability model cannot be employed or
ILI cannot be leveraged
 Important to consider source of incident data
 Should match characteristics of system being modeled
Gas
KATHY• FOX
• Liquids SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
• Products
• Upstream/Midstream/Transmission/Distribution


PoF approach from Exposure-Mitigation-Resistance:
 “…Exposure (attack) –…defined as an event which, in the
absence of mitigation, can result in failure, if insufficient
resistance exists…
 Mitigation (defense) –…type and effectiveness of every
mitigation measure designed to block or reduce an exposure.
 Resistance – measure or estimate of the ability of the
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component to absorb the exposure force without failure,
CHAIR,once the exposure
TRANSPORTATION reaches
SAFETY the
BOARD OFcomponent…”
CANADA
Muhlbauer, Pipeline Risk Assessment: The Definitive Approach and its Role in Risk
Management, 2015.


Exposure-Mitigation-Resistance Example:
PoF_time-independent = exposure x (1 - mitigation) x (1 - resistance)
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Quantitative Methods based on Models
► Mechanistic models, combined with statistical analysis establishes probability

of failure
Probability (damage resistance < load)
► Leverages ILI data, where

available
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►Often used in conjunction
with Monte CarloSAFETY
analysisBOARD OF CANADA


Monte Carlo Analysis
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► In Monte Carlo Analysis, mechanistic model is known as Limit State Equation

Estimating Failure Likelihood – EC Case Study

► Leverages latest MFL ILI metal loss data
► Approach incorporates corrosion growth since time of inspection
and consideration of tool error (i.e., considers uncertainties)
► The growth from run comparisons can be incorporated along
with different growth rates for specific parts of the system
► The Modified B31G equation serves as the limit state equation
for the POE analysis:
• Modified B31G equation serves as the limit state equation for
the POE
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Depth threshold = 80% NWT

Estimating Failure Likelihood - SCC Case Study

► The modified Ln-Sec and Barlow equations serve as the limit
state equations for the POE analysis.
► Crack growth, tool error and attribute variation is considered in
the analysis.
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Sample Limit State Equations:
► Modified B31G Equation (Corrosion)  NG18 Equation (Cracks)

 d 
   MT  h 
− 8  c   fl
2
 1 0,85  = ln sec 
2
t Kc 
 f =   
d
1 − 0.85 M −1   2   fl 
 t 
► Q-Factor Equation
(3rd Pty Damage) ► EGIG Equation (Dents)
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
 h =  fl 
(Q − C )0.6
SAFETY
 BOARD OF CANADA
2

 C 3 
 All of these models support probabilistic analysis of ILI data

Estimating Failure Likelihood – TPD Fault Tree

No Event Conditions Probability
B1 *Excavation on pipeline alignment Commercial/Industrial 0.52
(function of land use) High density residential 0.26
Low density residential 0.36
Agricultural 0.076
Remote/Water Body 0.06
B2 Third-party unaware of one-call Advertising via direct mail-outs and
(function of method of communicating one-call promotion among contractors 0.24
system) Above + Community meetings 0.10
Community meetings only 0.50
B3 Right-of-way signs not recognized Signs at selected crossings 0.23
(function of placement frequency for signs) Signs at all crossings 0.19
All crossings plus intermittently along route 0.17
B4 Failure of permanent markers No buried markers 1.00
(warning tape) With buried markers 0.10
B5 Third-party chooses not to notify Voluntary 0.58
(function of type of penalty for failure to advise Mandatory 0.33
of intent to excavate) Mandatory plus civil penalty 0.14
Right-of-way agreement 0.11
B6 Third-party fails to avoid pipeline Default value 0.40
B7 ROW patrols fail to detect activity Semi-daily patrols 0.13
(function of patrol frequency) Daily patrols 0.30
Bi-daily patrols 0.52
Weekly patrols 0.80
Biweekly patrols 0.90
Monthly patrols 0.95
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Semi-annual patrols 0.99
Annual patrols 0.996
B8 Activity not detected by other employees Default value 0.97
B9 Excavation prior to operator's response Response at the same day 0.02

