Srpski Godišnjak Za Međunarodno Pravo (The Serbian Yearbook of International Law), Duško Dimitrijević (Ed.)

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SRPSKI GODIŠNJAK ZA MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO (The Serbian Yearbook of

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SRPSKO UDRUŽENJE ZA MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO
Serbian International Law Association
SRPSKI GODIŠNJAK
ZA MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO
The Serbian Yearbook of International Law (SYIL)
(Drugo izdanje/Second annual edition)
Duško Dimitrijević (ur.)
Beograd, 2022.
SRPSKI GODIŠNJAK ZA MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO
Izdavač
Srpsko udruženje za međunarodno pravo
(Serbian International Law Association)
Bulevar Kralja Aleksandra br. 67, Beograd
Za izdavača
Prof. dr Milenko Kreća
Glavni i odgovorni urednik

dr Duško Dimitrijević
Zamenici glavnog i odgovornog urednika

Prof. dr Aleksandar Gajić
dr Marko Novaković
Uređivački odbor
1. Professor Don Wallace, Jr, International Law Institute, Washington, USA
2. Professor Sienho YEE, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China
3. Professor Alexander N. Vylegzhanin , MGIMO-University , Moscow,
Russia
4. Professor Artur G. Bezverhov, Faculty of Law, Samara University, Russia
5. Professor Hans Köchler, University of Innsbruck, Austria
6. Professor Thomas Giegerich, Saarland University, Germany
7. Professor Carsten Stahn, University of Leiden, Nederlands
8. Professor Ewa Sałkiewicz-Munnerlyn, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow
University, Krakow, Poland
9. Professor Charalambos Pamboukis, Hellenic Institute of International and
Foreign Law, Athens, Greece
10. Professor Tibor Várady, Academician, Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts, Belgrade, Serbia
11. Professor Vlado Kambovski, Academician, Macedonian Academy of
Sciences and Arts, Skopje, Macedonia
12. Professor Li Xixia, Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, Beijing, China
13. Professor Cheng Weidong, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
14. Professor Giuseppe Puma, LUMSA University Maria SS. Assumption of
Rome, Palermo, Italy
15. Professor Dragan Bolanča, Faculty of Law, Split, Croatia
16. Boško Tripković, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham,
United Kingdom
17. Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, Jean Moulin University Lyon, France
18. Bérénice Schramm, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey
19. Ezio Benedetti, University of Trieste, Italy
20. Lucia Mokra, Institute of European Studies and International Relations,
Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia
21. Anita Rodina, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia
22. Dmitry Galushko, Voronezh State University, Russia
23. Aneta Spaić, University of Monte Negro, Podgorica, Montenegro
Kompjuterska obrada
Snežana Vojković
Štampa
Pharmalab laboratorija
Poručnika Spasića i Mašare 22, 11030, Beograd
ISBN-978-86-903836-1-0
Odricanje od odgovornosti: Stavovi izneti u objavlјenim radovima ne izražavaju stavove Glavnog

i odgovornog urednika i članova Uređivačkog odbora Godišnjaka.
SADRŽAJ
Predgovor .......................................................................................................... 9
Foreword ........................................................................................................... 11
IN MEMORIAM
Profesor dr Đorđe N. Lopičić ........................................................................... 13
Đorđe N.Lopičić
Diplomatski odnosi Republike Srbije i Kraljevine Holandije ........................ 17
MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO U SAVREMENIM

MEĐUNARODNIM ODNOSIMA
(International Law in Contemporary International Relations)
Hans KÖCHLER
The Struggle for the World Order: Reflections in Times
of Global Realignment ...................................................................................... 35
Ezio BENEDETTI
Evolution of Citizenship Rights and Development of a Global Society ......... 48
Alexander N. VYLEGZHANIN
Inna P. ZHURAVLEVA
Maria A. MILYUKOVA
Sustainable Development as an Emerging Principle of International Law ..... 62
6 Srpski godišnjak za međunarodno pravo
Rodoljub ETINSKI
Legality of Humanitarian Intervention Revisted ............................................. 94
Gian Luigi CECCHINI

Some Preliminary International Legal Considerations on Secession ............. 118
Olga MAGOMEDOVA
Choices States Make: The Peculiar Case of the Selective Approach ............. 151
Vladimir ČOLOVIĆ
Javni poredak u međunarodnom privatnom pravu .......................................... 182
MEĐUNARODNOPRAVNE POLEMIKE
(International Legal Controversies)
Ewa SAŁKIEWICZ-MUNNERLYN
The Right to Self-Defense in the Ukrainian Armed Conflict .......................... 197
Igor JANEV
Pitanje ništavosti Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma iz Kumanova? ....................... 209
Aleksandar GAJIĆ
Režim turskih moreuza i izgradnja kanala Istanbul:
Srbija, kao strana Konvencije iz Montrea od 1936. godine ............................. 223
Bojan T. STOJANOVIĆ
Kriza multilateralizma u oblasti upravljanja savremenim
migracijama i odgovori međunarodne zajednice ..............................................237
MEĐUNARODNA PRAKSA
(International Practice)
Slavolјub CARIĆ
Sudska praksa međunarodnih i nacionalnih sudova
u vezi sa jurisdikcionim imunitetom država .................................................... 255
Srpski godišnjak za međunarodno pravo 7
Tijana ŠURLAN
Sources of International Law in the Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights ......................................................... 267
Dijana SAVIĆ BOŽIĆ

Trafficking in Human Rights in the Practice
of the European Court of Human Rights ......................................................... 292
Nemanja BEZAREVIĆ
Legal Framework for Integration of Refugees According to
International Law, EU Law and the National Legislation
of the Netherlands and Serbia .......................................................................... 305
Antonia JUTRONIĆ PANTIĆ

Déclarations de l’Union européenne:
Primauté de l’efficacité sur la légalité? ............................................................ 326
PREDGOVOR
Imamo čast i zadovoljstvo da široj naučnoj javnosti pružimo na uvid drugo

izdanje Godišnjaka Srpskog udruženja za međunarodno pravo (SUMP),
nacionalnog ogranka Svetskog udruženja za međunarodno pravo (International
Law Assocciation – ILA). Rukovodeći se principima naučnoistraživačkog rada
i slobodom naučnog izražavanja, SUMP ovim izdavačkim poduhvatom nastoji
da pruži doprinos razvoju naučne misli o međunarodnom pravu i pravnim
aspektima savremenih međunarodnih odnosa u Republici Srbiji.
Od 2012. godine, kada je osnovan na inicijativu profesora međunarodnog
prava sa Pravnih fakulteta u Beogradu i Novom Sadu i naučnih saradnika
Instituta za međunarodnu privredu i politiku iz Beograda, SUMP je svoje
aktivnosti usmerio više na naučno-istraživačke aktivnosti njegovih članova
unutar matičnih fakulteta i naučnih ustanova ili u okviru ekspertskih aktivnosti
nadležnih državnih organa i tela u kojima su njegovi članovi povremeno bili
angažovani.
S obzirom da Godišnjak SUMP-a predstavlja tematsku naučnu publikaciju
koja izlazi na godišnjem nivou, Godišnjak bi trebalo da bude izvor saznanja
svima onima koji se na profesionalnom planu bave pitanjima i problemima
međunarodnog prava. Njegovo objavljivanje doprinosi ne samo unapređenju
proučavanja različitih oblasti međunarodnog prava, već i ostvarivanju opštih
društvenih ciljeva i interesa unutar međunarodnog pravnog poretka. U tom
smislu, Uređivački odbor Godišnjaka SUMP-a, nastoji da pruži pouzdanu i
sistematizovanu osnovu neophodnu za sagledavanje aktuelnih pravnih i
političkih trendova u međunarodnoj zajednici. Pomenutim pristupom,
omogućila bi se eklektička sinteza teorijsko-empirijskih saznanja koja može biti
razrađena i unapređena u međunarodnoj praksi. Naučni rezultati objavlјeni u
Godišnjaku sasvim izvesno mogu poslužiti i kao solidna osnova za izbalansirano
spolјnopolitičko pozicioniranje Republike Srbije u normativnom, holistički
povezanom sistemu međunarodnih odnosa. Izdavanje Godišnjaka pruža i realnu
šansu za povezivanju članova SUMP-a sa pravnicima iz drugih zemalja,
razmenu njihovih naučnih znanja i iskustava, kao i za unapređenje međunarodne
naučne saradnje. U tom smislu, Godišnjak predstavlja i jedno celishodno
sredstvao u pravcu daljeg osposoblјavanja mladih naučnih radnika, pravnika i

političara, državnika i diplomata koji stečeno znanje treba da primene u
međunarodnoj praksi.
Namera izdavača i urednika ovog izdanja Godišnjaka bila je, da mlađim
generacijama pruži priliku da nastave da se bave proučavanjem međunarodnog
prava kako bi stekli osećaj pripadnosti zajedničkoj profesiji i shvatanju o
neophodnosti kontinuirane borbe za poštovanjem međunarodnopravnih pravila
i principa kao jedinim valjanim jemstvom u očuvanju univerzalnih pravnih
vrednosti savremenog sveta.
U ime Uređivačkog odbora:

dr Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ
Glavni i odgovorni urednik Godišnjaka i
Naučni savetnik IMPP, Beograd
FOREWORD
We are honoured and pleased to present to the wider scientific public the
second edition of the Yearbook of the Serbian International Law Association
(SILA), the national branch of the International Law Association (ILA). Guided
by the principles of scientific research work and freedom of scientific expression,
the SILA strives with this publishing venture to contribute to the development of
scientific thought on international law and legal aspects of contemporary
international relations in the Republic of Serbia.
Since 2012, when it was founded on the initiative of professors of international
law from the Faculties of Law in Belgrade and Novi Sad and scientific associates
of the Institute for International Economy and Politics from Belgrade, the SILA
has focused its activities more on the scientific and research activities of its
members within the home faculties and scientific institutions or within the expert
activities of competent state authorities and bodies in which its members were
occasionally engaged.
Given that the Yearbook of SILA is a thematic scientific publication published
annually, the Yearbook should be a source of knowledge for all those who
professionally deal with issues and problems of international law. Its publication
contributes not only to the advancement of the study of various areas of
international law, but also to the achievement of general social goals and interests
within the international legal order. In this sense, the Editorial Board of the SILA
Yearbook strives to provide a reliable and systematized basis necessary for
understanding current legal and political trends in the international community.
With the mentioned approach, an eclectic synthesis of theoretical-empirical
knowledge would be enabled, which can be elaborated and improved in
international practice. The scientific results published in the Yearbook can certainly
serve as a solid basis for a balanced foreign policy positioning of the Republic of
Serbia in a normative, holistically connected system of international relations.
Publication of the Yearbook also provides a real chance to connect SILA members
with lawyers from other countries, to exchange their scientific knowledge and
experience, as well as to improve international scientific cooperation. In this sense,
the Yearbook is also a useful tool in the direction of further training of young
scientific researchers, lawyers and politicians, statesmen and diplomats who should
apply the acquired knowledge in international practice.
The intention of the publishers and editor of this edition of the Yearbook was
to give younger generations the opportunity to continue studying international law
in order to gain a sense of belonging to a common profession and an understanding
of the necessity of a continuous struggle for respect for international legal rules
and principles as the only valid guarantee in the preservation of universal legal
values of the modern world.
On behalf of the Editorial Board

Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Editor in chief of the Yearbook
And Professorial Fellow of IIPE, Belgrade
IN MEMORIAM
Profesor dr Đorđe N. Lopičić (1938–2022)

Profesor Đorđe Lopičić rođen je u Beogradu, 4. jula 1938. godine. Osnovne
studije prava završio je na Pravnom fakultetu Univerziteta u Beogradu – 1961.
godine. Naredne godine, upisuje poslediplomske studije na katedri za
međunarodno pravo Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, koje uspešno završava 1963.
godine. Nakon toga, kraći period bio je radno angažovan u imovinsko-pravnoj
službi opštine Zvezdara, gde je stekao iskustvo iz građanskog i upravnog prava.
Posle odsluženja vojnog roka radio je u Okružnom javnom tužilaštvu,
Opštinskom i Okružnom sudu u Beogradu. Položivši uspešno pravosudni ispit
1965. godine, imenovan je za pomoćnika, a zatim i za zamenika opštinskog
javnog tužioca u Beogradu. Za zamenika okružnog javnog tužioca imenovan je
1973. godine. Doktorske studije na katedri za krivično pravo Pravnog fakulteta
Univerziteta u Zagrebu završio je 1974. godine, a doktorsku disertaciju:
Krivično delo ubistva na mah, odbranio je 1983. godine, na Pravnom fakultetu
u Univerziteta Kragujevcu. Od 1. januara 1978. godine, zaposlen je na mestu
samostalnog savetnika u Službi za međunarodno pravne poslove Saveznog
ministarstva inostranih poslova SFR Jugoslavije. Tokom radne karijere u
Saveznom ministarstvu inostranih poslova bio je imenovan za načelnika Uprave
za konzularne poslove i dva puta za načelnika Službe za međunarodno pravne
poslove sa zvanjem ambasadora. Službovao je u inostranstvu na mestu konzula
u konzularnom predstavništvu SFR Jugoslavije u Čikagu u Sjedinjenim
Američkim Državama od 1983. do 1987. godine, a takođe i na mestu stalnog
otpravnika poslova DKP-a Savezne Republike Jugoslavije u Kraljevini
Holandiji od 1993–1998. godine. Kao član delegacija Ministarstva za inostrane
poslove imao je priliku da učestvuje u pregovorima sa stranim delegacijama o
važnim državnim pitanjima iz oblasti diplomatije, konzularnih odnosa,
pravosuđa, pružanja međunarodne pravne pomoći, ekstradiciji, saobraćaju,
terorizmu, azilanatima, graničnim sporovoma, restituciji imovine i arhiva,
zaštiti nacionalnih manjina, regulisanju dvovlasničkih imanja, implementaciji
Osimskih sporazuma, prosvetnim i kulturnim pitanjima. Njegovo veliko
pravničko i diplomatsko iskustvo, uz teorijsko znanje preporučilo ga je da drži

predavanja iz međunarodnog javnog prava i diplomatskog i konzularnog prava
na Diplomatskoj akademiji Ministarstva inostranih poslova u kontinuitetu preko
dve decenije. Profesor Lopičić bio je i aktivni član komisija za polaganje
stručnih i savetničkih ispita. Učestvovao je na većem broju međunarodnih
savetovanja, konferencija i simpozijuma u zemlji i inostranstvu na kojima se
raspravljalo o međunarodno pravnim pitanjima. Navodimo neka od zapaženijih
na kojima je imao istaknuta saopštenja: VII Međunarodni kongres za
kriminologiju u Beogradu od 17–22. septembra 1973. godine; Konferencija
International Law Association u Beogradu, 1980. godine; Conference on the
defence against terrorism in Europe: tasks and problems, Council of Europe,
Strasbourg, 12–14. novembar 1980. godine; International peace conference, St.
Petersburg, 18–22. juna 1999. godine; Međunarodni simpozijum NATO agresija
na SR Jugoslaviju 1999. Novi Sad, 15–16. oktobar 1999. godine. Takođe je
održao više zapaženih predavanja iz oblasti međunarodnog prava, diplomatije
i istorije na pravnim fakultetima i fakultetima za proučavanje istorije u
Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i u Kraljevini Holandiji.
U periodu od 1993. do 2000. godine, professor Lopičić bio je koagent
Savezne Republike Jugoslavije pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde u Hagu, gde
je nastupao u više rasprava u predmetu Bosna i Hercegovina vs. Savezna
Republika Jugoslavija. U ime države, više puta je učestvovao u razgovorima sa
predstavnicima Međunarodnog krivičnog tribunala u Hagu. Penziju je dočekao
2001. godine, na mestu načelnika službe za međunarodno pravne poslove
Ministarstva inostranih poslova. Za vanrednog profesora Diplomatskih studija
za predmet Međunarodno javno pravo i diplomatija na Evropskom centru za
mir i razvoj (ECPD) Univerziteta za mir Ujedinjenih nacija u Beogradu, izabran
je 2012. godine. Na Akademiji za diplomatiju i bezbednost u Beogradu (posle
preimenovanom u Fakultet za diplomatiju i bezbednost), predavao je predmete
iz oblasti Diplomatije. Profesor Lopičić bio je veoma aktivan član redakcije
naučnog časopisa Udruženja pravnika Srbije – Pravni život, i recenzent časopisa
Diplomatija i bezbednost, Fakulteta za diplomatiju i bezbednost u Beogradu.
Držao je mnogobrojna predavanja po pozivu na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu,
Pravnom fakultetu u Novom Sadu, Pravnom fakultetu u Kragujevcu, Megatrend
univerzitetu u Beogradu, Univerzitetu „Braća Karić“ u Beogradu i
Internacionalnom univerzitetu iz Novog Pazara – Fakultetu humanističkih nauka
departmana u Beogradu i departmana u Nišu, Evropskom centru za mir i razvoj
Ujedinjenih nacija u Beogradu i Fakultetu političkih nauka u Banja Luci. Bio
je autor ili priređivač 26 knjiga iz oblasti međunarodnog javnog prava,
diplomatije, međunarodnog krivičnog prava, istorije međunarodnih odnosa i
književnosti. Napisao je preko 180 članaka, studija, rasprava, komentara,
analiza, feljtona, prikaza, recenzija i osvrta koji su objavljeni u domaćim i
stranim časopisima.
Među naučnim radovima Profesora Lopičića valja istaći sledeće:

Bibliografija krivičnog prava Jugoslavije 1851–1975, (koautor), Beograd,
1979; Krivično delo ubistva na mah, Beograd, 1989; Krivična dela ubistva u
jugoslovenskoj sudskoj praksi 1951–2001, judikatura i literatura, Beograd,
2003; Diplomatija 1834–2005, bibliografija, Beograd, 2006; Diplomatija,
zbornik radova, (ur.), Beograd, 2006; Studije i ogledi o konularnim odnosima,
Beograd, 2006; Konzularni odnosi Srbije 1804–1918, Beograd, 2007;
Bibliografija krivičnog prava Jugoslavije 1851–1975, Beograd, 1991; Studije i
ogledi o diplomatiji Crne Gore; Beograd, 2006; Studije, ogledi, dokumenti i
spisi o konzularnim odnosima Crne Gore 1611–1918. godine, Beograd, 2007;
Studije i ogledi iz istorije diplomatije, (koautor), Beograd, 2007; Konzularni
odnosi Srbije 1804–1918, Beograd, 2007; Bibliografija krivičnog prava 1976–
2005, (koautor), Beograd, 2008; Nemački ratni zločini 1941–1945, presude
jugoslovenskih vojnih sudova, Beograd, 2009; Mađarski ratni zločini 1941–
1945, presude jugoslovenskih sudova, Beograd, 2010; Dr David Albala:
Specijalni delegat pri Jugoslovenskom Kraljevskom poslanstvu u Vašingtonu
1939–1942, (ur.), Beograd, 2010; Konzularni odnosi i konzularno pravo,
(koautor), Beograd, 2013; Jevrejstvo, antisemitizam i holokaust, Beograd, 2013;
Studije i ogledi iz međunarodnog prava, međunarodnih odnosa i diplomatije,
Beograd, 2016; Međunarodno javno pravo i međunarodni odnosi Bibliografija
1834–2016, (koautor), Institut za međunarodnu politiku, Beograd, 2017;
Mihajlo Idvorski Pupin: Tekstovi u američkoj štampi 1912–1920, (koautor),
Novi Sad, 2018; Diplomatija, (koautor), Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd,
2021; Pregled spoljne politike Kraljevine Jugoslavije od 1918. do 1935,
(koautor), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2022.
DIPLOMATSKI ODNOSI REPUBLIKE SRBIJE
I KRALJEVINE HOLANDIJE
Đorđe N. LoPičić*
APSTRAKT
U radu se razmatraju diplomatski odnosi između Republike Srbije (uključujući i
ranije Kraljevinu Srbiju, Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju, SFR Jugoslaviju, Saveznu
Republiku Jugoslaviju), i Kraljevine Holandije. U uvodnom delu autor razmatra
geopolitička stanovišta Kraljevine Holandije iz razloga što u domaćoj naučnoj i
stručnoj literaturi postoji relativno malo studija, monografija, sistematskih radova
kao i članaka, komentara o Kraljevini Holandiji. Pored toga, u radu se pruža
međunarodnopravni uvid u nekoliko značajnih i važnih događaja u diplomatskim
odnosima između dve države u vremenskom periodu dugom više od jednog veka.
S obzirom na autorova praktična iskustva u oblasti međunarodnog javnog prava i
međunarodnog krivičnog prava, koja su proizašla iz dugogodišnjeg bavljenja
državnim poslovima u okviru Ministarstva spoljnih poslova, rad sadrži i osvrt na
dve veoma značajne međunarodne institucije koje imaju sedište u Hagu. Prvu
predstavlja Međunarodni sud pravde, a drugu, Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu
Jugoslaviju. Silom prilika, naša država (najpre država prethodnica – Savezna
Republika Jugoslavija, a potom i Republika Srbija), bila je involvirana u procesima
koji su se odvijali pred ovim međunarodnim pravosudnim telima. ovi procesi
umnogome su odredili i pravac razvoja diplomatskih odnosa između dve zemlje.
Ključne reči: Kraljevina Holandija, Jugoslavija, Srbija, Međunarodni sud pravde,
Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, diplomatija
UVOD
Na samom početku našeg rada, imamo potrebu da se ukratko osvrnemo na
podatke koji prikazuju osnovne karakteristike o Kraljevini Holandiji. U našoj
javnosti, kao i u stručnoj i naučnoj literaturi, relativno je malo informacija o ovoj
zemlji.1 Kraljevina Holandija se nalazi na severozapadu Evrope. ona predstavlja
*
Predmetni rad objavljujemo posthumno u znak pijeteta prema kolegi i prijatelju prof. dr Đorđu
Lopičiću, ambasadoru i velikom poznavaocu međunarodnog prava.
1
Naziv Holandija ili Nizozemska u upotrebi je na srspko-hrvatskom govornom području. Termin
Nedelanden upotreblјava se na holandskom, odnosno na flamanskom jeziku, dok Netherlands i
Holand na engleskom jeziku, a Pax-Bas na francuskom jeziku.
pomorsku državu sa veoma razvijenom privredom i visokim životnim standardom.

Površina Kraljevine Holandije iznosi 41.526. kvadratnih kilometara, broj
stanovnika 17.200.000. i ona je jedna od najnaseljenijih država na svetu sa 484
stanovnika po kvadratnom kilometru. U Kraljevini Holandiji Holanđani čine 81%
stanovništva ostalih 19% čine Nemci, Turci, Surinamci, Belgijanci, Marokanci,
iranci i drugi. Kraljevina Holandija je jedna je od država osnivača Evropske unije.
Poljoprivreda Holandije je jedna od najekstenzivnijih poljoprivreda u Evropi sa
jednom od najvećih stopa izvoza. Luka Roterdam predstavlja svetsko pomorsko
čvorište i luku od šireg međunarodnog trgovinskog značaja. Holandija je naročito
poznata po izvozu cveća. Takođe je poznata po svojoj elektronskoj industriji
Philips, starim vetrenjačama, izvarednim svetskim sirevima. Njeno socijalno i
zdravstveno osiguranje, uz odličan školski i univerzitetski sistem, predstavlja nešto
po čemu je ova zemlja poznata u čitavom svetu. Holanđani su jedna od nacija koja
ima najduži prosečan ljudski vek koji iznosi preko 84 godine. Pored navedenog
Holanđani su sportska nacija, kako u ekipnim sportovina (odbojka, fudbal,
vaterpolo, rukomet, atletika), tako i u individualnim sportovima (plivanje, brzo
klizenje na ledu, trčanje, tenis, razne borilačke veštine, biciklizam, šah), gde
ostvaruju vrhunske rezultate. U Kraljevini Holandiji postoje mnogobrojni svetski
poznati univerziteti. Veoma cenjen i jedna od najstarijih univerziteta u Evropi jeste
Univerzitet u Lajdenu osnovan 1575. godine, kao i Univerzitet u Groningenu
osnovan 1585. godine. Holandija ima veoma visok kulturni nivo obrazovanja.
obdareni su za strane jezike. Engleski jezik govori 85%, nemački 55% i francuski
25% stanovništva.Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), jedan je od najvećih međunarodnih
pravnika svoje epohe.2 Svetski poznati filozofi koji potiču iz Holandije bili su
Erazmo Roterdamski (1466–1536), i Baruh de Spinoza (1632–1677). Rembrant
Hamerson van Rajn (1606–1699), jedan je od najvećih slikara u istoriji svetske
umetnosti, dok je Johanes Vermer (1632–1675), svakako to predstavljao u
„zlatnom dobu Holandije”. Vinsent van Gog (1853–1890), najuticajni je slikar
postimpresionizma. ono po čemu je Holandija još poznata u svetu jeste šah. ova
popularna igra zastupljena je na mnogobrojnim turnirima i takmičenjima koji se
organizuju diljem Holandije. Holanđanin Dr. Maks Eve (1901–1981), bio je
svetski pravak u šahu 1935. godine.
USPOSTAVLJANJE I RAZVOJ DIPLOMATSKIH ODNOSA

U proteklih nekoliko vekova Kraljevina Holandija bila je jaka kolonijalna sila
koja je imala svoje kolonije u indoneziji i u Južnoj Americi (u Gvajani – danas
Surinamu), kao i u Karipskom moru (u Holandskim Antilima koji su u
2
Arnoldus Lysen, Hugo Grotius Essays on his life and works selected for the occasion of the ter-
centenary of his De iure belli as pacis 1625–1925, A.W. Sythoffs Publishing Co., Leyden, 1925;
Hugo Grotius, The right of war and peace, including Law of nature and nations, University of
Michigan, M.W. Dunne, 1901.
međuvremenu stekli nezavisnost). Holandski putopisci koji su za vreme Krstaških

ratova prolazila kroz srpske zemlje pisali su i publikovali u kraćim ili dužim pisanim
izvorima utiske o Srbiji.3 Do 19. veka, nisu postojali čvrsti politički ili ekonomski
odnosi Srbije sa Holandijom. Zvanični diplomatski odnosi između Kraljevine Srbije
i Kraljevine Holandije uspostavljeni su 10. maja 1882. godine, kada je u Beogradu
potpisana Trgovinska i konzularna pogodba između Kraljevine Srbije i Kraljevine
Holandije.4 Naše poznavanje ove zemlje do tada je bilo oskudno. U srpskoj literaturi
veoma je malo publikovano knjiga o Holandiji. Tako, prva knjiga koja je na jedan
sveobuhvatan način prikazivala Kraljevinu Holandiju izdata je u okviru Srpske
Književne Zadruge u Beogradu davne 1904. godine. Reč je o prevodu knjige
Edmonda de Amičisa: „Holandska”, koja je naišla na dobar prijem kod čitalačke
publike. U narednom periodu publikovani su sporadično romani ili zbirke
pripovedaka.5 Poznata knjiga holandskog diplomate Henri Vejnandtsa:„U žrvnju,
Jugoslovenska hronika”, objavljena je u Beogradu, 1996. godine. Najpoznatija je
svakako potresna knjiga AneFrank: „Dnevnik”, koja je doživela više izdanja raznih
izdavača. Valja se podsetiti i istorijski važnog događaja koji se desio u Kraljevini
Srbiji 1903. godine, kada je došlo do dinastičkog prevrata koji je umesto kraljevske
loze obrenovića doveo na vlast lozu Karađorđevića. Navedeni događaj je u čitavoj
Evropi izazavao zgražavanje i proteste. Svoje diplomatske predstavnike u Beogradu
povukle su tadašnje velike sile – Austro-Ugarska, Velika Britanija, Rusija, Španija,
Turska i italija. Velika Britanija i Kraljevina Holandija kasnije su i prekinule
diplomatske odnose sa Srbijom, koji su obnovljeni tek 1906. godine.6 Za vreme
Prvog svetskog rata (1914–1918), Kraljevina Holandija bila je neutralna država.
ipak, tu svoju neutralnost ekonomski je veoma iskoristila, jer je dve morske luke –
Roterdam i Amsterdam, proglasila otvorenim za sve trgovačke brodove uključujući
i brodove zaraćenih strana. Kao što je poznato, to je omogućilo da Nemačka svojom
trgovačkom flotilom dovlači neophodne rude iz svojih kolonija u Africi kako bi
opskrbila svoju ratnu mašineriju. Za vreme Prvog svetskog rata Holandija je jedno
vreme bila sila zaštitnica Kraljevine Srbije. ona je dosta doprinosila
pravovremenom obaveštavanju tadašnjeg evropskog javnog mnjenja o agresiji,
okupaciji i masovnim ratnim zločinima koje je Austro-Ugarska izvršila nad srpskim
civilnim stanovništvom, ratnim zarobljenicima, ranjenicima i bolesnicima. Pored
navedenog, Kraljevina Holandija upućivala je u Kraljevinu Srbiju humanitarnu
3
Jelena Novaković-Lopušina, „Srbi i Jugoistočna Evropa u nizozemskim izvorima do 1918”,
ReVision, Beograd, 1999.
4
Zbornik zakona i uredaba u Kralјevini Srbiji, Beograd, 37/1882, str. 87.
5
Navodimo samo dva poznata autora čije su knjige kod nas publikovane Ruter Bregman i Hugo
Klaus.
6
Živojin M. Perić, „o amnestiji u srpskom krivičnom pravu u vezi sa pitanjem o sudskoj
odgovornosti zaverenika”, Prevod s francuskog, Beograd, 1909; Dragiša Vasić, „Devesto treća,
Majski prevrat, Prilozi za istoriju Srbije od jula 1900 do 17. januara 1907”, Beograd, 1990; Bogdan
Lj. Popović, „Diplomatska istorija Srbije”, Zavod za udžbenike, Beograd, 2010, str. 489–49.
pomoć kao i medicinske ekipe i lekare pojedince.7 U tom pogledu valja pohvaliti
napor autora TatjaneVendring, Fabijana Vendringa, Džona M. Stiena, koji su
napisali knjigu „Srpski vojnici umrli u Holandiji 1917–1919”, koja je objavljena u
prevodu u Beogradu 2019. godine, a u kojoj se na dosta verodostojan način opisuju
srpski zarobljenici koji su iz austougarskih i nemačkih logora prebačeni u
Holandske bolnice, gde su lečeni i gde je većina i umrla.8 Zanimljivo je, da je nakon
Drugog svetskog rata, Hag postao svetski pravni centar. Naime, u Hagu se nalaze
sledeći međunarodni sudovi: Stalni arbitražni sud,9 Međunarodni sud pravde,10
Posebni sud za Liban, Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju.11 U Hagu
se pored navedenih međunarodnih sudova nalaze sedišta Međunarodne organizacije
za zabranu hemijskog oružja, zatim EURoPoL-a, Evropskog policijskog biroa i
kriminalističke obaveštajne agencije Evropske unije. Pojedini međunarodni pravnici
iz raznih država su se pitali šta je to Holandija uradila i čime je to sve zaslužila?
Nesumnjivo je, da je Holandija od kraja 19. veka bila veoma zaslužna za progresivni
razvoj i kodifikaciju međunarodnog prava koja se odvijala na dve Haške
konferencije. Holandija je međutim, 1920. godine, odbila da izrzuči nemačkog cara
Vilhelma ii Međunarodnom sudu. Car je, 9. novembra 1918. godine, pobegao u
Holandiju gde je trebalo da mu se sudi za otpočinjanje Prvog svetskog rata 1914.
godine, kao i za agresije, okupacije i masovne ratne zločine, a na osnovu Versajskog
ugovora o miru od 28. juna 1919. godine.12 Vilhelm je formalno abdicirao 24.
novembra 1918. godine, u holandskom gradu Amorogenu kraj Utrehta, i tu mu je
bilo privremeno utočište. Nikakvi međunarodni pritisci i intervencije za njegovo
izručenje nisu uspeli. U Kraljevini Holandiji živeo je ostatak svog života i umro je
7
Arijus Van Tinhoven, Strahote rata u Srbiji dnevnik ratnog hirurga 1915, Utopija, Beograd, 2005.
8
U pitanju je 156 srpskih ratnih zaroblјenika koji su smešteni u holandske bolanice, ali je 9.
preminuo od posledica španskog gripa. Posle završetka Prvog svetskog rata njihovi posmrtni
ostaci prebačeni su u zajedničku grobnicu u češkoj.
9
Mileta Novaković, „Rad Haškog izbornog suda”, Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke, 1912, knjiga
Xiii, broj 2, str. 96.
10
Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice an essay in political and theory, Leyden,
1957; Arthur Eyffinger, The International Court of Justice 1946–1966, Kluwer Law internationl,
The Hague-London-Boston, 1995; ivan čukalović, Međunarodni sud pravde, Kragujevac, 2003;
Sanja Đajić: Međunarodni i nacionalni sudovi od sukoba do saradnje: prilog raspravi o odnosu
međunarodnog i unutrašnjeg prava, Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad, 2003.
11
Mitar Kokolј, Međunarodni krivični sud za predhodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se sudi u Hagu?),
Centar marketing, Beograd, 1995; Dragan Jovašević, „Međunarodno krivično pravosuđe –
između prava, pravde, pomirenja i prava žrtava”, Međunarodni problemi, 2011, broj 4, str. 536;
Jovan ćirić (ur.), Haški tribunal između prava i politike, institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd,
2013.
12
Predlog zakona o Ugovoru mira između sila savezničkih i Nemačke i Protokol, potpisani u
Versaju, 28. juna 1919, Beograd, 1920, str. 79–78; Jovan M. Jovanović, „Suđenje Vilјemu ii
kao krivcu za svetski rat”, Zapisi, 1927, knjiga i, broj 4, str. 226; Andrej Mitrović, Jugoslavija
na konferenciji mira 1919–1920, Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika Socijalističke Republike Srbije,
Beograd, 1969.
u 82 godini – 4. juna 1941. godine.13 očigledno da je Kraljevina Holandija

navedenom odlukom o odbijanju izručenja praktično dovela do urušavanja
međunarodnog prava, što je imalo za posledicu odustajanje mnogih država da se
sudi nemačkim i austrougarskim ratnim zločincima. Tadašnja tzv. međunarodna
zajednica u kojoj su bile uglavnom bivše kolonijalne države, kao i bivše članice
osovine – Nemačka, Japan, italija, posle završetka Drugog svetskog rata praktično
su Kralјevinu Holandiju nagradile. Tako je Hag postao svetski međunarodni pravni
centar. Neshvatlјivo je da tadašnji Sovjetski Savez nije na ove odluke reagovao
preko Ujedinjenih nacija. Verovatno da u tom momentu Sovjetski Savez nije
pridavao neki veći značaj međunarodnom pravosuđu, računajući da bi pravne
sporove koji imaju i politički značaj trebalo da rešavaju Ujedinjene nacije, pre svega
Savet bezbednosti gde Sovjetski Savez ima pravo veta. između dva svetska rata
Holandija nije bila zainteresovana za političke događaje na Balkanu nego je svoje
interesovanje fokusirala na eksploataciju svojih kolonija – pre svega indoneziju,
ali i kolonije na Karibima. Diplomatski i ekonomski odnosi tadašnje Kralјevine
Jugoslavije i Kralјevine Holandije nisu bili obimni niti intenzivni. Razlog je bila
neznatna ekonomska razmena, ali to što je Kralјevina Holandija najveći uvoz imala
iz svojih kolonija po uobičajenim bagatelno niskim cenama Zatim, u Kralјevini
Holandiji, Kralјevina Jugoslavija imala je veoma mali broj iselјenika tako da i to
nije bio razlog za neko veće angažovanje na planu konzularnih odnosa. Treba istaći
da je Kralјevina Holandija bila jedna od prvih država koja je priznala Kralјevinu
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, smatrajući da je u pitanju kontinuitet diplomatskih odnosa
koji su tada postojali između Kralјevine Srbije i Kralјevine Holandije. Srpski
diplomatski poslanici koji su bili akreditovani u Londonu istovremeno su bili
akreditovani u Holandiji sve do 1917. godine. Kralјevina Srbija imenovala je 1916.
godine, Dr Milana Đ. Milojevića, karijernog diplomatu za otpravnika poslova u
Holandiji.14 Kralјevina Srbija je imala dva počasna konzula jednog u Amsterdamu
– Morensa, a drugog u Roterdamu – Vilkensa, koji nisu imali nikakve veze sa
priznavanje nove države Kralјevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, nego su obavlјali
konzularne funkcije uglavnom informativnog i promotivnog ekonomskog karaktera
koje obavlјaju počasni konzuli.15 Nakon toga usledio je prekid diplomatskih odnosa
između Kralјevine Holandije i Kralјevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca – 13. decembra
1920. godine. Do prekida je došlo zbog slučaja bivšeg holandskog počasnog
konzula Bernarda Rapaporta, inače državlјanina Austro-Ugarske. Naime, Rapaport
je bio uhvaćen još 1912. godine, od strane srpskih službi bezbednosti zbog
13
Džon Rol, Put u Sarajevo Kajzer Vilhelm II i uzroci Prvog svetskog rata, Clio, Medija centar
“odbrana”, Beograd, 2016, str. 55, 140–152.
14
Milan Đ. Milojević, „Balkanska ravnoteža, sećanje jednog kralјevog diplomate”, Milena
Pavlović i Milan Šećerović (urs), Beograd, 1994; Milan Đ. Milojević, Iz oblasti naše spolјne
politike knj. i., Beograd, 1932.
15
Miladin Milošević, „Diplomatski odnosi između Kralјevine SHS i Kralјevine Holandije
1918–1922”, Arhiv, 2001, broj 2, str. 131–133.
umešanosti u tada čuvenu špijunsku aferu Karla Milerovu.16 Naime, za vreme Prvog
svetskog rata Bernard Rapaport se bavio špijunskim i obaveštajnim radnjama protiv
Srbije, zbog čega posle Prvog svetskog rata Srbija nije dala agreman za njegovo
postavlјenje za počasnog konzula u Kralјevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. To je bio
razlog da Kralјevina Holandija izvrši prekid diplomatskih odnosa sa Kralјevinom
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Tek decembra 1922. godine, obnovljeni su diplomatski
odnosi između Kralјevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Kralјevine Holandije.17
DIPLOMATSKI ODNOSI ZA VREME

