Kant and the Paradox of Respect

Author(s): William W. Sokoloff

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 768-779
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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KantandtheParadox
ofRespect
William
W.SokoloffUniversity
ofMassachusettsat Amherst
Kant is criticizedby postmodernists
(Connolly)and mis-appropriatedfor
conservativepoliticalends (Rawls)
Myessay on Kant is skeptical of both
tendencies and offersan alternative
interpretationthatfocuses on the
paradox of respect. Kant is nota cold
rationalistbut rathera radical thinker
who anticipatesthe ideas of Derrida.
Throughexaminingthe feelingof
respect and its relationshipto philo-
sophical foundationsand freedomin
the Groundworkof the Metaphysics
of Morals and the Critiqueof Practical
Reason, Kantianethics are cast in a
new light.I argue thatthe affirmation
ofthe paradoxical elements in the
feelingof respect can expand con-
ceptualizationsof the foundationsfor
ethico-politicalpractice,but firstwe
mustmove beyond readings that
domesticate or dismiss Kant.The
positiveresultof thisexpansion is a
Kantianethic of paradox.
768
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T hisstudyreassesses in
theroleoffeeling-theparadoxofrespect,
particular-in Immanuel Kant and the ways it complicateshis
moral philosophy.Kant is classifiedas the philosopherof human
reason,but he is simultaneously a philosopherof feeling.'Withthefeeling
of respect,Kant lodged a crisisin the centerof his practicalphilosophy
whichhas provedto be a significant sourceof contentionamong promi-
nentcommentators. Tracingthecontoursof thisproblemmaylead to a re-
assessmentofthevalueand limitsof Kant'sethicalmeaningat a timewhen
hiswritings arebecomingincreasingly unpopular.
Criticsof KantincludingHonig (1993), Coles (1997), Connolly(1995,
1999,2000),and othersdetectproblemsin hispracticalphilosophy and con-
cludethathe is,forlackofa betterexpression,conservative.2Althoughthese
readershaveprovocative and insightful theyhaveoverstated
interpretations,
theircase. Not onlyare thereresourceswithintheKantianprojectthatcan
rejuvenateradicalpoliticalthought,freedomforexample,but also because
WilliamW. Sokoloffis a Ph.D.Candidatein theDepartment of PoliticalScienceat the
Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst. theHeribertRamsMemorial
He is currently
Fellowat theUniversity Europahaus2, EG,Zimmer7, Ploeck61,69117
of Heidelberg,
Heidelberg,Germany (wsokoloff2000@yahoo.com).
I wouldliketo thanktheInternational Programs Officeat theUniversity ofMassachu-
settsatAmherst and theKultusministerium desLandesBaden-Wuerttemberg fora Fel-
lowshipin Germany thatmadewriting thisarticlepossible.I also wishto thankNicho-
las Xenos,JamesDer Derian,AndrewParker, Susan Meld Shell,M. J.Peterson, John
AnsonWarner, E. C. Graf,WilliamMauriceSprague,and theanonymousreviewers for
thisjournalfortheirgenerouscommentson thisarticle.I thankthePhilosophisches
SeminarandtheInstitut fuerPolitische
Wissenschaft attheUniversity ofHeidelberg for
permissionto use theirlibraries. I wouldliketo thanktheeditorsat theAJPS.
Finally,
' Thisstudyowesmuchto Fenves(1991),Hamacher(1996),and Nancy(1993).
2Although Honigclaimsthatrespectis a "paradoxically hybrid, rational,moralfeeling"
(1993,26, 18),she does notpursuethedestabilizing implications of thisinsightand
concludesthattwoof thethreestrandsofKantianrespectare"didacticand disciplin-
ary";butHonigshouldbe applaudedbecausesheacknowledged theplurality ofrespect.
Coles arguesthatKant'sthinking radically eclipsestheotherand "'respect'is entwined
witha systematic kindofoblivion,imperialism, and theft"(l 997,24,4); I commenton
Coles'sremarks on Kantingreater detaillaterin thisarticle.Connolly(1999; 1995,235)
overemphasizes thepurityof Kantianpracticalreasonand insufficiently examinesthe
ambiguousrolethatrespectoccupiesin Kant'sethics.Eventhoughtheremaybe mul-
ofrespect,
tipletraditions ConnollyinvokestheKantianlanguagehe disavowswhenhe
appealsto"agonistic respect";Adorno(1973) claimsthatKantis repressive andauthori-
tarian.In contrast a thinker
to thesecritics, whoinsistedon theimportance ofKantfor
thefuture ofphilosophy is Benjamin:"It is of thegreatestimportance forthephiloso-
phyof thefuture to recognizeand sortoutwhichelementsof theKantianphilosophy
shouldbe adoptedand cultivated, whichshouldbe reworked, and whichshouldbe re-
jected"(1989,3).
American ofPoliticalScience,Vol.45,No. 4, October2001,Pp.768-779
Journal
?2001 bytheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT 769

