Religion, Brain & Behavior

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Gauging oneiromancy—the cognition of

dream content and cultural transmission of
(supernatural) divination

Andreas Nordin

To cite this article: Andreas Nordin (2023): Gauging oneiromancy—the cognition of dream
content and cultural transmission of (supernatural) divination, Religion, Brain & Behavior, DOI:
10.1080/2153599X.2023.2172068
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2023.2172068

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RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR
https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2023.2172068

Gauging oneiromancy—the cognition of dream content and

cultural transmission of (supernatural) divination
Andreas Nordin
Department of Cultural Sciences, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Dreaming is often connected with religious ideas and enjoys distinct Received 27 May 2022
epistemic status as a source of trusted information for divinatory Accepted 29 December 2022
practices—oneiromancy. These tendencies suggest the existence of a
KEYWORDS
distinct content affordance relevance for dream divination, hypothesized Cognition; cultural
in the “CARDD theory.” CARDD theory predicts that dreams containing transmission; divination;
nightmarish and threatening content, omission of self-agency models, dream content; dreaming;
bizarre and counterintuitive content, and SA imagery enhance the omitted self-agency models;
proclivity for dream communication and divination. Drawing upon ostensive detachment
ethnographic research among Nepalese Hindus, the purpose of the
present article is to extend assumptions from cognitive and cultural
transmission analysis of divination to the subcase of dream research
and divination. The specific aims are (1) to quantify and compare dream
contents according to their prevalence as described in CARDD theory,
and (2) to test CARDD theory against the assumption that the dream
contents have affordance value and provide motivation for dream
communication and divination. According to the present data, however,
only omission of self-agency models in dream imagery was significantly
shown to predict dream communication and divination—a result that
supports the idea that the formal features of “ostensive detachment”
(Boyer, 2020; Mercier & Boyer, 2021) are decisive factors in cultural
transmission of divinatory practices.

Introduction
Dreaming is a universal human experience and cultural theme that is often construed as a special
event and awarded special status in the world’s religious traditions and practices (Bulkeley, 2007,
2008; Jedrej & Shaw, 1992; Lohmann, 2003). In early anthropological theory, dreaming was
assumed to be a primary experiential source of religious beliefs (e.g., Tylor, 1871), and a cross-cul-
tural survey of dreams from the ethnographic literature demonstrates the importance of cultural
traits that relate dreams to religious systems (D’Andrade, 1961) and a widespread use of dreams
to contact or gain control over supernatural (agents) powers. Such dreams are treated as instances
of precognition or omens, or they may be used as oracles—hence the need for dream interpreters.
D’Andrade’s study also demonstrates that anxiety about being alone, demands for self-reliance,
and isolation give rise to powerful preoccupations with supernatural dreams (1961, p. 320, 328).
Relatedly, in various cultural and religious traditions, nightmares are reported in initiations and
conversion ordeals (Bulkeley, 2007). The importance of dreams particularly has to do with their

CONTACT Andreas Nordin andreas.nordin@kultvet.gu.se

© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 A. NORDIN

experiential salience as well as the dreamer’s concerns about the future in relation to prognostica-
tory content of dreams. In this sense they are precursors to features of divination and oracles (e.g.,
Bulkeley, 2008; cf. Patton, 2004) and support the “validation” of supernatural belief by presenting
cues for evidence (Bulkeley, 2008). Such prompts relate to intensely emotional experiences, a sense
of “realness” of imagery, and involuntary and intrusive encounters with supernatural entities, as
evidenced by nightmares, so-called “big dreams” (encounters with SAs of importance in the tra-
dition) or “visitation dreams” (encounters with ancestors, the dead, relatives, and loved ones).
A difference in the experiences and uses of dreaming has been described as relating to the dis-
tribution of monophasic versus polyphasic cultural traits (Laughlin, 2011). The former, seen in mod-
ern societies, points to norms that do not encourage belief in any distinct value of dreams or need to
give them attention, along with a strong distinction between imagination and reality (Laughlin
et al., 1990, 2011). The opposite tendency is seen in polyphasic cultures, which historically prevailed
in most human societies. These environments are characterized by epistemic recognition of dreams
as indexes or communication signals, ontological meta-belief about dream content as (true) infor-
mation about reality rather than pure imagination, as well as assumptions about the high value of
dream experiences and information (e.g., Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977), similar to drug/entheo-
gene-, trance-, and ordeal-driven visions (e.g., Locke & Kelly, 1985). Divination relating to
dream interpretation and prognostication of future events has existed in polyphasic contexts within
most religious traditions, ancient civilizations, and traditional societies (e.g., Bourguignon, 1972;
Bulkeley, 2008; Hughes, 2000; Jedrej & Shaw, 1992; Laughlin, 2011; Lincoln, 1935; Tedlock, 1987).
As scientific categories, “divination” and “religion” are best understood as polythetic terms (e.g.,
Needham, 1975), and they denote such diverse phenomena that they cannot be situated under a
single explanatory theory. Features connected to divinatory practices in the literature (e.g., the exer-
cise of social power, ideological and identity functions, or stress relief) cannot be the sole expla-
nations of divination, since they are common denominators of many types of human
undertakings (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, pp. 124–125). Recognizing the “fractionated” condition
of the categories can offer methodological leeway for using a kind of “piecemeal” (Barrett, 2007)
approach to studying (dream) divination. In a fractionated category approach, it is presumed
that dream contents tend to contain some predominant traits or “obvious recurrent aspects” and
salient imagery that are likely to be of relevance in dream divination and communication. It is
here assumed that the cognitive influences on such features are cultural transmission factors and
attractors of divinatory representations, such that those divinatory practices will earn an optimal
transmission advantage that produces cues engaging specific cognitive procedures (Boyer, 2020;
Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021).
The present article adopts contemporary models in cognitive and evolutionary anthropology
and the study of religion to assess and recast a number of tenets that test the hypothesis of a distinct
content affordance relevance for dream divination (CARDD). Based on CARDD theory and the
assumption that dream contents contribute to the affordance and motivation of dream divination,
it can be suggested that informants who report threatening imagery and nightmares, omitted self-
agency models, bizarreness and counterintuitiveness, and SA imagery in their dreams will have a
cultural transmission advantage and be more likely to engage in dream communication and divi-
natory consultation. The present article aims to single out which of these mentioned content factors
(if any) are key predictor(s) of dream divination, on the basis of previous fieldwork with Hindu
Nepalese.

Recurrent traits in “divination”

