NATIONALSECURITY FILES Box 201

COUNTRIES
VIETNAM
Vietnam Vol. XX, CIA C,ables, 10/15-29/63 '/J.
L\E><::1.i..';~~~
-v~--£~•-'i~: ~ f;;),M~"/
,4,/,,)r,I7-S.:f~ 1 j//,l
C 1 , Index of caQle/ from original folder
~ fVt...f(-"f'i_-7,
1-,)(e"'- t&)_ 1:/0 f,I _/ L.. t;'j,~ lJ_.t.f' 1 t

2__1of.i::;1p3 crA s (~) cr>P.,;ff'f;-r,l.w IJ,z.,r;/7 -~t-lc.'< '--~·.-,·6

,,llt.-1_JL ~Clo,

~J:!S'
EXEiVIPTED~\..V-..·G:a.-~\ 1 :!>'f".:!l·H{lf.<-'1.f-4,lt .'
~ 10/24/63 CIA S (1) 1p Cable ~?~?8(Washington)
I • ' •' El'-~t-A Pi<:'"P, N\.'L • c,--:i,.• :,vi 8 ; ?f-t'o

1 S-wr/t/;.e//Y'Lk/I J--S3ft' J Jff7

Exo,-,,,/.c/IVL/(· 99;-7 ~i tl..po-

1110/25/63 CIA TS (1) 5pp[5t]
•
I
 (!)

INDEX - CAS

1788
1896
1906
1925
47370
77873

------
78141

DTG 240750Z
DTG 2408011:Z
DTG 240928Z
DTG 241029Z

.......
t96ito
78161

DTG 260936Z
2003
2023
2040
2041
2043

•
SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5 /
cl1..,ll-I1-52(!
Sy NARA. Dale'
 ·ri o N ReP <:.{r li#!Jd;U+
~ fi#!:@;tf+~■ 1N F- >R ~~:A
• - • CENTRAL INTELLIGENce~AGitBr ✓ ~.;-,V'""V
1hit ,,,.,.,,., (OflfliM •lflfOtM•l;OI\ tlfnt:11q th• N,1;011,1 o,t,11w of ,,.,, U111t,d Sl.•to 'llf!;lk•fl,th, lflUl\illf of Ill, EtOIOll,IQt '-••l, Mlt It, u.s.c Stcl
1U i,id 1H, lht lr,111rni1ttO• or rtYtlllio11 of which (11 '"' MttMlt to •" 1110.a11V1ou19d
ootu'O,. h c,o.hlb:t1d by 1,.,.

CLASSIFICATION - 0ISSEMINATIOi,I CQ!-ITROLS

NO FOREIGNDISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND

USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTHVIE'l'NAMNORTHVIETNAM REPORTNO,

SUBJECT MADAME
NHUCONTACTSNORTHVIETNAMESE DATE DISTR. 15 OOTOBER1963
IN ROME
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN
DATE OF
INFO.
4¢¢¢3

APPR:
_,

"
. A, DURINGHER STAY IN ROMEMADAME
NGODINH NHUCONTACTED
LE DINH PHUONG
ANODR PHAMNGOCTHACH,DRVMINISTEROF HEALTH,
.
.WHOWEREBOTHATTENDING
THE INTERNATIONAL
TUBERCULOSIS
CONFERENCE
IN ROMEON 22, 23 AND24 SEPTEMBER. MADAME
NHUPRESENTED
WRITTEN
PROPOSALS
THATTHE ORVANOTHE REPUBLICOF VIETNAM
CONSQLIDATE
THEIR
·POSITIONSANDTHEN.WORKTOGETHER
TO LIQUIDATEAMERICAN
INFLUENCE.
·PHUONG
TOLDMADAME
NHUTHATTHEYWERENOTCOMMISSIONED TO NEGOTIATE
WITHH
r/c V c/ 8
sE7 R ET
cLAss1F1cAT1ON- D1sseM1NAT1ON coNTR:oLs

..---'---,---,;.---.---r--,-:--,,..-----,---,---==
o"'"",
NO_}'OREIGNDISSEM/NO~ISSEM ABROAD/BACICGR8ffi
USE ···~t::t:.f
STUCIINR OIA AfU,1vfACSI NAVY A.flt JCS SCCOCf' HSA -NIC JOD{ OCI OHC OCR ~ }fiiiX
I
STATCIO 1$'

L. blR .1.ol ·;.•/. S

~ lK OJ380LZT'B PR:sVI008 £DmON8.

 CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION
CONTROLS

SEC·· ...ET NOFOREIGN

DIS~/NO _DISSE!,!
Af)ROAD/ IN 4¢¢¢3
(When FUl.ed.'.In)
BACKGROUND'USE·ONLY PAGE 2

-~-
B. WASALSOTO BE ASSIGN~DTO THE,.DRVMIss·ION
DR. THACH
IN PARIS.
2. -J)ISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR
LODGE)USMACV
(GENERAL
HARKINS)CINCPACPACFLTARPACPACAF.
ENDOF MESSAGE

·' '

.'. '

'' .•'
..
•-

•,.

:'

.... . ;_,
... : ~... . . \. ~ .•.- :· .. : ....
' '
CLASSIF)CATION
- ._, - .. .. .
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ..
NO FOREIGND~~,l)ISSEM AB!1,OA,D/BACK~~~USE ONLY
··- .-
·r
.\_ •.
--·--------- -- :.t
 ------------------ -
TELEGRAM INF<\'. .lMATION RE Po'.-.r
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Thli m•!ui•I co111,;M i11fo,m•lio11 ,Uu.1:11Q 11\t 1'ht<o11•I Otf1,n, ot tlile Ul'li1td s,.,,, w,1>.,11 '"" m, • .,:11q or 11\,
'·
Eu>•
7') •11d ,, .., th• IUM,.,in;otl o, ,,,,,i.ulo.-. .I\., '"'"'''' to •11 Ulht ull'lotutd (l*HOh h CHOh;b;t,d by , ....
of .. ht(ll il'l

CLASSIFICATION - OISSeMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I_). E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE.ONLY
-~ CONTROtLEDDISSEM
=----'--
COUNTRYSOUTH VIETNAM REPORT
NO.

SU8JeCT 1. NATIONALIST GROUPS IN SAIGON PLANNiijl,nE DISTR.

15 OCTOBER 1963
ASSASSINATION OF AMERICANS
2. Piwrs D]/;FECTING TO CAMBODIA MAY os~ReCEDENCeROUTINE
AIRPLANES' WEAPONS AGAINST PRESIDENT
DATEOF NGO DINH D1EM REFERENCES IN 39010
' INFO. 10 OCTOBER 1963
PLACE & CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (12 OCTOBER 1963)
DATEACQ.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIHOREPORT
NO.
c._ _ ___; THISIS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.
SOURCE
GRADINGS
AREDEFINITIVE.
SOURCE
APPR:

1. SUMMARY. A MEMBER OF DR. PHAM HUY CO'S "NATIONAL

COUNCIL OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION" SAID ON 10 OCTOBER 1963

THAT NATIONALIST GROUPS WOULD SOON LAUNCH AN AMERICAN ASSASSINATION

CAMPAIGN IN SAIGON. IN THE FUTURE, VIETNAMESE PILOTS WHO DEFECT

TO CAMBODIA WILL USE THEIR AIRPLANES' WEAPONS AGAINST PRESIDENT

NGO DINH DIEM BEFORE LEAVING.

2. A COMMITTEE MEMBER OF DR. PHAM HUY CO'S "NATIONAL

$TAft/0fR • l.::~O

SANITIZED
1K~ OIISOLtn: PREVIOUS ED11'1QN8. E 1 6 S . 3.5
 . C~SlflCATION - DISSEMINATION
CON.TROLS
NOF0REIGN /
DISSEM NODISSEM
C-0-N-F:-I-D-E-N. -I-A-L BACKGROUND USE;ONLY/CONTRO
DISSEM

COUNCILOF THE VIETNAMESE.REVOLU'rION",

IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION
WITH A FRIEND IN PHNOMPENH, STATEDTHAT ANTI-AMERICAN
FEELING
WASINCREASINGRAPIDLY IN NATIONALISTCIRCLES. HE FORECASTTHAT
IN THE NEARFUTURENATIONALISTSIN SAIGON WOULDLAUNCHA CAMPAIGN
TO ASSASSINATEAMERICAN
PERSONNELTHERE, USING HANDGRE°NADES
AND
PLASTIC BOMBS. BE CLAIMEDTHAT MEAffiERS
OF DR. CO'S MOVEMENT
HAD

.. DECLINEDTO PARTICIPATE IN THESE ATTACKSBU'l' THAT MOSTOTHER

NATIONALISTGROUPSHADAGREEDTO DO SO.
3. THE SOUTHVIETNAMESE
PILOT, CAPTAINHUYNHMINGDUONG,
WHODEFECTEDTO CAMBODIA
ON 5 OCTOBER,IS A PERSONALFRIEND OF
LIEUTENANTPHAMPHU QUOC, THE PILOT WHOEARLIER BOMBED
PRESIDENT
NGODINH DIEM'S PALACE. QUOCWASUNHAPPYTHATDUONGHADNOT
USED HIS AIRPLANE'S WEAPONSAGAINSTDIEM BEFORELANDINGAT PlINOM
PENH, AS HADBEENPREVIOUSLYUNDERSTOOD.HOWEVER,HE CLAIMED
THAT OTHERPILOTS WHODEFECTEDTO CAMBODIA
WOULD
FIRE THEIR
IVEAPONS
AT DIEM BEFORELEAVING.
4. FIELD DISSEM. CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF. (SAIGON:
STATE,AMBASSADOR
LODGE;USMACV, ~S)
GENERAL
END OFMESSAGE

ClASSIFICATION
- DISSEMINATION
CONTROLS
NOFO!lEIGN DISSEM/NO
DISSEMABROAD/BACKGROUND
USEONLY/
•' · .:. · •• NTROLIED
DISSEM
fOiM JIM
·~1-§3.
;
. ' '
 -
'-1:....l.,l-v- ,.,.JL ~ 0.
FLE/\St:~ITUP-N
TO WASIIlNGTON TO CIA
FROM SAIGON 1788, 18 OCTOBER 1963

l. ON 16 OCTOBER 1963 FOLLOWING A ROTARY CLUB

LUNCHEON, MR. LAM NGOC HUAN ASKED THE ASSISTANT LABOR

ATTACHE, MR. GEORGE H. SHEEKS, TO STOP BY ms OFFICE FOR

A FEW MINUTES. MR. HUAN IS MANAGER OF THE CARAVELLE HOTEL,

A PROMINENT ROT ARIAN, AND A FORMER ARVN OFFICER WHO

WAS RETIRED IN 1961 FOR SUSPICION OF COMPLICITY IN THE 1960

COUP PLOT. HE IS AJ.,SO A Kl"'ljOWNCLOSE ASSOCIATE OF GENERALS

TRAN VAN DON AND DUONG VAN MINH. HUAN'S WIFE (HE IS HER

TffiRD HUSBAND) WAS EARLIER BELIEVED TO BE A FRENCH AGENT

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITY ON

HER PART SINCE 1961.

2. HUAN MENTIONED TO MR. SHEEKS THAT HE WAS TRYING

TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH A MILITARY OFFICER DESIGNATED BY

THE AMBASSADOR TO TAKE PART IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS.

HUAN CLAIMED THAT HE WAS REPRESENTING SOME VIETNAMESE

GENERALS AND OTHER OFFICERS WHO WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE

SITUA'IDN AND GET A CLEAR PICTURE OF U.S. DESIRES WITH

RESPECT TO VIETNAM. HE MENTIONED LT. COL. CONEIN'S NAME

AND WONDERED ALOUD IF CONEIN WAS THE RIGHT MAN WITH WHOM

TO TALK.
GB~lit1
IFIED Ettl~~~rrr..1t:t,cuu,
GJ-.i!J.i.. :..: c.J
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5 ( .. ....:::,I~, JJ
 SECRET
l:VE3
ONLY
3. MR. SHEEKS REPLIED NON-COMMITTALLY TO THIS

APPROACH BUT STATED HE WOULD TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE.

4. THIS INFORMATION WAS REPORTED TO CAS. IT HAD BEEN

PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED THAT AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GENERAL DON AND COL. CONEIN

AN OCCASIONAL MESSAGE MIGHT BE PASSED THROUGH HUAN.

THIS HAD BEEN GEN. DON'S SUGGESTION SINCE HUAN IS A MUTUAL

FRIEND OF BOTH DON AND CONEIN. HUAN WAS, IN FACT, A

SUBORDINATE OF CONEIN'S WHEN THE LATTER PARACHUTED INTO

LANG SON IN 1945 TO ORGANIZE AN ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA FORCE.

5. ACTING ON THIS INFORMATION CONEIN WAS INSTRUCTED

TO GO TO THE CARAVELLE BAR ON THE AFTERNOON OF 17 OCTOBER,

NOT TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HUAl~, BUT MERELY TO ASCERTAIN

IF HUAN WOULD CONTACT HIM. HUAN DID MAKE THIS CONTACT

ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND INFORMED CONEIN THAT HE HAD BEEN

ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT CONEIN FOR SOME TIME BUT HAD

HESITATED TO CALL CONEIN'S HOME OR THE EMBASSY FOR SECURITY

REASONS. CONEIN ASKED WHY HUAN HAD ATTEMPTED THIS CONTACT

AND HUAN REPLIED THAT HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM "THE GENERALS"

AS FOLLOWS:

A. AT A RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN ON THE NIGHT OF

18 OCTOBER BY GENERAL HARKINS FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AT

WHICH ALL THE VIETNAMESE GENERALS WILL BE PRESENT, ONE OF

2
SECRET
THEM, PRESUMABLY EITHER GENERAL DON OR GENERAL MINH,

WILL APPROACH AMBASSAOOR LODGE AND ASK THE LATTER TO

VOUCH THAT CONEIN SPEAKS WITH AUTHORITY.

B. IF THE AMBASSADOR CONFIRMS TH'AT CONEIN OOES

HAVE SUCH AUTHORITY, CONEIN SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR A NEAR

FUTURE CONT ACT WITH "THE GENERALS" SOME PLACE OUTSIDE

OF SAIGON, THE TIME AND PLACE TO BE MADE KNOWN TO CONEIN

SEPARATELY.

6. HUAN EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS ALL HE KNEW, COULD

NOT ELABORATE FURTHER, AND WAS MERELY PASSING THE

MESSAGE. CONEIN THANKED HUAN FOR THE MESSAGE BUT ADDED

THAT HE TOO WAS SOMEWHAT MYSTIFIED BY ITS CONTENT.

7 .. ABOVE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSAOOR. HE WILL RESPOND

AFFIRMATIVELY WITH RESPECT TO CONEIN IF THE QUESTION IS

RAISED.

END OF MESSAGE
 (>):;
~1~ 1<>/2~

,)._J ()(;1-b)

,.
• MET'WITH .HIM MORNING23 'per AT JOINT GENERAL STAFF; COVER'FOR
.
·, MEETING'WAS DISCt,JSSION REO!:NT DEMARC\iE MADE TO SECRETARYTHUAN ·.'