Kant's writingsdo not constitutea unified corpus.3 "Consistency is the greatestobligationof a philosopher
Velkley(1989) claimsthatKantshiftsfroman analytical, and yetthemostrarelyfound"(CritiqueofPracticalRea-
logical,and cognitiveorientation to a synthesizing,spon- son 22). Even thoughKantvalues philosophicalconsis-
taneous,and practicalone. Giventhisturn,theKantian tency,he suggeststhattheparadoxcould servea critical
projectis hauntedby ambiguityand tension,but these function.This is apparentwherehe explicitlydiscusses
momentstend to be insufficiently examinedor are ig- the paradox in a sectionentitled"On Egotism"in An-
noredaltogether. thropologyfrom a PragmaticPointofView(1978, 10-13).
Throughan analysisof thefeelingof respectand its Althoughhe knew thatit could be used as a tool em-
relationshipto philosophicalfoundationsand freedom, ployedmerelyto make one appear unique and original,
myinterpretation emphasizesthe structuralinstability Kantalso maintainedthattheparadoxcould servemore
inherentto Kant'sethicalprojectin orderto defendit in thanone'svanity:
post-structuralist terms.Kantis not"cognitivist, formal-
ist,and universalist,"as Habermas(1993, 321) contends, Preference fortheparadoxicalis logicalobstinacy in
buta radicalthinker who anticipatestheideas ofDerrida whicha mandoesnotwanttobe an imitator ofoth-
(1992, 1996).4Hence,myorientationalso distinguishes ers,but ratherprefers to appearas an unusualhu-
itselffromthosewho exclusively focuson Kant'snotion man being.Insteadof accomplishing his purpose,
of rightin orderto defendor presupposethevalueoflib- sucha man frequently succeedsonlyin beingodd.
eral institutions.5Rawls(1971) claimsthattherootsfor But,becauseeveryone musthaveand maintainhis
A TheoryofJusticecan be found in Kant. But Rawls's ownintelligence, thereproachofbeingparadoxical,
(1980) domesticatedimageof Kanthas littlesimilarity to whenitis notbasedon vanityorthedesiretobe dif-
thecriticalKoenigsbergian thinker.6 Forpostmodernpo- ferent,carriesno bad connotations. Oppositeto the
liticaltheoristsKant is too cold; forliberals,he is per- paradoxicalis thecommonplace, whichsideswith
fectly conservative. But thereis anotherKant. the generalopinion. But withthe commonplace
ifnotless,becauseitlullsthe
thereis as littlesafety,
mind to sleep,whereasthe paradoxawakensthe
Paradox mindto attentionand investigation, whichoften
leadto discoveries. (1978,12)
The word "paradox" appears in Kant's corpus infre-
quently, and thishas lead to itsrelativeneglectas a theme Since,"everyonemusthaveand maintainhis own intelli-
amongcommentators. Perhapsit is evenjustifiableto di- gence,"takingdelightin the paradoxical removesone
rectour attentionto othertopics giventhe following: from"generalopinion."A self-imposed exilecorresponds
to intellectualindependence.With the commonplace,
3Asforthefirst claim,Kantinsistson theimportance offreedom, one is prone to narcolepsyor perhapseven a dogmatic
and in thewordsofArendt, freedomis the"raisond'etreof poli- slumber.But Kantmaintainedthattheparadoxcould be
tics"(1956,151).ForKant,freedom is thegroundofall action;but an antidoteforcognitiveapathysinceittriggers attention
thisgroundis unstableand perhapsevengroundless. As forthe
secondclaim,Allison(1990,230) tendsto overstate theoverallco- and may lead to discoveries.If theparadox suspends rea-
herenceoftheKantianproject.It is notclearto mehowthefactof son, it also simultaneously enlivensit and "awakensthe
reasonis"a genuineadvance." mind."Not a symptomof cognitiveweakness,the para-
4AsfortheKantand Derridarelation, I am thinkingoftheprob- dox stimulatesautonomousthinking and is eventhesign
lemoffreedom inKantand Derrida'scontention thatanypolitical of a-"humorousintelligence" (Anthropology 120).7Even
actworthy of thenamemustenduretheordealof undecidability.
Arguably, is Derrida'swordforfreedom.
undecidability Forboth though Kant is aware that it could be abused, he did not
Kantand Derrida,freedom is beyondtheorderofknowledge and seek to devalue the paradox.
practicefrommechanicalimplemen-
thisrescuesethico-political There are also infrequentreferencesto paradox in
tation. Kant's practical philosophy. In many places, Kant
5Teuberclaims:"Contingenciesplayno roleinhis[Kant's]concep-
tionof themoralperson"(1983,389); Rawlsasserts:"thepriority
ofrightis a centralfeature
ofKant'sethics"(1971,31). 7In a sectionofKant'sAnthropology "On theSpecificDif-
entitled
ferencesBetweentheComparative and theArgumentative Intelli-
6See Rawls(1980). Rawlsgivesprimacyto thesocialeventhough gence,"he linkstheparadoxtolaughter: inpunningis
"Intelligence
Kantinsistson theprimacy ofthepractical.
Rawls'spreoccupation stale;whileneedlesssubtlety
(micrology) ofjudgmentis pedantic.
withinstitutions,
moreover, ignoresKant'svalorizationofcritical Humorousintelligence arisesfromdirectingtheheadtoappreciate
moralcitizenship,thatis,autonomy. The contrastI seekto draw paradoxes,in whichthe(sly)knavepeersfrombehindthenaive
betweenKantand Rawlsis notabsolutesinceKantalso theorizes soundofsimplicity inordertosubjectsomebody(or evenhisown
buttoa lesserextentthanis oftenemphasized.
institutions, opinion)to laughter"(1978,120).

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770 WILLIAM W. SOKOLOFF

acknowledgesthe enigmaof practicalreason.And even see, thehuman'smoraltransformation materializesas a

thougha particular"circle"threatensKant'sprojectnear mode of self-affection Kantcallsrespect.'0
the conclusionof the Groundwork oftheMetaphysics of One of Kant'searliestsustainedreferences to respect
Morals (1997, 55, 46), the word paradox appears only appearsin a footnotein theGroundwork oftheMetaphys-
once in thistext,and in a contextsomewhatremoved ics ofMorals.It is thefirstthorough,albeitpreliminary,
fromthe feelingof respect.In the CritiqueofPractical articulation ofthisfeelingand itsinterrelationship to the
Reason (1997, 54), Kant refersto the "paradox of networkoffundamental moralconceptsin Kant'spracti-
method,"but he neverexplicitlysaysthatthe feelingof cal philosophy. This footnoteappearsearlyon in thefirst
respectis a paradox. sectiontitled"Transitionfromcommonrationalto phil-
Butin theCritiqueofPureReason(1965, 165-166) in osophic moralcognition."That respectis discussedin a
thesectionentitled"The Applicationof theCategoriesto footnoteis notinsignificant. EventhoughKantdiscusses
ObjectsoftheSensesin General,"Kantrefers to thepara- respectin the CritiqueofPureReason(1965), Critiqueof
dox of self-affection.8 Respectcan justifiablybe desig- PracticalReason(1997), CritiqueofJudgment (1987), Re-
nateda paradoxbecauseitis a feelingthatis notreceived ligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason(1998), and
fromoutsideinfluences butone thatis self-generated,that Metaphysics ofMorals(1991), his discussionof it in the
And self-affection,
is,self-affected. Kantsuggests, is para- Groundwork demonstrates hisown uncertainty abouthis
doxical.But moreimportantly, thefugitive movementof appeal to a specifically moralfeelingin a textthatsevers
respectitselfis a strongerindicatorof itsparadoxicalsta- feelingfromthefieldof moralpractice.
tus.Respectis neithercompletely sensiblenorcompletely It is clearfromthefirstlineofthisnote,fromitssub-
intelligible
but bothand neitherat thesame time.It is a junctivegrammaticalconstruction to theanticipationof
transient thateludesbothpoles of thebinaryopposition an objection,thatKantbelievedhis appeal to respectwill
reason/feeling thatinaugurates Westernmetaphysics. be criticized.He triesto refutethe chargethathe seeks
refugebehind an obscuremoral feeling.Perhapsmore
importantly, Kantis hereconcernedwiththemerepossi-
Respect bilityof the feelingof respect.For thisreason,he must
distinguishit both fromtheinclinationsas wellas from
Kant'sviewson humanfeelingsare ambiguousand pro- thesphereof cognition.This is notan easytaskand Kant
vocative.Even thoughthe role and significanceof feel- knowsit.Respect,itseems,willoccupya nonspacesome-
ingsincludingthefeelingof thebeautiful,sublime,and wherebetweenthe phenomenaland noumenal realms.
respect,changesthroughout hispoliticaland philosophi- After introducing thefamousproposition"dutyis thene-
cal writings,his interestin human feeling persists cessity ofan actionfromrespectfor law"(Groundwork 13),
throughout hisentireintellectual career.As earlyas 1764, Kantappendsthefollowingnote:
Kantinvestigates offinerfeelingsin Obser-
thepossibility
vationson theFeelingof theBeautifuland theSublime It couldbe objectedthatI onlyseekrefuge, behind
(1960,46-50). Later,he dedicatesan immenseamountof thewordrespect, in an obscurefeeling,insteadof
attentionto therelationship betweenfeelingand moral- distinctly thequestionbymeansofa con-
resolving
in
ityand theways whichtheformerthreatens thepossi- cept of reason.But thoughrespectis a feeling, it is
bilityof thelatter.But Kantdoes not accordall feelings
thesame worth;fortheultimatesuccessof his practical 'IOnadditionto thescholarship therehavebeen
alreadydiscussed,
numerousstudiesofrespect.Fora clearand helpfuldiscussionof
philosophyhingeson his capacityto make qualitative respect,in additionto otherdifficulties in Kant'swritings, see
distinctionsbetweenspecificfeelings.9 And thequalita- Paton(1971); Gregor(1963, 186) discussestherelationship be-
tivefeelingpar excellenceis respect(Achtung). As we shall tweenloveand respect;McCartymakesa helpfuldistinction be-
tweentheintellectualistic viewsofKantianmoral
and affectivistic
8Fenves(1991,222) has an insightful
discussionofKant'selabora- motivation andalso claimsthat"somemystery ... shroudsthepe-
tionoftheparadoxofself-affection. See alsoCaygill:"Thediscus-culiarfeelingofrespect"(1993,434);Broadieand Pybus(1975,63)
sionofaffectionin the'TranscendentalAesthetic'
and'Deduction' distinguish betweentheSocratic(reason)and Sentimental (feel-
... has featureswhichKant himselfdescribesas paradoxical." ing) moralpositionsand claimthatKanthas effected a compro-
Caygillcontinues:
"Kanthimself seemsto havechosennottosolve misebetweenthem;Wolff observes:"theintroduction oftheemo-
theproblem, butrathertoleaveitopenas an ineluctable tionof reverenceis contradictory
butfertile to theentirethrustof Kant's
philosophicaldifficulty
or'aporia"'(1995,58-59). argument" (1973,83); Reath(1989) hasa helpful studyoftherela-
tionshipbetweenrespectand theinclinations; MacBeathexplores
9Kantdistinguishesrespectfromawe,reverence, contempt,admi- therelationship betweenthesublimeand thefeelingof respect
ration,fear,hope,and amazement.Fora discussionof manyof but,forreasonsthatareobvious,I cannotsupporthisclaimthat
thesefeelingssee Sokoloff(2001); see also Kant (Anthropology we must"ignoreall Kant'scontradictions ofwhatI taketo be his
1978,157) forthedifferencebetweenemotionand passion. official
theory oftheproperobjectsofrespect. . ." (1973,302).