The research literature commonly distinguishes between different, yet not exclusive categories (e.g.,
Tedlock, 2006, p. 65) of divinatory procedures that either are mechanical, in that they manipulate
specific items and objects according to detailed rules, are inspired, in that a person is connected to or
influenced by (through dreaming, trance, possession, etc.) another usually supernatural agent, or
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 3

involve signs and omens, often requiring interpretation by a divinatory specialist. The literature
demonstrates a multitude of descriptions of divination rituals (and magic) and how they are
embedded in social interaction and decision procedures engendering what is assumed to be reliable
and true information (for a recent overview, see, e.g., Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021). Scholars suggest that
the invention(s) of reliability-generating ritualistic procedures is an astonishingly successful inno-
vation in cultural evolution (Curry, 2013) that provides different methods for gaining access to pur-
portedly undisclosed vital knowledge and information (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, p. 125). These
methods presuppose a peculiar way of generating truth (Boyer, 2020; Mercier & Boyer, 2021).
The information in divinatory knowledge tends to be structured according to temporal vectors
referring to past, present, or future events (Zeitlyn, 2012) associated with topics of socially strategic
concern, such as cases of misfortune and provisions for decision-making (for example, see Evans-
Pritchard, 1976; Mendonsa, 2000). Such information is evidently related to direct or indirect adap-
tive fitness challenges (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, p. 136). As will be developed below, vivid imagery of
such fitness challenges is evident in REM sleep and is a pervasive concern in SA dreams and dream
divination communication. The function of supernatural agency in divination is disputed and raises
questions about why people hold that divinatory statements provide truth to begin with. Why
should a culturally transmitted meta-belief that such statements provide true information persist
and be based on supernatural agent beliefs (e.g., Mercier & Boyer, 2021)? However, there are com-
mon reports of trust in the divination institution itself coexisting with suspicion toward specific
cases of divinatory statements (Evans-Pritchard, 1976). It appears that the distinctiveness of divi-
natory procedures is what determines the epistemic value of statements generated by divination
(Boyer, 2020), which partly draws on the cognitive effects of ritualistic detachment and disengage-
ment of the actions and practices from the intentionality of the diviner (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021,
p. 140). This prompts a kind of “ostensive detachment,” which is seemingly vital for trust and com-
municative vigilance (Boyer, 2020; Mercier & Boyer, 2021).
Relatedly, specific types of actions that distinguish divination practices consist of randomization
and arbitrary manipulation of tokens, as well as ritualized action sequences (Frøkjær Sørensen,
2021, p. 141) that in and of themselves would provide additional attraction factors relating to vig-
ilance towards threats from invisible sources (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006). Some
of the most widely recognized traits in the cognitive literature on ritual actions (e.g., Boyer & Lié-
nard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Sørensen, 2007) are the causal demotion and underspecified
nature of ritualized action sequences and the fact that they are stipulated (Humphrey & Laidlaw,
1994), repetitious and mechanical, with the performance being only weakly connected to the inten-
tions of the actor. Regardless of whether randomization or ritualization occurs in divination, a rela-
tive lack of control or influence over the outcome of the action is manifest. Such conditions may
provide the decisive reason why supernatural agent causation would be a relevant explanation
among practitioners (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, p. 143), although the purported necessary involve-
ment of supernatural agent beliefs in divination is disputed. The issue of lack of control is further
discussed below in relation to compensatory control theory (CCT).

Cognitive pathways in the semiotics and communication of divination

The ethnographic literature provides rich evidence of cultural cognitive effects on dreaming such as
“cultural pattern dreams” (Lincoln, 1935, p. 189), and cultural uses of dreams (D’Andrade, 1961,
pp. 313–317), dream-related classifications and communication (Lohmann, 2007; Tedlock, 1987),
and the use of dreams as means for the cultural transmission (Knafo & Glick, 2000) and spreading
of religious ideas (e.g., Tylor, 1871). As previously noted, in so-called polyphasic cultures, prediction
of the future and revelation of undisclosed past states are manifested in dream divination practices.
The way humans obtain knowledge from divinatory practices suggests different affordance
potentials relating to the involved information. These can be viewed as semiotic aspects by
means of which the information is perceived as comprising either communicative or indexical
4 A. NORDIN

signs in relation to cognitive models specifying temporal positioning, with reference to retrospec-
tive, prognostic, or diagnostic conditions (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, pp. 127–133). Indexical divina-
tory information is seen in the widespread use of portents and omens predicting future events, and
suggests that divination involving communicative tokens is not always present. It would thus seem
reasonable to distinguish between the cognitive operations of divination that are involved in com-
munication and those involved with the indexical information. One reason for making such a dis-
tinction would be that not all divinatory signs can be seen as results of communication from
(superhuman) agents, such as those occurring during states of possession (e.g., Cohen, 2007; Ted-
lock, 2006). In the case of dreaming, they are seemingly either an “inspired” or omen-based type of
divination (cf. Tedlock, 2006), or both.
Generally, the cognition of divinatory information as indexical relies on basic model-dependent
modes relating to perceptual information (overview, Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021). These draw upon
intuitive causal reasoning and probabilistic inferences (e.g., Spelke et al., 1996) as well as predictive
expectations about events and processes, on associative learning based on linking and learning con-
tingent information and events in the environment (e.g., Kummer, 1995), or on complex cultural
learning models influencing transmission. In the context of dream divination, the affective and cog-
nitive salience that influences cultural learning and is seen in counterintuitive and emotional associ-
ations is elaborated below. Model-based cognition thus informs the reasoning in the explanation of
past events or predictions of future events construed as divinatory indexes.
On the other hand, construing divinatory events as communication will trigger other cognitive
systems evaluating such things as the intentions of other agents (i.e., Theory of Mind; see Gopnik &
Wellman, 1994; Leslie, 1996), and the relevance (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and candor (e.g.,
Bergstrom et al., 2006) of the transmitted information. Communication tactics are likely to have
evolved partly as means to detect social deceit (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015), and include epistemic
vigilance (Mercier, 2020; Sperber et al., 2010), whereby humans attend to the quality and sources
of arguments and information as a means of assessing what benefits can be gained from them.

The (neuro)cognition of dreaming that underpins proclivity to engage in

divination
Trust in dream contents as a source of divinatory knowledge is evidently related to precognition in
dreams and to the fact that dreaming operates as way of exercising simulations to test predicted and
hypothetical outcomes. Dreaming contains various inexplicable images and involves a modality of
cognition that enables prospective modeling and counterfactual states of affairs (e.g., Lewis, 1973).
Counterfactual dream simulation of past and future states has been demonstrated (McNamara
et al., 2002). More specifically, such processes are related to the state of REM dreaming as prospec-
tive coding (Llewellyn, 2016) and encoding of episodic memories (Llewellyn, 2016). Dreaming is
involved in the origination and elaboration of goals and values/desires, and in the content of day-
dreaming, which may be crucial to episodic prospection (McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015; Spuznar,
2010) of probable states of affairs and outcomes. Virtual dreaming models have furthermore
been seen as generating predictions in order to minimize energetic redundancy and model com-
plexity (Hobson et al., 2014).
Relatedly, the pervasive prospective vigilance of dream machinery is modeled by threat simulation
theory (TST) (Revonsuo, 2000; Valli & Revonsuo, 2009), and resembles other proposed cognitive pro-
clivities such as a “hypersensitive agency detection device,” HADD (Barrett, 2004), and threat-detec-
tion psychology (e.g., Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011), which are involved in the appraisal and detection of
potential fitness threats relating to predation, social intrusion, contagion, social offence, and threat to
offspring. The processing of vivid episodic memories and daydreams enables “episodic simulation” of
past and possible future events and conditions (Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011), which is important for
planning and decision-making (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Similarly, according to threat
simulation theory, dream cognition seen during REM and even perhaps in NREM sleep are evolved
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 5

proclivities that enable the simulation of threats in order to enhance vigilance to dangers (Revonsuo,
2000; Valli & Revonsuo, 2009). Nightmares about survival threats, aggression, misfortune, and acci-
dents are omnipresent and provide support for the threat simulation account. Indeed, themes of
“being attacked” or threatened by enemies, wild animals, strangers, or monstrous creatures predomi-
nate in the majority of dreams (Domhoff, 1996; Hall & Van De Castle, 1966).
Adaptive functions of dreaming have also been suggested in relation to the simulation of
social interaction and complexities (e.g., Brereton, 2000; Humphrey, 2000; McNamara, 2004;
Nielsen & Germain, 2000). In social simulation theory (SST) (Revonsuo et al., 2016; Tuominen,
Revonsuo, et al., 2019; Tuominen, Stenberg, et al., 2019), dream contents are modeled as simu-
lations of frequent cardinal social challenges and needs in waking life situations related to social
actors and characteristics, bonds, interactions and connections. SST suggests that specific evolved
functions operate in emotionally neutral and positive dreams in a way that complements those
that are described for TST (above) and operate in nightmares. Indicators of social simulation are
seen in the literature, and studies describe at least one social trait being present in over 83.5% of
dream reports (Tuominen, Stenberg, et al., 2019a), or alternatively that only 6.5% of dream
reports are about non-social simulation (Domhoff & Schneider, 2018). REM sleep promotes
social bonding dreams (McNamara, 1996), and comparatively more social characters occur in
dreams than in reports from waking states (McNamara et al., 2005). Dreaming extends to
forms of post-sleep social sharing, such as empathy and trust (Blagrove, Hale, et al., 2019a)
and seems to connect TST and SST with sharing of dream content in the context of divinatory
communication, as further discussed below.