DRUGOG SVETSKOG RATA
Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, od 1939–1945. godine, Kralјevina Holandija
bila je okupirana od strane nacističke Nemačke. isto se desilo i sa Kraljevinom
Jugoslavijom. Masovnim bombarodvanjima Roterdama, Utrehta i još nekoliko
gradova u Holandiji stradalo je civilno stanovništvo. Pored toga, u velikoj meri bio
je uništen ili oštećen sistem brojnih kanala i drugih brana i objekata kojima je
regulisan priliv i oticanje vode i na taj način sprečavane poplave. Takođe su uništeni
i mnogi infrastrukturni objekti. Vlada Kralјevine Holandije na čelu sa kralјicom
Vilheminom kao i kralјevska porodica bili su u egzilu u Londonu. Sličnu sudbinu
imala je i Vlada Kralјevine Jugoslavije, kao i ostale vlade čije je države okupirala
nacistička Nemačka ( Polјska, čehoslovačka, Grčka, Belgija, Norveška, Danska i
Luksemburg). U ratnim okolnostima, Vlada Kralјevine Jugoslavije održavala je
redovne diplomatske odnose sa Vladom Kraljevine Holandije. Za vreme nemačke
okupacije Holandije u Holandiji je postojao pokret otpora, čiji se centar nalazio u
Amsterdamu. Taj pokret otpora nije vodio gerilski rat. To je bilo pravdano činjenicom
da je Holandija velika ravnica gde nema planina koje bi ovom pokretu poslužio kao
zaklon. Stoga je pokret pružao odlučni pasivni otpor okupatoru kroz subverzivne
delatnosti. Holandski pokret otpora prihvatao je i sakrivao savezničke pilote koji su
iskakali iz oštećenih aviona, kao i ratne zaroblјenike savezničkih država koji su
uspevali da pobegnu iz zaroblјeničkih logora u Nemačkoj. Holandski pokret otpora
putem radio veze slao je obaveštenja svoj komandi u London, pre svega gde se nalaze
nemačke baze i garnizoni njihovim kretanjima, a naročito obaveštenja o vremenskim
prilikama koja su bile značajna za američko i britansko vazduhoplovstvo. U Londonu
se nalazila holandska radio stanica pod nazivom Radio Orange koju su u okupiranoj
Holandiji pored engleskog radija BBC-a masovno slušali i na taj način bili obavešteni
o ratnoj situaciji na svim bojištima u Evropi.18 Zanimljivo je pomenuti i nekoliko
podataka o statusu Jevreja u Holandiji u vreme okupacije. Jevreji su u Holandiji
16
Ibid., str. 132–133; Branko Bogdanović, „Špijunska posla”, Politika magazin, 30. januar 2022,
str. 29–30.
17
Miladin Milošević, op.cit., str.132–145.
18
Holand at war against Hitler Anglo-Dutch relations 1940–1945, M. R. D. Foot (Ed.), Frank
Cass and Company Limited, London, 1990, p. 73–82.
prisutni još od 16. veka. Pred izbijanje Drugog svetskog rata 1940. godine, u
Holandiji su živeli kao starosedeoci i holandski državlјani i to njih, oko 140 hiljada.
Jevreji su živeli uglavnom u većim gradovima. Najviše u Amsterdamu 70 hiljada, a
zatim u Hagu, Roterdamu, Utrehtu, Groningenu kao i u mnogim manjim mestima.
Pored toga, oko 30 hiljada Jevreja je izbeglo u Holandiju tokom okupacije iz pravca
Nemačke, Austrije i čehoslovačke. Većina holandskih Jevreja bili su visoko
obrazivani, univerzitetski profesori, lekari, stomatolozi, apotekari, advokati,
profesori, inženjeri svih struka, industrijalci, trgovci, umetnici. od ukupnog broja
Jevreja koji su ostali u Holandiji Nemački okupator je likvidirao 110 hiljada ili 79%
od navedene populacije. Najviše njih bilo je otpremljeno u zloglasni logor smrti
Aušvic.19 Većina holandskih Jevreja odavno je svoja originalna imena i prezimena
promenila u holandska, najviše da ne bi bili diskriminisani u svojim trgovačkim,
bankarskim, zanatskim i drugim poslovima, tako da je bilo veoma teško prepoznati
po prezimenu i imenu ko je Jevrejin, a ko nije. činjenica je, da su mnoge Jevreje
potkazali i prijavlјivali nemačkom Gestapou holandski kolabracionisti.. interesantno
je, da je evidencija o jevrejskom stanovništu tokom ovog perioda bila izmeštena u
Londonu. Poznatu jevrejsku devojčicu Anu Frank i njenu porodicu uhapsila je
holandska žandarmerija i predala je Gestapou. Potom su svi bili otpremljeni u Aušvic
gde su tragično završili. Holanđani inače nastoje da prećute ovaj kolaborazionizam,
štaviše često ga i zataškavaju.20 Za vreme okupacije, u Holandiji je delovala i jaka
pronacistička partija. Njeni pripadnici su kao dobrovoljci stupili u nemačke SS trupe
koje su upućene na istočni front u Sovjetski Savez.21 Pored Jevreja u Holandiji su
još u 19. veku naselјavani stanovnici holandskih kolonijalnih područja iz indonezije,
Holandske Gvajane i Kariba, kao jeftina radnu snaga potrebna za razvoj holandske
industrije i uslužnih delatnosti. Njihovi potomci i danas žive u Holandiji (oko 1
milion indonežana i oko 500 hilјada Surinamaca). Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata
1941–1945. godine, Japan je okupirao indoneziju. Pored Holanđana u indoneziji je
19
“Documents of the persecution of the Dutch Jewry 1940–1945”, Joods Historisch Museum,
Amsterdam Athenaum-Polak & Van Gennep Amsterdam, 1979, p. 33.
20
Zvaničan broj stradalih Jevreja koji su živeli u evropskim državamado 1940. godine iznosi:
Belgija od 100.000 stradalo 40.000 ili 40%; čeho-Slovačka od 360.000 stradalo 300.000 ili 83%;
Nemačka od 240.000 stradalo 200.000 ili 80%; Francuska od 300.000 stradalo 130.000 ili 38%;
Grčka od 75.000 stradalo 60.000 ili 80%; Mađarska od 403.000 stradalo 200.000 ili 50%;
Jugoslavija od 75.000 stradalo 65.000 ili 86%; Letvanija od 95.000 stradalo 85.000 ili 90%;
Litvanija od 155.000 stradalo 135.000 ili 90%; Holandija od 140.000 stradalo 110.000 ili 79%;
Austrija od 60.000 stradalo 40.000 ili 66%; Polјska do 3,250.000 stradalo 2,900.000 ili 88%;
Rumunija od 850.000 stradalo 420.000 ili 50%; Sovjetski Savez od 3,020.000 stradalo 1,000.000
ili 33%. Videti: “Documents of the persecution of the Dutch Jewry 1940–1945”, op.cit., p. 33.
21
Na istočni front u Sovjetski Savez iz evropskih država upućeno je preko 340 hiljada
dobrovolјaca. iz Francuske 60.000, Danske 60.000, Norveške 7.000, Nezavisne Države Hrvatske
12.000, Španije 10.000, Belgije 30.000, Luksemburga 1.500, Litvanije, Letonije, Estonije i
Polјske 50.000; Ukrajine 60.000. čak Švajcarska i Švedska koje su bile neutralne države uputile
su 50.000. dobrovolјaca. Kao saveznici nacističke Nemačke iz Rumunije je poslato 300.000 iz
Mađarske 250.000 vojnika uklјučujući i znatan broj dobrovolјaca.
bilo još u manjem broju raznih drugih nacija koji su se bavili ekonomskim poslovima
– indusa, Kineza, Engleza, Amerikanaca i Francuza. Japanci su protivno
međunarodnom ratnom pravu ove stanovnike proglasili za ratne zaroblјenike i strpali
ih u koncentracione logore. Japanski koncentracioni logori bili su praktično logori
smrti, gde je veliki broj logoraša stradao od nehumanih uslova smeštaja, ishrane,
nemanja lekarske pomoći i nege, zaraznih epidemija kao i od čestih samovolјnih
ubistava japanskih stražara. Japan je kapitulirao 15. avgusta 1945. godine, što je
značilo oslobođenje indonezije. Vođa indonežanskih gerilaca Ahmet Sukarno
proglasio je 17. avgusta 1945. godine, nezavisnost indonezije. Međutim, tada sa
britanskim ratnim brodovima dolazi holandska vojska i počinje rat sa Sukarnovom
vojskom, koji traje sve do 1948. godine. U tom ratu, holandska vojska likvidirala je
preko 200 hiljada indonežana i to, pretežno civilnog stanovništva. To joj međutim
nije omogućilo da i dalje zadrži ovu teritoriju, već je prizna nezavisnost indonezije
1949. godine.22
RAZVOJ DIPLOMATSKIH ODNOSA

NAKON DRUGOG SVETSKOG RATA
U posleratnom periodu, diplomatski i ekonomski odnosi socijalističke
Jugoslavije i Kralјevine Holandije razvijali su se na prijateljskim osnovama. Nije
bilo nekih otvorenih pitanja.23 Uzajamne posete predsednika vlada, ministara
inostranih poslova, privrednih delegacija su bile česte. ovde navodimo posetu
Predsednika Josipa Broza Tita Holandiji od 20–23 oktobra 1970. godine, na poziv
Kralјice Julijane (1909–2004), i Vlade Holandije. U to vreme u Holandiji je bilo
relativno mali broj naših radnika na privremenom radu, ukupno desetak hilјada.
Uglavnom su radili u brodogradilištu u Roterdamu, kao i u nekoj od brojnih
Filipsovih fabrika kao stručna lica u industriji, brodogradnji, elektroindustriji,
saobraćaju i slično. Lekara, profesora i inženjera bilo je malo jer prepreka je bio
uslov dobro znanje holandskog jezika. Tek desetak godina kasnije broj radnika iz
Jugoslavije se povećava, ali ne značajno. Razlog je bila više privlačnija i veća
mogućnost zarade u Nemačkoj, Austriji i zemljama Skandinavije. Kralјica Julijana
veoma je cenila i poštovala Predsednika Josipa Broza Tita. To se iz činjenice da je
Tito prilikom posete Holandiji 1970. godine, bio smešten u Kralјevsku palatu
Kralјice Julijane u centru Amsterdama.24 Tito je bio prvi šef države koji je u njemu
bio smešten. Pre Tita u posetama Holandiji dolazili su čerčil, Ajzenhauer, De Gol
22
Ali Sastromiđojo, „Problemi indonezije i njen međunarodni položaj” Međunarodni problemi
1957, broj 4., str. 76–80.
23
Ranko Petković, „Kontinuitet spolјne politike SFRJ od AVNoJ-a do današnjih dana (1943–1978)”,
Međunarodna politika, 1978, broj 688, str. 15; Velibor Gavranov, Momir Stojković, Međunarodni
odnosi i spolјna politika Jugoslavije, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1972; Leo Mates,
Međunarodni odnosi Socijalističke Jugoslavije, Nolit, Beograd, 1976.
24
Kralјevska palata u Amsterdamu na trgu Dam izgrađena je 1648. godine, kao gradska većnica. Kada
je Luj Bonaparta došao u Amsterdam 1808. godine, ova Palata je preuređena u Kralјevsku palatu.
i mnogi drugi šefovi država ali niko nije bio smešeten u toj Kralјevskoj palati. Naša
delegacija i Tito imali su političke razgovore sa članovima Vlade koju je predovodio
predsednik Pit De Jong. Poseta je bila i u Parlamentu, kao i susret sa
Gradonačelnikom Amsterdama. Naša delegacija posetila je Roterdam, Delft,
Ajdhofen kao jednu od Filipsovih fabrika.25 SFR Jugoslavija vodila je više političkih
i ekonomskih pregovora sa Holandijom u periodu od 1970–1980. godine.26
Holanđani su poznati kao turistička nacija koja voli da u turističke svrhe putuje u
razne države čitavog sveta. Tako su i u navedenom periodu od 1950 godine pa sve
do 1990. godine, holandski turisti – njih oko 300 hilјada – posećivali su letovališta
na Jadranskom moru kao i banje, planine i druga turistička mesta u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji. U vremenu od 1960–1970. godine, bilo je više međusobnih zvaničnih
poseta. Tako je holandski ministar Jozef Luns posetio Jugoslaviju juna 1960. godine.
Primio ga je lično predsednik Tito. Državni sekretar Koča posetio je Holandiju od
25–30. maja 1961. godine. Bio je primlјen kod Kralјice Julijane. Holandski ministar
inostranih poslova Jozef Luns ponovo je posetio Jugoslaviju na poziv tadašnjeg
Saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove Marka Nikezića od 12 do 17. marta 1968.
godine. Tom prilikom potpisan je Sporazum o ekonomskoj, industrijskoj i tehničkoj
saradnji. Ministar Lunsa primio je Predsednik Tito. Pomoćnik sekretara za inostrane
poslove Dimče Belovski posetio je Holandiju u junu 1968. godine. Holandski
ministar privrede Leo De Blok posetio je Jugoslaviju od 9–12. septembra 1968.
godine. Delegacija Savezne skupštine sa potpredsednikom Milošem Žankom
posetila je u junu 1968. godine Holandiju. Holandska parlamentarna delegacija je
uzvratila ovu posetu u maju 1969. godine.27 Jugoslaviju su, pored Kralјice Julijane
i njenih ćerki princeze Beatriks, irene, Margarete i Kristine još posećivale kulturne
i javne ličnosti Holandije.
RASPAD SFR JUGOSLAVIJE I MEĐUSOBNI

DIPLOMATSKI ODNOSI
Sa izbijanjem jugoslovenske krize devedesetih godina prošlog veka, Holandija
se svrstala na stranu SAD, Nemačke, Austrije, Vatikana, Velike Britanije i još nekih
država koje su podržavale protivzakonite secesije Slovenije i Hrvatske i razbijanje
Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije.28 Najodgovorniji su tada bili papa
25
Marko Vrhunec, Šest godina sa Titom (1967–1973), Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj
narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945), Beograd, 2000, str. 84–86.
26
Nina Dobraković, „Jugoslovensko-holandski pregovori o evropskim problemima”, Međunarodni
problemi, 1977, broj 1, str. 135–142.
27
Odnosi Jugoslavije i Holandije, Beograd, 1969, Jugoslovenski pregled – Jun 1969, str. 277.
28
Nina Dobrković, „Stavovi Nemačke prema jugoslovenskoj krizi”, Međunarodni problemi, 1992,
broj 1–2, str. 23–41; „Austrija i jugoslovenska kriza”, Međunarodni problemi, 1992, broj 1–2, str.
110–138; Milan Bulajić, Razbijanje jugoslovenske države 1991/1992-zločin protiv mira: odgovornost
Vetikana i Nemačke, Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 1994., str. 275–285; Brana Marković,
„Velika Britanije i jugoslovenska kriza” Međunarodni problemi, 1992, broj 1–2, str. 58–70.
Jovan Pavle ii, Hans Ditrih Genšer, Alojz Mok i Hans van den Bruk.29 Tadašnja
Evropska zajednica čiji je član bila Holandija, podržala je razbijanje Jugoslavije.30
Posebnu odgovornost za raspad jugoslovenske države snosi Hans van den Bruk –
državni sekretar i ministar za inostrane poslove Holandije, koji je zajedno sa
Genšerom bio glavni zagovornik razbijanja jugoslovenske države. Za vreme
procesa jugoslovenske države, van den Bruk bio je predsedavajući Saveta ministara
Evropske zajednice tzv. „Trojke”. Bio je izrazit u zastupanju svih mogućih
antijugoslovenskih i antisrpskih stavova kao i u zahtevima za kažnjavanjem i
totalnom satanizacijom Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije.
izbijanjem građanskog rata u Hrvatskoj, potom i u Bosni i Hercegovini, Holandija
je bila na strani muslimana i Hrvata. Vrlo aktivno je Holandija učestvovala u
primeni sankcija Evropske unije i sankcija Ujedinjenih nacija protiv Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije. Kralјevina Holandija primenila je protiv Savezne Republike
Jugoslavije diplomatske sankcije. Tadašnjeg stalnog otpravnika poslova u Ambasadi
Savezne Republike Jugolsavije po uobičajenom protokolu trebao je da primi
Ministar inostranih poslova. Međutim, otpravnika poslova primio je direktor
Diplomatskog protokola, jedan karijerni diplomata. on je saopštio da s obzirom na
postojeće međunarodne sankcije prema Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji jedini
kontakt u Ministarstvu inostranih poslova Holandije predviđen je sa direkcijom za
Jugoslaviju, i to, samo sa zamenikom direktora direkcije kao i sa diplomatskim
protokolom ukoliko postoje potrebe za rešavanje nekih funkcionalnih i tehničkih
problema. Potom, predstavnika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije u Holandiji neće
pozivati na bilo koje zvanične manifestacije, prijeme, konferencije, obeležavanje
državnih praznika i sličnih kulturnih manifestacija. Praktično Amabasada Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije u Holandiji izbrisana je iz svih mogućih agendi i
manifestacija kao da ne postoji! iz ličnog iskustva tokom službovanja u Holandiji,
autoru je poznato da su holandske vlasti pokušale da narede da se sa zgrade
Ambasade Savezne Republike Jugoslavije skine mesingana tabla na kojoj je bio
državni grb i natpis Ambasada Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, a takođe i državna
zastava. Uz energičan protest odbili smo taj protvpravni pokušaj skidanja table sa
naše zgrade i skidanje državne zastave. Zgrada jugoslovenske ambasade prema
Bečkoj konvenciji o diplomatskim odnosima iz 1961. godine, uživa imunitet i
nepovredivost, te bi bilo kakav nasilan pokušaj skidanja table i zastave bio neviđeni
međunarodni diplomastki skandal. Posle protesta, ovo pitanje se više nije
postavlјalo od strane Ministarstva spolјih poslova Holandije, ali se navedeni bojkot
nastavio nesmanjenom žestinom na svim polјima. Na prvom protokolarnom
sastanku sa zamenikom načelnika direkcije za Jugoslaviju razgovor je vođen od
strane holandskog diplomate sa vrlo neprijateljskim nabojem. Naveo je da
Holandija ne priznaje Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju, te da zbog sankcija
29
Milan Bulajić, op.cit., str. 324–331.
30
Branislava Alendar, „Evropska zajednica i jugoslovenska kriza” Međunarodni problemi, 1992,
broj 1–2, str. 23–41.
Jugoslavija je isključena iz svih međunarodnih odnosa i manifestacija. Zatim, nas

je optužio da su Srbi izazvali agresiju na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, i da su
Srbi izvršili masovne ratne zločine nad civilima Hrvatima i muslimanima. Takođe
da se u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji svakodnevno masovno krše lјudska prava,
i da masovno progonimo nacionalne manjine muslimane, Albance, Mađare i
Hrvate. ovakav neprijatelјski stav koji je u potpunosti izmišlјen i falsifikovan bio
je orkestriran od strane SAD, Nemačke, Austrije i Vatikana, a zasnivao se na
propagandnim emisijama američkih i nemačkih TV stanica, naročito američke TV
stanice CNN, kao i na osnovi brojne američke, nemačke i engleske štampe.
Neprijateljski odnos Kralјevine Holandije prema Saveznoj Republici Jugoslavije
nastavio se do agresije NATo-a na Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviji 1999. godine,
ali i nakon toga u „većoj ili manjoj meri” sve do današnjih dana. Trebalo bi uz
navedeno još istaći dva važna događaja koja su se zbila u Holandiji, a vezana su za
odnose sa Saveznom Republikom Jugoslavijom i kasnije, sa Republikom Srbijom.
Hronološki prvi je Međunarodni tribunal za krivično gonjenje lica za teška kršenja
međunarodnog humanitarnog prava na teritoriji Jugoslavije nakon 1991. godine,
koji je široj javnosti poznat kao Haški tribunal u Hagu. Haški tribunal osnovan je
25. maja 1993. godine, od Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija Rezolucijom 827,
što je u dotadašnjoj praksi ovog izvršnog organa Ujedinjenih nacija bilo
nezamislivo. Tribunal je prema mišljenju autora osnovan mimo Povelјe Ujedinjenih
nacija, budući da Povelјa Ujedinjenih nacija ne daje ovlašćenje i pravo Savetu
bezbednosti da osniva specijalne sudske organe. očigledno da je u pitanju bio
pokušaj revizije Povelјe svetske organizacije.31 Teško se može racionalizovati da
tadašnji Sovjetski Savez nije uložio veto na ovakvu odluku Saveta bezbednosti.
Moguće objašnjenje za takav odnos je, da je Sovjetski Savez bio u potpunom
rastakanju, te da se sovjetska vlada u potpunosti priklonila američkoj političkoj
poziciji i odlukama. Problematično je zašto je Hag određen za sedište navedenog
krivičnog Tribunala? Nezvanično je postojalo objašnjenje da je Holandija ponudila
najbolјe uslove i da je obezbedila besplatno zgradu za smeštaj tribunala. Međutim,
posle kraćeg vremena deo zgrade u kojoj je bio smešen Tribuinal pokazao se kao
mali pa se Tribunal proširio na celu zgradu, da bi je Holandija potom prodala
Tribunalu! Samo finansiranje Haškog tribunala bilo je prema shvatanju autora
nelegalno. iako je bilo predviđeno da Haški tribunal finansiraju Ujedinjene nacije,
one su finansirale samo jedan manji deo. Najveći deo finansirale su SAD, Saudijska
Arabija, i još nekoliko zapadnih država, potom fondacija „Džordž Soroš” kao i
čitav niz zapadnih nevladinih organizacija. U Tribunalu su bili zaposleni uglavnom
administrativni radnici iz zapadnih država i Holandije. Predsednik Trubunala bio
je čuveni italijanski profesor međunarodnog prava – Antonio Kaseze. Glavni tužilac
31
Mitar Kokolj, op.cit.; Boris Krivokapić, „Međunarodni tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju i Ruandu-
pro et contra”, Strani pravni život, 1996, broj 1–3, str. 43; Kosta čavoški, Hag protiv pravde,
iKP „Nikola Pašić”, Beograd, 1998; Od Nirnberga do Haga pouke istorije, Jelena Đ. Lopičić-
Jančić (ur.), Beogradski forum za svet ravnopravnih, Beograd, 2012.
Haškog tribunala bio je Ričard Goldston iz Južnoafričke Republike. S obzirom da

je imao jevrejsko poreklo, Goldston je bio maska za svetsku javnost. Naime,
računalo se da je u predmetnom slučaju Južnoafrička Republika neutralna, pa će i
njen predstavnik u Haškom tribunalu najverovatnij biti neutralan. Međutim, vreme
je pokazalo da to nije bio slučaj. To se vidi i po broju osuđenih po nacionalnostima.
Najviše je Srba sa 70%, a potom dolaze Hrvati sa 20% i Bošnjaci sa 10%. Zvanična
Holandija, kao i holandska sredstva javnog informisanja u potpunosti su podržavali
antisrpsku delatnost Haškog tribunala i tužilaštva. Drugi važan događaj koji je vezan
za razvoj međusobnih diplomatskih odnosa, tiče se slučaja koji je inicirala Bosna i
Hercegovina 20. marta 1993. godine, pred pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde u
Hagu. Zahtev za pokretanje sudskog postupka (Application) protiv Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije zasnovan je na Konvenciji o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju
zločina genocida iz 1948. godine. Bosna i Hercegovina podnela je 15. aprila 1994.
godine tužbu (Memorial) protiv Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, da bi ova podnela
odgovor na tužbu (Counter memorial), 23. jula 1997. godine, koja je ustvari protiv-
tužba kojom se optužuje Bosna i Hercegovina za izvršenje geneocida nad Srbima
u toku građanskog rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Takođe, Savezna Republika
Jugoslavija podnela je 22. februara 1999. godine, uzvratni odgovor (Rejoinder).
Tužba zajedno sa dokumentacijom i pismenim dokazima obuhvatila je preko dve
hilјade strana. Do 2000. godine, održano je nekoliko rasprava. Neočekivano,
tadašnja Vlada Savezne Repubike Jugoslavije, 20. aprila 2001. godine, izvršila je
povlačenje naše protivtužbe protiv Bosne i Hercegovine. U obrazloženju se pored
ostalog navodi: „S druge strane, naša protivtužba nije bila u dovolјnoj meri
činjenično utemelјena. Zadatak da se dokaže da je muslimanska vlada po svim
većim gradovima pod kontrlom te vlade (pri čemu su nesumnjivo trpeli), pokazao
se preteškim u situaciji kada je istovremeno trebalo ubediti Sud da srpske snage
nisu učinili genocid nad muslimanima, koji su podneli daleko brojnije žrtve”.32
Navedena odluka Savezne Vlade bila je zapravo katastrofalna. očigledno je doneta
pod pritiskom zapadnih sila koje su u potpunosti podržavale jednu stranu u Bosni
i Hercegovini. U Sudu je međutim, ostala tužba Bosne i Hercegovine i po njoj se
postupalo u dalјem toku postupka. U našoj pravnoj literaturi o ovom povlačenju
naše protivtužbe tek sporadično se raspravlјalo i pisalo.33 Pomenuti događaj
jednostavno je skinut sa dnevnog reda i protekom vremena bio je zaboravlјen.
Takođe o nekoj političkoj i pravnoj odgovornosti tadašnje Savezne Vlade niko nije
ni pokrenuo pitanje. Nastavljajući se na ovakav negativan trend, usledilo je kao što
je poznato NATo bombardovanje Savezne Republike Jugoslavije od 23. marta do
10. juna 1999. godine.34 Devetnaest država NATo-a su izvršilo je agresiju na našu
32
Srbija pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde, knjiga ii, Presuda, Radoslav Stojanović (ur.), Beograd,
Filip Višnjić, 2007, str. 8–9.
33
Duško Dimitrijević, „Pregled sporova pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde u Hagu”, Arhiv za
pravne i društvene nauke, 2006, knjiga LXViii, br. 3–4, str. 1331–1375.
34
Boris Krivokapić, Agresija NATO-a na Jugoslaviju-sila iznad prava, čigoja štampa, Beograd,
1999; Bjađo di Garsija, Zašto je NATO bombardovao Srbiju 1999?, Albatros Plus, Beograd, 2017.
zemlju i to: SAD, Velika Britanija, Nemačka, italija, Francuska, Holandija, Belgija,
Danska, Norveška, island, Luksebmurg, Grčka, Polјska, Mađarska, Portugal,
Španija, Turska, češka i Kanada. Zbog tog čina, Savezna Republika Jugoslavija
podnela je 29. aprila 1999. godine, zahteve za pokretanje postupka protiv deset
država članica NATo-a, koje su učestvovale u izvršenju agresije.35 Kralјevina
Holandija kao članica NATo-a koja je učestvovala u agresiji na Saveznu Republiku
Jugoslaviju nije nikada uputila bilo kakvo izvinjenje ili makar minimalnu
materijalnu naknadu za nanete lјudske žrtve i ogromna materijalna razaranja. Sa
dolaskom demokratskih promena u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, Predsednik
Vojislav Koštunica, prihvatio je stav o međunarodnopravnom diskontinuitetu SRJ
sa SFRJ, što je dovelo do novog prijema Jugoslavije u članstvo Ujedinjenih nacija
– 1. novembra 2000. godine. To je bila prema mišljenju autora, bila još jedna
katastrofalna odluka koja je nanela nesagledive materijalne štete državi kao i
desetinama hilјada fizičkih i pravnih lica. Naime, tadašnja Jugoslavija nije bila
isključena iz članstva Ujedinjenih nacija nego je njeno učešće u radu Generalne
skupštine bilo suspendovano. Tadašnja Vlada i predsednik Koštunica „nisu bili
obavešteni”, ali su morali znati da je već ranije postojao pokušaj SAD i njenih
saveznika da se Jugoslavija izbaci iz Ujedinjenih nacij. Taj pokušaj, kao što je
poznato, nije uspeo. Trebalo je stoga samo zahtevati da se ukine navedena
suspenzija, a ne i ponovno učlanjenje. Ponovnim učlanjenjem u Ujedinjene nacije,
Jugoslavija je prema našem mišljenju izgubila pravo da pred Međunarodnim sudom
pravde u Hagu podnese tužbe protiv svih država NATo radi naknadne pričinjene
materijalne štete izazvane agresijom, pošto se tužba ne može podneti za događaje
retoaktivno kada država nije bila članica Ujedinjenih nacija. Ni ova protivzakonita
odluka kao i predhodna o povalačenju naše protivtužbe protiv Bosne i Hercegovine
nije bila predmet rasprave pred našim organima kao ni u našoj stručnoj i naučnoj
literaturi. Jednostavno je zabašurena i zaboravlјena. Pojedini srpski advokati kao i
neke nevladine ogranizacije u javnosti sada navode da će pokrenuti postupke za
obeštećenje pred italijanskim pravosudnim organima, jer postoji već više odluka
kojima je nadoknađena šteta italijanskim vojnicima koji su bili na Kosovu i Metohiji
u sastavu organa KFoR-a i koji su oboleli od malignih bolesti uzrokovanih
upotrebom municije sa osiromašenim uranijumom kojom su snage NATo-a
bomardovale Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju (Srbiju). Ne znam da li će uspeti u
tome, jer za italijanske vojnike mora odgovarati država italija koja ih je tamo
službeno poslala. Za sve ostale koji nisu italijanski državlјani veliko je pitanje da
će i ko preuzeti odgovornost. Pored navedenih slučajeva gde je Holandija
ispoljavala negativan odnos prema bivšoj Jugoslaviji je i slučaj jugoslovenskih
potraživanja prema Holandiji u iznosu od preko 5 miliona dolara za usluge i takse
za prelet holandskih putničkih aviona preko jugoslovenske teritorije. Holandija je
zahtev odbila sa obrazloženjem da je Jugoslavija pod sankcijama i da ta isplata
35
Rodolјub Etinski, „Moć i pravo u slučaju agresije NATo država protiv SR Jugoslavija”, NATO
agresija na SR Jugoslaviju 99, Udruženje za pravnu teoriju i praksu, Novi Sad, 2000, str. 51–53.
podleže sankcijama. Nisu vredeli argumenti da se radi o dugovanju, jednostavno

su to odbili. Zanimljivo je, i da je Holandija u maju 1999 godine, vršila obeležavanje
Prve mirovne konferencije u Hagu iz 1899. godine. Tim povodom, pozvala je sve
učesnice tadašnje Konferencije. iako su Kralјevina Srbija i Kneževina Crna Gora
bile učesnice te Konferencije i potpisnice Haške konvencije iz 1899. godin,
Holandija nije uputila poziv Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji sa obarazloženjem da
sje ona pod sankcijama! i pored svih navedenih nedostataka u međusobnim
odnosima, situacija je u međuvremenu normalizovana. To je učinjeno u aprilu 1996.
godine, kada je Holandija priznala Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju i kada su prema
Jugoslaviji okončane sankcije. Tada je Kralјica Beatriks pozvala otpravnika
Ambasade Savezne Republike Jugoslavije u Hagu na svečani prijem 8. maja 1996.
godine u Kralјevsku palatu Dam u Amsterdamu. Posle toga, razne holandske
ustanove i institucije pozivale su predstavnika Ambasade Savezne Republike
Jugoslavije na razne manifestacije, simpozijume, konferencije i prijeme. Međutim,
i pored više zahteva da otpravnik poslova bude primlјen kod holandskog Ministra
inostranih poslova, to ipak nije učinjeno izgovori su bili lapidarne prirode, da je
„veoma zauzeт”, da je „na putu” i slično. Jednostavno nisu želeli bilo kakav
diplomatski kontakt sa Saveznom Republikom Jugoslavijom. Holandija kao što
smo napred naveli bila je jedna od devetnaest država NATo-a koje su izvršili
agresuju na Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju 24. marta 1999. godine. Zatim,
Kralјevina Holandija je sa ostalim državama agresorima priznala samoproglašenu
nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije što se moglo i osnovano očekivati obzirom na njenu
agresiju i antisrpsku neprijatelјsku politiku.36
36
Još jedan katastrofalan potez napravila je Vlada Republike Srbije kada je 2010. godine, uputila
Međunarodnom sudu pravde u Hagu pitanje za savetodavno mišlјenje u vezi sa Deklaracijom o
proglašenju nezavisnosti Kosova od 2008. godine. Vlada nije imala realno saznanje kako
Međunarodni sud pravde i pod kakvim uticajem donosi svoje odluke. Sasvim izvesno da nije
imala stručno mišlјenje naših pravnika koji su već imali praksu i iskustvo pred Međunarodnim
sudom pravde u Hagu. Naime, prema sastavu sudskog veća, bilo je jasno da će mišljenje Suda
biti protiv interesa Republike Srbije. Sastav sudija je bio iz sledećih država: Japan, Sijera Leone,
Jordan, SAD, Savezna Republika Nemačka, Francuska, Novi Zeland, Velika Britanija, Somalija,
Meksiko, koje su glasale za navedeno savetodavno mišlјenje. Protiv su glasle sudije iz Slovačke,
Maroka, Brazila i Rusije. Sudija iz Kine nije bio prisutan zasedanju kada je bilo glasanje. Poznato
je da sudije ne sude i ne glasaju po svom slobodnom sudijskom uverenju kao i materijalnim
dokazima, nego samo sprovode odluku svoje vlade. U sastavu Suda bili su predstavnici šest
zapadnih država, te se znalo unapred kako će glasati. Male države veoma lako su se priklonile
pritisku zapadnih država. Prema mišljenju autora, nije trebalo postavlјati bilo kakvo pitanje za
savetodavno mišlјenje Međunarodnom sudu pravde u Hagu, jer je za regulisanje nastale situacije
bio dovoljan pravni okvir uspostavljen Rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija 1244
od 10. juna 1999. godine, kojom je ustanovljen međunarodni status Kosova i Metohije u okviru
tadašnje SR Jugoslavije (Srbije). Videti više: Živadin Jovanović, 1244 klјuč mira u Evropi prilog
pravu Srbije na Kosovo i Metohiju, Beogradski forum za svet ravnopranih, Srpska književna
zadruga, Beograd, 2018.
ZAKLJUČAK
Agresija Kralјevine Holandije kao i ostalih država NATo-a je zaboravlјena.
Sada je Holandija jedan od četiri-pet najvećih investitora u Srbiju. Trgovinska
razmena teče normalno kao i sa ostalim državama Evropske unije. U Holandiji
državlјana Srbije ima oko 15 hilјada, i većina su već treća generacija koja tamo živi
i radi. Uglavnom najviše žive i rade u Roterdamu, Amsterdamu, Utrehtu, Hagu,
Tilburgu, Ajdhovenu, Groningenu kao i u drugim manjim mestima. Nјima su se
priklјučili i Srbi izbeglice iz Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Republika Srbija u
Kralјevini Holandiji ima Ambasadu u Hagu, kao i počasni konzulat u Amsterdamu.
Smatramo da bi Republika Srbija trebalo da u svim većim gradovima kao što su
Roterdam, Utreht, Tilburg, Ajdhofen, Mastriht, Grnoningen, Breda, Lajden,
Najmehen, Arnem i Harlem otvoriti počasne konzulate. Ne bi trebalo posebno
objašnjavati kolika bi korist bila od počasnih konzulata u promociji naše privrede,
kulture, nauke, turizma. Naročito turizma, jer su Holanđani poznati kao dobri i
izdašni turisti. Za počasne konzule veoma je lako pronaći pogodne ličnosti naročito
dobro stojeće poslovne lјude ili advokate koji vole i imaju čast da u svom gradu i
svojoj sredini budu počasni konzuli što im nesumnjivo podiže ugled i koristi u
redovnom obavljanju delatnosti. Pored ostalog, počasni konzuli mogli bi biti od
pomoći našim državlјanima u raznim privatno pravnim slučajevima kod lokalnih
organa tako da ne bi morali da odlaze u Amabasadu u Hagu. Konačno, na kraju
ovog kratkog rada u kojem smo razmotrili i sporadično obradili diplomastke odnose
između Srbije i Holandije, ostalo je još niz važnih pitanja i događaja koji zaslužuju
posebnu pažnju neke buduće analize, sistematskog rada ili monografske studije.
ovaj rad, samo je sumirao neka važna pitanja ukazujući na tok razvoja diplomatskih
odnosa Srbije i Holandije, što je svakako vredan pokušaj da se u naučnoj literaturi
popuni postojeća praznina. Nadamo se da će ovaj rad biti inspiracija nekim mladim
istraživačima da se bliže pozabave međunarodnim pravnim aspektima diplomatskih
odnosa Srbije i Holandije.
DiPLoMATiC RELATioNS oF THE REPUBLiC oF SERBiA

