BBS Book New

CHANGING WORKERS’ BEHAVIOR
Research – Methodology – Implementation
Sami Hussain Malallah, MBA
Date: Saturday, July 05, 2008
0
Changing Workers’ Behavior

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

Page 1
Table Of Contents
Acknowledgment ..................................................................... 9
The Book in Nutshell ............................................................. 11
Chapter One: Introduction ..................................................... 13
1. Problem Definition...................................................... 14
2. Research Objective ..................................................... 14
3. Research Methodology ............................................... 15
4. Data Analysis Method................................................. 16
5. Assumptions................................................................ 18
6. Research Limitations .................................................. 18
Chapter Two: An Overview ................................................... 21
1. Background Of The Refining Industry And
Occupational Hazards ........................................................ 22
2. Occupational Health History....................................... 22
3. Refining History.......................................................... 25
4. Kuwait Economy In General ...................................... 26
5. Occupational Safety And Health Legislation In Kuwait
27
6. Health, Safety And Environment Management System
In Oil Sector ....................................................................... 27
7. Behavior Programs In The Oil Sector......................... 28
8. Kuwait Oil Sector Incidents And Accidents ............... 30
9. Safety Culture Is Management Responsibility ........... 30
10. Safety Programs In Kuwait Oil Sector .................... 32
11. Safety Paradox......................................................... 33
Chapter Three: Behavior Theories ......................................... 37
1. What Is Behavior ........................................................ 38
2. Behavior Emergence Theories .................................... 38
3. Type Of Behavior And How They Are Formed ......... 40
4. The Activator-Behavior-Consequence (ABC) Model 43
5. Applied Behavior Analysis ......................................... 45
Chapter Four: Incidents, Accidents And Near Misses .......... 48
1. Loss Causation Model................................................. 49
2. Incident, Accident And Near Miss Data ..................... 52

Page 2
3.Data Analysis Methods ............................................... 54

4.Incident Reports Analysis In The Loss Causality Model
55
5. Incidents Root Causes Throughout The Years ........... 58
Chapter Five: Behavior-Based Safety Process ...................... 63
1. Overview Of The Behavior-Based Safety .................. 64
2. BBS Successful Implementations ............................... 66
3. Behavior-Based Safety Experiment In Kuwait Research
Institution ........................................................................... 68
4. BBS Unsuccessful Implementations ........................... 69
5. Behavior-Based Safety Model .................................... 71
5.1. Observation at site....................................................... 71
5.2. Data gathering and preliminary reports ...................... 74
5.3. Report analysis and recommendation ......................... 74
6. Group feedback ........................................................... 75
6.1. Feedback by written report: ........................................ 75
6.2. Intangible group feedback:.......................................... 77
7. Feedback Effect on Safety Training ........................... 78
Chapter Six: Safety Management System And Commun. ..... 82

1. Safety Management Systems ...................................... 84
2. Rewards, Recognition And Motivation ...................... 85
3. Management Involvement In Changing Behavior ...... 87
4. Observation Data and Individual Feedback ................ 88
4.1. Analyzing the overall observations ............................. 91
4.2. Analyzing selected observations elements .................. 92
5. Communication And Group Feedback ....................... 93
Chapter Seven: Observers Participation Survey .................... 97
1. Introduction ................................................................. 98
2. The Survey .................................................................. 99
3. Survey’s Overall Findings ........................................ 100
4. Observers busyness ................................................... 101
5. Observer’s sluggishness ............................................ 102

Page 3
6. Other points ............................................................... 104

7. Survey’s results and Recommendations ................... 104
Chapter Eight: BBS Process Final Outcome ....................... 107
1. Lost Workday Cases Record ..................................... 108
2. Worker’s behavior during Weekends ....................... 109
3. Treatment on Operations staff behavior ................... 111
4. Training Effect On Employees Behavior .................. 115
5. Safety Training Effect On Safety Behavior .............. 115
Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations ............. 120
REFERENCES .................................................................... 124
Appendix 1 Incident Data Analysis By Answertree 3.0 ..... 131
Appendix 2 Cross Tabulation Of Underlying Causes ........ 134
Appendix 3 Number Of Observations During Weekends .. 136
Appendix 4 Number Of Observations Each Month ........... 137
Appendix 5 Incident, Accidents And Near Miss Statistical
Data ......................................................................... 142
Appendix 6 Survey’s English Format (Electronic Copy) ... 143
Appendix 7 Survey Arabic Format (Hard Copy) ............... 144
Appendix 8 Observers Participation Survey Analysis........ 145
1) Training to conduct quality observation: .............. 146
2) Observation format availability ............................. 147
3) Time availability to execute quality observation .. 148
4) Effort required to do the observation .................... 150
5) BBS (SOLAR) process progress ........................... 152
6) Observation’s difficulty......................................... 154
7) Results credibility .................................................. 155
Appendix 9 Daily Time and Priority Check list ................. 157
Appendix 10 Behavior-Based Safety Strategy Template ..... 158
I. THE OBJECTIVE ............................................................. 158
II. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS AND KPI'S ............................. 158
III. INFLUENCES, OBJECTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ........... 160

Page 4
IV. PATH FORWARD .......................................................... 161

Appendix 11 : ASSE - Kuwait Chapter ................................ 163
Appendix 12 DEFINITIONS................................................ 167
Appendix 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................... 169
Appendix 14 LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ 170
Appendix 15 LIST OF TABLES .......................................... 172
Appendix 16 INDEX ............................................................ 173
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY ................................................. 175

Page 5
Foreword By ASSE

Page 6

Page 7

Page 8
Acknowledgment
I would like to express my appreciation to the American
Society of Safety Engineers-Kuwait Chapter for sponsoring this
book. My sincere gratitude to Professor Hernan Riquelme for
his unconditional help and guidance.
I would also like to thank Safety, Health and
Environment Department in Kuwait National Petroleum Company
for their support during Behavior-based Safety process
implementation. Finally, I would like to recognize the absolute
support and inspiration I received from my family.
Sami Malallah, MBA

The author

Page 9

Page 10
The Book in Nutshell

Behavior-based safety (BBS) is a proven process to
reduce incidents, accidents and personal injuries in many
industries. BBS process can prevent incidents by treating the
cause at its roots. Numerous books and articles were reviewed
and summarized in different locations in the book. This
reference material is used to add value to the reader’s time and
support the author’s argument.
The book discuss and argue different behavioral

models like Loss Causation model and the Activator-
Behavior-Consequence model. Behavior-based Safety model
is explained in a step by step method with extensive
discussion on its implementation. Many examples of
successful and unsuccessful implementations of the Behavior-
based safety process in different locations around the world
are listed for the reader’s judgment.
Large and complex oil refinery is used as a base for

this book’s research. Five years incidents reports are analyzed
to find each incident’s root cause. Also, Behavior-based
Safety full year implementation is collected and analyzed.
The objective of this book is to demonstrate the effect

of Behavior-based Safety process on changing workers’
behavior from at-risk to safe behavior. Also to find out if
management communications and group feedback could
encourage the trained observers to increase their contribution
to BBS process. The research is set to detect if supplying
better quality of personal protective equipment would
encourage the workers to use them. The final objective is to
gauge safety training effectiveness on changing workers’ at-
risk behavior.

Page 11

Page 12
Chapter One: Introduction
“My future starts when I wake up every morning...

Every day I find something creative to do with my
life.”
Miles Davis
US jazz musician
(1926 - 1991)
1. Problem Definition 14
2. Research Objective 14
3. Research Methodology 15
4. Data Analysis Method 16
5. Assumptions 18
6. Research Limitations 18
This chapter will introduce you to this book’s

objectives, researches methodology and data analysis method.
The chapter is written in an academic style that makes it not
attractive to some readers. If you are interested in the practical
implication of the Behavior-based Safety process please skip
this chapter and direct your eyes to Chapter Five: on page 63.

Page 13
1. Problem Definition
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) had two

fatal incidents in year 2000. As a result, one year later, KNPC
started working on a new Safety, Health and Environment
Management System (SHEMS). The system was inaugurated
in year 2003. In the same year, KNPC had 34 incidents that
resulted in lost workdays (employee injured and could not
report to work next day). Such accidents decreased with time
however did not stop.
Mina Abdulla Refinery is one of the three refineries

KNPC owns and operates. The refinery had 10 lost workdays
accidents in year 2007. Six of these accidents are linked to
workers at-risk behavior. Many safety programs are active for
many years but none of them was specifically targeting
workers behavior. The book will discuss BBS process
implementation on 1500 workers in Mina Abdulla refinery
only.
2. Research Objective
The research carried out for this book has distinct

objectives. The first objective is to demonstrate how the
observer’s individual interaction and feedback to the worker
could make the worker change his at-risk behavior to safe
behavior. We set out to investigate if management
communications and group feedback could encourage
observers to increase their contribution to the behavior-based
safety process. The research will find out if supplying better
quality of personal protective equipment would encourage the
worker to use them and hence reduce at-risk behavior. The
final objective of this book is to gauge safety training effect on
changing workers at-risk behavior.

Page 14
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
3. Ressearch Metthodology
The reseaarch startedd by reviiewing thee relevant

literaturre and selecting the appplicable models.
m Minna Abdulla
refineryy was selectted as the research
r fieeld. Five years history
(year 2003-2007) of reports on incidentts, accidents and near
misses were analyyzed. Loss causation
c m
model will be
b used to
identifyy the organnizational rooot cause in i these reeports. The
discussiion will folllow the beehavioral faactor throug ghout these
years, and
a find if safety effoorts done so far are effective
e in
changinng workers’ at-risk behhavior.
Impleement Field
recomm mend. obsservation
Give Group
G Give
feedb
back Feeedback
Steerring Daata Entry

commmittee to generate
g
analy
yze & rep
port and
recom
mmend Sttatistics
Figure 1:: Behavior-bbased Safetyy in nutshelll
BBS proceess is field observation

o n by a traineed observer
who will give feeedback to the workerr on safe and a at-risk
behavioors. Such innteraction and
a feedbacck is assumed to have
an effeect on chaanging thee workers’ behavior. The full
observaation is recoorded on a check list. An averag ge of 1050
observaations were performed every montth in the reffinery. The
ASSE – Kuuwait Chapter

Pagge 15
outcome of these observations is reported on a checklist. The

reported data is gathered in a data bank for further analysis.
Results from implementing the behavior-based safety

process is publicized to all workers in the refinery. Also,
observers’ individual performance is sent back to the observer
for two reasons. First, it helps the observer to improve his
performance. Second, the feedback shows to the observer
management’s commitment and support. Such group feedback
and other communications methods are presumed to
encourage the observer to do additional observations.
Workers neglect using their personal protective

equipment for different reasons. One reason is the equipment
quality. Superior quality personal protective equipment was
distributed to the workers to test the effect on their at-risk
behavior.
Safety training is important to inform the workers on

how to identify risk and avoid it. Safety programs are run
throughout the year in Kuwait National Petroleum Company.
We will examine the refinery safety record to find if such
training is effective in changing the workers’ at-risk behavior.
4. Data Analysis Method
There are two sets of data used in this research. The

first set is the incident, accident and near miss reports. Root
cause analysis will be used to analyze the data going through
the loss causation model. This model relates incidents causes
to organizational factors. Data compatibility with the model
will be tested by using the AnswerTree® software.
AnswerTree® is a standalone software part of the

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Decision

Page 16
trees are charts that illustrate decision rules. They begin with
one root node that contains all of the observations in the
sample. As the tree drops down, the data branches into evenly
exclusive subsets of the data. AnswerTree can build a tree
automatically or let the user take control to refine the tree
according to the user’s knowledge of the data (AnswerTree®
3.1 User’s Guide, 2002). The five year data of incidents and
near misses is used to generate a model in AnswerTree®.
Exhaustive Chi-Square Automatic Interaction Detector
(CHAID) is used to identify the optimal splits of the data.
Only results with P-value less than 0.01 is accepted.
According to the loss causation model, behavior is one

of the major organizational factors that causes the incidents.
We aim to find the effect of behavior-based safety on this
factor. Data from year 2003 to 2006 is compared with the data
in year 2007. Behavior-based safety process was implemented
in year 2007 and should have effect on reducing at-risk
behavior as a factor.
The second set of data is the Behavior-based Safety

(BBS) observations. This data will be validated and analyzed
using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Once
validated, we examine workers’ safety behavior percentage.
Only results with P-value less than 0.01 is accepted.
The one year data collected from BBS process

implementation is analyzed to find the effect of the individual
and group feedback on changing worker’s at-risk behavior.
The monthly number of observations and change in the
percentage of safe behavior is used as an indicator for the
overall effect of individual feedback.

Page 17
A comparison is carried out on the BBS process

monthly progress. We introduce two changes that are believed
to have effect on workers’ behavior. One change is the
distribution of superior quality personal protective equipment
to the workers. The other change is group feedback in a form
of progress report, personal performance report and token gift
to observers. We will monitor the resulting effect of those
changes on workers’ behavior.
5. Assumptions
Behavior-based Safety observations are done by

trained observers in the field. Since they are executed at site, it
is only assumed that observation and feedback processes are
of good quality and consistent. Moreover, the observation is
assumed to be executed at site with quality interaction and
feedback; it could be possible that the observer is filling the
checklist at his office without carrying real observation.
Most of the observations are done during the regular

working hours (07:00 – 15:00 hrs); it is assumed that such
observations can represent the afternoon and night shifts
behaviors.
Near miss and dangerous occurrence reports are filled

by workers at the time of the incident. It is assumed that such
incident has actually taken place and the information in the
report sheet is genuine. Experienced safety engineers do root
cause analysis for all reported incidents, accidents and near
misses. It is assumed that such analysis are done
professionally and unbiased.
6. Research Limitations

Page 18
The research is targeting Mina Abdulla Refinery which

is one of three refineries under KNPC’s custody. Similar BBS
programs are implemented in the other refineries but they are
not included or compared in this research. Most of the
observations are done on contractors (non-KNPC) employees
since they do majority of the field work. Most of KNPC
employees are holding supervisory jobs especially in
Maintenance & Engineering Department, so this will make
most of KNPC’s maintenance staff to be observers instead of
observee.
About three quarters of the observations are done

between 8:00 am – 12:00 pm. This is considered as the
preferred time for observers since most of them are at site
doing their normal supervisory work. Also, this is the work’s
peak time in the refinery. Less than 7% of the observations are
done during the afternoon shift since number of observers and
workers are at the minimum.

Page 19

Page 20
Chapter Two: An Overview
“In the business world, the rearview mirror is always

clearer than the windshield.”
Warren Buffett
US financier & investment
businessman (1930 - )
1. Background Of The Refining Industry 22

2. Occupational Health History 22
3. Refining History 25
4. Kuwait Economy In General 26
5. Occupational Safety And Health Legislation In Kuwait 27
6. Health, Safety And Environment Management Sys. 27
7. Behavior Programs In The Oil Sector 28
8. Kuwait Oil Sector Incidents And Accidents 30
9. Safety Culture Is Management Responsibility 30
10. Safety Programs In Kuwait Oil Sector 32
11. Safety Paradox 33
The chapter will give a general view of the history of

petroleum industry going though occupational health and
safety efforts. Kuwait economy and its dependence on the
petroleum industry are highlighted towered the middle of the
chapter. The chapter end by discussing the safety management
systems and efforts exerted by the petroleum companies in
Kuwait.

Page 21
1. Background Of The Refining Industry And

Occupational Hazards
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, early

petroleum wells were drilled using bamboo poles fitted with
drilling bits in ancient China. In Japan, petroleum was known
as the burning water during the 7th century. (Ajram, 1992)
Streets of Baghdad were paved with tar in the 8th century
signaling the early petroleum industry in the Middle East.
Petroleum distillation started with the Persian chemist Al-Razi
who performed the first petroleum distillations to produce
Kerosene and other products in the 9th century.
Occupational Health was

identified and acted upon by the
Egyptians. At 3000 B.C. the
Egyptians wrote a First Aid manual Ancient Roman would
for their workers. They knew then free a slave if he
the importance of Occupational
Health, and the necessity to maintain
survived a ship
skillful labor. Ramses, in 1500 B.C. launching!
hired physician for workers.
Compensation for work related
injuries were set by Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. One of the best
compensation and rewards given to workers were
demonstrated be the Ancient Romans. The would free a slave
if he survived a ship launching in 100 B.C. (Reese, 2003).
2. Occupational Health History
The so called "Common Law" was valid during the

second half of the 19th century in the USA. During that period
of time where manufacturing was shifting from animal power
to the mechanical power to drive the mass production in the

Page 22
industrial movement. The Common Law simply states the

following (Philip E. Hagan, John F. Montgomery, James T.
O’Reilly, 2001):
• Fellow servant rule: Employer was not liable for injury

to an employee that resulted from negligence of a
fellow employee.
• Contributory negligence: Employer was not liable if the

employee was injured due to his own negligence.
• Assumption of risk: Employer was not liable because

the employee took the job with full knowledge of the
risks and hazards involved.
The first accident insurance policy was issued in the

United States in 1864. Seventeen years later the American
Federation of Labor was founded. This federation remained
the largest union grouping in the United States throughout the
second half of the twentieth century. A mine disaster killed
362 in West Virginia after 26 years of federation foundation
(Reese, 2003).
Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) is an agency of the United States Department of
Labor. It was created in year 1971 by the congress under an
act signed by President Richard Nixon. Since its creation the
agency helped reducing workplace fatalities by more than
60% and cut occupational injury and illness rates by 40%. The
agency set standards and regulations to govern the non-
governmental workplaces. Such standards include the "Guards
on all moving parts" and "Personal protective equipment"
(Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 2007). Such
standards are now in use in Kuwait.

Page 23
There were 5,703 fatal work injuries in the United

States in year 2006, reduced slightly from the revised total of
5,734 fatalities in 2005 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2007). The rate of fatal work injuries in 2006 was 3.9 per
100,000 workers, down from a rate of 4.0 per 100,000 in
2005. Key findings of the 2006 Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries:
• The overall fatal work injury rate for the U.S. in the
year 2006 was lower than the rate for any year since the
fatality census was first conducted in 1992.
• Fatalities among self-employed workers declined 11

percent and reached a series low in 2006.
Manufacturing fatalities were up 14 percent in 2006.

The fatality rate in manufacturing rose 13 percent. Across the
Atlantic ocean, United Kingdom statistics showed 241
workers fatalities in 2006/07. Out of which, 35 fatalities
correspond to the manufacturing sector (Statistics of Fatal
Injuries 2006/07, 2007).
Some of the recent famous accidents around the globe

related to the petroleum industry are (Smith D. J., 2001):
• Flixborough (UK) reactor's by-pass failure led to an

explosion and 28 fatalities in 1974.
• Bhopal (India) more than 2000 fatalities after the

release of toxic gases from storage tank. This incident
took place in 1984.
• Liquefied Petroleum Gas explosion in Mexico city

resulted in the death of more than 500 people in year
1982.