Salience of dream bizarreness and counterintuitiveness

One peculiarity of dreams relates to their purported weirdness, and the ethnographic literature
reports cultural dream models concerned with “nonsense” and bizarreness (Lohmann, 2007,
pp. 41–44). Yet most dream content is not completely incoherent and bizarre, but for the most
part is structured in accordance with how waking life is cognized (Domhoff, 2003). Bizarreness
tends to occur in less than 50% of sampled dream reports (e.g., Cicogna et al., 2007; Revonsuo &
Tarkko, 2002) and concerns features such as physically impossible appearances, exaggerated shapes
and sizes, or a predominance of contextual rather than internal bizarreness.
The interface between the phenomena of counterintuitiveness (explicated below) and bizarre-
ness is somewhat complicated; however, one can say that non-counterintuitive bizarre cognition
does not tamper with core knowledge, although in some cases it may be difficult to clearly delineate
what items are counterintuitive. Bizarre concepts may vary depending on individual and cultural
factors, while counterintuitive concepts do not (Barrett, 2004), and dream researchers hold that
“bizarreness” is a kind of folk-psychological entity reducible to more basic neurocognitive processes
(e.g., Llewellyn, 2016; Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002). The concept of counterintuitiveness refers to the
way “religious concepts” (and specifically SA notions) tend to reverse some of the information
people more or less intuitively associate with basic ontological categories (e.g., Boyer, 2001,
pp. 54–65). The assumption of counterintuition is developed in minimal counterintuitiveness
(MCI) theory, which suggests that a low number of violations, such as “breaches” and “transfers”
of core knowledge and intuitive expectations drawn from basic ontological categories (e.g., Barrett,
2004, 2008; Boyer, 2001;), produces salience and memory advantage, which are optimal for cultural
transmission (Boyer & Ramble, 2001).
Research on bizarreness has primarily been related to aberration and deviation in the cognitive
“binding” of cohesiveness in dream imagery (Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002). Hence, bizarreness is seen
in incongruence; dream elements have features (e.g., a blue hedgehog) or appear in contexts (e.g., a
beehive in a bed) that do not fit with corresponding elements in waking reality. Bizarreness is also
seen in defective binding of discontinuity, where dream elements are unable to retain features and
categories of identity, but change them instead, resulting in a ceaseless and inexplicable emergence,
6 A. NORDIN

disappearance and alteration of entities, objects and contexts in dreams (e.g., a hedgehog appears,
turns blue, disappears, reappears and turns into a beehive).
The assemblage of seemingly inconsistent and bizarre dream images may be a consequence of sim-
plification and the reducing of model complexity in redundant memory elements during sleep—a
process that would serve to optimize predictive coding in the waking state (Bucci & Grasso, 2017;
Hobson et al., 2014; Hobson & Friston, 2012). In dream production during REM sleep, such pruning
and diminution of prediction errors and model complexity in prospective and predictive neural cod-
ing may be accomplished by blending memory fragments with emotional charges and motor
responses that are preserved in the predictive coding when awake (Llewellyn, 2016). Perhaps the gen-
eration of counterintuitive imagery, as with bizarreness, is an effect of the pruning of model complex-
ity. However, pruning of model complexity and prediction errors would occur anyway—since this is
the way the brain operates, according to the theory. Consequently, proximate explanations of specific
morphology seem weak. The predictive account so far seems to lack any specific evolutionarily driven
functional biases except for free energy minimization (cf. Tuominen & Valli, 2019).

Dreaming and omission of self-agency models

Bizarre and counterintuitive dream imagery relates to the tendency during REM sleep states to
manifest a demotion and/or loss of agency in the dreamer (McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015), night-
mares and the cross-cultural occurrence of sleep paralysis, and purportedly “mystical” dreams.
There is also a strong correlation between inhibition of the dreamer’s model of self and agency
during REM sleep states and an elevated sense of the causal-agentive role attributed to other
dream characters—particularly supernatural agents (McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015).
According to a predictive coding approach, cognitive brain processing aims to optimize errors
between prediction and actual outcomes, and the proclivity to attribute external causal agency is a
function of this processing (McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015). This may be compared to the modeling
of dreams as internal world simulations assuming a virtual immersive self and its sense of presence
(Revonsuo et al., 2016; cf. Windt & Metzinger, 2007). Such “synaptic pruning” or “Bayesian
reduction” of model complexity, as described above, would again operate on the generation of
agent models during dreaming. The tendencies to inhibit the causal role of the self-agency model
in dream imagery also resemble the demotion of action causality in ritual actions (see above) and
the tendency toward “ostensive detachment” in divinatory procedures (Boyer, 2020). These resem-
blances suggest that dream divination draws upon similar truth-generating factors as other forms of
divination, and that these thus can serve as a distinct attraction function in cultural transmission.

Divination and the issue of involved supernatural agents

As previously noted, not all divinatory signs can be seen as results of communication from (super-
human) agents, such as in cases of possession (e.g., Cohen, 2007; Tedlock, 2006). Nevertheless, it
has recently been disputed that SA cognition serves a constitutive function in divination; instead,
it is proposed, people trust divinatory information because of the detachment of the procedure
from human agency, manipulation, or intended outcome, without believing that superhuman
agents are the source (Boyer, 2020, pp. 204–205). However, if SAs are not necessary in these
forms of divination, an explanation is needed for why they are so prevalent. One proposal suggests
that SA cognitions are side effects generated as causal explanations of the various degrees of ritua-
lization employed in divination practices (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, pp. 140–146). Since ritual action
procedures are causally underspecified in relation to their overarching goal and the intention of the
ritual performer, the prevalent beliefs in the involvement of supernatural agents would be highly
relevant and fill explanatory gaps. This is particularly the case because divination aims to reveal
and acquire social-strategic information, and superhuman agents are believed to have “full access”
to strategic information (Boyer, 2001, pp. 154–155) of concern and social relevance to humans.
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 7

