Psychology An Exploration 2nd Edition

Ciccarelli Test Bank

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://testbankdeal.com/download/psychology-an-exploration-2nd-edition-ciccarelli-te
st-bank/
Psychology An Exploration 2nd Edition Ciccarelli Test Bank

TOTAL
Chapter 3
ASSESSMENT
Sensation and Perception
GUIDE

Factual Conceptual Applied Short

Learning True/False Essay
(Multiple (Multiple (Multiple Answer
Objectives Questions Questions
Choice) Choice) Choice) Questions
QUICK QUIZ 1 1, 4, 6, 7 2, 5, 10 3, 8, 9
3.1 - How does 2-5, 7-8, 10, 1, 9, 11, 14, 17, 6, 12, 18, 20 183-184 198 208
sensation travel 13, 15-16, 21-23
through the central 19, 24-25
nervous system, and
why are some
sensations ignored?

3.2 - What is light, 26-28, 30, 29, 39-40, 46 31, 36-37, 42 185-188 199
and how does it 32-35, 38,
travel through the 41, 43-45,
various parts of the 47-50
eye?

3.3 - How do the 53-55, 57- 56, 59, 67, 75 51-52, 64-65, 189 209
eyes see, and how 58, 60-63, 68, 71, 73-74,
do the eyes see 66, 69-70, 76
different colors? 72, 77
3.4 - What is sound, 78, 85, 87- 79, 81-82, 84, 80, 83, 99 190-193 200-202 210
and how does it 98, 100-101 86
travel through the
various parts of the
ear?

3.5 - How do the 102-104, 115 105 194-195 203-204

senses of taste and 106-114, 116
smell work, and how
are they alike?

3.6 – What allows 117-127, 130, 137, 139 128, 135, 140 196 205
people to experience 129, 131-
the sense of touch, 134, 136,
pain, motion, and 138
balance?

3.7 - What are 143, 147- 141-142, 162 144-146, 149,

perception, 148, 150- 152, 155
perceptual 151, 153-
constancies, and the 154, 156-
Gestalt principles of
161, 163
perception?

Visit TestBankDeal.com to get complete for all chapters

 Factual Conceptual Applied Short
Learning True/False Essay
(Multiple (Multiple (Multiple Answer
Objectives Questions Questions
Choice) Choice) Choice) Questions
3.8 - What is depth 164-171 172 197 206 211
perception, and what
kinds of cues are
important for it to
occur?

3.9 - What are visual 180-181 173-174, 176, 175, 177-178, 207 212
illusions, and how 179 182
can they and other
factors influence and
alter perception?
 Chapter 3: Sensation and Perception
Quick Quiz 1

1. The difference threshold is defined as the degree of change in a stimulus level that is required in order for a
person to detect a change ________ of the time.
a) 25 percent
b) 75 percent
c) 50 percent
d) 100 percent

2. The process by which unchanging information from the senses of taste, touch, smell, and vision is “ignored” by
the sensory receptor cells themselves is called _____________.
a) transformation
b) sensory adaptation
c) transmutation
d) transduction

3. When we describe someone’s eyes as blue, technically we are referring to his or her blue ___________.
a) pupils
b) irises
c) corneas
d) scleras

4. The idea that the eye contains separate receptors for red, green, and blue is known as the ________ theory.
a) opponent-process
b) additive color mixing
c) trichromatic
d) reductive color mixing

5. The bone that is attached to the eardrum is called the _________; the bone that is connected to the oval window is
called the ________.
a) anvil (incus); stirrup (stapes)
b) hammer (malleus); anvil (incus)
c) stirrup (stapes); hammer (malleus)
d) hammer (malleus); stirrup (stapes)

6. Which is the newest of the five basic tastes to be discovered?

a) bitter
b) sour
c) sweet
d) umami, or brothy

7. Which is the best description of the vestibular senses?

a) They have to do with touch, pressure, temperature, and pain.
b) They have to do with the location of body parts in relation to the ground and to each other.
c) They have to do with movement and body position.
d) They have to do with your location as compared to the position of the sun.

8. Suppose you look at a given figure and decide that, depending on how you look at it, it can be perceived as either
an old woman or a young lady. Such a figure would be said to be ___________.
a) mixed
b) confused
c) reversible
d) inconsistent