Page 24
• 167 fatalities resulted from the Piper Alpha explosion in

the North Sea in 1988.
• BP plant (Texas) explosion left 15 persons killed and

more than 100 injured in 2005.
3. Refining History
United States of America had 574 operable refineries

in 1924 with total crude capacity of 3 million barrels per
calendar day (b/cd). Those refineries were operated at 90%
utilization which is almost the same percentage the modern
refineries are running now. In 1969 the number of operable
refineries dropped to only 279, but with higher total capacity
of 11.7 million b/cd. By the year 1979 the number of operable
refineries reached 308. The statistics showed the total refining
capacity of those refineries as 18.5 million b/cd but they were
run on lower utilization of 69% on the year 1981 (Nakamura,
2003).
By 1982 the refinery feedstock cost increased

drastically and the environmental regulations became more
stringent. As a direct result, oil companies started shutting
down refineries with lower efficiencies. This shutting down
decreased the total refining capacity to 15 million b/cd
distributed across 133 refineries only (Nakamura, 2003). The
latest information on US refining capacity showed 17.4
million b/cd feed to 143 larger refineries with 90+% utilization
(Ranking of U. S. Refineries, 2007).
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) was

established in October 1960 as a shareholder company owned
by the government and the private sector. In 1968 the
company commissioned Shuaiba Refinery which was the
world's first all hydrogen refinery. It's capacity is 195,000

Page 25
Barrels per day. In 1975, KNPC became a fully owned state

company and had the responsibility of the three oil refineries:
Mina Al-Ahmadi, Mina Abdulla and Shuaiba, in addition to
the LPG plant in Mina Al-Ahmadi. The company
implemented Mina Al-Ahmadi “Refinery Modernization
Project” and “Further Upgrading Project” in 1984 and 1986
respectively to increase its capacity to 410,000 Barrels per
day. Mina Abdulla Refinery Modernization Project was also
completed in 1989 and the refinery capacity was raised to
231,000 Barrels per day (KNPC "Our History", 2005). Further
gradual modifications on the refining processes raised the total
capacity to 270,000 Barrels per day
4. Kuwait Economy In General
World oil demand grew by 14% during year 2007 and

forecasted to grow by 1.5% in year 2008. The current world
demand is 84.5 million barrels per day (mb/d), of which 37%
of the demand is supplied by members of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Crude oil prices
are on an increasing trend since 2002 when the average price
was US$ 24 per barrel. In year 2007 the average price was
US$ 69 per barrel. The price peaked at US$100 in December
2007 (Omar M. El-Quqa, et al, 2008). In June 2008 (at the
time of this book writing) oil price passed the US$ 140 mark.
Kuwait oil reserves are ranked number four in the

world, containing an estimated proven oil reserves of 101.5
billion barrels, which constitute around 8.5% of world total oil
reserves. Kuwait oil production reached 2.61 million barrels
per day in 2007. Out of the total production, 932 thousand
barrels per day were refined in the three Kuwaiti owned
refineries. Kuwait revenues for 2007/08 is estimated around
12.68 billion out of which 92% is from oil sector (Omar M.

Page 26
El-Quqa, Faisal Hasan, Bikash Rou, 2008). Human errors and

mistakes can lead to interruption or reduction in crude oil
production. In turn will lead to similar reduction in Kuwait’s
revenues.
Table 1 : Kuwait’s Oil production and refining capacity

(million barrels per day) Source: (Omar M. El-Quqa, et al, 2008)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total Oil
2.03 2.27 2.52 2.67 2.68 2.61
Production
Refinery
0.889 0.831 0.936 0.936 0.932 0.932
Capacity
5. Occupational Safety And Health Legislation In Kuwait
In year 1964 Kuwait passed labor law (38) and act (28)
was passed in year 1965 to protect workers in the petroleum
industry. Ministry of Social affairs and Labor impose
occupational safety and health policies in Kuwait. Its decision
number (45) 1979 and decision (56) 1982 made machinery
guarding obligatory. Decision number (57) 1982 was enforced
to protect the workers against benzol and decision (45) 1979
was set for chemical safety (RS/AS, 2000). Chemical and
hydrocarbons are part of the hazardous substances in the
petroleum industry. For example, workers may die by simply
inhaling high levels of benzol vapors. Low levels of benzol
may cause dizziness, headaches, confusion and
unconsciousness.
6. Health, Safety And Environment Management System

In Oil Sector
Kuwait started developing its technological capability

in oil production and refining by establishing Kuwait Institute

Page 27
for Scientific Research (KISR) in 1967 (Kuwait Institute for

Scientific Research, 2006). The development in that field was
slow, so most of the technology was imported with the
petroleum projects. Also, most of the Health, safety and
Environment (HSE) management systems were imported and
implemented with each project. Until the year 1992 when
KNPC started adapting the US Process Safety Management
(PSM) methodology.
7. Behavior Programs In The Oil Sector
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) was established

in 1980 in order to bring together all oil state-owned
companies under one corporate umbrella. KPC started Health,
Safety and Environment management system in 2003. The
management system is in various implementation stages in the
oil sector. While contacting the oil sector companies, we could
not find safety programs specifically targeting workers
behavioral on large scale in any of them. There are behavioral
training courses in few of the companies that target behavior
in general and on smaller scale. Kuwait Petroleum Training
Center offers corporate training for oil sector. The Center has
only one course dedicated to behavior-based safety training.
This course is offered only once a year for a capacity of 18
employees only.
Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC) had realized

the need for large scale and specific behavioral process to
address its safety management system needs. PIC’s Top
management representatives visited KNPC in December 2007
to discuss behavior-based safety process’ pros and cons. PIC
is planning to implement BBS process by the end of 2008.

Page 28
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) is similar to Kuwait

national Petroleum Company in the manpower size and
apparent risk. KOC is implementing Safety Training
Observation Programme (STOP). STOP is based on safety
principles that made DuPont a benchmark in safety
performance. STOP is used as Peer-to-Peer behavior changing
tools. Where, workers from the level of Supervisor and below
observe each other and report substandard acts or conditions.
Such reports are acted upon by the management to element
the substandard acts or conditions.
Table 2 : Kuwait Oil Company Safety Record

Source: (KOC Health, Safety & Environment Annual Review 2006/07, 2007)
Item 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07

Fatalities
4 5 3
(Company and contractor)
Industrial Disabling Injuries 32 28 30
Another program was introduced about 4 years ago
targeting workers’ behavior to some extent. The program is
called advanced safety audit, where line management team
audit work sites on periodical timing. During the audit, the
team discusses substandard acts and conditions with site
workers with some emphases on workers’ behavior. The
program was re-launched in September 2007 with slight
change in the methodology. The program was renamed Safety
Observations and Conversation. Kuwait Oil Company
maintained its safety records, with some reduction, by
implementing the above programs (KOC Health, Safety &
Environment Annual Review 2006/07, 2007).

Page 29
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
8. Kuw
wait Oil Seector Incideents And Accidents
A
Industrial Disabling
D Innjury (IDI) is similar tot the Lost
Workdaay discussed in sectionn 1 in pagee 108. IDI rate is the
numberr of on-job injury resuulting in onne or moree full days
away frrom work, including
i onn-job fatalitties for everry 200,000
on-job hours
h workeed (includinng overtimee.)
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Bahrain P. Qatar P. KOC KNPC Aramco

A
Figuure 2: Indusstrial Disablling Injury Rate
R for yeaar 2006
Sourrce: Author elabooration of data froom (Roberto Albaa, Cornelio Gabriiel, 2007)
Figure 2 reepresent ID
DI rates for petroleum companies
in the Arabian
A gulf countriess in year 20006. Kuwaiit National
Petroleuum Compaany (KNPC C) and Sauudi Aramco o have the
highest disabling injuries rate (Robeerto Alba, Cornelio
Gabriell, 2007).
Nu
umber of ID
DI′s 200,000
ID
DI Incidentt Rate
On job ho
ours worked
About 50% % of the inccidents in KNPC

K are caused by
workerss at-risk behhavior as discussed in section
s 5 off chapter 4.
9. Saffety Culturee Is Managgement Ressponsibility

y
Safety is soometimes seen

s as a buurden, extraa cost or a
show inntended for the stakehoolders. Top management look for
safety solution
s whhich are fasst, cheap annd requires minimum

Pagge 30
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
involveement from them (Frieend, M. A., Pagliari, L. R., 2000).

Buildinng a safety culture
c is tiime consumming. Culturre is a mix
of valuues and asssumptions which w drivves the orgaanizational
values to create artifacts
a likke heroes, myths,
m stru
uctures and
processses (Johnsonn, 2003). Buuilding a neew culture or o changing
the exissting unsafee culture cann cost manaagement mo ore than the
tangiblee effect theyy can immeediately feeel. Friend ett al (2000)
suggestt the followiing steps to build a reliiable safety culture.
Management
Realize that
should realize that a problem exist
problemm exists evven if it

is a potentiall one. Managment
M support
Review performmance
Ignoring this fact will indecators and Policy
establishment
lead thhe managem ment to

ignore the
t problem m. Later Clear standards
on, maanagement will be for monitoring
reactivee instead of
o being
Figure 3: 3 Safety cu ulture and
proactivve. Moneyy spent
manageement respo onsibility
on safeety program ms and (Souurce: Author elabo oration)
projectss is likke an
insurance premium m but withh one impoortant differrence. The
differennce is that with
w safety we are preventing thee undesired
act, whhere with innsurance, we
w pay the money m to compensate
c
for the undesired
u a after it taakes place.
act
Management support is essentiaal. Top maanagement,

represennted by thee highest level in the company,
c should sign
and disstribute a saafety commmitment pollicy which everybody
should honor. Mannagement ought
o to maake time to meet with
mployees annd discuss the policy and what it means.
the em
Manageement must convey to the t employeees:
• How they will back up thhe policy.

Pagge 31
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
• W
What kind of rewardss and discciplinary actions
a are
innvolved withh the policyy.
• What
W kind off resources will w be madde available.
Management needs to set and moonitor a critiical control

system to follow thhe above poolicy implem
mentation. The
T system
should establish clear
c standdards whichh will be constantly
monitorred. Take correctivee action based on observed
deviatioons. Review
w the oveerall perfoormance. Everybody
E
should be
b accustommed to be reeviewed andd monitoredd.
10. Saffety Prograams In Kuw

wait Oil Secctor
Some of the safety programs and initiiatives are

focusing on doing the safety program’s campaign rather r than
the targgeted benefiit of the cam
mpaign. Majjority of thee programs
are cooncentratingg on the substandaard condittions like
equipmment integrrity, equippment operation, to ools, etc.
Manageement offeers the
right eqquipment inn good Limiteed Campaign
C
workingg conditioon and attentio
on Focus
gives thhe worker thhe right
personaal prootective
equipmment (PPE),
howeveer, incidennts still
take place. These
incidentts might be
simply caused by b the
worker’’s negligennce or
equipmment misusse. Oil
sector companies should Figure 4: Safety
S progrrams focus
Sourcce: Author elaboraation
scale up
u their behhavioral
safety programms to
complem ment the saafety effort done
d so far..

Pagge 32
Kuwait economy depends heavily on the oil industry.

The incidents in this industry can be dangerous to the workers
and at the same time to Kuwait economy. Oil production
delays or stoppage can result in a devastating financial losses.
Damaging equipment in the oil industry can be vital since
most of the equipment used are specially made and custom
built for specific operation and condition. Losing one of the
equipments due to honest human errors will result in
production delays and unrecovered financial opportunity.
Behavior-based Safety target workers’ safety and prevent
employees from putting themselves in at-risk situation. Such
situations can result in personal injuries and/or asset damage.
11. Safety Paradox
Work may be planned ahead

and scheduled as desired by the
planners. However many times Management
unexpected delays change the work complains:
status from "scheduled" to "rush"; and “We give the
rushed jobs lead to at-risk behaviors workers quality
like cutting corners, skipping
training and supply
precautions and removing guards. Safe
guards and safety procedures, are set
them with Personal
to protect the workers, but they are Protective Equipment
inconvenient and time consumers. but still they don’t
When delays mean cost, use them !”
inconvenience or humiliation, the
worker will surely cut corners, remove
safe guards or does both.
Safety equipments, especially personal protective

equipments are bulky and inconvenient. For example, the
simple earplug might look small and nice but who would like

Page 33
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
to plugg his ears for

f an hourr or two? The hand gloves are
usually mass produuced. Theyy are mostlyy oversized,, itchy and
difficultt to use wheen handlingg small or deelicate objeccts.
Figure 5: Nonfatall injury andd illness inciidence ratess by case

type, 20003-2006.
(S
Source: United Sttates Departmentt of Labor -Bureauu of Labor Statisttics)
Workers beelieve that the

t next inccident or accident will
not haappen to them. Acccording to the Unitted States
Departmment of Labbor, only 4.44 out of 1000 full time workers
w are
fatal injury or illness every year (OSHA -
involveed in non-fa
Workpllace Injuriees and Illneesses in 20006, 2007). This fact
alone enncourages the
t workers to adapt unnsafe behaviiors.
Management sends mixed

m signalls when theey ask the
hourly workers
w to carry on a safe job buut meet, or exceed,
e the
preset time.
t They set system
ms of rewarrds and pen nalties, but
spent most
m of theirr time in thhe offices, not
n knowing g "who did
o when?". Emotional conflict annd distrust will result
what, or
when verbal
v verssus non-verrbal messaages are seent by the
manageement. Workers will usually acccept the non-verbal
n

Pagge 34
message over the verbal one to resolve the emotional conflict

(Larson, J., Brian H Kleiner, B. H., 2004).

Page 35

Page 36
Chapter Three: Behavior Theories
“Theories should be as simple as possible, but not

simpler.”
Albert Einstein
US physicist
(1879 - 1955)
1. What Is Behavior 38
2. Behavior Emergence Theories 38
3. Type Of Behavior And How They Are Formed 40
4. The Activator-Behavior-Consequence (ABC) Model 42
5. Applied Behavior Analysis 44
This chapter describes the behavior theories in general

and the Behavior-based Safety theory in particular. Two
models are also discussed, Loss Causation model and the
Activator-Behavior-Consequence model.

Page 37
1. What Is Behavior
Behavior refers to the action or

reaction of an individual in relation to a
stimulus. The Longman Dictionary “Social Norms is
(1984) simply defines behavior as the the influence of
things a person or animal does. Behavior social pressure
can be obvious to the observer or hidden. that is perceived
Type of motive that generates the
behavior and the probability to meet the
by the individual to
desired goal mold the individuals perform or not
behavior. Behavioral scientists look at perform a certain
behavior as actions that can be accurately behavior.
identified and observed by different (Human behavior,
2008)
observers and then documented.
2. Behavior Emergence Theories
There are two major theories

that explain behavior emergence. First
is the Value-attitude-behavior as
illustrated in “behavior is the
Directed Follow instruction
response of an
Training
Behavior and proceduresindividual, group,
Train
ing or species to its
ining Positive Negativeenvironment.?”
a Feedback Feedback
Tr Rewards
Merriam-Webster's
Medical Dictionary
(2002)
Habits Incentives Memorizing

Good or Bad
Recognition

Page 38
Figure 7. This theory relates human behavior to a

mechanistic response to one's attitude. The theory suggests
that the individual sees his surrounding environment as a
hierarchy of values, attitudes and behaviors. Behaviors are
numerous and specific to the situation they are exerted for.
Luckily, behaviors are easier to change when compared to
values and attitude.
Figure 6: Value-Attitude-Behavior
(Vaske, Jerry J., Donnelly, Maureen P., 1999)
Values are at the heart of the believe system and

difficult to change. Attitude is a hypothetical structure that
represents an individual's like or dislike (Vaske, Jerry J.,
Donnelly, Maureen P., 1999). The influence of values on
attitudes and behavior occurs indirectly via other components
in the cognitive hierarchy. For example, basic beliefs serve to
strengthen and give meaning to fundamental values. Patterns
of these basic beliefs create value orientations.

Page 39
The second theory is the "Theory of Planned Behavior

(TPB)" which acknowledge the influence of values on the
final behavior similar to the above theory. However TBP
count for the surrounding environment on the individual's
behavior since social pressure could help or contradict the
individual's behavior (Vaske, Jerry J., Donnelly, Maureen P.,
1999).
3. Type Of Behavior And How They Are Formed
Behaviors are learned and enforced daily. Basic

behaviors, like avoiding hot items, are learned by daily
interaction. However, more complex behaviors and skills, are
trained not learned.
“TPB is a theory
about the link
between attitude
and behavior
(Ajzen, 2008)

Page 40
Training Directed Follow instruction

Behavior and procedures
ing
Train
ining Positive Negative
a Feedback Feedback
Tr Rewards

Good or Bad
Recognition
Figure 7: How behavior is formed

(source: author elaboration)
The following is simplified steps explaining how
we convert behaviors to habits (
Training Directed Follow instruction

Behavior and procedures
ing
Train
ining Positive Negative
a Feedback Feedback
Tr Rewards

Good or Bad
Recognition
Figure 7).
a. Learning by training: We learn what to do by memorizing

newly trained skills. We talk to ourselves or formulate an
image before performing a behavior in order to activate
the right response. Then we feed back to ourselves the

Page 41
result of this response. If the desired result is achieved

then we enforce the action.
b. Memorizing: After performing the same behavior many

times successfully we memorize the behavior (Automatic
behavior). A self directed behavior is now formed.
c. Habits: With rewards and recognitions and other positive

consequences, a habit, either good or bad, is now formed
and solidified.
It is desired to keep the new habits especially if they

are good ones. However, bad habits will require repetitive
effort to change them, since they are imbedded in the self-
directed actions. The bad behavior should be identified and
explained to the worker with the suggestion to replace it with
new safe (corrective) behavior. One way to do this is by
observing the worker at the work site to identify his at-risk
behaviors. Then discuss at-risk behavior with the worker. Find
out why he prefers to perform the risky behavior, then suggest
a safer behavior for him to use. Figure 8 demonstrate a simple
“habit changing cycle” which will be discussed in details in
Chapter Five: using the Behavior-based Safety model.

Page 42
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Obbserve
w
worker
Agree to Identify
chang
ge habits
Suggest Disccuss
safe habit the risk
r
Figgure 8: Habbit changingg cycle

(Source: Authhor elaboratioons)
Experts in behavior change
c likee Geller, coonfirm the
fact thaat worker can
c be motiivated to chhange theirr habits by
highlighhting the negative
n connsequence of the old bad habit.
Then strengthen
s t
their motivvation by showing
s th
he positive
consequuences of the newly suggested habit (Gelller E. S.,
1999).
4. Thee Activatorr-Behavior--Consequen
nce (ABC) Model
The ABC model (Figgure 9) is a simple an nd forward

model that
t dependds on 3 stepps. First stepp is the acttivator “A”
which is i mostly thhe surroundding enviroonment. Thee activator
will triggger certainn behavior “B” to yielld a conseq quence “C”
(Geller E. S., 19994). For exaample, a worker
w is gooing to do
manual work, we willw call him m Worker-1.