The veracity and cultural transmission of dream divination content

Dream information may pose a challenge to trust in divination and generate skepticism, which in
turn can challenge the authority of dream divination practice and explanatory models of it. The
emotional valence of nightmarish content, on the other hand, is less likely to inhibit elaborate
disbelief. Regardless of whether dreamers hold dreams to be prognosticatory and/or communi-
cative, belief in the veracity of the dream information will probably depend on cognitive factors.
These cognitive conditions are likely to serve as a “scope syntax” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), and
more specifically, are likely to be informed by the domain of the knowledge and inferences
involved (cf. Bergstrom et al., 2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006), e.g., references to agents/mentality.
Other conditions, mentioned below, relate the veracity concerns to the predictive efficacy of the
dreams. Truth assumptions relating to dream content manifesting SA agents readily activate
ToM cognition and inferences about communicative intent, and the occurrence of CI properties
may relate to cues of authoritative religious sources (Bergstrom et al., 2006) conventionally held
to provide truer statements, such as divinatory experts. But domains of dream imagery about
apprehension and danger referring to fitness challenges (Revonsuo, 2000) may need less
additional testimonial support (Bergstrom et al., 2006), unless perhaps the imagery contain
fragments of CI and SA imagery.
It is here suggested that the salience of nightmare ordeals and bizarre and counterintuitive ima-
gery provides an additional “affordance” potential in the inclination to use dream information as
either diagnostic or prognostic divinatory items. That is, the properties of this agent’s dream ima-
gery have enough transmission advantage and salience to underpin evocation and memory in the
adoption of cultural learning models of indexes. Furthermore, the agency-related properties elicit
representations of dream images as communicative signs and signals requiring decoding—as in
dream divination.
Selection pressures should have made the human species highly sensitive to deceit and to
the reliability and quality of transmitted information, by means of an “epistemic vigilance”
mechanism (Mercier, 2020; Sperber et al., 2010). Such vigilance would be geared to assessing
misleading information, the quality and consistency of information sources, as well as the trust-
worthiness, competence, and benevolent intent of other agents. The widespread use of divina-
tory practices and information is likely to be based on “inventions” that sidestep suspicions
of deceit.
Indeed, there is a disengagement of the actions involved in conveying divinatory information
from the intentionality of the diviner (Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021, p. 140). Such ostensive detachment
(Boyer, 2020; Mercier & Boyer, 2021) signals and affirms that the diviner and the divinatory client
are not responsible for the information conveyed during the practice, making the information less
tainted by personal interest (Boyer, 2020). In this account, it is the epistemic status of divinatory
communication as an attractor that is crucial in cultural transmission (Boyer, 2020), rather than
its status as truths derived from sacred postulates and supernatural agents (e.g., Beattie, 1964).
The transmission of epistemic trust in divination practices may also be informed by a proclivity
to modify beliefs probabilistically, by expectations in relation to disconfirmation, as well as by selec-
tive overrepresentation of successful predictions caused by omitting failed ones (Hong, 2021).
Oneiromancy may be less common in cultural transmission than unconcealed divinatory technol-
ogies, since it is less amenable to being initiated on demand, which may result in lower attraction
and frequency of the practice. However, the frequent and automatic production of salient dreams
suggests an abundance of potential divinatory information not affected by any need for volitional
flexibility. Further, dream divination procedures may infringe on the credibility of ostensive detach-
ment, since the “practice” is (a) partly subjectively concealed by the dreamer and the narrative out-
put, and thus is open to (b) skepticism and suspicion (cf. Hong, 2021) and generally hampered by
epistemic vigilance (see above). However, as will be argued below, dreaming seems to provide
detachment through the inhibition of self-agency models.
8 A. NORDIN

Cultural transmission process and the dream/waking interface

According to the previously mentioned categorization, divinatory procedures are either mechanical,
inspired, or related to signs and omens (e.g., Tedlock, 2006, p. 65). Oneiromancy is typically found in
the two latter categories, and it also exhibits a stronger proclivity to invoke supernatural agency
beliefs. Whether acts of dream divination are construed as communicative signals or indexes,
they are attractor poles, underpinned by distinct cognitive systems (as outlined above, cf. Frøkjær
Sørensen, 2021, p. 129) that provide affordance propensities of expectation and use. Granting
CARDD theory, it is here suggested that dream divination and practices are more optimally trans-
mitted when they rely on cues that prompt cognitive modes from the manifestation of salient dream
content. Key components of such content are here taken to include apprehensive dreams, night-
mares, bizarreness and counterintuitiveness, agents and or SA, and omitted self-agency imagery.
These elicit a sense of veracity and motivate explanatory communication (which is typical of
divination).
The relevance and affordance potential of dreaming for divinatory practice can be simplified
under three general conditions (cf. Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2021). The first is (a) an input condition
(e.g., perception, reception and integration) bringing social information and public cultural rep-
resentations (e.g., religious allusions), environmental cues and conditions into the dreamer’s con-
ceptual “toolkit” of images employed in the dreaming process, and relatedly an intrinsic condition
(e.g., sleep state cognition) associated with the information and cues employed, rehashed and
pruned in the dream process. There is furthermore (b) an output condition taking subjective
dream content and imagery to the domain of cultural transmission in the waking state.
Finally, there is (c) a public dream communication condition affecting the transmission of dream
items during waking states. Key characteristics of dream divination, such as extraordinary content,
beliefs in veracity, and proneness to communication/consultation are different enough to suggest
that they rely on partly different proportions of cognitive modes. Regarding (a) and (b), the gener-
ation and rehashing of affordances yielding divinatory information derive from the salience of
dream content and imagery. Regarding (b), the content of dreaming experiences renders an exclu-
sive affordance potential for divinatory communication and practice.
There is ample evidence of the cross-cultural prevalence of salient nightmares and the neurocog-
nitive simulation and prediction functions of these tendencies. Nightmares co-occur with demotion
of dreamer self-agency models, which further contributes to the salience of dreams and correlates
with or causes the generation of SA dream cognition (McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015). Other research
based on compensatory control theory (CCT) has demonstrated correlations between experience of
deficiency of internal or external control and supernatural agent beliefs as a form of compensatory
control (Hoogeveen et al., 2018; Kay et al., 2010). According to this approach, religious beliefs can
be entertained in conditions of anxiety during experiences of confusion, randomness, and uncer-
tainty to boost a sense of compensatory control over the environment. It is the compensatory con-
trol generated by religious beliefs, rather than its being comforting in general, that is decisive
(Hoogeveen et al., 2018). Reestablishing a sense of control in circumstances of experienced uncer-
tainty motivates behavior and is demonstrated in perception of ritual efficacy (Legare & Souza,
2014), although rituals primarily operate as means to assert an illusion of increased control (cf.
Humphrey & Laidlaw, 1994; Legare & Souza, 2014; Legare & Souza, 2014). From the perspective
of CCT (which originally focused on waking states), dreaming—particularly during highly night-
marish REM sleep, which is commonly related to sleep paralysis, omitted sense of agency, uncer-
tainty, and lack of control—would be strongly related to social simulation of agents, SA agents, and
(inter-) action prototypes that mimic causal efficacy and control.
The literature has not yet shown that SA dreaming is better suited to persisting in waking con-
sciousness and developing cultural transmission than other content selected to the waking state
(McNamara et al., 2018). However, all that is needed for such influence to be exerted on the cultural
transmission would be that at least some SA dream images are recollected to such an extent that
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 9

