Studia theologica I, 4/2003, 160-166

THE HUMAN WILL - THE PRINCIPLES OF ITS MOVEMENT

ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS IN SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

Leonard Tony FARAUANU

ITI, Gaming

I. INTRODUCTION

Trying to explain the human freedom, many thinkers have failed to understand its very
nature and the principles of its movement. Both extremes have been reached: on one hand the
determinism, with its different nuances (mechanical determinism, psychological determinism,
double predestination, etc.) and on the other hand the theory of absolute freedom (its strong aspect
can be seen in the oriental religions, in which the human being is understood as god by nature,
although a fallen god, capable of everything, even of "living" beyond the good and the evil, etc.).[1]
However, there were philosophers who had a clear and true understanding of human freedom,
although it was not complete.[2] The Christian faith perfected this understanding, by the help of the
Divine Revelation, but there are still some conceptual difficulties that need clarification.
In the present paper we will try to explain how Saint Thomas Aquinas understands the
nature of the human will and the principles of its movement. Consequently, we will see his
explanation concerning the power and the limits of human freedom. We will begin our analysis with
the nature of the will (ch. II), as a basis of any further discussion about the movement of the will.
We will continue with the will as moved (ch. III), and afterwards with the will as mover (ch. IV).
Using the conclusions of the previous chapters, the following analysis will be concerned with the
human freedom in its self-determination and in its limits (ch. V).

II. THE NATURE OF HUMAN WILL

Following Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas distinguishes five genera of powers of the
human soul,[3] among which the appetitive powers. It is necessary to posit such powers in the soul,
inasmuch as they account for every desire (appetite), and desire is something characteristic to the
human soul.[4] On the other hand, it cannot be said that desire as such is in some other power of the
soul. We mean by desire that "with respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to
an end, which is first in intention."[5] This is to be distinguished from the "natural desire [or natural
appetite]", which is an inclination that each thing has, of its own nature, for something.[6] This is
called also "natural inclination". For example, a stone is naturally attracted by a heavy body, liquids
naturally take the shape of the recipient in which they are contained and the power of sight desires
naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only.
However, even among appetites there is a distinction. A human being can act against his
sensitive appetite (for example, the continent man who avoids something pleasant to his taste, for

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some particular reason). But this acting against some sensitive appetite has as principle another
appetite, for every human act is based upon some particular appetite.[7] Likewise, if a man restrains
himself from a sensitive pleasure for a particular reason and not for the sake of a more intense
sensitive pleasure immediately proposed, the appetite that accounts for his act should not be a
sensitive one. He acts in this way because he considers that it is better for him to avoid that pleasure
in those circumstances, for the sake of his good. He chooses in fact between two different goods:
immediate pleasure, on one hand, and healthy, for example, on the other hand. Reason plays an
important role in this act, for it presents the object to this other appetite (under the form of good)
and reason is also the principle of freedom. The human choice follows and is based upon the
inquiry, the counsel and the judgement of reason. Thus, the principle of this action is a rational
appetite, which is called will, and the object of this rational appetite is the good apprehended as
such by the practical reason.[8] That is why it can be said that man moves himself, for there is in him
a principle of his movement to an end, insofar as he knows that end.[9] Man acts from his own
inclination, and his action in this case is called voluntary.
Therefore, the will can be defined as "the rational appetite." Its specific act consists in
"selecting, by the light of reason, its object [the good] from among the various particular,
conflicting aims of all the tendencies and faculties of our nature."[10] Consequently, the will
naturally rules over the other appetites. Its object is the good in general, its prerogative being the
freedom in choosing among different forms of good. We can call it the faculty of choice. However,
this aspect (the freedom of the will) will be clarified in the following chapters.