(function of response time following advice of Response within two days 0.11
intent to excavate) Response within three days 0.20
B10 Temporary mark incorrect By company records 0.20
(function of marking method) By magnetic techniques 0.09
By pipe locators/probe bars 0.01
B11 Accidental interference with marked alignment Provide route information 0.35
(function of means of conveying information Locate/mark 0.17
pertaining to location of pipeline during Locate/mark/site supervision 0.03
excavation by others) Pipe exposed by hand 0.06
B12 Excavation depth exceeding cover depth Cover depth <= 0.8 m (2.5 ft) 0.42
(function of depth of cover) 0.8 m (2.5 ft) < Cover depth <=0.9 m (3 ft) 0.25
0.9 m (3 ft) < Cover depth <=1.2 m (4 ft) 0.08
1.2 m (4 ft) < Cover depth <=1.5 m (5 ft) 0.07
Cover depth > 1.5 m (5 ft) 0.06

Estimating Failure Likelihood – “Like-in-Kind”

2231
Like-in-kind
2232 3331
Group
Un-inspected pipeline
1.E+00
1.E-03 1.57E-04
Ruptures/km-yr
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FFRgroup

1.E-06 9.20E-08
1.32E-08
1.E-09
Questions?
KATHY FOX

Estimating
Consequence of
Failure
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 Consequence factors most commonly modeled
❑ Safety
❑ Economic
❑ Environmental
❑ Regulatory
❑ Corporate Image
❑ Outage
 Computer models/empirical relationships to establish

❑ Release Rate
❑ Hazard Area
❑ Spill Area
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❑ Damage Area
 Consideration of failure mode:
❑ Small Leak
❑ Large Leak
❑ Rupture


 Main Steps
❑ Identify fluid properties and parameters
❑ Estimate release rate
❑ Model hazard area and probability of hazard (ignition)
❑ Establish public impact
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Natural Gas Pipelines:
PIR = 0.69 P.D 2
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Hazardous Liquid Pipelines:
 Environmental impact determined by modelling
liquid outflow and overland spill
 Spill plume intersects are identified
❑ HCAs, MCAs, DGAs, ESAs
❑ Waterbodies
KATHY FOX
❑ Areas of Habitation
❑ Native territorial lands and reserves


▪ No regulatory body or standard has adopted a
means to quantify environmental impact Proposed:
CSA Z662:23
▪ No acceptance criteria based on quantitative end Annex B
points
▪ Challenges:*
• Limits on ability to • Appropriate units to quantify
accurately model complex ecosystem value
ecosystems • Variability in perception of
• Temporal / seasonal value (native / non-native /
commercial / recreational
KATHY FOX
impacts
user)
Lack of agreementSAFETY
CHAIR,• TRANSPORTATION on BOARD OF CANADA
assumptions • Social / cultural considerations
in valuation
• Lack of data on response
of environmental • Intangible value of habitat
receptors to toxic loads preservation among species
* European Commission Land
Use Planning Guidelines

Consequence Assessment; Environmental Consequence
► Outflow volume
• Production type • Pump shutdown time
• MOP • Valve design &
• Flow rate configuration
• Hole size • Valve actuation
• Leak detection • Valve section profile
capabilities
KATHY FOX


Consequence Assessment; Environmental Consequence
KATHY FOX

Quantitative Risk Analysis - Case Study

Straits of Mackinac Enbridge Line 5 Study
 Client: State of Michigan contracted study (public record)
 Project: detailed assessment of alternatives to controversial
oil pipeline crossing
❑ 64-year-old twin 20-inch diameter lines on bottom of the straits
❑ Transporting ≈540,000 bbl/day of light crude oil/natural gas
liquids
 Alternatives analyzed
❑ Construction of a new pipeline along a different route
❑ Moving oil by rail
❑ A new "trenched" crossing
KATHY FOX ❑ Tunnel under the straits
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
❑ Outright
BOARD closure and decommissioning of Line 5
OF CANADA
 Assessment included
❑ Design-based cost estimates
❑ Economic feasibility, socioeconomic and market impacts
❑ Operational risk including consequences associated with
an oil spill
Societal Risk and