they prime, or create a bias toward, acceptance of SA cognitions (and other religious cognitions and
practices) in the waking state (McNamara et al., 2018, pp. 439–440). Additionally, the contents of
children’s dreams are a rich source of supernatural beliefs (e.g., McNamara, 2016; cf. Barrett et al.,
2001; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Kelemen, 2004).
The counterintuitive properties of SA dream imagery seem to be crucial in this respect, and this
has been confirmed in dream research (Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019) and in the previously men-
tioned general literature on MCI cognitions in cultural transmission. The occurrence of dream
SA cognition, CI and bizarreness related to prediction and model pruning is likely to serve a func-
tion in the consolidation of prospective coding, emotional memory and de- and re-contextualiza-
tion relating to autobiographical experience of episodes and formation of long-term memories.
Once SA and CI dream imagery is entangled with strong emotions and prospective model pruning,
and is solidified in the long-term memory, this in itself may elevate its relevance, thereby selecting
for the use and engagement of SA and CI concepts in cultural transmission and communication.
The salience of emotional memory consolidation in relation to SA dreaming also draws its rationale
from dream threat simulation theory (Revonsuo, 2000; Valli & Revonsuo, 2009), “hypersensitive
agency detection device” HADD (Barrett, 2004), and a basic threat-detection psychology (e.g.,
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011), and the impact of emotional selection may be pervasive in cultural
dynamics (Kashima et al., 2020) and transmission (e.g., Stubbersfield et al., 2017), supporting the
point that highly emotional dreams and nightmares motivate communication.
Emotions are intricate and rich information packages (e.g., Kashima et al., 2020) consisting of
affective appraisal, action modalities (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), and cognitive constructs of predictive
models for interaction with the environment. Affective arousal may indicate adaptive significance,
where negative material is easier to manage (Baumeister et al., 2001), suggesting a negativity bias
(Bebbington et al., 2017; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). When emotive information is encoded in mem-
ory, it tends to be retrieved, reproduced and socially transmitted, and the stronger the affective
arousal of experiences, the more likely they are to be communicated in social sharing (Rimé,
2009; Stubbersfield et al., 2017). Research even suggests that it is primarily negative information,
for example relating to disgust and fear (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2017), that motivates emotional
sharing and transmission. Importantly, studies suggest that the emotional intensity of dreams is
a key predictor in social sharing of both negative and positive dreams (Curci & Rimé, 2008).
Additionally, dream sharing affects the relationship between dreamer and listener, and tends to
prompt positive rather than negative reactions (Schredl et al., 2015). Blagrove, Hale, et al. (2019a)
show significant emotional effects with respect to empathy based on the frequency of listening to
others’ dreams, communicating one’s own dreams to others, and overhearing dream presentations
more generally. In this way, empathy may further encourage and accelerate communicative dream
transmission. Sharing information by communicating dreams to others can reveal sensitive issues
for the dreamer, and dream disclosure involves aspects of enhanced trust (Ijams & Miller, 2000).
These findings support the notion that one overall function of dreaming is social simulation.
Dream sharing and communication thus reflect the narrative properties and story-making potential
of dreaming (Pace-Schott, 2013).
According to social simulation theory, and threat-detection models specifically, nightmares
and apprehensive dreams are perceived as communicative signs from, or traces of, other agents
(cf. Barrett, 2004, pp. 36–37). This is because divinatory information elicits indexical assumptions
about diagnosis or prognostication, or expectations of communicative intent (Frøkjær Sørensen,
2021, p. 140). Dream contents also elicit more special insights than personally significant events
(Edwards et al., 2015) and are rated by communicators of dreams as providing more personal
insights than conversations about daydreams (Blagrove, Edwards, et al., 2019). In relation to
dream divination, insights occurring in dreams could act as reminders of information that has
been ignored or forgotten in waking life (Blagrove, Edwards, et al., 2019). Schredl et al.
(2015) find that sharing one’s own dreams with others or listening to others’ dreams is primarily
motivated by three conditions: a wish to understand if the topic of the dream is relevant for the
10 A. NORDIN

interaction between the listener and the dreamer, the dream being extraordinary in some way,
and an ambition to better understand the dream. The two latter conditions match the tendencies
in dream divination very well.
About the third item, the (c) public dream communication condition, the transmission of
dream information is subject to the same conditions as all communication. One such condition
would be the overall relevance of dream information for others (in this context religious experts,
divinators, social peers) and their trust in it. Importantly, contextual validation and transmission
biases constrain the transmission of dream content. For example, salient dream narratives co-
occur in contexts of cultural expectations and in schemas regarding communication and divina-
tory practices. Different types of transmission factors regarding veracity and efficacy seem to con-
strain the communication of dream divination. While a circumstance of ostensive detachment
may be significant in the output condition and for belief in the truth of dream content, it may
not be as strong, constrained or disputed in public communication and reception relating to
epistemic vigilance (Mercier, 2020) or skepticism regarding efficacy (Hong, 2021). More nuanced
research needs to address these topics in relation to singular practices versus divinatory insti-
tutions (cf. Evans-Pritchard, 1976).

Specific aims
In the second half of this article I analyze the affordance potential of dreaming for divination by
focusing on (a) dream content and (b) actual and reported conduct in interpretation and communi-
cation. Additionally, (c) veracity beliefs and trust in (a) and (b) will be analyzed. The first item (a)
addresses the topic of salience in content that may elicit agent-causal explanations, the second (b)
concerns to what extent dreams are viewed as communicative signals that motivate explanatory
communication (typical of divination). It is suggested that rudimentary veracity beliefs are attached
to dreaming due to the prevalence of emotional urgency, SA causation, and inhibited dreamer agent
models, which strengthen intuitions about undisclosed and communicated dream information that
could be explicated through divination.
Aim (1): According to CARDD theory, dream reports have specific contents that are crucial for
their communicative affordance for divination. In this article, such content is measured and ana-
lyzed according to the prevalence of nightmarish and threatening content, SA imagery, inhibition
of self-agency models, counterintuitiveness (bizarreness), and the belief in accuracy.
Aim (2): Based on CARDD theory and the assumption that the dream content contributes to the
affordance and motivation of dream divination, it is predicted that informants who report night-
marish and threatening content, omission of self-agency models, bizarre and counterintuitive con-
tent, and SA imagery in their dreams will engage in dream communication. If the given content
themes are related to dream communication and divination, this would make a case for the
claim within CARDD theory that dream divination has a strong connection to this specific kind
of dream content and provide descriptions of the types of cognitive underpinnings that operate
in the transmission of divination.

Setting, method and results

Participants
The article uses interviews from ethnographic research conducted in Nepal in 2016 with the initial
aim of mapping the modalities of dreaming and of purportedly counterintuitive dream imagery.
However, in relation to the exploration of counterintuitive dreaming, its use, religious nature,
and ritualized communication were also a concern. The study included primarily Hindu-Nepali
informants from the Pokhara and Kathmandu valleys who were at various religious sites, pilgrim-
age destinations, and nonreligious sites.
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 11

Procedure
The informants were selected following a random procedure and were interviewed about the con-
tent of dream experiences that they considered to be, and remembered as, “special.” Informants
were thus not specifically instructed to mention any “dharmic” (i.e., religious) dreams. The study
was based on 61 interviews with 39 male (63.9%) and 22 female (36.1%) subjects.

Content of interviews
The interviews also employed a Qualtrics questionnaire that took roughly two hours to complete
and dealt with a range of dream-related topics such as their content, social use, nightmarish content,
emotionality, religiosity, and interpretations. The data discussed here demonstrate (1) the preva-
lence of counterintuitive and bizarre SA dream imagery, the frequency of apprehensive nightmarish
content, and omitted self-agency models, and that this compound of imagery is framed in episodes
drawing information from the input of (2) experiences and information current in the waking state
that (3) are distinguishable from the cultural environment and/or from stipulated topics of moral,
mythological, and religious significance.