Pagge 43
Figure 9: Activator-Behavior-Consequence Model

(Source: Author elaboration)
The job requires him to wear gloves (Activator). He
wears his gloves (behavior) and does the job. The
consequence is his hands are protected and remained clean
after the job was done. This will send a positive reinforcement
to wear the gloves.
Another worker (Worker-2) is now going to do the

same job (Activator) but neglect to put on (behavior) his
gloves. He finishes the job with no harm done to his hands and
they remain clean also (consequence). It was also more
convenient to work without gloves which generated positive
reinforcement not to use the gloves next time. The positive
reinforcement for Worker-2 are:

Page 44
• More convenient to work without gloves.

• Not putting on the gloves saved time and effort.
• Cheaper to work without gloves.
If we assume that Worker-2
repeated the same behavior of not wearing Behavior is:
the gloves (a behavior which by now has “Response of an
been enforced many times). Then he gets a
individual or group
superficial cut on one of his fingers
(negative consequence). The resulting to an action,
consequence will send negative environment,
reinforcement to the behavior of not person, or
wearing gloves. stimulus”
( behavior, 2006-2008)
The ABC model is useful for
understanding why some workers keep on
performing risky habits. An obvious
example is the speeding car drivers we encounter everyday on
the street. Those drivers notice the damaged cars, from
previous accidents but keep telling themselves that “this will
not happen to me…I am smarter and more careful than the
other drivers!”. The fact that those speeding drivers did not
involve in a car accident before, although they are speeding
every day, enforce their speeding habits.
5. Applied Behavior Analysis
Applied behavior analysis (ABA) concentrate on

socially significant areas that can have long term behavioral
change. The behavior change is related to workers' behavior
itself, not only changing what the workers are saying or
stopping their complains. Behavior change should be
measured during the change attempt. First, a base line
behavior is observed and measured then an intervention is
introduced. The change should be noticed and measured after

Page 45
the intervention. Lastly, final measurement is taken after the

intervention is stopped to see the change in the behavior (Baer,
D., Wolf, M., Risley, T., 1968).
Applied behavior analysis should be detailed in a way

to make it easy to understand and apply without further
explanations and clarifications. The systematic approach of
ABA makes it easy to replicate and produce effective results
which reach the targeted behaviors and related behaviors.
Most of the ABA work is public, where the results are
observed and recorded. During the execution, the analyst can
observe his intervention’s result and guess the reason for their
deviations. Adjustment can be made directly on the
intervention, without further guessing. Then further
observations and analyses can be done again (Heward, W., et
al, 2004). For further discussion and applications on the
Applied behavior analysis please see Chapter Five: on page
64.
“ABA takes what

we know about
behavior and uses
it to bring about
positive change”
(Applied behavior
analysis, 2008)

Page 46

Page 47
Chapter Four: Incidents, Accidents And Near Misses
“ It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the

analysis of the obvious.”
Alfred North Whitehead
English mathematician &
philosopher (1861 - 1947)
1. Loss Causation Model 48

2. Incident, Accident And Near Miss Data 51
3. Data Analysis Methods 53
4. Incident Reports Analysis In The Loss Causality Model 54
5. Incidents Root Causes Throughout The Years 57
In this chapter we discuss and explain the Loss

Causation model in details. We will analyze data of incidents,
accidents and near misses which took place in Mina Abdullah
Refinery for the years 2003-2007. AnswerTree® software will
be used to split the data and test its compatibility with the loss
causality model. The model will then be used to identify the
predominant root causes of the refinery incidents.

Page 48
1. Loss Causation Model
The Loss causation model directs incident

investigation to the root cause of the incident. According to
this model, incident or accident is part of the organizational
responsibility. The Safety Management System, which the
organization is using, did not eliminate the root cause to
prevent the event from happening.
Individual or
: team
q Systems
q Standards :
q Compliance q Errors
q Violation
q
Figure 10: Loss Causation Model

Source: Author elaboration
The model (in Figure 10) start from the event, which
took place and resulted in personal injury and/or lost or
damaged property (D. K. H. Chua, Y. M. Goh, 2004). The
event was caused by an immediate cause which is substandard
act or substandard condition. Those substandard factors are:

Page 49
Table 3 : Immediate Causes

Substandard Acts Substandard Condition
• Information error or • Inadequate guards or
omission barriers
• Failure to follow rules or • Inadequate or improper
procedures protective equipment
• Inadequate warning or • Defective tools,
safety devices equipment or material
• Failure to observe warning • Congestion or restricted
or use safety devices action
• Improper loading or • Inadequate warning
placement system
• Failure to use personal • Fire & explosion hazard
protective equipment • Hazardous environmental
properly conditions
• Influence of intoxication • Noise exposure
substances • Radiation exposure
• Using defective equipment • High or low temperature
or tools exposure
• Misuse of equipment or • Inadequate or excess
tools illumination
• Improper position for task • Inadequate ventilation
• Improper lifting
• Horseplay
The immediate causes are what we notice when an

incident takes place. However, there are underlying causes
that lead to the immediate cause. The difficulty in the
underlying causes is that they are hidden as situational and
human factors. The underlying causes are:

Page 50
Table 4 : Underlying Causes

Situational factors Human factors
• Inadequate Leadership or • Inadequate capability
supervision • Lack of knowledge
• Inadequate Engineering • Lack of skill
• Inadequate purchasing • Excessive stress
• Inadequate maintenance • Improper motivation
• Inadequate tools or
equipment
• Inadequate work standards
• Wear and Tear
• Abuse & Misuse
The underlying factors leading to the undesired event
are caused by organizational factors. These factors are
controlled by the organizational safety management system.
The organizational factors are:
Table 5 : Organizational Factors

• Behavior
• Leadership, Commitment & Accountability
• Safe Work Practices, Permits and Standards
• Training & Competence
• Environment
• Roles, Responsibilities & Assignments
• Contractor & Material Procurement
• Occupational Health
• Mechanical & Operational integrity
Following the logic described above, we can see that
failure in the organizational safety management system is the
root cause of the undesired event or accident.

Page 51
2. Incident, Accident And Near Miss Data
Accident is the unintended but

probable consequence of an unsafe act
that leads to hazardous circumstances. An Accident is
The dangerous occurrence and near miss “unplanned,
are incidents similar to the accident but unexpected, and un-
do not result in personal injury. We
notice and feel the occurring accidents,
designed event
which we immediately analyze and which occurs
recommend solution to avoid their suddenly and causes
reoccurrence. However, many industries injury or loss, a
ignore recording the dangerous decrease in value of
occurrences and near misses.
the resources, or
Near miss is an incident or an increase in
accident having the potential for either liabilities”
personal injury or property damage or (BusinessDictionary.com
, 2008)
both. Refinery workers are encouraged
to report near miss occurrences. A
special format was developed and made
Figure 11: Incident, Accident and Near Miss

digital report form.
Source: KNPC’s intranet SHE department site

Page 52
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
availablle in KNPC C refineriess for willingg workers to t report a

near miss
m when they
t witnesss one. It is i also man ndatory to
report incidents annd accidentss in the refinnery. The fiilled report
is sent to
t safety seection in thee refinery for
fo root causse analysis
purposees. Personaal injury inncidents andd “Loss orr Damage”
incidentts reports are
a also colllected and analyzed by y the same
methodd.
Team of safety
s engineers analyyze these reports
r by
using Root-Cause Analysiis method to reach h to the
organizzational facctors that cause thee incident. Systems,
standardds and woorkers com mpliance arre the orgaanizational
factors that causee the undeerlying facttors. The underlying
u
factors lead to the immediate cause. The immediate causes are
the visible factorss that
leads too an accidennt or a
near miiss
The root cause

analysiss starts by
treatingg the incideent as
mmediate caauses. The immediate
an evennt then findd out its im
causes are eitheer substanddard acts or/and su ubstandard
conditioons. The unnderlying caases behind the immediate causes
are thenn acknowleedged. Thosse causes area also maade of two
factors, situational and humann factors.
For exampple, a worrker was unnloading sccrap pipes

from a trailer
t whenn a small piipe rolled frrom the trailler and fell
on his leg. The worker
w suffeered minor contusion due to the
force exxerted by thhe falling pipe.
p In Tabble 6 we seee the root
cause analysis
a of thhis incidentt and how it can be rellated to the
organizzational item
ms. Notice that the cauuse of the incident is
due to Situational factor andd Human faactor. The root r of the

Pagge 53
incident can be traced in both directions but it will end up as

an organizational cause at the end.
Table 6 : Root cause analysis for Loss Causation model

Organizational
Underlying Causes Immediate Causes
Causes
Situational or task Substandard Act:
factors: • Improper
• Inadequate work position for
Work practices standard for the unloading
were not safe worker to follow
Human Factors: No Substandard
• Lack of job Condition
knowledge
3. Data Analysis Methods
AnswerTree® is a stand-alone program from the

“Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)”. Decision
trees are charts that illustrate decision rules. They begin with
one root node that contains all of the observations in the
sample. As the tree drops down, the data branches into evenly
exclusive subsets of the data. AnswerTree® can build a tree
automatically or let the user take control to refine the tree
according to the user’s knowledge of the data (AnswerTree®
3.1 User’s Guide, 2002).
The five year data of incident and near miss is used to

generate a model in AnswerTree. Exhaustive Chi-Square
Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID) is used to identify
the optimal splits of the data. Only results with P-value less
than 0.01 is accepted. Next section will fit the data in the Loss
Causation model. Some of the discussion is technical and

Page 54
filled with statistical jargon. The reader might skip the section
and go directly to section 5 “Incidents Root Causes
Throughout The Years” were the findings are discussed.
4. Incident Reports Analysis In The Loss Causality

Model
Data from the refinery’s incidents, accidents, personal

injuries and near miss reports for the years 2003 to 2007 were
collected and fed in AnswerTree® software database for
analysis. The graph in Figure 12 is part of the tree generated to
check data compatibility into the loss causation model
(discussed in section 1 on page 48). The total data is made of
1650 reports each had its sub sections.
The majority of the reports are near misses totaling

1220 reports. Loss or damage reports analyzed are 243 and
finally 187 personal injury reports. The research discussion
will follow only near miss reports in Figure 12 tree.
Starting from node-1 (in Figure 12) where all the data
are aggregated. The near miss data was split between the
“Substandard Act” and “Substandard Condition”. The result
was 809 reports (≈89% of total near miss) of the near misses
were caused by Substandard Acts. These 809 reports were
checked if they were caused by human factors as the
underlying cause for the Substandard Acts. It can be noticed in
node-3 that 336 reports (28% of total near miss) were human
factors, and out of those human factors 236 (19% of total near
miss) were behavioral (node-5).
Following node-1 to node-4 where the split shows

Substandard acts which are not falling under Human Factors.
Since they are not human factors then they will be “situational
and/or task factors”. So the data in node-4 are split into node-7

Page 55
and node-8. Node-7 represent the Situational and/or task

factors, and they represent 24% of the total reports.
Furthermore, node-7 checked for organizational factors and
found that Safe work practices are 16% and Mechanical /
operating integrity are 4% (Appendix 1 on page 131). To
recognize data splitting results in a simple way please see
Figure 14. The results from AnswerTree® computations are all
represented in the figure.
Figure 12: Incident analysis tree part-1 (produced by

AnswerTree® Software 3.0)
In node-2 of Figure 13 we follow the incidents which

are not Substandard Acts. We split them as “Substandard
Condition” to find out 361 (30% of total reports) are in
compliance in node-13. This 361 reports are split further to
test how many fall under Situational and task factors. We find
306 (25% of total reports) are part of this category which lead
to about 19% as Mechanical / operating integrity factors in

Page 56
node-17. Following the tree from node-1 down to node 17 we

can see that the data agree with the loss causation model.
Figure 13: Incident analysis tree part-2

(produced by AnswerTree® Software 3.0)

Page 57
We distributed the percentages calculated by

AnswerTree® into the loss causality model in Figure 14. In the
underlying causes we added the 25% of the incidents that are
common as a human factor and Situational or task related. For
further discussion and data tabulation, please see Appendix 2
on page 134.
Figure 14: incident distribution in each stage of Loss

Causality as split by AnswerTree® software.
It is clear that the data can fit the loss causation model.
In the following section we will analyze the organizational
causes and how did they change throughout the years.
5. Incidents Root Causes Throughout The Years
AnswerTree® was used to split the root causes of each

year’s total incidents. The results are graphed in Figure 15.
From the first look at the graph we can notice that summing
all the percentages of each year will exceed 100%. This is
confusing but true, since some of the incidents are caused by
two or three causes at the same time.

Page 58
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Year 2003 has high peercentage of o almost ev

very cause.
The samme year when
w Kuwaiit National Petroleum Company
(KNPCC) started the
t new Saafety, Heallth and En nvironment
Manageement Sysstem (SHE EMS). SH HEMS iden ntified 14
elementts to managge in the coompany to improve saffety, health
and envvironment too industrial standard.
60%
48%
46%
50%
39%
40%
29%
27%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Year 03 Year 04 Year 05 Year 06 Year 07
Safe W
Work Prectices, P
Permits, Standard
ds Behavior
Mech
hanical & Operating Integrity. Training &
& Competency
Manaagement Systemss, Matrics & Auditts Others
Figure 15: Incident rooot causes (oorganization

nal)
throughoout the yearss.
For statistical
s dataa of this graph please see Apppendix 5 on page
p 142
“Training & competenncy” and “M Managemen nt systems”

were high
h in yearr 2003. Botth of them decreased
d below
b 10%
and rem
mained low w in the subbsequent years. This reeduction is
due to the estabblished safeety manageement system which
manageed training, competencyy, matrix annd audits.
“Mechanicaal and Operrating integrrity” is decrreasing but

slower than what one
o would like it to be.
b One reasson for the
slow reeduction is the
t difficultty in maintaaining the mechanical
m

Pagge 59
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
equipmment. Most of o the refinnery equipmment are cusstom made

for speccial servicees. Replacinng or modiffying such equipment
require lengthy prrocedures and a large budgets.
b In
n addition,
most off these mechanical equuipments are running most
m of the
time unntil the prrocess unitt they are in is shu utdown for
periodiccal maintennance. Som me process units are shutdown
s months and others are shutddown once every six
every six
years.
As mentionned before that

t KNPC’s safety management
system (SHEMS) had 14 elem ments, and behavior was
w one of
those elements.
e Thhere was delay
d in tarrgeting behavior until
year 20006 since beehavior is a non-tangibble issue an
nd requires
attentioon to execuute. KNPC asked a specialized behavioral
u Behavior-based saffety (BBS) process in
consultaant to set up
year 20006. More on o the BBS S process isi detailed in
i Chapter
Five:.
Work targeeting behavvior took 60%

50%
off in Mina Abbdulla Refiinery in 40%

30%
Januaryy 2007. Behavior as a root 20%
10%
cause of inccidents inncreased 0%
(percenntagewise) since
s SHWWMS had Year Year Year Year Year
03 04 05 06 07
eliminaating most of organnizational Figure 16: Behavior

B as
factors. We see thhe increase trend in root cause of o incidents
behavioor percentagge in Figuree 16 until yeear 2006.
As a dirrect result of BBS implementtation, the

behavioor trend stoppped increaasing as a rooot cause, annd actually
started declining in 2007. The T reasonn for this decline is
obvioussly the impplementation of BBS process at that year.
Figure 16 is part ofo Figure 151 but show wing only behavior
b as
the perccent of the root
r causes of incidentss in the refin
nery.

Pagge 60
Figure 16 may raise question “What about the safety

training? Doesn’t training change workers behavior” The
answer to this question is Yes and NO! Safety training courses
are valuable and effective in conveying safety information to
the trainee. However, giving the information is not effective as
a program specifically targeting one thing only, which is
behavior. More on this discussion in 0.

Page 61

Page 62
Chapter Five: Behavior-Based Safety Process
“There's no secret about success. Did you ever know

a successful man who didn't tell you about it?”
Kin Hubbard
(1868 - 1930)
1. Overview Of The Behavior-Based Safety 63

2. BBS Successful Implementations 65
3. BBS Experiment In Kuwait Research Institution 67
4. BBS Unsuccessful Implementations 68
5. Behavior-Based Safety Model 70
5.1. Observation at site 70
5.2. Data gathering and preliminary reports 73
5.3. Report analysis and recommendation 73
6. Group feedback 74
6.1. Feedback by written report: 74
6.2. Intangible group feedback: 76
7. Feedback Effect on Safety Training 77
In this chapter, we will discuss Behavior-based Safety

past experiences, successful and unsuccessful
implementations. The BBS model is explained step by step for
the reader.

Page 63
1. Overview Of The Behavior-Based Safety
Behavior experimental
analysis by B. F. Skinner laid the
ground for the Behavioral Science
ABA is defined as
work in the 1940-50 and Applied
Behavior Analysis (ABA) later on. “the science in which
ABA was implemented on trial tactics derived from
basis at a bakery shop by academics the principles of
from Georgia Institute of behavior are applied
Technology. They had initial
systematically to
success in the bakery shop although
the implementation period was
improve socially
short. The same academics significant behavior and
(Komaki, Judi, Waddell, William experimentation is used
M., ET AL., 1977) were able to to identify the
improve the performance of two variables responsible
small businesses by also using the
ABA approach.
for change ?”
(Cooper et al, 2007)
One year later Komaki, the
lead team member, was able to
improve safety performance of two
departments by the same approach. They had 3-4 observations
done weekly on workers. Observations data were noted on a
checklist and observers feedback was given to the worker
during the observation. Data from the checklist were analyzed
to pinpoint the targeted behavior for future enforcement. The
team was able to improve safety behavior by 21-26% within
26 weeks. Safety performance of these departments went back
to the base line after stopping the study (Komaki, Judi,
Barwick, Kenneth D., Scott, Lawrence R., 1978).