III. THE WILL AS MOVED

The appetitive powers are passive powers, for they are naturally moved by the thing
apprehended. More precisely said, "the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while
the appetite is a mover moved."[11] It is moved because the principle of its act is found in that
particular apprehension - its mover, and it is a mover because the appetite itself is a principle of a
further movement of the soul. Consequently, the human will is a moved mover. Now we will
analyze the will as moved, that is, its passive aspect.
The first aspect to be clarified is that the will cannot suffer violence, that is, it cannot be
necessarily moved by an external principle. The act of the will is "a kind inclination proceeding
from an interior knowing principle,"[12] while what is forced comes from an external principle, with
no contribution of the thing forced. Thus to be forced by an external principle in its proper act
would be contrary to the very act of the will.
However, it is in the nature of the will to will necessarily the good. Also, because not every
good is desired for its own sake, but for the sake of some other good, one has to distinguish between
the highest good and the intermediate goods. The highest good must be one in number, for it is the
good that brings the will to rest, fulfilling all desire,[13] and the will wills it in willing all the other
goods. This highest good is happiness, which consists in the vision of God. Thus, the will
necessarily wills happiness when it wills all other goods, which are ordered towards happiness.

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With other words, one can say that the will is naturally (therefore, necessarily) moved towards
happiness.
The following step is to understand the nature of this necessary movement. Since the will
starts to will something that it did not will before, one can say that the will was first in potency with
respect to willing that thing. Thus, an agent that is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency
needs to be moved (to be brought from potency to actuality) by some mover. On one hand, the will
moves itself to will the means to an end, with the help of reason, which deliberates about the means
to that end. But, on the other hand, considering that a particular end can be in fact the means
towards another remote end, this process cannot go indefinitely, that is, there must be a last end,
before which there is no deliberation, but the will is moved towards it by some external mover.[14]
However, this first movement of the will is not a violent one, although it is caused by an external
mover, since it is the will that wills. In a violent movement the thing forced to move contributes
nothing to that movement. This is not the case in the first movement of the will, which is an
intrinsic one, for the will is naturally moved to will that last end (that is, happiness). But the natural
movement of the will is caused only by that which causes its nature, that is the First Mover and the
First Cause of every nature, namely, God. This can be known also from the fact that the will is
ordered to the universal good. A particular cause cannot produce a universal inclination, but God,
who is the universal good, can incline the will towards Himself. However, God moves the will only
towards its universal object, the good in general. Without this first universal and natural motion
man could not will anything. But it does not belong to God to move the will necessarily towards
this or that particular good. The human being by his own reason determines himself to will a
particular good, which can be merely an apparent good and not a true one. God moves all things to
move according to the nature that He gave them, thus He moves contingent things to act
contingently.[15] Consequently, the will necessarily acts under God's movement, but only with
respect to the universal good. When choosing the particular objects (goods), the will is not
necessarily moved by God to choose this or that good. However, God can move by grace the will to
choose a particular good, but the will does not necessarily follow this movement, since it can ignore
or reject it.[16] Therefore, God is the only external principle of the movement of the will, since He is
the only one who moves it internally, as the Creator of its nature and as its First Cause and First
Mover. The other external objects exercise an influence on the will only by the mediation of senses
and reason, thus they are also movers of the will, but in an indirect manner.
We have to consider now the role of the intellect in the movement of the will. Insofar as the
will is the rational appetite, its object is presented to it by reason. Thus the intellect moves the will
by presenting to it something under the aspect of good. The will tends towards the good in
universal, but in particular circumstances it is the practical reason that inquires, advises and judges
between different particular goods. Thus, without the activity of reason the will would not be able to
move, since it is moved by the intellectual apprehension of the good. Consequently, we have to
consider the intellect the mover of the will. However, the will is not necessitated by the intellect. All
objects offered to the will by the intellect, except happiness, are not good universally and from any
point of view. They are good in a certain respect, but they can be understood as lacking some good