Data and measures

The present article is based on secondary data analysis. In general, the analysis relies on the two-step
data analysis method used in the overall study (see Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019, 2021).
First, the frequency and modalities of contents according to (1), such as nightmares, omitted
self-agency models and in particular counterintuitiveness in SA and allegedly “religious” dream
reports, were quantified. This enterprise is in itself valuable for anthropological and cognitive
research on religious and cultural material, since it maps base-rates for various kinds of content,
such as counterintuitive imagery in dreaming (see Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019). Secondly, the per-
sonal relevance of such SA counterintuitive dream imagery was measured and correlated to social
usability and inclination toward communication, which indirectly could give a picture of whether
and in what way specific dream imagery can serve as a source and affordance of divinatory practice
and communication. In order to measure supernatural dream imagery, Barrett’s coding and quan-
tifying scheme for counterintuitiveness was employed (Barrett, 2008). For a thorough elucidation of
the steps in this scheme, see Barrett (2008), and for its use with supernatural dreaming, see Nordin
and Bjälkebring (2019, 2021) and Nordin (2020). Additionally, measures of nightmares were coded
according to reported themes of threat, apprehensive valence, and prevalence of omitted self-agency
model in relation to imagery of various degrees of paralysis, immobility, or restricted action
capacity. The coding was performed by two researchers: one postdoc familiar with the relevant the-
ory, and the author.

SA imagery and counterintuitive dream content

The Hindu Nepali informants indicated the presence of SA imagery and counterintuitive properties
in their dreams by means of phrases like: “Bhagwan appeared as a half statue (Murti) and half man
offering advice;” “Bhagwan appeared as a statue talking to me like a human;” “a big snake (Nag)
appeared whispering” (quotes from Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019). The dream narratives in the
study often contained SA imagery with one counterintuitive item, and in some cases more. The
longer example below (from Nordin, 2020, p. 64) demonstrates several types of SA and counterin-
tuitive imagery (detailed analysis in Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019) as well as nightmarish threats and
omitted self-agency models:
Among many dreams the dream that I like to talk most about is: A beggar wearing grey clothes and asking for
rice/money came to my house. I went inside my house and took a bowl of rice from a basket and [poured it]
12 A. NORDIN

… into his bag, but the small bowl didn’t empty. The bag was full and the bowl was also empty. I got surprised
[went] … inside again, opened the basket, but it was full [of] … Shaligram (sacred ammonite fossils, usually
believed to the relics of and animated by the deity Vishnu Narayan) and flowers. I could see mandirs and rivers
inside the basket where Bhagwans were singing and dancing. I went and joined [the] Bhagwans and Devatas
there. I was like a friend to them. They put me on a bamboo stretcher and threw [me] into the water. My legs
and body [were tied] with a Nag (supernatural serpent). I could do nothing after that, I was put on a block of
firewood. Some unknown people (actually could not remember what is was) produced fire from the mouth
and set fire to the firewood. I was burnt and died. The fire went out and again I got off the block of firewood
and came down, nothing has happened to my body, I was surprised in the dream too.

Objective coding criteria and intercoder reliability

The study applied scoring criteria from Barrett’s CI coding scheme (2008) to the ethnographic case
of Hindu-Nepali supernatural dream imagery. The intercoder reliability when applying Barrett’s CI
coding scheme was high (95%), and Kendall’s Tau-b was calculated, τ = 0.875, p < 0.001, N = 60
counterintuitive objects (analysis from Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2019).

Results: occurrence of CI items

Regarding the occurrence of CI items, there was a high frequency of dreams with at least one
CI element (87%, in 52 of the 60 dream reports), a high frequency of dream items with
counterintuitive ideas about agents (47 out of 57), and some cases consisting of counterintuitive
objects with non-agent properties (10 out of 57) (for an extensive discussion, see Nordin &
Bjälkebring, 2019). Although these are incomplete and culturally specific results, they suggest
that counterintuitive items are common in dream imagery, at least in certain types of cultural
environments.

Bizarre dreams and the relation to CI and veracity

Apart from the supernatural imagery, dream reports often coincided with nightmarish themes,
bizarre dream content, and omitted self-agency model. Although in some cases the interface
between general bizarreness and CI is murky, obvious (non-counterintuitive) cases of bizarreness
occurred, sometimes in combination with counterintuitive dream reports.
One example of a bizarre dream narrative is seen in the following:
I was going back to my home (Bihar, India) on a long bus with my fellow villagers. At the bus stop all the
people got off and I was sleeping. After some time, someone went to the driver’s seat and took the bus to
the sky by driving into the air (flying). The bus stopped at Svorga (the Hindu-Nepali heavenly realm).
There were many Bhagavans (plural form of “deity” or “the Lord”), but I couldn’t remember their faces. (Edi-
ted version with explanatory remarks)

Objective coding criteria and intercoder reliability

The coding criteria used for bizarre content tracked the modalities of the following types of ima-
gery in dream reports where they occur: physically impossible appearances, exaggerated shapes
and sizes, contextual apartness, incongruence, or discontinuity (cf. categorization in Cicogna
et al., 2007; Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002). Consequently, bizarre content was discerned in reports
about abnormal or grotesque volumes, sizes or proportions of buildings, animals, bodies, and
bodily organs. Imagery of being eaten or cooked, cremated, or vomited on by snakes occurred,
as well as of misplaced materials such as a ladder made of water or a snake with an umbrella
head.
Testing of the intercoder reliability of the scoring criteria gave Kappa 0.827, corresponding to
very high agreement. Inconsistencies were discussed and agreement was reached.
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 13

Results: bizarre imagery (and in relation to CI and veracity)

Out of 53 dream reports, bizarre elements occurred in 27 (50.9%), while 23 (43.4%) missed this and
3 (5.7%) were vague. Bizarre and counterintuitive dream content may reduce the dreamer’s
impression of the consistency and veracity of the information and impede affordance utility in divi-
nation and in theory, as it is likely to be hampered by epistemic vigilance in communication. How-
ever, when dreamers in this limited study were asked whether an implicitly bizarre (“a bus that is
500 meters long”) or counterintuitive (e.g., “a stone pig speaking to you”) dream fragment was true,
the obvious tendency favored counterintuitive dreams (14 out of 61 informants, 23%) while bizarre
dreams tended to be primarily trusted in combination with counterintuitive dreams (38 out of 61
informants, 63%) and not alone (1 out of 61 informants, 2%), while eight informants (13%) did not
answer the question. Evidently, stereotypical counterintuitive dream content was, in one way or
another, given the highest epistemic value (23% + 63.3% = 86.3%). This distribution of answers
between CI and bizarre items suggests that participants significantly trusted the dreams with CI
in them (X2 (1, N = 53) = 22.86, p < .0001).
Additionally, when the dreamers were asked whether they believed that a divinatory expert (e.g.,
a dhami jankri, brahmin, pujari, astrologer, mata or baba) would make the same epistemic evalu-
ation in comparing bizarre and counterintuitive dream items, a roughly similar trend unfolded: out
of 61 informants, 26 (42.6%) stated that a divinatory expert would trust counterintuitive dreams,
eight (13.1%) said experts would trust them in combination with bizarre dreams, and no informant
believed that a divinatory expert would trust a solely bizarre dream. Again, a recurrent belief seems
to be that dream content that in one way or another is counter-intuitive is also trusted by divinatory
experts more than solely bizarre content. Such a distribution of answers suggests that participants
significantly believed that experts trusted dreams with CI in them (X 2 (1, N = 31) = 13.03, p < .001).
This further points to the assumptions that CI dream content would also possess high epistemic
value among divinatory experts, and that as a consequence the experts would not immediately dis-
miss such information.

Nightmarish dream content and emotional salience

Objective coding criteria and intercoder reliability
The coding criteria used for nightmarish dream content tracked the modalities of the following
types of imagery in dream reports where they occur: being hunted, being attacked, being preyed
upon, being killed, reports of fear, threatening circumstances, environments, animals, monstrous
creatures, and strangers (cf. Domhoff, 1996; Hall & Van De Castle, 1966; Revonsuo, 2000).
These were coded with intercoder reliability Kappa 0.965, which corresponds to excellent agree-
ment. Inconsistencies were discussed and agreement was reached.