Page 64
In the late 1970's Dr. Krause and Dr. Hidley suggested

the Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) approach for an
offshore oil-drilling equipment manufacturer. At the same
time in Procter and Gamble the term "Behavior-based Safety"
was used to describe the work done by Gene Earnest and Jim
Palmer (Krause T. R., 2001).
Scientists started using similar approaches to reinforce

safe behaviors in different companies. In 1983, E. Scott Geller
published a research to increase seatbelt usage (Geller, E.
Scott, Davis, Liza, Spicer, Kevin, 1983).
This research was the starting point of
Behavior-based Safety (BBS) as we
know it now. However, the early model
“Discussion is an
of BBS was heavily dependent on the exchange of
Supervisor role. The Supervisor was knowledge;
trained on BBS analysis and feedback argument an
communication. Further changes took exchange of
place on the BBS model in the 1980's
during the popularization of the Total
ignorance.
Robert Quillen
Quality Management System (TQMS). American journalist
In the early 1990's more researches and
experiments made BBS a star in the
safety arena (Krause T. R., 2001).
One of the main reasons to focus on behavior is that

worker’s at-risk behavior is the main contributing factor to the
incident in most cases. This does not put the blame on the
worker. We need to focus on the at-risk behavior, analyze
these behaviors to find solution to change them. Behavior-
based Safety process is seen sometimes as the blame process
since it involves face to face confrontation (Krause T. R.,
1995). When a supervisor does his observation and records his
finding, the observee, as well as the observer, feels

Page 65
uncomfortable. The process involve fault finding and

feedback. This feedback is perceived as reprimanding at some
times.
2. BBS Successful Implementations
Krause et al (1999) did a study that selected 73 sites

located in North America and implemented the behavior-based
safety process for at least one year. Out of these 73 companies
42% were from the chemical or petroleum industry. The
average safety improvement in these sites was reported to be
26% after the first year of implementation. On the fifth year of
implementation the safety improvement reached 69% from the
baseline (T.R. Krause, K.J. Seymour, K.C.M. Sloat, 1999).
A case study was conducted on

International Chemical company based
in the UK. The company had behavior “It is possible to
safe process running for 3 years. Their
fail in many
average hours worked without accident
improved from 100,000 to 2,000,000
ways...while to
hrs. It will be fair to mention here that succeed is possible
this company had other safety programs only in one way.
running at the same time (The Keil Aristotle
Center for the Health and Safety
Executive, 2002).
A large nuclear company with international branches

had different safety programs and behavioral programs
running. They set their own behavioral program that catered
for the company in totality. The filled behavioral checklist
from each site was sent to a central location. In the central
location the data from each checklist was stored in a data bank
and analyzed for safety barriers and area of improvement

Page 66
identifications. The program was successful and their statistics

showed 50% reduction in accident when compared with 1990
record (The Keil Center for the Health and Safety Executive,
2002). The success factors of this behavior program are:
a. A survey was done prior to the implementation to check

if the company was ready for such initiatives.
b. The management team had excellent understanding and
association of the behavior program even before the
implementation.
c. The safety committee was composed of high level staff.
d. The company identified the locations where safety
records were alarming.
e. The company was prepared to do the program. Such
preparations were technical safeguards and effective
systems.
Another case study, data was analyzed coming from 31
focus groups working in 20 organization. These organizations
had implemented Behavior-based Safety (BBS) process. The
result of the analysis showed that the following can predict
employee involvement in BBS process:
a. Trust in management abilities

b. Reception of BBS education and effective training.
c. Held accountable for BBS performance in the
performance appraisals.
An interesting finding was reported in the same study
that employees gave and received positive BBS feedback
when the BBS process was mandatory in their site
(DePasquale, J., Geller, E. S., 1999). This finding contradicts
the thought that mandatory safety program may not succeed
due to workers’ resentment.

Page 67
Krause et al (1995) found two key factors for the BBS

success after implementing BBS process in 15 different
organizations around the world. The key success factors for
BBS were defining roles and responsibilities for each
employee in the organization. The other factor is involving
hourly employees in the program implementations. In addition
they recommend segregating safety from political issues and
communicating BBS matters when possible (Krause T. R.,
1995).
3. Behavior-Based Safety Experiment In Kuwait

Research Institution
A six weeks experiment was conducted by researchers

from Kuwait Research Institute. The experiment started by
dividing the workers in one of the department in the institute
into two groups. Each group is made of 10 workers. One
group was set as control group with no training or treatment.
The second group was trained for 3 days on the BBS
methodology and process similar to what was described in
section 5 on page 71. The first week was used as baseline data
collection phase. The following 5 weeks were used to conduct
observations and deliver feedback (Ali M. Al-Hemoud, May
M. Al-Asfoor, 2006).
From Figure 17 we notice continued improvement in the

safety index which represent eight safety behavioral factors.
The improvement was a result of more than 1500 observations
done during the experimental period. The following 3 months
were used as a follow up period, where only sample
observation were done. The safe behavior was sustained
between 97-100% during the follow up period.

Page 68
Figure 17: Mean safety performance index

for the experimental and control groups.
Source: (Ali M. Al-Hemoud, May M. Al-Asfoor, 2006)
4. BBS Unsuccessful Implementations
A large company with past failed safety program was

looking for a new safety program to pilot in one of its
department. Steering committee was formed but it could not
accomplish a lot. The implementation consultant requested
"influential" members for the steering committee who joined
after his request. Number of observations conducted per
month rose quickly due to the new members’ influence.
The company started injecting money and resources to

resolve the identified safety hurdles in the department. Within
one year the department’s accidents rate dropped drastically.
With time the steering committee shifted its focus to hardware
projects not related to behavior. Also budget and resource
dried up, which made the influencing members in the steering
committee to leave. It took one more year to drop the program.

Page 69
The following are the identified reasons for the failure (The
Keil Center for the Health and Safety Executive, 2002):
a. Workforce was not involved from the beginning of the

safety program.
b. Management-staff trust was pale.
c. Steering committee did not have the right staff
representatives.
d. The requested number of observations were impractical.
e. Steering committee focused on non-behavioral issues.
f. The site was not ready for such program.
Smith (2007) says that BBS expectations are not

realistic and many managers are disappointed from the poor
results they see after full implementation. Sometimes BBS
process concentrate on the behavior and forget the root cause
of the risk. The cause of the risk might be hardware. For
example, employees are running to the cafeteria because the
chairs are not enough for all of them to sit on, not because the
employees are reckless.
Part of the Behavior-based Safety process is interaction

between the observer and the observee. The interactions are
checked on a checklist for further analysis. Most of the BBS
program prevent the observer from writing the observee
personal information (name, staff No.). Recording the
observee’s name on the observation checklist will link it to
disciplinary action by his superiors.
A large newspaper publishing company implemented a

behavioral safety process that helped improving employee’s
morale, contribute to a significant drop in OSHA incident
rates and helped save more than $1 million in workers'
compensation costs. These excellent results were not found in

Page 70
one of the departments since the manager of that department

requested adding employees names to the observation forms
so she could discipline the violating employees later on
(Perkinson, 2005).
5. Behavior-Based Safety Model
5.1. Observation at site
Behavior-based Safety (BBS) process depends on site

observation. Site observation include individual feedback,
which is the most effective act in the BBS process. The
observer meets the worker at site and introduces himself and
the job he is going to do. There is no sneaking or spying in the
process. The observer monitors the worker and notices his safe
behaviors. He also, monitors the At-risk behaviors the worker
is putting himself in.
Figure 18: Site observations and individual feedback

(Source: author elaboration)
The observer starts his feedback by commending the
safe behavior the worker was doing during his work. Then he
explains, one by one, the At-risk behaviors the worker was
doing. Then the observer asks the worker why he was putting
himself at risk. For example, if the worker is welding a piece

Page 71
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
of metaal and the spparks are flyying

in the workers direction.
d The
observeer would then ask the
worker why he waas not wearring
protectiive clothingg, like flam me-
retardannt apron.
They both discuss thee at-

risk beehaviors unntil the worrker
agrees to try the t suggessted
recommmendation made by the
observeer. The woorker mightt be
aware of
o his at-riskk behavior or
o maybe noot. As discu
ussed in the
Activator-Behavior-Consequeence (ABC)) model in i Chapter
Three: (page 43) that the worker
w may be doing the at-risk
behavioor for longg time witthout hurtinng himselff (negative
consequuences). Thhe Observerr’s job herre is to higghlight this
behavioor, then explains the
associatted negaative
consequuences withh this behaviior.
The above discussion and

agreement is thhe individdual
feedbacck which heelps the worrker
to channge his behavior. It miight
look simmple but we will see later
l
on in thhis book how w effective it is
on the long
l run. Thhis feedbackk is
also coonsidered as a a form of
reward since:
• Thhe worker got commeendable coomments on

n his safe
behhavior.

Pagge 72
• The worker understood his at-risk behavior without being

reprimanded at site or reported to his superiors for further
penalties.
Figure 19: Behavior-based Safety observation checklist

(Source: Refinery’s BBS steering committee)
At the end of the observation, the Observer would fill
in a checklist (Error! Reference source not found.) with the
safe and at-risk behaviors he noticed along with the date, time
and location of the observations. Please note that the worker’s
name or identification number are not noted in the checklist.
The right side of the check list is used to summarize the
observation process and the discussion. Workers comments
and reasons for the at-risk behavior is recorded along with the
suggested safe behavior. Recording this interaction is
important for the detailed analysis. The results of such
analysis can be found in 03 on page 111.

Page 73
5.2. Data gathering and preliminary reports
Observation checklists are gathered and entered in

electronic data base. Reports are generated for BBS steering
committee to analyze and recommend practical solutions.
These reports flags out trends of at-risk behaviors and in
which location they are taking place.
5.3. Report analysis and recommendation

Observed
Workers
(Management
Commitment)
Observers
Committee (Management Facilitator
Steering Representative BBS
Commitment)
Management
(Management
Commitment)
Management
Refinery Top
Figure 20: Behavior-based Safety Model

(Source: author elaboration)
Steering committee is made of high level influential

members and chaired by Refinery Management
Representative. The committee has periodical meetings to

Page 74
discuss and analyze BBS report findings. The committee then

produces a set of recommendations to tackle workers’
behavior. Some of the recommendations would be as simple
as providing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to workers
in certain location, or increase manpower in another location.
Some of the recommendations require site modification or
costly machinery. Such recommendations are sent to top
management for necessary approvals.
Implementing the recommendations would change the

at-risk behaviors at the targeted location. Also the
recommendations would eliminate hazards and risks caused
by hardware or wrong design. Committee members devoted
time and effort to discuss and analyze these reports in
periodical meetings. These meetings
are counted as part of the
management commitment to
behavior process. Feed back is
“the a process of
6. Group feedback
sharing observations,
There are different types of concerns and
“group feedbacks”, some of them are suggestions between
tangible like monthly and quarterly
persons or divisions
reports, others are visible but
intangible. One of the intangible of the organization
group feedback is management with an intention of
commitment and transparency. improving both
Group feedback importance is personal and
detailed in Chapter Six: (section 5
organizational
page 93).
performance ?”
6.1. Feedback by written report:
(Feedback, 2008)

Page 75
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
The refinery management repreesentative sendss each

month a written report shoowing the month’s highlights,
achieveements and setbacks to t all obseervers. The observers
would know
k the BBS
B processs success annd gaps. Th
he monthly
report is sent eleectronicallyy via an E-mail
E to reach
r each
observeer at the sam
me time.
A more coomprehensivve report is i issued each year’s

quarter that detaails the fuull refineryy’s safety behavior.
Behavioor is measuured and anaalyzed according to eacch location
in the refinery. Also
A each contractor’s safety behavior
b is
evaluateed and docuumented in the report. Report’s analysis
a are
importaant for the observer too identify thhe thorny loocations in
the refinnery so as he
h targets thhem in his observation.
Figgure 21: Grooup feedbacck factors which

w contrib
bute to
behaviior change
Source: Autthor elaboratioon
The third report

r is peerhaps the most
m imporrtant report
from thhe observer’s point of view.
v This report
r is sen
nt quarterly
after thhe above mentioned
m r
report. Thee report is sent as a

Pagge 76
memorandum singed by the management representative

directly to each observer. It holds his name and summarize his
observations during the quarter. Words of appreciation and
encouragement are used to conclude the memorandum.
6.2. Intangible group feedback:
Management commitment is intangible to most of

the employees in the refinery. For example, the fact that the
management had chosen to implement the BBS process is a
commitment that send positive feedback to the employees.
Management participation in the observation process is
another feedback.
Figure 22: Feedback mind map

(source: Author elaboration)

Page 77
7. Feedback Effect on Safety Training
Worker’s competence is a group of associated abilities,

capacities and knowledge that enables the worker to
understand the job and act effectively. Classroom, field and
on-the-job training might increase workers competency.
Worker’s competency will help him execute his work in a safe
manner.
Training is vital for learning the

necessary skills for certain jobs. In
addition, ongoing or refresher training
“The way we
is always recommended to close gaps
created with time. A study done in the see the problem
Netherlands on large sector of the civil is the problem”
workers showed that 35% of them do Stephen Covey
not trust their colleagues and 20% do The 7 Habits of
Highly Effective
not trust their superiors. In the UK, People
another study found that 27% of the
workers believe their colleagues are
incompetent.
The financial loss in the UK due to incompetence is

tremendous. A report stated that £12 million worth of
management time is lost on looking after poor performers
(Rampersad, 2006). Training is important to learn the job and
also considered as a critical success factor for safety and
environmental management system implementation (Ambika
Zutshi, Amrik S Sohal, 2004).
A study was conducted on three department of a

vehicle maintenance division of a large city Department of
Public Works in the US. The study was 45 weeks long, with
the aim to compare the effectiveness of safety training only

Page 78
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
and theen include feed back into safetyy training. The study
found that
t training accompaanied by feedback inccreased the
overall safety recoord by an average off 16%, while training
alone sccored minoor improvem
ment in mosst of the deepartments.
(Ray, Paul
P S, Bishoop, Phillip A.,
A 1995).
Training Effectivness
E
With or Withoout Feedback
W k
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Case-1 Case-2 Casee-3
Base line Training onnly Trraining and Feedback
Figgure 23: Traaining effecttiveness witth or withou

ut
feedbaack.
Souurce : (Komaki, Juudi, Heinzmann, Arlene
A T., Lawsoon, Loralie., 1980
0)
After enjoying safetyy improvem ments in tw wo of the

departmments, the performanc
p ce declined to almost base line
level. When
W feedbback was inntroduced (33 times per week) the
safety performance
p e went to the highest levels as in
ndicated in
Figure 23 (Komaaki, Judi, Heinzmann,
H Arlene T.., Lawson,
Loralie., 1980).
An oil com mpany in Occupied

O P
Palestine haad a safety
programm going onn with limitted success. Trained supervisors
s
were suupposed to do
d a weeklyy interactionn with employees and
discuss their worrk behaviorr. After a base line and data
collection period, the
t supervissors were giiven feedbaack on their
perform
mance for a 12 weeks period. Suppervisor perrformance,

Pagge 79
during these 12 weeks, improved from 35% to 50%. Then

plateau at 70% twenty weeks later during a follow up check.
Workers unsafe behavior decreased from 25% to almost zero
(Dov Zohar, Gil Luria, 2003).
A report by the Health and Safety Laboratory cited a

study by Zohar et al, stating the following finding. Workers in
a metal fabrication plant were given hearing tests before and at
the end of their shifts. Hearing levels were found to be lower
at the end of the shift in comparison to the shift start, because
workers were not using ear plugs. This information was fed
back to 20 workers as a means of promoting ear protectors
use.
Over a period of five months ear plug usage in the

department increased to 85-90%. In a control group within the
same plant over the same five month period, workers were
given standard lectures on hearing conservation which were
later augmented by disciplinary threats. No more than 10% of
the workers in the control group wore earplugs over the five
months period (S Gadd, A M Collins, 2002).

Page 80

Page 81
Chapter Six: Safety Management System And

Communication
“The most important thing in communication is to

hear what isn't being said.”
Peter Drucker
American management
writer (1909 - 2005)
1. Safety Management Systems 82

2. Rewards, Recognition And Motivation 83
3. Management Involvement In Changing Behavior 85
4. Observation Data and Individual Feedback 86
4.1. Analyzing the overall observations 89
4.2. Analyzing selected observations elements 90
5. Communication And Group Feedback 91
This chapter will discuss the importance of having

safety management in the work place then explain the
importance of motivational schemes and management
involvement in safety programs. The benefits and
practicalities of safety training is discussed throughout the
chapter. One year of BBS implementation data is collected
and analyzed in this chapter. We will find out if Individual and
group feedback can change the worker’s behavior? The
chapter will answer the following questions:
• Is Management commitment important in changing

workers’ at-risk behavior to safe behavior?
• What is the effect of individual and group feedback on
workers behavior?

Page 82

Page 83
1. Safety Management Systems
Sellers (2000) identify the major hurdles to safety

behavior as the ineffective management system. For example,
a company may provide a ladder and a place to store it.
However, frustrated employees will use unsafe behavior to
reach elevated items when they cannot find the key for the
store where the ladder is stored. Rewarding system can be
damaging if the employees are rewarded for keeping the
production online by cleaning a jammed machine while it is
operating (Sellers, 2000).
Earnest (1997) stressed on the importance of the safety

system and the need to be proactive in implementing it. He
highlighted that the “safety system and its improvement”
should be the performance measure, not the absence of injury.
Companies are implementing different safety programs

each being a standalone system. These companies neglect
integrating such programs in one management system. As a
result, the isolated programs loss their focus and fail
ultimately. According to Petersen (2000), safety systems
should be:
• Ensure daily pro-action by supervisors and teams which

demonstrates that safety is a core value of the
organization.
• Involve middle managers as key players. It must require
them to:
o ensure the performance of subordinate, supervisor or
team;
o ensure quality of that performance;
o engage in actions that demonstrate the importance of
safety.

Page 84
• Ask for and obtain hourly involvement in meaningful

daily activities.
2. Rewards, Recognition And Motivation
Rewards and Incentives are defined as advantage,

privilege or rights to support and reinforce desirable action or
behavior. It is assumed that intangible rewards, like positive
feedback and withholding penalties, could enforce desired
behavior.
Employees will put enough

effort to accomplish a task when they
know the rewards related to it.
However, they will not add extra effort
“The first step
to exceed the targeted task, simply towards amendment
because the reward is accomplished by is the recognition of
the required effort, and the extra effort
will not be rewarded. Furthermore, the
error”
Seneca
same reward will not have the exact Roman dramatist,
effect for the same task. Overtime, the philosopher, &
politician
reward will be a "sure thing" and
(5 BC - 65 AD)
employees will look for better rewards
to exert the same effort for the same
tasks (Davids, 2007) .
We are attempting to manipulate the workers when we

offer reward. This manipulation may lead to negative effect
rather than positive. Reward schemes are short in time when
compared with the targeted lasting effect. Targeted behavior
will end with the scheme's ending ceremony. Sometimes
workers are self motivated to behave safely, all they need is
management support. Rewards and incentives in such situation
can be damaging. On the other hand, a positive feedback will

Page 85
support the targeted behavior, and this behavior will last

longer (Geller E. S., 1999).
It is always better to learn

from our successes. We have
positive reinforcement to drive
behavior during success. We could “A life spent
learn from mistakes, but mistakes
teach us what not to do. Mistakes making mistakes is
may discourage the learner and not only more
promote negative attitude, however, honorable, but more
successes will uplift our senses and
modes (Geller E. S., 1997). During useful than a life
Behavior-based Safety (BBS) spent doing nothing.”
observation, the observer will George Bernard
deliver positive feedback and Shaw
Irish dramatist &
recognition at the spot. The worker socialist (1856 - 1950)
will immediately know what he did
right and will get motivated to repeat
it. Some workers are embarrassed to
be recognized in front of a group. BBS process recognize the
safe behavior and appraise the workers in a "face to face"
setting in his privacy.
Many safety programs celebrate the “Zero Accident”

or “Completed … without Lost Work Case”. Instead we
should celebrate training completion, safety coaching or
number of incident investigated. It is recommended to avoid
the big boss’s speech and golden promises during the
celebration. It is always better to start the ceremony with
junior staff speaking about their experience in the process
success. Tangible gifts can be displayed or used will be the
best choice (Geller E. S., 1997).