144
Copyright © 2013 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
laid hold of on which men might vent their passions. The very same thing
occurred in France just after the restoration. When such a temper prevails,
the necessary consequence is a very sore feeling between government and
people. The Romans became discontented with their new constitution. Even
though the decemvirs had not been had, or no one else but Appius Claudius
had been such, they could not have been borne with, and the people would
not have remained quiet. Much besides may be guessed. The plebeians had
been mistaken in the men of their order who had become decemvirs. Just at
first indeed, the protection of the tribunes is stated not to have been missed;
but gradually these persons thought fit to use their power for their own
benefit, and to show the same exclusive spirit as the rest. It is easy to
understand that the plebeian Sp. Oppius was decidedly most obnoxious,
since he addicted the debtor as much as Ap. Claudius did. Such accusations
had until then been brought against patricians only.
That a war broke out with the Æquians and Sabines, was an event of
which the decemvirs might indeed have been glad, as they gained by it an
opportunity of giving the people employment. We are now told that patriots,
L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus, had got up in the senate, and
had required the decemvirs first to resign their power; but that the majority
of the senate had decided upon the levy. The speeches which are found in
Livy on this occasion, I look upon as empty declamations which have arisen
from the belief, that the decemvirs had usurped their office. The enemy had
invaded and plundered the country; resistance was necessary; there was no
time for deliberation. Also there was nothing more easy than such an
enlistment, as there were no more tribunes. Just as little foundation does
there seem to be for the story of the assassination of L. Siccius; it looks too
poetical. The only fact which we can gather from it is, that two Roman
armies took the field, of which the larger host stood on the Algidus against
the Æquians. In the meanwhile a crime happened in Rome, of a nature
which was quite common in the Greek oligarchies, Appius Claudius having
fallen in love with the daughter of a centurion L. Virginius, very likely a
relative of the tribune Virginius. That her death, like that of Lucretia,
became the cause of the downfall of the decemvirs, is uniformly stated by
all the accounts; the story is most ancient, and there is no reason to doubt it.
The rape of women and boys is quite a common crime of the tyrants against
their subjects. Aristotle and Polybius also tell us explicitly that the
overthrow of oligarchies was often brought about by such outrages against
female virtue. Appius Claudius suborned a false accuser, one of his clients,
to assert that the real mother of Virginia had been his slave, who had sold
her to the wife of Virginius, as the latter, being barren, wished to pass off
the child as her own; and this he offered to prove by the testimony of false
witnesses. Appius was resolved upon adjudging the slave to him; yet this
was contrary to the law of the Twelve Tables, for, if the freedom of a
Roman citizen was impugned, he could claim to remain in possession of it;
only he had to give bail, as the value of the person might be estimated in
money. This was called vindiciæ secundum libertatem; Appius wanted to
give them contra libertatem. Upon this, all who were in the Forum flocked
together, and adjured him to put off the sentence, at least until the father,
who was serving in the field, should be able to return. When the lictor tried
to use force, such a number of plebeians filled the market-place, that
Appius had not the courage to insist upon his decision, but requested the
plaintiff to rest content with the surety until the next court-day; yet in order
to prevent any thing that might appear like a conspiracy, the morrow was
named for the trial. At the same time, he sent messengers into the camp to
have the father detained with the army; but the latter had already been
fetched beforehand by the betrothed lover of the maiden, and other
kinsmen, and he appeared on the following day in the Forum. The
semblance of justice was now abandoned. Had Appius allowed the cause to
be tried in due form, the father would have unmasked the lie; and so he said
that he was satisfied that the damsel was the slave of the plaintiff, and
ordered her to be taken away. Amidst the general dismay at this decision,
Virginius collected himself; and while pretending to bid farewell to his
daughter, and to put some questions to the nurse, he stabbed her with a
knife taken from one of the stalls in the Forum, under a portico, and with
the bloody weapon walked unmolested out of the city back into the camp
again. Here the soldiers unanimously refused obedience to the decemvirs,
the two armies joining. But the accounts contradict each other: some state
that they occupied the Sacred Mount, and at the first secession the
Aventine; others the reverse. It is to be remarked that the commonalty has
now twenty leaders, and is therefore standing again under the guardianship
of its tribunes (phylarchs). These elected among themselves two men who
were to hold the presidency, and to treat with the authorities, whom the
people in the city had abandoned. The tribuni sacrosancti were abolished
by the decemviral constitution; but the tribuni had continued as wardens of
their tribes. With these at their head, they held out against the senate and the
decemvirs in a more decided insurrection than that of forty years before; for
at that time they had separated themselves in order to recover their rights,
but now they were completely armed as for war. In this contest the
decemvirs must needs have succumbed, especially as many patricians
evidently fell off from them, although, as Livy correctly remarks, they were
for the most part well pleased with the decemviral constitution, as they were
freed by it from the tribunician power. Nevertheless there were many, as for
instance Valerius and Horatius, who were for the restoration of the old
constitution, because they were convinced that the tribunate worked in a
very wholesome manner as a check upon the power of the consuls. Thus it
was determined to treat with the Plebes, and a peace was concluded.
We have yet some remnants of discrepant accounts concerning the
downfall of the decemvirs. Quite different from ours is that of Diodorus,
which might have been borrowed from Fabius, did it not contain a fact
which is rather strange. According to this version, the decision happened
much sooner than Livy places it; on the day after the occupation of the
Aventine, peace had been already concluded. According to Cicero, the
secession lasted for a long time; nor does he know anything of what Livy
says about Valerius and Horatius having been the mediators. Valerius he
afterwards mentions as consul, and as continually engaged in reconciling all
parties. These are signs of a discrepancy in the traditions, although the
character of this age was on the whole quite different from what it had been
before, and thoroughly historical. There is an account in Cicero that the
plebeians went from the Sacred Mount to the Aventine, which is certainly
false. They always occupied the Aventine; and the obscure Lex Icilia had
