PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS.

IAC

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Gamefowl Commission ordered Mayor Martinez to issue a license to operate a
cockpit to Hee Acusar and revoke the mayor’s permit previously issued to Santiago Sevilla.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine Gamefowl Commission has the power to issue licenses for the operation of
cockpits

RULING:

No. According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to "grant licenses and
permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the
conditions upon which they have been granted," and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate
cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines
promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission."

A study of the above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the
Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits.
Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid
down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited only to international
derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not
of control but only of review and supervision.
 TECSON VS. SALAS

FACTS:

Jose Tecson, the Superintendent of Dredging of the Bureau of Public Works, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition after then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas, acting on behalf of the President, assigned
him on temporary detail to the office of Commodore Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and
Harbors.

ISSUE:

Whether there is removal without just cause

RULING:

No. The detail of petitioner to the Office of the President was thus unobjectionable. By no stretch of the
imagination could it be considered a removal. It was not even a transfer. Even if it could be so viewed,
the same conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable under the Civil Service Act provision then in
force, so long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such transfer therefore not being considered
disciplinary when made in the interest of public service. Nor is there any merit to the assertion made in
the brief of petitioner that the directive of the Executive Secretary, acting upon authority of the
President, needed the approval of the Civil Service Commission and the Commissioner of the Budget for
its enforcement. Such a thought is repugnant to the very concept of a single, not a plural, executive in
whom is vested the whole panoply of executive power. It is not only illogical, but it does not make
sense, to require as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of subordinate to an action taken by their
superior, the President, who tinder the Constitution is the Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such
branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those discharging purely executive function in the
national government, he lie gives orders to all and takes orders from none.
 DENR VS. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES

FACTS:

The Regional Executive Director of DENR Region XI Israel C. Gaddi issued a Memorandum directing the
immediate transfer of DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronal, South Cotabato pursuant
to DENR AO No. 99-14 and EO No. 192. Respondent employees pf DENR sought to nullify said orders.

ISSUE:

Whether the DENR Secretary has authority to reorganize the DENR

RULING:

Yes. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President –
through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary – may legally and validly
decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance
of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS. IAC

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Gamefowl Commission ordered Mayor Martinez to issue a license to operate a
cockpit to Hee Acusar and revoke the mayor’s permit previously issued to Santiago Sevilla.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine Gamefowl Commission validly exercised its power to review other executive
officers

RULING:

No. The power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to
substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound
discretion. In the instant case, the PGC did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla, assuming he
was disqualified, but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own choice. Assuming
Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained with the municipal
authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC.

In ordering the respondent municipal officials to cancel the mayor's permit in favor of Santiago A. Sevilla
and to issue another one in favor of Acusar, the PGC was exercising not the powers of mere supervision
and review but the power of control, which had not been conferred upon it.

US VS. BARRIAS
FACTS:

Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of
the Insular Collector of Customs for moving the lighter Maude while heavily laden with bamboo poles,
and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Barrias claims that the Collector of Customs has no
authority to promulgate the same, thus there is undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether the Collector of Customs has the power to impose fines for the regulation of harbor activities
pursuant to Act No. 1136, thus, there is no undue delegation of legislative power

RULING:

No. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319
[19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235
and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but
also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.

A delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through
the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an
Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary
to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute
a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the
delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of
power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law
authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was
held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep.,
406.) The subject is considered, and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in
re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to
designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter
constitute a crime or misdemeanor.

US VS. ANG TANG HO

FACTS:

Defendant Ang Tang Ho questioned the validity of EO No. 53 issued pursuant to Act No. 2868, regulating
the distribution and sale of palay, rice and corn. EO No. 53 fixed the price at which palay can be sold.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a valid delegation

RULING:

No. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it
was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime,
it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature
making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to
a crime.