Page 86
3. Management Involvement In Changing Behavior
Site visits and direct interactions between the observer

and the observed worker is a key factor for changing workers’
safety behavior. The interaction communicates the desired
behavior, and serves as a form of consultation. The interaction
gives overall guidance and verbal
enforcement of the desired behavior.
One of the best effective
“Management by
communicators in such interaction is
the management. Cummings (2006) objectives works if
interviewed experts and academics in you first think
this field, most of them stressed on the
through your
management direct involvement. He
stated that the site visits and face to objectives. Ninety
face interactions were more effective percent of the
than the enforced approach others use.
Generally, Cummings (2006)
time you haven't..”
Peter Drucker
concludes that site visits and direct American
interactions with workers at site management writer
(1909 - 2005)
improved cooperation and
understanding of health and safety
issues.
An independent study confirmed a strong association

between workers’ perception of organizational factors related
to occupational health, and workers’ behavior towards safety
at work (Garcia, A. M., Boix, P., Canosa, C., 2004).
Conveying safety related issues and news to the workers help
changing their behavior positively. Part of the BBS process is
a transparent communication channel to pass the BBS goals,
targets, hurdles and achievements.

Page 87
A comprehensive review of 301 studies found high

correlation between job satisfaction and job performance. The
same study also found that complex jobs have high
relationship between job satisfaction and performance (Saari,
L. M., Judge, T. A., 2004). Informing the observers about their
achievements in changing the workers’ behavior will improve
their refinery overall performance and encourage them to
increase their participation in the BBS process.
Mina Abdulla Refinery management found that

workers’ at-risk behavior was a cause for many incidents in
the past, so the management chose to select BBS process to
solve the problem. The fact that management is doing such
process, and have this dedication towards employees safety,
shows employees the commitment and support needed to help
them change their at-risk behavior. Management active
participation in safety programs includes providing resources
and overseeing recommendations implementation.
Management should evaluate and revise organizational
policies to meet safety process targets. This chapter will
discuss the effect of management feedback and commitment
on the observers and safety behavior in general.
4. Observation Data and Individual Feedback
The Behavior-based Safety (BBS) process was

implemented in January 2006 but it took off by the end of
February 2007. As explained in section 5.1 of Chapter Five:
that BBS process depends on the observations and interaction
between the observer and worker at site. The outcome of the
each observation is filled in a checklist which include 29
behavioral elements and sub-elements.

Page 88
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
The same check list details the date, timee, location,

shift, obbserver’s name
n and otther essentiial data. Thhe observer
mark only the item ms he obseerves. For example,
e th
he observer
might observe
o the worker’s ergonomics
e but ignore observing
his perssonal protecctive equipmment. He will
w end up marking 5
sub-elemments from m the check list
l only.
Mina Abduullah refineery collectss an averag ge of 1050

observaation sheetts per monnth. The lowest num mber was
collecteed in Januarry 2007 at thhe beginninng of the BB
BS process,
which wasw 484 obbservation sheets.
s Thee highest nuumber was
reachedd in April 2008 withh a total of o 1912 sh heets. Data
reliabiliity was chhecked by using thee reliability y analysis
functionn in the Statistical Package forr the Sociaal Sciences
(SPSS) software. The resullting Cronbbach's Alph ha for 29
behavioor elements (and sub-ellements) waas found to be b 0.912.
100 2000
No. of Monthly Observations
98 1800
96 1600
Safe Behavior Percentage
94 1400
92 1200
90 1000
88 800
86 600
84 400
82 200
80 0
Feb‐07
Aug‐07
Sep‐07
Oct‐07
Feb‐08
Jan‐07
Mar‐07
Apr‐07
May‐07
Jun‐07
Jul‐07
Nov‐07
Dec‐07
Jan‐08
Mar‐08
Apr‐08
p
Overrall Safety % No.Observations
Figuure 24: Perccentage of saafe behavioor verses num

mber of
observattions done per
p month.

Pagge 89
January and February of year 2007 were at the start of

the BBS process. Both months had lower number of
observations. Also July, August and September had lower
number of observations since they are the prime summer
vacation months with minimum manpower in the refinery. The
remaining observers working at site during summer time are
discouraged to do the voluntary BBS observation due to the
summer high ambient temperature. December 2007 had lower
observation count since Holy Hajj was in December of year
2007 which include 6 days Eid holiday. The refinery
experienced lower manpower in December since many
workers (and observers) took paid vacations to enjoy the
holidays or going to Hajj.
The graph in Figure 24 above shows the relation

between number of observations done during the month with
overall safe behavior percentage. The overall observable items
are:
• Body position: line of fire, eyes on path, eyes on task,

pinch points and ascending/descending.
• Body use: lifting, lowering, pulling, pushing, twisting,
overextended or cramped, response to ergo risk, body
posture and assistance.
• Tools and equipment selection: selection, condition,
use, storage of tools and vehicle select, condition and
use.
• Procedure follow up: Energy isolation, lockout-tag out,
multi-lock system, work permit and work authorization.
• Personal protective equipment use: head, eyes-face,
hearing, respiratory, hand-arm, body, fall and foot.
• Work Environment: walking surface, working surfaces,
housekeeping.

Page 90
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
• Others
O
4.1. Annalyzing thee overall obsservations
As expplained in section
s 5.1 of Chapterr Five: that
thee observer will
w mark in i the obserrvation checklist only
thee items he observe annd discuss with w the worker.
w His
nottes will statte either thee observablle behavior is Safe or
at-rrisk.
We will
w find outt in the following disscussion if
inddividual feeedback, in the
t form of interactio
on between
thee observer and workker, had a positive effect on
chaanging the worker’s
w beehavior.
Safe behavior
b reesult in Figure
F 24 above are
reppresented inn Figure 255 as a trendd line. We notice
n that
thee overall Safe behavior is increeasing throu ughout the
yeaar in relation with num
mber of obseervation.
100 2000
98 1800
96 1600
94 1400
Safe Behavior
92 1200
90 1000
88 800
86 600
84 400
82 200
80 0
Jan‐07
Feb‐07
Mar 07
Mar‐07
Apr‐07
May‐07
Jun‐07
Aug‐07
Sep‐07
Nov‐07
Dec‐07
Jan‐08
Feb‐08
Mar‐08
Apr‐08
Jul‐07
Oct‐07
Figure 25:
2 Linear Trrend lines of Safety Behaavior
and Numbber of Observvations
Safety improveement slow wed dow wn during
Noovember and a Decemmber in correlation
c with the
redduction in number
n of observation
o n in the sam
me months.

Pagge 91
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Thhe spilloveer effect of o the prrevious mo onths had

maaintained the t momentum in safety beehavior in
Noovember andd Decemberr. As the nuumber of obbservations
inccreased in Jaanuary and February, the
t behaviorr improved
agaain in the saame monthss.
4.2. Annalyzing selected obserrvations elemments

This section willw conceentrate on workers’
behhavioral eleements of thhe observations data (FFigure 26).
Thhose elemennts are “boody positioon”, “body use” and
“peersonal prottective equiipment use””. Only thosse elements
(with their suub elementss) were sellected sincee they are
related to workers’ behavvior more thhan the others.
1100% 25000
No. of behavior items Observations
Safe Behavior Observed
95% 20000
90% 15000
85% 10000
80% 5000
75% 0
Feb‐07
Apr‐07
May‐07
Jul 07
Jul‐07
Aug‐07
Sep‐07
Oct‐07
Feb‐08
Apr‐08
Jan‐07
Mar‐07
Jun‐07
Nov‐07
Dec‐07
Jan‐08
Mar‐08
Safety Percentaage T
Total observation s
Figure 26:
2 Selectedd worker's behavior
b vs.
number off observatioons
When this seleccted data was w checkeed on the
reliability analysis functioon in SPSS software, it i yielded a
Croonbach's Alpha
A of 0.879
0 whicch indicatee that the
sellected data is measurinng the samee behaviorall elements.
Thhe selected behaviors as indicatted in the graph are
corrrespondingg to the number of obbservation made. m The
reaason for thiss segregatioon of data iss to make su
ure that the

Pagge 92
important behaviors are the one related, no other (less

important) behaviors are causing the change.
5. Communication And Group Feedback
Observers feedback to workers is important element to

achieve the change in workers’ behavior. The importance of
group and individual feedback was discussed expensively
throughout the book, we will see in this section the real live
results.
Observers receive summary of BBS process directly to

their email account every month. The email is sent from the
refinery BBS Management representative. Also, a
comprehensive BBS report is released quarterly. Number of
monthly observations spikes immediately after releasing each
report. The observers noticed the good results achieved during
the last quarter, so they get motivated and carry more
observation. Workers in general, start to see the good results
and believe in the BBS process which in the end change their
behavior.
In addition to the quarterly report, a memorandum

signed by the management representative was sent to each
observer detailing his observation performance. The same
memorandum is sent to the observers who did not perform
their monthly observations during the quarter. The
memorandum was a reminder for the underperforming
observers that they missed their chance to participate in the
BBS overall success.
The first Behavior-based Safety quarterly report was

issued in April 2007. At the same month, Polo shirts (with
modest quality and cost of 2.5 KD or $10) were distributed to

Page 93
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
100 2000
98 1800
96 1600
Safe Behavior Percentage
94 1400
report released
report released
report released
92 1200
report not released
report released
90 1000
report released
88 800
86 600
84 400
82 200
80 0
Jan‐07
Feb‐07
Mar‐07
Apr‐07
May‐07
Jun‐07
Jul‐07
Aug‐07
Sep‐07
Oct‐07
Nov‐07
Dec‐07
Jan‐08
Feb‐08
Mar‐08
Apr‐08
Ove
erall Safety % No.Ob
bservations
Figure 27: Group feedback efffect on num

mber of observations
andd workers’ overall
o behaavior.
the observers onlyy to publicizze the Sammple statistical details of
BBS prrocess. Obsservers recceived one
e behavioral element of
the above figure
the shirrt without requiremennts or EYES / FA
ACE
conditioons. From Figure 277, we Not Safe At-Risk
observed
noticed the jump in
i the numbber of JANN 65 151 270
FEB
B 104 183 335
observaation made in
i April 20007. MAR
R 213 454 368
APR
RIL 486 602 557
MAY
Y 157 409 376
Due to diifferent reaasons, JUN
N 106 801 515
JUL
L 47 464 282
the secoond quarterlly report waas not AUG
G 57 534 349
issued (due in Auugust 2007)). So, SEP
P
OCT
T
129
180
431
1006
423
574
the observations
o s in AugustA NOV
V 220 758 386
DEC
C 91 439 197
remaineed on the average
a nummber.
Safety behavior was
w higher than P
Pearson Chi-Sq
quare Tests
the prrevious moonth, but this EYES / FACE

F
Chi-square 863.472
improveement is a spillover from
df 22
the ovverall factoors. Notice that
Significance .000(*)
safety behavior had h a droop in Results are based
b on
Septemmber correspponding too the n
nonempty rows and
a columns
in each innermo ost suitable.
averagee number off observatioons in * The Chi-squarre statistic is
August and September. The third s
significant at the
e 0.05 level.

Pagge 94
quarterly report was issued in October 2007. October had the

highest number of observations during the full year as a result
of the detailed communication and management commitment.
By studying Figure 27 we notice the same spikes are
reoccurring in January 2008 and April 2008.
Figure 27 is live evidence on the relation between

workers behavior management feedback. Some time it looks
“too good to be true!”, but luckily, it is true. A survey was
conducted in the Mina Abdulla refinery to check if the
observers believe that this kind of improvement and
achievement is true. The results were very interesting.

Page 95

Page 96
Chapter Seven: Observers Participation Survey
“I have never met a man so ignorant that I couldn't

learn something from him.”
Galileo Galilei
Italian astronomer &
physicist (1564 - 1642)
1. Introduction 96
2. The Survey 97
3. Survey’s Overall Findings 98
4. Observers busyness 99
5. Observer’s sluggishness 100
6. Other points 102
7. Survey’s results and Recommendations 102
The previous chapters established the link between

Behavior-based Safety process and number of observations
conducted. Although number of observation is increasing
every month, but about 40% of the certified observers do not
participate in the process. Exclusive survey was conducted in
the refinery to find out the reasons behind observers
disengagement.

Page 97
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
1. Intrroduction
The previoous chapters and secctions apprroved that

Behavioor-based Safety
S proccess is stroongly linked to the
numberr of observations madde by the trrained obseervers. The
more observations
o s are made the better the overalll behavior
gets. Thhe number of observaations is inccreasing eveery month,
movingg from abouut 500 obseervation in the
t beginniing of year
2007 too more thann 1,500 obsservation inn the end of
o the year
2007.
The refinerry’s BBS steering

s coommittee no oticed that
40% off the observvers did nott participatee in year 20
007. Initial
investiggation wass done to find the reason beehind this
inactiviity. Differennt reasons were
w given to t the comm mittee from
differennt observerrs at each departmennt and possition. The
committtee finally decided too find out thet reason by a large
scale a survey.
Exactly, 5223 survey questionnaiires were sent

s to the
certifiedd observerss. Feedbackk received from 223 observers
which represent
r 422% of the taargeted popuulation.
More
than 12
observations Did not
per year observe
31% 40%
1 to 12
observaations
per yyear
32% %
Figure 28: Observer's

O paarticipation during
d year 2007
(T
Total number of
o observers by
b the end of year
y 2007 wass 460)

Pagge 98
2. The Survey
The survey was distributed to 523 observers in two

ways. Personalized envelope that holds the observer’s name
and address containing the following:
• A personalized memorandum explaining the survey

and its objectives. Each memorandum was personally
signed by the BBS Refinery Management
Representative (operations manager).
• Arabic and English survey format (Appendix 6 and
Appendix 7). Both languages were used to ensure good
understanding of the survey questionnaires.
• Self addressed return envelope to insert the filled
format and mail it directly to operations manager’s
office. This envelope was important to help the
observer express his honest views without external
influences.
An electronic survey format was also sent by e-mail

directly from the BBS Refinery Management representative E-
mail account to each observer (no “cc” were used). The E-mail
had brief description of the survey’s objectives and an
attached Arabic and English electronic survey forms. Each
electronic form has two buttons. One to directly send the filled
form to a dedicated clerk. The other button to print the form.
The survey was made of 14 questions distributed

between 7 categories:
• BBS training adequacy.

a. I was trained on SOLAR and I know how to do the
Observations
b. The training I had for SOLAR was enough for me
to do the observation
• Observation format availability for the observers.

Page 99
a. I have enough copies of the SOLAR forms to do the

observation
b. I can't do the SOLAR observation since the forms
are not available
• Observers busyness to the point where they could not
perform the monthly observations.
a. I do not have time to do the SOLAR observation
b. I am always busy that's why I can't do the SOLAR
observation
• Observer’s sluggishness
a. I am far from the working area, I do not see
workers near me to do the observation
b. If the workers are close by me, I will definitely do
the observation
• BBS process’s results and progress.
a. I can't see SOLAR process' effect on worker's
behavior immediately
b. SOLAR process is very slow in changing behavior
• Difficulty to find workers performing at-risk behavior.
a. When I do the SOLAR observation I could not find
workers doing at-risk behavior
b. Most of the workers are behaving safely, so there is
nothing to observe
• BBS results’ credibility.
a. I feel that SOLAR achievements are not real
b. The published SOLAR results and finding are not
A period of 4 weeks was consumed to collect 223

replies out of which 74 were electronic replays.
3. Survey’s Overall Findings
Survey feedback rate was 40% (223 out of 523) which

is more than the required amount to have accurate statistical
results. The feedback is fully analyzed in details in Appendix
8 on page 145. In this section we will discuss the major
findings and suggest valuable recommendations.

Page 100
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Implem
menting the recommenndations wiill hopefullly enhance
observeers’ particippation.
Most of thet observvers stated that they y received

adequatte training to performm quality obbservation. Also they
have ennough copiees of the reqquired formaat available with them
when thhey need to do the obseervation.
4. Obsservers bussyness
Everybody’s busy these days to thet point where

w some
observeers use it as an excuse for missingg their “4 obbservations
per moonth” quotaa. The survvey’s overaall results hadh agreed
with thhis statemennt (green baars in Figuure 29), butt when we
split thee results beetween the Poor-obserrvers” (bluee bars) and
“Best observers” (rred bars) wee were ablee to identify why some
observeers neglect their
t monthlly quota.
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral D
Disagree Strrongly
Dissagree
Poor Ob
bservers Best Observers overall
Fiigure 29: Deetailed analyysis for obsservers busy

yness.
The answer to “I“ am alwayys busy duriing working g hours,
I can't do
d the SOLA AR (BBS) obbservation” ”
The best observers
o whho do moree than 10 ob bservations
per moonth disagreeed with thhe statemennt “I’m alw ways busy
during working hoours . . .”. The
T poor obbservers who o does less
than 4 observation
o per month agree with the statemeent.

Pagge 101
The reason for such difference can be found between

time-management and pro-activeness. Best observers plan
their daily work and imbed the BBS observation in it. They
plan their important work before it becomes urgent. The poor
observers deal with urgent work and postponed the important
work until it turns to “urgent & important”. Simple time-
management and task-prioritization tools can solve this
problem.
5. Observer’s sluggishness
Most of the observers are

required to visit the field or workshop
at least once every day. These site
visits are required as part of their daily
“I'm lazy. But it's
routine work. An organized observer the lazy people
will plan his BBS observation ahead of who invented the
time and perform it during his regular
site visits. Also, BBS observation can
wheel and the
be performed on any worker at any bicycle because
site. This includes the office workers, they didn't like
the cleaning and pantry staff as well as
pipe-fetters and fabricators.
walking or
carrying things.”
All the previously mentioned Lech Walesa
employees are “workers” and behave Polish labor leader,
safely or at risk during their daily politician, &
reformer
routines. So observing them will help
in changing their at-risk behavior and
improve their refinery overall safety
behavior.
When the statement “If the workers are close by me I

will definitely do the observation” was asked in the survey,

Page 102
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
most off the observvers did not fully agreee with it (greeen bars in
Figure 30). Examiining the pooor observeers’ results (blue
( bars)
shows that
t they woould like too have the workers
w closse by them
to be abble to observe them. As A explaineed above, workers
w are
all arouund us andd we may perform the t BBS observation
o
whenevver and wheerever we caan. That’s whyw the bestt observers
(red barrs) did not agree
a with thhe survey’ss statement.
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly Agree Neutral D
Disagree Strrongly
Agree Dissagree
Poor Observers Best Observerrs Overall
Figuure 30: Detaailed analyssis for obserrvers sluggishness.

Thhe answer too “If the woorkers are close
c by me I will
def
efinitely do the
t observaation”
To overcom me the obseervers’ slugggishness, an

nd help the
observeers do maxximum num mber of obbservations,, the BBS
committtee will edducate the observers abouta the above
a fact.
They will
w be able to t observe their
t co-worrkers, friend
ds, sanitary
staff, ettc. office errgonomics is as imporrtant as laboor workers
ergonom mics. Both canc lead to at-risk situaations. The observer’s
role is to
t identify such
s behavioors and elim
minate themm.