Individual Risk
KATHY FOX

Societal Risk
 Represented by an F-N curve, which is

a plot of the frequency F, of incidents
resulting in N or more fatalities
 An F-N curve is associated with a
specified length of pipeline
KATHY FOX

Societal Risk
 Probability of failure
 Probability of ignition
 Probability of fatality
KATHY FOX

Societal Risk
 CSA Z662:19 Annex O: Reliability Targets for Ultimate
Limit States (Natural Gas Pipelines):
KATHY FOX
Where: SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
ρ = the population density (people per hectare)
P = the pressure, MPa
D = the diameter, mm

Societal Risk
 CSA Z662:19 Annex O: Reliability Targets for Ultimate
Limit States (Natural Gas Pipelines):
KATHY FOX

Individual Risk
 Defined as the probability of fatality for a Intolerable

person at a particular location due to a
Individual Risk (per year)

pipeline failure. Tolerable if ALARP
 Calculated for locations where individuals Broadly Acceptable
can be present for extended periods of

time. -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
KATHY FOX Distance from Pipe Centreline (m)
 Varies
CHAIR, with theSAFETY
TRANSPORTATION distance from
BOARD the pipeline
OF CANADA
and the likelihood of individuals being
present.

Individual Risk
KATHY FOX

Individual Risk
 CSChE Guidelines:
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Risk Acceptance
Criteria and
Presentation of
Risk
KATHY FOX

Risk Acceptance Criteria

 Industry Activities:
• PHMSA Paper Study on Risk Tolerance
• CSA Annex B Risk Management Task Force (proposed updates for 2023
standard)
• Operators developing their own reliability targets or using Annex O
• Comparison to other industries and jurisdictions that have criteria:
• Nuclear
KATHY FOX
• Aeronautical
• Aerospace
• Chemical
• Employing ALARP principles


 ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable):
KATHY FOX


 ALARP: As Low as Reasonably Practicable is the level of risk
that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the
time, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become
unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction
obtained. (ref. CSA Z276-15 LNG)
 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) – a risk level at

KATHY FOXwhich the cost of further risk reduction is grossly
disproportionate
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY to the risk
BOARD reduction achieved. (proposed for CSA
OF CANADA
Z662:23 Annex B)

Risk Acceptance Criteria – Safety Risk

► Proposed for CSA Z662:23: the individual risk
criterion is intended to protect individuals that
may live, work or be occasionally present near
the pipeline. The broadly acceptable individual
risk threshold is 1 x 10-6/yr and the maximum
tolerable risk threshold is 1 x 10-4/yr.
►Proposed for CSA Z662:23: the societal risk
criterion is intended to protect populations
along the pipeline from incidents that can
involve multiple casualties. It is represented as
KATHY FOX
an F-N relationship. The broadly acceptable
CHAIR,and
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
maximum tolerable BOARD
societal riskOF CANADA
thresholds
Figure B.7 Societal Risk Thresholds (Based on 1 km of Pipeline)
are given in Figure B.7.

Risk Acceptance Criteria – Environmental Risk

► Proposed for CSA Z662:23 Annex B: Environmental risk is defined in terms of an expected
environmental impact measure and the associated criteria are expressed in terms of
broadly acceptable and maximum tolerable environmental impact thresholds:
o The broadly acceptable environmental risk threshold is 2.4 x 10-2 m3/km-yr and the
maximum tolerable risk threshold is 2.4 m3/km-yr.
► The impact-adjusted release volume, 𝑉𝐼𝐴 , shall be calculated as follows:
𝑉𝐼𝐴 = 𝛽 𝑉 𝛼
KATHY FOX
Where: V = total
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETYrelease volume;
BOARD OF CANADA
𝛼 = volume attenuation factor = 0.8; and
𝛽 = environmental impact factor (factors provided in a table based on
impact category.)