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KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT 771

notone received bymeansofinfluence; itis,instead,cal."l Theyestablisha relationof similitudethroughthe

a feelingself-wroughtbymeansofa rationalconcept reflective transfer(metaphe'rein) of thefeaturesof differ-
and therefore specifically differentfromall feelings entobjectsplaced in a spatialrelationship. This moment
ofthefirst kind,whichcanbe reducedto inclination of analogical spatializationin Kant simultaneouslyin-
or fear.WhatI recognizeimmediately as a law forterconnectsand separatesrespectfromits siblingsfear
me I cognizewithrespect,whichsignifiesmerely and inclination.All threeare similarsincetheyare feel-
consciousnessof thesubordination of mywillto a ings;fortheyall appearon theradarof corporeality. But
law withoutthemediationof otherinfluences on theyare not the same. Kant doubts theextentto which
mysense.Immediatedetermination of thewillby fearcould engendermoral conductsince it signalsthe
meansofa lawandconsciousness ofthisis calledre- absenceof freedom;respect,in contrast,namestheleap
spect,so thatthisis regarded as theeffect of thelaw out of thecausal mechanism.And,actiondrivenbyfear
on thesubject,and notas thecauseof thelaw.Re- would "destroythe whole moral worthof actions"be-
spectis properly therepresentation of a worththat cause it receivesitsgroundforconductcompletelyfrom
infringes upon myself-love. Hence thereis some- sensibility (CritiqueofPracticalReason108).
thingthatis regarded as an objectneither ofinclina- Something else is strikingabout this subtextual
tionnorof fear,thoughithassomething analogous qualification.Kant maintainsthat"respectis a feeling."
to both.The objectofrespectis therefore simplythe The inclinations willnotand could notbe eradicatedbe-
law,and indeedthelaw thatwe imposeupon our- cause,as Kantstates,thehuman"can neverbe altogether
selvesand yetas necessary in itself.
As a law we are freefromdesiresand inclinations. . ."(CritiqueofPracti-
subjectto itwithoutconsulting self-love;as imposed cal Reason71). The totalpurification of sensibilityis an
uponus byourselves itis nevertheless a resultofour impossibility.'2 Kantgoes evenfurther whenhe claimsin
will;and in thefirstrespectit has an analogywith ReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReasonthat"con-
inthesecondwithinclination.
fear, Anyrespectfora sideredin themselves naturalinclinationsare good . . ."
personis properly onlyrespectforthelaw(ofinteg- (1998, 78). But theinclinationsmustnonethelessbe cir-
rityand so forth)ofwhichhe givesus an example. cumscribedso thatthehumancan be morallyelevated.
Because we also regardenlargingour talentsas a And thehumiliationor circumscription ofhumansensi-
duty,we represent a personof talentsalso as, so to bilityis proportionate to his moralelevation(Critiqueof
speak,an exampleofthelaw(to becomelikehimin PracticalReason67).
thisbypractice),and thisis whatconstitutes ourre- If respectreceivesa preliminary and subtextualelu-
spect.Allso-calledmoralinterest consistssimplyin cidation, this is not surprisingsince the Groundwork
respectforthelaw.(Groundwork 14) only prepares the way for another textthat takes up
similarthemes.But thefeelingof respectis not dropped
Kant's discussion in
of respect thislongfootnote strik- as an elusive object of inquiry; Kant develops it in
is
ing.Respect(if thereis such a thing)is a self-produced greaterdetailthreeyearslaterin the CritiqueofPractical
feelingas opposed to one receivedfromexternalstimuli, Reasonwhereit takescenterstage as the incentivefor
and thatis whatmakesitdifferent fromall otherfeelings. moral conduct.'3And Kant's discussionof it does not
The unmediatedrecognitionof the validityof moral occurbeneaththetextbut in one of thelongestsections
claimsimposedupon humansgeneratesrespect.It is the in themiddleof thisbook. Froma painstakingfootnote
"effectofthelawon thesubject"thatresultswhenwe im- in the Groundwork, respectreemergesto occupya cen-
pose a law withno mediatinginfluencesupon ourselves. tralplace in Chapter3 of theanalyticof practicalreason
The immediacyof thislaw meansrespectis feltas imme-
diacy itself,as pure force:"lawgivingreason . . . forces
11Derridamaintainsthat"Analogyis metaphorpar excellence"
fromme immediaterespect"(Groundwork 16). And this (1982,242).
peculiar mode of immediacyis preciselywhat distin-
guishesrespectfromotherfeelings. In thewordsof Kant, '2ThepurityConnolly(1999) seesinKantianmorality contradicts
Kant'sownwordson thesensiblebasisof it.Kantwantsto purify
respectis more"powerfulthanall . . . feelingstogether" morality froma certainmodeofsensiblecontamination butone
(Metaphysics ofMorals209). feelingremains(respect),
and itis theunstablenexusbetweenthe
Respectis neitherfearnor inclinationbut is "analo- humanand thelaw.
gous" to both. It is not surprisingthatKant invokesan 13Kantdistinguishes betweenincentive(Triebfeder)and contin-
analogicalmode of presentation hereas an indirectway gent grounds (Bewegungsgrund)in theCritique
ofPractical
Reason
(1997),a distinction
thatwasnotmadein theGroundwork (1997).
to elucidaterespect.Analogicalrelationships are not re- Gregor, of Kant(1997,32), makesthispointin a foot-
translator
lationsof identityand are not rationalbut metaphori- notetohereditedvolumeoftheCritiqueofPracticalReason.