Pagge 103
6. Other points
Most of the observers realize that changing workers’

behavior can take long time and its positive results will be
incremental. Also, the observers are trusting the BBS
committee and its work. They trust the published results
without any doubt. More on the survey’s questions and
analysis can be found in Appendix 8 on page 145.
7. Survey’s results and Recommendations
Feedback analyzing led to the conclusion that

observers’ time management and sluggishness are the main
reasons for missing their monthly observation quota. The
refinery BBS steering committee will remind the observers on
how to use time-management tools similar to Figure 32. The
committee will give task
prioritization guideline Urgent
Urgent &
similar to Figure 31 with Not
Important
Important
simple clarifications and
guidelines. The observers
Not
will also receive tips to Important
Important or
overcome their not Urgent
Urgent
sluggishness. E-mails, flyers
and booklets will be used to Important
refresh the observers
information and encourage Figure 31: Task priority matrix
them to participate in BBS
process success.

Page 104
Figure 32: daily time and priority checklist

(See Appendix 9 on page 157 for the full checklist)

Page 105

Page 106
Chapter Eight: BBS Process Final Outcome
“An idealist is a person who helps other people to be

prosperous.”
Henry Ford
US automobile industrialist
(1863 - 1947)
1. Lost Workday Cases Record 106

2. Worker’s behavior during Weekends 107
3. Treatment on Operations staff behavior 109
4. Training Effect On Employees Behavior 113
5. Safety Training Effect On Safety Behavior 113
This is the most interesting chapter in the book. In this

chapter we will find the answer to the following questions:
• Does Behavior-based Safety process really works?

• What is the usefulness of supplying employees with
different types of personal protective equipment?
• Is safety training alone enough to have significant
consequence on workers’ behavior?

Page 107
1. Lost Workday Cases Record
Lost Workday Case (LWC) is defined as any work-

related injury or occupational illness, which renders a person
temporarily unable to perform any regular job for one or more
days after the incident (KNPC Element 12 Team, 2004). Lost
Workday Cases are the most serious incident cases since they
involve personal injuries. Figure 33 display the incidents
distribution starting from January 2007 up to May 2008. The
last Lost Workday case took place in March 8, 2008, where
the previous LWC was in August 21, 2007.
Figure 33: Mina Abdullah Refinery Lost Work Cases timeline
We notice that two areas are congested with LWC’s on

the time line in Figure 33. The first area is between May-June
2007. During this period the refinery shutdown few operating
units for routine and planned equipment inspections and
maintenance work. The second area is in August 2007 which
had similar planned inspection and maintenance work. There
were also similar planned activities after August 2007 but no
Lost Workday Case was recorded until March 2008.
For the first time in five years, Mina Abdulla refinery

was able to pass the one million man-hour land mark without
LWC. It would be fair to mention here that last LWC (in
March 2008) was investigated and found to fall in the
“Training & Competency” category. It was not related to the
worker’s behavior.

Page 108
We could not see a clear evidence of BBS process

success before one year of implementation. This is what it
takes to change workers behavior in a large and complex
refinery. The timeline in Figure 33 stops at May 1st, 2008. No
LWC’s reported after March 2008 case to the time of writing
this paragraph (July, 2008).
2. Worker’s behavior during Weekends
Workers behavior during weekdays is different than

their behavior during weekend and holidays. Also their
behavior during daytime working hours is different than their
behavior in the afternoon and night. During weekends,
workers lower their psychological safety shields for two
reasons. First, amount of work done during weekends is less
than 15% of the workdays. Second, management supervision
is at the lowest since it is a weekend. The behavior even
worsen during afternoons and night working hours, when the
workers are tired or sleepy.
In this section we will use the same BBS data collected

from MAB refinery, but it will be dissected in a different way.
We will compare workers’ safety behavior during weekdays
and weekends throughout year 2007. The year is split into two
sections according to weekend days change. In year 2007,
State of Kuwait changed the weekend days from Thursday-
Friday to Friday-Saturday. This weekend change took effect
in September 2007.
Number of observations done each weekday is about

18% of the total observations. However, we see from Figure
34, that both weekend days’ (Thu-Fir or Fri-Sat) total
observations is only 14%. We would assume that safe

Page 109
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
behavioor will decliine since nuumber of obbservations during the

weekennd is less.
MON
N TUE
E
18%
% 19%
%
SUN
N
17% WE
ED
19%
%
SAT TH
HU
12% FRI 12
2%
3%
Figure 34: Observationns distributiion over weeek days

This assummption woould be truue if the behavioral
change is momenttary. As if the workerr might beh have safely
while thhe observerr is watchinng him, but he will co
ontinue the
at-risk behavior afterwards
a or during the week kends. The
followinng figure disagree
d withh the assum
mption. BBSS had long
lasting change thaat will be effective during
d weekends and
holidayys.
In Figure 35 we nootice that safe s behavior during

weekennd, especiallly Friday, is below average
a in the earlier
months of BBS (Jaanuary to Auugust). How wever, durinng the later
months of the impplementationns, (Septem mber to Deceember) the
weekennd safe behaavior is aboove the aveerage. One reason for
the enhhancement in safe behhavior, durring weeken nds in the
later moonths, is thhat behaviorr change haas taken plaace and the
weekennd has less activities.
a W lower rate of worrk, workers
With
tend to stop cuttingg corners orr lower theirr psycholog
gical safety
shields.. During thee weekend they are noow having better safe
behavioor and lowerr amount off work.

Pagge 110
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Jaan to Augusst 100%
%
Sep to Dec
100%
90% 90%
%
80% 80%
%
70% 70%
%
60% 60%
%
50% 50%
%
40% 40%
%
30% 30%
%
20% 20%
%
10% 10%
%
0% 0%
%
WeekdaayThursday Frid
day Weekday Frriday Saturday
Saafe At‐Riskk Safe At‐Risk
Figure 35: Safe Behavior during Weeekdays and Weekends

W
Improvemeent in thee overall safety beehavior is

displayeed in Figuure 24 andd Figure 26 2 of Chap pter Five:,
howeveer, Figure 35 is an eviddence that the
t change took place
even duuring the weekends.
w For daily obbservations percentage
p
during the
t year, pleease refer too Appendix 3 on page 136.
3. Treeatment on Operation
ns staff behavior
Behavior-bbased Safeety (BBS))

processs has 6 majjor target areas
a whichh
are boddy position, body use, tools andd
In Minaa Abdulla
equipm
ments, p
procedures,
, workk Reffinery
environnments annd finally personall
protectiive equipm ment (PP PE). Minaa
39% off operations
Abdullaa refinery (MMAB) has a history off
staff forrget to use
workerss neglectinng the usee of theirr
their eyee protection
personaal eye prottection equuipment. Inn equipment!! And 9%
this seection wee will diiscuss eyee neglect ussing them?”
protectiion behavvior in Operationss
ment which consist off more thann
departm

Pagge 111
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
650 em
mployees woorking in shiifts.
The lowestt safe behavvior score inn MAB refinnery safety

record is eye prootection. Thhe averagedd safe scorre for eye
protectiion was 40% % safe durinng Jan to April
A 2007. Operations
O
departmment staff hadh lower score (averrage of 33% %) for the
same peeriod. Workkers give diifferent reassons for not using the
safety spectacles.
s T reasonss range from
The m “I do not have
h one!”
to “I caan’t see cleaarly while I am using thhem!”. These answers
are reccorded in the observation sheeet during the BBS
observaation processs.
The answ wers from operationns employ yees were

collecteed for the period
p ween Januaary to May and were
betw
w in Figure 36.
analyzeed. The resuults are illustrated below
Caan not see

Broken
p
properly
3%
3%
Not comffortable
3%
% Other
7% Not available /
Lost it provided
6% 19%
Not aware of the

risk
11%
No Answerr
/Neglegance
Forggot to
9% weear
399%
Figuure 36: Reasons for nott using perssonal eye prrotection

(Before supplying new glaasses)

Pagge 112
Notice that 27% did not

wear their eye protection because
they claim that they don’t have
one (“lost it”, “broken” or “not
available”). Convenience
represent 6% (“cannot see
properly”, “not comfortable”).
Refinery management thought of
providing new personal eye
protection to the employees since
convenience and none Figure 37: Eye Protection
availability of the spectacles is a (Safety spectacles).
Top two are the new set. Bottom
major issue as indicated in the spectacle is old.
Figure 36.
A new and fashionable eye protection spectacles were

distributed to operations staff on June 2007 (Figure 37). The
new spectacles were attached with lace to hold each one
around the employee’s neck. The lace is distributed so as the
employee keeps the spectacles with him all the time. Also, the
refinery management chose to supply two new spectacles
instead of one. One can be used all day, the other one is tinted
to be used during the sunny days.
From the pie chart in Figure 38, please note that the
reason for none availability (broken, lost and not available)
declined to only 6%. Convenience remained almost the same
at 5%. However, behavior issues like, “forgot”, “not aware”
and “negligence” had increased to 83%.
Providing new personal protective equipment eliminate

one of the immediate causes of incidents which is substandard
condition (loss causation modelChapter Four:). However, the
cause of incidents shift to the substandard act of “failure to use

Page 113
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
PPE”. For
F more on o the loss causation model
m please refer to
Chapterr Four: on page
p 48.
Can nott see Broken Not available /

Not comffortable properrly 2% provided
2%
% 3% 2%
Other
O
Lost it 6%
2% Not aware of the
risk
12%
No Answer
/Neglegance Forgot to wear
11% 60%%
Figure 38: Reasonns for not ussing personaal eye protection (After
supplyingg new glasses))
Operationss staff immproved theeir overalll behavior
includinng eye proteection after supplying them
t with the
t new set
of specctacles. But the BBS observers
o nooticed that operations
staff chhanged theirr reasons froom non avaailability to behavioral
issues.
100%
80%
Percentage
Before
60%
After
40%
20%
0%
Availability Convenience Behavioraal Other
Fiigure 39: Beefore and affter supplyinng new specctacles

Pagge 114
We can conclude that if the existing personal

protective equipment (PPE) is good enough then changing it
with better or fashionable equipment will not change
employees’ behavior. During my regular field visits and
discussions with operations staff I learned a good use for the
tinted spectacles. The workers used them during their fishing
trips at their leisure time. They said it shielded their eyes from
the blowing air during sailing and blocked the sun light while
fishing!
4. Training Effect On Employees Behavior
A research was commissioned by Kuwait Foundation

for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS) to find the effect of
training on employees’ behavior. The research surveyed
employees’ superiors to find out training effect on
occupational knowledge, occupational skills and, occupational
attitude. The change in knowledge, skill and attitude was
related to employees behavior. The research survey covered
397 governmental and non-governmental employees
distributed over 20 locations in Kuwait (Al-Fadalah, 2002).
The research found that employees’ occupational

knowledge improved by 50% and their occupational skills
improved by 42.7%. Employees’ attitude changed positively
by 58.7%. Employees’ behavior, as measured by the these
three factors, received medium positive effect from training.
The highest effect, as reported by the researcher, was seen on
employees in the age group between 30-40 years old (Al-
Fadalah, 2002).
5. Safety Training Effect On Safety Behavior
Safety training is a prearranged activity aimed at

conveying safety information and instructions to improve the

Page 115
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
worker’’s safety performanc

p e to the required
r leevel. It is
hypotheesized thatt training can channge workeers at-risk
behavioor.
The importtance of traaining and its effectiveness with

or without feedbacck was detaailed in secttion 7 of th
his chapter.
Also thhe five yearr incident data
d was discussed in n details in
Chapterr Four:. In this
t sectionn, safety traiining effecttiveness on
changinng workers’ behavior will
w be discuussed.
I presentedd the folloowing graphh and its finding in

several occasions, and at eacch occasionn I would receive
r the
same reeaction. Thhe four emootional stages are whaat I receive
usually. Start witth shock, denial,
d mild anger th
hen comes
acceptaance after some moree technicall questions. I would
assume you will feelf the sam
me and I will
w try to explain
e the
analysiss and results as simple as I can.
50% 15000
45%
Percent of the incidents and Near Miss
40% 12000
caused by Behavioral Items
Training Man Hours
35%
30% 9000
25%
20% 6000
15%
10% 3000
5%
0% 0
Year 03 Year 04 Y
Year 05 Year 06 Year 07
Training Behaavior Training Man Ho
ours
Fiigure 40: Saafety Traininng vs. behaavior as a caause of

inccidents

Pagge 116
Selected root causes of the incidents discussed in

Chapter Four section 5 on page 58 were isolated and
represented in Figure 40 below. In the same figure, the safety
training man hours done every year were also added to the
graph. We will follow yearly causes of the incidents and near
misses took place and recorded. We will then compare them to
the number safety training man-hours executed. Naturally, we
would expect that as the safety training man-hours increase we
would notice the decrease in the number of incidents caused
by lack of safety training. In other words, Training as a cause
will decrease. You find this true if you follow the blue bars in
Figure 40.
Behavior as a cause of incidents has no relation (or

correlation) with safety training man-hours. Another look at
the same figure to compare the relationship between behavior
as a cause (green bars) with safety training man-hours would
reveal the shock mentioned above. A step by step discussion is
explained below for the reader’s benefits.
The graph help comparing safety training man hours

with the number of incidents or near misses caused by
workers’ at-risk behavior. We see that the highest training
man hours (red trend line) were achieved on year 2005.
Sharp decline in the safety training took place in year

2006. However the number of incidents and near misses did
not increase in the same year. In year 2007, almost the same
training man hours were executed, however incidents caused
by workers’ behavior had decreased.
From above, we find that safety training man hours did

not correlate with the number of incidents and near misses
caused by workers’ behavior. The only logical reduction was

Page 117
seen in year 2007 when the Behavior-based Safety process

was implemented in the refinery.

Page 118

Page 119
Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations
“Success is a journey, not a destination. The doing is

often more important than the outcome”.
Arthur Ashe
African American tennis
player (1943-1993)
I hope the reader had read the previous chapters before

directly flipping the pages to reach here. It is like knowing the
score of your favorite sport team without watching and
enjoying the game. Those who read the book and reached here
knows what I am talking about!

Page 120
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) had two

fatal incident in year 2000. In year 2003, KNPC had 34
incidents that resulted in lost workdays (employee injured and
could not report to work next day). In year 2007 the lost
workday came down to 22. Mina Abdullah Refinery had 10
lost workdays accidents in the same year. Six of these
accidents were related to workers’ behavior.
One of the objectives of this book is to demonstrate

how individual feedback coming from the observer at worksite
to the worker could make the worker change his at-risk
behavior to safe behavior. We also set out to investigate to
what extent management communications and group feedback
encourage observers to increase their contribution to the
behavior-based safety process. Moreover, the research was set
to find out if supplying better quality of personal protective
equipment would encourage the worker to put them on. The
final objective was to gauge safety training effect on changing
workers’ behavior.
The most effective factor of the Behavior-based safety

(BBS) process is site interactions and individual feedback. The
effectiveness of BBS process was demonstrated in the results
of this book’s research. Mina Abdulla refinery could improve
its 1500 workers overall safe behaviors from 82% safe to 95%
within one year of BBS process implementations.
Observers willingly participate in the behavior-based

safety process. They perform site observations to improve
workplace safety. Feedback on their individual performance
and the progress of the behavior-based safety process helped
them believing in the process. The feedback increased the
number of observations, and consequently the safe behavior
record improved.

Page 121
Workers complain from the quality of their personal

protective equipment. They use the quality as an excuse for
not using them. No change in the at-risk behavior was noticed
after supplying the workers with new and better quality
personal protective equipment. The research could not identify
any correlations or relation between the workers’ behavior and
enhancement of the personal protective equipment.
Safety training, whether in the class room or on-job, is

useful, if not a must. However the research could not link
safety training to workers’ behavior. Safety training can
eliminate training as a cause of the incident, but has no
influence on changing the at-risk behavior to safe behavior.
Behavior-based Safety is effective in changing the behavior
but goes hand in hand with safety training. Safety training will
give the knowhow, BBS will insure the use of that knowhow
at site.
Observations should be done according to BBS model.

Quality observation should include interaction between the
observer and worker, acknowledgement of safe behavior and
suggestion of safe behavior to replace at-risk ones.
Agreement on using the new safe behavior should be reached
at site, before filling the observation checklist and concluding
the observation. Doing the observation for the sake of
achieving a preset number of observation will discredit the
BBS process. However, the more observations they do the
better the safety results will become. Quality observation is a
key factor in the process and should be executed as such.
It is recommended to present good safety equipment to

eliminate big part of the immediate and underlying causes of
the incident. We can complement the personal protective

Page 122
equipment with BBS process to encourage the workers to

change their at-risk behavior and use these equipment.
Since Behavior-based Safety was effective in changing

workers’ behavior at site, then it is recommended to
implement the same process in the offices. Office ergonomics
behaviors are as hazardous as worksite behaviors. Both at-risk
behaviors can lead to serious consequences. It is suggested to
implement BBS process in office site to maximize office
safety.
Progress in behavior-based safety process is relatively

slow. It is suggested to monitor BBS results for long periods
to focus on certain problematic locations as they start to
appear after the monthly analysis.
Most of the major accidents in the petroleum industry

take place during plant startups or shutdowns. During these
activities the workers are alerted and responsive. They may be
willing to compromise safety rules and regulations due to the
criticality of work and the importance of executing it on time.
It will be useful to study workers’ behaviors at those timing to
identify and change at-risk behaviors.

Page 123
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Page 129
Appendixes
Appendix 1 Incident Data Analysis By Answertree 3.0 128
Appendix 2 Cross Tabulation Of Underlying Causes 131
Appendix 3 Number Of Observations During Weekends 133
Appendix 4 Number Of Observations Each Month 134
Appendix 5 Incident, Accidents And Near Miss Data 139
Appendix 6 Survey’s English Format (Electronic Copy) 140
Appendix 7 Survey Arabic Format (Hard Copy) 141
Appendix 8 Observers Participation Survey Analysis 142
1) Training to conduct quality observation: 143
2) Observation format availability 144
3) Time availability to execute quality observation 145
4) Effort required to do the observation 146
5) BBS (SOLAR) process progress 149
6) Observation’s difficulty 151
7) Results credibility 152
Appendix 9 Daily Time and Priority Check list 154
Appendix 10 Behavior-Based Safety Strategy Template 155
• I. The objective 155
• Ii. Implementation steps and kpi's 155
• Iii. Influences, objections and constraints: 157
• Iv. Path forward 158
Appendix 11 : ASSE - Kuwait Chapter 160
Appendix 12 DEFINITIONS 164
Appendix 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 166
Appendix 14 LIST OF FIGURES 167
Appendix 15 LIST OF TABLES 169
Appendix 16 INDEX 170

Page 130
Appendix 1 Incident Data Analysis By Answertree 3.0
10 9
11 12

Page 131
13 14
16 15
18 17

Page 132
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor

Pagge 133
Appendix 2 Cross Tabulation Of Underlying Causes
Cross tabulation of the Underlying Causes

Human Factors
Improper motivation
Lack of Knowledge
Excessive stress
Human Factors
Lack of skill
Inadequate
capability
Total
Inadequate
Situational / Task Factors
Leadership / 12 85 111 7 3 215 433

supervision
Inadequate
1 16 9 2 1 29 58
Engineering
Inadequate
0 2 5 2 0 7 16
purchasing
Inadequate
1 23 16 2 0 41 83
Maintenance
Inadequate
Tool / 2 7 13 1 0 23 46
Equipment
Inadequate
5 45 44 1 2 95 192
work standards
Wear & Tear 0 10 9 1 0 20 40
Abuse or
3 3 3 0 1 9 19
misuse
Total 24 191 210 16 7 439 887

Page 134
Underlying causes are difficult to distinguish and segregate

since they are invisible. However, most of the incidents in real
life are multi-factorial. During the data analysis by
AnswerTree Software, I found 25% of the data were not
clearly cut between “Situational / Task Factors” and “Human
Factors” . the reason was that many of them are inter-related
as shown in the above table.