also probably reference to this point, that the Aventine should be excluded
from the union with Rome, and, as the peculiar seat of the plebeians, be
ruled by their own magistrates. We must therefore understand this statement
of his to mean, that the army had betaken itself to the Mons Sacer, and that
it had then marched to the towns, and united with the men of its own order
on the Aventine. The Capitol was given up to the armed troops, and the
circumstance of this surrender is a marked proof of the difference of the
then plebeians from those of forty years before. The plebeians were
conquerors to all intents and purposes.
 The decemvirs laid down their office. The first election which was now
proceeded with, was that of the ten tribunes under the presidency of the
Pontifex Maximus, which is the strongest possible form of acknowledgment
on the part of the patricians; the plebeian magistracy makes its own
inviolability part and parcel of the sacred law. By a most remarkable
anomaly, they hold the councils in what was in later times the Circus
Flaminius, which was for the plebeians what the Circus Maximus was for
the patricians. This happened in December: since that time the tribunes
regularly entered upon their office in that month. In order to settle the
affairs of the state, it was resolved to elect again two patrician magistrates;
yet not under the former title of prætors, but under that of consuls, as
Zonaras tells us. This change of designation proves, that the magistracy was
considered as distinct from the former one; it was a less elevated dignity:
prætores were “such as took the lead, generals;” consules were only
“colleagues,” quite a general name like decemviri. This new form of the
consulate was not, however, designed to reintroduce the old constitution,
and to abolish the decemvirate; but it was merely an extraordinary and
temporary measure, a proof of which is the further extension, at this period,
of the law which denounced outlawry against him who had offended against
tribunes or ædiles, in favour of the tribunes, ædiles, judges, and decemvirs.
This law has been much discussed; the mention of the decemvirs in it is a
certain fact. The great Antonius Augustinus, bishop of Tarragona,—a man
highly distinguished for his knowledge of the old monuments and of the
political law, but who, with great historical talent, was unfortunately
deficient in grammatical acuteness,—has already seen that the judices here
are the Centumviri, the judges who were appointed by the Plebes, three for
each tribe, to decide in all causes concerning Quiritary property. He merely
threw out this assertion; I have proved it fully in the latest edition of my
History. Even as these judices were said to have meant the consuls, and the
inviolability of these were derived from thence, thus also with equal
incorrectness, the decemvirs in the law were made out to have been the
decemviri stlitibus judicandis; yet these were first appointed in the fifth
century. It refers without doubt to the former decemviri consulari potestate,
and indeed to the plebeians among them, as the patricians were already
protected by their old laws.
When the tribunate was restored, the patricians might say, “You were in
the right; the power, which the former prætors had, was too great, and
therefore we shared the decemvirate with you. But now that you have again
your tribunes, the power which you would gain, would be excessive; and
therefore you must leave the decemvirate to us alone.” This the plebeians
did not choose to do; and thus the negotiations for the restoration of the
decemvirate came to a stand still. The consular power was retained, yet
with a considerable modification. According to trustworthy accounts, the
assembly of the electors, down to the year 269, was in possession of an
unfettered and real elective franchise. From that time, first by usurpation
and then by compromise, the change was introduced that one consul was
previously to be chosen by the senate and confirmed by the curies, and the
other to be elected by the centuries. At this period, the election of the
centuries was again perfectly free, with the reservation of its being
confirmed by the curies,—as was the case with all other acts of the
centuries,—very likely a consequence of the legislation of the decemvirs.
The tribunes also had their authority altered in an essential point.
Formerly in that board the majority of votes decided; now, according to
Dionysius, the right was established by virtue of which the protest of one
tribune might paralyse the influence of the whole college, which is
equivalent to an appeal to the tribes. The principle was applied to them,
vetantis major potestas. According to Livy this right had existed already
before; yet it is probable that at least it was now first acknowledged, as the
relation of the tribunes to the commonalty was changed. They were no more
the deputies, but the representatives of their order; which in fact was a
corruption of the right, though the evil consequences of it only became
manifest some generations afterwards. In this point also the government
gave a signal proof of adroitness; for they might always hope to find some
one in the board who would side with them. Cicero says, that the tribunate
of the people preserved Rome from a revolution; that unless tribunes had
been granted to the people, the kings must needs have been retained. The
centuries had now gotten a right of jurisdiction; yet according to the sacred
law, the comitia centuriata had auspices, as the gods were asked with
regard to the matters which were to be discussed, whether it was their
pleasure that they should. Since the tribunes might now prosecute before
the centuries, it also follows that they must have been empowered to hold
auspices (de cœlo observare). To this the statement in Zonaras refers, that
the tribunes had received permission to observe auspices. According to a
notice in Diodorus, outlawry was denounced against any one who should be
the occasion of the Plebes’ remaining without tribune.—It is quite a
phenomenon that at the close of the year two patricians are found among
the tribunes: either these are patricians who have joined the Plebes, or the
patricians set forth the thoroughly sound principle, that the tribunes of the
people, owing to their action upon the machinery of the state, were no
longer a magistracy of a part of the nation, but of the whole. That at this
period many patricians went over to the Plebes is expressly asserted; yet the
other version is also very probable. From this time, we often find the
patricians mentioned as fellow-tribesmen of the plebeians. At the discussion
of the project for the separation of the Plebes and their settling at Veii, the
senators are said to have gone about prensantes suos quisque tribules. In
like manner we are told that Mamercus Æmilius, about fifteen years after
the time of the Decemvirs, had been struck from the list of his tribe, and
placed among the ærarii. Camillus also appeals to his tribules; yet this may
perhaps have meant his patrician clansmen. That afterwards, in Cicero’s
days, all the patricians were in the tribes is well known. Cæsar belonged to
the Tribus Fabia; Sulpicius, to the Lemonia. After the war of Hannibal, C.
Claudius says in Livy, that to strike one from the list of all the five and
thirty tribes, was to deprive him of the right of citizenship. M. Livius expels
his colleague Claudius from the tribes. The number of these examples