AND THE KiNGDoM oF THE NETHERLANDS
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the diplomatic relations between the Republic of Serbia
(including the former Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, SFR
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
in the introductory part, the author discusses the geopolitical viewpoints of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, due to the fact that there are relatively few studies,
monographs, systematic works as well as articles and comments about the
Kingdom of the Netherlands in domestic scientific and professional literature. in
addition, the paper provides an international legal insight into several significant
and important events in the diplomatic relations between the two states over a
period of time lasting more than a century. Considering the author’s practical
experience in the field of international public law and international criminal law,
which resulted from many years of dealing with state affairs within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the paper also contains a review of two very important
international institutions based in The Hague. The first is represented by the
international Court of Justice, and the second by the international Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. By force of circumstances, our state (first the
predecessor state – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and then the Republic of
Serbia) was involved in the processes that took place before these international
judicial bodies. These processes largely determined the direction of the
development of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Key words: Kingdom of the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Serbia, international Court
of Justice, international Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, diplomacy
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22. Kokolј, Mitar, Međunarodni krivični sud za predhodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se
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MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO U SAVREMENIM
MEĐUNARODNIM ODNOSIMA
(International Law in Contemporary International Relations)
THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER:

REFLECTIONS IN TIMES OF GLOBAL REALIGNMENT
Hans KÖCHLER*
ABSTRACT
This text is dedicated to the struggle for a new world order in the time of global
realignment. The work represents an introspective discussion of the current
situation in international relations and international law. According to the
author’s understanding, the rules and principles of international law are not
necessarily a normative reflection of the political interaction of states, which is
why the world order should not be viewed in a static sense. Just as the external
aspect of international rules and principles is visibly manifested through the
behaviour of states in international relations, so these rules and principles are
not given once and for all nor do they provide “frozen” stability in time. on the
contrary, the history of international relations and international law speaks in
favour of constant and dynamic constellations of power. in this regard,
regardless of the established international legal order, social variables act in the
direction of social changes, which means that the normative system of
international relations is in constant movement and dynamics. Consequently,
the world order, despite the noble visions of “perpetual peace”, clashes with
realpolitik, which in the nuclear age can threaten the survival of the human
species. in the time of the new global realignment, the balance of power between
the great powers will not be possible without the realization of civilizational
diversity and the mutual interests of various political actors aware of the creation
of a new multipolar order.
Key words: World order, international law, international relations, global
relignment
INTRODUCTION
As long as sovereign states have existed, international order has been shaped
by the will to preserve the status quo, and the revolt against it. The dominant actors
of the moment – those that prevailed in the struggle for power, whether in a hot or
*
University of innsbruck, international Progress organization, Austria. E-mail: hans.
koechler@uibk.ac.at
cold war, or in some other form of rivalry – will always do whatever is needed, in
their assessment,1 to preserve and perpetuate their privileged position, at the expense
of all others. Unlike as suggested by the beneficiaries of the post-Cold War status
quo, we are not now witnessing the advent of a new era of lawlessness or, in reverse,
the end of a so-called rules-based international order. The “law of force” has
determined the course of events ever since the beginning of history. This did not
change with the adoption of international agreements or the creation of
organizations aimed at the prevention of war. in spite of solemn proclamations to
the contrary, neither the Treaty of Westphalia after the Thirty Years’ War (1648) nor
the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic wars (1815), the League of Nations after the
First World War or the United Nations after the Second World War did put an end
to the use of force between states. More often than not did the conclusion of a war
herald not an era of peace (not to speak at all of the Kantian vision of “perpetual
peace,” ewiger Friede), but a renewed struggle for power – either among the group
of victors or by a single hegemon, aiming for imperial rule. Those who are – or see
themselves as – the winners try to perpetuate their dominant position. This was true
for the “Concert of Powers” after the Vienna Congress as it (still) is true for today’s
P5, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, who Hans
Morgenthau once referred to as “the Holy Alliance of our time.”2 The military
interventions in the European periphery, justified in the name of “humanity,” by
the “Powers” of the 19th century are mirrored by the “humanitarian interventions”
of Western powers after the end of the Cold War.3 Notwithstanding the ban on the
use of force between states in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and in the Charter
of the United Nations, powerful states have continued to wage war also in our era,
without due attention to issues of legality. in all the years since the end of the Second
World War, the UN system of “collective security” has remained utterly ineffective.
Devastating wars, in fact unilateral military interventions – in Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and more recently in Yugoslavia, iraq, Syria, or Libya – have been
testimony to the primacy of national interests over international law all along, in
spite of the United Nations’ solemn commitment “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war.”4 in that regard, nothing has changed in 2022. Those who
now deplore the end of a “rules-based order” are disingenuous. it has never existed.
1
Since the end of the Cold War in particular, the phrase “all necessary means [measures]” – used
in resolutions of the Security Council – has become common parlance in self-serving justifications
of excessive uses of force.
2
Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New
York, 1985, p. 503.
3
Hans Köchler, “The Concept of Humanitarian intervention in the Context of Modern Power
Politics: is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the international Rule of
Law?”, Studies in International Relations, 2001, Vol. 26, international Progress organization,
Vienna.
4
“UN Charter”, First sentence of the Preamble, United Nations, 1945, internet: https://www.
un.org/en/about-us/un-charter, 22.01.2022.
Notwithstanding the grand proclamations in the wake of Europe’s, or the world’s,

major catastrophes – in 1815, 1918, and 1945 –, every new beginning was fraught
with contradictions and inconsistencies. Whether it is the promise of the signatories
of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance – Austria, Prussia and Russia that they will adhere
to the “commandments of justice, Christian charity and peace” or the solemn
intention of the founders of the United Nations “to unite our forces to maintain
international peace and security” instead that heralds a new era of peace, the moral
triumphalism of the victorious states, which only resulted in further unbridled
struggles for power and for regional or global supremacy.5 in particular, the promise
of the founders of the United Nations, assembled in San Francisco, to create a new
world order of peace – based on a strict ban on the use of force in relations between
states that was to be enforced through an elaborate system of collective security as
laid out in Chapter Vii of the UN Charter – was flawed from the outset. The system
they created was designed in such a way as to exempt its enforcers, the victorious
powers of 1945, from that ban. one just needs to read the fine print of the Charter.
Article 27, Paragraph 3 provides, in somewhat oblique language, that the permanent
members of the Security Council can veto any coercive measure against themselves,
even if they are party to a dispute, including in cases when they use force or threaten
other states with the use of force.6 This strange kind of “procedural immunity”
effectively also applies to states that are allied with a permanent member. Thus,
what was actually created was a system of anarchy among the great powers. Ever
since its foundation, the United Nations has been helpless against the abuses of
their privilege. Whether one is prepared to admit it or not: a system of anarchy
among the great is a system of anarchy among all. The long list of unilateral uses
of force by permanent member states, since the early years of the organization, is
testimony to this predicament of the international rule of law under UN auspices.
Whenever a permanent member, or one of its allies, is involved in a dispute, the
Security Council is paralyzed.
THE REALPOLITIC PARADOX OF THE WORLD ORDER

What, since 1945, prevented a new global conflagration was not the United
Nations system of collective security, but the – albeit fragile – balance of power
among the two major actors of the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and the
United States. Global security was based on mutual deterrence. This changed with
the events of 1989. After the end of the bipolar balance of power, the self-
proclaimed winner of the power struggle of the Cold War, together with its allies,
5
“The Holy Alliance Treaty”, Paris, 26 September 1815, Para. 2, internet: https://www.napoleon-
series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_alliance.html , 22. 01.2022; “UN Charter”, Ibid.
6
Hans Köchler, “The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a
Normative Contradiction and its Consequences on international Relations”, Studies in
International Relations, 1991, Vol. 17, international Progress organization, Vienna.
was able to use war to advance its geopolitical agenda, and to do so with total
impunity – whether in Yugoslavia, iraq or Afghanistan, just to mention some of
the most consequential uses of military force in this period. in a triumphant speech
in March 1991, President George H. W. Bush, declaring victory in the Gulf War,
misleadingly spoke of “the very real prospect of a new world order.” He claimed
that “the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate,” would now be able “to
fulfill the historic vision of its founders,” and, borrowing from a speech of Winston
Churchill after World War ii, he suggested that this would be a world where the
“principles of justice and fair play” will prevail.7 Nothing could have been further
from the truth. in the hegemonic setting of the 1990s, the earlier mentioned
structural flaw in the UN Charter became even more consequential, and
detrimental to global order. Suddenly, the United States was able to set the global
agenda not only without any procedural challenges within the UN system of
collective security (due to its privilege under Article 27[3]), but also without having
to face any competitor in terms of power politics. This elevated international
anarchy to an entirely new dimension. To emphasize it yet again: The element of
anarchy was built into the Charter of the United Nations. According to that very
statute, the prohibition of aggressive war is necessarily ineffective when it comes
to restraining the assertion of power by the most powerful. This means lawlessness
by virtue of the law (namely, the letter of the Charter). Thus, the United Nations
organization is condemned to the role of a mere bystander if a conflict involves a
permanent member of the Security Council. There should be no illusion of the
“laws” of international realpolitik (or, more precisely, power politics): impunity,
under the Charter, of certain members in cases of their own transgressions is not
an innocent procedural mishap (in certain specific situations), but a statutory fact.
Double standards are part and parcel of the functioning of the world organization
in its most important responsibility, the maintenance of international peace and
security. The organization would never have been established if this had not been
the case. Commenting on the veto, former US Secretary of State Cordell Hull did
not mince words: “our government would not remain there [in the UN] a day
without retaining the veto power.”8
NEW GLOBAL REALIGNMENT

However, the primacy of power over law, evidenced in statute and practice of
the UN (as shaped by some of its leading members), may ultimately be self-
defeating. it this seems to be a lesson of history never learned: Every assertion of
7
“President George H. W. Bush Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the End of the Gulf
War”, 6 March 1991, internet: https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/
march-6-1991-address-joint-session-congress-end-gulf-war, 5.02.2022; Hans Köchler,
Democracy and the New World Order. Studies in International Relations, 1993, Vol. 19,
international Progress organization, Vienna.
8
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Macmillan Co., New York, 1948, Vol. 2. p. 1664.
power, particularly by a state claiming hegemony, provokes a counter-assertion.

The quest for perpetual dominance, inherent in the logic of hegemonial rule, brings
never-ending challenges to any guardian of the status quo in his strategy to prevent
a competitor from reaching strategic parity. The “blow-back effect,” as it was aptly
described by Chalmers Johnson in his seminal work, “The Costs and
Consequences of American Empire,” may lead to conflict and armed confrontation
in all corners of the world.9 The global struggle for power has entered a new phase.
At the beginning of the 21st century, it is the challenge to pax Americana that
determines the transformation of global order in the direction of a new multipolar
constellation that will be different from the one that had existed among the P5 (the
five permanent members of the Security Council) for a short period after 1945.
As we explained in regard to the provisions of Chapter Vii of the Charter, the
United Nations was conceived of as a tool of the P5 to rule the world. After several
decades of bipolarity (after the 1950s) and a relatively short “unipolar moment”
(after 1990), a new and complex dynamic of power relations is unfolding of which
the late Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke as the “global realignment.”10 The great power
consensus embodied in the UN Charter does not anymore reflect the reality of
today. The predominance not only of the West, but also of the traditional
industrialized world, is coming to an end. Due to the absence of checks and
balances in the UN system of collective security, US-dominated unipolarity has
profoundly destabilized global order and created a power vacuum in strategically
vital regions. New alliances are being shaped by countries that were left out of the
power equation in the Cold War period and even more so under the conditions of
unipolarity.11 While centers of economic gravity are shifting from the Western
world towards the East, new, alternative trade and financial networks are being
set up that better represent global realities and build new bridges between North
and South. The process is accelerated by the Western powers’, in particular the
United States’, insistence on setting the rules and excluding those who do not abide
by the unilateral standards set by those states. The illegal policy of unilateral
sanctions, imposed – and in many instances also enforced extraterritorially – by
the United States and the European Union, is evidence of an exclusivism that is at
variance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This policy has
not only seriously undermined the free trade system of the WTo [World Trade
organization], but also has poisoned the climate of international co-operation and
profoundly destabilized the system of global security.12 The unilateralist strategy
9
Chalmers Johnson, The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Metropolitan Books, New
York, 2000.
10
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Toward a Global Realignment,” in: The American Interest, 2016, Vol.
11, No. 6, pp. 1–3.
11
Hans Köchler, “World order in an Age of Transition,” international Progress organization,
Vienna, Studies in International Relations, 2019, Vol. 34, pp. 61–73.
12
Hans Köchler, “Санкции и международное право,” in: Вестник международных
организаций, 2019, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 27–47.
is essentially revisionist. it is part of a larger struggle for power in the beginning

21st century, namely for the preservation of the dominant position of the West under
an emerging new order that will be different from the fragile multipolar balance
of power after World War ii. in its structure, it resembles the competitions for
power in earlier periods of transition. However, what have changed in the constant
struggle for power are its implications for the survival of mankind. Any
“repositioning” – or realignment – within the global balance of power, involving
the major global players, now occurs under the sword of Damocles of nuclear
annihilation. it is to be hoped that this risk will at least caution rational rulers who
understand the logic of “mutual deterrence.” The argument in favor of deterrence
is based on the rationale of “mutually assured destruction,” another term from the
inventory of the Cold War era. However, an appeal to the rationality – and
responsibility – of leaders of the great powers in the Security Council may not be
enough. in spite of the grand strategy of non-proliferation embodied in the NPT,13
nuclear weapons capability has already spread beyond the traditional “nuclear
club.” The unstable global situation and the regime change interventionism of the
post-Cold War years seem to have led an increasing number of countries to view
nuclear arms as insurance policy for national survival. The Advisory opinion of
the international Court of Justice, leaving open whether in a case where a state’s
survival is at stake – “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence”14 – the use of
nuclear arms might be in conformity with international law, hasn’t made things
any easier. Legal ambiguities notwithstanding, in the logic of mutually assured
destruction, an insurance policy for survival may quickly turn into a guarantee of
collective suicide. Also, the nuclear capability of an increasing number of states
will severely distort power relations and may make global realignment much more
unpredictable and chaotic, fraught with the risk of global conflagration. When in
the possession of nuclear arms plus high capacity missile systems, a small,
otherwise weak and uninfluential, country may totally upset an existing balance
of power, and even dictate the actions of great powers. The disparity between the
parameters of power – economic, political, and conventional-military versus non-
conventional – defies even the most elaborate geopolitical calculations. in view
of this state of affairs, a legal prohibition of nuclear arms such as the one recently
13
“Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT”, United Nations, internet:
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text, 2.2.2022. The NPT was concluded to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to advance the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and
general and complete disarmament. The treaty was opened for signature in 1968, and entered
into force in 1970. in May 1995, the contract was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 states
have joined the treaty, including five nuclear-weapon states. More countries have ratified the
NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament treaty, which is testament to the importance
of the Treaty.
14
“Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict”, ICJ Advisory Opinion,
General List No. 93, 8 July 1996.
adopted15 can only be of declaratory nature – as an act of what we in German call

Gesinnungsethik (“ethics of conscience”). instead of adoption of a treaty that is
unenforceable from the outset, what is needed is an act of Verantwortungsethik
(“ethics of responsibility”) by the leaders of nuclear states committing their
countries to a policy of no first use.16 it is appropriate to recall here the consensus
of just a few months ago among the five permanent members of the Security
Council on a somewhat implicit no first use-declaration. in their joint declaration,
the leaders of the five countries stated, inter alia, “that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought” and “that nuclear weapons – for as long as they
continue to exist – should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent
war.”17
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER –

GLOBAL ILLUSION OR POLITICAL REALITY?
The state of international affairs as we have described it leaves the world with
the question as to how to “organize” the greed for power – and the mutual mistrust
among states that accompanies it – in such a way that it does not ultimately defeat
itself, i.e. that, in the nuclear era, it will not lead to the self-destruction of mankind.
What is needed is a new honesty of realpolitik. The history of power politics has
been a sequence of grand delusions and dishonest proclamations by those who were
out to rule the world or, more “modestly,” to change the balance of power in their
favour – whether it was Alexander the Great in his conquest of Asia two and a half
millennia ago, the “Concert of Powers,” assembled at the Vienna Congress, the 19th
century British Empire, or, in our “post-modern” age, the United States of America,
undertaking – after having proclaimed “victory” in the Cold War – to reshape the
world in its image.18 They evoke “civilization,” “peace,” or – in modern parlance –
“human rights,” “democracy,” “justice,” or “rule of law.” However, what they mean
15
“Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, United Nations/General Assembly,
A/CoNF.229/2017/8. The TPNW was adopted by the Conference (by a vote of 122 States in
favour, with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017, and
opened for signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017.
Following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the 50th instrument of ratification or
accession of the Treaty on 24 october 2020, it entered into force on 22 January 2021 in
accordance with its article 15 (1).
16
Nina Tannenwald, “it’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy, Texas National Security
Review, 2019, Vol. 2, issue 3, pp. 130–137.
17
“Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War
and Avoiding Arms Races”, The White House, Briefing Room, 3 January 2022, internet:
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-
nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/, 30.04.2022.
18
on the perception and development of the balance of power concept in Europe, see in particular,
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, pp. 19, etc.
– in the overwhelming majority of cases – are the national interests of the conqueror
or competitor for power. Because they are so typical of the disingenuous, self-
aggrandizing imperial narrative, we quote here from the words of British Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin, in his Empire Day message of 1924:
“When we speak of Empire, it is in no spirit of flag-wagging. [...] I think deep
down in all our hearts we look to the Empire as the means by which we may
hope to see that increase of our race which we believe to be of such inestimable
benefit to the world at large; the spread abroad of people to whom freedom
and justice are as the breath of their nostrils, of people distinguished, as we
would faint hope and believe, above all things, by an abiding sense of duty.”19
The false idealism of, and delusions nurtured by, proclamations of a Novus ordo
saeculorum have always stood in contrast to the sobriety of the reasoning and
calculations of realpolitik. Today, when President Bush’s “New World order,”
proclaimed in 1991, has dramatically failed and the unilateral system which the
United States aimed to establish on the basis of that proclamation is increasingly
challenged,20 new uncertainties emerge in an ever more complex multipolar
framework. on the “grand chessboard”21 the entire globe has become for the power
game among more than the two or three traditional players,22 new groupings
emerge, and the “board” is constantly being reconfigured, which makes predictions
almost impossible. Apart from the traditional “major players” and their regional or
worldwide groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty organization, the European
Union (EU) or the G7, intergovernmental organizations such as the African Union,
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), BRiCS (Brazil, Russia, india, China, South Africa) or the Shanghai
Cooperation organization (SCo), to mention only a few, have begun to challenge
the Western-dominated global architecture. Not surprisingly, this has initiated a
flurry of “alliance diplomacy” according to the ancient imperial maxim, divide et
impera! [Divide and rule]. it’s essentially about “containing” the new emerging
powers and/or their alliances in order to preserve the power and privilege of the
self-appointed guardians of global order. Among those “reactive,” still somewhat
informal, alliances figure the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue [QSD]
between the United States, Japan, Australia and india) and “AUKUS,” a trilateral
security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
19
Stanley Baldwin, On England And other Addresses, Frederick A. Stokes, New York, 1926, pp.
71, etc.
20
This was also one of the main concerns of Russian President Putin in his speech at the Munich
Security Conference in 2007. See official transcript: “President Vladimir Putin Speech and the
Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, Munich, 10 February 2007,
internet: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/, 2.4.2022.transcripts/24034, accessed 30 April 2022.
21
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997.
22
United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China – in the two decades since the 1970s.
overlapping membership of these structures (global-regional) has enormous

disruptive potential, bringing new risks of inter- and intra-regional rivalries (e.g.
between india and China, Japan and China). These may in turn be opportunistically
exploited by a global power struggling to defend its dominant position against any
new rival. Stemming the influence of its main antagonist in Asia – or staving off
the emergence of a new geopolitical constellation – was indeed the overriding
motive, on the part of the United States, for entering into the above-mentioned ad
hoc alliances. Under the circumstances, there is no global arbiter, no
intergovernmental organization that would be capable of moderating the
repositioning of power in the gradually unfolding multipolar framework. Herein
also lays the existential challenge for the United Nations: how to survive the
transition from the multipolar order of 1945 to the multipolar order of the 21st
century? The organization will simply become irrelevant if it continues to embody
the power balance of an earlier era. in view of the statutory veto of the “powers of
1945” over any amendment to the Charter,23 the problems appear almost
insurmountable. After the post-World War ii period of decolonization, the four
decades of the Cold War, and upon the end of a destabilizing hegemonial interlude,
the grand task for the international community will be how to manage the real post-
colonial constellation of the 21st century – with the former colonial countries finally
emancipating themselves from the persistent tutelage –, and how to integrate the
Global South into the balance of power. This will, among other measures, require
an enlargement of the Security Council in regard to permanent membership.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this introspective discussion, it seems rational to conclude that it
would be wrong to believe in a world order in a static sense because it would leave
the impression that there are permanent and unchanging rules, which ensure
“frozen” stability in time. in the real world, history is a sequence of ever-changing,
dynamic constellations of power among those that achieve the status of “major
player” at a given point in time. Their efforts, though ultimately vain, to preserve
the status quo – and to stave off contenders “by all necessary means” – has always
been a driving factor of international conflict.24 Whatever provisions (norms,
principles) and mechanisms the international community may agree on, the
parameters of human nature will not change. Against the background of an
obviously permanent struggle for world order, “perpetual peace” – immanuel
Kant’s vision of ewiger Friede25 – will remain a noble vision. it may nonetheless
23
According to Article 108 of the UN Charter, an amendment requires the consent of the permanent
members of the Security Council.
24
Hans Köchler, “Power and World order,” in: Current Concerns – Special Edition, Zurich,
February 2022, pp. 1–4.
25
immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, Königsberg, 1795; Heiner
F. Klemme (Ed.), Philosophische Bibliothek, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1992.
have the role of moral conscience, or of a corrective of the excesses of realpolitik

that in our nuclear age can threaten the survival of mankind. A world state – which
alone could do away with inter-state conflict and the “tragedy” of power politics,
as John Mearsheimer aptly described it26 – would be a totalitarian colossus whose
organizational imperatives can never be compatible with the aspirations of
mankind for freedom (individual as well as collective), for civilizational diversity,
and self-determination. Also, in today’s system of sovereign nation-states, there
cannot yet be international law in the strict sense of the term “law.” Unlike the
norms of morality, the norms of law are, as Hans Kelsen convincingly argued,27
defined by unified mechanisms of enforcement in the case of their violation. These
are absent in the present system. The wording of the United Nations Charter leaves
no doubt about one fact: namely, that power trumps law when it comes to the
sovereign status of the organization’s permanent members, the enforcers of the
“law” under the provisions for collective security according to Chapter Vii of the
Charter.28 in the absence of unified mechanisms of enforcement of the norms of
international behaviour, states may have to rely on the rules and maxims of old-
fashioned realpolitik. in view of the consequences of nuclear war, any global
realignment in the emerging new multipolar framework will need to be rooted in
a rational calculus of each nation’s interest to survive, on the basis of mutuality.
(This also is the essence of the United Nations’ principle of “sovereign equality”
of states.29) As long as it is not effectively restrained by law, the struggle for world
order will only then not end in collective suicide if a robust balance of power deters
each actor from striking first. in the real world – and until mankind will have
“reinvented” it – peace, as disillusioning as it may be, is not “guaranteed” by law,
but maintained by the fear of destruction.
26
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New
York, 2014.
27
See the chapter on the law as coercive normative order: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre,1934
in: M. Jestaedt (Ed.), Mohr Siebeck/Verlag Österreich, Tübingen/Vienna, 2017, pp. 94, etc.
28
Hans Köchler, “The Dual Face of Sovereignty: Contradictions of Coercion in international Law,”
in: The Global Community – Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2019, Part 6: “Recent
Lines of internationalist Thought”, oxford University Press, New York, 2020, pp. 875–885.
29
Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the UN Charter.
BoRBA ZA SVETSKi PoREDAK: REFLEKSiJE U VREMENiMA

GLoBALNoG PRESTRoJAVANJA
APSTRAKT
ovaj tekst posvećen je borbi za novi svetski poredak u vremenu globalnog
prestrojavanja. Rad predstavlja introspektivnu raspravu o aktuelnoj situaciji u
međunarodnim odnosima i međunarodnom pravu. Prema shvatanju autora,
pravila i principi međunarodnog prava nisu nužno normativni odraz političke
interakcije država, zbog čega svetski poredak ne treba posmatrati u statičkom
smislu. Kao što se spoljašnji vid međunarodnih pravila i principa vidljivo
manifestuje kroz ponašanje država u međunarodnim odnosima, tako ta pravila i
principi nisu jednom zauvek dati niti obezbeđuju „zamrznutu stabilnost” u
vremenu. Naprotiv, istorija međunarodnih odnosa i međunarodnog prava govori
u prilog stalnim i dinamičnim konstelacijama moći. S tim u vezi, bez obzira na
uspostavljeni međunarodni pravni poredak, socijalne varijable deluju u pravcu
društvenih promena, čime je normativni sistem međunarodnih odnosa u stalnom
pokretu i dinamici. Sledstveno i svetski poredak, uprkos plemenitim vizijama o
„večnom miru”, sukobljava se sa realpotikom, koja u nuklearnom dobu može
ugroziti opstanak ljudske vrste. U vremenu novog globalnog prestrojavanja,
ravnoteža snaga između velikih sila neće biti moguća bez ostvarenja
civilizacijskog diverziteta i uzajamnih interesa različitih političkih aktera svesnih
stvaranja novog multipolarnog poretka.
Ključne reči: Svetski poredak, međunarodno pravo, međunarodni odnosi,
globalna prevlast
REFERENCES
1. Baldwin, Stanley, On England And other Addresses, Frederick A. Stokes, New
York, 1926.
2. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Toward a Global Realignment,” in: The American
Interest, 2016, Vol. 11, No. 6.
3. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997.
4. Chalmers Johnson, The Costs and Consequences of American Empire,
Metropolitan Books, New York, 2000.
5. immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf,
Königsberg, 1795.
6. “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on
Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races”, The White House, Briefing
Room, 3 January 2022, internet: whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arm
s-races/, 30.04.2022.
7. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934 in: M. Jestaedt (Ed.), Mohr

Siebeck/Verlag Österreich, Tübingen/Vienna, 2017.
8. Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994.
9. Klemme, Heiner F. (Ed.), Philosophische Bibliothek, Felix Meiner, Hamburg,
1992.
10. Köchler, Hans, “Power and World order,” in: Current Concerns – Special
Edition, Zurich, February 2022, pp. 1–4.
11. Köchler, Hans, “The Concept of Humanitarian intervention in the Context of
Modern Power Politics: is the Revival of the Doctrine of “Just War”
Compatible with the international Rule of Law?”, Studies in International
Relations, 2001, Vol. 26, international Progress organization, Vienna.
12. Köchler, Hans, “The Dual Face of Sovereignty: Contradictions of Coercion in
international Law,” in: The Global Community – Yearbook of International
Law and Jurisprudence 2019, Part 6: “Recent Lines of internationalist
Thought”, oxford University Press, New York, 2020.
13. Köchler, Hans, “The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council:
Examining a Normative Contradiction and its Consequences on international
Relations”, Studies in International Relations, 1991, Vol. 17, international
Progress organization, Vienna.
14. Köchler, Hans, “World order in an Age of Transition,” Studies in International
15. Köchler, Hans, “Санкции и международное право,” in: Вестник
международных организаций, 2019, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 27-47.
16. Köchler, Hans, Democracy and the New World Order. Studies in International
17. “Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict”, ICJ
Advisory Opinion, General List No. 93, 8 July 1996.
18. Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton &
Company, New York, 2014.
19. Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, Knopf, New York, 1985.
20. “President George H. W. Bush Address before a Joint Session of Congress on
the End of the Gulf War”, 6 March 1991, internet: https://millercenter.org/the-
presidency/presidential-speeches/march-6-1991-address-joint-session-congres
s-end-gulf-war, 5.02.2022.
21. “President Vladimir Putin Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich
Conference on Security Policy”, Munich, 10 February 2007, internet:
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/, 2.4.2022.
22. “The Holy Alliance Treaty”, Paris, 26 September 1815, Para. 2, internet:
https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_alliance.
html, 22. 01.2022
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internet: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text, 2.2.2022.
24. “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, United Nations/General
Assembly, A/CoNF.229/2017/8, 7 July 2017.
25. “UN Charter”, First sentence of the Preamble, United Nations, 1945, internet:
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter, 22.01.2022.
26. Tannenwald, Nina, “it’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy, Texas
National Security Review, 2019, Vol. 2, issue 3, pp. 130-137.
27. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Macmillan Co., New York, 1948, Vol. 2.
28. United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China – in the two decades
since the 1970s.
EVOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

AND DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL SOCIETY
Ezio BENEDETTi*
ABSTRACT
in this study, the author examines the issue of the development of citizenship
rights in the context of the development of global society and the transformation
of the world order. in this sense, the author touches on issues related to the process
of globalization, which is connected to the issue of further progress of humanity
and solving problems in the political, legal, economic, social and cultural spheres.
Examining hyper globalist, skeptic and transformationist concepts about
globalization, as a process that marks the transformation of contemporary global
relations, the author presented new opportunities for the liberation and
development of the identity of individuals, groups and communities. Since the
development of this identity is not a completed process because it encounters
obstacles within national states, the possibility of its transformation through the
transformation of the international legal order would also mean the application
of international legal standards, primarily in respect of human rights. Although
these rights have been heavily instrumentalized in the modern age, the author is
of the opinion that their consistent application could contribute to the creation of
supranational rights, as, for example, would be the case with the citizenship rights.
Key words: Citizenship rights, international law, international community,
globalization, sovereignty
INTRODUCTION
The globalization controversy has long been the focus of philosophical,
sociological, legal and economic considerations. Ever since the early 1990s, that
is, in the last almost thirty years, the word “globalization” has been in use among
theorists and practitioners. There are numerous opinions on this topic, some of
which offer radically different viewpoints.
“From the late 16th century onwards, political power became concentrated in
state structures, first in Europe and then around the world.” Sovereignty, legitimacy
and democracy were associated with fixed borders and territories. Against this
*
University of Trieste, italy. E-mail: eziobenedetti@hotmail.com
background, maps can be drawn showing states with clear borders and well-
defined zones of power and influence. Today, questions are being asked, are states
still as important as they once were, and are they, in short, subject to erosion due
to the process of globalization?1
The definition given by Held draws a very clear picture of how a world obliged
to deal with a phenomenon such as globalization may qualify, and in particular in
what areas its influence manifests itself. Globalization is “a process, or a set of
processes, that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social and
legal relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows
and networks of activity, interaction and power”.2 Globalization is therefore a
process marked by the tension between global economic and technological
interdependence and social, legal and informational and cultural heterogeneity and
political fragmentation.3 According to some theorists, the role of the nation-state
seems to have ceased in favor of the process of integration into the European Union
and global interconnection. However, we believe that a global society does not
yet exist, and even if a series of interconnected processes involving individuals,
but also groups, communities, states, markets and large corporations, international
governmental and non-governmental organizations, which ultimately result in the
creation of networks of global economic interdependence and legal frameworks
that traditionally regulate these dimensions at the transnational level.4 Nation-states
are particularly vulnerable in this scenario of global interconnectedness since they
are determined by the possibility of exercising control over national territory. This
is especially important to keep in mind because transnational relations are
emerging in the world capable of reasoning beyond borders, so that national
territories and borders lose their authority and are perceived only as an obstacle to
the full development of the globalization process.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON THE PHENOMENON