\'
'. 2;
·, . '
, AND Ca. TUNG WITH RESPECT TO SUPPOOTOF SPECIAL FORCES; • :
GEN DON WAS QUITE· AGITATED; • HE STATED THAT THE GENERALS

COUP COMMITTEE HAD DECIDED TO ATTEMPT TO T.Al<EADVANTAGEOF THE (, .• ,'

..-- _,J. '
.........
0

··:26i;~I }NATIONA L ·HOLIDA.'f, IN OODERTO STAGE A COUP WITHIN THE WEEK;~'.__ .....,·_:
• • ♦
1
.HOWEVER; ON 22 OCT'GEN HARl<INS HAD CALLED IN GEN DON AND STATED

' , ..!"'__KHUO~G; A. MEMBER

THAT 'HE. <HARKINS) HAD REPOOTS THAT COL· NGUY;
. • I .
OF GEN DON'S STAFF; WAS PLANNING A COUP TOf':octliR;.ON OR ABOUT 27
>k . • .
. ocr; (SEE USARMA SAIGON C-398, 2·1 ocr 63, DTG 21 !055Z), GEN

HARKINS ALLEGEDL'Y STATED TO DON THAT THIS WAS THE WRONGTIME FOR
..
A coup·;THE ~AR \I/AS GOING \I/ELL AND THAT COL KHUONGSHOULD BE MADE

TO C~ASE AND DESIST IN HIS PLANNING; "FURl'HERMORE; GEN DON AS.SERTED

....
.. .
THAT WOFID·OF COL KHUONG',S OVERTURESTO THE AMERICANS HAD REACHED '
..
THE PALACE; AS A RESULT; THE 5TH DIVISION AND THE 7TH DIVISION;

WHICH HAD BEEN·COUNTED QN AS KEY ELEfdENTS IN THE ~A!IGON AREA·'.fO

':

. ......
PARTICIPATE IN .THE coup; HAD.BEEN EXTENDED ON THEIR OPERATIONS
.. ___.,_ -
.l -.... . •:
. '.
..
' . ' .
REPRODUCTION
llY OTHERTHANTHE ISSUINGOFFICEIS PROHIBITED • Copy No..
 CLASSIFIED
ME~SAGt TOP SECRET IN 4556L_ PAGE2 OF"3
OUTSIDE OF' SAIGON.BY' OlfDER or· THE PRESIDENT;
3; DON DEMANDEO TO KNOii THE ANSWERSTO HIS PREVIOUS QUESTIONS

WITH RESPECT TO THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARDSA coup: co )t ,N REPLIED

•
\ .
THAT; SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS; HE COULD SAY THAT THE USG WOU1.D
,NOT THWART A·CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT'ORDENY ECONOMICAND MILITAR.Y· ...
•':
. ,#
.• '.'

.
)

ASSISTANCE· TO A NEW REGIME .IF IT APPEARED CAPABLE OF INCREASING •: ,..

' ' • .. .
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MIL J.TARY EFF'QRT~ ASSURING POPULAR SUPPORT . \'t.•
' )·;.·
: .
•. TO WIN THE WAR; AND IMPROVING WORKINGRELATIONSHIPS WITH THF; us:
4; GEN DON THEN ASKED CONEIN TO TELL THE AMBASSADOR; AS FROM
'
THE GENERALS COUP COMMITTEE~ :HAT COL KHUONGWAS NOT A MEMBEROF' T\IE
' .'t}

.of.,·!:•_:
•
.
COUP COMMITTEE; DID NOT ,REPRESENT THE COMMITTEE OR ITS THINKING;
t I
:
•
,4· ,
... •
i, • :•
'. AND SHOULD NOT. BE CONSIDERED AS REPRESENTING ANY SUBSTANTIAL · •1 ::' ! '
• • • I
• 4 .. i
ELEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE COUP COMMITTEE WILL MEET-ON 2:S , .. , .,~.;,_! .
. ,OCT AND DECIDE ON APP~O'P~IATE'DISCIPLI~ARY ACTION TO BE(T~. ,· : ,,!. ••.••

...\/ITH RESPECT TO COL· KHUONG:

.:-, ( •"
• •.
, . ,,· 5;CONEIN INQUIRED,IF GEN.DON HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT . ,.•, ,
I J .
• HIM THRU THE MEDIUM or LAM NGOC·HUAN. GEN DON ADMITTED T.H~T
-
, HE HAD: CONEIN INQUIRED WHY THE GENERALS HAD NOT THEN SPOKEN
,,., . . '
TO THE AMBASSADORAT THE RE~PT ION ON THE 18TH: DON RESPONDED
..
r THAT THERE HAD BEEN'TOO MANY MEMBERSOF GEN HARKINs·s

PERMIT ANY SECURE CONVERSATIONWITH THE AMBASSADOR:

STAFF ro·

. : .. ..
/1 CONEIN THEN CHALLENGEDDON TO PRODUCEPR0_0F'JHAT THE

I i)f GENERALS COUP COMMITTEE EXISTED OR THAT THEY HAD ANY PLAN .·:
WHATSOEVER: TO THI.s; DON SAID THE GENERALS PLANS WERE'~IELL

, ADVANCEDAND THAT AS PROOF HE WOl)LD SEEK THE PERMISSION OF 1,"HE

..
'

1•TOP SECRET .
- •
' .

'
-
 . . - . -- . ~ .1~.,.,t i.a I,-._,
T8P:SECRET.
.. .·.. -.. PAGE·1"or ·2 '; •• :. ·lv
. . ' ... .. ·-·-·-..- ·-··-- ·····-···•· .. ____
\
•.•... ..,...
\o.
- •;.

DATE; [23_OCT 6:3 RECD: OCT23 O907z 63

FROM1 SAIGO!i). ;tj;b jt:9-IEDI ATE

TO: DI RECTOR

$~ tYE~. O~t.Y FORSECREl;ARY

RUSKFROMLODGE

PLEASE,PASSEYESONLYTO SECRETARY
M,CN.AMARA
AliD DCI, MR. JOHNMCCONE:

' '
t. AT THE TIME '
OF FILING CAS SAIGON 189~ I HAD BELIEVED

GENERAL HARKINS WAS IN BANGKOK. IN FACT, HE \\!AS NOT, BUT HAD

BEEN ON A TRIP IN THE DELTA AREA. IN CONVERSATION w·ITH GENERAL

HARKINS ON THE AFTERNOO,N OF 23 OCTOBER, \\IE DISCUSSED CAS SAIGON

1896. GENERAL HARKINS CONFIRMED THAT THAT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE

WHICH REFERRED TO HIM ~AS CORRECT, GENERAL HARKINS ADDED THAT IT

-WAS HIS INTENTION TO DISCOURAGE VARIOUS MILITARY OFFICERS FROM

APFR OACHING HIS OFFICERS ON POL IT I CAL MATTERS, AS \ti AS THE CASE WITH

ca..
.
KHUONG, AND THAT HE WISHED TO FOCUS 'f.H~ ATTENTION
. .
OF THESE

. OFFICERS ON THEIR MILITARY DUTIES IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THE WAR

EFFCRT.
2, I DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL HARKINS THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED

IN A MESSAGE THROUGH CAS CHANNELS, !DENT IFIED AS CAS WASHINGTON

74228. I ALSO RECALLED TO HIS MEt'iORY OUR .DISCUSSIONS ON THE

. ----
FREVIOUs••iBJTifNH'.']ICONEIN MEET ING ON WHICH \\IE JOINTLY COMMENTED
,.
.IN CAS SAIGONi448,
·DE:CLASSlrJED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NL"-C\'l- 1-11
'\PP'.S'ECR'l!T .
• • .J • • • 01 QJmK•NAnA ::>.u, ah,lu
\ ·-
 \o
"f8P SECRET
' '

SAIGON
IN 45699
3. GENERAL HARKINS STATED T'HAT HE HAD· MISUNDERSTOOD AND
.'
FELT THAT THE USG WAS NOT NOW IN FAVOR OF A COUP. I EXPLAINED
•
THAT, WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT I.HE USG DID NOT DESIRE TO INITIATE A
, '
COUP, WE HAD INSTRUCT IONS FROM THE HIGHE~T_LEVELS NOT TO THWART
.'
ANY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTWHI.CH GIVES PRbMISE OF INCREASING THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY EFFORT, INSURING POPULAR SUPPORT TO

WIN THE WAR, AND IMPROVING WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. I

NOTED PARTICUALRLY THAT GENERAL DON HAD INITIATED THIS MEETING

HIMSELF ANO THAT NO COM!11TMENTSHAD BEEN MADE NOR WOULD ANY BE MADE

WITHOUT A FULL REVIEW OF THE GENERALS' Pl.ANS.

4. GENERAL HARKINS ~XPRESSED REGRET IF HE HAD INADVERTENTLY

'
'UPSET ANY DELICATE ARRANGEMENTSIN PROGRESS AND ADDED THAT HE WOULD
'
FIND A SUITABLE OCCASION IN WHICH TO INJ:"ORMGENERAL DON THAT HIS

REMARKS OF 22 ocr DID NOT CONVEY OFFICIAL USG THINKING.

5.
'
WE AGREED TO KEEP IN ·a..osE CONSULTATION ON THIS
. '
MATTER.

,.

- . .. "FOPSECRET,..
 CAS MESSAGE SAIGON 1925

!. AT 0615 HOURS ON THE MORNINt? OF 24 OCT, LT CO).. CONEIN

_ -~E;CEIV_ED.
A TELEPHONE CAL}.. AT• HIS. HOl-'.EF'?OM THE AIDE OF 1".0.JGEN

TRAN VAN DON; . THE AIDE INFORMED' CONE!N THAT GEN DON \•.'OULDBE

TAXING AN AIRPLANE TRI? ON 24 OCT AND REQUESTED CONEIN TO ~IEET

WITH DON AT THE VI? TERMINAL JUST PRIOR TO TAKE-O'FF AT 0640 •

.
AT TA.N SON NHUT, GEN· DON TOOK CONEIN ASIDE ANO STATED

THAT HE HAO t1ET WITH GEN .. HAl'lKINS

.'
. ON THE EVENING OF 23 OCT;
.
. 1
· GlcN HAl'll<INS QUESTIONED• GEN DON ~ ITH "!ESPECT TO T~ LATTER'S

?P.t-lAPYS TO CONEIN ON 23 OCT; GEN DON CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD

Ml\!)E THP.SE REMAPKS; GE•N HARKINS Tl-lEN STATED THAT Hl-S PREV!OIIS
;
COMMENTSTO GEN DON 'ON 22 OCT CONCF.Rll!INGTHE NON-DESIRABILITY

OF r, CHANGE OF GOVERNMEl,rr WERE .ACTUALLy CONTRARY TO A PRESIDENTIAL

DIRECTIVE; AEN HAPJ<INS ADDED THAT HIS STA·TEMENTS HAD. BEEN

-INADVERTENT AND THAT HE WISHED GEN DON·TO BE Al.ARE.OFT.Hrs:

3. GEN DON' rUPTHF.R ·sTATED THAT ARPANREMENTSHAD BEEN MADE

FOR HH~ TO ~!EET WITH AMBASSAD()P, HENRY CABOT LODGE AT 1700 ·HOURS

•
OE.CLASSIFIEO
E.0. 13526 SEC.3.5

I. ~!Of-~~~Rf6l
. , '"~:~~;.::::
...
REPRODUCTIONBY OTHE'RTHAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIS_IT_E_D
___ Copy No. /
• .- ~-· - .,._ ··.~
 - ----
OF 2~ JCT.

... •• • ♦- ., •••

1-ir;; W~LILD -C01'l:-Ir- r: Td T~ A1"3ASS.~DO? TSAT HS A~lD T:-!E OTHF:0 G:.~':.~~LS

eESii?.F:p TO Q:E·P.Lv1 ITH CONF.!N AND CONEtN ONL"Y IN FURTHF.P !HSCl!SS!u~S

01: TH! S MATTSQ.

4. noN ST,~TED Ti-'AT ALL ?LA~S HAVE N0~.1 BEEN COM?LE:T~O,

THE NECESSP.PY \!NITS ARE AVAILAALE AND ~!!LLING TO ,IOIN IN THE

NOT LA TF.1< Tl-!.~N 2 NOV.

5. f)JN REQUESTED CON€IN TO MEET v1ITH XH 1 TN' .o. flENTIST' S

O?F!GE D01,!NTOWN S,\IGON, WH!CH DON STATEn 1

.-i.o.s s-;:cuR•;; /IT is:so
'-!OIIQS ?.4 OC"i FOR rUP.THF.R DISCUSSION Or DETA!LS OF THF. PLt,~1.
'
6. THERE APPARENTL V ' !S SOi~E tt.ISliNDSPSTt-~Ji)INt,, ~S A(ll?'SS 1
D~"

OT\f.::P DAY. ~OREO\IER, T,HE Att.3ASSADOP FE:;LS IT _WOIJLu i'lE UNWISE T:)

MEET DON TO DISCUSS THIS ' SUBJECT Af TH!S TIME.

TOP SECPET
..
. ...
..' _ ....

·--..
1 ....
L. _.
__ .

-. .
.
••
·. .
.....
•••
. ..
' 4
...... '
"J

-· -

TOP GEGRT:'T
TO SAIGON

FROM : CAS 77878, 24 OCTOBER 1963

RE SAIGON 1896

SOMEWHAT CONCERNED AT FUZZ AND LOOSENESS OF DON'S

"GOMMlTTEE", PLUS ms SOMEWHAT .AMllIGUOUS ROLE IN OTHER

GVN :OlRECTED ACTIONS. KNOW YOU ARE FULLY AWARE POSSIBIUTY
-~
ms ACTING UNDER PALACE ORDERS AS PR0VOCA'FEUR, AND BASIC!:
DIFFICULTY OF FINDING UL'PIMATE ANSWER. NONETHELESS

BElJEVE SOME WAR~NG SIGNALS StJGGEST l~-."EED

FOR CAUTION AND

MOST PROFESSIONAL HANDI.,lNG OF THESE CONT ACTS. THUS

REITERATE EARLIER SUGGESTIONS OF

FTJLL PROBE FOR DETAILS OF DON'S

-
RELATIONSffiPS Wl'l'H OTHER GENERALS, AGREED GOVER S'rORY

AND CONTINGENCY PLAN IN CASE ·oF ARREST,

AVOIDANGE OF POLieY COMMITMENTS WITHOUT

INSTRUCTIONS, ETC, ALL OF CO"URSE TO EXTENT FE.ASlBLE IN

CONTEXT OF LOCAL seENE AND 1N eONFORMITY WITH BASIC POUCY

AS STA'l'ED CAS 74228 AND SET BY AMBASSAPOR.