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772
in the sectionof the CritiqueofPracticalReasontitled
"On theincentivesof purepracticalreason."Respect,we
learn,is thesole motiveto moralconduct.
Whereasin the Groundwork (1997, 48) Kantclaims
thatbasingmoralityon incentives destroysitssublimity,
in the CritiqueofPracticalReasonthisis no longerthe
case.'4 A specificincentiveis now distinguishedfrom
contingent ones,and theformerwillundergirdthesub-
limityof moralpractice.Anydoubt Kanthad about the
possibilityof respectaccomplishingthisin the Ground-
workis gone:"respectforthemorallaw is ... thesole and
also theundoubtedmoralincentive"(CritiqueofPracti-
cal Reason67). Buthow is respectan incentive?
Kant definesan incentiveas "the subjectivedeter-
mininggroundof thewillof a beingwhose reasondoes
not by itsnaturenecessarilyconformwiththeobjective
law. . ." (CritiqueofPracticalReason62). But at theout-
setoftheCritiqueofPracticalReasondedicatedto clarify-
ingthe moralincentive(Triebfeder), Kantacknowledges
thedifficulty of evenconceivingof one: "How a law can
be of itselfand immediately a determining groundofthe
willis forhumanreasonan insolubleproblem.. ." (Cri-
tiqueofPracticalReason62, italicsadded). Kant avoids
theproblemand redefines histask.The taskbecomesone
ofshowing"notthegroundfromwhichthemorallaw in
itselfsuppliesan incentivebut ratherwhatit effects (or,
to putitbetter, musteffect)in themindinsofaras itis an
incentive" (CritiqueofPracticalReason62-63). The effect
willbe elucidated,not thegrounditselffromwhichthe
morallaw servesas a sourceof motivation.
As we have learned,Kant thinksthatthe human is
nevertotallyfreefrominclinations and desires.And even
thoughhumanscan neverstepoutsideof sensibility, the
challengeis whethersomethingotherthansensibility can
motivateactionin orderto giveitjustifiable moralworth:
sensiblefeeling. . . is indeedtheconditionof that
feelingwe call respect, butthecausedeterminingit
liesin purepracticalreason;and so thisfeeling,on
"4Coles's(1997,24-74) underexamines theinterconnectionbe-
tweensublimity and moralcategoriesin Kant'sphilosophy.
This
connection wouldprobablyfrustrate
thelinehe seeksto drawbe-
tweenthefirst and thethird.Colesprivileges
twocritiques theCri-
tiqueofJudgmentwhileadoptinga somewhat dismissive
stanceto-
ward the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical
Reason.Colesfindstheconsequences ofKant'snarrative
ofsubjec-
tivesovereigntyin theCritiqueofPureReasonproblematic. Kant's
views on lyingand revolution,accordingto Coles, are short-
As thisarticleseeksto demonstrate,
sighted. theradicalresources
Coles unearthsin theCritiqueofJudgment thatcan productively
disfigure
dominantinterpretations ofKantin thenameofan ethic
ofreceptivegenerositycan also be foundin Kant'stheoretical
and
practicalphilosophyas well,althoughthespecificethicalconse-
quenceswouldnot,ofcourse,necessarily be thesame.
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WILLIAM W. SOKOLOFF
accountofitsorigin,cannotbe calledpathologically
effected butmustbe calledpractically effected,and is
effected as follows:therepresentation of themoral
law deprivesself-love of itsinfluence
and self-con-
ceitofitsillusion,and thereby thehindrance to pure
practical reasonis lessenedandtherepresentation of
thesuperiority ofitsobjectivelawto theimpulsesof
sensibility,andwithittherelative weightiness ofthe
law . . . is producedin the judgmentof reason
through theremovalofthecounterweight .... (Cri-
tiqueofPractical Reason65)
Respectis an effecton feelingbut it is not pleasure;nor
can itbe comparedto anypathologicalfeelingbecause it
is not,Kant claims,"pathologically effected." And yet,it
presupposesthesensibility and finitudethatis itscondi-
tion of possibility:"Sensible feeling. . . is indeed the
conditionof thatfeelingwe call respect... ."Yet,respect
is nonethelessproducedsolelybyreason,byan "intellec-
tual ground" (Critique of Practical Reason 64). This
opens the arduous path to genuinemoral practicethat
requiresgettingrid of sensibility, "the counterweight."
This is not an excavationthatthe human subjectwel-
comes: "So littleis respecta feelingof pleasurethatwe
give way to it only reluctantly.... We tryto discover
somethingthatcould lightenthe burdenof it forus . .
."(CritiqueofPracticalReason66). Again:"Respectis a
tributethatwe cannot refuseto pay merit,whetherwe
want to or not; we may indeed withholdit outwardly
but we stillcannothelp feelingit inwardly"(Critiqueof
PracticalReason66). Respectexceedsthe intentionsof
the subject.But it also does more.It exposes theworld
of appearancesto inherentmeaninglessness sincesome-
thingotherthanthephenomenalworld,somethinges-
sentiallynegative,provides the ground for genuine
moralconduct.
A peculiarnegativity thatcan be cognized a priori
willprovidedetermination fortheliberatedwill.Butthis
liberationis not entirelypleasant.And this particular
mode of determinativediscomfortcorrespondsto the
firstmomentof respect:
Whatis essentialin everydetermination of thewill
by themoral law is that,as freewill . . . it is deter-
minedsolelybythelaw.So far,then,theeffect ofthe
morallawas incentive is onlynegative, and as such
thisincentivecan be cognizeda priori.For,all incli-
nationand everysensibleimpulseis basedon feel-
ing,and thenegative effect on feeling. . . is itselfa
Hencewecanseea priorithatthemorallaw,
feeling.
as the determining groundof the will, must by
thwartingall ourinclinations producea feeling that
KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT
can be calledpain .... (Critique ofPracticalReason
63,italicsadded)
"The negativeeffecton feelingis itselfa feeling." On the
one hand, feelingis crossed out, but on the other,a
feelinglessfeelingis itselffeltas a feeling.Respectseems
to liveofftheveryfeelings thatseekto denyrespect'sown
possibility.Feeling the absence of feeling-that is,
"pain"-corresponds to thenegationof theinclinations
of the self;thissignalsthebeginningof one's infinitely
testedmembershipin an intelligible world.The devasta-
tion of self-loveis a prerequisite;self-conceitmustalso
be struckdownand thisinvolveshumiliation(Critiqueof
PracticalReason64). Kantacknowledgesthat"respect...
showsus our unworthiness with... severity" (Critiqueof
PracticalReason67).
The second momentof respectis also a negative
feelingbut one closerto thefeelingof pleasure.And it is
here that a strikingresemblancebetweenthe compli-
cated networkof sensationsthatconstituterespectand
Kant'sdiscussionof thesublimein theCritiqueofJudge-
mentappears. The movementof attractionand repul-
sion in boththefeelingof thesublimeand thefeelingof
respectresultsin a negativepleasure.'5But in thecase of
respect,the law is not onlya sourceof pain but also the
groundof a "positivefeeling"(CritiqueofPracticalRea-
son 63). Althoughrespectis not pleasure, one is "el-
evated,"and thiscorrespondsto theawarenessof need-