OF GLOBALIZATION: HYPERGLOBALISTS, SCEPTICS
AND TRANSFORMATIONALISTS
There are various contributions on this topic, which concern the scope of the
phenomenon of globalization, its potential for novelty and the consequences it causes
in international society. A prime example in this regard is the hyperglobalist trend
(whose exponent is the already mentioned Held), according to which the
development of connections between different parts of the world is fundamentally
1
David Held, A globalizing world? Culture, Economics, Politics, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 2.
2
David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, Globalization, Global
Governance, 1999, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 483-496.
3
Alberto Martinelli, La democrazia globale. Mercati, movimenti, governi Copertina flessibile,
Università Bocconi, Milano, 2004, p. Viii.
4
Alberto Martinelli, op.cit., p. 2.
based on economic relations and precisely on the progressive integration of people

and markets.5 This state of economic interdependence is seen as fundamentally
irreversible and therefore binding on both governments and individuals. The
progressive interaction of the market, for the hyperglobalist current, represents the
imposition of a single, perfectly integrated global economy, while the global legal
system does not seem relevant or mandatory to these authors.6 it is not clear whether
the theory of hyperglobalism positively or negatively assesses the risks and benefits
that individuals, states and communities can derive from the existence of a global
market? There are those who believe that globalization is an essentially positive
event for the destiny of humanity. Such a view coincides with the view of Francis
Fukuyama who claims that the historical epoch in which humanity experiences
globalization should for all intents and purposes be considered the end of history, as
nothing more will disturb the world beyond the era of interdependence.7 Within the
hyperglobalist current, there are theories that acknowledge that interconnectedness
and globalization have produced improvements in the lives of a small core of people,
but that globally, the divide that separates the weakest and poorest from the strongest
and richest is progressively widening. This statement is even more related to the fact
that we believe that in the absence of a systematized legal approach, this approach
is the right one. This approach to globalization is traditionally intended for
international law, but it seems incapable of facing the globalist challenges that require
a credible response.8 However, when the hyperglobalist thesis is considered more
5
The terms “progressive interaction” mean that economies in different states are less and less
characterized by their national attribute and increasingly interconnected, linked by the phenomena
of de-nationalized and thus transnationalised trade, production and financial networks.
6
Kelly and Prokhovnik maintain that there is some agreement on the subject that international
trade and certain forms of investment have indeed increased compared to the past, but that there
is still no single global economy capable of single-handedly controlling the rhythms of production
and consumption of each individual within each society. Therefore, the different positions on the
subject are not distinguished according to a Manichean classification, but there are commonalities
and, above all, grey areas, so much so that they give the idea of being rather a progression, an
evolution in scale. See: Phillip Kelly, Raia Prokhovnik, “Economic Globalisation?”, in: David
Held, A globalizing world? Culture, Economics, Politics, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 84.
7
Francis Fukuyama argues that the problem of confrontation (or better said, recognition; this
narrative is already present in Hegel’s thought, according to which the relationship with others
and the agnation derived from it are at the basis of all human interaction), has been the engine of
History and that now, with the advent of capitalism and liberalism, this conflict has ceased to
exist.: “While some present-day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and
others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military
dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on”; thus virtually the end of
the line of humanity’s ideological evolution would have been reached. See: Francis Fukuyama
The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York, 1992, p. xi.
8
on this issue in particular, the position of Greider is interesting, in fact he affirms that, “in the
global marketplace defined as free trade, everyone is free, it seems, but the people”. The negative
vision he has of the globalization process is present in several passages of his work, like when he
affirms that “in wealthy countries, business interests often complain that labour laws and unions
closely, it would appear to be at odds with reality as it predicts the weakening of the
nation-state in favor of a transnational system of exchange. With the outbreak of the
global financial crisis in 2007, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the instability
of the European Monetary Union, it seemed that the world economic system was
less and less tied to markets and more and more dependent on the choices of
governments.9 if, therefore, hyperglobalists believe that, sooner or later, one global
economic reality will be able to encompass all of humanity, skeptics, on the other
hand, believe that it is unrealistic and utopian to believe and hope for global economic
unity. Therefore, globalization would not be a description of reality, but only a dream,
a projection of the desired future. in fact, globalization would be a catalyst, a source
of strength and growth almost exclusively for the private sector, for the expansion
of competition in almost all spheres. According to the concept that fosters a skeptical
approach to this phenomenon, globalization has brought with it fundamental
technological advances, but its focus remains on the pursuit of profit and the
associated economic power, while the legal and “right” dimensions remain in the
background.10 Hence, there remains a controversial interpretation of the effects of
globalization on the economy (international trade and investments, and especially
on financial markets, which are most often the easiest to integrate). difficulties in
communicating with different cultures.11 A skeptical response to the utopia of a free
and perfectly integrated global market envisioned by hyperglobalists considers the
prop up wage levels but, in poorer countries, the same companies rely upon heavy-handed labour
regulations, including the prohibition of free trade unions, to suppress wages. The economics of
globalization thus relies upon a barbaric transaction – the denial of individual rights – as a vital
element of profitability”. See: Williem Greider, “Why The Global Economy Needs Worker
Rights”, Journal of Labor and Society, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 32–44.
9
instability caused by what was described by Mario Draghi as a misguided strategy adopted by
the ECB, which tackled the various national bank crises without any clear criteria.
10
A “moderate” skeptic, Waltz is nonetheless highly critical of those who believe that the reality
of a globalised world is real: “Economists and scientists make free use of modern-day clichés:
spaceship earth, planet getting smaller, global village, international interdependence. These
ubiquitous phrases reiterate that the world must be considered in its entirety”; yet Waltz believes,
although the previous reflection could be considered coherent, that the world cannot be
interpreted in strictly economic terms and that in the case of interdependence, “the inequalities
between nations are greater than those within them. A world of nations, marked by great
inequalities, cannot usefully be considered the unity of its own analysis”. See: Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, New York, 1986, pp. 264, etc-
11
R.J. Barry Jones, Global Governance in Question: The problems and prospects of effective global
governance in finance, trade and environment, Kindle Edition, Tollesbury, 2013. The pivotal
arguments in Jones’ reflection essentially concern the risks that the unregulated free market may
bring with it, since it may require numerous efforts (mainly by governments) in order to be able
to regulate and limit it; that globalization is, in fact, an uneven phenomenon that has unbalanced
effects and destabilizing consequences; and that finally, this phenomenon represents an obstacle
to an effective capacity to govern, whether this is exercised by states or by an international
community. See: Alberto Martinelli, op.cit., p. 8.
world of economies by dividing them into regional rather than global trading and
financial blocs.12
According to a skeptical perspective, globalization is a phenomenon completely
incapable of producing valid effects on the world stage, which is why it is
impossible to predict its final outcomes because it spreads in various forms, with
different intensities in different parts of the world. For lawyers, this situation is
unprecedented because they are unable to follow this evolution.13 For skeptics, on
the contrary, there is evidence of a strong role played by nation-states in the world
of globalization, in which they are certainly losing their own power, although they
are not excluded from the new system. The United States and Europe retain their
preeminence in international affairs, while international law is still largely developed
and applied by nation-states rather than a defunct global governance system.
Skeptics claim that governments continuously participate in the shaping of
economic relations and in serving as a basis for multinational corporations, which
through the process of internationalization, and thus globalization, are largely
dependent on government policy, which regulates and guarantees free trade.
Different parts of the world are therefore integrated differently, while there is almost
no uniform legal approach to the phenomenon. Legal inequality between different
groups still exists and is intensifying, while in some areas the intensity of
transnational trade is so great that it has caused a wave of protectionist measures,
especially in Europe and the United States of America in response to the progressive
expansion of young Asian economies.14 According to the skeptical view, therefore,
it is not true that globalization is the solution to world poverty. De la Dehesa argues
that scientific and technological progress is predominantly developed in richer
countries, and that such progress has an inherent tendency to increase the differences
between richer and poorer countries, as well as between countries that can actually
invent or apply new technologies and those that cannot.15 However, if the economies
are closed, the technological breakthroughs achieved could not affect the economies
12
According to skeptics, hyperglobalists lack empirical evidence, thus making their theories little
more than opinions about numerous processes related to globalization, as if these affected every
area of the world in the same way. See: Luke Martell, The Sociology and Law of Globalization,
Cambridge, 2010, p. 63.
13
For this reason, skeptics believe that globalization is not a globally inclusive phenomenon and
therefore cannot be defined in a single discourse as all its manifestations.
14
An example of this type of policy is the Trump administration’s choices in 2018 and 2019, which,
as in the case of the trade clash with China, chose to impose duties on the import of solar panels
for four years, amounting to a levy of 30 per cent of the value of the goods sold in the United
States, which will then scale up to 15 per cent. The US President has made no secret of his
“national security strategy”, according to which the interests of both American industries and
workers would be at stake. The so-called war on tariffs against both China and South Korea has
led to a series of appeals to the WTo.
15
Guillermo De la Dehesa, What Do We Know About Globalization. Issues of Poverty and Income
Distribution, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, New Jersey, 2007.
of other countries in any way.16 According to a skeptical perspective, it would be

unlikely to hope for a unified system in which there could be harmony (even if only
on an economic level) between the parties. Huntington’s pessimistic view of the
clash of civilizations offers a good account of such claims.17 Namely, it is assumed
that the system of transnational relations is somehow still dominated by fear – the
fear that the neighbor will become too rich and too powerful. in this regard,
Mearsheimer’s description is timely: “Although the intensity of their competition
waxes and wanes, the great powers fear each other and are always competing with
each other for power.” The most important goal of every country is to maximize its
share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other countries.
But the great powers do not just aspire to be the strongest of all the great powers,
although that is a welcome outcome.18
Their ultimate goal is to be a hegemon – that is, the only great power in the
system”. Power relations are in central focus when considering globalization from
the perspective of skepticism. Transformationists, on the other hand, distance
themselves from the skeptics, but at the same time propose a more complex vision
than that proposed by hyperglobalists. The transformist direction seeks solutions in
the space between hyperglobalism and skepticism. This seems to be the most prudent
way to understand what globalization actually is, since, according to the
transformationists, the phenomenon would be characterized in much broader and
more complex terms than previous experiences, since globalization is now becoming
a multiform process, which is the result of a combination of different conditions:
economic-financial, legal, technological, socio-cultural and political.19 Prediction of
the future in this sense does not offer a safe scenario and it is certainly more prudent
16
With all the appropriate consequences: in a globalised world, the progress of one country also benefits
others. Therefore, if a country wishes to benefit not only from access to other countries’ markets,
but also through access to the latest technologies, it is necessary to open its borders, enlarge,
’globalize’, and adopt truly ’international’ standards insofar as they are consistently accepted and
applied by the majority of the international community. See: Guillermo De la Dehesa, op.cit., p. 2.
17
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 2011. in stark contrast to Fukuyama’s End of History, according to
Huntington, after the end of the Cold War, the world’s different civilizations would have been
freed from the constraints of bipolarity, leaving ample discretion in terms of development and
self-determination. However, this event would not have produced positive consequences since
the element of greatest instability on the world political scene today would be precisely the
conflict and incompatibility between these very different groups from different civilizations;
Huntington had even predicted a 2010 marked by the outbreak of a new world war, perhaps he
had been wrong by only 12 years or a little more considering the current war in Ukraine and the
growing military confrontation between Russia, China, the EU and USA.
18
Johan Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, New
York, 2014, pp. 37–38.
19
The process is so multifaceted and particular that one could define a number of globalizations instead
of just one, in order to better analyze the kind of consequences it entails. See: Alberto Martinelli,
op.cit., p. 14.
to emphasize multiple networks of relationships between citizens, communities, states,

international organizations and transnational actors. There is no focus on global
integration, because global integration does not seem like a testable hypothesis.
Certainly, according to transformationists, globalization reaffirms and allows
traditional inequalities and hierarchies to adapt to the new reality, thus creating new
forms of social inclusion and exclusion, but also new opportunities for liberation and
development for individuals, groups and communities.20 Finally, this third theory notes
that in addition to the homogenizing influence of multinational corporations on
lifestyles and consumption patterns, there is also a growing hybridization of cultures
and a persistent defense of local identities. it is noted that nation-states suffer the
effects of deterritorialization, but also have the capacity to redesign and develop their
own role. As the world is troubled by old and new conflicts, there is a growing
awareness of the need for democratic global governance, based on equal
responsibilities for all citizens of the world and a common legal order.
INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY IDENTIES

if we accept the existence of the nation state as a simple historical phenomenon,
which will end in an interconnected and globalized world, we cannot deny that
the integration between different social systems is made possible thanks to
institutions based on the principle of authority. in modern society, it is precisely
the national state that embodies this principle.21 The state has historically asserted
itself as an independent and sovereign body, indispensable and supreme in social
relations within its jurisdiction. This was possible because it represented the most
suitable organizational model for holding together two apparently contradictory
needs, such as guaranteeing security and at the same time not suppressing the
rights of the individual. The characteristics of a state, relevant to its international
legal subjectivity, are recognized provided that the following elements are
simultaneously present: permanent population, defined territory, exclusive and
effective authority and the ability to maintain relations with other states.22
20
Globalization is therefore an open process, which orients individual and collective action,
redistributes costs and benefits and constraints and opportunities, redefines forms of inequality,
and can produce different outcomes for individuals and groups depending on structural
constraints, individual decisions and collective action. See: Alberto Martinelli, op.cit., p. 15.
21
Sergio Maria Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto, A. Santa Maria, Istituzioni di diritto internazionale,
Giappichelli, Torino, 2003.
22
This was already the case in 1933, when the Montevideo Convention was signed at the 7th
international Conference of American States. Art 1: “The state as a person of international law should
possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government;
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”. Art 3: “The political existence of the
state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right
to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and
consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and
to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other
limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law”.
Consequently, it follows that, on the one hand, nation-states survive, while on the
other hand, the process of integration at the global level, in which different
communities and interests participate in order to reach an agreement on issues that
have a global character, is emerging. Hence, the national level means the loss, that
is, the evolution of the historical role of the state.23 Zygmuth Baumann has
brilliantly argued the consequences that this process of globalization produces, not
only on nation-states but also on individuals in the world described above.
“We are all moving a bit, whether we want it or not, because we have decided
to do it or because it is imposed on us. We are on the move even if, physically, we
stand still; immobility is not a realistic option in an ever-changing world. Yet, the
effects induced by the new condition create radical inequalities [...]. in short, being
“local” in a globalised world is a sign of inferiority and social degradation. [...]
The increasing segregation, separation and exclusion in space are an integral part
of the globalization processes”.24
it is certainly true that movement has become an essential characteristic of
existence and that even at rest we are involuntarily involved in those
interdependent and transnational relationships discussed above. Leaving aside for
a moment the commercial and economic dimension of globalization, which
precisely affects states as actors of international trade, we now notice how the
transformations that have taken place in culture and media have also gone beyond
national territorial borders, far beyond mere national culture.25 “Globalization leads
to identity being constituted from outside, not from the local community”.26 The
conclusion follows that in those circumstances the individual would be subject to
23
Human rights and armed conflicts, the preservation of the planet and environmental policies,
economic instability and the fight against inequalities have become issues of global concern and
no longer exclusively national or regional ones: therefore, it is necessary for actors to cooperate
to reach solutions. Hyperglobalists tend to rely on global fora to solve collective problems;
skeptics, on the other hand, do not put so much trust in global policies. in fact, skeptics (among
them solo affirms: “The last two centuries have seen no significant increase in the efficacy or
authority of international institutions. Neither the peace nor the ’just’ world order which these
institutions were officially brought into being to promote has in fact been achieved. And in the
meantime the condition of the planet has taken on alarming aspects”. See: Danilova Solo, Cosmo
polis. Prospects for World Government, Cambridge, 1997, p. 12) do not believe that the Western
powers would ever be willing to come to terms with the political leveling that a global democracy
would bring. Because of their position of supremacy, Western powers will resist political equality
and seek to preserve their superiority in the forum. Therefore, according to this view, conflicts
in global politics are more likely to arise and the spirit of cooperation desired by hyper globalism
would be rather unlikely.
24
Sigmund Bauman, Inside Globalisation, Consequences on people, Paris, 1996, p. 5.
25
An excellent example of how culture (in this case food) can spread globally is offered by Ritzer
and the so-called McDonaldization thesis: consumer goods spread worldwide. This thesis is also
called homogenisation and almost always concerns consumer goods such as food and beverage,
or media..
26
Luke Martell, op.cit., p. 237.
numerous inputs that create a conflict between the local area of belonging and the
place of origin of the new culture and identity. A widely accepted view understands
the process of globalization as determining the practice and theory of citizenship.
The concept of citizenship includes the idea of citizenship as a status, that is, the
right to be a member of a political community, to have rights in it. Faced with an
ever-changing era of globalization, the focus falls on the crystallization of order,
on the individual’s need to define himself in an ever-changing world. This attitude
generates a series of international and transnational consequences that argue for
the need to reconsider the criterion of citizenship. Generally speaking, if we
consider that aspect of democracy that concerns participation in the political
community, citizenship is an integral part of democracy. Citizenship has
historically been characterized by civil, political and social rights.27 Delanty
believes that: “Until the late 1980s, multiculturalism and citizenship performed
quite different functions. Citizenship, as a whole, referred to the national
citizenship of the established polity and was generally defined by birth, or in some
cases descent, while multicultural policies served to manage incoming migrant
groups. Today, this difference has practically disappeared. Migrant groups are
becoming more and more part of the main population and cannot be so easily
contained by multicultural policies, and, on the other hand, the native population
itself is becoming more and more culturally plural, partly due to the impact of
about four decades of ethnic mixing, but also due to the general pluralization it
has brought post-industrial and post-modern culture”.28 Now, a global type of
citizenship, in order to exist, requires the existence of a number of conditions.
Among them is the presence of a global civil society, as well as the development
of a global market economy, together with the erosion of state sovereignty and the
aspiration to form a global governance – a kind of world government and
international police. This would establish “legal globalism”, especially judicial
globalism. in parallel, international criminal jurisdiction would be constituted as
a possible countermeasure against global terrorism by the entire civil society. Zolo
expresses a slightly skeptical attitude according to which it would be very difficult
to interpret the reality of the globalized world in relation to the classic European
idea of what it means to be a citizen. in fact, the European concept of citizenship
is closely related to the concept of the modern European state. Therefore, it
expresses the idea that an individual is a full member of a community or group,
politically organized in the form of a state, thereby reinforcing the idea that an
individual is a full member of a political group organized in the form of a state if
27
Marshall’s reflection on the formation of modern citizenship is based exclusively on the English
experience, and like many conceptions of the issue at the time he did not include the cultural
sphere, which characterises and defines the interactions between individuals and their belonging
to a group, in the analysis. See: T.H. Marshall, Legal theories on citizenship: between national
and international law, London, 2019.
28
Gerard Delanty, op.cit., p. 18.
the same individual he has certain basic rights that protect him from state power
and qualify him as a citizen, and no longer as a mere subject of state sovereignty.29
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

“L’ordinamento giuridico internazionale, così come ogni ordinamento
giuridico, è un prodotto, una sovrastruttura, di un determinato ambiente sociale,
di una determinata comunità, e non è altro o di più che questo”.30 Ferrajoli gives
only a formal definition of what a “fundamental right” is, which does not take into
account the contents, i.e. actual protections, but is based solely on the universal,
recognized character of their attribution. Therefore, according to the author,
fundamental rights are all those subjective rights that universally belong to all
human beings insofar as they are given the status of persons, i.e. citizens or persons
capable of acting. By “subjective right” is meant any positive expectation (of
benefit), or negative expectation (for non-injury), which is attributed to the subject
by a legal norm, and by “status” is meant the condition of the subject also provided
for by the positive legal norm as a presumption of his suitability to be bearer of
legal situations and/or author of acts that are their implementation.31 Ferraјoli’s
definition of fundamental rights corresponds to universal expectations and interests
at the global level. The definition therefore forms the basis of the parameter of
legal equality, the so-called “substantive dimension of democracy”. This theorist
acknowledges the supranational nature of most fundamental rights. in fact,
citizenship rights would simply form a subclass, since many of them are already
granted by national constitutions, regardless of citizenship. Furthermore, by
formulating them in international conventions, these rights would become properly
supranational. By incorporating them into state constitutions or by signing such
international conventions, these rights would acquire a certain character of
universality. Ferrajoli cites the example of the United Nations and especially the
adoption of international charters and conventions on human rights. Thanks to
such actions, the rights in question would no longer be fundamental only for the
states in whose constitutions they would be formulated, since they would be
supranational rights to which states are subordinated and bound primarily in terms
of international law. in short, not just the rights of citizenship, but the rights of
individuals regardless of their origins. in essence, Ferraјoli argues that it is
necessary to overcome the dimension of the sovereignty of the nation state in favor
of the perspective of universal citizenship and the construction of a constitutional
29
Danilo Zolo, “Global citizenship. A realist critique”, in; Wayne Hudson, Steven Slaughter (eds),
Globalisation and Citizenship: The transnational challenge, Routledge/Challenges of
Globalisation, Taylor & Francis, London and New York, 2007, pp. 78, etc.
30
Translation: “The international legal order, like any legal order, is a product, a superstructure, of
a given social environment, a given community, and is no more or no less than this”. see: Mario
Giuliano, La comunità internazionale e il diritto, CEDAM, Padova, 2011, pp. 221, etc.
31
Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritti fondamentali. Un dibattito teorico, Laterza, Roma, 2008, p. 5.
democracy of global dimensions. His perspective is interesting because he

considers the views of those who believe that nation-states continue to exist and
perform necessary and important functions for collective well-being and security
to be wrong. His opposition is based on the position that to consider that the
national dimension of citizenship is still strong in a globalized context means in
fact not recognizing the universality of those basic rights. in conclusion, state
sovereignty and national citizenship would represent an obstacle to citizens, who
would thus be prevented from enjoying basic rights that would remain reserved
only for members of the national political community. Against this point of view,
Zolo believes that the perspective offered by Ferraјoli underestimates the root
causes, the historical reasons according to which such national structures capable
of discrimination and selection have developed, far from an inclusive perspective.32
it is clear according to his understanding that over the centuries it has become of
decisive importance for individuals to protect their property, their traditions and
in general, their existence by organizing into groups that are politically, culturally
and militarily distinct and separate from each other. one can certainly think that
the opening of borders could lead to accelerated evolution, to an unprecedented
push towards peaceful interaction, cooperation and altruism, but it is also true that
to date there are no signs that such circumstances will occur in the near future.
According to Zolo: “Una estructura de poder global estaría, en la actualidad,
inevitablemente destinada a reprimir las diferencias culturales del planeta, a
penalizar a los sujetos más débiles y a reducir drásticamente la complejidad de las
estructuras políticas intermedias. Y provocaría, muy probablemente, reacciones
más intensas del terrorismo internacional contra los países industriales, cuya
hegemonía actuaría, inevitablemente, de soporte político-militar de la nueva
Cosmópolis”.33 Therefore, Zolo identifies human rights as instruments through
which Western powers could continue to impose their supremacy. Consequently,
human rights today face national particularism. Despite the fact that almost all UN
members have ratified charters and conventions on the defense of human rights
and integrated them into their legal systems, in reality, numerous states are guilty
of human rights violations. According to Ferraglio’s view, encroachment on human
rights can be evident through the violation of the Charter of Human Rights, which
represents cosmopolitan citizenship. The United Nations could in such a case offer
effective protection of those rights, guaranteed by an international police force
32
Danilo Zolo, “Libertad, Propiedad e igualdad en la teoría de los “derechos fundamentales; A
propósito de un ensayo de Luigi Ferrajoli”, in: Luigi Ferrajoli (Ed.), Los fundamentos de los
derechos fundamentales, Trotta, Madrid, 2009, pp. 75, etc.
33
Ibid., p. 100. in Cosmopolis, Translation: “A structure of global power would, at present,
inevitably be destined to repress the cultural differences of the planet, to penalise the weakest
subjects and to drastically reduce the complexity of the intermediate political structures. And it
would most probably provoke more intense reactions of international terrorism against the
industrial countries, whose hegemony would inevitably act as a political-military support for the
new Cosmopolis”.
controlled by the Security Council. That point of view calls into question the
provisions of the UN Charter on internal state jurisdiction. For Zol, on the other
hand, the Security Council cannot be considered an arbiter, because it is bound to
the will of the permanent members with the right of veto that allows them to act
or not act indifferently to the collective will. He affirms that “the international
government of the United Nations is identical with the international government
of the Security Council. The Security Council appears, so to speak, as the Holy
Alliance of our time. The five permanent members of the Security Council are, so
to speak, the Holy Alliance within the Holy Alliance”.34 His point of view confirms
the inorganic and egalitarian character of the international community, which is
fundamental to achieving conditions in which different groups can get along with
each other. The goal would be to create a dense network of relations between
international subjects capable of meeting the needs of production, consumption
and exchange, mutual communication and support, territorial defense and even
education. Zolo therefore calls this form of international society ’cooperative
anarchy’, in which the constant balancing of opposing forces and groups were
essential to the maintenance of international harmony.
CONCLUSION
By discussing the change of the world order in the context of the transformation
of human rights, especially civil rights, the author marked the creation of a new
system of international relations that emerged after the end of the Cold War, an
integral part of which is the process of globalization. From the previous discussion,
it can be concluded that globalization in itself is neither good nor bad. its application
has a direct impact on international relations. Just as globalization is not harmful to
economic development based on the principles of international law, it is not harmful
to development in other social areas such as human rights, especially the subjective
rights of citizenship. Their transformation goes hand in hand with the scientific and
technological revolution, sustainable economic development and the reform of the
world legal system. in order to advance the process of globalization at the
interregional and global level, fundamental philosophical questions related to the
transformation of the global governance system are being asked. The existing forms,
which emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, historically seem
anachronistic. Current international relations therefore require the development of
a new system of Global Governance that would be able to overcome existing world
problems and establish equal responsibility for all citizens of the world and
according to a common legal order. Establishing a balance between the interests of
national states implies maintaining the permanent harmony of human rights, which
include the civil rights of individuals, which occupy a significant place in the
hierarchy of modern democratic achievements and civilizational values.
34
Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis. Prospects for World Government, 1997, op.cit.
EVoLUCiJA PRAVA DRŽAVLJANSTVA

i RAZVoJ GLoBALNoG DRUŠTVA
APSTRAKT
U ovoj studiji autor ispituje pitanje razvoja državljanskih prava u kontekstu razvoja
globalnog društva i transformacije svetskog poretka. U tom smislu, autor se dotiče pitanja
vezanih za proces globalizacije, koji je povezan sa pitanjem daljeg napretka čovečanstva
i rešavanja problema u političkoj, pravnoj, ekonomskoj, socijalnoj i kulturnoj sferi.
ispitujući hiperglobalističke, skeptične i transformacionističke koncepte o globalizaciji,
kao procesu koji obeležava transformaciju savremenih globalnih odnosa, autor je
predstavio nove mogućnosti za oslobađanje i razvoj identiteta pojedinaca, grupa i
zajednica. Kako razvoj ovog identiteta nije završen proces jer nailazi na prepreke unutar
nacionalnih država, mogućnost njegove transformacije kroz transformaciju
međunarodnog pravnog poretka značila bi i primenu međunarodnopravnih standarda, pre
svega u pogledu ljudskih prava. iako su ova prava u savremenom dobu u velikoj meri
instrumentalizovana, autor smatra da bi njihova dosledna primena mogla doprineti
stvaranju nadnacionalnih prava, kao što bi, na primer, bio slučaj sa pravima državljanstva.
Ključne reči: Prava državljanstva, međunarodno pravo, međunarodna zajednica,
globalizacija, suverenitet
REFERENCES
1. Barry Jones, R.J., Global Governance in Question: The problems and prospects
of effective global governance in finance, trade and environment, Kindle
Edition, Tollesbury, 2013. Bauman, Zygmunt, Inside Globalisation,
Consequences on people, Paris, 1996.
2. Carbone, Sergio Maria, Luzzatto, Riccardo, Santa Maria, A., Istituzioni di diritto
internazionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2003.
3. De la Dehesa, Guillermo, What Do We Know About Globalization. Issues of
Poverty and Income Distribution, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, New Jersey, 2007.
4. Ferrajoli, Luigi, Diritti fondamentali. Un dibattito teorico, Laterza, Roma, 2008.
5. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New
York, 1992.
6. Giuliano, Mario, La comunità internazionale e il diritto, CEDAM, Padova,
2011.
7. Greider, Williem, “Why The Global Economy Needs Worker Rights”, Journal
of Labor and Society, 1997, vol. 1.
8. Held, David, A globalizing world? Culture, Economics, Politics, Routledge,
New York, 2004.
9. Held, David, McGrew, Anthony, Goldblatt, David, Perraton, Jonathan,
Globalization, Global Governance, 1999, vol. 5, no. 4.
10. Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2011.
11. Kelly, Phillip, Prokhovnik, Raia, “Economic Globalisation?”, in: David Held,
A globalizing world? Culture, Economics, Politics, Routledge, New York,
2004.
12. Marshall, T.H., Legal theories on citizenship: between national and
international law, London, 2019.
13. Martell, Luke, The Sociology and Law of Globalization, Cambridge, 2010.
14. Martinelli, Alberto, La democrazia globale. Mercati, movimenti, governi
Copertina flessibile, Università Bocconi, Milano, 2004.
15. Mearsheimer, Johan, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton &
Company, New York, 2014.
16. Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, New
York, 1986.
17. Zolo, Danilo, “Global citizenship. A realist critique”, in; Wayne Hudson,
Steven Slaughter (eds), Globalisation and Citizenship: The transnational
challenge, Routledge/Challenges of Globalisation, Taylor & Francis, London
and New York, 2007.
18. Zolo, Danilo, “Libertad, Propiedad e igualdad en la teoría de los “derechos
fundamentales; A propósito de un ensayo de Luigi Ferrajoli”, in: Luigi Ferrajoli
(Ed.), Los fundamentos de los derechos fundamentales, Trotta, Madrid, 2009.
19. Zolo, Danilo, Cosmopolis. Prospects for World Government, Cambridge, 1997.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS AN EMERGING

PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Alexander N. VYLEGZHANIN*
Inna P. ZHURAVLEVA**
Maria A. MILYUKOVA***
ABSTRACT
The concept of “sustainable development” in contemporary international relations is very
important for understanding the transformations that took place in the international legal
order in the second half of the 20th century. Given the growing concern about the
establishment of global environmental management, defining the international legal
framework of sustainable development is essential for formulating the key principles of
such management. This paper presents the development of the concept of “sustainability”
as well as the resulting changes that are manifested through the adoption of international
legal instruments that regulate this matter. Through consideration of this issue, the authors
have come to a series of evidences that prove, contrary to prevailing opinions, that the
idea of sustainable development in the sense of respecting the interests of future
generations was expressed long before the so-called Brundtland report on world life issues
on environment and development from 1987. Namely, this idea is contained in the
provisions of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling from 1946, as
well as in the Stockholm Declaration from 1972. The analysis indicates that the concept
of sustainable development has several cumulative characteristics that together constitute
its status as a legal norm that reflects the evolving balance of social, economic and
environmental interests. From the extensive research of universal international legal
conventions and “soft law” documents, the authors came to the conclusion that sustainable
development as a legal term is increasingly becoming “hard” international law, although
its content remains of a principled legal nature that inevitably carries with it specificities
that are characterized by different branches of international law.
Key words: Sustainable development, global governance, environmental protection,
international environmental law, social development
*
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University). E-mail: a.vylegzhanin
@inno.mgimo.ru.
**
Law Firm “Factor”, E-mail: inna_mel3008@mail.ru.
***
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University). E-mail:
milyukova.m@inno.mgimo.ru.
INTRODUCTION
Though different in detail, national legal instruments of states aimed at
protecting the environment share quite a few similarities in approaching
environmental governance. At the same time, almost all states consider themselves
as interested rational actors in international environmental policy. Therefore,
notwithstanding the existing debates around establishing proper national regulation
of this sphere, states arguably have options for developing a common
environmental legal policy based on the best practices of such national governance.
This article looks into the development of sustainability as a legal concept and the
response of the law and policy to the contemporary climate and other
environmental challenges in the context of relevant legal instruments. The authors
thus emphasize the importance of the link between international law and states’
policy in responding to the impacts of environmental changes. Ever since it
emerged, the idea of sustainable development has received wide recognition. From
the standpoint of the 1987 Report of the World Life issues on Environment and
Development, “our Common Future”, the essence of sustainable development is
that providing for the current generation’s needs should not undermine the
possibility of the future generations to provide for theirs.1 The key question here
is the meaning of the term “sustainable development” within the framework of
international law. The other question is, whether it constitutes a mere “concept”
or could be regarded, in its cumulative effect, as a rule or even a principle of
international law. The prevailing opinion of scholars in this regard seems cautious,
implying that this term does not represents an established principle of international
law - rather, it comprises widely recognized goals which only are effective when
interpreted and applied by the relevant international legal instruments.2 in this
paper, the authors identify the international treaties as well other international
instruments (including UN General Assembly Resolutions and other “soft law”
documents) referring to sustainable development with a view to clarify the
1
“Report of the Brundtland Commission”, A/42/427.1987, [New York]: UN, 4 Aug. 1987, internet:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/139811.
2
D. Luff, “An overview of international Law of Sustainable Development and a Confrontation
between WTo Rules and Sustainable Development.”, Revue Belge de Droit International, 1996, No.
1, pp. 91–144; B. Klauer, “Defining and Achieving Sustainable Development”, The International
Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 1999, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 114–121; W. Lang,
“UN-Principles and international Environmental Law”, Max Planck UNYB, 1999, no. 3, pp. 157–
172; P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, University Press, Cambridge, 2003,
pp 252–266; Sands P. “international Courts and the Application of the Concept of Sustainable
Development”., Max Planck UNYB, 1999, no. 3, pp. 389–405; N.J., Schrijver, F. Weiss (Eds).
International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice. Brill, 2004, pp. 162–221;
W.R., Kates, T.M. Parris & A.A. Leiserowitz, “What is Sustainable Development? Goals, indicators,
Values, and Practice”, Environment, Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 2005, vol. 4,
no. 3, pp. 8–21; P.W., Birnie, A.E. Boyle & C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment.,
oxford University Press, oxford; New York, 2009, pp. 115–127.
normative essence of the term. Firstly, it should be noted that the famous
“Brundtland Report” 1987 (“our Common Future”) is not the first international
document mentioning sustainable development. The concept emerged based on
the ideas voiced decades earlier. in particular, Principle 2 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration as well as the international Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
1946, provide that the natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land,
flora and fauna as well as representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful
planning or management, as appropriate.3 Following the ideas encapsulated in the
1972 Stockholm Declaration, the UN created the UN Environment Program for
the purposes of their implementation. The 1987 Report “our Common Future” is
more specific in formulating the concept. The vague slogan regarding satisfying
generation’s needs began to take a clearer shape. Thus, the Report outlines
limitations impeding constant development, namely, technological development,
social organization, biosphere’s ability to assimilate the consequences of human
activity. The development is interpreted as economic growth, whereas poverty is
seen as the primary concern. Constant development is not construed as a “fixed
state of harmony”; instead, it is defined “a process of change in which the
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of
technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with
future as well as present needs”. Secondly, the authors suggest of this paper, that
the definition of sustainable development, for which the 1987 Report provides,
has substantial shortcomings, such as being too anthropocentric and abstract. in
such a context Section 2 discusses the role of the “sustainable development” clause
according to the relevant legal teachings. Section 3 represents a selective citation
of the international agreements containing specific rules aimed at sustainable
development and of the most important “soft law” documents, such as the UN
General Assembly resolutions. Conclusion is provided by Section 4.
DIFFERENT LEGAL MEANINGS