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from some other point of view. That is why they do not move necessarily the will, for they can be
regarded as non-good, and the will would flee them.[17] But one could say that practical reason
inquires, advises and judges between different particular goods, thus the will would have to follow
necessarily the ultimate practical judgment of the intellect. This is true, but it has to be said that it is
the will which decides which judgment shall be the ultimate one. By its power to move the other
powers of the soul, the will can stop the inquiry, the counsel or the judgment of the intellect in one
point (towards which it is more inclined to consent by some other appetites or by habit), ignoring in
this way the other aspects of that thing. Thus the will is not absolutely controlled by reason. But we
will have a more detailed analysis of the mutual interdependence between intellect and will in the
next chapter of the paper, when we will speak about the will as mover.
We should consider now the will moved by the sense appetite. We have shown in the
previous chapter that the will rules over the lower appetite, in as much as it can choose between
different particular goods. However, since the will is moved by that which appears to be good and
fitting, the lower appetites, being moved by their particular objects, can make an object to appear as
good and fitting. In fact, this fittingness appears as such "either from the condition of the thing
proposed or of the one to whom it is proposed."[18] But the lower appetites can change the condition
of the one to whom a thing is proposed, through a particular attraction. Thus, the sense appetite can
incline the will towards a particular sensitive good. In this sense one can say that the will is moved
by the sense appetite. However, inasmuch as a person still has a sane mind, the lower appetites do
not have a compelling influence to the will. A sound will can resist and control the lower appetites,
or can accept to follow them. But sometimes it happens that the sensitive appetites enter in conflict
with reason, and if the will is weakened by vices they can win and control the rational appetite.

IV. THE WILL AS MOVER

We have analyzed the will as moved, but in order to understand the principles of its
movement we should look now also to the will as mover. We will consider first the will as self-
mover, and afterwards the will as the mover of the other powers of the soul.
Insofar as the will wills necessarily the last end (that is, happiness) without any other
intervention from the side of the other powers of the soul, it follows that the will wills necessarily
the means towards this last end.[19] Saint Thomas compares the self-actualization of the intellect
with the self-actualization of will, saying that the end in relation to the desirable is like a principle
in relation to what is intelligible. The intellect brings itself from potency to act regarding the
knowledge of conclusions through the knowledge of a principle, and in the same way the will
brings itself from potency to act with respect of willing the means through willing the end.[20] This
is possible because in this case the intellect and the will are not passive and active in the same
respect.
Likewise, all the influences of the other powers that move the will have to be accepted by
the will before they are effective. The will controls the activity of the powers that have an influence
over it, even the activity of reason (in its discursive aspect), that is why they do not necessarily
move it. Thus, finally it is the will that moves itself to its acts (that is, intention, choice, consent and

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use). If it is to describe the cooperation between will and reason through a linear sequence, it can be
said that everything begins with the intention of the will and is followed by the counsel of reason
concerning the means to attain that end and afterwards by the consent of the will to those means. If
there are many acceptable means to that end, it follows the judgment of reason and afterwards the
choice of the will between those means.[21] If there is only one suitable means, choice and consent
do not differ in reality, but only according to reason, and no other judgment of reason follows the
consent. Thus, after consent (or after choice, according to the situation) it follows the command and
afterwards the use of the will. But use precedes in a way the consent (and also choice), for the will
uses reason, by moving it to inquire and to deliberate, in order to attain the end. It is in this way in
fact that the will is able to control reason and to pursue its own inclination, being free from any
necessary movement with respect to the means towards the last end.
The acts which are begun and completed in the will itself are called elicited by the will (for
example, intention, consent, choice and use) and the acts carried out by the intellect, the sensitive,
and the bodily powers are called commanded by the will. Command is in fact an order of reason
presupposing an act of the will[22], thus it belongs as direction to the intellect, but as executive order
it belongs to the will. Reason is commanded by the will in its discursive activity, in the focalization
of the attention upon a particular object, etc. Thus the will moves the other powers of the soul by
reason of an end,[23] in this respect being their mover.