END OF MESSAGE

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NLK.-11- 5-io_..
 (
INCOMING Department
TELEGRAM of Sictte q

43-H SESBEI
·Action Control: .18700
FE Rec'd: OcTOfjE~?4, 1963
3:23 A.M.
Info
FROM:cENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
SAIGON.
SS TO: Secretary of State
G
SP NO: DTG 24o75oz, OCTOBER(CIA MESSAGE).
L
H
SAL FLASH
EUR
IO ACTIONFLASHDIRNSA; INFORMATION
FLASHUSlfj AGENCIES,STATE
AID DEPA~TMENT.
p .
USIA CR!Tlc·'

~NR ✓ ?.) REPORTSCOUP IMMINENT LED fjy LT.

A r· COL PHAMNGOCTHAO. ORIGINAL~YSCHEDULED
0 1300 HRS 24 OCT
oc ~~T MAJORNGUYEN VANTu, co 8TH RGT WHOLEADINGFIVE fjATTALIONS
OCM :UNABLETO GET TRANSPORT ·ANDNOJ CO~iMANDEERING TRUCKSANDoUSSES.
-s'CA 5TH PARATROOP BTN COMMANDEDfjy NGOQUANGTRUONGIN SAIGONAND
PARTICIPATINGBUT HADNO AMMO BUT BEING SUPPLIEDNOW. TARGET
RMR IS GIA LONGPALACETO OVERTHROW DIEM. COL LE NGUYEN KHANG~
MARINEfjRIGADECO, ANDCOLONEL NGUYtNVANTHIEU, 5TH DIVISION
cop PROMISEREMAINNEUTRAL. KHANGINDICATEDMAYGIVE SUPPO~T
LATER. IN EVENTINITIAL ASSAULTFAILS TROOPSWILL WITHDRAW.
AIR FORCELED BY LT COL NGUYEN CAOKY WILL fj0MBPALACEFOLLOW-
ED fjy RENEWEDTROOPASSAULT. LAWYER NGUYEN HUUDUONG SEIZING
CIVIC ACTION, INFORMATIOt)J,
ANDRADro VIETNAM WITH FIVE HUNDRED
STUDENTS PLUS PARTOF TUtS FORCE. FOLLOWING FIRST ATTACKCOUP
GROUPWILL fjRQADCAST FROMRADIOVIETNAMOR FROMAUXILLIARY
TRANSMITTER AT CIVIC ACTIONIF NECESSARY.

::

3• STATIONBELIEVESABOVEINSUFFICIENTTO SUCCEEDBUTMAY
TRIGGEROTHERUNITS. ' . ' . . '
. ; .: . . ! . , : . -;.,_·_;. .:.:..: :-.::~_':. . ·, ' . •
REPRODUCTION
FROMTHIS COPYIS
___ __::::,;S::!;E~G!!R:!.;E:!:T
_____ PROHIBITED
UNLESS
"UNCLASSIFIED"
SANITIZED

BY Tu¾ ~AR/ti DA TE ~\~•

wq>l~\J NLk'.-(1,5':)~ <,(11

 SECRET

-2- DTG 24o750z, OcTOtlER.(CI A MESSAGE): FROM: CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCEAGENCY SAIGON.

--
I ___
!ir~filf+-•
H~AOANDHUYNHVANLANGHAVECLAIMEDARMOR
u1!iii
AS KEY
TO THEIR PLANS.

4: AMtlASSADOR
HAS tlEEN tlRIEFED.

tlA/22.

NOTE: ADVANCE
DELIVERYTO S/S-0 OCTOtlER24 - 3:26 A.M.
.

SECRET
 ,o
INCOMING Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECR£'f
43 Control : 18717
Action
Rec'd: October 24, 1963
FE
4:19 a.m.
FROM: CIA Saigon
Info
r 02
TO: Secretary of State
ss
G NO: CRTIC 2, DTG 240807Z October (CIA Message)
SP
L
H .,F,V,.SH
S,AL
EUR ACTIONFLASHDIRNSA, INFOR.'1-!ATION
FLASHUSIB AGENCIES,DEPAR'll.,i;ENT
IO OF STAT£
AID
p Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao contacted at 1500 hours at his home.
USIA Disclaims any knowledge of any coup activity scheduled
--INR
today or i.n next few days. Thao apparently sincere.
0
Checking far.r.t::'J.er.
A
oc SMD/18
OCM
NOTE: Advance copy to s/s~o at 4:J.9 a.m., October 24.
RMR

DEC LA$SIF /ED

fSO. I 235" Sa: 3.4 SECR:E'.f REPRODUCTION
FROMTHIS COPYIS
N'-J<- qlf-/µf ------------ PROHIBITED
UNLESS
"UNCLASSIFIED"
M!t 2.JEh_5
81 ffiN\~r,1,-,;,.A,
 No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/09/20: NLK-01R-201-2-6-0 .,

;_.. .i.·t·· . Approved For Release 2001/08/16: NLK-01-201-2-9-8I _-··.. . ....... '.'
.·•
INCOMING
TELEGRAM
Departm_ent of State
43 SEeR£f
Action- Control: .. 18766.
Rec'd: October 24, 1963
FROM:C.IA Saigon 5:41 a.m.
l~fo
ss TO: Secretary or State
G
SP NO: CRnc 3, DTG 240928Z October •(C~ Message)
L
H
SAL EI.ASH
EUR
IO ACTION.Fi.J\SH DIRNSA; .INFORMATIONFI.ASK USIB AGEN~S, DEPARTieNT
AIDA OF STA:I'E
p
IOP
25X1A !NR
' ..
SCA
.. ---
L• ,,. ...•~-·
....
.. ·'-= • • • - ; •
repor4s ths.t he
y HQS on 24 •Od:tob~r 63 t.o
RMR
):l:!:'esent Vietnamese Wµigs ·to USAF. t:ransport co-pi~ots (Dirty
Thirty). Vietnamese pilo.ts present did .c:onsider*le drinking
•and• were generally in -rela4<-ed, .convivial atti.tude. I Col. ~yen
Ca? ,Ky, commander of first ··transport g.,:-oup and rejpor~ed in •
CRITIC No. l ~s coup leader commanding pilots 'sla~ed to bomb
Gia Long Palace; was p-resent. After ceremony Col:. ,Ky joined
American officers who were drinking beer and was. ~till with
American officers at 1500 hours 24 •October .

.JVC/4
i •
NOTE: Advance Copy•·to s/s-o at 5·:44 •a.m., .Oc:tobe • '24 1 1963
7

SANITIZED'
Nv"-,·<;,a·leI
AY~ N~ DAU ~4'8 ·
\/ f' heId. No~J.ai"k,fe~~ I ---=~5:i==----
1 _11.:...,_.
SECPET
REPROOUCTIO~
PROHI_BITED
FROMTHIS COPYIS
~NlESS"UNClASSIF!£O"
~a~ ot!hisreif~
. .
Approved For Release2001/08/16: NLK-01-201-2-9-8

No Objection T~ Oe~las~ification in Part 2013/09/20: NLK-01R-201-2-6-0

 INCOMING Department of Stute
TELEGRAM
43 SECRE;F-
Action Control: 18811
Rec'd: October 24, 1963
FE 6:41 a.m.
FROM: CIA Saigon
Info
ss TO: Secretary of State
G
SP NO: CRTIC 4, DTG241029Z October (CIA Message)
L
H
SAL
EUR FLASH
IO
AID ACTION-FLASHDIRNSA, INFORMATION
FLASHUSIB AGENCIES,
p DEPARTMENTOF STATE
USIA
INR Check of most prominent indicators of action outlined in
o•· CRITIC No. 1 has proved negative. Conclude either original
A report was false or action has been delayed or aborted,
oc Checking continue~ buf with this message,will discontinue
OCM CRITIC series unless new significant information available.
RMR SMD/14

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 6:43 a.m., October 24.

OECLASS1FH:0 REPRODUCTION
FROMTHIS COPYIS
1---___::E.:::.O:.:_·
~12T.,)::.;5oT.
~SE~·C:;.:;3_.4
___ ___ -S_E_GR_E'f
______ PROHIBITED
UNLESS
"UNCLASSIFIED"
l'lt..J, 'I)~·~\ 1
NARAOato ~
 r •

TO: SAIGON 24 OCTOBER 1963

FROM: DIRECTOR 78141

REF A. SAIGON 1896

B. SAIGON CRITIC NO. 1

1. IN FUTURE DO NOT REPEAT NOT PUT MESSAGES RE COUP

PLOTS OR RUMORS IN CRITIC CHANNEL. RATHER YOU SHOULD SLUG

THEM IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR MR. MC CONE.

2. AS INDICATED CAS 77878 AND SEPARATE CABLE BEING

SENT AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HARKINS, WE HERE ARE CONCERNED

AT POSSIBILITIES OF DON LEADING CONEIN (AND THRU HIM UNITED

STATES) DOWN GARDEN PATH TO CONTROL OUR EFFORTS AT LEAST,

TO ENTRAP CONEJ.N AT MOST. THUS BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL WE

DEVELOP SOME OF PROTECTIONS OUTLINED CAS 77878, ESPECIALLY

TO BRING SOME DEGREE DENIABILITY FOR AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL

HARKINS INTO PICTURE.

S. CAS WASHINGTON NOW ENGAGED IN EFFORT IDENTIFY AND

SEPARATE THE DIFFERENT COUP GROUPS, THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS

AND OVERLAPS AND THEIR COMPARATIVE M.ERITS FROM U. S. VIEWPOINT.

WILL CABLE OUTLINE TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT MEANWHILE

INVITE YOUR URGENT ATTENTION TO A SIMILAR EFFORT TO UNTANGLE

THE SEPARATE THREADS IN THIS SKEIN.

END OF MESSAGE
 TO SAIGON

FROM CAS 78161, 24 OCTOBER 1963

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND GENERAL HARKINS

FROM MC GEORGE BUNDY

1. SAIGON 1896, 1906, 1925 AND YOUR RECENT CRITICS HAVE

BEEN CONSIDERED AT InGHEST LEVELS. WE WISH TO REAFFIRM

INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED CAB 74228 AND WITmN THEIR CONTEXT

WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

2. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE DON-CONEIN CONT ACTS GIVE

US CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. DON'S REFERENCE (1) TO A

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AND TO A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH

AMB LODGE, FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO BASIS, (2) THE LACK OF

INFORMATION REGARIINO DON'S REAL BACKING# AND (~) THE

LACK OF' EVIDENCE THAT ANY REAL CAPABILITIES FOR ACTION

HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, ALL LEAD US TO WONDER WHETHER

THERE MAY BE DANGER NHU ATTEMPTING ENTRAPMENT THROUGH

DON'S APPROACHES TO CONEIN.

S. WE WONDER WHETHER IT JS WISE TO RISK CONTINUED

INVOLVEMENT OF CONEIN IN THE DIALOGUE WITH DON, SINCE NOT

ONLY MIGHT IT DESTROY ms USEFULNESS, BUT MlGHI' ALSO

INVOLVE YOU AND GENERAL HARKINS IN AN OPERATION WHICH IS

DE::CLASSlrtEO
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK·94·'!3 <lrnnr-T
uLGn,:...
DlFFICULT TO DENY. IS IT POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A MORE SECURE

SYSTEM OF CONTACTS WITH GENERAL DON AND OTHERS IN THE

MILITARY, PERHAPS THROUGH CUT•OUTS. WE DO FEEL QUITE

STRONGLY THAT YOU AND GEN HARKINS S.HOULD ST AND BACK FROM

ANY N0N•ESSENTI.AL INVOLVEMENT IN THESE MATTERS. CAS

SEPTEL MAKES OTHER TECHNICAL SUGGESTIONS.

4. WE ALSO NEED URGENTLY YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF

OON'S OWN STATUS, THE GROUP BE REPRESENTS, AND WHATEVER

PLANS THEY MAY HAVE FOR THE FUTURE. CONSIDERING ALL

THESE FACTORS, IT SEEMS WISE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTROL OVER

MEETINGS BETWEEN DON AND C0NEIN.

END OF MESSAGE

2
 10/25/63
PoUy,

MFiV took charge of getting this out via

CAS channels, and left this as our file copy.

mz
--

TOP S:S6R-E-r

DRAFT MESSAGE THROUGH CAS CHANNELS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND GENERAL HARKINS

~" U:4.J<° )

Your 1896, 1906, 1925 andlcritics 21 ~ and 4 have been considered Q,K"
~ _k,,.g<).
by • e .. i.er c£fictals, major agenc1e" and~e PresideM. We wish to

reaffirm instructions contained CAS 74228 and within their context we

have the following comments for your consideration.

Certain ~u'ra the Don-Conein contacts give us considerable

~t.
concern. Don's reference (1) to a Presidential directive, ;.etto a scheduled

meeting with Ambassador Lodge, for which there was no basis, (~ the

lack of information regarding Don's real backing, and (3) the lack of

evidence that any real capabilities for action

~'-""
wa.e developed, all lead us

to wonder whether there may be danger Nhu attempting entrapment through

Don's approaches to Conein.

1.->~
.M-t tbis nrl,ee us wonder whether tt is wise to risk continued

involvement of Conein in the dialogue with Don, since not only might it

destroy his usefulness, but might also involve you and General Harkins

in an operation which is difficult to deny. Is it possible to arrange a more

secure system of contacts with GeneralDon and others in the military,

~l'lLI~ "M.o¼A
perhaps through cut-outs? CAS ~ other technical suggestions.

e do feel quite strongly "

that you and General Harkins should

stand back from any non-essential involvement in these matters.

~ !I OC:CLASSlilED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
___ N"""'-L
ut'>_·<\_,_4_,_-_4'-"3'----
1
l 01 ~NAil,\ =.llhh~
'FOP SECRET - 2 -

also need urgently your personal assessment of Don's own status, the

group he represents, and what~ve~lans they may have for the future.
~~ o.U ~ ~ ~ ~
tJ?ltib<S'tl.ch an a~sessment
is possibl~)it seems wise r.J~ further

meetings between Don and Conein.

TOP SEGRE'F
 . . ,_
I

• • IJINFORMATION REPORT li#!@;t-t~•

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
hh "'•1,,;,1 <o"t•;"' :,.,o,"'•lio-11 •Hcc1:ri9 ""• N•t:o,ul O•f•in• of lh• u,,;,,..d s1.1u with," •~ "'''";"9 of "" EtP\Ol'I•~• 1,, .. ,. 1,11, n u.\,C: \•o
7t) .,.d tt4. 11-., lt•l'lt.ffliuio11 o, ""'''•fio11 of ...hi(I\ lfl lf'lf ,,.,11ntr lo 4/t \111
... tl'.o,,ad O<l'f\Of'l 11 c1oloiibil1d .tr.,· ,..... •

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Ftlkd In) NO FORtlGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH V I ETNAM REPORT NO.

SUBJECT REASON FOR FAILURE OF PHAM NGOC THAO'S DATE DISTR. 25 OCTOBER 1963
PLANNED COUP O' ETAT WAS LACK OF TRANSPORT
PRECEDENCE PRIOR ITY

DATE Of 24 OCTOBE~ 1963 REFERE!<CES

INFO.
PLACE & VIETNAM·, SAIGON (24 OCTOBER 1963)
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL FIELD REPORTNO.