Results: nightmares and apprehensive emotions

As shown in the previously quoted dream narrative, nightmarish imagery was common, and 40%
(n = 24) of reported dreams had some kind of horror theme. In these dreams, being eaten was the
most frequent theme, being represented in 17% of the reported dreams (see Table 1). In the present
sample, the nightmarish content score in dream reports was actually a bit lower than the global base
rate of 65% in the literature (e.g., Domhoff, 2003; Hall & Van De Castle, 1966).
Virtually all reported nightmares concerned direct fitness threats, such as imminent death or
mortality. These are themes that are less about indirect adaptive threats, as otherwise seen in divi-
nation (cf. Frøkjær Sørensen, 2021). These dream narratives were coded as nightmares not only
based on reported morbid, uncanny, or scary imagery but also based on a reported sense of appre-
hension. When the horror of reported nightmares was measured on a graded scale ranging from 10
to 100, out of 61 informants, 32 (52.3%) scored above 50 for emotional intensity. Among these, 20
14 A. NORDIN

Table 1. The main distribution of nightmarish content in the dream reports.

n %
Being eaten (cannibalism) 10 16.7
Being cremated 3 5.0
Exposure to a catastrophe (e.g., earthquake) 1 1.7
Disgust (e.g., exposure to vomit) 1 1.7
Scary movement of animals (e.g., snakes) 3 5.0
Being hunted in the dark by demons 2 3.3
Death caused by accident or sacrifice 2 3.3
Seeing a dead relative 2 3.3

informants (32.8%) estimated a 100 in intensity, while four informants (6.6%) measured 90, and
three (4.9%) measured 80. According to these figures, most nightmares were at the upper level
of discomfort. From the perspective of emotional selection in cultural transmission, this makes
sense, and it explains the prevalence of apprehensive dreaming in motivating communication.

Omitted self-agency imagery in dreams

Nightmares appear in association with diminished agency in the dreamer (McNamara et al., 2018;
McNamara & Bulkeley, 2015). As presented in the previously quoted dream, imagery about an
inhibited self-agency model frequently occurred in nightmares and relates to themes of immobility
or paralysis, as in this dream report: “It was scary because there were many snakes (…) surrounding
me. I could not even move my feet one step further. When I tried, all the snakes started to come
closer to me (…) so frightening.”

Objective coding criteria and intercoder reliability

The coding criteria tracked the modalities of the following imagery in dream reports where they
occur: inability or difficulty to act, move (e.g., paralysis), and speak (being mute), being forced
to escape, being chased, being acted upon (e.g., being eaten), lack of reference to the dreamer in
the imagery (cf. coding procedure in McNamara, 2016, pp. 97–99). An intercoder reliability of
Kappa 0.833 was achieved, corresponding to very high agreement. Inconsistencies were discussed
and agreement was reached.

Results for omitted self-agency imagery in dreams

When coding for the prevalence of omitted self-agency models in the nightmarish reports, 20 cases
of nightmares significantly contained omitted self-agency models, while only one case was found in
a non-nightmarish report. Further, and complicating the issue, self-agency models did occur in nine
nightmares and in 10 non-nightmarish reports. Despite the limited data at hand, the general picture
is that omission of self-agency model occurs during nightmarish dreams (see Table 2).
The prevalence of omitted self-agency models in this dream sample was tested, and the results
show that they are significantly more common in nightmares, Chi Square test χ2 = 11.46, p < .001
(significant). This result is line with other findings (e.g., McNamara et al., 2018; McNamara &
Bulkeley, 2015) that nightmares are predicted by the occurrence of omitted self-agency model in
dreams.

Table 2. The distribution of omitted self-agency model in nightmares and dreams.

Nightmare Dream
Omitted self-agency model 20 1
Self-agency model 9 10
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 15

Summing up (aim 1)
The previous sections have qualified and quantified (aim 1) the recurrent dream content according
to reports mentioning nightmares, omitted self-agency models, bizarreness and CI, SA imagery,
and veracity Although many of the dreams from this sample were evidently nightmarish, the pro-
portionality is slightly lower than is reported in the literature. This may be due to cultural variation
or sampling errors and invites further research.

The second step of the study (aim 2)

The second step of the study (aim 2) was to connect the reported dream content containing night-
mares, omitted self-agency models, bizarreness and counterintuitiveness, and SA imagery, which
suggested affordance relevance of divination, with reported communication. The procedure for car-
rying out this measure consisted of roughly three related topics. The first is whether dreams and
their contents were held to be tokens of communication. The second is whether dream communi-
cation was promoted or actually performed in relation to the occurrence of the dream content. The
third is whether communication and actual divination were considered crucial and were actually
performed. While the first item would highlight the perception and belief that dream contents
are communicative signals, the second would relate the issue to general and rudimentary divinatory
communication, and the third would relate it to actual and specific divinatory practices.

Results
In 36 (60%) of the reports, nightmares were seen as communication with and signals from SA
agents. When reports about moral transgressions were coded as signals, 43 (71.7%) held nightmares
to be communication. Relatedly, in 26.6% of the reports, the concerns relate to moral transgression
or retribution.
As has recently been demonstrated in research specifically addressing the question of SA and
counterintuitive dream reports and communication proneness (Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2021), for
those informants that actually have had a (SA) dream and communicated it to a dream expert, a
significant correlation was found between religiosity and likelihood to communicate the (SA)
dream to an expert (rs = .41, p = .018.). This suggest that those who are more religious are in fact
more likely to communicate their (SA) dreams to experts for divinatory interpretation or advice.
Hence, the connection between SA, counterintuitive dreams and religiosity (at least according to
the present dataset) lies not merely in the overall communication of SA and MCI dreams, but in
a specific act of communicating MCI dreams to religious “experts,” emphasizing that the impor-
tance of divinatory dream interpretation is related to its affordance potential and relevance for
the dreamer.

Multiple regression
A manifest hesitancy to engage in dream sharing with the researcher and field assistant during
interviews was uncommon, a fact that directly demonstrates actual behaviors and attitudes of
dream communication. To further investigate the topic of dream sharing, multiple regression
was used to explore the overall communication attitude, measured by a one-item statement, “It
is important to tell others about this dream,” using a 5-point scale where 1 indicates not important
and 5 indicates very important. This overall communication was used as the dependent variable
(outcome), while the independent variables (hypothetical predictors) were whether the dream
had a nightmarish theme, was bizarre, and if the person reported having an omitted self-model.
In addition, the respective interactions of these characteristics were included (see Table 3). The
model explained 24% (indicated by an R 2 = .24) of the variance in the general communication of
16 A. NORDIN

Table 3. Model predicting overall dream communication.

Unstandardized
coefficients Standardized coefficients
B Std. error Beta t p
Intercept 2.909 .175 16.612 <.001
Nightmare .186 .709 .154 .263 .794
Bizarre .119 .654 .098 .182 .857
Omitted self-model .972 .347 .801 2.800 .009
OmittedXBizzare −.610 .349 −.474 −1.745 .091
OmittedXNightmare −.508 .384 −.366 −1.323 .195
BizzareXNightmare .012 .343 .009 .034 .973
The model explains 24% of the variance; however, only omitted self-model remains a significant predictor.

Table 4. Logistic regression predicting seeking dream-divination.