might easily be enlarged. In the earlier times, there were patrician and
plebeian tribes; in the later, the Ramnes, Tities and Luceres are no more
spoken of: they only make their appearance still as the sex suffragia in the
centuries. The whole Roman nation was now thrown together into the same
tribes. The same was done at Athens, when the ten phylæ of the Demos
became the only ones, and the four old mixed tribes were broken up. I
believed formerly that this was to be attributed to the decemviral
legislation; yet, if we bear in mind how carefully the decemvirs otherwise
distinguish between the two orders, we cannot possibly suppose, that in this
respect they should have aimed at their fusion. We must place it at a
somewhat later period, and we are led to decide upon the time of the second
censors; it was therefore soon after the decemvirs. In the fragments of Dio
Cassius it is mentioned, that the patricians had preferred the plebeian order
on account of its greater power, and had passed over to it. Greater power at
that time the Plebes had not; but it had greater strength, and it was easy to
foresee what it would attain to. It was for many a more pleasing position to
be in the ranks of those who were advancing, than of those who stood still.
 The decemvirs were brought to justice; Appius Claudius and Sp. Oppius
died in prison. The latter was of plebeian extraction, a proof that we need
not regard the plebeians as the holders of particular virtues. Wherever a
state is divided into factions, the strong party abuses its might, so that our
interest turns to the weaker one. Sp. Oppius was perhaps one of those who
formerly had talked a great deal against tyranny, and now he had become a
tyrant himself. Appius was capitally impeached by L. Virginius (Aulus
Virginius is certainly a mistake of the transcriber, as the copyists had in
their mind the former tribune of that name): L. Virginius as avenger of the
blood of his daughter had been appointed tribune. He wished, by virtue of
his tribunitian authority, to have Appius cast into prison. Livy’s account of
this leads us to a remarkable point. It is indeed a generally received opinion,
that every Roman citizen had the right of saving himself from the
punishment of death by exile. If such had been the case, one might well
have wondered why capital punishments should indeed have been instituted
at all, of which notwithstanding the old Roman laws have so great a
number. Yet these facts are to be looked upon quite in another light. The
views of the ancients with regard to criminal law are very different from
ours, and perhaps more so than with regard to any other object in life.
According to our notions, a man has also a right to be tried who has been
caught in the very act; it is considered as an obligation of the prisoner to
deny his guilt, and to allow himself to be convicted by evidence; the
lawyers may defend him, and endeavour to lead the judge into error. Of this
the ancients had no idea. If any one was taxed with having committed a
delictum, the deposition of the witnesses was sufficient to have him
instantly arrested and dragged before the magistrate; if it was no delictum
manifestum, and he was a plebeian, then he applied to the tribune and gave
bail. Should he thus manage to get free, he might leave his sureties in the
lurch and go into exile. But if, on the contrary, he had been caught in a
delictum manifestum in flagranti, and the testes locupletes asserted that they
had been present, thereby identifying his person, no trial was allowed; but
he was, obtorto collo, his toga drawn over his head, conducted before the
magistrate, who then at once gave judgment. If it did not happen to be a
court-day, the culprit was in the meanwhile put into prison. Yet if any body
committed a crime worthy of death, but not, however, of a kind in which it
would have been possible to catch him in flagranti, the plaintiff had still a
remedy in law by which the defendant was brought into prison.[106] Thus,
for instance, in the case of Appius Claudius, the charge against him was a
crime punishable by death; he had deprived a citizen of liberty. For this
offence, Virginius prosecuted him; and would not allow him to give bail,
lest by this means he should escape. The prosecutor could then offer to the
accused a sponsio, a sort of wager, which consisted on the part of the
prosecutor of a sum of money (sacramentum) staked against the personal
liberty of his opponent. The prosecutor said, Thou hast deprived a citizen of
his liberty; the defendant denied it: if the judge, elected for this purpose,
decided for the prosecutor, no further judgment was needed, but the culprit
was at once taken before the magistrate and executed; if he decided against
the prosecutor, the latter lost the sacramentum. But, if the defendant would
have nothing to do with the sponsio, he was thrown into prison. The
question now was, whether the prosecutor should be obliged to drop the
charge, or to accept bail. The passages which prove this are to be found in
Livy and Cicero. It was only until the court-day that the culprit remained in
prison, which accounts for the Carcer being so exceedingly small. The
staying there, as also its darkness, was already a foretaste of death: he who
entered it was lost. Cicero says, carcerem vindicem nefariorum ac
manifestorum scelerum majores esse voluerunt; either his neck was broken
there, or he was led out and executed. The Greek custom with regard to
imprisonment was much nearer our own.
Yet one remark remains to be added. If one had a charge against a filius
familias, the father was judge; in causes against the clients, the patron.
Another part of the Roman criminal law which is likewise utterly at
variance with ours, is that which takes cognizance of political
delinquencies. For many of them no penalty was fixed, as in such cases it
was the decided opinion of the ancients, and held by them as a general rule,
that the state ought to look to its own preservation (salus publica suprema
lex esto). They were well aware that offences against the state might, when
taken severally, have the most varied shades: the same act outwardly may
either spring from error, or it may be the offshoot of the darkest crime, and
it is therefore impossible to assign a distinct penalty for every single case.
Hence the Greeks and Romans had for all the judicia publica this most
important right, that the prosecutor could sue for a certain penalty in
proportion to the matter in question, even though a different degree of
punishment might have been inflicted for the same act in another instance.
The same privilege was applicable, it seems, even to judicia privata,
whenever the criminal code was insufficient; instead of which, in modern
times, the foolish notion was entertained that punishment must only proceed
from a distinct law, a wretched opinion which has really got the upperhand
every where. The ancients held just the opposite principle. The boy who
tortured an animal was doomed to die by the popular assembly of the
Athenians, although the laws contained nothing for the protection of
animals. Hence a man might also be condemned to death, provided that he
had committed an act which was contrary to the general feeling of honour.
Until then the patricians had indeed claimed for themselves the
privilege of not being liable to be imprisoned at all; for we are told that