ing nothing,thesign of whichis an "innertranquility"
(CritiqueofPracticalReason67, 75). This is notso much
a pathologicalrewardas it is a peculiar comfortKant
names "consolation" that is the resultof viewingthe
majestyof the moral law in its absolute holiness (Cri-
tiqueofPracticalReason75).
As we haveseen,a discussionof therelationship be-
tween duty and respect in the Groundworkinitiates
Kant'sinvestigation of thelatter.He provisionallycon-
cludeshis discussionof respectby returning to thecon-
cept of dutyin the Triebfeder sectionof the Critiqueof
PracticalReason:
Duty! Sublimeand mightyname that embraces
nothingcharming butrequiressub-
or insinuating
mission,and yetdoes notseekto movethewillby
threatening anythingthatwould arouse natural
aversionorterror in themindbutonlyholdsforth a
law thatof itselffindsentryintothemindand yet
"In reference to thefeelingof thesublime,Kantmaintains: "the
mindis notjustattracted bytheobjectbutis alternatively
always
repelledas well,thelikingforthesublimecontainsnotso mucha
positivepleasureas ratheradmiration and respect,
and so should
be calleda negativepleasure"(CritiqueofJudgment
98).
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773
gainsreluctantreverence
(thoughnotalwaysobedi-
ence),a lawbeforewhichall inclinations
aredumb,
eventhoughtheysecretly workagainstit;whatori-
ginis thereworthyofyou,andwhereis to be found
therootofyournobledescentwhichproudlyrejects
allkinshipwiththeinclinations,
descentfromwhich
conditionof thatworthwhich
is theindispensable
humanbeingsalonecan givethemselves? (1997,73)
The interconnection betweenour moraldutyand thelaw
silencesthe inclinations.The criticalphilosophereven
raisesthepossibility ofduty'simmaculateconception;no
originis worthyofher.This mystery does notjeopardize
thehuman'smoralworthbut is thefundamental condi-
tionof it.This worthis notgrantedbya politicianbut is
self-given,thatis, taken.In orderto be a moral citizen,
one mustplace a law above oneselfwhich in turn"el-
evatesa humanbeingabovehimself"and theendlessness
of thisself-overcoming constitutes
our properself(Cri-
tique ofPracticalReason 74). Finally,we discover"the
sublimityof our own supersensibleexistence. . ." (Cri-
tiqueofPracticalReason75). But whydoes Kant evade
the questionof the originof duty?If thereis an origin
worthyof duty,whatwould itbe?
Ground
The wordground(Grund)has particularsignificance for
Kantsince respectis unfathomable(unergruendlich) for
speculativereason and because he soughtto providea
criticalgroundforpractice.'6The conceptof theground
is centralin thefirstand one of themostsignificant texts
in the developmentof his criticalpracticalphilosophy:
Groundwork oftheMetaphysics ofMorals.'7 This textis
ambitiousbecause it seeks out and establishesthe su-
premeprincipleof morality, thecategoricalimperative.
This is necessaryand justifiablesince all previoustexts
on moralphilosophyfailedto locatethisprinciple.Butto
getthereone musttraverse "thehighestlimitofall moral
inquiry"(Groundwork 65).
Despiteitsmonumentalgoal,theGroundwork has an
astonishingconclusion. For the ultimatefoundation
formoralityremainsa question and is fundamentally
16Gregor,translator
ofKant(1997,68), renders
"unergruendlich"
as "impenetrable"
whicherasestheforceof theliteralconnection
to theground.Unfathomableisbetter.
17Foran antifoundationalist accountoftheKantiancriticalproject
see O'Neill(1989). O'Neill'sdiscussionofthefirst
critiqueas a re-
flexiveand politicaltaskis provocative.
774
inaccessibleto cognition.'8A massivegap separatesthe
bodyof thetextfromthecharacterof theinquiryprom-
isedbythetitle.AlthoughthewordGroundwork suggests
thatthistextwill providea groundlaying, groundwork,
grounding,or foundationformorals,sucha foundation is
preciselywhatthetextfailsto supply.In fact,the"Con-
cludingRemark"containsthefollowing paradox:
Andthuswe do notindeedcomprehend thepracti-
cal unconditioned necessityofthemoralimperative,
butwe nevertheless comprehend itsincomprehensi-
bility,
and thisis all thatcan fairlybe requiredof a
philosophy thatstrivesin itsprinciples to reachthe
veryboundaryofhumanreason.(Groundwork 66)
Aftera transitionfrom"OrdinaryRationalKnowledgeof
Moralityto the Philosophical"and one from"Popular
Moral Philosophyto a Metaphysicsof Morals,"the text
culminatesin a paradoxthatsignalsthefundamental in-
of thefoundationforpractice.Eventhough
accessibility
groundingonlynames a preliminaryproject,one that
will be workedout threeyearslater in the Critiqueof
PracticalReason,Kant does not even providea prelimi-
narygrounding.Instead,we getsomethinglikean abso-
lute ungroundingsignaledin the invitationto embrace
negativityor"comprehendincomprehensibility:"
The negativityof Kantianmoralityhas provedto be
a significant
pointof contentionamongreadersof Kant
leadingmanyto dismisshisethicalprinciples.Butduring
Kant'sdiscussionof thesublimity of theJewishlaw pro-
hibitingimagesof thedivinein theCritiqueofJudgment,
Kantreversestherelationbetweensensibility and moral-
ityand insiststhatit is indeedthenegativity
of morality
thatinvigorates themoralimagination-givesit force-
and checksthepracticesofgovernments who seekpliable
subjects:
It is indeeda mistaketo worrythatdeprivingthis
presentation ofwhatever couldcommenditto the
senseswillresultin itscarrying
withitno morethan
a coldandlifelessapprovalwithoutanymovingforce
or emotion.It is exactlytheotherwayround.For
oncethesensesno longersee anything beforethem,
whileyettheunmistakable andindelibleideaofmo-
rality onewouldsoonerneedtotemperthe
remains,
momentum of an unboundedimagination so as to
keepitfromrisingtothelevelofenthusiasm, thanto
seekto supporttheseideaswithimagesandchildish
devicesforfearthattheywouldotherwise be power-
'Groundlaying
is theliteraltranslation
of theGermanword
"Grundlegung."
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WILLIAM W. SOKOLOFF
less.Thatis also whygovernments havegladlyper-
mittedreligionto be amplyfurnished withsuchac-
cessories:theyweretrying to relieveeverysubjectof
thetrouble, yetalsooftheability,
toexpandhissoul's
forcesbeyondthebarriers thatone canchoosetoset
forhimso as to reducehimto merepassivity and so
makehimmorepliable. . . thispure,elevating, and
merelynegativeexhibition of morality involvesno
dangeroffanaticism, whichisthedelusion[ Wahn]of
wanting toSEE somethingbeyond all boundsofsensi-
bility... The exhibition
avoidsfanaticism precisely
becauseitis merely negative.Fortheideaoffreedom
isinscrutableandthereby precludes all positiveexhi-
bitionwhatever....(1987,135)
The negativity of moralityis not "cold and lifeless"but
producesimaginative momentumand is simultaneously
a checkon fanaticism; theinverseinstantaneously dead-
ens the soul and is a tool of governments thatengineer
moralpassivity. Governments fearthatmoralclaimswill
haveno forceunlesstheyare supplementedwith"child-
ishdevices."Kantdoes nothavethisfear.Forhim,moral