OF “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT”
Throughout the years that followed the 1987 Report, according to John
Drexhage and Deborah Murphy’s paper on the evolution of the sustainable
development concept, the latter was interpreted by governments, businesses and
the public as the leading principle of social development. it was reemphasized that
sustainable development rested on three pillars: economic growth, social equality
and protection of the environment. However, the abovementioned scholars note
that for the last two decades, sustainable development has begun to be
predominantly interpreted in the environmental context, the other two pillars
3
“Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment”, Stockholm, 5–16 June
1972, United Nations, A/CoNF.48/Rev.1, internet: http://www.un-documents.net/aconf48-14r1.pdf
remaining in the shadow. The development as such has been understood as

economic growth,4 which is a debatable statement. This understanding reflects the
approach of the developed states with a high level of welfare and, to some extent,
a few rapidly developing ones. Nevertheless, such a path is accompanied by the
degradation of natural resources and biosphere as a whole. Therefore, the social
element should not be removed from the context of sustainable development. in
parallel with the outlined economy-oriented understanding, another approach is
emerging. This one defines development as the expansion of human possibilities.
it was reflected in the 1991 Human Development Report. According to the
champions of this approach, the concept’s key components are equal opportunities
for all members of society, sustainability of such opportunities for current and
future generations, and allowing people to participate in the development and
derive benefits from it.5 Amartya Sen, a prominent economist and philosopher and
Nobel Prize laureate, was the one to put forward such a new narrative of
sustainable development. He claimed that economic growth necessitates social
reforms, such as improving education and healthcare. They precede economic
development and constitute its preconditions. His book Collective Choice and
Social Welfare (published in 1970) still dramatically influences the social-oriented
concept of development. in this book he discusses the issues of human rights,
societal attitudes, and the availability of information. in addition, Sen pays
attention to the issue of gender equality, stating that if it is not achieved, the
development will come to a deadlock.6 Although the meaning of the concept of
development expanded in the 21st century, economic growth remains its main
component. At the same time, currently the concept covers many other strata of
life, such as reducing inequality, improving essential living standards, promoting
integrated management of natural resources, etc.7 of relevance here is also the UN
General Assembly’s “Sustainable Development Goals” adopted on 25 September
2015 (“Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development”). its adoption was preceded by lengthy debates and consultations.
Eventually, 17 broad tasks were set out that together covered 169 more specific
objectives. Essentially, these goals and tasks remained unchanged from when the
UN GA Working Group proposed them on 12 August 2014. These 17/169 items,
effective since 1 January 2016, are usually considered as the global agenda for the
following years, the implementation of which is expected to involve not only
4
J. Drexhage, D. Murphy, “Sustainable Development from Brundtland to Rio 2012”, Background
Paper prepared for consideration by the High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability at its first
meeting, 19 September 2010. international institute for Sustainable Development (iiSD), 2010.
5
Elizabeth Lwanga – Coordinator, Victor Davies – Consultant. “Financing Human Development”,
Human Development Report , New York, 1991, internet: https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-
development-report-1991.
6
Sen A. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden Day; 1970.
7
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 20–22 June 2012, Rio de Janeiro,
A/RES/66/288, internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio2012.
governments but also transnational companies, charities, the public, NGos,

scholars and students around the world. The document covers many
environmental, economic and social issues which are to be resolved. it is essential
to identify the general trend of the evolution of the term “sustainable
development”. initially, it had a particular core idea that made it novel, distinctive,
and concordant with the UN Charter Preamble. The idea of taking care of the
interests of future generations is, without doubt, a noble and appealing one. What
it implies is more or less evident in the context of the use of natural resources, but
it accrued an urgent practical meaning in the context of climate change.8 Numerous
legal and political documents, under the “heading” of sustainable development,
reveal a long list of diverse problems and tasks that concern the world community
and need to be resolved. However, it might be observed that in this the initial idea
of taking care for future generations is becoming somewhat lost. Even the 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the associated sub-goals outlined in
the UN document are viewed as unspecific and unattainable as noted by ingo
Keilitz in his paper “The Trouble with Justice in the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals 2016-2030”. The author focuses on just one SDG 16 and the
associated performance targets (not the entire ’package’ of “Sustainable
Development Goals”). He characterizes the document as a certain indicator of
progress in environmental governance providing provisional parameters for the
future performance of the sustainable development targets. According to ingo
Keilitz, the key problem is the lack of conceptual clarity and imprecise definitions
of the analyzed SDG.9 Another issue is that the ambitious SDGs are hard to turn
into specific measures and meaningful development results. And indeed, SDG 16
covers such aims as the considerable reduction of all kinds of violence and
corruption, putting an end to the exploitation and trafficking of children etc.
However, the criteria to monitor progress in the outlined areas as well as their
contribution into the attainment of sustainable development remain unclear.
Moreover, it is arguable whether the deadline 2030 is adequate for resolving these
issues. All this makes one agree with the arguments presented by ingo Keilitz. on
the other hand, the question arises whether the concept of sustainable development,
having become global by the growing scope of problems to be resolved (which
keep multiplying), has lost its clear legal shape. From the philosophical
perspective, development is a qualitative change which cannot happen only
evolutionarily and can imply both progress and regress. Therefore, it is unlikely
to achieve “sustainable development” meaning constant improvement of welfare
8
W.R. Moomaw, P. Verkooijen, P. Agarwal, “The Future of the Paris Climate Agreement: Carbon
Pricing as a Pathway to Climate Sustainability”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Power in
Partnerships. Cooperation in a Fragmented World, 2017, Vol 41, no.1, pp. 69–78. The price for
hydrocarbons, according to the authors, makes the most of the efforts towards sustainable
development and affects all of its components: the environment, the economy and the society.
9
ingo Keilitz, “The Trouble with Justice in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
2016–2030”, Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev., 2015–2016, vol. 7, no. 1.
and living conditions on a planetary scale. At the same time, numerous provisions
on sustainable development may remain relevant at the regional and bilateral
levels, where states have common problems and interests and where it is, in
principle, easier for them to set specific targets they could resolve together to
achieve success in specific areas. Suppose it is legitimate to talk about the
fragmentation of global space law (a thesis proffered by the high-ranking Russian
and Chinese officials at the “one Belt one Road” meeting in Beijing in May 2018).
in that case, it is logical to talk about the fragmentation of the globalist concepts.
Furthermore, since the publication of the “our Common Future” Report, not only
has the concept of sustainable development undergone a substantial transformation
in terms of its concept, but also of status. Primarily, this is due to the formation of
the EU and development of the EU law. Consequently, the idea of sustainable
development has started to be recognized as a legal principle within the EU.
Sustainable development has become one of the fundamental principles of EU
environmental law envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.10 The Treaty and numerous
other EU documents widely use the term “sustainable development”, but one
would be unable to find a single act containing a detailed description of its legal
scope. instead, it is elaborated in the EU acts (mostly in directives) within the
framework of various issues, in particular, the use of resources, environmental
protection and development of the relevant legal mechanisms (e.g., the Fifth
Environmental Action Programme is called just that, “Towards Sustainability”).11
As a legal idea, sustainable development evolved mainly due to legal scholars. in
the legal doctrine, the following key elements are associated with this concept:
1. Recognition of the human right to the environment corresponds to
requirements for support of life and welfare.
2. States’ recognition of intergenerational equity, especially regarding the use of
the environment and natural resources.
3. Conservation of nature implies the management of natural resources to ensure
their best sustainable use in the interests of the current generation while
preserving enough resources to provide for the needs of future generations.
This approach is viewed as an integral element of the planning process.
4. Valuable ecosystems and natural biosphere processes should be subject to
conservation, which, in turn, is inseparable from conserving biodiversity.
5. States must adopt sufficiently high environmental standards and monitor the
state of the environment based on the same; the respective data should be
published in the media.
10
“Treaty on European Union”, oJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112, internet: https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT.
11
E.E. Vylegzhanina, “osnovnye tendentsii razvitiya ekologicheskogo prava Evropeiskogo Soyuza
[Key Trends of Development of EU Environmental Law]”, Abstract to a diss. for a Doctor of
Laws degree. Moscow. 2005.
6. Where human activities may cause a significant impact on the environment

or natural resources, any decision to carry out such activities should be
preceded by an environmental impact assessment (EiA).
7. States and persons should be informed of environmentally sensitive projects
in advance and should have access to the competent administrative and judicial
authorities for the legal protection of their rights.
8. States should cooperate in promoting sustainable development; the most
developed states should assist developing ones.
9. Given that many natural objects and resources are transnational and global,
they should be used by states reasonably and equitably. The states should strive
to prevent material adverse transboundary environmental impacts.
This interpretation of the scope of legal provisions on sustainable development
covers several principal contemporary legal methods aimed at conserving nature and
seeking a balance of social, economic and environmental interests (conservation of
ecosystems and biodiversity, applying EiA, preventing harm to the environment,
including transboundary damage, transparency of environmentally sensitive
information). it appears, however, that, from the legal standpoint, it is unclear what
the concept of sustainable development implies for future generations – our children
or great-great-great-grandchildren. if the needs of our children’s generation for natural
resources are more or less clear, is it realistic today to assess the needs of more distant
generations? Would they, for instance, need oil and gas as we do now? or will they
use the sun or nuclear energy, having discovered a way of maximum processing
nuclear waste? Furthermore, it is necessary to define the term “development” in this
concept. Here, one should consider that the approaches to defining “development”
are constantly changing in the political and legal doctrine. Not so long ago, “economic
development” was traditionally viewed as economic growth, meanwhile, the current
concept of development is a broader one. Legal documents already draw a distinction
between the terms “economic growth” and “economic development”. The key goals
of economic development are achieving higher living standards and quality, which
suggests, among other things, higher income, creating more jobs, better education,
increased attention to cultural and ethical values, as well as expanding the
opportunities for economic and social choice. it is also important that all interested
parties should be involved. Many researchers answer the question of whether
“development” is possible without economic growth by saying that poorer regions
sometimes have economic growth, but this is accompanied by very little, if any,
economic development. Legal scholars propose certain intellectual avenues and
methods to solve these problems. However, these proposals are somewhat too general
and blurry. These are the solutions they see:
– natural resources in a region are viewed as some natural capital, from which
goods can be derived, with simultaneous maintenance of the valuable attributes
of ecosystems (literally ecosystem services, useful to man: clean air, potable

water, healthy food, etc.);
– integrating the environmental dimension into politics and states’ plans;
– efficient use of natural resources and ecosystem support measures to be
considered in market pricing so that economic growth and waste production
do not entail degradation of the natural capital;
– ecosystem-based management, with the key elements of a collection of data
and information, planning development for specific regions;
– elaborating comprehensive ecosystem management plans to cover economic
activities, nature’s possibilities and the ecosystem’s restoration capacity. The
examples drawn are the EU integrated Maritime Strategy and Norway’s
integrated Management Plan for the Barents Sea and sea areas off the Lofoten
islands.12
– Scholars are trying to find ways to adapt legal mechanisms that have already
been tested in the conservation of nature and natural resource management to
the specific regions, international legal peculiarities and natural uniqueness of
a particular region. Here, EiA plays the leading role among legal means in the
area.
The EiA was introduced in the US under the 1969 National Environmental
Policy Act.13 in line with the American model, which was adopted in Europe later,
the initiator of economic operations, prior to making a decision on commissioning
a project, should prepare a special document (report) on the impact the project is
going to have on the environment. Such a document should be a precise projection
and part of the decision-making, rather than justifying a decision already made.
The impact assessment should cover aspects such as substantiating the need for
the project, as well as alternatives (including possible refusal to conduct any new
activities in the region in question). A vital aspect of EiA is the involvement of the
locals, who take part in deciding whether the project is worth carrying out. The
US legislation and practice in conducting a prior assessment of environmental
effects was adopted in Europe, too. During that period, the following respective
laws and other legal acts were adopted in Germany (1990), Greece (1986), ireland
(1989), Denmark (1989), italy (1988), the Netherlands (1987), Spain (1987),
Portugal (1990), etc. Every national EiA system has its peculiarities, but the main
parameters of these systems have much in common. Directive 85/337/ЕЕС of 27
12
N. Bock, “Sustainable Development Considerations in the Arctic”, in: P.A.Berkman and
A.N.Vylegzhanin (eds), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean, Springer, 2013, p.52.
13
Federal Environmental Law, 999th ed. West Group 1999, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321 to 4370b.
Responsibility for enforcing and analyzing the observance of this law is placed on a special body
created under the U.S. President – the Council on Environmental Quality, that issued a number
of documents regulating specific aspects of EiA. in 1979, the Council approved the EiA
Regulations, substantially amended later in 1986.
June 1985 became the first document of the European Economic Community EU
that defined the fundamentals of this procedure.14 This Directive was further
replaced by Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public
and private projects on the environment. it requires that assessment identify the
influence of a project on human beings, fauna and flora; soil, water, air, climate
and the landscape; material assets and the cultural heritage; as well as the
interrelation of these factors. Furthermore, the member states must ensure that
every request for authorization of any operations and information on the project
be available to the public concerned, who must be provided with an opportunity
to express their comments and opinions before the project begins. if the project
can have transboundary effects, information thereon should be sent to other
Member states for consultations.15 Despite problems of theoretical and practical
nature, EiA remains one of the most dynamically evolving mechanisms of
sustainable development. As will be demonstrated further, its current content takes
into account not only the Biodiversity Convention, the Convention on
Environmental impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and the Aarhus
Convention, but a bulky set of international agreements.
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

OF UNIVERSAL LEVEL
Binding instruments
As noted earlier, the idea of sustainable use of natural resources is reflected in

the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the 1946
Convention).16 it’s preamble provides: “Recognizing the interest of the nations of
the world in safeguarding for future generations the great nature resources
represented by the whale stocks; (…) Recognizing that it is in the common interest
to achieve the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing
wide-spread economic and nutritional distress; (…) Desiring to establish a system
of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective
conservation and development of whale stocks (…)”. in accordance Article V of
the 1946 Convention: “2. (…) the conservation, development, and optimum
utilization of the whale resources”. The Schedule provides “(…) Classification of
14
E.E. Vylegzhanina, “osnovnye tendentsii razvitiya ekologicheskogo prava Evropeiskogo Soyuza
[Key Trends of Development of EU Environmental Law]”, Abstract to a diss. for a Doctor of
Laws degree. Moscow, 2005.
15
“Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment”, oJ L 26,
28.1.2012, p. 1–21, internet: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A32011L0092.
16
“international Convention for the Regulation of Whaling”, Dec 2, 1946, internet: https://www.
ecolex.org/details/treaty/international-convention-for-the-regulation-of-whaling-tre-000074/.
Stocks: 9. All stocks of whales shall be classified in one of three categories

according to the advice of the Scientific Committee as follows: a) A Sustained
Management Stock is a stock which is not more than 10 per cent of Maximum
Sustainable Yield (hereinafter referred to as MSY) stock level below MSY stock
level, and not more than 20 per cent above that level; MSY being determined on
the basis of the number of whales. When a stock has remained at a stable level for
a considerable period under a regime of approximately constant catches, it shall
be classified as a Sustained Management Stock in the absence of any positive
evidence that it should be otherwise classified (…). According to Article 2 of the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 1958: “As employed in this Convention, the expression “conservation of the
living resources of the high seas” means the aggregate of the measures rendering
possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a
maximum supply of food and other marine products”.17 The 1971 Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, provides,
in particular, in its Article 2 “(…) Each Contracting Party shall consider its
international responsibilities for the conservation, management and wise use of
migratory stocks of waterfowl, both when designating entries for the List and when
exercising its right to change entries in the List relating to wetlands within its
territory”. As provided Article 3: “The Contracting Parties shall formulate and
implement their planning so as to promote the conservation of the wetlands …,
and … the wise use of wetlands in their territory (…).”.18 As provided in Article
24 of the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage,: “international assistance on a large scale shall be preceded by
detailed scientific, economic and technical studies. These studies shall draw upon
the most advanced techniques for the protection, conservation, presentation and
rehabilitation of the natural and cultural heritage (…). The studies shall also seek
means of making rational use of the resources available in the State concerned”.19
The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, contains the following provisions: “Recognizing that the marine
environment and the living organisms which it supports are of vital importance to
humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is so managed that its
quality and resources are not impaired (…). Noting that marine pollution originates
in many sources, such as dumping and discharges through the atmosphere, rivers,
17
“Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas”, Geneva,
29 April 1958,internet:https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXi-3&chapter=21&clang=_en.
18
“Convention on Wetlands of international importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat”, Feb 2,
1971, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-on-wetlands-of-international-
importance-especially-as-waterfowl-habitat-tre-000531/.
19
“Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage”, Nov 23,
1972, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-concerning-the-protection-of-
the-world-cultural-and-natural-heritage-tre-155235/.
estuaries, outfalls and pipelines, and that it is important that States use the best
practicable means to prevent such pollution and develop products and processes
which will reduce the amount of harmful wastes to be disposed of (…)”. in
accordance with Article i: “Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively
promote the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment,
and pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage
amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea”.20 The 1996 Protocol
to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, contemplates: “Stressing the need to protect the marine
environment and to promote the sustainable use and conservation of marine
resources (…). Being convinced that further international action to prevent, reduce
and where practicable eliminate pollution of the sea caused by dumping can and
must be taken without delay to protect and preserve the marine environment and
to manage human activities in such a manner that the marine ecosystem will
continue to sustain the legitimate uses of the sea and will continue to meet the
needs of present and future generations(…)”.21 The 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CiTES),
envisages: “Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and
varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected for this and the generations to come (…). Recognizing, in
addition, that international cooperation is essential for the protection of certain
species of wild fauna and flora against overexploitation through international trade
(…)”.22 The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals (CMS), specifies: “Recognizing that wild animals in their innumerable
forms are an irreplaceable part of the earth’s natural system which must be
conserved for the good of mankind; Aware that each generation of man holds the
resources of the earth for future generations and has an obligation to ensure that
this legacy is conserved and, where utilized, is used wisely; According to Article
i: “1. For the purpose of this Convention: (…) c) “Conservation status” will be
taken as “favourable” when: (1) population dynamics data indicate that the
migratory species is maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component
of its ecosystems; (2) the range of the migratory species is neither currently being
20
“Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter”,
Dec 29, 1972, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-on-the-prevention-of-
marine-pollution-by-dumping-of-wastes-and-other-matter-tre-000420/.
21
“1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
other Matter”, 1972, Nov 7, 1996, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/1996-protocol-to-
the-convention-on-the-prevention-of-marine-pollution-by-dumping-of-wastes-and-other-matter-197
2-tre-001268/.
22
Convention on international Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington,
03/03/1973, internet: https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280105383.
reduced, nor is likely to be reduced, on a long-term basis; (3) there is, and will be
in the foreseeable future, sufficient habitat to maintain the population of the
migratory species on a long-term basis; and (4) the distribution and abundance of
the migratory species approach historic coverage and levels to the extent that
potentially suitable ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with wise wildlife
management (…)”.23 The 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, sets forth:
“Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities
with respect to modification of the environment, (…). Realizing that the use of
environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the
interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and
improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations”.
in accordance with Article iii(2), “the States Parties to this Convention undertake
to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
scientific and technological information on the use of environmental modification
techniques for peaceful purposes. States Parties in a position to do so shall
contribute, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to
international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation,
improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration
for the needs of the developing areas of the world”. 24 The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLoS), provides that “the codification and
progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will
contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and friendly
relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice and equal
rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of
the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
as set forth in the Charter (…)”.25 in accordance with Article 61: “The coastal State
shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive
economic cone. 2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence
available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures
that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
endangered by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent
international organisations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall co-
operate to this end. 3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore
23
“Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals”, Jun 23, 1979, internet:
https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-on-the-conservation-of-migratory-species-of-
wild-animals-tre-000495/.
24
“Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques”, New York, 10 December 1976, internet: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=iND&mtdsg_no=XXVi-1&chapter=26&clang=_en.
25
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, internet:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsiii.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXi-6&chapter=21&
Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum

sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors,
including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special
requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum
standards, whether subregional, regional or global. 4. in taking such measures the
coastal State shall take into consideration the effects on species associated with or
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring
populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their
reproduction may seriously threatened. 5. Available scientific information, catch
and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish
stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where
appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, including States whose
nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone”. According to Article
62: “The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61”.
Article 63 contemplates: “Where the same stock or stocks of associated species
occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these
States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the
conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other
provisions of this Part”. According to Article 119: “in determining the allowable
catch and establishing other conservation measures for the living resources in the
high seas, States shall: (a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific
evidence available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special
requirements of developing states, and taking into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum
standards, whether subregional, regional or global; (b) take into consideration the
effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view
to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species
above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. 2.
Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics” and other data
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on
a regular basis through competent international organisations, whether subregional,
regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States
concerned. 3. States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their
implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any
State”. Article 1 of the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement, uses words
about “(…) (h) the development of national policies aimed at sustainable utilization
and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and at maintaining
the ecological balance in the regions concerned”.26 The 1994 International Tropical
Timber Agreement, provides “a strategy for achieving international trade in tropical
timber from sustainably managed sources”; “the need to promote and apply
comparable and appropriate guidelines and criteria for the management,
conservation and sustainable development of all types of timber-producing
forests”.27 in accordance with Article 1: “Recognizing the sovereignty of members
over their natural resources, as defined in Principle 1 (a) of the Non-Legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests,
the objectives of the international Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (hereinafter
referred to as “this Agreement are: (…) (c) To contribute to the process of
sustainable development; (d) To enhance the capacity of members to implement
a strategy for achieving exports of tropical timber and timber products from
sustainably managed sources by the year 2000; (e) To promote the expansion and
diversification of international trade in tropical timber from sustainable sources
by improving the structural conditions in international markets, by taking into
account, on the one hand, a long-term increase in consumption and continuity of
supplies, and, on the other, prices which reflect the costs of sustainable forest
management and which are remunerative and equitable for members, and the
improvement of market access (…)”. The 2006 International Tropical Timber
Agreement, recognizes the importance “of the multiple economic, environmental
and social benefits provided by forests, including timber and non-timber forest
products and environmental services, in the context of sustainable forest
management, at local, national and global levels and the contribution of sustainable
forest management to sustainable development and poverty alleviation and the
achievement of internationally agreed development goals, including those
contained in the Millennium Declaration” and “the need to promote and apply
comparable criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management as important
tools for all members to assess, monitor and promote progress toward sustainable
management of their forests”.28 According to Article 1: “The objectives of the
international Tropical Timber Agreement, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “this
Agreement”) are to promote the expansion and diversification of international
trade in tropical timber from sustainably managed and legally harvested forests
26
“international Tropical Timber Agreement”, 1983, Geneva, 18 November 1983, internet:
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XiX-26&chapter=19&
clang=_en. Superseded by: International Tropical Timber Agreement, 26 January 1994, Geneva;
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 27 January 2006, Geneva.
27
“international Tropical Timber Agreement”, 1994, Geneva, 26 January 1994, internet: https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=iND&mtdsg_no=XiX-39&chapter=19&clang=_en.Superseded
by: International Tropical Timber Agreement, 27 January 2006, Geneva.
28
“international Tropical Timber Agreement”, 2006, Geneva, 27 January 2006, internet: https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XiX-46&chapter=19&clang
=_en.
and to promote the sustainable management of tropical timber producing forests

by: (…) (c) Contributing to sustainable development and to poverty alleviation;
(d) Enhancing the capacity of members to implement strategies for achieving
exports of tropical timber and timber products from sustainably managed sources;
(e) Promoting improved understanding of the structural conditions in international
markets, including long-term trends in consumption and production, factors
affecting market access, consumer preferences and prices, and conditions leading
to prices which reflect the costs of sustainable forest management; <…> (i)
Promoting increased and further processing of tropical timber from sustainable
sources in producer member countries, with a view to promoting their
industrialization and thereby increasing their employment opportunities and export
earnings; (…) (k) improving marketing and distribution of tropical timber and
timber product exports from sustainably managed and legally harvested sources
and which are legally traded, including promoting consumer awareness”. Article
27 contemplates: “(…) Members shall, to the fullest extent possible not
inconsistent with their national legislation, furnish, within the time specified by
the Executive Director, statistics and information on timber, its trade and activities
aimed at achieving sustainable management of timber producing forests, as well
as other relevant information as requested by the Council. The Council shall decide
on the type of information to be provided under this paragraph and on the format
in which it is to be presented. 6. The Council shall arrange to have any relevant
studies undertaken of the trends and of short and long-term problems of the
international timber markets and of the progress towards the achievement of
sustainable management of timber producing forests”. The 1989 Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, states (Article 4): “(…) Each Party shall take the appropriate measures
to: (a) Ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes within it
is reduced to a minimum, taking into account social, technological and economic
aspects; (…) (d) Ensure that the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
and other wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent with the environmentally
sound and efficient management of such wastes, and is conducted in a manner
which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects
which may result from such movement; (…) (g) Prevent the import of hazardous
wastes and other wastes if it has reason to believe that the wastes in question will
not be managed in an environmentally sound manner (…)”.29 Furthermore,
according to Article 10(2): “the Parties shall: (…) (c) Co-operate, subject to their
national laws, regulations and policies, in the development and implementation
of new environmentally sound low-waste technologies and the improvement of
existing technologies with a view to eliminating, as far as practicable, the
29
“Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal”, March 22, 1989, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/basel-convention-on-
the-control-of-transboundary-movements-of-hazardous-wastes-and-their-disposal-tre-001003/.
generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes and achieving more effective and
efficient methods of ensuring their management in an environmentally sound
manner, including the study of the economic, social and environmental effects of
the adoption of such new or improved technologies”. The 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, sets forth in its Article 3 tha, “the
Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. (…) The
Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all
Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to
address the problems of climate change”.30 The Article 2 of the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
provides that each party, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments, “in order to promote sustainable development, shall: (a)
implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its
national circumstances, such as: … promotion of sustainable forest management
practices, afforestation and reforestation; (iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of
agriculture in light of climate change considerations (…)”.31 The 2015 Paris
Agreement, provides in its Article 2 that, “this Agreement, in enhancing the
implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the
global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: (…) (b) increasing the
ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate
resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does
not threaten food production; and (c) Making finance flows consistent with a
pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient
development”.32 Article 2 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
envisages “Sustainable use” means the use of components of biological diversity
in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological
diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of
present and future generations (…)”. in furtherance of this, article 5 of CBD calls
for each Contracting party, “as far as possible and as appropriate”, to ensure
cooperation “for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.
Article 7 of CBD also provides for the obligations of the states to “identify
processes and categories of activities which have or are likely to have significant
30
“United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, New York, 9 May 1992,
internet:https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsiii.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-7&
chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
31
“Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, Kyoto, 11
December 1997, internet:https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXVii-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en.
32
“Paris Agreement”, Paris, 12 December 2015, internet: https://unfccc.int/process-and-
meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement; https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en.
adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,

and monitor their effects through sampling and other techniques”. This provision
corresponds to the one set forth in Article 10(a) CBD, which contemplate that
states should “integrate consideration of the conservation and sustainable use of
biological resources into national decision-making”.33 The 2000 Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, establishes
in its article 16 that states should cooperate in order to identify, “living modified
organisms or specific traits of living modified organisms that may have adverse
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also
into account risks to human health”.34 The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, in its Preamble
recognizes “the interdependence of all countries with regard to genetic resources
for food and agriculture as well as their special nature and importance for achieving
food security worldwide and for sustainable development of agriculture in the
context of poverty alleviation and climate change and acknowledging the
fundamental role of the international Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture and the FAo Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture in this regard”.35 The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the
High Seas, provides: “(…) Bearing in mind that under Agenda 21, States commit
themselves to the conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources on
the high seas, (…)”.36 The 1993 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, provides: “Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade
and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
33
“Convention on Biological Diversity”, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, internet: https://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-8&chapter=27&clang=_en.
34
“Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity”, Montreal, 29
January 2000, internet:https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
_no=XXVii-8-a&chapter=27&clang=_en.
35
“Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity”, Nagoya, 29 october 2010,
internet: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-8-b&c
hapter=27&clang=_en.
36
“Agreement to Promote Compliance with international Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas”, Nov 29, 1993, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/
treaty/agreement-to-promote-compliance-with-international-conservation-and-management-
measures-by-fishing-vessels-on-the-high-seas-tre-001183/.
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development (…)”.37 The 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, defines the term “combating desertification”
as including “activities which are part of the integrated development of land in
arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas for sustainable development which are
aimed at: (i) prevention and/or reduction of land degradation; (ii) rehabilitation of
partly degraded land; and (iii) reclamation of desertified land (…)”.38 Furthermore,
article 3(c) imposes the obligation on the parties to “develop, in a spirit of
partnership, cooperation among all levels of government, communities, non-
governmental organizations and landholders to establish a better understanding of
the nature and value of land and scarce water resources in affected areas and to
work towards their sustainable use”. Moreover, according to article 4(2), the states
are called for, while implementing the objective of the Convention, to adopt, inter
alia “an integrated approach addressing the physical, biological and socio-
economic aspects of the processes of desertification and drought”. This obligation
is further developed by art. 18 which aims to inspire the parties to develop
“environmentally sound, economically viable and socially acceptable technologies
relevant to combating desertification and/or mitigating the effects of drought, with
a view to contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in affected
areas” The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, states as follows: “Determined to ensure the long-term conservation
and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
(…). Recognizing the need for specific assistance, including financial, scientific
and technological assistance, in order that developing States can participate
effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory stocks (…)”.39 Article 5(d) of the Agreement also sets
out the importance of the EiA as far as impact of “fishing, other human activities
and environmental factors on target stocks and species belonging to the same
ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks” are concerned.
37
“Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade organization”, Marrakesh, 15/04/1994,
internet: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.
38
“United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa”, Paris, 14 october 1994, internet:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-10&chapter=
27&clang=_en.
39
“Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, New York, 4 August 1995, internet:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXi-7&chapter=21
&clang=_en.
in accordance with the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, “an international watercourse shall be used and
developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the
watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the
watercourse”.40 The objectives of the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, are, in
particular, to ensure that during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste
management there are effective defenses against potential hazards so that
individuals, society and the environment are protected from harmful effects of
ionizing radiation, now and in the future, in such a way that the needs and
aspirations of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their needs and aspirations (…)”. 41 The 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, in its Preamble, mentions the
interests of future generations as one of the primary concerns “resulting from local
exposure to persistent organic pollutants”. interestingly, the Convention
specifically mentions the adverse effect of such pollutants on women, through
which pollutants mainly affect the said future generations.42 The 2001 Agreement
on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), sets forth that albatrosses
and petrels, being an integral part of marine ecosystems “must be conserved for
the benefit of present and future generations”.43 The 2001 International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, acknowledging that the
conservation, exploration, collection, characterization, evaluation and
documentation of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are essential
“for sustainable agricultural development for this and future generations”, provides
specifically for a number of “hard law” obligations of state parties aimed at
ensuring such sustainable development.44 The 2009 Agreement on Port State
Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing (PSMA), emphasizes in its Preamble the necessity to “promote the
40
“Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of international Watercourses”, New York,
21 May 1997, internet: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=XXVii-12&chapter=27&clang=_en.
41
“Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management”, Sep 5, 1997, iNTERNET: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/joint-
convention-on-the-safety-of-spent-fuel-management-and-on-the-safety-of-radioactive-waste-man
agement-tre-001273/.
42
“Stockholm Convention on Persistent organic Pollutants”, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, internet: https:
//treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-15&chapter=27.
43
“Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels”, Jun 19, 2001, internet: https://www.
ecolex.org/details/treaty/agreement-on-the-conservation-of-albatrosses-and-petrels-tre-001351/.
44
“international Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, Nov 3, 2001. internet:
https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/international-treaty-on-plant-genetic-resources-for-food-
and-agriculture-tre-001346/.
sustainable use and the long-term conservation of living marine resources”, which
is further referred to in article 2 as one of the objectives of the Agreement.45
According to article 7 of the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury, states’
cooperation can include “promotion of research into sustainable non-mercury
alternative practices”; as well as “use of existing information exchange
mechanisms to promote knowledge, best environmental practices and alternative
technologies that are environmentally, technically, socially and economically
viable”. 46
Non-binding instruments
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, acknowledges: “The Conference calls upon Governments and peoples
to exert common efforts for the preservation and improvement of the human
environment, for the benefit of all the people and for their posterity
(…)”.47 Principle 2: “The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land,
flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning
or management, as appropriate”. Principle 4: “Man has a special responsibility to
safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat, which are now
gravely imperiled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation, including
wildlife, must therefore receive importance in planning for economic development”.
Principle 5: “The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such a
way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure that benefits
from such employment are shared by all mankind”. Principle 8: “Economic and social
development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working environment
for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement
of the quality of life”. Principle 13: “in order to achieve a more rational management
of resources and thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated
45
“Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing”, Nov 22, 2009, internet: https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/agreement-
on-port-state-measures-to-prevent-deter-and-eliminate-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing
-tre-154601/.
46
“Minamata Convention on Mercury”, Kumamoto, 10 october 2013, internet: https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVii-17&chapter=27&clang=_en.
47
“Stockholm Declaration (of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment)”, 1972,
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment | Stockholm, Sweden | 19720605-
19720616, internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/stockholm1972; https://www.
ecolex.org/details/literature/stockholm-declaration-of-the-united-nations-conference-on-the-human-
environment-mon-075786/. See also: “Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment”, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, A/CoNF.48/14/REV.1, New York, UN, 1973, internet:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FCoNF.48%2F14%2FRev.1&Language=E
&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that

development is compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for the
benefit of their population”. Principle 14: “Rational planning constitutes an essential
tool for reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and the need to
protect and improve the environment”. Principle 15: “Planning must be applied to
human settlements and urbanization with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the
environment and obtaining maximum social, economic and environmental benefits
for all”. The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, sets forth:
“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature” (Principle 1). “The
right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations” (Principle 3). “in order to
achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”
(Principle 4). “All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of
eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in
order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of
the majority of the people of the world” (Principle 5). “To achieve sustainable
development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote
appropriate demographic policies” (Principle 8). “States should cooperate to promote
a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems
of environmental degradation (Principle 12)”.48 The aims of sustainable development
are reflected also in the 1997 Resolution of the UN General Assembly Programme
for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 (“Rio+5”) that states: “(…) We reaffirm
that Agenda 21 remains the fundamental programme of action for achieving
sustainable development. We reaffirm all the principles contained in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development and the Forest Principles. We are
convinced that the achievement of sustainable development requires the integration
of its economic, environmental and social components. We recommit to working
together – in the spirit of global partnership – to reinforce our joint efforts to meet
equitably the needs of present and future generations”. “(…) Economic development,
social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing components of sustainable development”.49 The 2000 UN Millennium
48
“Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development”, Rio de Janeiro,
3–14 June 1992. UN Proceedings of the Conference, New York, 1993. internet: https://
www.un.org/esa/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1.htm.
49
“Programme for the Further implementation of Agenda 21”, Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, A/RES/S-19/2, UN, 19 Sept. 1997. internet: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/S-19/2; 19th
Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the implementation of Agenda
21, 23–27 June 1997, New York, A/RES/S/19-2. internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/
environment/newyork1997.
Declaration, provides: “i. Values and principles: “(…) We consider certain

fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first
century.50 These include: “(…) Respect for nature. Prudence must be shown in the
management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the
precepts of sustainable development (…)”. “iV. Protecting our common environment:
“(…) We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including
those set out in Agenda 21, agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development. “The eight Millennium Development Goals:
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; “(…) ensure environmental sustainability
(…)”.51 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, envisages:
“(…) We assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development –
economic development, social development and environmental protection – at the
local, national, regional and global levels. We are determined to ensure that our rich
diversity, which is our collective strength, will be used for constructive partnership
for change and for the achievement of the common goal of sustainable development
(…)”. 52 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document states: “i. Values and principles:
We reaffirm that development is a central goal in itself and that sustainable
development in its economic, social and environmental aspects constitutes a key
element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities. “Sustainable
development: managing and protecting our common environment: (…) We reaffirm
our commitment to achieve the goal of sustainable development, including through
the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of implementation. To
this end, we commit ourselves to undertaking concrete actions and measures at all
levels and to enhancing international cooperation, taking into account the Rio
principles. These efforts will also promote the integration of the three components of
sustainable development – economic development, social development and
environmental protection – as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars (…)”.53
The “The Future We Want” – the Outcome Document of the 2012 United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development, “Rio+20”, contemplates: Annex i. “our
common vision”: (…) We, the Heads of State and Government and high-level
representatives, having met at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012, with
the full participation of civil society, renew our commitment to sustainable
development and to ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future
50
Millennium Summit, 6-8 September 2000, New York, A/RES/55/2, internet: https://www.un.org/
en/conferences/environment/newyork2000.
51
“Millennium Development Goals and post-2015 Development Agenda”, internet: https://www.un.
org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml.
52
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 26 August – 4 September 2002, Johannesburg,
A/CoNF.199/20, internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/johannesburg2002.
53
World Summit, 14–16 September 2005, New York, A/RES/60/1, internet: https://www.un.org/
en/conferences/environment/newyork2005.
generations. Poverty eradication is the greatest global challenge facing the world today
and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development (…)”. iV. institutional
framework for sustainable development. A. Strengthening the three dimensions of
sustainable development: (…) The institutional framework for sustainable
development should integrate the three dimensions of sustainable development in a
balanced manner and enhance implementation by, inter alia, strengthening coherence
and coordination, avoiding duplication of efforts and reviewing progress in
implementing sustainable development (…)”.54 The “Transforming our World: the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” – the Outcome Document of the 2015
United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development provides: “The 17 sustainable
development goals and 169 targets (…). They seek to build on the Millennium
Development Goals and complete what they did not achieve (…). They are integrated
and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the
economic, social and environmental”. 55 The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development, states: “We are deeply convinced that economic development, social
development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing components of sustainable development, which is the framework for our
efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. Equitable social development
that recognizes empowering the poor to utilize environmental resources sustainably
is a necessary foundation for sustainable development. We also recognize that broad-
based and sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development is
necessary to sustain social development and social justice”. “We commit ourselves
to (…), preserving the essential bases of people-centred sustainable development; and
contributing to the full development of human resources and to social development
(…) (Commitment 6)”.56 The UN General Assembly Resolution 626 (Vii) “Right to
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources” from 1952, stipulates: “Bearing in
mind the need for encouraging the under-developed countries in the proper use and
exploitation of their natural wealth and resources (…). Recommends all Member
States, in the exercise of their right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and
resources wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic
development, to have due regard, consistently with their sovereignty, to the need for
maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and
economic co-operation among nations”.57 The UN General Assembly resolution 1803
54
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 20–22 June 2012, Rio de Janeiro,
A/RES/66/288, internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio2012.
55
United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development, 25–27 September 2015, New York,
A/RES/70/1, internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/newyork2015.
56
World Summit for Social Development – 6–12 March 1995, Copenhagen, Denmark, Declaration
and Programme of Action, A/CoNF.166/9. internet: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/social-
development/copenhagen1995.
57
“Right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources”, UN General Assembly, 21 December 1952,
A/RES/626, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0853e.html [accessed 13 october
2022].
(XVii) “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources” from 1962, contains the
following provisions: “The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned
(…). international co-operation for the economic development of developing
countries, whether in the form of public or private capital investments, exchange of
goods and services, technical assistance, or exchange of scientific information, shall
be such as to further their independent national development and shall be based upon
respect for their sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources”.58 The 1980
World Conservation Strategy of the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources stipulates: “ (…) Conservation is defined here as: the
management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable
benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and
aspirations of future generations (…)”.59 The 1982 World Charter for Nature, sets
forth: “Ecosystems and organisms, as well as the land, marine and atmospheric
resources that are utilized by man, shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum
sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those
other ecosystems or species with which they coexist”.60 The Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development “our Common Future” from 1987,
provides: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. it contains within it two key concepts: the concept of “needs”, in particular the
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on
the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. Thus the goals of economic
and social development must be defined in terms of sustainability in all countries
(…)”.61 The 2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating
to Sustainable Development, envisages: “NoTiNG that sustainable development is
now widely accepted as a global objective and that the concept has been amply
recognized in various international and national legal instruments, including treaty
law and jurisprudence at international and national levels (…), considers that the
application and, where relevant, consolidation and further development of the
58
General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVii) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent sovereignty over
natural resources” internet: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments
/general-assembly-resolution-1803-xvii-14-december-1962-permanent.
59
“World Conservation Strategy: living resource conservation for sustainable development”,
prepared by the international Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (iUCN),
UNEP(02)/C6, Gland, Switzerland, i.U.C.N., 1980, internet: https://digitallibrary.un.org
/record/91329.
60
“The World Charter for Nature”, A/RES/37/7, United Nations | New York, U.S.A. internet:
https://www.ecolex.org/details/literature/the-world-charter-for-nature-mon-088085/.
61
“Report of the Brundtland Commission”, A/42/427.1987, [New York]: UN, 4 Aug. 1987. internet:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/139811.
following principles of international law relevant to the activities of all actors involved
would be instrumental in pursuing the objective of sustainable development in an
effective way: The duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources (…),
all States have the sovereign right to manage their own natural resources (…). The
principle of equity and the eradication of poverty (…). The principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities (…). The principle of the precautionary approach to
human health, natural resources and ecosystems. A precautionary approach is central
to sustainable development (…). The principle of public participation and access to
information and justice (…). The principle of good governance (…). The principle
of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social,
economic and environmental objectives (…). The principle of integration reflects the
interdependence of social, economic, financial, environmental and human rights
aspects of principles and rules of international law relating to sustainable development
as well as of the interdependence of the needs of current and future generations of
humankind (…)”.62 This selection of legal rules on sustainable development
demonstrates the normative character of this legal phenomenon. it is not just a legal
idea or approach, or policy option. it is indeed the evolving principle of international
law.
CONCLUSION
The results of the subject analysis present a critical assessment of the prevailing
position in the doctrines of European international law regarding the idea of
sustainable development, which was proposed in 1987 by the Commission that
prepared the Report entitled: “our Common Future” (the so-called Brundtland
Report). Through an exhaustive analysis of international legal practice, the authors
show that the idea of sustainable development predates long before this report was
written. The term itself and its determinants were established in a series of
international legal instruments before 1987, whose provisions the authors referred
to in this text. it should be noted that in the modern system of international law,
the provisions on sustainable development have several cumulative characteristics
that allow to determine its content. There are mechanisms and approaches that are
included in the content of sustainable development as a legal phenomenon. Such
mechanisms – including EiA, serve as means to achieve sustainable development
goals and have a much narrower scope of application when considered in isolation.
The principle of sustainable development is aimed at resolving tensions between
the legitimate right of states to their development, but also their right to protect
62
“New Delhi Declaration of principles of international law relating to sustainable development”,
2002, A/Conf.199/8, United Nations New York, U.S.A. 7 p. internet: https://www.ecolex.org/
details/literature/new-delhi-declaration-of-principles-of-international-law-relating-to-sustainable
-development-mon-070850/ (the 70th Conference of the international Law Association, held in
New Delhi, india, 2–6 April 2002, A/CoNF.199/8).
the environment. Therefore, this principle serves as a regulatory corrective that

does not allow any of these rights to be neglected. Also, it would be important to
note that the interbranch (cross) character of the principle of sustainable
development includes legal relations in different spheres of human activity. The
normative content of the principles of sustainable development goes beyond the
framework of any specific branch of international law, such as, for example,
international law of the sea, international environmental law and international
economic law.
oDRŽiVi RAZVoJ KAo MEĐUNARoDNoPRAVNi