Appius Claudius had called the Carcer the domicilium plebis. Virginius
showed himself generous, and granted to Appius a respite that he might
deprive himself of life. Yet Sp. Oppius was executed, because his crime was
of another kind, and not merely against an individual who might act with
mildness. For that he had ordered an old soldier, who had served twenty-
seven years, to be scourged; and that the man had come forward as his
prosecutor, is evidently a fiction. Twenty-eight years was the time of
effective service for a soldier; and here an old soldier is now brought in,
who was in the last year of his military obligation, evidently as a general
representation of tyranny. The other decemvirs went into voluntary exile,
and their goods were confiscated. One of them was Q. Fabius, the ancestor
of what was afterwards the Gens Fabia. The tribune Duilius now
proclaimed an amnesty for all those who had committed any offence in this
unfortunate time. This incident is of great importance for the history of the
Roman method of procedure. I have already, on a former occasion,
explicitly stated my opinion about it; but since the discovery of Gaius, the
case has become much clearer.
 LEX HORATIA VALERIA. FURTHER
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION.
MILITARY TRIBUNATE. CENSORSHIP. SP.
MÆLIUS. VICTORY OF A. POSTUMIUS
TUBERTUS OVER THE VOLSCIANS AND
ÆQUIANS. CONQUEST OF FIDENÆ AND
VEII.
At first the patricians were in great dismay, and they confirmed all the
laws proposed. Among them is that which gave the plebiscita general
validity (ut quod tributim plebes jussisset populum teneret). This law is one
of the greatest riddles in Roman history; and it cannot be solved with any
historical certainty, although I have formed for myself an hypothesis on the
subject, of the truth of which I am perfectly convinced. The law is thus
given in Livy; afterwards in the eighth book he says of the second Publilian
law, ut plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent; and in like manner, Pliny and
Lælius Felix in Gellius quote the law of Hortensius which is to be placed a
hundred and sixty years later; Gaius says concerning the latter, ut plebiscita
populum tenerent. When we now consider these three laws,—as to the
Publilian, Livy alone mentions it,—they seem all of them to say the same
thing. Is this really the case; or was the enactment only revived from time to
time, because of its having fallen into oblivion? If we investigate the
character of these laws according to their several ages, we see that the
meaning of each was a distinct one, and that the import of the plebiscita
was differently interpreted at different periods. The result of my researches
is this, that Livy in his mention of the lex Valeria Horatia, was certainly not
accurate, because he did not himself clearly see his way, and the generally
known Hortensian law was present to his mind. The law may have been
something to this effect,—quæ plebs tributim jusserit,
, ut populum tenerent; for, from that time the
course of the legislation was frequently this, that when the tribunes had
gotten a proposition adopted by the commonalty, they laid it before the
curies, who immediately put it to the vote; which was an abridgment of the
proper order of business, according to which the laws approved by the
senate had first to go to the centuries, and then only to the curies. In the new
system, the asking the leave of the senate and the passing through the
centuries were done away with. This was a great change, as now the
discussion might originate with the Plebes itself. That, however, the
plebiscita without the approval of the curies had no legal force, is evident,
especially from the struggle on the occasion of the Licinian laws; wherefore
at that time already, leges may be spoken of with reference to the
resolutions of the Plebes, for as soon as the curies had sanctioned them,
they were leges. Whenever the Plebes and the curies were not kept asunder
by class-interests, every matter was carried. It is also to be borne in mind,
that this law was enacted, not by a tribunician, but by a consular rogation.
The lex Publilia had been rendered superfluous by the decemviral
legislation, as in this there were no comitia tributa.
The later Publilian law of the dictator Q. Publilius Philo, has quite a
different intention. By it the sanction of the curies to a resolution which had
been carried in the tribes, was declared superfluous, as this course was too
circuitous, and the senate after all had the right of proposing. His law, ut
plebiscita omnem populum tenerent, must on the other hand run thus,—ut
plebiscita , omnes Quirites tenerent; for
from henceforth it happens with regard to many enactments concerning the
administration, that the senate commissions the consuls to arrange with the
tribunes about making proposals to the tribes which they were to approve
of; yet this was only with reference to administrative ordinances
(ψηφίσματα), (for instance, whether an extraordinary imperium should be
given to any one), and not to legislative ones (νόμοι). This was a useful
simplification: on certain days only, from religious reasons, might the curies
and centuries be convoked; the tribes on the contrary might assemble, and
did assemble, every day, they were not restricted by the dies nefasti. People
saw more and more that the form of general assemblies was a mere
semblance, and too much depending on accident: it is but fancy to think of
votes being the expression of personal will; impulse, the force of example,
does every thing. Clearer and clearer became the conviction, that the more
the state increased, the more necessary it was to have a settled government;
and thus what the Romans had to do, was to find out forms, which might
check the arbitrary sway of the men in power, and secure publicity. In this
especially the Romans differ from the Greeks, that they confidently gave
themselves up to the personal guidance of individuals, which was never the
case at Athens.
Lastly, the Hortensian law again has quite a different object. It
establishes a true democracy, inasmuch as it lays down the rule that in
legislative measures,—for with regard to administrative ones, the second
Publilian law remained in force,—a previous resolution of the senate was
not necessary, but the Plebes could pass any decree: at the same time, the
power of the curies was taken away. This is a decided victory of the
democracy. The administrative measures were decrees for particular cases,
nor could any thing of this kind be brought before the Plebes without a
previous resolution of the senate, even so late as the end of the sixth century
(570); but for actual laws the resolution of the Plebes was sufficient. By this
means, the older body of citizens lost its power of regeneration, the
equilibrium was destroyed, and the scale was turned in favour of the
democratic side. The curies were bound already by the lex Publilia of the
year 417, before a convocation of the centuries to declare after a certain
form that they sanctioned whatever was going to be decreed. It was a
misfortune for the state that the curies did not regenerate themselves; yet as
long as the resolutions were still made in the centuries, this mattered
nothing. But by the lex Hortensia, by which the whole weight was given to
the tribes, all the wholesome relations between the different elements of the
state were broken, and the balance utterly destroyed. In the first stage