APPR IT IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO WILL 'BE ABLE TO ARRAr-K.ETHE
NEEDED TRANSPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT DURING THE NATIONAL DAY PLANNING, .AND HE WILL
PROBABLY AGAIN HAVE TO POSTPONE THE COUP D'ETAT HE HAS BEEN PLANNING.

1. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOCTHAO HAD CANCELLED AT ·\330 HOURS ON

24 OCTOBER 1963 THE COUP D'ETAT HE HAO PLANNED AND ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED AT

1300 HOURS ON THE 24TH BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO ARRANGE fOR THE 'NECESSARY

TROOP TRANSPORT. COMMENT. SAIGON CRITIC NO•. 1,.24.0CTOBER,

-
REPORTED THAT A COUP WAS l:,t.l lNENT LED BY COL. THAO, AND THAT M~JOR NGUYEN

VAN TU, CO 8TH RGT,WAS UNABLE TO GET TRANSPORT ANO HAS CQMMANDITRI NGTRUCKS

AND 6USSES.) COL. Tl~O POSTPONED·THE COUP

. D'ETAT TO
. 1300 HOURSON 25 .OCTOBER .
IF HE WAS ABLE 'TO SOLVE THE TRANSPORT PROBLEM. --CO,~ENT. THAO WILL

PROBABLY'BE UNABLE TO SOLVE THE TRANSPORT PROBLEM IN VIEW OF THE Nll.T IONAL DAY

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN D'ISSEM

STAT(/INR OIA ARMYIA(SI HA.VY AIR JC$ S£CO(f tf$A NIC AIO USIA OCI 0Ht

STAlt/OIR

I N F O R M A T I ON R E P O R-T.
IM--IEDIATE TO: OIRNSA (PROD \-0) AFSSO WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM
STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES) DIA/Cl IC
JCS . NIC r----:-"""'.:'"~,------,
CNO (OP 922 Y 1) I •
r SANITIZED
OF I A~ E.O. 13526. SEC. 3.5
OBSOLETE PRZVIOUS EDfflONS. (1~20)
Ll<.-1"\~5 ;,__

... id Js t ll Cl Cf d
 ClASSlflCA~ION - OJSSEMtNAllON CONTROLS

SECRET NOfOREIGNDISSEM
r
• (Whtra Ftu«s In)
,AGE TWO

,.
PLANNING
IN SAIGON
WHICHINVOLVES
THEUSUAL
SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS
ANDTROOPS
'PRESENT.)
2. flELD DISSEM. STATE ARMYNAVY
AIR .USMACV
MAAG2NDAIR.DIVISJON
9TH flELD STATIONAID USIA ·CINCPAC
• ARPAC'PACAf PACfLT.
. . ..

ENDOf MESSAGE

• I

....

CUSSIFICATJON - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NOFOREIGNQ ISSEM"

(
j.
..,-
 i
:
;
j
i SAIGON47370, 25 Oct 63
I
I Fro.f SAIGONTO CIA
'
I

1. As indi<;ated ~ Saigon 1925--- Col.' Conein met

in a dentist's office in downtown Sai~ght ·of 24 Oct. ,
No others were present. • • • •• ..
j • 2. he had just com~ from a meeting with '
•- ..-Gen. Harkins. • ·expected.Ambassador lodge to be at that

lI· meeting but apparently had misunderstood

that he had l!Usunderstood a

Gen. Harkins· on that' scor~.
He did not appear to be u set at·not having seen the Ambassador. •
3. Gen. Harkins had reiterateq
esid!lltial directive,
the fact
'that .Ambas~ador
l Iodge was awa..>-eof and controlling ·conein' s contacts ~and
that Conein was the proper pers·on with wlian to speak.
4. ■•• •■
I' he had requested permission of
the generals coup camnittee to turn over to.Conein the.plan of poli-
tical organization. The coup committee on 24 Oct. denied this request .•
for reasons of security. The camnittee did concur, however, that the·.
complete political and military pla'l would be turned over for study ..
by the .Ambassador two ~e:scheduled time for the coup .. ••
5, Conein reminded ~the· USG had made no camnitments
to the generals and that the question of any kind of ccmmitments •
0 before or a.f'ter a coup would definitely depend on a study.of the pl,a.ns.
\ -----unqerstood this and would assure that the plans were in
American hands two days prior to tbe coup.whi~h he reiterated is now
scheduled to occur not later than 2 Nov. ,i;S,, __ .. ,.:;;_;_::."'.
6. Con 'in challenged to ·nap,.~_th"e:;:other:meylb~rs
- ;11:i'{jlrg~:ti-
e i.ticlucieii _,.i,
·-~--.........
Each of these
ro_~ ., o pla,y, nen quel:'1e about 111111111111111
coope • :i-ng but is not a member~
committee and will take his~ ~r~~f~. "like :e':,'erybody. else." 111111111111111
not attemot to take his cornsi'area ..int.o d;i_~sidence. This also applies
-to ..,.When sane su..'1)rise was •
regis ere at the mention is surrounded.
by coup committee supporters a cooperate or
be crushed. The coup committee does ·not expec stand up
under any pressure for more than one week.
7. When Conein indicated that he had beard the GV'Nbad bought off
emphatically that this was not true, that·
he had heard the same rumours circulated with respect to himself', and
,that he did not require any money for himself since bis wealth came from
'his father .
.·• . 8. ~o· outline the politicaJ.·tbinking of the
coup camnittee. He responded that there were basically four points:·
a. ~e succeeding government would be civilian. No member.
of the coup ccmnittee would have any senior·position in the succeeding
goverl'.ll!lent. •
• b. The new government would, as soon as possible, free non-
camnunist political prisoners and hold honest elections. The operation
1 of opposition parties, except for VC, would be tolerated
would be.made _to build up the legislative
and an attempt
branch of the gov~rlllllent.
'• iI
:-.1 SANITIZED

LI,,
.
E.O. 13526, SEC ..3.5
rlL15.o\•i.o'-1. 1-·10· 0
By "'.ffi .NARA.Cato 1ti ?
 @

c. There would be complete f'reed= of' religion With no

favoritism or discrimination shown towards any creed or, f'or that
matter, against atheism.
d. The new government 'Will be pro-western but Will not be
a vassal of the United States. • The government 'Will carry the war
against the VC to successf'ul conclusion with Western; particularly
American, help. .
9. Conein ~discussed metho<l:5·of introducµig addit:).onal
security into f'utu=:e meetings. Conein prCX!lised11111i(""~oproduce a
secure plan at their next meeting scheduled for 2S""oct.
10. the coup oc_curs_ Conein Will be in close
an coup headquarters. The purpose of
Conein's being close at hand with the generals at the time of the
coup 'Will be to assure a.line of communications between the generals
and the Ambassador. S=ewhat emphatica_lly9llllla.added once the
coup. bas started, it would do no good to send anyone around to attempt •
to stop them as happened in Nov. 196o. Once begun, the coup Will
proceed to complete victory or total defeat".
11·. Conein related tnat he had heard sa:ne rumors that other junior •
also bad coup plans and wondered if' the generals were aware of
be had knok'l.edge:of the coup plotting of' Lt.
the coup committee had been in
0 contact 'Wit
out his scheme.
ao u ve the necessary force:, to carry

12.-.a.briefed on the fact that .Ambassador Lodge wou1d

be accan~ent Diem to Dalat and would stay in the •
Presidential villa on 27 and 28 Oct. . as to
whether there would be any danger to the assador in s.
•·••■ll;there would not be any danger and that notb.i.og was planned
'r'or the weekend. .
13. Without being questioned on this point,
the generals' committee had ca:ne to the conclusion that the entire Ngo
family bad to be eliminated f'ra:n the political scene in Vietnam.
14. Counter-surveillance'of this m~eting did not indicate any
unusual activity in the neighborhood or specific location of the meeting.

2
 PLEASE
RETURN
TO CIA... ""
25, _1963
DATE: OCTOBER
RECEtVEDiOCT25 o825z63
f'RQ,11 SAIGON / 9b 1
TO: DIRECTOR

MCGEORGE
BUNDYf'ROMAM:!ASSADOR
LOOGE

1. I .~PPRECIATE THE CONCERN EXFRESSED BY YOU IN RE·F A RELATIVE

TO Ti-'E GENERAL DDN/CONEIN RELATIONSHIP, Al'l> ALSO THE FRESENT LACK

OF FIRM IITTELLIGENCE ON THE DETAILS OF THE GENERALS' PLOT. I HOPE

,:

THAT REF B WILL ASSIST IN CLEARING UP SOME OFT~ DOUBTS RELATIVE

TO T tF. !::ENERAL? PLANS, At-0 I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE DETAILED PLANS

PROMISED FOO TWO DAYS BEFORE THE COUP ATTEMPT WILL Cl.EAR UP ANY

REMAINING DOUBTS,
0

2. CAS HAS BEEN PUNCTILIOUS IN CARRYING OUT MY INSIRUCTIONS.

I HA11E PERSONALLY APFROVED EACH MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL DON AND

CONEI\J WHO HAS CARRIED OUT MY ORDERS IN EACH INSTANCE EXPLICITLY.

WHILE I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT ·THE CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT OF CONEIN

IN THIS MATTER, A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR CONEIN AS THE PRINCIPAL

COITTACT IS NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. CONEIN, AS YOU KNOW, IS A

FRIEt\H OF SOME EIGHTEEN YEARS' STAIDING WITH GENERAL DON, AND GENERAL

• / DECLASSIFIED..,,,,____
.~J?r.,11\ ...J.J.\'.&i.l~
t 0. ll~. St<. 31ClnJ S(DJOf (£J
s, R,,&zU!,j~d''-"'-Du.,.!.UX..i:l
DON f-AS EXFRESSED EXTREME RELUCTANCE TO DEAL WITH ANYONE ELSE. I
.... I l!
DO l\C'T EELIEVE THE INVOLVEMENT OF ANOTHER AMERICAN IN Cl.OSE CONTACT

WITf- THE GENERALS WOULD BE FRODUCTlVE, WE ARE, HOWEVER, CONSIDERING

THE FEl\SIBJL IT Y OF A PLAN FOR THE INTROOUCTION OF AN ADDITIONAL

OFFICER AS A CUT-CUT BETWEEN CONEIN AND A DESIGNEE OF GEN!i;RAL DON

I

FOR COM~:UNICATION PURPOSES ONLY, THIS OFFICER IS COMPLETELY UN\t/ITTING

OF ANY DETAILS OF PAST ~R -~-E.SENT COUP ACTIVITIES AND It/ILL REMAIN SO•

3.
. '.-
WITH REFERENCE TO GENERAL HARKINS' COMMENTTO GENERAL DON

WHICH DON REPCRTS TO HAVE REFERRED TO A !'RESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AND

THE ffiOPOSAL FOR Al,IEETING WITH ME, THIS MAY HAVE SERVED THE USEFUL

PURFOSC:OF ALLAYING THE GENERAL'S FEARS AS TO OUR INTEREST• IF THIS

WERE A FROVOCATION, THE GVN COULD HAVE ASSUMED AND MANUFACTUREDANY

VARI;.TIONS OF THE SAME THEME, AS A PRECA'UUONARY MEASURE, HOWEVER,

'
I OF co:.RSE REFUSED TO SEE GENERAL DON. AS TO THE LACK OF INFORMATION

AS TO GENERAL DON'S REAL BACKING, AND THE LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT

ANY RE.l\L CAPABILITIES FOR ACT ION HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, REF B PROVIDES

.,ONLy PART OFT HE ANSWER, I FEEL SURE THAT THE RELUCTANCE or THE

GENERALS TO FROVIDE THE UNITED STATES WITH FULL DETAILS OF THEIR

PLA~'f AT THIS THIE, IS A.REFLECTION OF THEIR OWN SENSE OF SECURITY

AND A LACK OF CONFIDENCE THAT IN THE LARGE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

PRESENT IN SAIGON THEIR PLANS It/ILL NOT BE PERMATURELY REVEALED,

4. THE BEST EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY, WHICH I GRANT

YOU JS Nor AS COMPLETE AS WE WOULD LIKE IT, IS THAT GENERAL DON

At\'D THE OfHER GENERALS INVOLVED WITH HIM ARE SERIOUSLY ATTEMPTING

•.._T8Pt.[85
'
 T8P:MIJ
·TO Ef FECT A CHANGE INT HE GOVERNMENT. 1 DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS

IS t, PilOVOCAT ION BY NGO DINH NHU, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CONTINUE [,O

+ \

ASSE,!: THE Fl.ANNING AS WELL AS POSSIBLE. IN THE EVENT THAT THE

COUJ ABORTS, OR IN THE EVENT THAT NHU HAS MASTERMINDED A PROVOCATION,

I BfLIEVE THAT OUR INVOLVEMENT TO DATE THROUGH CONEIN IS STILL

WITFJN THE REALM OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL. CASIS PERFECTLY PREPARED

TO HAVE ME DISAVOW CONEIN AT ANY TIME IT MAY SERVE IHE NAiIONAL

_lNTEREg. - -------
5, I WELCOME YOUR _REAFFIRMING INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED I'N CAS

WASHINGTON 74228, IT IS VITAL THAT WE NEITHER THWART A COUP RPT COUP

NOR THAT WE ARE EVEN IN A POSITION WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON.