Page 135
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
Append
dix 3 Num
mber Of Observation
ns During Weekends
W
Jan to A
August 2
2007
TUE
MON 14525
13498 19% WED
18% 14531
SUN 19%
13010
%
17% S
SAT
11
1244
1
15%
HU
TH
69
913
FRI
9%
2256
3%
Sep to Dec 200
07
TUEE WED
9071
1 8466
19%
% 18%
MON THU
8323 7451
17% 16%
SUN
1
8151 SAT
17% 4151
9%
FRI
2105
4%

Pagge 136
Appendix 4 Number Of Observations Each Month
SPSS results for the monthly observations
APRIL
MAR
MAY
AUG
NOV
OCT
DEC
FEB
JAN
JUN
JUL
SEP
Behavior Condition
Not observed 65 104 213 486 157 106 47 57 129 180 220 91
EYES / FACE Safe 151 183 454 602 409 801 464 534 431 1006 758 439
At-Risk 270 335 368 557 376 515 282 349 423 574 386 197
Not observed 331 441 698 1327 779 972 706 722 762 1230 750 469
HEARING Safe 128 146 272 280 147 422 77 206 199 511 589 252
At-Risk 27 35 65 38 16 28 10 12 22 19 25 6
Not observed 367 471 721 1241 790 975 710 787 895 1509 1002 518
RESPIRATORY Safe 93 116 288 335 131 422 72 142 70 213 336 199
At-Risk 26 35 26 69 21 25 11 11 18 38 26 10
Not observed 149 206 226 444 176 182 91 112 153 249 257 173
HAND / ARM Safe 233 273 563 822 580 990 601 749 710 1315 896 417
At-Risk 104 143 246 379 186 250 101 79 120 196 211 137
Not observed 175 271 327 679 239 291 275 158 134 264 220 157
BODY Safe 286 325 669 938 686 1105 508 754 834 1481 1105 562
At-Risk 25 26 39 28 17 26 10 28 15 15 39 8
Not observed 336 431 694 1196 721 745 555 407 672 1162 697 466
FALL Safe 128 160 304 412 206 644 221 515 281 558 625 246
At-Risk 22 31 37 37 15 33 17 18 30 40 42 15
Not observed 142 185 273 650 214 236 237 217 174 278 222 148
FOOT Safe 321 421 734 974 722 1162 550 711 796 1473 1114 572
At-Risk 23 16 28 21 6 24 6 12 13 9 28 7

Page 137
APRIL
MAR
MAY
AUG
NOV
OCT
DEC
JAN
FEB
JUN
JUL
SEP
Behavior Condition
Not observed 308 425 745 1336 681 691 377 414 702 1106 830 496
LINE OF FIRE Safe 173 175 278 298 259 720 405 512 272 646 507 226
At-Risk 5 22 12 11 2 11 11 14 9 8 27 5
Not observed 213 327 600 1106 614 572 349 351 463 901 708 419
EYES ON PATH Safe 263 266 420 510 323 847 438 579 516 853 639 304
At-Risk 10 29 15 29 5 3 6 10 4 6 17 4
Not observed 168 255 499 1038 570 521 328 329 479 827 619 288
EYES ON TASK Safe 305 341 523 560 364 898 455 607 500 925 726 433
At-Risk 13 26 13 47 8 3 10 4 4 8 19 6
Not observed 351 489 771 1398 800 991 685 838 861 1452 1068 515
PINCH POINTS Safe 131 127 261 245 140 429 106 102 121 308 293 211
At-Risk 4 6 3 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 3 1
Not observed 359 508 781 1387 816 941 495 529 823 1275 1000 526
ASCENDING/
DESCENDING Safe 118 102 245 241 121 471 295 404 151 476 359 200
At-Risk 9 12 9 17 5 10 3 7 9 9 5 1
LIFTING/ Not observed 313 472 734 1304 667 723 488 510 698 1101 891 445
LOWERING
PULLING/ Safe 158 131 287 300 266 688 296 418 275 633 457 276
PUSHING At-Risk 15 19 14 41 9 11 9 12 10 26 16 6
Not observed 346 495 767 1358 720 822 460 518 780 1309 1079 567
TWISTING Safe 134 116 259 279 217 593 329 416 196 440 278 153
At-Risk 6 11 9 8 5 7 4 6 7 11 7 7
Not observed 360 517 821 1403 805 1018 686 833 838 1469 1157 575
OVEREXTEND
ED/CRAMPED Safe 115 98 206 232 131 403 103 105 138 279 191 145
At-Risk 11 7 8 10 6 1 4 2 7 12 16 7
Not observed 339 511 829 1407 806 911 578 634 852 1357 1146 550
RESPONSE TO
ERGO RISK Safe 141 107 204 234 134 507 211 300 128 395 218 175
At-Risk 6 4 2 4 2 4 4 6 3 8 0 2
Not observed 203 341 601 997 526 503 202 333 645 820 646 330
BODY
POSTURE Safe 278 268 422 631 411 906 586 592 319 909 701 394
At-Risk 5 13 12 17 5 13 5 15 19 31 17 3
HEAD Not observed 109 154 209 496 153 136 73 80 127 195 166 87

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APRIL
MAR
MAY
NOV
AUG
OCT
DEC
JAN
FEB
JUN
JUL
SEP
Behavior Condition
Not observed 65 104 213 486 157 106 47 57 129 180 220 91
EYES / FACE Safe 151 183 454 602 409 801 464 534 431 1006 758 439
At-Risk 270 335 368 557 376 515 282 349 423 574 386 197
Not observed 331 441 698 1327 779 972 706 722 762 1230 750 469
HEARING Safe 128 146 272 280 147 422 77 206 199 511 589 252
At-Risk 27 35 65 38 16 28 10 12 22 19 25 6
Not observed 367 471 721 1241 790 975 710 787 895 1509 1002 518
RESPIRATORY Safe 93 116 288 335 131 422 72 142 70 213 336 199
At-Risk 26 35 26 69 21 25 11 11 18 38 26 10
Not observed 149 206 226 444 176 182 91 112 153 249 257 173
HAND / ARM Safe 233 273 563 822 580 990 601 749 710 1315 896 417
At-Risk 104 143 246 379 186 250 101 79 120 196 211 137
Not observed 175 271 327 679 239 291 275 158 134 264 220 157
BODY Safe 286 325 669 938 686 1105 508 754 834 1481 1105 562
At-Risk 25 26 39 28 17 26 10 28 15 15 39 8
Not observed 336 431 694 1196 721 745 555 407 672 1162 697 466
FALL Safe 128 160 304 412 206 644 221 515 281 558 625 246
At-Risk 22 31 37 37 15 33 17 18 30 40 42 15
Not observed 142 185 273 650 214 236 237 217 174 278 222 148
FOOT Safe 321 421 734 974 722 1162 550 711 796 1473 1114 572
At-Risk 23 16 28 21 6 24 6 12 13 9 28 7

Page 139
Pearson Chi-Square Tests

Chi-square 778.7
LINE OF FIRE df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 580.8
EYES ON PATH df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 565.3
EYES ON TASK df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 359.8
PINCH POINTS df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 553
ASCENDING/
df 22
DESCENDING
Sig. 0
Chi-square 497.5
LIFTING/LOWERING/
df 22
PULLING/PUSHING
Sig. 0
Chi-square 588.7
TWISTING df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 256.5
OVEREXTENDED/
df 22
CRAMPED
Sig. 0
Chi-square 441
RESPONSE TO ERGO RISK df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 665.9
BODY POSTURE df 22
Sig. 0
HEAD Chi-square 616.3

Page 140
Pearson Chi-Square Tests

df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 863.5
EYES / FACE df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 674.8
HEARING df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 530.2
RESPIRATORY df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 695.2
HAND / ARM df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 809.8
BODY df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 578.6
FALL df 22
Sig. 0
Chi-square 519.5
FOOT df 22
Sig. 0

Page 141
Appendix 5 Incident, Accidents And Near Miss

Statistical Data
Behavior Crosstab
Year No Yes Total
2003 116 46 162
2004 177 55 232
2005 216 138 354
2006 234 216 450
2007 249 203 452
Total 992 658 1650
Asymp. Sig.
Chi-Square Tests Value df
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 51.49 4 0.000
Likelihood Ratio 53.42 4 0.000
Linear-by-Linear
37.22 1 0.000
Association
N of Valid Cases 1650

Page 142
Appendix 6 Survey’s English Format (Electronic Copy)

Page 143
Appendix 7 Survey Arabic Format (Hard Copy)

Page 144
Appendix 8 Observers Participation Survey Analysis
The survey was made of seven categories to test the cause

of poor participation of some of the observers to conduct 4
behavior-based safety audits every month. Each category
is made of two similar questions. The reason for the
similarity in the questions is to find if the employees
understand the question right and give an answer relevant
to the question. We received 223 survey’s feedbacks
which represent 40% of the total observers population.
More than 20% of the observers did not do a single
observation in the year 2008 (Jan-April). And more than
20 % of them did more than 20 observations in the same
period.

Page 145
1) Training to conduct quality observation:
100
80
60
40
20
0
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Figure 41: I was trained on SOLAR and I know how

to do the Observations
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 42: The training I had for SOLAR was enough

for me to do the observation
These two questions were set to find if training was

adequate and sufficient for the observers to carry out
quality behavior-based safety observation. The training is
one and half day long and include site training. From the
results in both questions we can see that the training was
sufficient.

Page 146
2) Observation format availability
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 43: I have enough copies of the SOLAR sheets to

do the observation
100
80
60
40
20
0
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Figure 44: I can't do the observations since SOLAR

observation sheets are not available
Some of the observers explained that they cannot
find the observation format. And since they are not
available, or at least handy, then they could not do the
observation. To test this point we set the above two
questions which unanimously showed that the forms are
available and the forms cannot be used as an excuse for
neglecting the monthly observation. It is worth mentioning

Page 147
here that the hard copy forms are available but most of the
observers use the soft copies which they keep in their
PC’s. Most of them will print a blank form and use it for
his BBS observation.
3) Time availability to execute quality observation
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 45: I do not have time to do the SOLAR

observation
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 46: I am always busy during working hours, I

can't do the SOLAR observation
Everybody is busy these days. The most popular

excuse we hear for not participating in the BBS program is
“I don’t have the time to do it!” or “ I know it is important

Page 148
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
but I have moore importaant things to t do for my

m time!”.
When we askked the aboove questioons and analyzed the
resuults we noticced that the time was not
n a problem
m at all.
30
20
10
0
Strongly Agrree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Poor Observeers Beest Observers
Figgure 47: I do not have h time to do thee SOLAR

observation (S
Split resultss)
30
20
10
0
Disagree
Poor Observvers B
Best Observers
s
Figgure 48: I am
m always busy during working hoours, I can't
do the SOLAR R observatioon (Split results)
When we w split thee results annd looked at

a the poor
obseervers (less than 4 obseervation perr month) an
nd compare
theiir results with
w the best
b observvers (moree than 10
obseervations peer month). The resultss showed th hat the best
obseervers havee time to do the observation and th hey are not
always busy to the poiint where they cann not do the

Pagge 149
observation. On the other hand, the poor observers results

are distributed between strongly-agreeing and disagreeing
on time availability. But they are agreeing that they are
always busy to the point where they cannot do the monthly
observations.
4) Effort required to do the observation
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 49: I am far from the working area, I do not see

workers near me to do the observation
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
Figure 50: If the workers are close by me I will

definitely do the observation
There was a concern that some observers do not

dedicate the required effort to do the observation. This is

Page 150
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
becaause they are far froom the fieeld so they y need to

inteentionally leeave their air-condition
a ned offices and go to
the field just too do the reequired obseervation. But most of
the observers are
a requiredd to visit thee field or wo
ork shop at
leasst once everry day.
An orrganized observer
o w
will plan his BBS
obseervation aheead of time and perform m it during his regular
site visits. From
m Figure 494 above we w notice th hat most of
the observers claim
c that thhey are closse by the woorking area
(fielld or workkshop) butt Figure 50 5 shows that some
obseervers would like to have
h the woorkers nearb by them to
do the
t observaation, howevver, the figuure does no ot conclude
this fact for all observeers. This point p need
ded further
inveestigation so
s we split the abovee figures beetween the
pooor observerss and the best
b observvers in the following
figuures.
4
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
Poor Observeers Besst Observers
Figgure 51: I am
a far from
m the workiing area, I do not see
woorkers near me
m to do the observatioon (split ressults)

Pagge 151
Changing Workers’
W Behavioor
4
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
Poor Observers Best Observers
Figgure 52: If the workerss are close by

b me I willl definitely
do the observaation (split results)
r
Figure 52 confirmss what we expected,

e which
w is the
pooor observers would not n exert the t effort to do the
obseervation. However,
H thhe best obseervers do not n require
the workers to be nearby, since they plan their observation
o
aheaad and perfo
form it durinng their site visits.
5) BBS (SOLA
AR) process progress
80
6
60
4
40
20
0
Disagree
Figgure 53: I can't see SO

OLAR proceess effect on
n worker's
behhavior immmediately

Pagge 152
80
60
40
20
0
Disagree
Figure 54: SOLAR process is very slow in changing

behavior
Changing employees’ behavior is a slow process.

This slow process can be disappointing sometimes when
we look for fast results. Many of us would like to have the
“Quick Fix” or the immediate solution for each problem
we face. Many observers were disappointed that their
observation did not have an immediate effect on workers
behavior. Although both figures above are skewed toward
“Disagree” but, the same figures did not conclude if the
observers agree or disagree with the statements that the
BBS process is slow or fast in changing the workers’
behavior. the same results were seen when we split the
results between the Poor observers and best observers.

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6) Observation’s difficulty
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 55: When I do the SOLAR observation I could

not find workers doing at-risk behavior
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 56: Most of the workers are behaving safely, so

there are nothing to observe
Some of the observers complained that when they

are at site and ready to do the observations they could not
find workers showing at-risk behavior. So they postponed
the observation. This could be true since the refinery’s
overall behavior is 95% safe. However, during the 1½
days of BBS training the trainer explains that observation
should be done on any worker regardless of his behavior.

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To find out if the complain is true, the above two questions

were inserted in the survey. The result were disagreeing
with the complain. We did split the result and checked the
poor observers who matched the above figures.
7) Results credibility
80
60
40
20
0
Disagree
Figure 57: The published SOLAR results and finding are

not realistic
100
80
60
40
20
0
Agree Disagree
Figure 58: I feel that SOLAR achievements are not real
The improvement in the refinery staff behavior was

“too good to be true” to some observers. Looking at
Error! Reference source not found. on page Error!

Page 155
Bookmark not defined. we notice the great improvement

in the overall safe behavior and the improvement in the
eye protection behavior change which improved from 55%
to 74% within one year. There was a doubt that the results
were made up by the BBS committee to make their work
look good. The results of the survey confirmed the results
credibility as displayed by Figure 57 and Figure 58. So,
observers did not question the achieved results; and still
believe that the BBS process can yield good results and
worth pursuing.

Page 156
Appendix 9 Daily Time and Priority Check list
1) Set priority of each task. “A” category has higher

Priority than “B”. If you have more than one task that
fall in the same category then you may give them
numbers. For example: “A1”, “A2” and “A3”.
2) Always work on your highest priority until it is
completed.
3) Be pro-active, work on your important tasks before they
become urgent.
4) Check yesterday’s list for incomplete tasks.

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Appendix 10 Behavior-Based Safety Strategy Template
This template can be used by the reader, with minor

customization, to start Behavior-based Safety process in his
location
I. THE OBJECTIVE
The objective is to change employees' behavior toward
safety with the purpose to make Location a safer workplace.
The beneficial effects of this plan will increase and reaffirms
management accountability, eliminate incidents and accidents
and make Location a desirable place to work in.
A good evidence of the above mentioned benefits will

be seen when employees take the initiative to implement
safety practices without management request. This self driven
safety behavior will lead to incident free work place. We will
know that BBS process is effective when we have less than
XXX Lost Workday Cases in 12 months. And overall safety
percentage of 95% or above. We would like to see the safety
percentage on the higher side but the change in the contractor
manpower and new recruitment in Location will always
strengthen the challenge.
Behavior-based Safety steering committee will take the

leading role in achieving Zero Accident Year. The period of
one year is needed to implement the following strategy to
reach this objective. The chief actors in the strategy are
Location senior and middle management.
II. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS AND KPI'S

Major steps in the strategy implementations are:
Step-1: Start a BBS awareness campaign to present the
process and its noble targets to the workers.

Page 158
Step-2: Train and certify observers from the supervision

layer of the workforce to conduct quality
observations.
Step-3: Set up an “influential” steering committee with
enough authority to steer the needed change.
Step-4: generate more than XXX observation per month
until Month 20XX. Increase the number of
observations gradually to XXX per month until the
end of the year. (The ultimate number of
observation will be one observation per week per
worker.)
Step-5: analyze observations data on monthly basis to
identify the underperforming behavior elements
and in which location they are.
Step-6: Discuss result with the steering committee to
generate recommendations and solutions.
Step-7: explain step 6 findings to the management to get
approvals and support for immediate
implementation.
The Strategy Key Performance Indicators will be:

• Number of observations made every week should
exceed XXX observations. This indicator shows the
level of awareness the observers has and how much
buy-in was generated in Location.
• XXX consecutive incident free months will be a good
indicator that the strategy is moving in the right
direction.
• Maintain the overall safe behavior percentage on 95%
or above.
• Increase observers’ participation incrementally. Which
lead to the reception of observation sheets from at least
XXX observers every month.