therefore, the plebiscita are mere bye-laws which have no reference to
general affairs; for instance, resolutions at the death of a person of
consequence concerning his burial, &c., or a poll tax. In the second, by
virtue of the older Publilian law, the Plebes declared itself competent to
pass resolutions on general affairs, which were, however, to be taken into
consideration by the consul, to be laid before the senate, and by the latter to
be brought before the centuries and curies. In the third stage, according to
the Valerian law, a plebiscitum was just as valid as a resolution of the
centuries: it went at once to the curies, and received their sanction. And
fourthly, by the later Publilian law, the plebiscita could do for the
confirmation of resolutions of the senate which, in pressing circumstances,
when one could not wait for the next dies comitialis, were brought by the
consul to the tribunes. It was sufficient that the tribunes proclaimed a
concilium: the dies nefasti only affected curule magistrates and the Populus.
For instance, let us suppose that an army was in the field at the conclusion
of the year, and that a decree of the senate had first to be brought to the
centuries, and then to be ratified by the curies; in such a case a shorter
course was taken. The consuls were ordered ut cum tribunis plebis agerent,
quam primum fieri posset ad plebem ferrent. This does not occur before the
Publilian law. Lastly and fifthly, by the lex Hortensia the Plebes took upon
itself the authority for an independent and inherent legislation.
The consuls now took the field against the Æquians and Sabines, and
returned after splendid victories, having also probably concluded a lasting
peace with the Sabines. The patricians had in the meanwhile again taken
courage, and those men of their order, who in the general confusion had
sincerely wished for the best, were now the object of their hatred; and
therefore the senate refused them a triumph on their return. Now for the
first time the paramount power of the tribunes was displayed. They stepped
in, and granted the triumph on their own responsibility: their legal authority
for doing so may fairly be called in question. The consuls accepted the
triumph; if they had been disturbed in it the tribunes would have assisted
them. This incident shows what exasperation then filled men’s minds. In the
following year, it rose to such a height that, as we are told by Livy, the
heads of the patricians assembled and discussed the proposal to rid
themselves of their antagonists by a massacre: but this mad design was not
carried out.
The events which now take place are shrouded in darkness; the piety of
posterity has thrown a veil over them. People had emerged from the
irksome tranquillity of the decemvirate; but the constitution had not yet
recovered its equilibrium, and there was still a contest for the possession of
the government. The plebeians either wished the consulship to be divided
between the two orders, or the form of the decemviral rule to be restored.
The next year, the patricians showed themselves somewhat more yielding.
The criminal judges, until then a patrician magistracy, were for the first time
elected by the centuries; the choice fell upon the two consuls of the last
year, Valerius and Horatius, which was certainly not accidental. Many of
the ancients are mistaken with regard to this point; for instance, Tacitus,
Plutarch, even Ulpian, but not so Gaius. There were in fact two kinds of
quæstors, the public accusers (Quæstores parricidii), who impeached
political offenders before the curies, and the six Quæstores Classici, who in
works on antiquities are all along confounded with the former: Tacitus
refers to the latter what ought to be referred to the former. He says that the
quæstors had formerly been chosen by the kings, and then by the consuls, as
was evident from a lex curiata of Brutus. But this law Tacitus cannot
possibly have seen; for the Quæstores parricidii are synonymous with the
Duumviri perduellionis, and it is these who were always elected by the
curies, or rather by the Ramnes and Tities whom they represented. That
Poplicola caused also the Treasurers to be elected, is possible; but the two,
who were formerly elected by the curies, and now, as Tacitus says, sixty-
three years after the expulsion of the kings, and consequently in the second
year after the abolition of the decemvirate, by the centuries, were the old
Quæstores parricidii, who continued until they were changed into the
Ædiles Curules. Nine tribunes then made the proposal to leave the offices
of censor and quæstor to the patricians, and, either to divide the consulship,
or to introduce military tribunes with consular power; one only of their
colleagues was of a different opinion. Perhaps to this is to be referred the
incident mentioned before, that the Populus had once condemned nine
tribunes to be burned alive, and that a traitor among the tribunes, P. Mucius,
had ensured the carrying out of this sentence. Without doubt the Populus
means the curies, who had again usurped this power. Among the nine
tribunes was probably a son or grandson of Sp. Cassius, who had renounced
his order, and perished in the attempt to revenge his father.
It was the general wish to re-elect the consuls and tribunes; the consuls
declined it, and Duilius, who had been delegated by his colleagues to
represent them, refused in the name of the tribunate also to accept any
votes. This had evil consequences. A division was caused, and the tribunes
who wished to remain in office, had indeed so much influence upon their
partisans, that they abstained from voting; so that five tribunes only were
elected, who had themselves to elect their colleagues. It is stated that they
likewise elected two patricians, which is a proof in favour of our assertion
that the tribes had acquired a double character, that is, that they also become
a general national division.
A remarkable change which dates from this time, is the repeal of the
prohibition of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians. This
prohibition, as we know, had been sanctioned by usage since the very
earliest times, and had been first made an enactment in the twelve tables
only; such a custom generally first becomes galling by being received
among the written laws; and thus the storm was raised from which the
plebiscitum Canuleium sprang. This is usually considered as a great victory
of the plebeians: the patricians, so it is said, at last yielded it in
compensation for other rights which they reserved to themselves; Livy
looks upon it as a degradation of the ruling order. If we take the matter as it
really was, it is evident that the existence of such a prohibition did harm to
no one more than to the patricians themselves. Mixed marriages from both
orders must surely have been common at all times, and they were binding in
conscience; yet the son of a patrician-plebeian marriage never had any
gentilician rights, and was counted among the plebeians; the consequence
of which was that the patricians were fast dwindling away. Wherever the
nobles are limited to marriages within their own class, their order becomes
quite powerless in the course of time. Rehberg mentions, that of the
members of the States of the duchy of Bremen, in whose case sixteen
quarters were required, one-third had become extinct within fifty years. If