6, WE SHOULD NOT THWART A COUP RPT COUP FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST~

IT SEEMS AT LEAST AN EVEN BET THAT THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT

BUNGLE AND STUNBLE AS MUCH AS THE PRESENT ONE HAS: SECONDLY~· IT

IS EXTREMELY UNWISE IN THE LONG RANGE FOR US TO POUR COLD WATER ON

ATTEMPTS AT A COUP, PARTICLUARLY WHEN THEY ARE JUST IN THEIR BE·

GINNING STATES: WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH

THE PEOPLE IN VIETNAM CAN POSSIBLY GET A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT: WHEN-

,.
EYER WE THWART ATTEMPTS AT A coup; AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST; WE
ARE INCURRING VERY LONG LASTING RESENTMENTS; WE ARE ASSUMING AN UNDUE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE INCUMBENTS IN OFFICE, AND IN GENERAL··

ARE SETTING OURSELVES IN JUDGEMENT OVER THE AFFAIRS OF VIETNAM,

MERELY TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THIS SITUATION AND A POLICY

MERELY
I'-
LIMITED TO "NOT THWARTING;" ..
ARE COURSES BOTH OF WHICH ENTA}9 SOME

BUT THESE ARE LESSEi{_,' RISKS THAN :E-I_JH_E_R

__
_#.wARTING ·.ALL COUPS
- -- ~~ -- _...,_ - - -=--
i'

...·..lOf. OEHA_ET
•;
 18P8f8Mf PAGE4 ..;___.
WH,ILE THEY ARE STILLBORN OR OUR NOT BEING INFORMED or WHATni:-HAPPENING~ ·-
/ -:: I ·1>
ALL THE ABOVE• . ·' ~

• IS TOTALLY DISTINCT FROM NOTMANl'ING u:s: MILIT'ARY •

I - •-- • • • •• -

ADVISORS TO BE DISTRACTED BY MATTERS WHICH ARE NOT IN THEIR DOMAIN~

·WITH WHICH I HEARTILY

WITH A POLICY OF NOT THWARTING:

AGREE; BUT OBVIOUSLY THIS

IN
DOES NOT ·'CONFLICT

JUDGING PROPOSED COUPS: 1 WE

·- . .
MUST CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON THE WAR EFFORT; CERTAINLY A SUCCESSON
·---'--
OF FIGHTS FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD INTERFERE

WITH THE WAR EFFORT; IT MUST ALSO BE SAID THAT THE VAR EFFORT HAS

~-BEEN INTERFERED WITH ALREADY BY THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE PRESENT

GOVEflfJMENT AND THE UPROAR WHICH THIS HAS CAUSED:

7. GENERAL DON'S INTENTION TO HAVE NO RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IS COMMENDABLE AND I APPLAUD HIS DESIRE NOT

TO BE "A VASSAL" OF THE u:s: BUT I DO NOT THINK HIS PROMISE or A

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION IS REALISTIC: THIS COONTRY SIMPLY IS NOT READY

FOR· THAT PROCEDURE: I WOULD ADD TWO OTHER REQUlREMENTs: FIRST,

1
THAT THERE BE NO WHOLESALE PURGES
' '
'OF ···PERSONNEL IN THE GOVERNMENT;
'

iNDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PARTICULARLY REPREHENSIBLE COULD BE DEALT

WITH LATER BY THE REG.ILAR LEGAL PROCESS~· THEN I WOULD SUGGEST A

CABINET COVERING A VERY BROAD RANGE: THIS MAY BE IMPRACTICAL~

BUT I AM THINKING or A GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE TRI QUANG

AND WICH CERTAINLY SHOULD INCLUDE MEN or THE STATURE OF MR BUU~

THE LABOR LEADER:

8. COPY TO GENERAL HARKINS:

T 8 P 5 E S RE T
---------~----

- .. lBPBEORliil'
.-:-- ... ·- . . ...
.....___. ......
... ... ......
 October 25, 1963
~;
~)
'J 29 ('">

! CZ C C ■T EYES ONLY ~
I''
\j\
CAS MESSAGE

TO AMBASSADOR LODGE AND GENERAL HARKINS

\-
\
·..
FROM McGEORGE BUNDY

Your 1964 most helpful.

We will continue to be grateful for all additional information

giving inc1·eased clarity to prospects of action by Don or others, and

we look forward to discussing with you the whole question of control

and cut-out on your return, always assuming that one of these D-days

does not turn out to be real. We are particularly concerned about

hazard that an unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid

direct engagement, will be laid at our door by public opinion almost

everywhere. Therefore, while sharing your view that we should not

be in position of thwarting coup, we would like to have option of judging

and warning on any plan with poor prospects of success. We

recognize that this is a large order, but President wants you to know

of our concern. ~;:;rnm~~..i-1-.L.~

C"e-d' 1l ~
.........
urs<Fth,a:we"w~ ~..-:,=~ '° be-ablll_
C)
to=ju4g,e...these-piarrs.vitheu,t:,a,~J:':t:tixgQ eS}iGil'.$.l.b)~m;~ /l
/ \.11 --,
iropossi'alte_ta:k-es a little Jan~ ;, ~
j\) ►
w
'I IiC Oil StHil'f EYES ONLY \Jl
 ·, .

.
..
i
I

QOESf.·
• •• ;•

"'.
•

, ':,
N
._"' ,-• ),

•·•-
•
DE ESF 2 25/2335Z t;. .. • .

T AMEMB
SAIGON . ,-', '
0 252329Z
.. .. .
'
~

.,. I\)
FMTHE WHITEHOUSEWASHDG 0 :;o
.,, li
,.
I'

•
TO AMEM8
,'
SAIGON'
. .'
0
\,J1 ·=<
M
0
I •
EXEC
BT
t a 2
SAIGONFOR AMBASSADOR
AMEMB LODGl'AND-GE.N.~8~'.!.
HA!tKINS.· ~

FROMMCGEORGE
BUNDY.
YOUR1964 MOSTHELPFUL.
' .
WEWILLCONTINUE
TO BE GRATEFUL
FOR ALL ADDITJONAL
1., .. t,ORMATI~N , G/' I~- INCRE&sEil-CLI\Jl IU. TO. PRosPECTS. OF ~C! 10N ••
BY DONOR OTHER?,AND.WE LOOKFO~WARD
TO DISCU~SINGWITHYOU ,
1
~
QUESTIONOr CONTROL
THEWHOLE ANDcut-OUT ON YOURRETURN,
ALWAYS THATONE or THESED-DAYSDOESNOTTURNOUT
ASSUMING
•. . ~ . .
. · TO B~ REAL. WE AREPARTICUl..ARL
Y CONCERNED
ABOUTHAZARD
.THAT
AN UNSUCCESSFUL
COUP, HOWEVER
CAREFULLY
WEAVOIDDIRECT
'
ENGAGE~ENT,
WILL BE LAID AT OURDOORBY PUBLICOPINIONALMOST
EVERYWHERE. '
THEREFORE,
.WHILESHARINGYOURV.IEW
THATWE SHOULD
NOTBE IN POSITION o, THWARTING
couP~ WEWOULD
LtKE io HAVE
-·
OPTI,l)N01'\JUDGINGANDWARNING
0~. ANYPLANWITHPOORPROSPE;CTS
••
'~ • t .. ,.,:J.,;•·-"
Or SUCCESS.WERECOGNIZE
THATTHIS IS A LARGEORDER,BUT PRESI-
DENT.WANTS or OURCONCERN
YOUTO KNOW
..
I • -
BT .. .'
181'
8[8~.
. ·-

fDETERIO~TINGORI<;iINAL
XEROXED
BY-THB
I ~ t • •
· • KENNEDY
LIBRARY ; •• 1
·- ,

. .
 .,

_,
...
'
'-·''
I

,...,
<.•
-·•
C)
c,
~SI 2e14 26/11362 0
--...!
:,s0936Z ~-
,., .--
C:
g P S E e R E T
0 ;.:: .,
.•f.

.. I C

-1.0~/I:~:; MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM CAS SAIGON

,:S O~LY MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR LODGS

,. CAP 63590

1. AS REGARDS PROSPECTS OF ACTION BY DON THE BEST INFORMATION

, THI\T HE PLANS TO DO SOMETHING BEFORE NOVEMBER 2 9UT THIS

, STILL NOT AT ALL DEPENDABLE AND I HAVE NOT YET CONVINCED

'f.oE?F THAT HE HAS THE IRO?·l IN HIS SOUL.

2. AS IO POSSIBLE ACTION SY OTHERS WE WILL HAVE A TELEGRAM

...HER,

3. I AGREE THAT AN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP 1;JILL BE LAID AT OUR

OCR SY CERTAIN PERSONS WHO WISH TO DAMAGE US, BUT I BELIEVE

. HAT IF 1i/E COVER UP OUR TRACKS, AS I THI!lK WE ARE DOING AND

'!LL DO, THAT WE CAN ENTER A VERY VIGOROUS DENIAL AND EFFECTIVELY

'·\CHALLENGE THOSE "HO CRITICIZ:£ US TO PRODUCE PROOF, THE TRUTH

.: THAT THERE IS A WIDE SPREAD DESIRE IN THIS COUNTRY FOR A

·:nf\t-SE IN GOVERNMENT AND THIS HAS NOT BEEN CAUSED BY US BUT

Y THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT,

4, YOU CAN COUNT ON ME TO LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED TO

IV~,: YOU EVERY CHANCE OF JUDGING AND ll'ARNING, IF THERE EVER

. A COUP IN THIS COUNTRY THE TIME t/ILL COME WHEN IT HAS

·:!TED ROLLING AND ~E COULD NOT STCP IT, BUT I WILL DO' ALI.

''Y ?O\JER SO THAT PRESIDENT HAS INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION

' !!' "' TC THE VERY LAST MINUTES,

SF1004
<Y.16
00 ESF' $1:.""E
$1"N.CT1:'l.t~
l.lo::.i'CO)i;)
DE ES! 28/12152 N1.\;..-'lt\.·l.t I,

0 2812002 Rl:.CEIVEO
li-/HASA
F'MCIA
TO WHITEHOUSESITUATION'6£ibt1C128 12 27
ZEM
S ECRET
FMCAS SAIGON2003/FROM
TO SECSTATEWASHEYES ONLYFOR RUSK, HARRIMAN,
BALL, HILSMAN,
HUGHES
OSD EYESONLYFOR MCNAMARA,
GILPATRICNTAYLOR,KRULAK,
MR1,1t•1BUNDY
WHITEHOUSE/EYES
ONLYMCGEORGE
BUNDY
INFO~OR ADMFELT EYES 01,LY
CIA/EYES ONLYMCCONE,CARTER,HELMS
BT
1. ADDRESSEES
OF' THIS MESSAGE
ARE AS SUGGESTED
INCAS
WASHINGTON
78517.
2. AT THE AIRPORT0700 MONDAY,
LEADINGGVNOFFICIALS WERE
GATHERED
TO SAY GOODBYE
TO PRESIDENTDIEM, WHOWASTAKINGME OFF
ON A TRIP. GENERAL
DONSOUGHTME OUTANDASKEDME WHETHER
CONEIN
WASAUTHORIZED
TO SPEAKFOR ME. I SAl-0 THATHE WAS. DONTHEN
SAID THATWHATEVER
WASDONEMUSTBE THOROUGHLY
VIETNAMESE
AND
THATTHE U.S. SHOULDNOT INTERFEREOR TRY TO STIMULATE
A COUP.
3. I SAID THATI A~REED;THE U.S. WANTED
NO SATELLITES;
WElWULDNOTTHv/ART. I ASKEDHOWSOONACTIONCOULDBE EXPECTED.
HE SAID, l1E ARE NOTREADYYET. HE THENADDED: ARMYH/1SLOST ITS
DRIVE<IN FRENCH''ALLANT''); WEMUSTWIN BEFOREYOUAMERICANS
LEAVE. WECANNOT
DO IT WITHTHIS GOVERNMENT,
WEMUST, THEREFORE,
GET A GOVERNMENT
vJITHWHICHWECANWIN NOW. I SAID KEEPME
INFORMED
ANDLET ME SEE YOURPLANS.
4. UNLESSYOUOBJECT, IN THE INTERESTSOF MAXIMUM
SECURITY,
I PROPOSETO LIMIT MESSAGES
ON THIS SUBJECTTO MYSELFANDTHE
CAS ACOS. OTHERSWILL BE GIVENACCESSON A STRICT NEEDTO KNOW
BA'SIS.
BT

SANITIZED
e.91 13526, sec, 3.5
NL..._-11-51>0--
By ll\lt' NARA.Oale(.Jl'J
.l
' SFI0!4

hu.\.,1._,...,a,
,
00 ESF

DE ESI 820S 29/09152 OCT

0 2906542

T O P S E C R E T_SECTTON' OllE OF 11WO 1.8528

T'li'ii;:,'--n,:r±fi,-,,_,i--/" ll,-:J
IQ J a..J""v~ ..
)vlA CAS SA IGO~ 2~23j FROM .,t\1',!BASSADORLODGE 'DTG 2909242'

TO SECSTATE ~ASH EYE~ ONLY -FOR RUSK, .HARRHlA~i BALL, HILSl-tAN, HUGES

OSD EY}:S ONL"Y FOR ~lCN_ANcA~A, G1LPATR[C, TAYLOR, !(RULAK, MR. Wf'I'. -BUNDY
WHITE HOUSE/EYES ONLY ~CGEORGE BU~j)Y

l-NFO CAS HONOLULt) FOR AD~l rELT J!:YES O~LY

.,.
CIA/EYES ONLY McCONE, CARTER, HtLMS

I. BY PREAR~A~GEMENT AN_.QAF GEN'OON'Sl r~I1I1TIVE, COL CONE1N

MET GEN DON AT A DENTIST'S O~FlCJ: iN DOW~TOWNSAlI~O~ 0~ FVENl~G Of

2S OCT, TO PROTE~T COVERlfOR j~ESF RECURRING V[SITS THE DENTIST

EXAM.rnED CQNEW''S' T~ETHl F,i.ICLED OOT A RECORD OF TREATMENT AND MADE

RECQMMFNDATJONS FOR ADD!l'IO,r§~L T~EATMENT.

2. THE DENTIST THEN RET~RED TO QNOTHER P~~j OF !);I~ SUITE AND GEN

DON AND CONEIN CARRIED ON THElR CO~VERSATION ALONE.

3, E>O(tSTATED TliAT }!£ HAD.,'!'ALRED TO At1B LODGE AND THAl LODGE HAD

VOUC}{El) FOR GONElJ,l. 1f>ONEMl?HA2:IZEili'T!;!.AJ; HE HAD TOLD ;\~lB LODGE 1;1<lil!]

HE AND HIS GROUP HAD NO POLITICAL Al1B,ITIONS, TIHA'l' THEIR ONLY DESIRE

~J.ASTO WIN THE Wf¾Jl,f113Ai•NST THE VC AND RE-'ESlfABLI$H" THE:' PRESTIGE OF

VIETNAM AND T}{E ARMY, }{ESTATED FLATLY T~E ONLY WAY TO WlN BEFORE

THE A('JERI-CANS LEAVE I'N I 965 t,,i,AS Tel CKANGffi TAE PRESENT REG,H!E. DON'

INDICA'fED"HE WAS COMPLETELY SAT[SFIED ATCONE~•s BO'NA FIDE$ AS WERE.

