H

HLSC 2010-W
WP/55
International Civil Aviatio
on Organizattion 15/3/10
E
English only1
WORKING
W PAPER

HIGH-LE
EVEL SAF
FETY CON
NFERENCE 2010
M
Montréal, 29 March
M to 1 April
A 2010

Theme 1:: The found dations for global aviatioon safety

Topic 1..2: The evolu
ution of the saafety oversigght audit process by ICAO
O

ERSAL SAFE
UNIVE ETY OVERSSIGHT AUD
DIT PROGRA
AMME COM MPREHENS
SIVE SYSTE
EMS
APPROACH AUDIT– ONE
O OR MOORE THAN ONE STATE
E COORDIN
NATOR

(Preseented by Brazil)

SU
UMMARY
The outlline of the Universal Saafety Oversight Audit Programme’s P new
continuouus monitoringg approach (CMA)
( requires that bothh ICAO and State
Memberss complete a number off actions in order to im mplement the new
approach
h, including thet need for States to nom minate a Nattional Continnuous
Monitorinng Coordinattor (NCMC). Brazilian exxperience shows, however, that
such propposal could crreate conflictts in civil aviaation safety reesponsibilitiess and
accountabbilities related to regulatioon and surveiillance activitties on the seervice
providerss by the Statee, considering that some States, like Brazil,B have more
than one Accountable Executive in their SSP.

Action: The Conferennce is invited to consider:

a) the Brazilian
B expeerience in maanaging the trransition to thhe implementtation
of a State
S Safety Programme
P (S
SSP) environm ment; and

b) ICAOO’s review off concept thaat each State must

m define only
o one Nattional
Continuous Moniitoring Coorddinator (NCM MC) to be reesponsible for the
impleementation off the USOAP CMA enviroonment.

1. IN
NTRODUCT
TION

1.1 The HLSC

H 2010-WWP/3 – The evolution
e of the
t safety oveersight audit process by IC CAO,
presented by ICAO Secretariat
S in HLSC 20100, affirms thaat the transition to an US SOAP Continnuous
Monitorinng Approach (CMA) will involve the establishment
e of a system to monitor thhe safety overrsight
capabilityy of State Members
M on ana ongoing basisb and wiith a harmonnized and coonsistent approach
towards assessing
a the safety
s level off aviation acttivities and evvaluating safeety managemeent capabilitiees.

1.2 The CMA

C transitioon plan will require that both
b ICAO and
a State Meembers complete a
number of
o actions in order
o to impllement the neew approach.. States will first be requiired to sign a new

1
English veersion submitted by Brazil.

(3 pages)
HLSC.10.WWP.055.1.en.docc
HLSC 2010-WP/55 -2-

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ICAO and nominate a National Continuous Monitoring
Coordinator (NCMC), that will receive Computer-Based Training (CBT) on the CMA and will be
responsible for communicating to ICAO their respective State’s progress in resolving their safety
oversight deficiencies as well as their level of aviation activity.

1.3 Considering the paragraph above, the approach proposed by ICAO to USOAP CMA
begins with a requirement that States can identify and nominate just one Coordinator to assume the
responsibility to coordinate all activities related to the new audit process that will evaluate States safety
oversight capacity.

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1 The State Safety Programme (SSP) implementation concept, as proposed by ICAO, may
involve the necessity of coordination among several authorities responsible for a variety of SSP functions.
The ICAO documentation also establishes that States should clearly identify and define requirements,
responsibilities and accountabilities related to the establishment and maintenance of an SSP.

2.2 Element 1.2 “State safety responsibilities and accountabilities”, of the first component
(State safety policy and objectives) proposed by ICAO to the SSP structure, points out to the necessity for
States to identify and nominate the Accountable Executive for SSP. The whole proposal for the
Accountable Executive is to give him the responsibility for coordinating the activities of several civil
aviation organizations in the State, having administrative responsibilities and accountabilities, acting in
behalf of the State in all issues related to the implementation and maintenance of SSP.