PRiNCiP U NASTAJANJU
APSTRAKT
Koncept „održivog razvoa” u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima, veoma je
važan za razumevanje transformacija koje su se desile u međunarodnopravnom
poretku u drugoj polovini 20. veka. S obzirom na rastuću zabrinutost oko
uspostavljanja globalnog upravljanja životnom sredinom, definisanje
međunarodnopravnog okvira održivog razvoja od suštinske je važnosti za
formulisanje ključnih principa takvog upravljanja. U ovom radu dat je prikaz
razvoja koncepta „održivosti” kao i nastalih promena koje se manifestuju kroz
donošenje međunarodnopravnih instrumenata kojima se ova materija reguliše.
Kroz razmatranje ove problematike, autori su došli do niza dokaza koji dokazuju
suprotno preovlađujućim mišljenjima, da je ideja održivog razvoja u smislu
poštovanja interesa budućih generacija izražena mnogo pre tzv. Bruntlandovog
izveštaja o svetskim životnim pitanjima o životnoj sredini i razvoju iz 1987.
godine. Naime, ova ideja sadržana je u odredbama Međunarodne konvencije za
regulisanje lova na kitove iz 1946, kao i u Stokholmskoj deklaraciji iz 1972.
godine. Analiza ukazuje da pojam održivog razvoja ima nekoliko kumulativnih
karakteristika koje zajedno čine njegov status pravne norme koja odražava
evoluirajući balans društvenih, ekonomskih i ekoloških interesa. iz opsežnog
istraživanja univerzalnih međunarodnopravnih konvencija i dokumenata „mekog
prava”, autori su došli do zaključka da održivi razvoj kao pravni pojam, sve više
postaje „tvrdo” međunarodno pravo iako njegov sadržaj ostaje i dalje principijelne
pravne prirode koja neizbežno nosi sa sobom specifičnosti koje odlikuju različite
grane međunarodnog prava.
Ključne reči: održivi razvoj, globalno upravljanje, zaštita životne sredine,
međunarodno pravo životne sredine, društveni razvoj
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LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION REVISITED
Rodoljub ETiNSKi*
ABSTRACT
The issue of the legality of humanitarian intervention is one of the most complex
and difficult issues of international law. it is not at all surprising that the positions
of states and the opinions of international lawyers are divided on this issue. The
debate among jurists reveals its complexity. However, members of the United
Nations reached a political compromise on the issue in 2005. With the entry into
force of the amendment to the Statute of the international Criminal Court on the
criminal law definition of the crime of aggression, an effective mechanism was
created to examine the legality of humanitarian intervention in some cases. The
decisions of the international Court of Justice from 2022 make a significant
contribution to considering the legality of humanitarian intervention in general.
Despite some divergent cases, the dynamics of international law and international
relations in the first decades of the 21st century, goes in the direction of requiring
humanitarian intervention to be based on the powers of the Security Council or
the United Nations General Assembly.
Key words: Humanitarian intervention, aggression, genocide
INTRODUCTION
The invasion of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, named by the highest Russian
representatives as “special military operation” and qualified by the UN General
Assembly as an act of aggression,1 sparks again, inter alia, discussion on legality of
humanitarian intervention. The representatives of the Russian Federation offered
several reasons for the invasion and one of them was the protection of people in the
Donbas region against genocide. A military intervention of a State against another
*
Faculty of Law, Novi Sad; international Law Section of the Kopaonik School of Natural law. E-
mail: etinskirodoljub@yahoo.com. Serbian version of this text will be presented at the 35th
meeting of the Kopaonik School of Natural Law in December 2022.
1
on its Xi Emergency Special Session the General Assembly reaffirmed by Resolution ES 11/1
of 1 March 2022 its commitments to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity
of Ukraine and condemned the aggression of the Russian Federation aganinst Ukraine.
State aimed at protection of population of another State against genocide has been
usually named as a humanitarian intervention. The issue of legality of humanitarian
intervention is one of the most complex and the most serious issues of international
law. Complexity of the issue has been confirmed again in 2015, when the members
of the institute of international Law failed to agree on the subject-matter and to adopt
a new resolution.2 The author of this text3 addressed the issue in his previous text of
2000 under title Bombing of Yugoslavia: Human Rights, Sovereignty, Humanitarian
Intervention or Aggressions, a Way Further.4 in the mentioned text, i argued that the
bombing of the FR of Yugoslavia was illegal and that response to humanitarian crises
should be searched through strengthening and improving of international mechanisms.
Now, i return to the issue, consider legality of humanitarian intervention in general
and focus attention to relevant international development after 2000. The issue of
legality of humanitarian intervention is an issue of interpretation of the UN Charter.
The Charter does not say anything explicitly and thus opens the door for different
interpretations. The prohibition of use of force, as formulated in Article 2(4) of the
Charter is not absolute. The Article prohibits the use of force against territorial integrity
and political independence of a State and the use of force incompatible with the
purposes of the Charter. one of the purposes is protection of human rights. Thus, the
Article might be interpreted as not prohibiting force if it is not directed against
territorial integrity and when it is used against massive and serious violation of human
rights. on the other hand, the Charter itself provides two exemptions from the
prohibition of the use of force – the right to self-defense and armed measures of the
Security Council. Thus, an opposite interpretation could be based on the argument
that if the founding furthers of the Charter wanted to allow the use of force in the case
of massive violations of human rights, they would have said so in the Charter. if one
supposes that the Charter allows humanitarian intervention, the question might be
whether motives of intervention are relevant for its legality. in many cases of
intervention, intervening States were not moved by purely humanitarian motive, but
also by other reasons. Whether the outcome of an intervention may be relevant, also,
for appraisal of its legality? international lawyers addressed these and other questions
in discussion on legality of humanitarian interventions. instigated by the Secretary
General Kofi Annan, heads of States and Governments of the Member States achieved
2
“Tallinn Session”, Yearbook of Institute of International Law, 2015, vol. 76, pp. 399–411.
3
The author was legal advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FR of Yugoslavia from
1994 to 2000 and agent of that State before the international Court of Justice in disputes
concerning legality of use of force in 1999.
4
R. Etinski, “Bombing of Yugoslavia: Human Rights, Sovereignity, Humanitarian intervention or
Aggression, a Way Further”, in: Jelica Stefanović-Štambuk, Blagoje Babić (eds), The Aggression,
Conseqeneces of NATO Agression against the FR of Yugoslavia, The Belgrade Forum for a World
of Equals, Belgrade, 2014, pp. 23–27. The book presents discussions of participants of an
international conference on conseqences of NATo aggression against Yugoslavia, organized by
the institute of international Politics and Economics in Belgrade in 2000. Due to reasons, which
editors of the book did not state, the book was published fourtheen years later.
a political consensus in 2005, according to which a humanitarian intervention should

be based on authorization of the Security Council. The compromise has remained
unclear in key issue–whether there is an obligation of the Security Council to authorize
an intervention when the conditions are met–or if it is clear in sense that the obligation
does not exist, then it is not satisfactory. The issue of legality of humanitarian
intervention is, thus, really, very complex. The fact that loss of human lives may be
reason of an intervention, but also that human lives may be lost by use of force by
intervening State(s) during the intervention and losing of lives may continue after the
intervention adds a great moral burden to the complexity of the issue. After
presentation of theoretical discourse on the issue, some light will be cast on
international developments, which have occurred after 2000 and which may be
relevant for the issue of legality of humanitarian intervention. After entering into force,
the amendment to the Statute of the international Criminal Court, which defines the
crime of aggression, created an effective international mechanism for investigating
legality of concrete humanitarian interventions under certain conditions. Two
decisions of the international Court of Justice from 2022 are, also, of importance for
discussion on the issue.
DOCTRINAL DISCOURSE ON LEGALITY

OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A slightly narrower definition of humanitarian intervention of Louis Henkin
will be used in this text. Henkin stated: “’Humanitarian intervention’ has come to
refer to coercive intervention by states, singly or collectively, through economic
sanctions or by use of military force, in response to gross violations of human
rights.”5 The paper will be focused exclusively to intervention by military force.
Having in view complexity of the issue, it is not strange that Rogers begins his text
on humanitarian intervention and international law in 2004 by following remark:
“Nothing seems to have divided international lawyers as much in recent years as
the question of humanitarian intervention. Discussions on the subject seem to
produce an explosive mixture of ethics, politics, and law; and it is not always clear
where scholars are drawing the dividing lines among the three, if at all.”6
Humanitarian interventions have occurred already in the 19th century. Some
European powers intervened military several times against the ottoman Empire to
protect Christian peoples.7 in 1913 Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia waged war, which
5
Louis Henkin, “Humanitarian intervention”, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, 1994, vol.
26, p. 383.
6
A. P. V. Rogers, “Humanitarian intervention and international Law”, Harvard Journal of Law &
Public Policy, 2004, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 725.
7
Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, “The Customary international Law Doctrine of Humanitarian
intervention: its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter”, California Western International Law
Journal, 1974, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 207–.
lasted several months, against the ottoman Empire to protect Christian population
in Macedonia.8 The majority of writers before the First World War thought that
military intervention for humanitarian purposes was legal.9 There is an opinion that
an international customary rule on legality of intervention emerged at that time.
Having in view inconsistency of relevant practice, it is not easy to support such
view. Between the two World Wars, writers were divided, but it seems that majority
saw military interventions as legal.10 Adoption of the UN Charter had powerful
impact to discussion on legality of humanitarian interventions. P. Jessup wrote in
1948 that the Charter made individual military intervention illegal.11 Still, he left
an important reservation-humanitarian individual intervention would be further
legal if the UN would not be capable quickly to react for the protection of human
lives.12 The reservation will play later significant role in a discussion on legality of
humanitarian interventions. ian Brownlie expressed doubt about legality of
humanitarian intervention in 1963.13 Armed intervention of india in East Pakistan
for the protection of Bengali people in 1971, which ended by secession of
Bangladesh, revived discussion on legality of humanitarian intervention. in the
United Nations india justified the intervention invoking humanitarian reasons and
justice.14 A year later Richard Lillich justified the indian intervention by passivity
of the UN. in a report of 1972, he proposed reassessment of humanitarian
intervention “given the failure of the United Nations to take effective steps to curb
the genocidal conduct and alleviate the mass suffering which took place in...
Bangladesh”.15 The following year, Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley disagreed
with Lillich. The reason for disagreement emerged from an analysis of practice of
humanitarian interventions. The two authors submitted certain powerful arguments
against legality of humanitarian interventions: “A critical, if not exhaustive,
examination of principal cases in which the right to carry out humanitarian purposes
through the use of military force has been asserted does not provide clear answers.
8
Ibid., p. 213.
9
Ibid., p. 223.
10
Ibid., p. 224.
11
Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, New York, 1948; Quoted by Richard B. Lillich,
“intervention to Protect Human Rights”, McGill Law Journal, 1969, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 211.
12
Ibid.
13
ian Brownlie, international Law and the Use of Force by States, oxford, 1963, p. 433; Quoted
by R. B. Lillich, op. cit., 210, supra n. 12.
14
Thomas M. Franck, Rodley S. Nigel, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian intervention
by Military Force”, American Journal of International Law, 1973, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 276.
15
“The international Protection of Human Rights by General international Law”, Second interim
Report of the Sub-Committee (Richard Lillich, Rapporteur), Report of the International
Committee on Human Rights of the International Law Assn. 1972, vol. 54, Quoted by Thomas
M., Franck, Nigel S. Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian intervention by
Military Force”, American Journal of International Law, 1973, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 277.
in very few, if any, instances has the right been asserted under circumstances that
appear more humanitarian than self-interested and power-seeking. Nor is there any
mechanism for making a definitive separation between sheep and goat cases, nor
even of establishing the facts beyond reasonable doubt. it is abundantly apparent,
however, that history is all too replete with instances in which one would have
expected states claiming the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention to
have sent their armies to the rescue. The selective way humanitarian intervention
has been applied in the past, when its legality was merely alleged, is a guide to how
the right would be applied if it were recognized: recognition would presumably
expand, not alter, existing practice.”16 Some other authors thought, however, that
selfish political motivation does not compromise legality of an intervention. Wolf
considered that it may be enough that political convenience and humanitarian
necessity were overlapped.17 He explained that by the fact that there is a right to
intervention, not an obligation to intervention.18 However, the continuing practice
of selectivity induced Christine Chinkin twenty years later to say that such
selectivity undermined moral authority of humanitarian intervention.19 in 1978 Cees
Flinterman argued that humanitarian intervention should be within the exclusive
domain of the UN.20 He argued that effective protection of human rights of
endangered citizens of a State could not be achieved without a deep changes in
structures of power of the State and that the deep changes could not be achieved in
a limited time of presence of foreign troops on its territory. 21 He wrote: “Such a
deep penetration into the domestic affairs of a particular state should only be
permissible if it is undertaken in accordance with global community expectations
to be embodied in specific General Assembly or Security Council resolutions.” The
early Jessup’s opinion from 1948 that only inefficacy of the UN would legalize
humanitarian intervention was accepted later by some international lawyers and an
international nongovernmental commission. in 1981 Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah wrote that failure of the UN in effective pursuing function of protection
has revived customary rule on humanitarian interventions.22 Wolf wrote on post-
Charter time in sense of inefficacy of the organization and that practice of unilateral
military interventions has legalized theses interventions.23 He believed thus that an
16
T.F. Franck, N. S. Rodley. op. cit., 290, supra n. 15.
17
Daniel Wolf, “Humanitarian intervention,” Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies,
1988, vol. 9, p. 352.
18
Ibid.
19
Christine M. Chinkin, “Kosovo: A ’Good’ or ’Bed’ War” in Editorial Comments: NATo’s
Kosovo intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, , p. 847.
20
Cees Flinterman, “Humanitarian intervention”, Chitty’s Law Journal, 1978, vol. 26, no. 8, p. 285.
21
Ibid.
22
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “internal Colonialism and Humanitarian intervention”,
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1981, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 60.
23
D. Wolf, op. cit., 340, supra n. 18.
armed intervention for the prevention of genocide was legal and legitimate.24 Six
years later, however, Henkin wrote that practice of unilateral interventions that
legalized them was not known to him.25
Tragic development in the former Yugoslavia, iraq and Somalia as well as
ethnic tensions in the Republics of the former Soviet Union actualized again the
issue of legality of humanitarian interventions.26 Then some writers broadened
purposes of humanitarian interventions. in 1994 Henkin observed that some writers
widened the purpose so as “to include intervention to maintain, restore, or achieve
representative democracy.”27 He remarked, also, that the concept was applied to
maintaining order in failed State or to provide humanitarian assistance to people
where no government exists or when the existing government is refusing such
assistance.28 Henkin believed that humanitarian intervention should be primarily
task of the UN, and in particular of the Security Council and the General
Assembly.29 He advocated revival of Article 43 of the Charter.30 However, he
investigated also safeguards against abuse of the power of the Security Council in
that regard.31 Henkin was quite clear that unilateral humanitarian intervention has
remained prohibited by the UN Charter since it “contravenes the target state’s
essential right to be let alone”.32 He asserted, also, that the Charter did not permit
military intervention even in the case when lives of nationals of an intervening
states are at deadly risk in another state.33 Yet, he allows that in such circumstances
an intervening state might invoke the right of self-defense. A year later, in 1995,
Malvina Halberstam defined three conditions under which she believed that
humanitarian intervention was legal: a) a threat of imminent death or grave injury;
b) territorial state is unwilling or unable to protect; and c) intervening state will
withdraw when it has rescued those in danger.34 She determines the effect of the
action, not the motive as a test of legality.35 Four years later, NATo military
24
Ibid., p. 343
25
L. Henkin, op. cit., 399, supra n. 6.
26
Richard T. Miller, “Goals of Humanitarian intervention”, In Defense of the Alien, 1993, vol. 16,
p. 159.
27
L. Henkin, “Humanitarian intervention,” Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, 1994, vol. 26,
p. 383.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., pp. 391–398.
30
Ibid., p. 401.
31
Ibid., p. 394.
32
Ibid., p. 398.
33
Ibid., p. 399.
34
Malvina Halberstam, “The Legality of Humanitarian intervention,” Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law, vol. 3, no. 1,1995, p. 1.
35
Ibid., p. 2.
intervention against the FR of Yugoslavia sparked a new wave of discussion on

legality of humanitarian intervention. Presentation of discussion will be limited
here to discourse among leading US international lawyers as it was published
within Editorial Comments on pages of the october issue of the American Journal
of international Law in 1999. Louis Henkin, Ruth Wedgwood, Jonathan Charney,
Christine Chinkin, Richard Falk, Thomas Franck and Michael Reisman
participated in discussion. All of them were moved by human tragedy and atrocities
in Kosovo, but they differently understood the law and the facts. The crucial point
of divergence at legal level was the issue whether an authorization of the Security
Council was unavoidable condition of legality. They also differently saw the facts.
Some were focused only on crimes perpetrated on Kosovo while others took into
consideration other facts. Besides, they differently interpreted relevance of the
resolutions of the Security Council to legality of the intervention. Discussion as a
whole cast, however, light on the issue of legality of NATo bombing. Louis
Henkin repeated his opinion that unilateral intervention “even for what the
intervening state deems to be important humanitarian ends, is and should remain
unlawful”.36 intervention of several States is also unilateral, if taken by their own
decision.37 According to him, humanitarian intervention is permissible if authorized
by the Security Council, but problem is that a single permanent member can
prevent such authorization.38 The question raised by Henkin was whether a veto
against humanitarian intervention might be avoided by later ratification of the
intervention by the Security Council. He considered that the Security Council
ratified the intervention by its resolution 1244 (1999),39 endorsing an agreement
of the FR of Yugoslavia and NATo on withdrawal Yugoslav forces from Kosovo
and establishment of international civil and military presence in the province. He
wrote that even plausible expectation of a subsequent ratification by the Security
Council should not encourage a State of a collectivity of States to intervene on its
own authority.40 on the other hand, he was aware that it might happen again, if
the Security Council would not be ready to accept procedure for dealing with
humanitarian crises without the use of the veto.41 Thus, he believed that a change
in law was necessary.42 Ruth Wedgwood advocated a soft approach to “generative
power” of State practice. She stated: “When an action is deemed morally urgent
by a majority of states—even an action involving the use of force—it is likely to
36
Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and ’the Law of Humanitarian intervention,’” Editorial Comments:
NATo’s Kosovo intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, p.
824.
37
Ibid., p. 826.
38
Ibid., pp. 825, 826.
39
Ibid., p. 827.
40
Ibid., p. 827.
41
Ibid
42
Ibid., p. 828.
shape a legal justification to match”.43 She found certain legitimacy for the
intervention in the resolutions of the Security Council from 1998 and 1999, that
qualified the Kosovo conflict as a threat to peace and security and warned on
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Yugoslav and Serbian forces and the
impending humanitarian catastrophe.44 She found, also, some support in refusal
of the Security Council by 12:3 to adopt the Russian proposal to condemn NATo
military action.45 She noted, also, that the Kosovo intervention did not happen in
isolation, but in the context of failure of the United Nations to act effectively in
Rwanda and Bosnia.46 Still, Wedgwood benevolence is not without certain
concern. She warned that the NATo action would be a mixed success if NATo
forces could not reverse “the retaliatory actions that have driven out most of
Kosovo’s Serb minority”.47 She said that the consistency of the air campaign with
protection of civilian objects and the problem of dual use of targets called for
reflection. Wedgwood observed, also, that some would wonder whether the more
flexible terms allowed by NATo to end the conflict should had been offered
before.48 Jonathan Charney did not find any legal justification for the NATo
bombing the FR of Yugoslavia. Quite contrary, he was categorical that “the NATo
intervention through its bombing campaign violated the U.N. Charter and
international law”.49 Charney considered that specifics of the situation did not
authorize outside entities to take forcible actions.50 He had in view that the Security
Council adopted three resolutions under Chapter Vii of the Charter prior to the
NATo bombing.51 The resolutions authorized the organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe to install an observer force, “the Kosovo Verification
Mission,” in Kosovo to monitor the situation.52 The resolutions called upon the
FR of Yugoslavia and the Kosovо Liberation Army to stop using force and to halt
violating human rights. Charney noted, also, that the resolutions did not authorize
the use of force by foreign entities and that they reaffirmed the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FR of Yugoslavia.53 He did not see the Resolution 1244
43
Ruth Wedgwood,” NATo’s Campaign in Yugoslavia,” Editorial Comments: NATo’s Kosovo
intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, p. 828.
44
Ibid., p. 830.
45
Ibid., pp.830, 831.
46
Ibid., p. 834.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Jonathan i. Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo,” Editorial Comments:
NATo’s Kosovo intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, p. 834.
50
Ibid, p. 835.
51
Jonathan i. Charney, op.cit.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
(1999) of the Security Council as a retroactive legalization of the NATo’s action.54

Having qualified the NATo intervention as “an unfortunate precedent,” he
observed that “[a]s now conceived, the so-called doctrine of humanitarian
intervention can lead to an escalation of international violence, discord, and
disorder and diminish protections of human rights worldwide.”55 From the
perspective of 2022, his worry looks quite grounded. Charney qualified the
bombing as an “anticipatory humanitarian intervention” “based on past actions of
the FRY regime and future risks.”56 He considered that as “a particularly dangerous
permutation of an already problematic concept,” which opened the door for
hegemonic States to use force for purposes incompatible with international law.57
Christine Chinkin made a correct record of facts, not missing to mention that
victims of bombing included refugees seeking safety, television station workers,
journalists or the Chines embassy in Belgrade.58 This author submitted a short, but
balanced analysis of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, showing that
they addressed both sides in the conflict-the FR Yugoslavia and Kosovo Albanian
leadership.59 Chinkin, as an advocate of human rights, asked how she could “resist
the assertion of a moral imperative on states to intervene in the internal affairs of
another state where there is evidence of ethnic cleansing, rape and other forms of
systematic and widespread abuse, regardless of what the Charter mandates about
the use of force and its allocation of competence?”60 it seems that she did not
challenge legality of the bombing in principle, but rather legality of the way as it
was executed. She wrote that the NATo bombing was disproportionate by
excessive impact on human rights of civilian population and at the same time
inadequate to protect other population without ground forces.61
Starting from “double condemnation”-condemnation of Serbian forces and
NATo-Richard Falk formulated “essential normative challenge for future:
genocidal behavior cannot be shielded by claims of sovereignty, but neither can
these claims be overridden by unauthorized uses of force delivered in an excessive
and inappropriate manner”.62 His approach to the NATo intervention was that “it
was justifiable to act, but not in the manner undertaken”.63 According to Falk, the
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., p. 841.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., p.841.
59
Ibid., p. 842.
60
Ch. Chinkin, op. cit., 843, supra n. 20.
61
Ibid., p. 845.
62
Richard A. Falk, “Kosovo, World order and Future of international Law” Editorial Comments:
NATo’s Kosovo intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, pp.
848, 853.
63
Ibid., p. 854.
issue of legality of the intervention should not fall in dead end of textual
interpretation of Article 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, but should be located on terrain
of reasonableness in sense that more reasonable option is more legal.64 The
substance of the issue was whether other more reasonable options for intervention
existed. Falk gave positive answer. He thought that diplomatic action of US
preceding the bombing was not satisfactory. Absence of sufficiently flexible
diplomacy that would include Russia and China and that might make military
intervention unnecessary casted dark shadow on the NATo initiative.65 Beside,
“NATo’s style of bombing after the first few days was to inflict heavy, deliberate
damage on civilian targets of a wide variety, relying on mastery of the air, smart
weaponry, and a proclaimed intention to continue the bombing on an intensifying
scale until Belgrade ’submitted’ without conditions.”66 Such style of bombing was,
according Falk, beyond limits of humanitarian intervention. He ended his text by
the following observation: “Skeptical observers must wonder whether the primary
motives for intervention were other than those publicly relied upon, such as
keeping NATo alive and testing new weaponry and war-fighting doctrine. An
additional subtext was to demonstrate that, contrary to the teaching of ’the Vietnam
syndrome,’ internal wars can be fought and won at acceptable costs.”67 Thomas
Franck agreed with Bruno Simma that NATo military intervention was in breach
of international law.68 But, he agreed, also, with another European international
lawyer, Antonio Cassese that the intervention served to protect human rights and
buttressed humanitarian law.69 Franck said that the UN Charter was hit but, having
in mind circumstances, not too much seriously.70 He added that legal system had
capacity to mitigate circumstances, but stressed the difference between mitigation
and justification. He observed that neither the U.S. Department of State nor NATo
attempted seriously to legally justify the war not wishing to reverse international
order to the pre-Charter era.71 Such reversion would open the door for “even greater
mischief than Yugoslavia’s policies in Kosovo” and due to that reason Franck
warned that interest of every nation was to treat the intervention as an exception,
not as a rule.72 Michael Reisman placed the NATo intervention in searching for
solution of an antimony between necessity of members of community to respect
64
Richard A. Falk, op.cit., pp. 852, 853, 855.
65
Ibid., pp. 854, 855.
66
Ibid., p. 855.
67
Ibid., p. 856.
68
Thomas M. Franck, “Lessons of Kosovo” Editorial Comments: NATo’s Kosovo intervention,
American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, p. 858.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., p. 859.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
constitutional procedures, as precondition of group security and individual liberty,

on the one hand, and opposition to treat a constitution as “suicide pact” in a case
when the procedures do not work73 Having described the intervention as
successful, Reisman explored whether the intervention came under “suicide pact”
exception and gave an affirmative answer.74 Urgent necessity of saving human
lives, according to him, justifies a military action even in absence of the
authorization of the Security Council.75 Having observed that NATo and US
leaders avoided to offer legal justification for the NATo intervention against the
FR of Yugoslavia, but invoked the moral and political justification, Bartram Brown
warned, also, in 2000 that “[with]out clear legal standards to limit it, the practice
of humanitarian intervention threatens to undermine the friendly relations among
states and could have an adverse impact upon international peace and security.”76
in absence of clear standards, Brown was not able to determine whether the NATo
intervention was legal, although it was prima facie contrary to Article 2(4) of the
Charter.77 He proposed the following conditions under which humanitarian
intervention may be legal: a) the Security Council is blocked by a veto; b) the
humanitarian necessity is present, the motives of intervention are relevant; c) the
requirement of proportionality; d) respect for international humanitarian law and
international human rights; e) the duty not to make the humanitarian situation
worse than it otherwise would have been; f) responsibility for reconstruction.78
The international Commission on intervention and State Sovereignty published
in 2001 the report under title “The Responsibility to Protect”.79 The Canadian
Government established the Commission in response to Secretary General Kofi
Annan’s call to the international community to endeavor to achieve an international
consensus how to respond to massive violations of human rights and humanitarian
law.80 The Commission consisted of 12 lawyers from different parts of the world.81
The responsibility to protect was conceived as a complex responsibility composed
73
Michael W. Reisman, “Kosovo’s Antinomies” Editorial Comments: NATo’s Kosovo
intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93, no. 4, p. 860.
74
Ibid., p. 861.
75
Ibid., p. 862.
76
Bartram S. Brown, “Humanitarian intervention at a Crossroads,” William and Mary Law Review,
2000, vol. 41, no. 5, p. 1686.
77
Ibid., pp.1739–40.
78
Ibid, pp. 1728–39.
79
“The Responsibility to Protect”, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, ottawa, 2001, internet: https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/responsibility-protect-
report- international-commission-intervention-and-state-sovereignty
80
“The Responsibility to Protect”, op.cit., p. 81.
81
Co-Chairs: Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. Members: Gisèle Côté-Harper, Lee Hamilton,
Michael ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos, Cornelio
Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein and Ramesh Thakur.
of the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to

rebuild. The primary holder of the responsibility, according to the Commission,
are States themselves to peoples on their territories. A subsidiary holder in the case
of failure of a State, is the UN. However, the Commission did not exclude a
possibility that in the case of failure of the UN, a coalition of States or individual
States take action. Appealing to the Security Council to hold its responsibility, the
Commission sent two messages to the Security Council: “The first message is that
if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in conscience-shocking
situations crying out for action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states
will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of
these situations. if collective organizations will not authorize collective
intervention against regimes that flout the most elementary norms of legitimate
governmental behavior, then the pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or
individual states will surely intensify. And there is a risk then that such
interventions, without the discipline and constraints of UN authorization, will not
be conducted for the right reasons or with the right commitment to the necessary
precautionary principles. The second message is that if, following the failure of
the Council to act, a military intervention is undertaken by an ad hoc coalition or
individual state which does fully observe and respect all the criteria we have
identified, and if that intervention is carried through successfully – and is seen by
world public opinion to have been carried through successfully – then this may
have enduringly serious consequences for the stature and credibility of the UN
itself”.82 The report presents the principles for military intervention which are
assembled in four clusters: 1) “the just cause threshold”; 2) “the precautionary
principles”; 3) “right authority”; and 4) “operational principles”.83 Large scale of
loss of life and large-scale ethnic cleansing, both “actual or apprehended” are
indicated as a just cause. one of the principles of “right authority” states that the
Security Council authorization should be sought in all cases prior to any military
intervention. However, if authorization is not given, that is if the Security Council
does not react, the Commission leaves possibility to the General Assembly to
recommend, on basis of Resolution 377 A (V), known under name “Uniting for
Peace,” collective military measures.84
82
“The Responsibility to Protect”, op. cit., 55, supra n. 80.
83
Ibid., Xii.
84
“The Responsibility to Protect”, op. cit., 53, supra n. 80.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AFTER 2000

OF RELEVANCE FOR THE ISSUE OF LEGALITY
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
2005 World Summit Outcome
The Secretary General Kofi Annan established a panel of 16 eminent persons

from different parts of the world to address various threats to collective security
in a comprehensive and systematic way. The panel submitted a report in 2004
under title “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”.85 in part iX,
dedicated to rules or guidelines of using force, under subtitle “Chapter Vii of the
Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and responsibility to protect,” the
report discusses the issue of legality of humanitarian intervention. After noting
that the Charter “is not as clear as it could be when it comes to saving lives within
countries in situations of mass atrocity,”86 the panel repeated basic ideas from the
Report of the international Commission on intervention and State Sovereignty,
and endorsed “the emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing,
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which
sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”87 The
panel did not thus support humanitarian intervention without authorization of the
Security Council. Heads of States and Governments, gathered in the General
Assembly from 14 to 16 September 2005, adopted a document under the title
“2005 World Summit outcome,” presented in Resolution 60/1 of the General
Assembly of 16 September 2005,88 whose paragraphs 138 and 139 are dedicated
to the responsibility to protect against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. Paragraph 138 confirms responsibility of every State for
protection of its population from the enumerated crimes. According to the
paragraph, international community should encourage and help States to pursue
this responsibility and to support the UN to develop capability of early warning.
The international community has through the UN responsibility, according to
paragraph 139, to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means, in
accordance with chapters Vi and Viii of the UN Charter to help protection of
population from the mentioned crimes. in that context, in paragraph 139, heads of
States and Governments expressed their readiness “… to take collective action, in
85
“Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change”, United
Nations, 2004, internet:https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/
documents/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf
86
Ibid., para 199, p. 65.
87
Ibid., para 203, p. 66.
88
“2005 World Summit outcome”, UN doc. A/Res/60/1.
a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter Vii, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity”.89 They agreed further that the General Assembly should continue to
consider responsibility for protection of population from these crimes, having in
view the principles of the UN Charter and international law. Finally, heads of States
and Governments expressed intention to support States in building capacities for
protection of population from the enumerated crimes and to assist those States
under distress, before crises break out. in the process of preparation of the
document “2005 World Summit outcome“ a few States opposed implementation
of the concept responsibility to protect in the document, alleging that it was too
vague, suitable for misuse and incompatible with the UN Charter.90 other
challenged legal nature of the concept, believing that it is possible to speak only
on a moral duty. 91 The accepted text is thus a compromise.92 it is well known that
resolution of the UN General Assembly do not establish legal obligations. The
Security Council supported and confirmed the provisions from paragraphs 138
and 139 by Resolution 1674 (2006) of 18 April 2006 and Resolution 1894 (2009)
of 11 November 2009.93 The resolution added a new political weight to the
provisions of 138 and 139 paragraphs, but they did not lift them at legal level.
Greater problem is that head of States and Governments expressed readiness to
take collective measures through the Security Council “on a case-by-case basis”.
So, does it mean that it will not be in every case? if not in each case, what will be
criteria of election? That would leave space for political profitability, competition
of geostrategic interests, and that would undermine the concept of the
responsibility to protect. Due to geopolitical interest a permanent Member of the
Security Council might block adopting necessary decision. in respect of that a
slight progress has been made in 2022. The General Assembly adopted Resolution
76/262 on 20 April 2022 under title “Standing mandate for a General Assembly
debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council”.94 The Resolution obliges the
president of the General Assembly to convene a formal meeting of the Assembly
within ten days after a veto has been used, except when the Assembly is in an
emergency special session regarding the situation in which the veto was cast, to
discuss the situation as to which the veto was cast. it will be seen how possible
89
“2005 World Summit outcome”, op.cit.
90
Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric of Emerging Legal Norm”, American
Journal of International Law, 2007, vol. 109, p. 108.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
SC Res. S/RES/1674 (2006), SC Res. S/RES/1894 (2009).
94
GA Res. 76/262, April 26, 2022.
critique of the General Assembly will influence using of veto, when international
community is expected to act. Having in view persistent practice of disagreement
of the General Assembly and some permanent Members of the Security Council
in certain cases, it is difficult to expect that possible critique will prevail over
geopolitical interests of the permanent Members. When the Security Council is
blocked by a veto and if a threat to international peace and security, a breach of
peace or an act of aggression exists, the General Assembly is competent to
recommend collective measures “including in the case of a breach of the peace or
act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security” on the basis of the Resolution 377 A (V) of 3
November 1950, known under name “Uniting for Peace”.95 The fact is that
genocide and crimes against humanity may be perpetrated also in circumstances
which may be qualified as a threat against peace and security rather than as a
breach of peace. Whether the General Assembly is authorized to recommend use
of armed forces in such circumstances? The text of the Resolution does not state
that, but we have seen above that the international Commission on intervention
and State Sovereignty gave positive answer. However, the document “2005 World
Summit outcome,” which implements the concept of responsibility to protect, is
silent on the issue. opinions in literature are divided. Referring to Articles 2(4)
and 51 of the Charter, Larry Johnson asserted that the General Assembly may
recommend armed measures only in the case of aggression when they would serve
to self-defense i. e. to the right guaranteed by Article 51. in other cases, including
the case of genocide, the author thought that recommendation of armed measures
would not be in accordance with the UN Charter.96 on the other hand, Henry
Richardson did not agree, alleging that interpretation of Johnson was too narrow.97
Richardson compared the Resolution with a statute of a national parliament. As a
national parliament can change its statute, equally the General Assembly can
modify the Resolution. Stare decisis is not valid in this context. Besides, he
considered that evolution of competences of the General Assembly should be taken
into account in interpretation of the Resolution.98 He thought further that Article
2(4) of the Charter should be interpreted in the light of the rule on responsibility
to protect, which has become, according to him, obligatory.99 The fact is that in
1950, when the Resolution “Uniting for Peace” was adopted, humanitarian
intervention was not on agenda of international community. The Resolution was
adopted in the context of Korean war on proposal of the USA to avoid blocking
95
UN doc. A/Res/5/377.
96
Larry D. Johnson, “’Uniting for Peace’: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?”, American
Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 108, pp. 2014–2015, Unbound, pp. 112–115.
97
Henry Richardson, ˮComment of Larry Johnson, Uniting for Peace,” American Journal of
International Law, 2015, vol. 108, pp. 2014–2015, Unbound, pp. pp.137, 138.
98
Ibid., p.138.
99
Ibid., p. 139.
the UN by veto of the SSSR.100 Having in view overall development and, in