practicegroundedon freedomultimately lacksa ground;
freedomis essentially negative.And itis indeedthisnega-
tivitythatengendersthemoralcitizen'sempowerment.
Butthenegativecharacterofmoraldemandsand the
human'sinabilityto conceivethepossibility of an action
done out of dutydoes not mean thatmoralityis a mere
"phantom"or thatthelaw failsto effectus (Groundwork
51). We are summonedbythelaw thatwe cannotcom-
pletelygrasp even thoughwe can nonethelesshear its
command.The "voice of reason"is one thatis "so dis-
tinct,so irrepressible,
and so audible"(CritiqueofPracti-
cal Reason 32). It "makes even the boldest evildoer
tremble;"moreterrifyingly, "eventhedead arenotalways
safefromthiscriticalexamination"(CritiqueofPractical
Reason 68, 66). We are in doubt, though,whetherthe
voice of reason "comes fromman, fromthe perfected
powerof his own reason,or whetherit comes froman
other,whoseessenceis unknownto us .. ." ("On a Newly
ArisenSuperiorTone in Philosophy"71, italicsadded).
The groundformoralitycannotbe rationally elucidated
or graspedbecause it is freedom;thatalone transfers the
humanintoa higherorder.
Freedom
WhenKantdesignatesGod, freedom, and immortalityin
the CritiqueofPureReasonas the"unavoidableproblems
setby pure reason"(1965, 46), thisdoes not name three
KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT
separateundertakings but onlyone. It is theannounce-
mentof theproblemof freedomas themostimportant
metaphysical investigation.Forboth theidea of an eter-
nal divinityand immortalityinvolvethe possibilityof
somethingthatis entirely unconditioned, thatis,free.In
thecase of God, independencefroman originor ground
otherthanone thatis self-given, or,in thecase of immor-
somethingoutsideoftemporaldetermination
tality, alto-
gether.And thepossibilityofboththeformerand thelat-
terpointto theproblemof freedom.
Perhapsmore so thanany otherphilosopher,Kant
dedicateshimselfto freedomwithunprecedentedrigor.
And even thoughit occupies a centralplace in Kant's
writings,freedomneverceases to be an unproblematic
concept.Consider,forexample,how Kantspeaksof free-
dom in threedifferent texts.In theGroundwork, freedom
is "presupposed"(1997, 53). In the CritiqueofPractical
Reason,freedomis a "factof reason"(1997, 28). In An-
thropology froma PragmaticPointofView,freedomap-
pearsas somethingprimordial:"The childwho has just
come fromitsmother'swomb,unlikeall otheranimals,
seemsto entertheworldwitha loud shriekjust because
it considersthe inabilityto make use of its limbs a re-
straint;consequently,itannouncesthisclaimto freedom
(whichno otheranimalknows)"(l978, 176).
But overand above thesestrainedformulations and
anthropological speculationabouttheprimalcry,thereis
somethingparadoxicalabout Kant'smeditationon free-
dom. In thethoughtof freedom,reasonmustdo whatit
is ultimatelyunable to do, thatis, thinkthe uncondi-
tioned.A gap separatestheconditioningactivityof rea-
son and the unconditionedessenceof freedom;forthe
thoughtof the unconditionedis incompatiblewiththe
groundgivingcharacterof reason. It seems thatevery
thoughtof freedomis destinedto missits.target. In order
to thinkfreedom,then,we have to thinkthe uncondi-
tioned.Thoughtmustthinktheunthinkable. An unsatis-
fyingpredicamentindeed:"Byconstantinquiryafterthe
condition,the satisfactionof reasonis onlyfurther and
furtherpostponed" (Groundwork66). The deferralof
cognitivegratificationmeans thatfreedomalwaysex-
ceeds our faculties:"We shall neverbe able to compre-
hendhow freedomis possible"(Groundwork 60). Butwe
shouldbe satisfied"ifonlywe can be sufficiently assured
thatthereis no proofof itsimpossibility. . ." (Critiqueof
PracticalReason79). This is a surprisingclaim ifwe ac-
ceptAllison'sobservation( 1990,1) thatfreedominhabits
themostimportantplace in Kant'spracticalphilosophy.
The theoretical
impossibility of completely conceiv-
ing freedomcorrespondsto thepracticaldifficulty of it
as well. On the one hand, freedomis the condition of
possibilityforethicalpractice,but,on theother,freedom
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775
is nota stablefoundationbutdesignatesthecompletere-
movalof all determinate grounds.Freedomwillneverbe
a particularplaceor standpoint.Kant'sfamous"footpath
offreedom," thepath"on whichitis possibleto makeuse
of our reasonin our conduct. . ." turnsout to be not so
much a trailof securitybut somethingelse,something
thatis at best undecidable(Groundwork 60). The unde-
cidablecharacterof freedomis,in thewordsof Kant,"a
terriblething,"not onlybecause it is the condition of
bothgood and evil,but because it annihilatesthestabil-
ityofthefundamental groundforpractice(KantLectures
on Ethics17). The result:the human comes faceto face
withtheradicalindeterminacy of all action.Kant:"The
law cannotspecifypreciselyin whatwayone is to act ...
(Metaphysics ofMorals194).19
But,and thisis Kant'sgenius,theinstability of free-
dom does notauthorizeethicallicense.The fundamental
undecidability of freedompromisesto generatemodesof
actionthatdo not negatethefreedomthatinitiallyper-
mitstheseactsto be possibleat all.Thereis thusa certain
lawfulness thatcorrespondsto theinstability offreedom:
"A freewilland a will undermorallaws are one and the
same"(Groundwork 53).20Butthereciprocalrelationship
betweenlawfulness and freedomdoes noteffacethefun-
damentalriddleof freedom.Atthebottomof it all,free-
dom is thelaw,and thelaw can neverbe anythingother
thanfreedom.
Kantmaintainsin theGroundwork thatcontemplat-
ingthepossibility of thelawvas an imperative of freedom
leads one to the"extremeboundaryof all practicalphi-
losophy"(1997, 59). Conductingoneselfin accordance
withitgoes further. For Kantbelievedthatitwould lead
to nothingless thana totalcosmicinversionof thefun-
damentallawsoftheuniverse;theforceofthelawsof na-
turein determining conductare replacedwiththeforce
of freedom.We must"conductourselvesin accordance
withmaximsof freedomas iftheywerelaws of nature"
'9Thisdoes notthreaten Kantianmorality withpointlessness.It
preserves thesublimityoffreedom andprevents thedenigrationof
thelaw to a tool.Fora critiqueof thepotentialpointlessness of
Kantianmorality, see Schneewind (1992).Fora valorization ofthe
nontechnical foundation forethics,politics,and culturalidentity
see Derrida:"whena responsibility is exercisedin theorderofthe
possible,itsimplyfollowsa direction and elaboratesa program. It
makesofactiontheappliedconsequence, thesimpleapplication of
a knowledge or know-how. It makesofethicsand politicsa tech-
nology.No longeroftheorderofpractical reasonordecision,itbe-
ginstobe irresponsible ... Europeanculturalidentity ... mustbe-
longto thisexperience and experiment of theimpossible" (1992,
45, italicsadded).AlthoughDerridais criticalof Kant,thereis a
striking betweenKant'sconceptionofpracticalreason
similarity
and theDerrideandecision.
(1989) fora discussionoftheimpactofJean-Jacques
Velkley
211See
oflawon Kant.
Rousseau'sconception