2.3 It is also established in ICAO SSP material that this Accountable Executive must have
authority under important financial aspects related to the SSP implementation and certification process for
service providers, as well as responsibilities in coordinating solutions for all the aspects related to the
safety of civil aviation.

2.4 Summarizing, all ICAO SSP implementation and maintenance material considers the
possibility of having just one person accumulating responsibilities and accountabilities over all the SSP
activities, no matter the quantity, variety and subordination of the organizations involved in SSP
implementation.

3. DISCUSSION

3.1 Since the end of 2005, there are two (2) aviation authorities in Brazil responsible and
accountable for the safety oversight of its several activities. The President -Director of ANAC is the civil
aviation authority, being ANAC the Brazilian civil aviation Agency, a special autarchy with a regulatory
status and of an administrative independence, financial autonomy, with no hierarchical subordination,
linked to the Ministry of Defense. The other authority is the Air Force Command, a military authority,
subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.

3.2 ANAC is responsible for the civil aviation regulation and the safety oversight related to
ICAO USOAP protocols, as follows: PEL (part of Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing), OPS (Annex 6 —
Operation of Aircraft, Annex 7 — Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks and Annex 18 — The Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air), AIR (Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft and Annex 16 —
Environmental Protection) and AGA (Annex 14 — Aerodromes).
 -3- HLSC 2010-WP/55

3.3 The Air Force Command (COMAER) is a military organization responsible for
regulation and surveillance related to the other protocols, PEL (part of Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing,
related to air navigation personnel), ANS (Annex 2 — Rules of the Air, Annex 3 — Meteorological
Service for International Air Navigation, Annex 4 — Aeronautical Charts , Annex 10 — Aeronautical
Telecommunications, Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services, Annex 12 — Search and Rescue and Annex 15
— Aeronautical Information Services) and AIG (Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation).

3.4 The decision of proposing two authorities with specific responsibilities and
accountabilities, in the Brazilian SSP, called Safety Programme for Brazilian Civil Aviation – PSO-BR,
had the objective of establishing the Brazilian authorities obligations in order to help to increase civil
aviation safety, using proactive management, predictive techniques, complemented by procedures focused
on reactive techniques.

3.5 Another objective of PSO-BR was to define the requirements that enable each authority
(ANAC and COMAER) to create specific programmes for their area of activity. These Specific Safety
Programmes to the Nacional Civil Aviation Agency (PSOE-ANAC) and to the Air Force Command
(PSOE-COMAER), once approved by their respective authorities, become part of PSO-BR.

3.6 Among the directives of PSO-BR there is one that establishes that ANAC and COMAER
must elaborate and approve a PSOE for each organization, containing safety management requirements to
themselves as regulatory authorities and to the service providers regulated by them, aiming at contributing
to the continuous increase of civil aviation safety in Brazil. Each PSOE must define an Accountable
Executive for its implementation, operation and safety oversight including other aspects such as human
and financial resources necessary to the appropriate implementation.

3.7 On 8 January 2009, the President-Director of ANAC and the Air Force Commander
signed the PSO-BR that was used as a guidance to create the PSOE-ANAC, approved in June of the same
year.

3.8 The success that Brazil has been obtaining in its SSP implementation process proves that
the decision of having two authorities with specific responsibilities and accountabilities may be applied in
other countries that have more than one organization taking care of civil aviation safety management and
acting in a independent way.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 The successful experience in Brazil in its SSP implementation process proves that it is
possible for the States to have more than one authority with responsibilities and accountabilities for
implementing the SSP environment, with different subordinations, once they agree with common safety
objectives, having their responsibilities clearly defined in their SSP.

4.2 In this sense, the proposal for States of nominating just one National Continuous
Monitoring Coordinator (NCMC) in the USOAP CMA environment could create conflicts in civil
aviation safety responsibilities and accountabilities related to regulation and surveillance activities on the
service providers by the State, considering that some States, like Brazil, have more than one Accountable
Executive in their SSP.

— END —