particular, “2005 World Summit outcome,” the competence of the General
Assembly to recommend collective military measures in cases of genocide, war
crimes or crimes against humanity should be recognized. By its Resolution 1973
(2011) of 17 March 2011, the Security Council authorized the Member States and
its regional organizations to take all necessary measures to protect civilians from
violence of the Gaddafi regime. “All necessary measures” were interpreted to
include, also, military measures. The resolution has been seen as authorization of
the Security Council for taking a humanitarian intervention.101 Judge of the
international Court of Justice, Bennouna expressed opinion that intervening NATo
forces favorized a change of a regime in Libya and that fact made the end of the
concept of responsibility to protect.102 Hopefully, it will not be the end. Alternative
might be intervention without authorization of the Security Council and it would
be more problematic solution.
Definition of the Crime of Aggression

in the Statute of the International Criminal Court
An amendment that defines the crime of aggression was inserted in the Statute of
the international Criminal Court in Article 8 bis. The amendment has entered into
force. That might be a remarkable step forward in international judicial control of
legality of humanitarian intervention. it is well known that the Briand-Kellogg Pact
of 1928 outlawed the war as an instrument of foreign policy. The Pact was criticized
as not prohibiting war, but legalizing war, due to vague formulations and many
reservations, but it played an important rule later in the Nuremberg proceedings. The
Nuremberg Tribunal tried individuals for the crime of aggression, although a formal,
explicit definition of aggression did not exist. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits
not only use of force, but also threat by force. The Article reads: “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The Charter foresees two
exemptions: the right to self-defense and armed measures of the Security Council.
Article 51 of the Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security”. Article 42 authorizes the
100
L. Johnson, op. cit., p. 109, supra n. 97.
101
Zaid Ali Zaid, “Humanitarian intervention in international Law,” Acta Juridica Hungarica,
2013, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 185–199, 197.
102
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) order, 16 March 2022, “Declaration of Judge
Bennouna”, para. 8.
Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security…” Article 43 obliges the
Members to make available to the Security Council their armed forces for exercising
that function. The Article has never been realized and due that reason the Security
Council has authorized the Members to take armed actions for maintaining or
restoring international peace. During negotiations on a constitutive act of the
international Criminal Court, the participants agreed that the jurisdiction of the Court
should include the crime of aggression, but they did not agree about definition of
aggression as a crime. That was done twelve years later in Kampala on 11 June 2010.
The adopted definition combines and supplements Article 2(4) of the Charter and
definition of aggression from Resolution 3314 (XXiX) of 14 December 1974.
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 bis of the Statute combines Article 2(4) of the Charter and
definition of aggression from the Resolution. Paragraph 1 explains who can
perpetrated the crime and qualifies Article 2(4) of the Charter. According to the
paragraph, “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State” can perpetrate the crime. According to the same
paragraph, the crime of aggression shall “by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. Paragraph 2 combines, as
it was said, a part of the text of Article 2(4) and particular forms of aggression as
enumerated in Resolution 3314 (XXiX) of the General Assembly. For example,
paragraph 2(b) specifies bombing of territory of another State or using any arms
against territory of another State as a form of aggression in sense of the Resolution.
The bombing will thus constitute a crime of aggression in sense of the Statute, if it
satisfies conditions form paragraphs 2 and 1. it should be done “against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations” and it should “by its character, gravity and
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. Might
humanitarian intervention be qualified as a crime of aggression within the Rome
Statute? When the amendment on the crime of aggression was in process of
negotiation, Sean Murphy saw the amendment as a means of future legal evaluation
of humanitarian intervention.103 According to Murphy, prosecution, or at least
indictment of leaders of an intervening State would indicate unlawfulness of the
intervention.104 on the other hand, absence of indictment or prosecution would direct
to contrary conclusion. The author saw the definition of aggression as neutral toward
legality of humanitarian intervention. in other words, the definition does not make
humanitarian intervention automatically legal or illegal.105 Really, the reference to
character, gravity and scale which makes a violation of the Charter manifest, does
not legalize humanitarian intervention in general. Murphy observed that “[t]he
103
Sean D. Murphy, “Criminalizing Humanitarian intervention”, Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law, 2009, vol. 41, no. issues 2–3, p. 341.
104
Ibid., p. 343.
105
Sean D. Murphy, op.cit.
’character, gravity, and scale’ of Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the

tripartite intervention in northern iraq in 1991, or NATo’s bombing of Serbia in 1999,
is comparable in nature or scale to other uses of force that presumably are to be
encompassed in the iCC’s jurisdiction over this crime.”106 Murphy explored
hypothetically what would be reaction of the prosecutor towards NATo bombing in
1999 if legal conditions existed for rising criminal indictment against NATo leaders
before the international Criminal Court. He numbered reasons for and against
indictment and found that reasons against indictment would prevail. Having in view
that an indictment should have encompassed leaders of the most powerful Western
countries, as the last reason against, Murphy invoked an old saying: “…some
observers believe NATo did commit jus in bello violations in the course of its
bombing campaign, such that one explanation for the lack of indictments with respect
to jus in bello crimes is the old saw ’don’t bite the hand that feeds you.’”107 Hopefully,
the saying will not be confirmed in practice of the international Criminal Court. The
amendment inserting criminal definition of aggression as Article 8 bis of the Statute
of international Criminal Court was adopted mostly by small States.108 Germany and
italy are exceptions. No permanent Members of the Security Council accepted the
amendment. From former Yugoslav Republics only Croatia, North Macedonia and
Slovenia ratified the amendment. it is interesting that, for the time being, some States
which were or are victims of military interventions, like iraq, Libya, Serbia or Ukraine
did not adopt the amendment. iraq, Libya and Ukraine are not among 123 Parties to
the Statute. Ukraine signed the Statute in 2000, but did not ratify it.109 By a unilateral
declaration, based on Article 12(3) of the Statute, Ukraine accepted the jurisdiction
of the international Criminal Court for the period between 21 November 2013 and
22 February 2014. Again, by a unilateral declaration Ukraine accepted the jurisdiction
from 20 February 2014 forward.110 Forty three State Parties to the Statute addressed
the Prosecutor of the Court in March 2022 asking investigation of alleged war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. The Prosecutor has begun to collect evidence.
Since only State Parties can accept the jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, Ukraine
cannot do it by a unilateral declaration. it may be a disappointing fact that among 123
State Parties to the Statute, only 43 accepted the amendment, i. e. the jurisdiction of
the international Criminal Court in respect of aggression. Among them are mostly
Members to the European Union, more States from Latin America and a few States
from Africa and Asia.111 The amendment has become operative on 15 November
106
Ibid., p. 362.
107
Ibid., p. 375.
108
“UN Treaty Collection”, Status of Treaties, internet: https://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XViii-10-b&chapter=18&clang=_en
109
internet: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XViii-10-
b&chapter=18&clang=_en
110
international Criminal Court, Situation in Ukraine, internet: https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine
111
“UN Treaty Collection”, op. cit.
2018.112 There might be more reasons for relatively weak acceptance of the
amendment. Many African States have been disappointed regarding the international
Criminal Court since it was focused during its early years to leaders of these States.
Generally, a reason might be a low level of confidence to the rule of law at
international level. it is interesting, however, that countries with higher level of internal
rule of law have more confidence in the international Criminal Court and international
courts in general than the countries with lower internal rule of law.
Case concerning the Application of the Convention

on Genocide (Gambia v. Myanmar)
in my text from 2000, mentioned in the introduction, i expressed an opinion

that every State Party to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (further Convention on Genocide) may address the
international Court of Justice and ask preliminary measures of protection for
people in another State Party, when considers that people in it is exposed to
genocide. if there was any doubt whether a State Party that is not affected by
genocide had legal standing before the Court, the doubt has been dispelled by the
judgment of the Court of 2022 in the case of Gambia v. Myanmar. The Court
refused an objection of Myanmar that Gambia, not being injured State, did not
have legal standing in the case.113 Every State Party to the Convention on Genocide
can, thus, initiated proceedings before the international Court of Justice when
claims that another State Party is in a breach of the Convention.
Case on Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russia) 2022
The highest representatives of the Russian Federation justified a “special

military operation” against Ukraine inter alia by genocide allegedly committed in
Lugansk and Donetsk. Ukraine negated that genocide was committed and asked
the international Court of Justice to order Russia to cease all operations based on
false allegations on genocide, to compensate damage etc. Deciding on requests of
Ukraine, the Court observed that Article 1 of the Convention on Genocide
authorizes all State Parties to prevent or punish the crime of genocide, but that it
does not specify measures that a State Party may take to fulfill this obligation.114
112
iCC Judges amend the Regulations of the Court in connection with the activation of jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression, internet: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-amend-
regulations-court-connection-activation-jurisdiction-over-crime-aggression
113
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Gambia v. Myanmar), Jurisdiction, 22 July 2022, para. 93–114.
114
of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), order, 16 March 2022, para. 56.
The Court stated, however, that the State Parties have to implement the obligation
in good faith, taking into account other parts of the Convention, and in particular
Articles Viii and iX and preamble.115 on the basis of Article Viii, the Court
reminds, a State Party, when considers that genocide is occurring on territory of
another State Party, can ask the competent organs of the United Nations to take
appropriate measures.116 Besides, the Court recalled that a State Party can, on the
basis of Article iX, submit to the international Court of Justice a dispute on
interpretation or implementation of the Convention.117 The Court added that a State
Party can take also other measures, but it stressed that any measure may be taken
only in limits permitted by international law.118 Acts taken for prevention or
punishment of genocide, the Court explained, have to be in accordance with spirit
and purposes of the United Nations, as they are laid down in Article 1 of the
Charter. in connection with that, the Court quoted the first purpose, as stated in
Article 1 and which relates to maintenance of international peace and security.119
The Court informed that it would decide the merits of the claims of Ukraine if the
case comes to appropriate phase of proceedings.120 in the current phase of
proceedings, the Court stated that it did not possess evidence that genocide was
perpetrated on the territory of Ukraine.121 The Court continued: “Moreover, it is
doubtful that the Convention, in light of its object and purpose, authorizes a
Contracting Party’s unilateral use of force in the territory of another State for the
purpose of preventing or punishing an alleged genocide.”122 in such circumstances
the Court considered that Ukraine had “a plausible right not to be subjected to
military operations by the Russian Federation for the purpose of preventing and
punishing an alleged genocide in the territory of Ukraine.”123 Thus, the Court
ordered the Russian Federation to cease the use of force against Ukraine. in spite
of the fact that the Court did not take a definitive position on unilateral use of force
for preventing genocide on territory of another State Party, the statements of the
Court are relevant for general issue of legality of humanitarian intervention and,
it seems, they are supporting more lawyers who considered unilateral intervention
without authorization of the Security Council illegal, than the opposite group.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid., para. 57.
119
of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), op.cit.
120
Ibid., para. 59.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid., para. 60.
CONCLUSION
The issue of legality of humanitarian intervention is among the most complex
and the most serious issues of international law. The complexity is generated by
the fact that core of the issue consists of conflict between two fundamental interests
of international community: maintenance of international peace and security, on
the one hand, and preservation of human lives, on the other hand. Besides,
complexity is amplified by facts that the Charter does not explicitly address the
issue, that action of the Security Council can be blocked by a veto, and that
humanitarian concerns can be used to mask geopolitical interests. it is not strange
that international lawyers are divided about the issue. it seems that opinion that
unilateral intervention is not legal prevails. Authors, who thought that it can be
legal, enumerate strict conditions for its legality. Heads of States and Governments
of Members of the United Nations reached a consensus at the session of the
General Assembly in 2005 that humanitarian intervention may be taken only under
authorization of the Security Council. in spite of the fact that the consensus has
been inspired by the doctrine “responsibility to protect,” it seems that an opinion
prevailed that the responsibility is only moral. Besides, the compromise does not
touch the problem of veto. Entering into force of the amendment to the Statute of
the international Criminal Court, which defined the crime of aggression, an
effective legal mechanism has been created for evaluation of legality of
humanitarian intervention in some particular cases. it is a disappointing fact that
relatively small number of State Parties accepted the amendment. Two decisions
of the international Court of Justice from 2022 contributed to consideration of
legality of humanitarian intervention. Deciding on admissibility of Gambia’s
application against Myanmar, submitted on the basis of Article iX of the
Convention on Genocide, the Court confirmed that every State Party to the
Convention has the right to initialize proceeding when considers that another State
Party is in a breach of the Convention. if there were doubts whether a State Party,
which is not directly affected by a breach of the Convention, has a standing before
the Court, the doubts are now dispelled. Decision of the Court on Ukraine’s request
for preliminary measures against the Russian Federation is particularly important
for considerations of legality of humanitarian intervention. The Court stated that
measures taken for prevention or punishment of the crime of genocide have to be
in accordance with spirit and purposes of the United Nations as they are determined
in Article 1 of the Charter and it quoted the first purpose relating to international
peace and security. Saying that it is doubtful whether unilateral military
intervention would be compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention
on Genocide, the Court unfortunately did not take final position on the matter, but
it seems that all what the Court stated inclined more against unilateral intervention.
international developments in the last decades are running in direction of creation
of a rule which prohibits unilateral military intervention without permission of
competent organs of the United Nations, on the one hand, and which obliges the
competent organs of the UN to take adequate measures in due time. in a case of

blockade of the Security Council by a veto, that role should be taken by the General
Assembly.
PoNoVo o LEGALNoSTi HUMANiTARNE iNTERVENCiJE
APSTRAKT
Pitanje legalnosti humanitarne intervencije je jedno od najsloženijih i najtežih
pitanja međunarodnog prava. Uopšte ne iznenađuje da su pozicije država i
mišljenja međunarodnih pravnika podeljena oko tog pitanja. Rasprava među
pravnicima otkriva njegovu složenost. ipak, članice Ujedinjenih nacija postigle
su politički kompromis u vezi sa tim pitanjem 2005. godine. Stupanjem na snagu
amandmana na Statut Međunarodnog krivičnog suda o krivičnopravnoj definiciji
zločina agresije stvoren je efikasan mehanizam za ispitivanje legalnosti
humanitarne intervencije u nekim slučajevima. odluke Međunarodnog suda
pravde iz 2022. godine, čine značajan doprinos razmatranju legalnosti
humanitarne intervencije uopšte. Uprkos nekim divergentnim slučajevima,
dinamika međunarodnog prava i međunarodnih odnosa u prvim dekadama 21.
veka, ide u pravcu zahteva da humanitarna intervencija bude zasnovana na
ovlašćenjima Saveta bezbednosti ili Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija.
Ključne reči: humanitarna intervencija, agresija, genocid.
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) order,
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World of Equals, Belgrade, 2014.
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17. iCC Judges amend the Regulations of the Court in connection with the
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https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-amend-regulations-court-connection-
activation-jurisdiction-over-crime-aggression
18. Johnson, Larry D., “Uniting for Peace’: Does it Still Serve Any Useful
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Kosovo intervention, American Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 93,
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SOME PRELIMINARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

CONSIDERATIONS ON SECESSION
Gian Luigi CECCHiNi*
ABSTRACT
The relevant international legal discussion deals with the phenomenon of secession.
Through the synthesis of legal doctrine and practice, the author raised a large number
of legal and political issues of essential importance for the existence of states with
this discussion. Through a clear theoretical discussion, the author points to the
absence of codified rules on secession, which leaves a lot of room for insufficiently
reliable criteria by which this phenomenon could be considered legally justified and
grounded in international law. Previous empirical experiences on secession based
on the concept of decolonization and liberation from domination, exploitation and
oppression have an accessory meaning for contemporary international practice. This
is understandable to some extent, because the legitimacy of contemporary secessions
derives primarily from domestic reasons that assume the existence of severe forms
of state repression, systemic discrimination or gross violation of human rights, which
ultimately prevents the realization of the right of various social groups to internal
self-determination. Based on these circumstances, the author points to certain
problems regarding the external and internal dimensions of the right to self-
determination, and the conflict of norms that exists within international law and on
whose regulation the realization of secession in practice depends. Whether and to
what extent the realization of secession will be successful in practice depends not
only on international political circumstances, but also on real social conditions
within the states where the rules and principles of positive international law are
applied. in this regard, the author systematically examined the role of the
international legal principle of sovereignty in the process of secession, indicating
that its respect is imposed in the context of respect for the principle of non-
interference (or non-intervention), which prohibits states and international
organizations from interfering in the internal affairs of independent states. Given
that foreign interventions in connection with secession often violate the
aforementioned prohibition, the author believed that their role and implications in
this process should be examined in more detail.
Key words: Secession, self-determination, sovereignty, independence,
international law
*
University of Trieste, Department of Social and Political Studies; University Niccolò Cusano,
Roma. E-mail: gianluigi.cecchini@hotmail.it
INTRODUCTION
one fact is well established: we are facing a progressive increase in the
constitutive population of the international community. This means that you need to
deepen your understanding, focusing on the phenomenon of creation, birth of the
state. At the beginning, it is enough to remember that the approach to statehood can
take place in ways that, although different from each other, are based on the
acquisition of two basic material elements for building a state: territory and
population. Given that there are no longer “terre nullius” in the world, the formation
of a new state necessarily implies the alienation of a part of an already existing state,
which is a circumstance that is the main problem of state creation. it cannot be
disputed that disintegration, dissolution, merger, incorporation, devolution or
decolonization have in themselves played an important role in the expansion of the
international community. However, our attention is focused on a more controversial
modality of territorial changes, namely the secession of states. Understanding what
is meant by this term inevitably goes beyond its definition. in this regard, it has been
said that secession is one, action pacifique ou violente par laquelle une partie de la
population d’un État se détache volontairement de celui-ci pour s’intégrer à un autre
État ou former un État nouveau, which is, séparation d’une partie du territoire d’un
État préexistant, qui laisse subsister celui-ci, or again, secession is an effort to remove
oneself from the scope of the State’s authority (…), by redrawing the boundaries so
that one is not included within them.1
There is an important difference between these two definitions, as one focuses
on the territorial factor, the second on the population element and the third, finally,
on the authority of the state. But, despite their differences, all these definitions, on
closer inspection, are correct, because they indicate different points of view about
the same phenomenon. A precise, complete definition of what is meant by the word
secession is therefore impossible to find, both because of the complexity of the
mechanism and because of the existence of restrictive and extensive concepts of this
term. Secession can have a very broad meaning, in which case it would include all
types of state collapse, regardless of scale, context or end result. Strictly speaking,
however, there is no unequivocal conception of what is and what is not Art Nouveau,
all the more so given that the scope of the definition varies from author to author.
Here we will therefore try to give our idea of what is meant by secession.
At the outset, we exclude the case of independence through decolonization, a
case governed by special rules of international law. We are not even considering
the case of competing governments tasked with controlling the same territory, as
was the case in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Still different is the
1
Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire Juridique, Association Henri Capitant, Paris, 2009, pp. 848–849 ;
Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Mathias Forteau, Droit International Public, LGDJ, Paris, 2022,
p. 584; Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination”,
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1995, Vol. 24 n. 2, p. 144.
case of state disintegration, which occurs when a previously existing state breaks
up into several new state entities, thereby putting an end to the existence of the
predecessor state.2 This case is very problematic because in many points it is
identified with secession, and the three most frequently mentioned examples are:
1) the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; 2) the division of
Czechoslovakia and, 3) the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. We do not consider
the first two cases because they are not disputed like the third case whose legal
qualification remains controversial and therefore relevant to our analysis.3 The
mentioned situations could be used in the case of incidental questions in which
the parallelism between them would prove to be constructive in order to better
understand the contours of the secession regime. Marcelo Cohen excludes from
the sphere of secession the case of a predecessor state that agreed to the separation
of part of its territory.4 on the other hand, John Dugard, in a course held at the
Academy of international Law in The Hague, adopts the same approach at the
outset by distinguishing between secession and devolution, but does not hesitate
to point out the difficulties this distinction presents in practice. For example, the
secession of Eritrea with the consent of Ethiopia? Can independence from Eritrea
after years of civil war be configured as a case of secession or devolution?5 i think
it is desirable to avoid the adoption of such a restrictive concept, but the
implications of both the consent and lack of consent of the “home” state cannot
be ignored. From a material point of view, therefore, secession can be a
manifestation of a separatist desire, as can the irredentism of a part of the
population present in the territory, but which does not lead to the creation of a new
state, but leads to the transfer of sovereignty over the territory and the given
population from one existing state to another. Finally, it should be mentioned that
the problem of secession does not concern a certain geographical area, but practical
examples come from all continents of the world. This means that the issue is felt
everywhere and has its roots in the distant past. We will limit ourselves to some
recent cases, those from the last three decades, in order to explore the phenomenon
in the light of contemporary international law.
THE SECESSION OF THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA

in order to better illustrate the role of state secession in international law, we
can start from a concrete, recent case, which is the case of Crimea, a Black Sea
peninsula whose sovereignty passed from Ukraine to Russia in 2014. Here we
2
Christopher H. Wellman, op.cit.
3
Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Mathias Forteau, op.cit., p. 584.
4
Marcelo Kohen, “introduction”, in: Kohen M. (Ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives,
Cambridge, 2006, pp. 2–3.
5
John Dugard, The Secession of States and their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, in Recueil
des Cours, 2011, pp. 24–26.
limit ourselves to the questions raised so far, without a detailed analysis of the case
and the developments that could follow it, given that the fluidity of the situation
has matured since the start of the Russian special military operation on February
24. 2022.6 it is known that on March 18, 2014, the Crimean peninsula (consisting
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol) joins
the Russian Federation as a new federal entity, after six decades of belonging to
Ukraine. in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev decided to transfer this territory with a
predominantly Russian ethnic and Russian-speaking population from the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.7
However, what at that time was just a mere change of administrative boundaries,
given that the transfer was still taking place within the Soviet Socialist Federal
Republic, took on a completely new meaning in 1991, when with the fall of the
USSR, applying the principle uti possidetis juris, found Crimea on the “wrong”
side of the state border, while Russians living in this area simultaneously became
citizens of Ukraine.8 The following years were full of political oscillations and
events, as is well known.9 A conflict ensued that affected not only Crimea, but the
whole of Ukraine. The origin of the turmoil lies in the condemnation of the
association agreement with the European Union by the pro-Russian Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, which shows the organization’s desire to extend its
influence to the border with Russia.10 This was manifested through statements that
Ukraine is an “expansion area” of the Union. Yanukovych, the democratically
elected president, tried to present his own choice to the West, only to become the
victim of a coup d’état after several months of carefully orchestrated protests.11
The coming to power of the anti-Russian opposition caused great concern among
the Russian-speaking population in the east and south of the country. After a short-
term overcoming of tensions, a political crisis occurred in Ukraine. The reason for
its initiation was the abolition of the Russian language as a regional language in
Crimea and other territories of the state, by the decision of the authorities in Kiev,
which resulted in the acceleration of irredentist demands on the peninsula.12 on
6
G.L. Cecchini, “L’operazione militare speciale russa”, Rivista della cooperazione giuridica
internazionale, 2022, vol. 70, pp. 47–83.
7
Emmanuelle Armandon, La Crimée entre Russie et Ukraine : un conflit qui n’a pas eu lieu,
Bruylant, Paris, 2012, pp. 17–18.
8
Giuseppe Nesi, L’uti possidetis iuris nel diritto internazionale, CEDAM, Padova, 1996.
9
Ibid.
10
Regis Bismuth, “odyssée dans le conundrum des réactions décentralisées à l’illicite”, Journal
du Droit International, 2014, n. 3, p. 780.
11
The oSCE in its report on the progress of the presidential elections in 2010 describes them as
“transparent and honest”. internet: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844?
download=true,2.8.2022.; G. Luigi Cecchini, Giuseppe Liani, Il colpo di Stato. Media e diritto
internazionale, Padova, 2012, p. 102.
12
“Canceled language law in Ukraine sparks concern among Russian and EU diplomats”, 27
February 2014, internet: https://www.rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/ 2.8.2022.
March 16, 2014, citizens of the Crimean peninsula were asked to comment on one
of two questions raised in the referendum: a) the reunification of Crimea with
Russia and, b) keeping Crimea within Ukraine? 95.5 percent of voters voted for
the first option. Crimea declared independence and asked to join the Russian
Federation.13 Two days later, Vladimir Putin made the reunion official. Crimea
became Russian again, just as it had been for centuries until Nikita Khrushchev’s
sudden decision.14 Therefore, the reunification of Crimea with Russia is part of
the crisis caused by the violent inter-ethnic conflict that hit Ukraine in connection
with the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia in 2014. This act
took place in the circumstances of the state of emergency, ie. tensions, which
surprised the actors who were active in different capacities in the Ukrainian
national context, and in general, in the European post-Soviet area. The act of
annexation, which the Russian government carried out decisively and flexibly,
combined with the separatist movement, caused a wide and critical response in
the international community. The operation, which saw Ukraine deprived of a
strategically important region, was deemed a serious attack on the European
territorial balance system sanctioned with the end of the Cold War. The result was
the tightening of East/West relations in reaction to the forced modification of the
diplomatic political order agreed between the Great Powers interested in stability
on the continent.15 A condition of stability, as recent developments show, is closely
related to the political evolution of the post-Soviet area between Russia and the
European Union, of which Ukraine is the most important national state.16 The state
of persistent insecure coexistence is characteristic of the relationship between the
Ukrainian and Russian communities.17 it also has a decisive influence on the
emergence of the crisis that hit Ukraine, leading to the secession of Crimea. in this
regard, we touch on the element of contradiction underlying the fragility of the
Ukrainian regime that is destined to dramatically condition the evolution of the
country: a fact, aggravated by the closeness with Russia that goes beyond the
territorial dimension, made up of the tensions inherent in the multi-ethnic and
multicultural configuration of Ukraine. on the one hand, represented by the
presence of the Ukrainian majority community that prevails in the western regions
(Galicia, Volhynia and Podolia) and more limited in the central ones, while on the
other hand by the large concentration of the Russian minority community in the
13
“Crimea referendum: Voters back Russia union”, BBC, 16 March 2014, internet:
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 2.8.2022.
14
“Address by President of the Russian Federation”, 18 March 2014, internet: 2.8.2022.
15
Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainian Crisis what it means for the West, Yale University Press, 2014;
T. C. Amar, Nikolai Petro, “Should Ukraine and the West accept Crimea joining Russia?”, Real
News Network, March 2014.
16
M. Di Liddo, “Un exit Strategy per la Crisi in Ucraina”, Ce.s.i, Settembre 2014, pp. 1–28.
17
Alexander M. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarism, Council on Foreign
Relations Books, New York, 1993.
eastern and southern regions (Donbass, Novorossya and Crimea). it is the

rootedness of two groups that, despite the centuries-old intertwining of relations,
are deeply divided on the ethno-cultural, and therefore political level, as well as
two explicitly opposing interpretations of the identity and history of Ukraine. For
the Ukrainian community, the goal is to work to develop its national culture in all
its fullness for an ethnically homogeneous Ukraine, overcoming the legacy of
Russian culture prevalent in the country.18 in this sense, it is essentially hostile
towards Russia, because it perceives Russia as an oppressive power. The
orientation that is presented to her as a civilizational choice goes in the direction
of Europe. However, it is possible that Ukraine forgets that Europe has already
experienced the tragedy of countries that strived for ethnic homogeneity.
The Russian community, on the other hand, aspires to a more coherent Ukraine
with a separate identity, but closely connected to Russia due to the consistency of
historical, cultural and economic ties. Faced with an alternative, as shown by the
case of Crimea and then Donbass, Russia is not oriented towards the European
Union. From the above, it is clear that the two communities oppose each other
with conceptions imbued with a deep emotional charge that is especially cultivated
by the radical components, which makes it difficult to develop a common vision
of the Ukrainian identity.19 The context in which the secession of Crimea took
place with its political consequences must be appreciated in the light of the
overthrow of the pro-Russian government of President Yanukovych at the end of
February 2014. This overthrow began as a protest demonstration, as a reaction to
the official refusal inspired by the Kremlin to sign the agreement on accession to
the European Union, which gradually led to a direct confrontation between the
authorities and the mass of demonstrators, monopolized by the most militant
Ukrainian nationalist sectors, which were not exempted. from neo-Nazi tendencies.
Nationalist promoters of the Ukrainian regime are inspired by Ukrainian national
values whose goal is to bring the Russian minority into a subordinate position.
interpretations regarding the causes and evolution of the Maidan revolution clearly
differ: for representatives of the Ukrainian community and European and American
governments that support its claims, regime change through the use of coercive
means must be justified given that the rebellion was promoted under emergency
conditions; for the Russian community and the Kremlin, the guarantor of the ruling
power, the rebellion that led to the coup d’état was caused by the interference of
the West and a government that was left without legitimacy. The perverse game
of their mistrust, fueled by stereotypes and prejudices rooted in the imaginary of
the two communities, Ukrainian and Russian, inevitably turned into an accentuated
conflict dimension in mutual relations. in circumstances marked by widespread
insecurity and growing opposition as a result of a sudden and violent change in
18
G.L. Cecchini, op. cit.
19
Henry E. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism in Eurasia and the World,
University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
institutional structure, there has been an “ethnicization” of parties, which implies

a strengthening of the sense of identification with the respective community to
which they belong. This caused a situation in which there was widespread violence.
With this in mind, the Russian annexation of Crimea is a symbol of the close
connection between internal events and international relations, which resulted in
the outbreak of a crisis that is still in full swing.
At the head of the protest organized by representatives of the southeastern
regions of the Kiev line, Crimean leaders strongly resisted the government’s
attempt to intrude into the administration of the peninsula. The call for the right to
self-determination in a referendum at the end of March in order to restore the status
of full autonomy, which later turned into a demand for independence, confirmed
the nature of the views widely spread among the Russian population of the
peninsula. Attitudes of alienation from the central authorities appeared on several
occasions during the evolution of Ukrainian independence, reflecting the eccentric
position that Crimea occupied in the system of relations between the Ukrainian
central authorities and those on the periphery.20 A number of factors contributed
to the justification of the referendum – organized under the protection of Russian
military contingents who intervened in the territory in support of those stationed
at the Sevastopol military-naval base, which Moscow leased for thirty years. This
is supported by over 60% of the pro-Russian population compared to the Ukrainian
and Tatar minorities in Crimea, then the inclusion of Crimea at the end of the
eighteenth century in the state complex of imperial Russia, and then the Soviet
Union, which was subsequently transferred from the Russian Federation to the
Ukrainian Republic by an act from 1954 . in addition to these arguments, the
emotional relationships that bind the population to the common Russian homeland
are cemented by the memory of the military epic, which primarily refers to the
great patriotic war of 1941–45, fought on the territory of the peninsula. The
progress of the referendum, which was formally legitimized by the mass
participation of the population in favor of secession, was, even in the absence of
impartial foreign observers, free from coercive pressure on the electorate. The
initial ambiguities about what institutional conformation to ascribe to the state of
neo-independence that emerged from the referendum were quickly overcome by
Moscow’s decision to proceed with the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian
state. Rejecting the hypothesis of a transitional formula on the example of the one
that, with Russian support for local secessionist movements, led to the birth of a
series of proto-states in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South ossetia – the Kremlin
opted for a different choice, disrupting relations with Western powers. The ultimate
question is much less discussed for now, both in the media and in legal circles.
20
in 1998, following a change of government determined by the rise of Ukrainian parties in favor
of strengthening the powers of the central authorities, Crimea was deprived of most of the
prerogatives inherent in its status as an autonomous region, arousing the reactions of local
representatives of the Russian community.
Consequently, this act will lead to a succession of states with all its domestic and
international implications for Crimea, Ukraine and Russia. The problem of
changing the citizenship of the population of Crimea cannot go unnoticed.21 An
analysis of this case reveals a host of legal issues that arise whenever we are faced
with secession. Many parallels were drawn with the situation in Kosovo and, to
that end, the advisory opinion of the international Court of Justice on the matter
was cited as a precedent.22 As to the general question of the legality of secession
in international law, part of the doctrine continues to affirm that international law
maintains the position of not allowing secession.23,24 From this point of view, the
emergence of states is an extra-juridical phenomenon where the law is limited to
the very statement of this act, and nothing more. international law serves only as
an observer of the creation of states (including the case of secession).25 James
Crawford does not accept, however, the theory according to which the formation
of a state would be a simple question of effectiveness: “For international law to
concede that its most fundamental concept is purely a question of fact would
amount to a form of unilateral disarmament”.26 The same goes for Marcelo Kohen,
according to whom international law would have a lot to say about the creation of
states and above all about secession.27 Therefore, it is a matter of understanding
what is the role of international law in the case of secession. The question is current
in continuity, because before Crimea there were cases of South Sudan, Kosovo,
East Timor and other cases. in Tibet, in Catalonia, in Kurdistan, the problem is
still burning. if the issue of secession is a constant concern of the international
community, the role of international law in this matter has yet to be defined.
Therefore, the focus is on the clarification of various legal issues that arise from
the secession of states in the light of state practice and positive international law.
For example, what are the different principles of international law that come into
play before, during, and after secession that lead to its justification or
condemnation? Hence, the question of secession is a question of understanding
and the “procedural” aspects that follow this act.
21
oxana Shevel, The Aftermath of the Annexation: Russia and Ukraine Adopt Conflicting Rules
for Changing Citizenship of Crimean Residents, in European Union Democracy Observatory
on Citizenship, internet: http://eudocitizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1113-the-aftermath-of-
annexation-russia-and-ukraine-adopt-conflictingrules-for-changing-citizenship-of-crimean-reside
nts.
22
Christian Marxsen, “The Crimea Crisis – An international Law Perspective”, Heidelberg Journal
of International Law, 2014, vol. 74, pp. 367–391, pp. 379–380.
23
Anouche Baudouin, Uti possidetis et sécession, Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses, Paris, 2011,
pp. 10–13.
24
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon Press, oxford, 2006.
25
Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Mathias Forteau, op.cit., p. 574.
26
Crawford J., op.cit., p. vi.
27
Marcelo Kohen, op.cit., pp. 3–6.
DIFFICULT RECONCILIATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTING RULES
The success or failure of secession depends, according to some, not on
international law but on international politics.28 Secession is often considered a
behavior that is not regulated by international law, as shown by the statement on the
secession of Kosovo formulated by Judge Bruno Sima, according to which, la
neutralité du droit international sur certains points indique simplement qu’il existe
des domaines qui n ’ont pas encore été réglementés par him et qui peut-être ne le
seront jamais.29 The success or failure of secession would therefore depend on the
mere discretion of the international community without any other legal consideration,
a judgment that inevitably varies according to the doctrinal orientation and political
assessment of the moment. We note that this thesis is primarily advocated by lawyers,
while actors of international law constantly try to justify their positions against
secession with arguments based on international law. Therefore, it is necessary to
take into account the fact that, in one way or another, international law regulates the
creation of states, even if incidentally. The principles underlying the act of secession
are of great importance for international law: “The desire for secession restrained
by the principle of sovereignty hides the thirst for self-determination.” From this
point of view, secession is often considered a conflict between the principle of
people’s right to self-determination and the principle of state sovereignty (and more
broadly, territorial integrity), which is why the success or failure of secession would
have to rest on the triumph of one principle over the other.
THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION

AS THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT OF SECESSION
only one thing is certain in the matter of state secession, namely that no text, no
custom or jurisprudence explicitly establishes a right to secession. Nonetheless,
secessions are frequent in practice, and many of them result in the creation of a state
recognized by the international community. Moreover, secession is not explicitly
prohibited by international law. Separatists, separatists and irredentists, in search of
legal legitimacy, then had to look elsewhere to find a rule of international law that
would serve as the basis for a valid secession. Allen Buchanan cites, among others,
the consensus theory, that of rectifying justice and the argument of discriminatory
redistribution as possible foundations of a right of secession.30 However, we will not
consider these hypotheses, which, moreover, have never found a place in practice.
28
Constanza Margiotta, L’ultimo diritto : profili storici e teorici della secessione, il Mulino,
Bologna, 2005. pp.1–380.
29
CiJ, Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au
Kosovo, Déclaration de M. le juge Simma.
30
Allen Buchanan, “Towards a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, 1991, Vol. 101 no. 2, pp. 327–332;
Constanza Margiotta, op. cit., pp. 82, etc.
We will focus, however, on the third principle Buchanan insists on, which is the right
of peoples to self-determination. it is a principle that the actors of secession refer to
extensively. First of all, we will try to examine the outline of the principle represented
by the right of peoples to self-determination in order to better understand what
connections exist between this right and the possible right to secession, and then to
illuminate the difficulties presented by the principle itself, as well as the challenges
posed by secessionist theories.
THE MAIN THEORETICAL OUTLINES