 "PHEOTl:!ERMEMB.J::RS
Or T~E GENERALS
COUPCOMMIITil.
4. DONADDEbTHA~HE ANDlt1'$..r£LL00 GENERALS
WtSHEDTO DO EVERY-
THINGPOS~IBLETO AV0,.1-0
A~~ER~~AN
INVOLVEMENi,.
IN THE C'OUE. HE STA1ED
EMPHAT-ICALLY
THA~OTHERA1'!ERI'CANS
S}WULOQUlT TALKINGT-0 COLONELS
AND
MAJORSABOOTCOUPACTI-ON
SlNCE IN THJS WAY,AMERICANS
W1LL1-1';1.;VOLVj
THEMSELVES
DESPllE ANYOISCRE/f!ON.
ON THE PAR'P-OFTHAGENERALS.
CONElp AS~EDrOR iSPEOirI~S O..NT.!(IS.POINT. DONREPLIEDMERELY
HE
RECOGNIZED
COtiEIN.TO SE THE PROPER€G)IT;ACT
ONJHE AMERICA11
SipE AND
THE AMERI~~NSSHOULD
RECOGNIZE
ff!~ AS THE PROPERCONTACT
ONTH~
VIETNAMESE
SIDE. ALL OTHERDEALINGSONJ"HESU,BJE011'
OF COUPACTION
BETWEEN
A~ERICANSANDVIE!H~AMESE
SHOULD
CEASE. DO~ WOOLD
NOT
BE MORESPEOIF'IC.
5. E,XPLAIN~NG
T-HAT 0~ lf!5 OWNIN1T'rATIVEAND
'HE WASSPEAIKING
WITHOUT
I~STRUCiIONS<THI~ HAOPR~VIOUSLY
B~E.t,fOLEA~EO~iTH hHE
AMBASSAl}OR)'
"!CONEI,N
C'ALLED s
'TO oor-r· ATTE;~TlON
i1THEF'ACT'J\l-lAT
THE(AMS
~OULOBE LEAVINGrOR A BRIEr TRIP T-0~HE U~JTEDSTATESON31 OCT,
THAI IT ltIGHT PROVEIMPORTA~®TH fo VIE1'~AMESE
ANOAMERICAN
CON-
"or THt'"sQ.UESTf-ON
SIDERATIONS Sl:IDU.LTI
AMBL-ODGE
HAVEA COMF}LETE
G,RASP
OF THE GR~ERALS'P-LAN!tt:tNa
PRJOR TO HI~ DEt'ARTURE.'Do}.iREPEAT~D
1:HAT
AMBLODGEWOULD
HAVETHE PLANS..BEr'O~J::
THE COUPf,auT WHEN,
PRESSEDON
HIS PREVLOUS r-o !9.el<ETHESEPLANSA.VA'g.f1BL'"£
CO'MMI1'NKNT 48 HOUR~IN
t<ADYANC~,
DONSTAT&QTHA\ POSSIB~~ THE PLANSCOULDONLYBE MAOE
~VAILA~LE4 HOU~sIN ADVANC~.~o~ ~UEStIONEDCONE1NCLOSELYAS TO
WHATTI~E ON THE 31~] THE AMl3"WOULO
BE LEAVTNG. PONADDED1:HAT~E
 HOPED THE AMB WOU)..0 NQT CHAAiGE HIS SCHEDULE, l!S '4,NY Cl:IAttG MIGIJ,'F :BE

SUSPECT. "DO.N STATED >fOiHING WO\Juf>-S-E HAPP.E}IIt)-G WITH.IN T·HE NEXT 48 HOURS

ANO THAT' IF' THERc7 w,;is A GOOP RE1i'.SONF"O..RTHE A~l.2 TQ CHANS.E HIS PLJIN.NING,

THE AM'B WOULD BE INF'OR~lED IN TI!!E TO 11!AKEHI'S OW,~ DEOJS!Oir. ,DON Aj)DEO

THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING ON THE l•!ORWING OF' 2S .OCT TO SEE G&N DO CAO

TRI ANO GENERAL NGUYEt,i.KHAN.H, RAT THE COVER F"OR Tl!I:S TRIP WOULD BE

THE 'DISTRlBUT!O,N OF •l£DALS. ACTUALLY, DON WOU,LO

'8£ TALJ(I{:JG TO 'TRI

A'ND l(HAlJH TO PERFEC'P, TH~ PL,(li.\l~'J,t/.G. oo;~K$KED CQJ\\E'IN TO REMAI~ AT

HOMEFRON WEDNESDA'{ EV.E.\'ll;\JGONW.l-\R.D.

6. A NEW SE'C'URLT1' SYSTE!4 POR ~OJ'JTCICTSY)A$ EXPLAh~ED TO £EN DON

INVOLVIN-0 cur-our~FeR CO~rWNlCA\!O~S PURPOS~s. THE USE OE 01HE8 SAFE

JSITES FOR MEETIWG'S, StffETY SI~N.'ILS, A.'~D THE USe 0F 1'1!)..lTARY V}HI;CLES

F'o'ft TRAf)SPORTATlON FROM POINT 1'0 .POINT. 11)0,1APPEARED J'O ABSORB A.LL OF

THIS, AG..,REEDE)NTIR.£L'I' AND MAD':!: :-lOT'ES AS TO HIS PART IN THESE AR~A'N.G,€-

MENTS.

7. CONKIN RECALLEfl TO D!;>.NTCAW;

Lfl'ttp•~ P8EVI01JS M,ENJION OF LT COL

PHA11-NGOC THAO, BON SALl) TO 3EWAR:E Of THAO SINOE' Hf- IS NOJ ABOVE

FABRICATION AND .JS SUSP'ECl) 8'.Y 'iRE 3ENERALS' t:;Rpu.P..'l;}QN.:AODEl) THAT Tlil!O

IS A PROJJ;:GE 'Of NSO :Rljllll THUC AUD NHU, T)l~T LI K&ivIS~ THAO 1S UNO'ER

SUSPICION BY C0L J)0 Al.}, CijJ.EF or T#,£ M§S. Q.QN~DOE~ T+IAT EVEJl! Gli;lll

1<HANH rs SUSPECTE.rO9Y 'fl:lE Pi'?E.S

IQEi'n' ,AS N,PT cE;Iii!~ £NT I RELY LOYs/l.I,.
4500

NNNN
 .3. GEN DON W&~ AGAIN QUES-TIONED ABOUT THE PART-IGIPATiON :OF' G&N TON

THAT DINH IN THEl COUP PLAtffl!NG. !s>0,.1'1

REPEA'IJD T'liAi DINH IS N01

PARTICIPATil:JG IN Tl:lE PLA~I~G, THAJ DINH '.IS !.h\1J).ER SUSPICIOl'J'1 73Y NGO

Dlt~H NHU., WITH WHON DINH JARGU~9 \t/HIL& llE W-11.S

MILITARY B6VER11/0R OF'

SAIGO~. DON REITE~~tED TltAJ GEN BINH IS CONTINUOUSLY i$1.JRROUNDEDBY

COUP CO~l{HTTEE SYMP'~THI;zERS .4Nt1 THESE PERSONS HAV-E 'BEEN GIVEN 'ORD)i:RS TO

l::LHlINATE l'lINJ?! IF :;ii Sl'!O,v/S ANX SIGNS OF C01>1PRO.nl:tS11~G

Tl:!~ COUP.

9. DON WAS PREssfo ,ro Rf;NE-i),L DETAILS- OF' Tf!!i: UijITS P~RTICIPATIN.G IN

THE COUP, DON SAJD THAT lfd-l1S WAS '10$ HIS .SPE€-!F'IC FU)lCTION WITHIN

THE COUP COl'HifIJ:TE'E AND TllERE-r'-0:RE HE COULD "NO~ ~}.JS.\lf.ERTHE QUESTION WITH

PiECIS]ON. DO~! OUTLINED HIS FUNCTFQ A'S THE 001H1CT f!lMI WITH 1HE

AMERICAfJS, OTHER -B"ENERALS, ,i£!ND DIVISIO~ CO(!lMA~DERS. GEN LE VAN KIM IS

DOI,NG THE POLITICAL PLA~N:ING AND THE 14.iLITARY PLA.l'll'-lING rs IN- THE
HANDS OF OT1iERS CCO~Mli:-NT: PRESU!MBLtl "ilI:G t,f.lNH" f!I~E;.Ui'). OF THOSE
UNIJ'S WIHOH HE !iAD KlllOW.bEWE ~ L1S'l'CD:

A, ON! HALF' OF TH~ AIRBORNE'8RIGt1DE CS?ECIF'IC lJNlTS NOT XNCWN

TO HI!lD.

9, TWO BAT'I'ALI'O('TS OF ~ARINE-S CSPECIFIC UNITS UNKN0-\4N>.

COL NGUYEN KHA.NG-, 1'lA'RENE CO, F£ARS rOR RIS FAMiLY At:¾DWO!a!LDLE€1D THE

E'NTJRE MARINE COR'P~ INTO T.}{E. COUP !F' -ME COULD ;13.E
ASSURED THE SECURITY

Of ~rs FAMILY IN CASE HE rs KILLED.

o. ALL OF THE AIR FORCE ~ITJ'I "i:xcE?TI-ON OF ITS CO~[rlANDER, COL

HUYNH HUU l:lI E()J.,

1). SOi·tE tJN1TS OF TJ-!E PRESrDR&TIAL GUARD ?tUS AT L;:AST FOUR )'ANKS.
 I!':, THE E,NTIRE 5TH DIV1S10_N,
F', THE 9TH DIVISJO~ (CO~MENT: NOW[~ THE~ELTA) AFTER THE COUP

'B,EGINS,

G, ENTIR-E 21ST DF\IIS!OJJ,

H. HALF' OF' Tl:IE 23RD D1VISION <SPECiF'IC REGIMENTS NOt KNOWN).

19, GE~"DO~ SAID THAT HE WASUN-AWAREOF THE PDSITlON OF THE 7JH

DIVISION BUT DID KNO~ THAT ~EI]HER THJ NAVY NOR THE SPE;CIAb F'ORC£S

ARE INVOLVED IN 1.NY W,AY, l{E SA1D LIKEWISE THE 135TH' REGH!ENT Wf.S NOT

l~VOLVIDD, HE INDICATED SO~! P-OS~I&1L11'Y THAT THID COMBAT POLIGE ~ND

OTH!i:R ELEMEN1S OF' fHE fSATJ-ONAL E-OL,Io,.: IN SAIGON MIGHT JOIN I, AFTER

1'1-lE COUP BEGINS, HE COULO ~OT GIVE AM OPINION WITH RESPECT TO THE

46TH AND 48TH TE.RRilfORl-AL REGHlENTS, HE E.MPHASIZED THAT HE ~/AS

NOT DOING THE 14ILIT.(IRY i'LANNii'fG,

11. DON VOLUNTEERtD iRAT GEN TRAN THIE~ KHlfill w~s BEiNG VEnY

C!RCUMSP1:CT Al' '!'HE l~OMEijT B,ECAUSE HE Ki,OWS HE lS l:lNDER SUSPICIO~ BY

THE PRESIDENT.

12, 1'HE ONLY ADO:ITIONAL DETA!bS THAT D01\' C-OUlD OfF'tR I/ERE:

A, GQMMANDPOST fO'R THE COUP WILL i,BE THE JGS. TlHS j/_AS CH'OSEN

BEC'AUSE:Of ITS ?,'RO-XJ:i'tITY TO SPEc;.yU. FORCES HEAOQUAR'J'ERSAND iAi~ SON. 1\IHUT.

S, THE GE'NERALS ARE AWARE THAT 1iHERf: ARE TWO Ut-l.DERGROUND

TUNNELS OF' ESCAPE FROM GI A LONG PllLAQE. vHESE T£R~~!NATE AT THE

CEMETARY AiT THE CORNER Of P11llNG !<HOC 'KlfOAf,I AND PHAN THANH GIA'N AND

AT THE ZOO, JHESE WERE FO~MERLY ?ART OF TH& S~Wj:RS 3UT THE

SEWERAGE HAS BEEN DIVERI0D INTO OTHER C~A~NELS.

 c. AT'fiHf MOMENTOF'4HE INilfIA!tIP.N 'OF' T,!IE coµp-; PIT WliLL BE

TAKEN ~~D PHaµEs COT OF'F.

13. (N CLOS NG, GEN DON S~TD THA'f>lHE WOOLD BE IN CONTACT AGAtN
WITHij 48 HOURS, UTILJZI~ 11-fE NEW SYSTEM OUIUtNEO, B.Y,GONE-IN. HE

PLEADED THAT THE AllB OT ALERT HIE AMERlCA'N CO~!!lYINJ1TYcINA.NY WAY,

SPECifICALbY THAT AMERICANS~QT 2E TOLD TO STOCK UP ON FOOD SINCE

THAT WOUIJDBE- AN INSTANT ALERT TO. THE GV.N.