Presentation of Risk
Quantitative risk display Risk matrix with descriptive categories
Annual Frequency of Occurrence
Accepta ble Tol erable if ALARP ntol erable

Intolerable
Medi um- Very Very
Li kel y Hi gh
hi gh hi gh hi gh
Tol erable if ALARP Annex O-based risk display
Medi um- Very
Pos s i bl e Medi um Hi gh
hi gh hi gh
Medi um-
Unl i kel y Low Medi um Hi gh
Broa dly hi gh
Accepta ble
Very Medi um-
Low Low Medi um
Unl i kel y hi gh
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of Persons Affected Mi nor Modera te Ma jor Cri ti ca l
Cons equences
Individual risk transect F-N relationship
Frequency of N or More Fatalities , F (per year)
KATHY FOX
Intolerable
Intolerable
Individual Risk (per year)
Tolerable if ALARP
CHAIR, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA Tolerable if ALARP
Broadly Acceptable
Broadly Acceptable
1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+03

-250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 Number of Fatalities, N
Distance from Pipe Centreline (m)

Presentation of Risk
Semi-quantitative risk display Line Segment Risk Profile
KATHY FOX

Using the Risk

Results
KATHY FOX

Using the Risk Results

 Goal: risk-based decision making
 Supports integrity management activities and
prioritizations
 Eliminate high consequence events
 Regulatory expectation to integrate risk results
Recognize that integrity management and risk

KATHY FOX
assessment approaches may not always be
aligned
 Need to gain trust in the results across the
organization
Integration of Risk Assessment into IMP

► Compares the calculated risk to established measures
► Combines Probability of failure and Consequence meaningfully
► Prioritizes preventative & maintenance (P&M) activities
KATHY FOX

Questions?
KATHY FOX

Thank-you!
KATHY FOX

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Pipeline Risk Assessment

KATHY FOX P.Eng.

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

 Pipeline Risk and Reliability Modeling

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

 Risk is “The chance of loss”

► This definition involves:

Loss Adverse consequences

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk of a person dying in a car accident 1 in 11,000 per year

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk as Defined in CSA Z662

 CSA Z662:19 – Clause 2.2

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk as Defined in ASME B31.8S

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Likelihood: Probability & Frequency

 Probability: likelihood, or measure of the chance of

Likelihood: Probability & Frequency

 Frequency: 2/10 chance (0.2, 20%) of failing per year

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

 Reliability = 1- probability of failure

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk Assessment as Defined In CSA Z662:19

 CSA Z662:19 – Clause 2.2

KATHY FOX Guidelines for risk

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk Assessment as Defined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk Assessment within Risk Management

 Risk Management is the integrated

 Risk Assessment is a component of

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Risk Assessment Objectives

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Guidance from Canadian Standards

Risk Assessment – Canadian Pipelines

• Annex B – Guidelines for risk assessment of

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Guidance from Canadian Standards

 CSA Z662 Annex H

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Guidance from U.S. Standards

• Subpart O Section 192.917

Guidance from U.S. Standards

 49 CFR Part 192 (Gas Pipelines)

• Subpart O Section 192.917 (cont’d)

• No specific changes to risk assessment from

Guidance from N.A. Standards

 Provides general guidance on risk assessment

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Guidance from N.A. Standards

Guidance from International Standards

 ISO 31000:2018, Risk management – Guidelines, provides

Using ISO 31000 can help organizations increase the

 Adopted by Canada: CAN/CSA ISO 31000 Risk Management

2021 BANFF PIPELINE WORKSHOP B U I L D I N G A N D M A I N TA I N I N G C O M P E T E N C E

Guidance from International Standards