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III. INFLUENCES, OBJECTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS:

Observers will have the highest influence on BBS
process. They will be doing the most important and tiresome
work. Observers will collect necessary data by filling the
observations sheet; complement and reaffirm safe behaviors;
and discuss at-risk behavior with the worker to suggest safer
way to do the same job.
The XXX observations we are targeting are actually:

• Valuable data-bank on workers behavior coming
from many sets of eyes and experiences.
• Countless complements on the safe behavior and
several discussions around the at-risk behaviors.
• Many recommendations to try a safer behavior to do
the jobs.
• Management visits to work place to conduct face to
face interaction with workers.
Observers' need encouragement and management

support to do a fair observation yielding the above desired
results. Forcing the observers into this weekly task will lead to
half-cooked observation if not leading to negative results.
Someone might object to this plan if no quick wins

were noticed or incident reduction trend wasn't obvious. The
BBS steering committee role, along with Location
management, is to analyze monthly observations data and look
for the problematic areas. Set BBS action items to remove the
barriers in these areas. One important constraint on this
strategy will be the large scale behavior change which requires
patient and hard work.

Page 160
IV. PATH FORWARD

Location is going through many initiatives and
programs. Most of those initiatives are excellent and would
definitely lead to brilliant results, but sometimes it was felt
that too many of them are running at the same time. HSE
initiatives and programs are contributions to overall programs
clutter. We need to combine most of the HSE programs, at
least the similar ones, into one overall program that organizes,
recommends actions and follow ups.
1) Generating acceptance
Currently we need observers involvement into BBS
process. Part of this difficulty is the issue discussed in
the above paragraph. BBS process training and
awareness will target all levels; with especial emphasize
on the observers. Appreciations, token gifts and
recognition will be mostly aimed at the observers since
they play the most important role in BBS process.
2) Observation Data Analysis

The results will be discussed in the BBS steering
committee and the recommendations will be presented
to the Location management for approval and support.
Monthly report will be also presented in Location
monthly meeting for further discussion.
3) Management Commitment
Management commitment to safety is essential in BBS
process. They will be observing the safe and at-risk
behavior by themselves; this act alone will generate
good management acceptance to safety programs in
general, and in BBS process in specific. We need to

Page 161
train Location management starting from managers and

below.
4) Awareness Campaign
The usual campaign logistics will be used like banners,
flyers, pins and posters. In addition to that we will be
using monthly newsletters and personalized E-mails and
letters direct to the observers. Monthly data analysis,
findings and recommendations will be sent to all
observers to make them see and feel the benefits of their
observations and the management follow-ups. Token
gifts will be given to the distinguished observers. Also
more token gifts will be passed with visible recognition
to BBS volunteers.

Page 162
Appendix 11 : ASSE - Kuwait Chapter
Founded in 1911, the American Society of Safety

Engineers (ASSE) is the oldest and largest professional safety
society and is committed to protecting people, property and
the environment. Based in Des Plaines, Illinois, USA, ASSE
has more than 31,000 occupational Health, Safety and
Environmental (HSE) professional members, who manage,
supervise research and consult on safety, health, transportation
and the environment in all industries, government, labor and
education. ASSE is a nonprofit organization.
The Kuwait Chapter of ASSE is the recent additions to

the ASSE family of worldwide presence and was established
in the year 2000. ASSE is the Kuwait’s premier voluntary,
non-profit making Health, Safety and Environmental
organization that strives to provide professional guidance,
training, consultancy and resources to the industrial and social
sectors in the region.
In pursuance to its lofty goals and objectives the

society has been organizing international Conferences,
Technical meets, Training programs and Outreach activities
on the way to become one of the most active professional
bodies in the Middle East. ASSE is a group of HSE
professionals who are deeply associated with the society
activities on a voluntary basis to meet the objective of
protecting people, property and environment. Keeping the
local and global HSE challenges in view, ASSE-Kuwait
Chapter has been organizing many events. Already recognized
as the busiest professional association of Kuwait in a very
short period of time the Chapter has achieved a string of
successes and looking forward to reach greater heights in the
years to come.

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VISION STATEMENT
The ASSE-Kuwait chapter envisions developing into a

center of excellence providing professional guidance, services,
consultancy and resources to the Industrial and Social sectors
in the region on matters related to Health, Safety and
Environmental Protection.
MISSION STATEMENT
American Society of Safety Engineers- Kuwait

Chapter is a nonprofit organization of professionals committed
to the advancement of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE)
practices among the Industrial sectors and social groups in
Kuwait
STRATEGIC PLAN
This strategic plan defines the ASSE-Kuwait Chapter

strategic goals through the years October 2003 to September
2008. Based on outlined goals in the strategic plan, individual
Working Groups will develop annual performance plans
defining specific action plans to be accomplished each year. It
is expected that accomplishment of these planned goals will
directly help in achieving the ASSE-Kuwait chapter strategic
goals.
As a continuous improvement, a nominated committee

(on a Quarterly basis) will monitor progress on the plan. The
committee will formulate revised action plans or initiatives to
further the developmental activities of the Chapter.
Strategic Goals
The strategic goals identified by the ASSE Kuwait chapter are:

Page 164
1. Establish ASSE-Kuwait as a resource center for the

dissemination of knowledge, programs and services in the
Safety, Health and Environmental domain.
2. Establish and maintain a friendly and effective organization
for the achievement of the society's mission.
3. Provide growth and developmental opportunities for SHE
practitioners.
4. Develop and retain a wide membership and base.
5. Establish a diversified funding base to deliver a wide range
of exceptional programs, products and services.
6. Establish a structured governance to facilitate timely and
transparent decisions.
7. Position itself as an advocator for public and private.
GUIDING VALUES
To achieve its mission, the chapter has adopted a series

of guiding values. These values guide ASSE-Kuwait chapter
in its daily activities, both internally and externally.
1. Dedication and commitment

Be dedicated and committed to further the mission of ASSE-
Kuwait.
2. Effective Leadership
We recognize that leadership exists at all level of the chapter
and they provide clear direction, understand the organizational
needs and provide support to ensure success.
3. Knowledge
Provide exceptional skills and enduring knowledge in our area
of operation/expertise.
4. Teamwork and Collaboration
Promote communication, consultation and involvement to
achieve best of results.
Provide rewards and recognition of achievements and

Page 165
show respect to all.

5. Consultation
Assist industries and organizations in understanding best
practices in SHE related activities and facilitate positive
change management.
6. Interactive Communication
WE recognize that effective communication as the foundation
for successful teamwork connecting all our members in
achieving our mission
7. Professional Development
Promote personal and professional growth and development
of our member by arranging training/developmental courses
and creating forums for multitasking.
8. Professionalism
Maintain professional work ethics and respect confidentiality.
9. Partnerships
We recognize the importance of building and maintaining
partnerships with all organizations and individuals working in
the SHE areas.
10. Respect for Individual Differences
We believe in building and maintaining a positive work
environment where diverse ideas and background are
respected and valued.

Page 166
Appendix 12 DEFINITIONS
is the unintended but probable consequence of

Accident unsafe acts that lead to hazardous
circumstances
is a hypothetical structure that represents an
Attitude: individual's like or dislike (Vaske, Jerry J.,
Donnelly, Maureen P., 1999).
The action or reaction of an individual in
relation to a stimuli.
The response of an individual, group, or

Behavior: species to its environment (Merriam-Webster's
Medical Dictionary, 2002).
The things a person or animal does (The

Longman Dictionary, 1984)
Cronbach's α is defined as
∑
1
where N is the number of components (items or

Cronbach’s α testlets), is the variance of the observed total
test scores, and is the variance of
component i. Cronbach's alpha will generally
increase when the correlations between the
items increase. For this reason the coefficient is
also called the internal consistency or the
internal consistency reliability of the test
(Cronbach's alpha, 2008).
A mix of values and assumptions which drive
Culture: the organizational values to create artifacts like
heroes, myths, structures and processes

Page 167
(Johnson, 2003)
Industrial
An on-job injury resulting in one or more full
Disabling
days away from work, including on-job
Injury
fatalities.
(IDI)
IDI The number of IDIs for every 200,000 on-job
Incident hours worked, including overtime.
Number of IDI′s 200,000
Rate IDI Incident Rate
On job hours worked
is any work-related injury or occupational
Lost illness, which renders person temporarily
Workday unable to perform any regular job for one or
Case more days after the incident (KNPC Element
12 Team, 2004).
The probability that the observed statistic

p-value. would occur if there were no difference in the
population.
A test statistic having a chi-square distribution

Pearson
that is based on differences between observed
chi-square
and expected cell frequencies.
are defined as advantage, privilege or rights to
Rewards &
support and reinforce desirable action or
Incentives
behavior
is a prearranged activity aimed at conveying
Safety safety information and instructions to improve
training the worker’s safety performance to the required
level
is a group of associated abilities, capacities and
Worker’s
knowledge that enable the worker to
competence
understand the job and act effectively

Page 168
Appendix 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABA: Applied Behavior Analysis

ABC: Activator-Behavior-Consequence
b/cd: barrels per calendar day
CHAID: Chi-Square Automatic Interaction Detector
HSE: Health, Safety and Environment
IDI: Industrial Disabling Injury
KOC: Kuwait Oil Company
KPC: Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
LWC: Lost Workday Case
mb/d: Million barrel per day
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PIC: Petrochemical Industries Company
PSM: Process Safety Management
SHEMS: Safety, Health and Environment Management
System
SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TQMS: Total Quality Management System

Page 169
Appendix 14 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Behavior-based Safety in nutshell .............................................. 15
Figure 2: Industrial Disabling Injury Rate for year 2006........................... 30
Figure 3: Safety culture and management responsibility ........................... 31
Figure 4: Safety programs focus ................................................................ 32
Figure 5: Nonfatal injury and illness incidence rates by case .................... 34
Figure 6: Value-Attitude-Behavior ............................................................ 39
Figure 7: How behavior is formed ............................................................. 41
Figure 8: Habit changing cycle .................................................................. 43
Figure 9: Activator-Behavior-Consequence Model ................................... 44
Figure 10: Loss Causation Model .............................................................. 49
Figure 11: Incident, Accident and Near Miss digital report form. ............. 52
Figure 12: Incident analysis tree part-1 (produced by AnswerTree®
Software 3.0) ............................................................................................. 56
Figure 13: Incident analysis tree part-2 (produced by AnswerTree®
Software 3.0) ............................................................................................. 57
Figure 14: incident distribution in each stage of Loss Causality as split by
AnswerTree® software. .............................................................................. 58
Figure 15: Incident root causes (organizational) ....................................... 59
Figure 16: Behavior as root cause of incidents .......................................... 60
Figure 17: Mean safety performance index ............................................... 69
Figure 18: Site observations and individual feedback ............................... 71
Figure 19: Behavior-based Safety observation checklist .......................... 73
Figure 21: Behavior-based Safety Model .................................................. 74
Figure 22: Group feedback factors which contribute to behavior change . 76
Figure 23: Feedback mind map ................................................................. 77
Figure 24: Training effectiveness with or without feedback. .................... 79
Figure 25: Percentage of safe behavior verses number of observations done
per month. .................................................................................................. 89
Figure 26: Linear Trend lines of Safety Behavior .................................... 91
Figure 27: Selected worker's behavior vs. ................................................. 92
Figure 28: Group feedback effect on number of observations and workers’
overall behavior. ........................................................................................ 94
Figure 29: Observer's participation during year 2007................................ 98
Figure 30: Detailed analysis for observers busyness. .............................. 101
Figure 31: Detailed analysis for observers sluggishness. ........................ 103
Figure 32: Task priority matrix................................................................ 104
Figure 33: daily time and priority checklist ............................................. 105
Figure 34: Mina Abdullah Refinery Lost Work Cases timeline .............. 108
Figure 35: Observations distribution over week days.............................. 110
Figure 36: Safe Behavior during Weekdays and Weekends .................... 111
Figure 37: Reasons for not using personal eye protection (Before supplying
new glasses) ............................................................................................. 112
Figure 38: Eye Protection (Safety spectacles). ........................................ 113

Page 170
Figure 39: Reasons for not using personal eye protection (After supplying
new glasses) ............................................................................................. 114
Figure 40: Before and after supplying new spectacles ............................ 114
Figure 41: Safety Training vs. behavior as a cause of incidents .............. 116
Figure 42: I was trained on SOLAR and I know how to do the
Observations ............................................................................................ 146
Figure 43: The training I had for SOLAR was enough for me to do the
observation .............................................................................................. 146
Figure 44: I have enough copies of the SOLAR sheets to do the
observation .............................................................................................. 147
Figure 45: I can't do the observations since SOLAR observation sheets are
not available............................................................................................. 147
Figure 46: I do not have time to do the SOLAR observation .................. 148
Figure 47: I am always busy during working hours, I can't do the SOLAR
observation .............................................................................................. 148
Figure 48: I do not have time to do the SOLAR observation (Split results)
................................................................................................................. 149
Figure 49: I am always busy during working hours, I can't do the SOLAR
observation (Split results) ........................................................................ 149
Figure 50: I am far from the working area, I do not see workers near me to
do the observation .................................................................................... 150
Figure 51: If the workers are close by me I will definitely do the
observation .............................................................................................. 150
Figure 52: I am far from the working area, I do not see workers near me to
do the observation (split results) .............................................................. 151
Figure 53: If the workers are close by me I will definitely do the
observation (split results)......................................................................... 152
Figure 54: I can't see SOLAR process effect on worker's behavior
immediately ............................................................................................. 152
Figure 55: SOLAR process is very slow in changing behavior ............... 153
Figure 56: When I do the SOLAR observation I could not find workers
doing at-risk behavior .............................................................................. 154
Figure 57: Most of the workers are behaving safely, so there are nothing to
observe..................................................................................................... 154
Figure 58: The published SOLAR results and finding are not realistic ... 155
Figure 59: I feel that SOLAR achievements are not real ......................... 155

Page 171
Appendix 15. LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 : Kuwait’s Oil production and refining capacity ......... 27

Table 2 : Kuwait Oil Company Safety Record ......................... 29
Table 3 : Immediate Causes ...................................................... 50
Table 4 : Underlying Causes ..................................................... 51
Table 5 : Organizational Factors ............................................... 51
Table 6 : Root cause analysis for Loss Causation model..................... 54

Page 172
Appendix 16 INDEX
ABA ......................... 44, 63 Health ................................. 22
ABC ......................... 42, 71 KNPC ................................. 25
KPC .......................... See KPC
accident Refining.............................. 25
insurance ............................. 23
IDI
Accident ......................... 51 injury .................................. 30
Assumptions ................. 18 Incentives............... 83, 164
at-risk ............................. 14 KFAS ........................... 113
BBS KISR .............................. 28
Kuwait ................................ 67
observation ......................... 70
KOC............................... 29
successful ........................... 65 KPC ............................... 28
unsuccessful ....................... 68 labor
behavior department of ..................... 34
activator ................... See ABC law
applide ..................... See ABA act ....................................... 27
applied ................................ 64 Common ............................. 22
Applied ............................... 44 decision .............................. 27
learned ................................ 40 labor ................................... 27
value-attitude ...................... 38 Legislation .................... 27
Behavior management................... 34
Definetion of ....................... 38 involvement ........................ 85
Planned ............................... 39 Management
behavioral responsibility..................... 30
science ................................ 63 model
Competence............ 76, 164 ABC ............................. 42, 44
competencySee competence Behavior-based Safety ....... 73
credibility ....................... 98 loss causation ..................... 16
Cronbach ................ 87, 163 Loss Causation ................... 48
Economy Near miss ....................... 51
Kuwait .......................... 26, 33 observer
factors sluggishness ..................... 100
Human ................................ 50 Observer
Organizational .................... 50 busyness ............................ 99
Situational ........................... 50 Occupational
feedback ......................... 98 health .................................. 22
individual ............................ 71 Safet ...................... See OSHA
habit OPEC ............................. 26
change ................................. 41 OSHA ............................ 23
History PIC ................................. 28

Page 173
PPE................................. 32 paradox ............................. 33

problem Safety training ..... 113, 164
Definition ........................... 14 SHEMS .......................... 59
PSM................................ 28 sluggishness .See observer
research STOP ............................. 29
objective ............................. 14 Substandard
reserves Act ...................................... 49
Oil ....................................... 26 Condition............................ 49
Rewards.................. 83, 164 Survey ........................... 97
Root theory
cause analysis ..................... 53 planned behavior ................ 39
Safety value-attitude...................... 38
culture ................................ 30

Page 174
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY
The author was born on October 1962 in the state

of Kuwait. The author received most of his formal
education, up to high school in Kuwait city. Joined Kuwait
National Petroleum Company (KNPC) in 1980 as field
operator after graduating from an in-house petroleum
course.
He was granted a scholarship in 1987 to study

Chemical Engineering in the University of Dayton in
USA. He graduated in August 1992 after a delay of one
year because of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The
author joined back KNPC as an engineer in 1992. He went
through the managerial ladder to reach Operations
Manager position in Mina Abdulla Refinery in 2004, and
still holds the same position. In the year 2008, the author
received his degree in Masters in Business
Administrations.
The author can be reached on:
9 s.mallah@knpc.cpm
9 s.mallah@gmail.com

Page 175
Book Back Cover

The research conducted for this book aims to answer
the following questions:
• Does Behavior-based Safety process really works?

• What is the effect of individual and group feedback on
workers behavior?
• Will group feedback in a form of progress reports,
updates and process development encourage the
observers to increase their participation?
• Is Management commitment important in changing
workers’ at-risk behavior to safe behavior?
• What is the usefulness of supplying employees with
different types of personal protective equipment?
• Is safety training alone enough to have significant
consequence on workers’ behavior?

Page 176

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CHANGING WORKERS’ BEHAVIOR

Research – Methodology – Implementation

Sami Hussain Malallah, MBA

Date: Saturday, July 05, 2008

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

3.Data Analysis Methods ............................................... 54

Chapter Six: Safety Management System And Commun. ..... 82

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

6. Other points ............................................................... 104

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

IV. PATH FORWARD .......................................................... 161

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

Sami Malallah, MBA

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

The Book in Nutshell

The book discuss and argue different behavioral

Large and complex oil refinery is used as a base for

The objective of this book is to demonstrate the effect

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

Chapter One: Introduction

“My future starts when I wake up every morning...

This chapter will introduce you to this book’s

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) had two

Mina Abdulla Refinery is one of the three refineries

The research carried out for this book has distinct

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

The reseaarch startedd by reviiewing thee relevant

Steerring Daata Entry

Figure 1:: Behavior-bbased Safetyy in nutshelll

BBS proceess is field observation

ASSE – Kuuwait Chapter

outcome of these observations is reported on a checklist. The

Results from implementing the behavior-based safety

Workers neglect using their personal protective

Safety training is important to inform the workers on

4. Data Analysis Method

There are two sets of data used in this research. The

AnswerTree® is a standalone software part of the

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

According to the loss causation model, behavior is one

The second set of data is the Behavior-based Safety

The one year data collected from BBS process

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

A comparison is carried out on the BBS process

Behavior-based Safety observations are done by

Most of the observations are done during the regular

Near miss and dangerous occurrence reports are filled

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

The research is targeting Mina Abdulla Refinery which

About three quarters of the observations are done

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

ASSE – Kuwait Chapter

Chapter Two: An Overview

“In the business world, the rearview mirror is always

1. Background Of The Refining Industry 22

The chapter will give a general view of the history of