14. coufh:ERSUR\fEJLLA'NCE OFI TllE~EEJ~G R~VEALED NO UNUSUAL

AC-:rIVlilY IN T
~~~i,ii
3900
0 2910402
18534
0 P 5 ;: e. R.1-.E i36JOCT29
.::> 00
\GAS SAIGON204~ FROMAMBASSADOR LODGEDTG29/1040Z
BALL, HILSMAN,
TO SECSTATEWASHEYES ONLYFOR RUSI(, HARRIMAN,
HUGHES. [,1[$ij~lV
OSD EYES
vJHITEHOUSE/EYESONLYMCGEORGE
BUNDY
INFO-HONOLULU FOR ADMFELT EYES ONLY
1853<!
CIA/EYES ONLYMCCONE,CARTER,HELMS.
BT
J. i HAVERE\J-\°PEWED
THE FOLLOvJING
FACTORSWHICHAPPEARTO
METO BE PARTICULARLY
RELEVANT
IN .A BALANCED
EXAMINATION
OF THE
POSITIVE ANDNEGATIVEFACTORSAFFECTINGTHE CHANCES
OF A
SUCCESSFUL
COUPD'ETAT:
A. OF IMMEDIATE
CONCERN
IS THE APPARENT
LACKOF pETAIL
FURNISHED
BY GENERAL
DONBOTHWITHREGARD
TO THE MILITARYUNITS
TO BE INVOLVED
ANDTHE POLITICO/PSYWAR
SIDE. ·THIS APPEARSTO ME
TO BE AT LEAST IN PARTEXPLAINEDBY.THEGENERALS'RETICENCETO
REVEALTHESEDETAILSAT THIS POINT ANDBECAUSEOF WHATMUSTBE A
MUCHGREATER
REGUARD
FOR SECURITYTHANWASTHE CASE IN AUGUST.
THE GENERALS
ALSOACl(NOv!LEDGE
A CERTAINAMOUNT
OF COMPARTMENTATION
ANDDIVISION OF LABORMlONGTHE PRINCIPALSWHICHON BALANCE
SHOULD
.
WORJ(
TO OURADVANTAGE.
B. THE ACKNOWLEDGED
INVOLVEMENT
OF GENERAL
DINH IS AN
EXTREMELY
VARIABLEFACTOR. THE GENERALS
SEEN ACUTELY
AWARE
OF
THIS ANDDONSTATESTHATTHEYHAVEHIM UNDERTWENTY-FOUR
HOURA
DAYSURVEILLANCE
ANDARE PREPAREDTO NEUTRALIZE
HIM AT ANYTIME
SHOULDHE KICK OVERTHE TRACES.
,
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF A PREMATURE,
UNRELATED
ANDPRl::CIPITATE
COUPBY COL PHAMNGOCTHAOOR OTHERSLOOMSLARGEAS A NEGATIVE
- . FACTOR. AGAIN, THE GENERALS
APPEARCOMPLETELY
.A\o!ARE
OF THIS AND.
AS YOUl<NO~!,V!EHAVENEVERBEENPARTICULARLY
SANGUINE
THATTHAOHAS
THIS CAPABILITY.

SANITIZED

.I
 • D, l<NOWLEDGE
OF THE INVOLVEMENT
OF CERTAIN
·CIVILIAN
' .
• OPPOSIT'IONISTELEMENTS'
N°0TABLY'
BUI DI~M~W!'{O
HASST,ATED
THAI:HE
IS LIAISON BEJWEENGE!~ERAL
KIM ANDCIVILIAN LEADERS,PROBABLY
DANG
SUNGANDPHANHUYQUAT,REPRESENTSBOTHA POSITIVE ANDNEGATIVE
FACTOR, ON THE NEGATIVESIDE, IT REPRESENTS
ANEXTENSIONOF
l{NO\•Jt.EDGE
~IEAKENING
THE SECURITYELEMENT
BUTON THE POSITIVE SIDE,
IT INDICATESAN AWARENESS
OF THE NECESSITYOF CIVILIAN POLITICAL
INCLUSION.AND
THE FACTTHATAS DONHASSTATEDIT IS NOT INTENDED
TO ESTABLISHA MILITARYJUNTA, TRANTRUNGDUNG'Sl<NOWLEDGE
AND
PROBABLE
INVOLVEMENT
DESPITE HIS DISCLAIMER,FURTHERINDICATES
INTENTIONTO FORMCIVILIAN GOVERNMENT,
PROBABLY
WITHINFRAMEOF
REFERENCE
OF REFERENCE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SUCCESSION,
E. I AMDISTRUBED
OVERTHE REPORTED
DISCUSSIONOF COL
NGUYEN
KHUONG'S
APPROACHES
TO U, . MILITARYPERSONNZL
INWITHOUT
THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE COUPPRINCIPALS. IT SHOULDBE REMEMBERED
THATKHUONG'S
ROLEWASOBSCUREIN OE AUGUST
COUPACTIVITIES.
DONHASSTATEDTHATTHE COUPPRINCIPALSWOULD
DISCIPLINE KHUONG
'
ANDTHATHE HASBEENREMOVED
FROMTHE SCENE.
T OP S E CRET
CFN 2040 CAS SAIGON2040 LODGE29/10402 RUSI<HARRIMAN
BALLHILSNAN
HUGHES
OSDMCNAMARA
GILPATRICTAYLORKRULAK
MRWMBUNDY
MCGEORVE
BUNDY
CAS HONOLULU
ADMFELT CIA MCCONE
CARTERHEU1S
l HAVECOUPD'ETAT DONDINH DONCOLPHAMNGOCTHAOTHAOBUI DIEM
KIM DANGVANSUNGPHANHUYQUATDONNOTINTENDED
JUNTATRAN
TRUNGDUNG'SA AN COLNGUYEN
KHUONG'S
U.S. KHUONG'S
DONKHUONG
CCC: SUBPARA E LINE TWOPORTIONSHUDREAD"U.S. MILITARYPERSONNEL
\oJIT HOUT
THE"
BT •©@00\rO\IDIEllffiT~I\..

NNNN

.I
 .•-
.. , • r
(\, ...
l, ••
'.
•!?!:'
.. ·:

' 1%3OCT29 13 I4

SF'I007
00 ESF
1.8535
DE ES! 29/ 1304Z
0 291040Z
+0 r S E 6 R E T ©@llilfrDIID\__lm1f
~ll
CAS SAIGON~~ FROMAMBASSADOR
LODGEDTG29/1040Z
.
TO SECSTATEv/ASHEYES ONLYFOR RUSK, HARRIMAN,
BALL, HILSMAN,
HUGHES.
0.SDEYES ONLYFOR MCNAMARA,
'GILPATRIC, TAYLOR,KRULAK,MRv/MBUNDY.
SHITE HOUSE/EYES
ONLYMCGEORG
BUNDY
INFO•• _HONOLULU
FOR ADMF'ELT EYES ONLY
CIA/EYES
BT ©@liilfFOIDJWWllt\\l!.
F. IT WOULD
SEEMTO ME THATTHE EXISTENCEOF AN IMMINENT
COUPATMOSPHERE
WOULD
REDUCETHE ELEMENT
OF SURPRISENECESSARY
FOR THE SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION
.
OF
. A COUPD'ETAT. THIS COUP
ATMOSPHERE
HAS PERTAINED,HOWEVER,
FOR SEVERALMONTHS
WHICHWOULD
TENDTO REDUCETHE STATEOF READINESSFOR COUNTERING
SUCHA COUP
ATTEMPT. vJE HAVESOMEINFORMATION
THATCOUNTER-COUP
COMBAT
ELEMENTSHAVEBEENSUBORNED.THE FACTTHATTHE COUPPRINCIPALS
. '
REMAINAS THE RESPONSIBLEMIL.ITARYAUTHORITY
ENHANCES
BOTHTHEIR
KNOWLEDGE
ANDABILITY TO DISPOSETHE UNITS BOTHFOR ANDAGAINST.
2. ADDITIONAL
FACTORSWHICHSHOULDBE NOTEDARE:
A. TO DATETHE GENERALS
HAVENOT INDICATEDEITHERA DESIRE
FOR OR DEPENDENCE
ON OURSUPPORTOR ACTIONSFOR SUCCESSVUL
IMPLEMENTATION
OF A COUP. ON THE CONTRARY,
THE GENERALS
HAVE
REPEATEDLY
DEMANDED
THE LEASTPOSSIBLE AMERICAN
IijVOLVEMENT.
B. ALTHOUGH
WEARE WELLAWARE
OF THE PROFUNDITY
OF STUDENT
ANDBUDDHISTDISSIDENCEANDUNREST.AND
EVENABILITY TO UNDER-
.TAKECERTAIN~INITED ACTION, WEDO NOT KNOW
OF ANYPLANST0 UTILIZE
THESEELEMENTS
ANDOF COURSECANNOT
CALCULATE
THE EXTENTOF
SPONTANEOUS
ACTIONTHEYMIGHTUNDERTAKE.
··--
SANITIZED
E.0. 13526, SEC. 315
cl1...1(.I 1, 51>i;s. •

.I
 --.,-,------~---~--,._,.,.
I' ·c. ACTIONTAJ<EN
WlTHRESPECTTO T,HE- ·coNMERC'IAL-·-IMPORT··
... . .. . ... \
-·· • -? -!.,
r' ~3 . .,
,P.HOGRAM
ANDTHE SEVERENCE
COLTUNGHAVECREATED
OF SUPPORTOF CERTA1'N
A COUPATMOSPHERE
ELEMENTS,
UNDER
AND$ONE DETEIUORATION
·@,:
IN THE ECONOMIC
SITUATIONCHARACTERIZED OF THE
BY THE FLUCTUATION
PIASTREVALUE,THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF GOLDONTHE MARKET,AND
I

THE RISING PRICES OF CONSUMER

COMMODITIES.
D. PLEASENOTEDONDOESNOTWANTMETO CHANGE
DATEOF
MYDEPARTURE
FOR WASHINGTON.WEAREREVIEWING
WHOLE
SITUATION
1-JED.NESDAY
NIGHTTO SEE WHETHER
CHANGE
MYDEPA;R.TURE
IS JUSTIFIED·:
3. A POINT WHICHMUSTBE COMPLETELY
UNDERSTOON
IS THAT1-JE
ARE NOTENGINEERING
THIS COUP. THE SUMTOTALOF OURRELATIONSHIP.
THUSFAR IS: THATvlE WILL'NOTTHWART
"A COUP; THATWEWILL MONITOR
VANDREPORT;ANDTHATCONEIN'S LONGSTANDINGFREINDSHIPWITHDON
11AYBE A REALHELP. ALTHOUGH
THEREHAVEBEENNO REQUESTSTO DATE
BY THE GENERALS
FOR NATER
I AL OR FINANCIALSUPPORT,WEMUST

ANTICIPATETHATSUCHREQUESTSMAYBE FORTHCOMING.
4. IN SUMMARY,
IT WOULD
APPEARTHATA COUPATTEMPT
BY THE
GENERALS'GROUPIS IMMINENT;THATWHETHER
THIS COUPFAILS OR
SUCCEEDS,'THEUSGMUSTBE PREPARED
TO ACCEPTTHE FACTTHATWE
WILL BE BLAMED,HOWEVER
UNJUSTIFIABLY;ANDFINALLY,THATNO
POSITIVE ACTIONBY THE USGCANPREVENTA COUPATTEMPT
SHORTOF
INFORMING
DIEMANDNHUWITHALL THE OPPROBRIUM
THATSUCHAN ACTION
NOTETOODON'S STATEMENT ~lE WILL ONLYHAVEFOUR
c:.J,,e< 1 wd-~ '1.,,.__
le,;..<,e
HOURSNOTICE. THIS RULESOi)T MYCW\·Net1#r--OPThlTON BETWEEN
TIME
I LEARNOf COUPANDTIME THATIT STARTS. IT MEANSU.S. WILL
NOTBE ABLESIGNifICANTLYTO INFLUENCECOURSE OF EVENT.
GP-1
©@IJiJIFOiID~
BT
f; . •
1(.1lI •• , h..:1•.I!..,:l
 ~ ... /. :,~
si:e so.,~i:,n1:.1)
·~1;:'-S!t.1-'

r~Lo~-~)'o
-
1%>GGT29 11+ 07
SFI009
00 ESF (G@[tfllrU©lfamTl!/A\IL
.... 1.8537
~ DE ESI 29/13582
T g ? ,.. r-- ,... r-. T"'" :T i~~
,::o_srat@ri
:1.tiJUM. mts•·oNL~
- .- C •• - ..
.. .
LODGEDTG29/10392
CAS SAIGOl~2041_/rRCi·!AMBASSADOR
TO SECSTATEWASHEYESONLYFOR RUSK, HARRIMAN, BALL, HILSMAN,
HUGHES
..
·osD EYES ONLYFOR ~CNAMARA,
GILPATRIC, TAYLOR,KRULAK,HR •M BUNDY.
\:/HITEHOUSE/EYES
ONLYFOR MCGEORGE
8UNDY
INFO- HONOLULU
FOR ADMFELT EYES ONL'{ "l

Ow
CIA/EYES ONLYt<lCCONE,
CARTER,HELMS. ~ (/)
~~
-N
BT z.,,
~(')
(/)~
1. EVENING25 OCTOBER
r'ORMERASST MINISTEROF DEFENSE,TRAN 6
ui
TRUNGDUNG,TOLDCAE OFFICERHE HADLEARNED
GENERAL
OFFICERS
PLAN~HNG
COUP\HTHIN TEN DAYS. COUPTO BE LED BY GENERALS
DON,
"BIG MINH", A'.'JDTHATHE UNDERSTOOD
GENERAL
LE VANKIM INVOLVED
AT TOP LEV.EL. DUNGSAID APPARENTLY
GENERALS
PLANNED
THE COMPLETE
REMOVAL
OF THE NGOFAMILY,
2. DUNGSAID THATTO HIS KNOWLEDGE
GENRALS
HADNOTYET
APPROACHED
CIVILIAN LEADERS. AS KE HASPREVIOUSLY,DU,~GEXPRESSED
SOMECONCERN
ABOUTCAPABILITIESANDINTENTIONSGENERALS, HE
CONSIDERSMAJORITYOF GENERALS
NO MORETHANFRENCHTRAINED
s::RGEANTSIN GENERALS'UIHF'ORi,JS. DUNGNOTEDTHREEEXCEPTIONS
THIS ASSESSMENT:"3IG MINH", KIM, ANDPHAMXUANCHIEU, DUF,G
SAID HIS CONCERN
RE GENERALS.WAS
DEVELOPMENT
OF MILITARYJUNTA
AND, ALTHOUSHRZ3HlE MUSTBE REPLACED,GENERALS
LP.CKED
NECESSARY
 3. DUNGSAID HE ?ERSONALLY
WOULD
PREFE1tCONSTITUTIONAL
SUCCESSIONAS INTERHl SOLUTION. r!E NOTEDVICE PRES NGUYEN
HGOC a,;
THO?ILLED SEVERALREQUIREMEtHS:THOSOUTHERNER,
HASGAINEDA /{:-
TYPE OF NEGATIVERESPECTIN POSTUREVIS A VIS DIEMANDNHU, WAS
i-JOTAMBITIOUSFOR POWER,WOULD
DELEGATE
AUTHORITY
ANDRESPONSIBLITY,
vlASNOTAT ODDSWITHMILITARY,ANDMOSTIMPORTANT,
l4ASFLEXIBLE
AND~iOULD
NOTFIGHT CHANGEIN CONSTITUTION
PROVIDINGFOR PRIME
MINISTER, DU~GSAID NEXTBEST CHOICEHEADAN INTERIMREGIMEWAS
PHANHUYQUAT, WHOFROM~ENTER, COULDUNIFYCIVILIAN LEADERSHIP
ELEtl5.:NTS,WASCLEAN,CAPABLEEXECUTIVEANDADMINISTRATOR,
PROBABLY
ACCZPTABLE
TO MILITARYANDWOULD
ALSODELEGATE
POWERS. THO
?RErE:'lASLEAS PRESIDENT' QUATAS PRIMErlINISTER, WITHSTRONG
CABINET:JECESSARY
TO SUPPORTEITHER OR 30TH, FURTHERSUPPORTED
BY ENERGETICYOUl-JGER
LEADERSAT SECONDARY
ECHELON
LEVEL.
4. DUNGSPECIFICALLYSINGLEDOUTTRANVANLY FOR INTERIOR
POST, PHA~QUANGDAN, TRANVANTUYEN,ANDPHAMKHACSUU, ALL FOR
MINISTRIES; DANOR SUU FOR SOCIALANDCULTURAL
AFFAIRS,.DANOR
SUUFOR CIVIC ACTION, TUYENFOR INFORMATION.ONLYTHREEEXILES
WORTH
CONSIDERATION:
NGUYEN
NGOCarcH, DUESTRONGFOLLOWING
AND
POPULARITY
COCHINCHINA, NGUYEN
HUUCAHU,WHOSTOODUP TO
FAMILYANDHIGHLYCAPABLE,AND:¾GUYEN
TONHOANAS GOODMINISTER
FORNAYOUTH.IN CATi::GORY
USELESSEXILES DUNGNAMED
PHAMHUYCO
ND HOANG
CO THUY.
5. DUNGHIMSELFSAID WOULD
NOTREFUSESERVEIN NEWGOVT,
BUTCLEANSWEEPWASNECESSARY
ANDFACTHE MARRIED
TO DIEMNIECE
HAYHARM
NEWGROUPING. DUNGADMITTED
RESIGNATION
ANDALOOF
POSTURESINCE, MAYNULLIFYHARMFUL
EFFECTSOF HIS CONNECTIONS
WITHNGOFAMILY. THROUGHOUT
EVENINGDUNGMUCHMORECRITICALTHAN
BEFOREOf DIEM, NHU, MADAME
NHU, ANDENTIRE NGOENTOURAGE
AND
GOVTHIERARCHY. SEVERALTINES EMPHASIZED
NECESSITYCLEANSWEEP,
NGO'S 3EYONDSAVINGSELVESOR COUNTRY,ANDAS IN PAST WILLNEVER
SINCERELYAGREERErORNS, ESPECIALLYUNDERPRESSURE. SEVERALTIMES
DUNGTOASTED"SECONDREPUBLIC".
6. DESPITE DISCLAIMORS
TO CONTRARY,
IT POSSIBLEDUNGINVOLVED
CURRENT
COUPPLANNINGON CIVILIAN SIDE. THIS BASEDON FOLLOWING:
DUNGINITIAL STATEMENT
DONAND"BIG MINH"PLANNING
COUP, SEEMING
UMCERTAINTY
RE KIM, COUPLED
WITHLATERSTATEMENT
WHENHE INCLUDED
"BIG MINH", KIM ANDCHIEU IN CATEGORY
CAPABLEGENERALS;HIS
STATEMENT
THATTO HIS KNOWLEDGE
CIVILIANS NOTAPPROACHED,
LATER
i•iENTIONING
SOMEOf MORENATUR.~L
CIVILIAN LEADERCANDIDATES.ON
OTHERHAND,NOTHINGDUNGSAID PROVESHE PERSONALLY
INVOLVED
OR
HASBEENAPPROACHED,
ESPECIALLYSINCE.WHATHE SAID FOLLOWS
LOGICALLINE Of DISCUSSIONANDELICITATION.
GP-1
BT
29/13552
 ..,
i\~F:I 00$: . ~1;:l: ~,~ M! r1 'll'l,
Q.ESF \\: I{<;rn1 , ;;.5

,.:Q.),:ES! 29'/!212Z
C.l\. 1.......~CA>
' • ••·• •'-'
, .."t~,
• • ' },1 'I •
, _,,,
·r·..,.
..

! 0, 2910302 ~ ••• • ' 1.

•
1 0 P 5 E e R E, T 1%3OCT29 J.3 I8
1
~~S~:_GON 2043J FROMAMBASSADOR
LODGE29/ l 030Z
TO SEC STATEWASHEYES ONLYFOR RUSH, HARRIMAN,