(Groundwork 66). Freedom,a new groundin theouter
reachesof cognition,changesplace withthelawsof na-
tureand becomestheconditionof possibilityforan el-
evatedand redeemedplanet.The initialsignof thispos-
sibilityis thefeelingof one's own radicalindependence
fromnature.
But thepossibility of evenpartiallyrisingabove na-
turedepends on human receptivity. One mustreceive
whatis absolutelyotherand intrinsically opposed to the
innermostcompositionof thehuman.This is especially
difficult to bearsincethemorallaw recognizesno limits.
The logical resultof the limitlessnessof moral com-
mandsis permanentmoralfailure;thesecommandscan
neverbe fulfilled.2' But theunfulfillability
and impossi-
bilityof moralcommandsdoes not mean thattheyare
opaque, even thoughtheymayproduce thaumain the
residentof Koenigsberghimself:"The simplicityof this
law ... mustseemastonishing..." (Metaphysics ofMorals
51). This is thelaw: "So act thatthe maximof yourwill
could alwayshold at thesametimeas a principlein a giv-
ingof universallaw" (CritiqueofPracticalReason28). In
thecategoricalimperative, thehumanis commandedto
do the impossible,and thisis theessence,not of Kant's
moralreform, butofhismoralrevolution. Kant'sfamous
criticismof revolutionin the Metaphysicsof Morals
(1991, 129-133) shouldbe viewedstrictly withinthedo-
mainof legality. Kantneverruledout thepossibility of a
moralrevolution:"That a humanbeingshould become
not merelylegallygood,but morallygood ... cannotbe
effectedthroughgradual reform but mustratherbe ef-
fectedthrougha revolution in thedispositionof thehu-
man being"(ReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereRea-
son67-68).
The nameforthemoralrevolutionin thedisposition
of thehumanis Achtung. Respectnamestheannihilation
of politicalprojectsgroundedon pathologicalsubjectiv-
ity.It also signalstheimpossibility of humanmoralper-
fectionbut withoutabandoningthe aspirationforit.A
distinctlyhuman feelingof moral failure,respectre-
mindsus thatthereis no securepositionon whichmoral
conductcan be based.Butas a signofthehuman'smoral
finitude,respectnonethelessnames the possibleeleva-
2'Foran intriguingdiscussionof thenonfulfillable
characterof
themorallaw see Hamacher(1996,81-108). Duringhis discus-
betweenthemorallaw and happiness,
sion of therelationship
Coles claimsthatthe"morallaw ... wouldinvolvereasonin the
contradictionofcommanding thatitdetermine
and willitselfac-
cordingto something whichis fundamentally
impossible" (1997,
45). Byappealingto theprincipleof noncontradiction,
it is not
Kantbut Coles who privilegesthesovereigntyof reason.I find
Hamacher'sdiscussion(1996) ofstructural
impossibilityin Kant
morepersuasive.
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WILLIAM W. SOKOLOFF
tionof thehumanout of thecausal mechanismand into
a "kingdomof ends."Althoughhe is morallyelevated,he
is also embodied.22He is freebut he cannotcompletely
stepoutsideof sensibility.Ascendingas he fallsand de-
scendingas he rises,theKantianmoralagentis occupied
by divergentforcesthatneverentirelysupplya stand-
point thatexceedsthe poles of thismotileopposition.
But theregimeof sensibility does not stop him fromat-
tempting to elevatehimselfabove thetyrannicalvoiceof
pathologybecause the Kantian moral agentalso hears
the"voiceof reason"(CritiqueofPracticalReason32).
EthicalParadox
Readersof Kantfroma wide varietyof priesthoodshave
had a difficult timecomingto termswiththe feelingof
respect.It is, in the wordsof Kofman,an "economyof
panic;"forLyotardit is "a blankfeeling;"forAdorno,re-
spect is even"repressive"(Kofman 1997; Lyotard1994,
118; Adorno 1973, 232). But forthe purposes of this
study,I examineConnolly's(1999, 163-177) recentcri-
tiqueofKant.In hisimportantWhyI am Nota Secularist,
he theorizesthe"visceralregister," a name designating
gut feelingsand embodied trauma,and in the Chapter
entitled"A Critiqueof Pure Politics,"he launchesa cri-
tique of Kantian purity.And it is here that Connolly
smellsan unconsciousdogmatismand imperialismin
Kant;he is also nervousabouttheKantiandevaluationof
sensibility;he wonders,finally,whetherKant places his
commandmorality outsidea zone oflegitimate contesta-
tion (see also Connolly2000). I understandand share
Connolly'shesitationsbut,as I haveshown,thereis an-
otherwayto approachKant.
Connollysees a dangerousdriveto purityin Kant
but,as I havedemonstrated, thereis also structural
con-
taminationat work. He sees a command moralityin
Kant;so do I, but,it is a paradoxicalone. In contrastto
Connolly,myreadingseeksto unhingetheconservative
appropriationof Kant at its root in orderto develop a
Kantianethicof paradox.Such an ethicdoes not involve
22Forthe themeof embodimentin Kant's writingssee Shell
(1996). In Shell(1980) sheobserves: "Bythusheightening theim-
portanceof intellectual and economicrights,
Kantlessensthesig-
nificanceof thedistinction he drawsbetweenactiveand passive
citizenship.An empiricallyrepublican governmentis lessurgently
needfulthantheformalrightto developfullyone'sownpowers"
(173). I am made uneasybythedistinction Shelldrawsbetween
activeand passivecitizenship. GivenKant'sown insistence on the
importance of autonomyand,moregenerally, Kant'segalitarian
hopefulness, passivecitizenshipis oxymoronic.
KANT AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT 777