B S.E. Wald df p
Nightmare(1) 24.089 40192.966 .000 1 1.000
Bizarre (1) −22.188 40192.966 .000 1 1.000
OmittedSM (1) 1.901 1.338 2.019 1 .155
OmittedXBizzare (1) −.119 1.473 .007 1 .936
OmittedXNightmare (1) −.599 1.484 .163 1 .686
BizzareXNightmare (1) −1.381 1.354 1.041 1 .308
Constant −.916 .592 2.399 1 .121
None of the predictors were significant.

the dreams; however, omitted self-model was the only significant predictor of more general com-
munication of dreams.
In a logistic regression (because seeking dream-divination was coded as either seeking divination
or not) the same predictors were used for seeking divination of the dream (see Table 4). None of the
predictors were significantly related to seeking dream-divination of the dream.
However, regarding the simple correlation between omitted self-model and seeking dream-divi-
nation, the Spearman correlation was significant, rs = .31, p = .045. This again indicates that omitted
self-models in dreams are a key part of communication of dreams, and thus are a crucial factor of
divinatory relevance.

Discussion and conclusion

The present study has aimed to test the viability of the CARDD hypothesis using limited empirical
and ethnographic data from Nepal. Although the initial study was not primarily designed to test
what here is framed as the CARDD hypothesis in relation to divination and communication, the
results were solid and relevant enough to prompt the present analysis and publication. This surely
suggests a need for more reliable and fine-grained samplings and predictions, both regarding base-
rates in Nepalese cultural contexts and more generally from dream databases. At the same time the
present study is an attempt to test a methodology and lay the groundwork for general base-rates in
the context of dream divination.
The idea behind the CARDD hypothesis was that certain recurrent traits in dream imagery
should render such imagery more prone to communication and divination in cultural transmission.
Although the list may not be exhaustive, the present analysis assumed that imagery relating to coun-
terintuitive SA imagery in dream reports, along with content concerned with nightmares, loss of
agency and bizarreness, are plausible candidates for being factors in divinatory communication.
All these traits are indeed found to be prevalent and common in the present dataset and in
dream research more generally (except for research on MCI dreams, which is extremely limited).
This conforms with the presuppositions of CARDD theory. First, content involving nightmares
 RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 17

and loss of agency was prevalent in the dream reports, though to a lesser extent than the research
literature suggests. Since nothing in the present research suggests that all dreams are nightmares
and thus are the only content that could be communicated, it is likely that the salience of apprehen-
sive dreams is one relevant feature of divinatory communication. At least this is what the research
literature indicates regarding the relation between strong emotions and communication.
Secondly, almost all of the reported dreams had MCI content and supernatural imagery. Generally,
this may imply that MCI content is ubiquitous in dreams and hence is always selected for communi-
cation, yet dream research appears to have little to say about such content, or has not specifically
demonstrated it, aside from bizarreness (cf. Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2021). In line with the literature
on the transmission advantage of MCI items in the waking state, it is suggested here that when the par-
ticipants selected a dream to report they chose a salient dream with MCI items. Thus, in line with the
literature, MCI items should boost the communication of dreams, even though MCI does not occur in
all dreams. Further research is needed on this point. Apart from the influence of counterintuitive SA
concepts on cultural transmission, the reported veracity belief connected to bizarre and counterintui-
tive dream content might provide further motivation for divinatory communication.
Nightmares and inhibited self-agency imagery are prevalent, suggesting that the presence of
ostensive detachment in ordinary divination generates belief in the veracity of dream content.
This indicates that similar epistemic effects may result from inhibited self-agency imagery and
ostensive detachment, and such conditions would provide an additional attraction factor for
dream communication, just as with ordinary divinatory truth and ostensive detachment.
When it comes to aim (1) of the study, dream content was quantified and internally compared
according to the prevalence of reports referring to nightmares, omitted self-agency models, bizarre-
ness, and counterintuitiveness; additionally, SA imagery and its prevalence were demonstrated.
Interrater /coder reliability was high on all these CARDD items during the analysis.
When it comes to aim (2) of the study, about whether the dream content provides affordance
value and motivation for general dream communication and divination, the data suggest that it
does, at least when omission of self-agency model occurs, and only weakly when counterintuitive
SA dream content occurs (cf. Nordin & Bjälkebring, 2021). Additionally, because different types
of dream content, according to CARDD theory, are likely to motivate divinatory communication,
MCI content is less likely to be the sole factor, which is also demonstrated in the data on the relation
between nightmarish imagery of omitted agency and communication.
Crucially, even if the items included in the CARDD hypothesis for dream divination had solid
theoretical support, when running multiple regressions on the empirical sample, signs of corre-
lations (between the CARDD items) were primarily evident. Only the occurrence of dreams with
omitted self-agency models predicted dream communication.
These results generally suggest that cognitions of omitted self-agency models operate as func-
tionally similar to the cognitive effects produced by ostensive detachment in divination practices
in the waking state. That is, occurrence of lack of control, randomness, non-voluntarism, and
absence of manipulatory intent affect the perceived epistemic value of the causal flow of events.
And consequently, the present study offers evidence for the assumption that analogous conditions
hold for dream divination. These results further support the notion that SA concepts are not them-
selves the crucial factor in the transmission and communication of (dream) divination.
In light of the present research, improved models, further theory-driven, culturally sensitive,
cross-cultural research, and the establishment of base rates are called for concerning the contents
of dreaming and the cultural transmission of these representations.

Ethical statement

. This research fully complies with the ethical guidelines of the Swedish Research Council, includ-
ing with regard to informed consent, strategies of anonymization, and informing the
18 A. NORDIN

interviewees about the consequences of their participation. All reasonable efforts were made to
ensure that the ethnographic interviews and research process would not jeopardize participants’
integrity. By following these conditions, the study avoided potential ethical problems from the
start.
. Before each ethnographic interview, potential participants were informed about the conse-
quences of their participation and told that they were contributing to scientific research on
dreaming and the Hindu religion. It was made clear to them that they were free (1) to choose
whether to take part in the interview, (2) to decline to answer any question, and (3) to stop
the interview at any stage. Furthermore, they were fully informed that personal and sensitive
topics were not part of the questionnaire and were not of interest for the research project. Inter-
viewees gave their verbal informed consent, and strategies for anonymization were used.
. No vulnerable populations were involved. Regarding our choice of verbal informed consent, the
use of written informed consent from informants is not practiced (in the social sciences) when
ethical concerns are estimated to be largely absent and the procedures adhere to the guidelines of
the Swedish Research Council. Regarding ethical approval, when research projects include topics
of sensitive ethical nature, they must be approved by a committee at the local university in Swe-
den. The present project, however, never touched on or dealt with such questions.
. As a consequence of the above-mentioned facts, ethical approval was not required as per the
applicable institutional and national guidelines and regulations in Sweden.
. Finally, the present study was conducted in the developing country of Nepal, where seeking writ-
ten informed consent would have been difficult, impractical, and even potentially counterpro-
ductive from an ethical perspective. This is because many persons in this sociocultural
context may believe that signing formal (and foreign) documents could lead to legal problems
and trouble with the authorities.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his gratitude to Pär Bjälkebring, Ph.D., for help with the data collection strategy and
data analysis. This included an independent coding procedure, separate from that of the author, and estimates of
inter-rater reliabilities in the coding of dream content. The author would also like to thank field assistant Bikram
Timsina for his invaluable work in Nepal.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This research was supported by grants from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences [2008, 2009] and Stiftelsen Wil-
helm och Martina Lundgrens Vetenskapsfond [Dnr 2016-13-17].

ORCID
Andreas Nordin http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4388-1760

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