BALL, HILSMAN,

HUGHES ....~~~.--~;~~,;;;=
1
OSDEYES ONLY/ForiH~NAMARA,
1 ~i:n
rvE~
~;~J.J.
~@IIJJ[Fll@lEmrrr~
GILPATRIC, TAY.LOR,KRULAI(,MR\m
BUNDY
WHITEHOUSE/EYES
ONLYMCGEORGE
BUNDY
INFO-HONOLULU FOR ADMFELT EYES ONLY
CIA/EYESONLYMCCONE,CARTER, HELMS
BT ~

J. ON 14 OCTOBER,BUI DIEM, DAI VIET OPPOSITIONIST, TOLD

'
.
·CASOFFICERHE OPTIMISTIC AT THATTIME BECAUSEMILITARYFRIENDS
~WERECONTINUING
THEIR PLOTTINGAGAINSTREGIME. SAID HAD
~EEAREDAPPARENT
VICTORYOF NGOFAMILYOVERUNITEDSTATESMIGHT
tHALT FURTHER
COUPPLANNINGBUT THIS NOTCASE BECAUSE,EVEN
rTHOUGH
MANY
VIETNAMESE
DO NOT UNDERSTAND
AMERICAN
POLICY,

~.
~'f•HEY
ALSOAPPRECIATED
tAFFAIRS.
FACT USGNOTSATISFIED CURRENT
BUI DIEM NOTEDCONTINUED
STATE
RELUCTANCE
VIETNAMESE
TALK
[~REELYAMERICANS,
SINCE IN PAST THIS HAS RESULTEDIN DIEM"
'REGIMEKNOWING
OF SUCHPLANNING.

2, ON 28 OCTOBER,BUI DIEM TOLDSAMECA~ OFFICERTHAT

GENERALS
WHOPLANNINGCOUPBEIIJG VERYSECRETIVEFOR SECURITY
REASONS,SUCHSECURITYLACKINGIN PAST, ANDANYBREAKIN
,
SECURITYNOl•/DISASTRO.US
FOR FAMILIES ALL CONCERNED.IN CONTEXT
OF CAS OFFICER\~ARNING
ABOUTWHOM
HE SHOULDOR SHOULDNOT
SPEAKTO, BUI DIEM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD
CONEINHADA KEYROLE
VIS~ VIS THE AMERICANS
ANDCOULDCONEINBE TRUSTED?
AFFIRMATIVE
REPLYG~VEN. BUI DIEM SAID IT MIGHTBE NECESSARY
FOR HIM CONTACT
CONEININ FUTUREAS ALTERNATE
LINK BETlvEEN
SANITIZED
E.O. 13526. SEC. 3.5
NLIL--11-S'?d.
By Mrv NARA,00101,/17
.
CONEit~ANDGENERALSIF EXISTING LINKS DISRUPTED.
• --.3. BUI DIEMSAID HE HADFREQUENT
CONTACT
WITHGENERAL
KIM
ANDTHATKIM MOSTPOLITICALLYASTUTEOF GENERALS. HE SAID
KIM ~ND BIG MINHCLOSEON THEIR THINKINGRELATIVECIVILIAN
ROLEIN OR IMMEDIATELY
AF'fER COUP, THATOTHERGENERALS
HAD
BEENBROUGHT
IN ON MILITARYSIDE, NAMELY
GENERALS
DONAND
CHIEU, BUTTHATIN MILITARYDISCUSSIONSTHE NAMINGOF
.
SPECIFIC CIVILIANS HADBEENMINIMIZEDIN ORDERNOTTO COMPROMISE
CIVILIANS. BUI DIEMSAID CIVILIAN SIDE NOTSERIOUSPROBLEM,
THATCIVILIAN LEADERSHIPCOULDBE SOLVED WITHOUT
MUCHDIFFICULTY
WHENTIME CAME. NOTEDHIS DISCUSSIONSWITHKIM ANDTHE
SEVERALPAPERSHE HADPROVIDEDKIM WEREMORECONCERNED
WITH
STRUCTURE
ANDPOLICIES OF A NEWGOVTTHANWITHPERSONALITIES.
GASOFFICER REMARKED
THATSTRUCTURE,POLICIES, ANDPERSONALITIES
OF VITAL CONERNANYGROUPHOPINGFOR USGRECOGNITION,THAT
ANYNEWGOVTWOULD
DESIRE SUCHRECOGNITION
SOONEST,THEREFORE
THESEDETAILSSHOULDBE MADEKNOWN
IN ADVANCE. BUI DIEM ALSO
SAID HE HADEMERGENCY
COMMO
WITHDR PHANHUYQUAT, ASSIGNED
THIS WEEKTO CANTHO AREA, ANDTHATQUATCOULDBE BACKIN
SAIGONON SHORTNOTICE. HE ADDEDTHATQUATWOULD
IN ANY
CASEBE IN SAIGONBY ENDOF WEEK,ANDTHATHE WASACTINGAS
LIAISON BETWEEN
GENERALS
ANDQUAT.
GP-I
BT
29/l.302Z

~@IMIFD@IEI/Wfl£\ifl.

NNNN
 .- ((-
. ..
-·
' ... ·
.- ----------------------
SAIGO!I'!2)i.O 29 Octoa:.er 1963
---- .. .. -
from Lodee to SecState
l. I have reviewed the followinz factors which appear to me to be particularly
relevant in a balanced examination of the positive and negative factors affecting
the chances of a successful coup d'etat:

1 a, Of immediate concern is the a?parent lack of detai~f) MN

@ffi~oth -.,ith regard to the military units to i::,,e involved-and the
.. - po1[fuo;sywar side. This appears -to me to be at least in ;>art explained
by the Generals' reticence to rev~al these details at this point and because
-·-····-··- of what must be a .1uch greater regard =or sccur:.ty than was the case in August:~-
The Generals al.so acknowledge a certain arr~u.~t of comparttr.entation and division
. of labor among the principals ·.:hich on balance should work to our advantage,

·..o factor,
b, The acknowledged involvement of General. Dinh~mely
The Generals seem acutely aware of this and~that
variable
,;hey have···
.

.. him under t..,enty-four hour a day surveillance and are,p:-.pared to neutralize

him at any time should he kick over the traces.
c. The possibility of a 9remature,
·r-- COP ?ham llgoc Thao or others looms larze
. \....' ' .1,enerals appear completely aware of this
particularly sanguine that Thao has this
unrelilted and p.recipitate coup by ..
as a negat!ve f.ac.tor, Again, the
and as you l<nowi.we have never been
capability,

..
elements ·--
re?resents bo,:h
a ;,ositive negati•1e negative represents an
extension of knowledge weakening the security element but on the positive
side, it indicates an awareness of 1:he necessity of civilian ;iolitical inclusion
and the fact '.hat it is not intended to establish a militat"J ~
junta, Tran Trung Dung's lcno.1ledge and ;>robable involven:ient 1111 •
I-, &4£il further indicates intent ion to for::i civilian. £overnment, probably_
. within frame of reference of constitutional succossion,

~ .. e, I am disturbed over the reported discussion of .

approaches to U,S, military ~ersonnel without the autho i:a,;ion or t • cou~ .

0
f, It ·--ould seem to ::-.e that the exis-cence of an immiment coup ati:os;;,hcre •
would"reduca the alement of sur;;,rise necessar:,, for the s~ccessful . implementation
...·-- ·.,,, .. .,,,.. ___, ___ ...~--
.

-··•·

,,......,
I I
~
.. -. . :•
'.·
·.-
' . ... ' .
..•

SA,N1TIZED , /'•

.- .. . ·-·: .
'.5'-::½,
·~ •\5.5
SY
0 of a coup d'etat. This coup atmosphe:-e has ;,ertained, ·howev~r, for several.
months which would tend to reduce the state of readiness for countering such
a coup attempt, We have some information that counter-cou? comhat elements
have been suborned. The fact th~t the coup ~rincipals remain as the responsible
military authority enhar.ces both their knowledge and ability to dis;,ose the
units both for and against.

2. Additional factors which should be noted are:

a. To date the Generals have not indicated either a desire for or dependence
on our support or ac~ions for successful im?lemen~ation of a coup, On th~
con-::rary, the Generals have re;:,eate<lly demanded the least possibl1: American
involvement,

b, Although we are well aware of the profundity.of ,student and Suddhist

dissidence and unrest and even ability to undertake certain limited action, we
do net know of any plans to utilize the elements and of course cannot calcula-::e
the extent of spontaneous ac-::ion they ~ight undertake,

c. Action taken with r~sPect to the com~~rcial import ?ro~ram and the
severance of suo~ort of certain elements under Col, Tung have created a cou;:,
a~;nos?here and S~me deteriora~ion in the economic situation characterized by
the fluctuation of the ?iastre value, the disa?pearance of gold on the market,
and the rising prices of consut:'ier comrr.odities. ·

0 d,
Washington.
does not want me to chan~e date of my departure
He are reviewing whole situation
for
Wednesday night to see whether
change my daparture is justified,
3,
this A point"hich must be completely understood is that we are not engineering
The sum total of our relationshi? tluis far is: That we will not
that we will moni~or and repo~t;
Althoug een no requP.sts
to date by the material or financial support, we must anticip~te
that such requests may be forthcoming,

~. In sumrr.ary, it would ap?ear that a cou? attempt by the Generals' group is

imminent; that whether this coup fails or succeeds, the USG must be prepared
to acce9t the fact that we will be hla:::cd, however unjustifiably; and finally,
tr.at no ;iositive action b:, the lJSG can ?revent a coup attempt short of informing
Diem and ~~u with all the o orobrium that such.an action/would entail. llillllar ;
This rules our;;;;-
·checki:1 6 with you between time I learn o . coup and time ,hat it starts. It
means U,S. >1ill not be able significantly to influence course of event,

----------------·----------·--·------------------·---------------------------
'

14
 SAIGOlf204 l 21 October 1963

from ~odge to SecState

2. •nerals had not yet appro3ched civilian

ex?rcss~d some concern about capabilities
s ra-,•ority of Generals no more t~an
,~~nch trained sergeants in ger.e~als' unifor~s. MSf three exceotions --
~!"lis assess:nent: 0
3i~ Hinh 0 , Kir:i, and Pham Xua!'lChieu. concern
re Generals ~as dev~lopment of military ~unta and, althougn regime ~ust be
re9laced, Generals lacXeC necessary political ~xp~rienc~ run iovernment.

--;-------><-• .... ~would ?ref~r constitutional succession as interim

solution. U~l:&'lalDIIVice Pres,. Nguyen Ngoc Tho filled several rec_uirements:
Tho souther.rier • has gained a ;:y9e of-- negativ'? res9ect in pos1:ure vis a vis
Diem and ,lhu, was not am!:>itious for ;,ower-, wo1Jld delega'te authority and
res?onsibili ty, was not at odds with militar'j, and most important, was flexible
:!?"°cot fi:;ht change_ in C:on:;ticution ;iroviding for Prime Minister.
_,ext best c~oice hea<l an i~teriM regi~e was ?ha~ ~uy Quat, who from
center, could ~nify civilian leadershi? elements, was clean, capable executive
and administrator, ?robably acceptable to military and would also delegate
?Owe~s. Tho preferable as.President, Quac as Pri~e Minis~er, with strong
Cabinet necessar, to su;i9ort eit~er or both, further sup?orted by energetic
younger- leaders at secondary echelon level.
4, singlad out Tran Van Ly for Interior ?Ost, ?han Quang
I Dan 1 iran Van Tuyen,
social and cultural
ar.d Pham Khac Suu, all
affairs,
for Ministries; Dan or Suu for
D~n or SUU for Civic Action, ,uyen for Inforr,,ation,
I Onl, three exiles wor,:h consideration: Nguyen Ngoc 3ich, due strong follo1,1ing
'j and po?ulari ty Cochin China, Nguyen Ton ;;oan as E;OOdMinister for Youth and
Hguyen Huu Cah... u;> to fa::-.l.ly and highly capable, In category
1 useless exiles-Pham ~u, Co and Hoang Co Thuy,

- /

SANITIZED
 29 Oc1:ober. 1963
froo Lod&e 1:0 SecSta1:e
..

~ere continuing their plotting

against fea:-eci a~?Z:"l?n~ vl.c1:0r-;1 of l!go fat:'lily over U.S. r.ii&ht
ha~t furt~er coup 9lannir.g but this not case because, even though u1any Vietna~es
c!o not understand Ai::e:-icar. policy, they elso a;,prcciated fac!= USG not sa1:isfied
current s~ote affairs. cor.ti~ued reluctance ·Vietnaoese talk
:ree-Y oericans, since 1n pas~ this hes r2sulted in ~iem reeime knowing of
I .
such olanni:ig, . ,
2. liW+@Wt#W¥i&Mi4¥ lf%9%l.}fijifi8~enerals who ?.lannin~
coup being very secretive for sP.c~rity reascns, such security lacki~g_in ?as~,
and a~y break in seccrit:y disas~~ous for fami!ies all concerned.

polidca!ly Sig Minh close on their .:hin:Ci::i

:-elati.ve civilian role !.n or i:n:::ediat:ely af~l?r c!>ui), tha~ other Generals had
be~n brought in on military s~d4 1 r.a~ely Generals Oon and Chieu, but that in
0 ~ilitar; disc~ssions the naming of_s~ccific
order net to comprooise civ~lian~.
civilians
f5
gsaid
had been minimized.in
c~vilian side no~ serious
problem, that civilian leaders?iio c<iuld be solved ~ithou1: much difficu.lty •
'-'her. time

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SANITIZED ll

-·--------
 r,
\...

·1
'

'

;;;;