theeither/or choiceofembracinglawor affirming essen- creatingand enactingmodes of thinkingand practices

tial contingency(an oppositionthatI believecontem-
poraryethico-political needs to questionto a
reflection
greaterextentthan it has) but doing bothat the same
time.23 And thisis precisely whatcan deepenand expand
contemporary conceptualizations of thefoundationsfor
ethico-political practice.24AlthoughI can onlysketchthe
outlines of this new ethic, it is my alternativeto
Connolly'sconceptionof "agonisticrespect"thathe de-
velopsin oppositionto Kant.
A Kantianethicof paradoxaffirms thevalue of the
moralforcecontainedin categoricallawfulpronounce-
mentsand is also attentiveto the inescapableaporetic
dimensions,theconditionsof possibility thatare simul-
taneouslyconditions of impossibility,of these com-
mands.25Secondly,a Kantianethicof paradoxaspiresto
value universality and particularity at the same time.It
thus seeks a middle positionbetweenadvocatesof ab-
stractuniversalism, on the one hand,and particularity,
on theother.At itsworst,an overemphasis on universal-
ityresultsin imperialism, homogenization, and universal
domination;affirming the particular,takento the ex-
treme,producesnationalism,relativism, and subjectiv-
ism.So we needto knowthedangersofbothuniversality
and particularity, but also thevalueofboth.
Derrida'srecentworkon culturalidentity, cosmo-
politanism,and hospitalityhas gone furtherthan any
othercontemporary thinkerin thisregard.He articulates
the necessity,value, and indispensabilityof a "double
contradictory imperative"or "double duty"(1992, 77-
78).26 Universality is limitedbyvaluingparticularity,and
particularity is stretched outsideof itsidiombytheuni-
versal.The one is alwaysinscribedintotheother.So it is
not a choice betweenuniversalityor particularitybut
23Habermas theclearestexampleofan advocateofra-
is probably
tionalityand universality,buta critiqueofhisworkis beyondthe
scopeofthecurrent article.
24Although I cannotdevelopthisthemehere,Connollyhasprema-
turely accepteda domesticated rendering ofKant.
25 I borrowthisparadoxical formulationfromtheworkofDerrida.
For his discussionof conditionsof possibility thatare simulta- eventhoughtheparadoxmaysuspendthesovereignty
neouslyconditions ofimpossibilitysee hisessayin Deconstruction reasonand pushitto itslimit,itis valuablebecauseitcan
and Pragmatism entitled"Remarkson Deconstruction and Prag- irritatereasonout of self-assurance or thoughtlessness,
matism"(1996,82).
26Derridaarticulates thepracticalformsthatthis"doubleduty"
takesin TheOtherHeading"The samedutyalso dictateswelcom-
ingforeigners inordernotonlyto integrate thembutto recognize
and accepttheiralterity:twoconceptsofhospitality thattodaydi- definesthinking. Thus thinkingis alwaysthinking
videourEuropeanand nationalconsciousness." He goeson toadd:
"Thesamedutydictatesrespecting idioms,minorities,
differences,
offormallaw,thedesirefor
butalso theuniversality
singularities,
translation,
agreement thelawofthemajority,
and univocity, op- ManuscriptsubmittedAugust16,2000.
positionto racism,nationalism,
andxenophobia" (1992,77,78). Final manuscript
thatvalue bothat thesametime.In Derrida'swords:"The
difficultyis to gesturein oppositedirectionsat thesame
time"(1984, 120). This"doubleduty"simultaneously en-
ables ethicalconductbut disablesit too. It makesethics
difficult.Butwithoutethicaldifficulty thereis no reason
to workat beingethical.
But let us returnto Kant.Have I forcedKantianre-
spect into a paradoxicalstructurethatunderminesthe
logical consistencyof Kant'spracticalphilosophy?The
answeris no. All commentatorson Kant acknowledge
respect'smysterious status.And I refuseto ignoreor ho-
mogenizethetextualtensionsthatconstitute respect.In-
deed,I affirm itsparadoxicalmovement.Butwhatis the
value oftheparadoxof respectand whataretheimplica-
tionsof thisparadoxon Kant'spracticalphilosophyas a
whole?
First,theparadoxof respectmayhelp us appreciate
the essentiallyambiguous status of fundamentalele-
mentsof Kant'spracticalphilosophyin orderto attune
us to theactualcomplexity of moralproblemsin thereal
world.The paradox,theone thatreasonand thewill to
meaningseek to annul,can open a space forreflection.
Second, generatinga paradox in a relativelynew place
may providean impetusto read othercrisispoints in
Kant'swritings. WhileI thinkthathe is too dismissiveof
Kant'spracticalphilosophy, I applaud Coles's (1997) af-
firmative rereadingof thesublime,genius,and aesthetic
ideas in the CritiqueofJudgment thathe developsto ar-
ticulatean ethicof receptive generosity.
Third,theparadoxofrespectcan createa space from
whichone can contestethicalprogramsthatdestroyspace
forthesingularity of theother,especiallywhentheother
is a hybridor paradox.Kant'sown valuationof thepara-
dox (1978, 12) is consistent withthefoundinggestureof
thecriticalproject:restraining cognitivehubris. Affirming
paradoxsuspendsthewillto cognitivedomination.But
sometimeslettinga paradoxpersistsignalsa pathological
yearningto appearunique,or as Kantputitearlier, "logi-
cal obstinacy" (1978, 12). Butnot always. It may be a gen-
erousresponseto constitutive ethicalambiguity. Finally,
of
and perhapsthe paradox can even"awakenthe mind"
(KantAnthropology 12). As Nancyputsit:"Thinkingis al-
waysthinkingon thelimit.The limitof comprehending
about
theincomprehensible..." (1993,54).
received
April2, 2001.

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 WILLIAM W. SOKOLOFF

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