the plebeians had meant mischief against the patricians, they ought to have
insisted with all their might upon the prohibition of intermarriage being
kept up: but for the Canuleian law, the patricians would have lost their
position in the state a hundred years sooner. We do not know, whether the
thing was granted as a favour to the patricians or the plebeians; this is one
of those cases in which no probable hypothesis can be formed; even
absurdity is sometimes quite possible.
Afterwards there appear for once three military tribunes instead of the
consuls. Dionysius says that it had been resolved to satisfy the Plebes by
the institution of military tribunes, three of whom were to be patricians and
three plebeians. But there were only three, one of whom was a plebeian.
Livy foolishly takes them all for patricians; he thinks that the plebeians had
wanted indeed to possess the right, yet that afterwards they had looked upon
themselves as unworthy of exercising it, and had elected patricians only. He
speaks of the plebeians as if they had been unutterably stupid. This is the
confused notion of a man who with all his genius was, after all, no more
than a rhetorician. What is most likely, is that it was agreed upon to drop the
name of consul altogether, as the two orders were indeed no longer distinct,
and to leave the elections free and open to both parties; but that in the
meanwhile all sorts of artifices were nevertheless employed to turn the scale
in favour of the patricians. In the earlier times, for instance, the clients of
the patricians were not in the tribes; like the patricians, they had to
withdraw when the voting began; and whoever was not in the tribes, was
either not in the centuries at all, or voted in them only with the craftsmen
and the capite censi. Yet from henceforth every mention of cases in which
Plebes and clients were opposed, entirely ceases; and this ought to lead us
to observe how trustworthy our accounts are. Could a forger of a later age
have so accurately discriminated between the positions as implied by the
law? A fabulist is always an unlearned man, and even a learned one would
have made here some mistake. The clients now appear in the tribes, and
therefore in the centuries likewise, as is expressly mentioned, and as we
may also partly see from the circumstances themselves. The discussions of
the Plebes now take quite a different character; they lose all their violence,
the struggle of two hostile masses against each other, is at once entirely at
an end. The checks which the plebeians meet with in the elections, &c.,
arise no more from any resistance from without, but they are from within
the body itself. Whilst formerly the boards of the tribunes showed
themselves unanimous, they are now divided; some of the members are
even in the interest of the senate, and only single tribunes yet make such
motions as those which formerly proceeded from the whole college. These
are proofs of the fusion of the orders having been completed.
The military tribunate had been considered as a sort of compromise.
Among the first were, according to Livy, L. Atilius Longus and T. Cæcilius.
[107] For the latter, Dionysius in the eleventh book has Clœlius. We cannot
decide in this question, the readings in the eleventh book being all of them
of very recent date. If it is Cæcilius, there were two plebeians among their
number; and this would account for the violence with which the patricians
insisted upon doing away with the military tribunate.
In the same year as the military tribunate (311), the censorship seems to
have been instituted. There must have been therefore a common motive for
both, which Livy does not see: and the circumstance that the first censors
are not found as consuls either in the Fasti or in the libri magistratum, but
only in one of the libri lintei, may be accounted for by supposing that the
censors were already elected in conformity with the laws of the twelve
tables; and that when the patricians by their violent commotions were
carrying every thing with a high hand, these magistrates who were neither
consuls nor military tribunes,—a fact of which we have only a trace,—acted
as consuls, and thus concluded the peace with the Ardeates. Livy could not
explain this to himself, nor could Macer have done it. Strange indeed is
what Livy mentions, that the military tribunes had been obliged to abdicate
because of the tabernaculum vitio captum; and that T. Quinctius as Interrex
(or rather, perhaps, as dictator) had chosen the two consuls, L. Papirius
Magillanus and L. Sempronius Atratinus, whose names were not, however,
recorded in the Fasti. Nevertheless he relates the thing as certain. It is still
more strange that in the following year he says of these first censors, that in
order to indemnify those quorum de consulatu dubitabatur, ut eo magistratu
parum solidum magistratum explerent, they had been elected censors; as if
in 312 there could have been any doubt as to what had happened in 311. In
the very same way, Livy in the second Punic war mistakes a certain
Heraclitus for the philosopher of that name.
As to the nature of these military tribunes, their magistracy is for us a
subject of considerable obscurity.[108] Livy says of them, eos juribus et
insignibus consularibus usos esse, and they are also called tribuni militares
consulari potestate; but Dio Cassius, that acute observer, who himself had
sat in the curule chair, says that the military tribunes were inferior to the
consuls, and that not one of them had ever been granted a triumph, though
many had performed deeds which were worthy of it. This is in perfect
accordance with history. We also find that a consul was never appointed
Magister Equitum, but that the military tribunes certainly were. From this it
seems to be evident that the military tribunes were no magistratus curules,
that is to say, none of those magistrates, as Gellius explains it, who were
allowed to make use of a carriage (thus we have Juno Curulis, whose image
was carried on a car). The consuls drove in carriages to the Curia; the full
triumph was termed triumphus curulis, according to the Monumentum
Ancyranum on which the number of the triumphi curules of Augustus is
given; different from this is the Ovatio.[109]—Moreover, the military
tribunes never had any jurisdiction; but originally the censors, and
afterwards the Præfectus Urbi had one, the latter probably holding likewise
the presidency in the senate. This magistracy also had been abolished by the
decemviral legislation; but it now again makes its appearance. The consular
power was weakened in this manner, and so it was afterwards by the
Licinian law; for when at that time the consulship was divided between
patricians and plebeians, the prætorship was separated from it, and
established as a distinct magistracy. We may understand how it was, that the
plebeians preferred the election of military tribunes, even when they were
not taken from their own order: their power was at all events less.
According to Livy’s account, it was the senate which decided in every
instance, whether consuls or military tribunes were to be elected: it is more
probable that it was the curies which determined it. The mistake may have
been occasioned by the ambiguous word patres. The military tribunate is
also of a wonderfully variable character. Sometimes, but seldom, we find
three tribunes; more frequently, four; but from 347 or 348, regularly