V. THE MEANING OF HUMAN FREEDOM

Concluding what has been shown in the previous chapters, it can be said that the human will
is both limited and free. Limited by its own created nature, which makes it to move necessarily
towards the last end (happiness) and to depend upon the other powers of the soul. It is free with
respect to the means towards the last end, because of its rational nature, and it is also free because it
is not completely determined by any power of the soul. However, speaking about the "bondage" of
the will, the fact that it necessarily wills happiness is not against freedom. In a way every nature is
"bounded" in itself, insofar as it cannot be something else buy itself, and it would be strange to call
it a lack of freedom. The true freedom is the state in which something is fully itself. For example,
without this first necessary movement of the will, there would be no order in the human action, thus
the human being would not be able to attain his perfection, and a chaotic movement would rule in
the human mind. In this case the very happiness of man would be lost. But this is in fact impossible,
since everything is ordered towards God by God Himself, as the Mover and the Last End of all
things.
Speaking about the freedom of the will, one could also distinguish between the
"psychological freedom", or the freedom of contradiction, and "moral freedom". The first one
affirms the capacity of the will to do good or evil, while the latter affirms the acquired facility of the
will in doing good. That is why when God moves the will by grace to a particular salutary act the
freedom of the will is not destroyed, but even increased. However, this movement by the help of
grace is not a necessary one, since the will can ignore or resist it. So the "psychological freedom" is
completely preserved. Freedom is the condition of love, and since human beings are created in

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order to participate in Gods love, they are fully human inasmuch as they are free. Free not only in
the sense that they can say "yes" or "no" - this is absolutely necessary, but free in saying fully and
with facility "yes".

Notes

[1]
A weak form of this "philosophy" is pelagianism and semi-pelagianism.
[2]
Aristotle, for example.
[3]
That is, nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and rational powers.
[4]
Also to the animal soul. However, we are concerned here with human acts, thus we will limit our
analysis to what is characteristic to human beings.
[5]
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 78, body.
[6]
Ibidem, 1st reply.
[7]
We have defined the appetite as "that with respect of which the soul is referred to something
extrinsic as to an end, which is first in intention." Thus, acting against a sensitive desire has a reason
that points to an end, which is extrinsic to the soul and it is first in intention. Consequently, this
action has an appetite as principle.
[8]
Insofar as the practical reason is concerned with particular circumstances, "hic et nunc". Also, the
rational appetite is not always against the sensitive desire, but we used this example in order to see
the difference between them.
[9]
Vide Saint Thomas, op. cit., Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 1, body.
[10]
The Catholic Encyclopædia, Vol. XV, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm.
[11]
Aristotle, De Anima, III, 10, apud Saint Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q. 80, body.
[12]
Saint Thomas, op. cit., Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4, body.
[13]
Saint Thomas adds other two reasons: nature tends always to one thing (1) and there is always
one first principle determining the genus of the different species of human acts (Summa Theologiae,
Ia Iae, q. 1, a. 5).
[14]
Saint Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 4, body.
[15]
Ibidem, q. 10, a. 4, body.
[16]
Ibidem, q. 9, a. 6, third reply.
[17]
Ibidem, q. 10, a. 2, body.
[18]
Ibidem, q. 9, a. 3, body.
[19]
Willing the means is contained in willing the end, since the end cannot be attained without the
suitable means. However, the intellect must see the necessary connection between these particular
means and the end so that the will may actually will these means. But, on the side of the will, the
act of willing the means follows upon willing the end. Thus in this respect the will moves itself.
[20]
Saint Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., q. 9, a. 3, body. See also the previous note.

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[21]
However, we have said that it is the will which decides which is the last judgment of reason,
insofar as will uses reason in pursuing its end, by moving it to reason (in its discursive way).
[22]
Saint Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., q. 17, a. 1, body.
[23]
The sensitive, the bodily powers and the reason - in its discursive acts. The will cannot control
the growth, the digestion or other similar functions of man.

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