whenever they occur, six; once, as many as eight, among whom, however,
the two censors are included. Of the four, one is generally Præfectus Urbi:
so that in reality there are after all only three. The claim of the plebeians to
be chosen among the military tribunes is never disputed; but after the first
election it is almost always eluded. How this could be done is
inconceivable; Livy’s explanation of it is silly. On the one hand, it is quite
possible that a compromise was made, and that the patricians said, we
consent to the weaker magistracy’s being established, but then it must be
filled up from our ranks only; or else in the earlier times the preceding
magistrate had the right of not accepting any votes (nomina non accipere)
in favour of those who from different reasons were to be rejected; or again,
if six military tribunes were elected, the curies afterwards gave the
imperium to the patricians only, and denied it to the plebeians. Yet it is
incomprehensible in this last case how the plebeians could have allowed it.
Unfortunately Dionysius fails us here, who, though he did not himself
understand these relations, nevertheless faithfully recorded the facts as he
found them: if we had him, the whole of this period would undoubtedly be
clearer to us. After the last change, when six military tribunes always occur,
we several times find the plebeians in a majority among them; and it is
evident that it was then a settled rule that the number of six should always
be full, and that without any further distinction between the two orders.
This looks very much as if in the change the election had been transferred
from the centuries to the tribes. It now depended only upon the honesty of
the president whether he received the votes or not. That policy by which
Italy became great in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that wretched
ideal of states-craft, is now displayed in the Roman history, especially in the
division in the college of tribunes. This is one of the causes, which for some
time checked the progress of Rome.
 Times in which successful wars are carried on, as was now the case with
Rome until the Gallic invasion, are exceedingly apt to lead subjects to
acquiesce in what they otherwise would never have borne with. The name
of the state was surrounded with a halo of glory; a great deal of booty was
gained, and also many conquests; plebeians as well as patricians felt
comfortable; and although the power was not much liked, matters were yet
allowed to go on as they were. Rome recovered from the decline into which
she had fallen since the Regifugium. Moreover the intermarriage allowed
between the two orders, must have exercised a powerful influence: the
families on both sides became more closely related; the patrician who, born
of a plebeian mother, was in the senate, stood on an equal footing with the
plebeians.
A greater, a lasting magistracy, and according to all appearance the first,
the lustre of which far outshone that of the military tribunes, was the
censorship. If we admit that it was instituted by the twelve tables, we can
understand why Cicero also made the censors the first magistrates. He may
have copied this from the laws of the twelve tables; only he must have left
out something, as there they had yet a greater number of attributes. The
consuls are said to have formerly had the functions of the censors; which is
very probable from the almost kingly power of the consuls, and it is only to
be wondered how they could have got through this immense amount of
work. The Greek states also had τιμηταί, Athens alone excepted, and the
Siceliote and Italiote towns had them as well; yet nowhere in Greece was
their power so extensive as at Rome. According to the Roman law, the
censors had to value and assess; accurate lists were kept of properties, of
births and deaths, of newly admitted citizens. Yet we are to distinguish
between two kinds of lists. The one was of persons, and was arranged
according to names; Q. Mucius, for instance, with all his family and
rateable property, stood under his name among the Tribus Romilia: his sons
wearing the toga virilis may perhaps have had each a distinct caput. The
other list was topographical; in it the landed estates were registered
according to the districts, for instance, the Tribus Romilia in all its
divisions. The ancients wrote on the whole much more than is generally
imagined; this was done with a prolixity which was part of the forms of the
state. In London, I saw a register of lands belonging to an Indian province,
—in the translation, of course, as I do not understand a word of the Indian
language,—which had a copiousness of detail of which we can scarcely
form an idea. And it was the same among the ancients: the registers of
mortgages at Athens were very prolix; and so, even in later ages, were the
contracts before the curies at Rome. In the registers of the Roman censors,
the division of the hides was very accurately marked down; under the caput
of every individual, his descent, tribe, station, property, &c. were entered.
Now the censors had also the power of transferring people from one class to
the other, as an honour or a disgrace; yet what were the qualities for which
they pronounced the ignominia, as it is termed? Every one in Rome was to
correspond to the definition of his station; a plebeian was necessarily an
agriculturist, either a land-owner or a free day labourer. This rule was laid
down positively; and still more strictly in its negative bearing, as no one
who carried on a trade or business could be a plebeian. Whoever did so,
was forthwith struck out of the list of the tribe; consequently this was not so
much a personal ignominia, as a declaration that he had passed from one
side to the other. But he who badly cultivated his field was likewise put out
of the tribe, that is to say, he was declared to be de facto no husbandman;
and so was the eques who kept his horse badly: this is the notatio censoria.
Such a person was placed among the burghers of the pale (ærarii), because
he was not worthy of holding his property. The ærarian, on the other hand,
who distinguished himself, who acquired landed property, was placed as a
mark of honour among the plebeians; the plebeian who distinguished
himself, was transferred into the centuries of the plebeian knights.
Foreigners, however, they could certainly not make citizens: for this there
were fixed rules, or else the popular assembly conferred the right of
citizenship by means of an extraordinary act. In a state, the changeable
elements of which were widely different,—where the Plebes was not an
exclusive order, but was allowed to recruit itself; and where there existed
among its ranks an aristocratic order of honour, that of the knights, which
was not bound to the census; there must be some authority which assigns to
every individual his station: for such an order of honour cannot be exclusive
and unchangeable, owing to its very nature as an order of honour. One
might say, that the decision about it ought to have been left to the people;
yet this was not only a circuitous, but also a preposterous arrangement, as in
all probability the censors,—who were chosen from the most distinguished
persons, and who held their office under the fullest responsibility, whilst
moreover one colleague might even impugn the acts of the other,—would
be much fairer than the whole people, had it been called upon to make the