OF THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
A study on the phenomenon of secession cannot but devote an important place
to the leading principle underlying the “theory of the right to secession”, which is
the right of the people to self-determination, which legitimizes the role of striving
for independence. Therefore, it is appropriate to first take an interest in this right,
which is invoked by the doctrines, politicians and movements of “iberation”
present in different parts of the world. Then it would be rational to examine the
progressive dedication of this international right from the foundation of its
existence to the evolution of its imperative character. The implications that
accompany the existence of the right of peoples to self-determination are
numerous. The right to self-determination is effective only if it is exercised. At the
same time, the methods of implementing the right to self-determination are
different in international practice. in this sense, the author will illustrate more
closely the relationship between self-determination and secession.
The Consecration of the Principle of Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination, represents one of the pillars of contemporary
international law, and at the same time represents one of its most controversial
aspects. its controversy with good reason stems from the fact that the law of nations
must be confronted with many fundamental principles of international law, especially
with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also with those related
to state jurisdiction and the application of international treaties.31 Self-determination
pushes international law beyond mere interstate relations and includes a study that
goes beyond just the legal context and touches on issues such as sociology,
philosophy, history, or geography.32 The very concept of the right of peoples to self-
determination seems to be a combination of the liberal idea of individual choice and
Marxist views on national liberation and human equality. This is an idea that delights
“political scientists” and hates lawyers, because, although the affirmation of this
31
Robert McCorquodale (Ed.), Self-Determination in International Law, Aldershot,
Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000, p. xi.
32
Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1992, p. 14.
principle is universal, its transposition as a legal norm of international law has proven
to be extremely complicated. Rupert Emerson considers the people’s right to self-
determination “no more and no less than an aspect of the right to revolution (...), a
right welcomed by a philosopher but not by a statesman”, considering that the
preservation of an organized society seems incompatible with the right of its
members to upset and overthrow the government at their own discretion. 33 The right
of the people to self-determination also has the peculiarity of being a collective right,
the realization of which is a sine qua non for the purposes of guaranteeing and
effective respect of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening
of these rights, as the Human Rights Committee claims.34 in this sense, collectivism
and individualism are reconciled, hence the popularity of its use in political language.
in reality, the legal definition of this principle is difficult if not impossible. Article
20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that, Tout peuple
a un droit imprescriptible et inaliénable à autodétermination. The détermine
librement son statut politique et assure son développement économique et social
selon la voie qu’il a librement choisie.35 There are those who believe that self-
determination is similar or even equal to self-government.36 it refers to the ability of
a person or group to create their own rules and manage their affairs at will. Nathaniel
Berman talks about the right of peoples to control their own destiny despite not
having yet achieved state independence under international law, and this is because
traditionally only statehood can confer international legal subjectivity on a group.37
The right of peoples to self-determination would therefore essentially be a transitional
right that allows a group, a “people”, to have a specific role in international law in
order to claim and control their collective rights and destiny. But the biggest difficulty
of this definition remains the ability to define what is meant by the word “people”.
The right of peoples to self-determination was born, in its present conception, after
the First World War with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The American
President, in his speech to Congress, argued that: “Peoples and provinces are not to
be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and
pawns in a game”.38 if the principle was not included in the fundamental texts of the
33
Ralph Emerson, “Self-Determination”, in: Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law, 1966, Vol. 60, p. 136.
34
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Article 1 (Twenty-first session, 1984),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRi/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994).
35
“Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples”, internet: http://www.achpr.org/fr/
instruments/achpr/.2.2.2022.
36
Adina Preda, “The Principle of Self-Determination and National Minorities”, Dialectical
Anthropology,2003, vol. 27, n. 3, p. 206.
37
Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance, in: McCorquodale R. (Ed.), Self-Determination in
International Law, Aldershot, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000, p. 52.
38
“President Wilson’s Addendum to the Fourteen Points”, 11 February 1918, internet: http://www.
firstworldwar.com/source/fourteenpoints_wilson2.htm.1.5.2022.
organization, a certain recognition of this right was nevertheless obtained with the
introduction of the system of mandates, applied, aux territoires détachés de la
souveraineté allemande ou turque, et habités par des peuples non encore capables
de se diriger eux-mêmes, le prince que le bien-être et le développement des
communautés forment une mission sacrée de la civilization, et que la tutelle de ces
peuples doit être confiée à des nations plus avancées dans le progrès qui l ’ exerceront
en qualité de mandataires et au nom de la Société des Nation.39 it follows that the
right to self-determination was therefore recognized, although not immediately
applicable, so that the European powers intended to “guide” these peoples in their
quest for self-determination. At this stage, however, the principle was still considered
a political ideal rather than a legal norm of international law, an aspiration rather
than an imperative. This is clear in the report on the Åland islands issue. A
commission of lawyers appointed by the Council of the League of Nations came to
the conclusion that the principle of self-determination is not a positive rule of
international law. With the birth of the United Nations, the right of peoples to self-
determination was consecrated as a positive legal norm of international law. The
Charter of the United Nations in Article 1 (2) as well as in Article 55 unequivocally
mentions this right, which is now an integral part of the international legal order.
Some Juridical Problems Raised by the Secession

This situation raises a number of legal problems: both sides invoke
international law in support of their claims, sometimes invoking the same principle
for the opposite thesis. it should be noted that international law is invoked more
and more in support of party theses, without any respect for the arguments of the
other side. This, on the one hand, suggests that international law is not real law;
on the other hand, it indirectly confirms that there is no legal field that is more
closely related to politics than the international one. Among the various areas of
law, therefore, international is the one that is most affected by political life as it is
articulated in the international community. Therefore, it is the shortsightedness of
a positivist lawyer or political scientist to believe that international law is not
strictly law just because one gets the impression that the rules are not accompanied
by sanctions. Considering that law and punishment (law and force) may not be
closely related to each other, the international community differs from the national
community in that it is an inorganic community, because it does not have a superior
structure, which is a circumstance that does not deprive it of its characteristics
community. it is therefore understandable that the parties refer to international law
while proceeding from different, conflicting assumptions. But for this very reason,
it cannot be said that the motivation of some is superior, more correct than that of
others. Therefore, we will try to enumerate the issues of international law that have
arisen so far in the context of the above-mentioned crisis. And not only that: we
39
Norman Bentwich, Le système des mandats, in Recueil des Cours, 1929, p. 122.
will also be careful not to adopt the position of certain academics who, as duly
noted, s’alignent comme un seul homme derrière le monolithe médiatique pour
condamner l’attitude russe, but, at the same time, we will not adopt an openly pro-
Russian stance to try to justify all the actions of the Kremlin. 40 Therefore, we will
try, as far as possible, to ignore political considerations and to perform a legal
analysis of the issue. Even if legal considerations are often imbued with ideological
controversy, our preference for one or the other will be legally motivated, not
adopted out of mere convenience. The Crimean authorities, backed by the Kremlin,
invoked the “right of peoples to self-determination” as a principle of international
law, thus justifying their choice to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. However,
Ukraine, the European Union and the United States of America have rejected this
thesis by presenting different arguments, among which the théorie de l’eau salée
stands out.41 Therefore, the first problem arises around the principle of self-
determination, its scope and its applicability. Arguments about the illegality of
Russian intervention and the violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity were then
presented against secession.42 The legitimacy of the referendum held in Crimea is
also contested, both in terms of international law and Ukrainian constitutional
law.43 These different arguments affect, in one way or another, the principle of
state sovereignty, which is a legal obstacle to the legitimacy of secession, which
again emphasizes its unambiguous political and extralegal nature.44 Then there is
the problem of recognizing the de facto and de jure situation, given that some
countries such as Armenia, Nicaragua, Bolivia recognized the reunification of
Crimea with Russia, while others such as the European Union and other countries
such as the USA categorically denied it, and many others, such as China and india
are reticent or ambiguous on this subject.45 What are the implications in
international law if secession is recognized or not? Examples that illustrate the
close correlation between secessionist logic and the pursuit of self-determination
are not only numerous but also varied. This feeling is revealed both in democratic
societies and among oppressed peoples. But this correlation does not only exist in
40
Carlo Santulli, “La crise ukrainienne: position du problème”, Revue générale de droit
international public, 2014, no.4, p. 800.
41
Ibid., p. 807.
42
Marcelo Kohen, “L’Ukraine et le respect du droit international”, Le Temps, 13 mars 2014.
Интернет: http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/a02807b0-a9fa-11e3-a7f6006044306642/L
Ukraine_et_le_respect_du_droit_international.
43
Christian Marxsen, “The Crimea Crisis – An international Law Perspective”, Heidelberg Journal
of International Law, 2014, Vol. 74, pp. 377–379.
44
The West has tended to point out, oblivious to the case of Kosovo, which at the time had already
been indicated by the most astute scholars as a dangerous precedent, the illegitimacy of the recent
referendums for the independence of the two separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk.
45
Theodore Christakis T., “Les conflits de sécession en Crimée et dans l’est de l’Ukraine et le droit
international”, Journal du Droit International, 2014, no. 3, p. 735.
terms of feelings, but is also affirmed in some national texts. For example, the
former Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia provided that
the latter constituted a communauté de peuples égaux en droits qui, en vertu du
droit des peuples à disposer d’eux mêmes, and compris celui de sécession, ont
exprimé leur will de vivre ensemble dans un État fédératif.46 After that, the
Constitution of 1974 declaratively confirmed the right of peoples within socialist
Yugoslavia to self-determination. The constitution of the U.S.S.R. of 1977 in its
article 70 underlines the multinational character of the country, formed following
the “autodétermination libre des nations et leur association volontaire” before
article 72 confirmed that, Chaque république de l’union reteens le droit de
librement faire sécession de the U.S.S.R.47 of course, one can doubt the actual
ability of these entities to “freely” decide to secede from their regimes.
Nevertheless, these constitutional provisions indicate a certain idea of what is
meant by the term self-determination, including the right to secession as an indirect
right. This conception is all the more interesting because it is internal to both
socialist federations in which most of the secessionist movements developed in
the last thirty years. From the point of view of international law, the preceding
examples are far from validating the actual extension of the right of peoples to
self-determination to the right of secession.48 However, it cannot be denied that
although this conception is not unanimously shared, it exists and cannot be easily
dismissed, because if it is true that nothing in international law permits secession,
it is no less true that there is nothing that prohibits it. But even in this perspective,
secession is only the last stage of the implementation of the people’s right to self-
determination, because it is necessary to express the will of the people to assert
itself through an independent state, that is, in the case of irredentism, to express
the will to enter another independent state.49 The “plebiscite theory” is the most
common aspect of this manifestation of will, because it predicts that in the case of
holding a referendum in a territory on an issue related to the acquisition of
independence, if the referendum leads to a positive result, the population has a
legitimate right to secession. it goes without saying that affirming the right to
secede after a referendum in favor of this option would open the door to the
fragmentation of the international community. This theory is therefore certainly
exaggerated, but its merit lies in the importance given to the term “self-
determination” as a result of the concrete choice of “people”, which is often
common in practice. The Machakos Protocol, which was one of the decisive steps
46
“Constitution de la République populaire fédérale de Yougoslavie“, 1946. Traduction en anglais,
internet: http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia_1946. 2.2.2022.
47
“Constitution de l’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques“, 1977. il testo inglese,
internet: http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html.2.2.2022.
48
CiJ, Kosovo, Requête pour avis consultatif du 10 octobre 2008, par. 84 .
49
Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State”, Ethics, 2002, vol.112, no. 3,
pp. 561–56.
on the way to the independence of South Sudan, clearly established that, “the
people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a
referendum to determine their future status”.50 This referendum was finally held
in January 2011 and led to a recognized and orderly secession after decades of
conflict. Article 60 of the Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
sanctioned the possibility of secession only after the referendum, which was held
on May 21, 2006. East Timor’s independence was made possible by an agreement
concluded between indonesia and Portugal, which guaranteed the people of East
Timor to determine their future status through an act of self-determination to be
held under the auspices of the United Nations.51 Also within the framework of the
United Nations, there is a peacekeeping operation expressly called “Mission des
Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un Référendum au Sahara occidental”, one
of whose main functions is the eventual organization of a self-determination
referendum.52 in 2000, following a law passed by the federal parliament of Canada
regarding its jurisdiction to determine the validity of a possible new referendum
on the secession of Quebec, Quebec legislators adopted an act confirming the right
of the people of Quebec to express themselves through a referendum whose
modalities do not depend on the appreciation of the federal government.53 From
the above examples, it can be seen that self-determination by calling a referendum
is undoubtedly the best way to legitimize eventual secession. Badinter’s
commission for Yugoslavia, for example, advised not to recognize the
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, given that no referendum was held that
would precede its declaration of independence.54 Does this perhaps indicate that
the referendum is the only means of implementing the people’s right to self-
determination? The secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) took place in
1971, and was widely recognized by the international community, although not
the result of a referendum, but a unilateral declaration of independence that led to
a violent armed conflict with Pakistani forces.55 other cases of secession for the
unilateral declaration of independence have also caused armed conflicts, but this
50
“Machakos Protocol”, 20 July 2002, internet: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/iMG/pdf/
iGAD.pdfhttp://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_020710_MachakosProtoco
l.pdf. 5.3.2022.
51
“Agreement on East Timor Leste“, Интеренет: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/iD%20TL_990505_AgreementonEastTimor.pdf.12.5.2022.
52
Résolution 690 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, La situation concernant le Sahara
occidental, 29 avril 1991, S/RES/690(1991). internet: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/690%281991%29.
53
“Loi sur l’exercice des droits fondamentaux et des prérogatives du peuple québécois et de l’État
du Québec“, internet: http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-
99-36-1.html. 2.2.2022.
54
Commission d’arbitrage de la Conférence européenne pour la paix en Yougoslavie, opinion
nо. 10.
55
John Dugard, op.cit, pp. 146–148.
has not led to international recognition of the secessionist entity. Notable examples
include the secession of Katanga following the breakup of the Belgian Congo and
Biafra in its conflict with Nigeria.56 A more recent example of partially successful
secession, which was also the subject of an advisory opinion of the international
Court of Justice, is the unilateral declaration of independence by the temporary
self-governing institutions of Kosovo on February 17, 2008. The General
Assembly of the United Nations, in light of the numerous reactions of many of its
members to this declaration, on the initiative of Serbia, decides to turn to the
international Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the
United Nations, for an advisory opinion on the possible compliance of the
unilateral declaration of independence with international law. The international
Court of Justice, deciding on the question, still managed to completely avoid
arguments about the scope of the right to self-determination and the existence of
the right to secession, considering that they do not fall within the scope of the
formulated request for an opinion.57 The Court therefore limited itself to re-
establishing the principle of neutrality of international law in relation to secession,
noting that, le droit international general implies no aucune interdiction applicable
des declarations d’independance.58 in short, the question of whether the self-
determination of a people can be materialized on the basis of a mere declaration
of independence formulated in the absence of any consultation with the people,
does not seem to have a definite answer. Although the Court confirmed the
conformity of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration with international law, it still did
not qualify this act as a means of implementing the people’s right to self-
determination. on the basis of such an opinion, it seemed that secession could
occur even without popular consultation and the declaration of the representatives
of the people in question, whether they are elected representatives within a certain
legal structure or leaders of the national liberation movement, provided that the
international society recognizes them as representatives people. Considering the
views expressed, we believe that there is no valid legal basis in the protests of the
West regarding the referendum on the annexation of NR Donbass, Luhansk and
Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions to Russia.
The External Dimension of the Principle of Self-Determination

Following the distinctions present in international legal theory, we can note
that what has been discussed so far represents only the “external” aspect of the
operation of the principle of self-determination, that is, the possibility of realizing
the right of peoples to self-determination. According to some authors, this external
56
Ibidem, pp. 126–128; 135–136.
57
CiJ, Kosovo, Requête pour avis consultatif du 10 octobre 2008.
58
Ibidem, Avis consultatif du 22 juillet 2010, par. 82–83.
aspect should be understood as the power of a nation to determine its status in

relation to other nations. People must therefore decide on one of the following
three options: 1) integration into the already existing state; 2) uniting with other
nations to create a common state and, 3) creating an independent state.59 The
constant reaffirmation of the international legal principle of self-determination of
peoples in state practice has fueled a certain fear in some multinational states,
which are afraid to see their territories dismembered based on the recognition of
the right to self-determination up to secession. This is where the theory of “inner”
self-determination comes from. Unlike external self-determination, which was
reserved for occupied or non-autonomous territories, internal self-determination
was suggested as a more desirable and privileged path for peoples living in
independent states.60 Some discussions have concluded that there are three degrees
of inner self-determination. First of all, the right of the people to choose their
political system is followed by the right of the people to express themselves in all
constitutional revisions and, finally, the right of the people to govern in order to
participate in public affairs, including elections and referendums.61 internal self-
determination is therefore separate from any right of secession. 62 However, internal
self-determination guarantees the choice of a system of government. The
dichotomy of internal and external law of nations is not present in any charter or
text of international organizations. Nevertheless, that dichotomy gained a lot of
space in the legal literature during the 1980s and was widely remembered in the
comments of various states in the case of Kosovo.63 The Supreme Court of Canada
in its famous judgment on the secession of Quebec states that, Les sources
reconnues du droit international établissent que le droit d’un peuple à disposer
de lui-même est normament réalisé par voie d’autodétermination intern – à savoir
la poursuite par ce peuple de son développement politique, économique, social et
culturel dans le cadre d’un État existant.64
However, the exact scope of the concept of internal self-determination still
remains shrouded in uncertainty, even if practice allows us to identify some
methods of application: for example, the peoples of Greenland and the Faroe
islands were able to enjoy their right to internal self-determination under the
59
Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, “on the (Human) Rights to Self-Determination and National Conflicts”,
in Gagnon A. & Sauca J.M. (eds), Negotiating Diversity, Brussels, 2014, pp. 163–164.
60
John Dugard, op.cit., p. 86.
61
Allan Rosas, “internal Self-Determination”, in Tomuschat C (Ed.), Modern Law of Self-
Determination, Boston, 1993, p. 227.
62
Katherine Del Mar, “The Myth of Remedial Secession”, in French D. (Ed.), Statehood and Self-
Determination, Cambridge, 2013, p. 87.
63
James Summers, Internal & External Aspects of Self-Determination, in Duncan French (Ed.).
Statehood and self-determination: reconciling tradition and modernity in international law,
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 229–231.
64
Cour Suprême du Canada, Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, 20 aout 1998, par. 126.
Danish Home Rule after receiving state power which enables them to
independently manage and preserve their specificities without separating from
Danish sovereignty.65 The same applies to the Cook islands and Niue in their
relations with New Zealand. But internal self-determination does not necessarily
take place through such complex constitutional constructions. it can arise as a
result of the simple freedom of the people to independently choose their
representatives and as a guarantee of representativeness recognized by them in
public institutions. internal self-determination can also take the form of state
recognition of certain language rights that apply to a particular group, such as those
that recognize the use of a language in official documents or in training. internal
self-determination has a continuous character, unlike external self-determination,
which is carried out ad hoc.66 Therefore, the host state must constantly respect the
internal aspect of the people’s right to self-determination, guaranteeing effective
participation and representativeness in the government. A logical question arises,
what happens if this warranty is terminated?
Part of the doctrine, in response to the internal and external dichotomy of the
people’s right to self-determination, developed a theory known as the “secession-
remedy” - if internal self-determination must always be privileged in the exercise
of the people’s right, one of its misunderstandings or violations of its application
would therefore involve the implementation external self-determination by all
possible means, including secession.67 Some American authors in this sense quote
the words of the “founding fathers: “Whenever any form of government becomes
destructive (...), it is the right of the people to change or abolish it, and to establish
a new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its
powers in such a form, which will most likely affect their safety and happiness”.
The report of the international commission on the Åland question could also serve
as a basis for the development of the theory of remedial secession. After Finland’s
independence from Russia, the people of the Åland islands demanded their right
to secede and unite with Sweden, a country with which they maintain historical
and cultural ties. The newly formed League of Nations decided to submit the case
to a committee of lawyers, which concluded the proceedings, stating that the
secession of a minority from the state of which it is a part and its annexation to
another state can only be an exceptional, final way to a solution that should be
addressed when the state does not guarantee religious, linguistic or social freedom
of this people.68 However, the Commission decided that in this case the peoples
65
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Question of Indigenous People’s Rights, in Duncan French (Ed.).
Statehood and self-determination: reconciling tradition and modernity in international law,
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 368–379.
66
Antonio Cassese, op.cit., p. 101.
67
John Dugard, op.cit., pp. 112–113.
68
Journal officiel de la Ligue des Nations, Rapport de la commission des rapporteurs sur la
question des iles Åland, 1921.
of the Åland islands do not have the right to secede, because their rights and
freedoms are respected and guaranteed by Finland. it follows that a group would
have the right to secede only if it has suffered some injustice, whereby the right to
secession is a legal remedy, a last resort before repeated violations of the internal
self-determination of the people in question.69 The analysis of the provisions of
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2625 also allows us to identify
some elements in support of this theory: Rien dans les paragraphes précédents ne
sera interprété comme autorisant ou encourageant une action, those qu’ elle soit,
qui démembrerait ou menacerait, totalment ou partiellement, the territorial
intégrité ou l’unité politique de tout État souverain et indépendant se conduisant
conformément au prince de l’égalité de droits et du droit des peuples à disposer
d’eux-mêmes.70 A state that does not respect the established principles could be
called to fight secession promoted by people who have been harmed in their rights.
The secession-remedy theory was put to the test, in the case of Kosovo, before the
iCJ. in particular, different reactions to this concept have been observed. Some
countries, such as China, have expressly rejected it, other countries, such as
Germany or Switzerland, have persistently defended it, and others, such as Russia,
have recognized it while emphasizing its inapplicability in this case (Russia
therefore reserved the right to calls for the principle in relation to Abkhazia and
South ossetia). France, the United States and the United Kingdom considered that
the principle should not be decided, as did the Court of international Justice itself.71
The secession-remedy doctrine is therefore still not unanimously accepted by the
international community, even if it is increasingly present in practice.72 Apart from
the situation in Kosovo, it seems difficult to determine which situations in state
practice can qualify as cases of secession-remedy given the relatively new
character of the doctrine. Nonetheless, the situations in Bangladesh and Eritrea
seem to fit the definition. However, the adoption of this theory of international
law could call into question the validity of some failed secessionist attempts, such
as those of Biafra or Katanga.73 one of the criticisms addressed to the secession-
remedy theory concerns the extent of the right to internal self-determination.
According to this criticism, the beneficiary of internal self-determination would
be the people in the sense of the population of a state as a whole, while external
self-determination concerns only a part of it. internal self-determination would
then be a guarantee of democratic representation, so that it is always possible to
check whether the government actually represents “the people”. in support of this
69
David Copp, “international Law and Morality in the Theory of Secession”, The Journal of Ethics,
1998, vol.2 No.3, pp. 223–224.
70
Résolution 2625 de l’Assemblé Générale de l’oNU, 24 octobre 1970.
71
CiJ, Kosovo, Advisory opinion.
72
Del Mar K., op.cit., pp. 84–85.
73
Thomas W. Simon, “Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to
Kosovo”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2011, vol.40, n.1, pp. 156–158.
view, the case of Southern Rhodesia is cited, as well as the case of apartheid in
South Africa. This criticism is relevant, but not entirely convincing in light of state
practice. in this regard, it is enough to recall what James Crawford wrote,
according to which: “This does not mean that the only “peoples” relevant for
international purposes are the entire people of each state. international lawyers
should resist the conclusion that a widely used term should be conditionally and
narrowly defined, in a way that reflects neither the normal usage nor the self-
perception and identity of diverse and long-established human groups. That would
turn the principle of self-determination into a cruel deception”.74As a conclusion,
let us return to the analysis of Dugard, who, in determining the conditions
necessary for the implementation of secession-remedy, believes that there must
be a people who enjoy the right to self-determination and who have an ethnic,
religious, linguistic or cultural identity different from the national identity of the
country in which they live, then that the people must occupy a certain part of the
territory of the state where the majority is, and as a last resort, that people were
previously denied the right to internal self-determination, that is, that the members
of that people were victims of massive and widespread violations of their basic
rights. Finally, the condition it sets is that the people have exhausted all possible
reasonable possibilities in light of respecting their fundamental rights and
exercising their right to internal self-determination.75
SECESSION AND CONFLICT OF RULES

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
in this part, we abstract from the problems posed by the definition of the “right
of peoples to self-determination” according to international law. Therefore, we
will consider as a precondition the fact that the right to self-determination can lead,
in one way or another, to the secession of the state. The “right of secession” will
therefore be based on a widely recognized and respected principle of positive
international law. But will this assumption be enough to legitimize the
phenomenon of secession in the eyes of international law? Are there no other
obstacles in the rules governing interstate relations that could prevent the
emergence of new international actors? As many authors have noted, articulating
the right of peoples to self-determination in such a way as to allow secession leads
to a conflict between this principle and other principles of international law that
are also closely related to state building.76 We will begin by illustrating the issues
that are motivated by secession and self-determination, and which need to be tested
74
James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in Alston P., People’s
Rights, oxford, 2001, p. 7.
75
John Dugard, op.cit., p. 117.
76
Lea Brilmayer,”Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial interpretation”, Yale Journal of
International Law, 1991, no. 192, pp. 177–202, 183.
on the example of the constitutive principle inherent in the very existence of the
state – state sovereignty. Next, we will focus on another specific element which,
although closely related to the principle of sovereignty, represents its different
aspects that make it particularly interesting to examine from the point of view of
the secession of states. it is first of all the principle of territorial integrity, then
other important principles of international law, and issues related to the realization
of the right of peoples to self-determination, which ultimately includes the issue
of secession.
State Sovereignty and Secession

one of the most acute problems of the legality of secession relates to the
principle of “sovereignty” as a norm of international law. The very concept of
sovereignty has been the subject of a wide doctrinal and philosophical debate on
which we will dwell very little, because what we are essentially interested in is to
examine the practical aspect of things, the arguments put forward by states to
oppose secession attempts, which concern the very construction of the state and
its positioning in the international community. in this part, we will adopt the classic
dichotomy regarding sovereignty, focusing primarily on its internal aspect and on
its implications in terms of separatist demands. it is essentially the relationship
between the state and its population, or part of it. Then, our focus includes the
external aspect of the principle of sovereignty, which as independence is opposed
to foreign interventions in the eventual support of secessionist movements.
The Internal Dimension of State Sovereignty

The internal aspect of sovereignty that we will deal with here is not easy to
define. This is essentially a question of domestic law, especially constitutional law,
but which does not miss consequences in international matters as well. Hence, the
right of peoples to self-determination, contained in international law, often in the
implementation phase, faces the foundations of domestic law. This comparison of
domestic law and international law is far from being limited to the problem of
secession. it is our intention not to fall into the temptation to deepen aspects of the
discussion that are beyond the scope of this study. Sovereignty is a characteristic
attribute of the state, because only it enjoys it.77 if the state were a human being,
sovereignty would be its soul, its essence. The correlation between these two
concepts is so strong that the role of the constituent elements of the state and the
repercussions of the right to self-determination of the people cannot be ignored in
this discussion. it is well known that the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
77
Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, 1990, p. 15.
Rights and Duties of States, in its enumeration of the constituent elements of the
state, dedicates already existing international “custom” to the basis of the definition
of the state. Article 1 of the Convention indicates the four constitutive pillars of
the state: “permanent population, defined territory, exclusive authority and the
possibility of establishing relations with other states”.78 Exercising the right to
secession would lead to the neglect of at least three of the constituent elements
because secession withdraws part of the population from the state, amputates part
of its territory and calls into question its authority. Let’s focus on the territorial
aspect of the problem since we are particularly interested in the issue of people
and government. The exercise of people’s right to self-determination, whether in
the form of popular consultation or unilateral declaration of independence, is
almost always in conflict with state sovereignty. The argument that is very often
raised by states that are victims of secession is the illegality of the act on the
implementation of self-determination in relation to domestic law. in this regard,
the Constitutional Council of Ukraine declared the referendum on self-
determination of Crimea illegal.79 The Venice Commission appointed by the
Council of Europe reached the same conclusion, particularly highlighting the
Ukrainian constitutional provisions.80 For its part, Spain’s Constitutional Court
ruled the Catalan independence referendum illegal, arguing that only the central
government would have the power to organize such a vote.81 According to this
logic, the exercise of rights recognized and proclaimed by international law would
be limited by the provisions of domestic law, and the self-determination of the
people should be subject to the sovereign decision of the state.
Sovereignty therefore takes precedence over the people’s right to self-
determination and any attempt to secede outside the constitutionally planned
framework, such as in Uzbekistan or in St. Kitts and Nevis, would be illegal and
illegitimate. The Supreme Court of Canada asked the question whether “Can the
National Assembly, the legislature or the government of Quebec, under the
Constitution of Canada, proceed unilaterally with the secession of Quebec from
Canada?” The answer was that “Quebec could not, despite the clear referendum
result, to invokes the right to self-determination in order to dictate to the other
78
“Montevideo convention on the rights and obligations of states”, internet: https://www.ilsa.
org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf. 1.1.2022.
79
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraina, internet: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-
news/19573-rishennya-konstitucijnogo-sudu-v-ukrajini-shhodoreferendumu-v-krimu. 18.12.2015.
80
“Оpinion on whether the decision taken by the Supreme council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea in Ukraine to organize a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian
Federation is compatible with constitutional principles”, European Commission for Democracy
Through Law, 2014, pp. 4–6. internet: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.
aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282014%29002-e. 2.09.2022.
81
“Declaracion Catalunya”, Tribunal Constitucional, 25 février 2015. internet: http://www.aelpa.
org/actualidad/201403/STC-DeclaracionCatalunya.pdf. 30.04.2022.
parties in the federation the terms of the proposed secession”. Also, “the existing
Canadian constitutional order cannot but remain indifferent to the clear
determination of the majority of Quebecers to no longer be part of Canada.82 The
Supreme Court of Canada therefore does not rule out the possibility of holding a
referendum on the issue of federal secession. At the same time, however, he is
careful to clarify that the results of the referendum do not create any automatic
right to secede, but only the obligation of the federal government to negotiate with
the secessionist body. it should be noted that the Court considered it unnecessary
to provide an answer to the question of which law, domestic or international, takes
precedence in achieving the secession of Quebec.83 A similar approach was
recently adopted in the Scottish independence referendum, with the British and
Scottish governments postponing negotiations on the terms of independence until
after the election.84 in light of the Quebec issue, some authors have argued that
the right to secession should be fully regulated by domestic law in the manner
provided for in the Constitution. The “domestic” dimension of secession, as
described by Wayne Norman, would be a way to avoid this kind of conflict. Also,
granting the constitutional right to secession would allow minorities to have a
sense of respect for their right to self-determination, while the process framed in
such a way would make it difficult for them to realize that which would come
from a simple demand of the people (for example, by establishing a qualified
majority or foreseeing some unfavorable consequences in the event that minorities
vote for secession). in this way, giving the people the choice to secede actually
turns into the establishment of an inclusive feeling, because respect for the
constitutional order is conditioned by the fact that those who are subject to it find
in it the sanctification of their aspirations.85 However, subjecting secession to the
provisions of domestic law would not only enhance the sovereignty of states over
the right of peoples to self-determination, but would also lead to limiting the
exercise of a right recognized by international law within a purely internal legal
framework. in its written statement before the international Court of Justice in the
case of Kosovo, the United Kingdom states that “international law does not
consider that the legality of an act of secession according to the internal law of the
predecessor state determines the effect of this act at the international level.” in
most cases of secession, of course, the law of the predecessor state will not be
respected - this is true by the very definition of secession.86 in a broader context,
82
Cour Suprême du Canada, Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, Renvoi relatif à la sécession
du Québec, [1998] 2 RCS 217, par. 84.
83
Ibid, par. 147.
84
“Scottish independence: UK ministers not seeking advice on Scotland in EU”, BBC, 1 November
2012, internet: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-20164826. 22.04.2022.
85
David Haljan, Constitutionalizing Secession, Hart Publishing, oxford, 2014, pp. 5–14.
86
CiJ, Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au
Kosovo, exposé écrit du Royaume Uni, 17 avril 2009, par. 5.5.
in the case of “Namibia”, Fouad Ammoun argued that in the matter of people’s
right to self-determination, “texts, be they laws, constitutions, declarations or
charters, seem to define and mark successive stages. They are simple statements.
This means that the rights that people and nations gradually enjoy are much less
the result of these texts than the human progress they witness.87 in this opinion,
the first attempt is to qualify the right of peoples to self-determination on the basis
of Jus Cogens. if we accept that secession is the implementation of the right to
self-determination of peoples, then it would be impossible to limit the latter to
respect for internal texts and existing institutions. However, we should not leave
out in the discussion of the conflict between self-determination and sovereignty
the factor that connects these two great principles, which is “the people”. Faced
with the right to self-determination enjoyed by peoples, as stated above, the
principle of sovereignty, which also belongs to the people, as derived from the
italian or French constitution, is established. This legal schizophrenia was well
summarized by Edmond Jouve, according to whom “faced with the right to
sovereignty that it has, the nation demands the right to sovereignty”.88 Secessionist
claims actually represent a rift between the common origins of a nation and its
future aspirations. Therefore, it cannot be considered that the implementation of
the people’s right to self-determination is considered a violation of sovereignty,
but on the contrary, its definitive recognition. Neither sovereignty nor self-
determination is an absolute right, they counterbalance each other in order to find
a balance, a balance that sometimes results in secession, sometimes in the
continuation of unity.89 But the state cannot oppose the people with arguments
related to sovereignty, because international law requires that the state in the
exercise of sovereignty protect the rights of its citizens, provide, if they are absent,
procedures and mechanisms to guarantee such protection. it is precisely in this
perspective that the above-mentioned theory of remedial secession fits. Accepting
that the right to secession is a consequence of the people’s right to self-
determination and accepting that this other collective right is assimilated to human
rights law would lead to the conclusion that international law allows the limitation
of state sovereignty when it comes to the exercise of certain rights, including the
right to self-determination.90
87
CiJ, Namibie, cit., opinion individuelle du vice-président Ammoun, p. 76.
88
Edmond Jouve, ˮoù en est le droit des peuples à l’aube du iiième millénaire? ˮ, in: Symposium
International de Bamako, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Paris, 2000, p. 503.
89
Hurst Hannum, op.cit., p. 14.
90
Jean Charpentier, ˮLe droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et le droit international positifˮ,
Revue québécoise de droit international, 1985,vol.2, pp. 195–213, p. 213.
The Implications of Foreign Intervention in a Secessionist Process

State sovereignty in its external aspect concerns interstate relations, including the
sphere of action of international organizations. Respect for state sovereignty is
imposed in international law through the principle of non-interference (or non-
intervention), which prohibits states and international organizations from interfering
in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign states. However, conflicts related
to secession are almost always domestic affairs of the state, hence the interest to
examine the role of foreign intervention in that process. Foreign intervention can take
different forms. intervention can be done through the use of armed force, coercion,
economic or political means.91 We are not interested in political intervention at this
stage, because it is very similar to issues of recognition and non-recognition.
Therefore, we will mainly focus on the issues of foreign military or economic
intervention in the secessionist conflict and their implications for the legitimacy of
secession. The issue will be addressed from different angles and confronted with state
practice in that matter. First of all, as far as international organizations are concerned,
within the United Nations, we must recall the content of Article 2(7) of the UN
Charter: “No provision of this Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, nor does it oblige
members to file such cases in the settlement procedure under this Charter”. A priori,
since secessionist conflicts are usually purely internal, states should stay away from
such problems, which was initially the case.92 The first United Nations intervention
in a secessionist conflict took place during the conflict between the decolonized
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the independent province of Katanga. As is
known, the Security Council intervened by establishing the oNUC (United Nations
Operation in the Congo), to assist the Congolese Central Authority in maintaining
public order, which directly enabled any attempt at secession to be defeated.93 A few
years later, during the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra, Secretary-General U Thant
said: “on the question of the secession of a certain part of the country, the position of
the United Nations is unequivocal. The United Nations as an international organization
has never accepted and does not accept, and i do not believe that it will ever accept
the principle of secession of parts of its member states”.94 Therefore, the UN, after
initially distancing itself from such disputes, took a clear stance against secession.
But John Dugard notes that U Tanta’s words have not stood the test of time, as
evidenced by the UN admission of Bangladesh, Eritrea and South Sudan.95 But the
role of the United Nations during the twenties of the 20th century, in the conflicts in
91
Georg Nolte, Secession and External Intervention, in: Kohen M. (Ed.), Secession: International
Law Perspectives, op.cit., p. 65.
92
Ibid., p. 66.
93
Ibid., pp. 67–68.
94
UN Monthly Chronicle, Février 1979, p. 40.
95
John Dugard, op.cit., p.74.
Kosovo and East Timor, certainly did not serve to prevent the secession of the latter,
on the contrary, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the UN allowed these
secessions to continue, that is, it is more correct to say that they facilitated their
appearance. if the UN takes the liberty to intervene, deviating from Article 2(7) of
the Charter, in secessionist crises, it is because they very often involve two major
challenges for the international community: the protection of human rights and the
maintenance of international peace and security.96
Some countries have shown themselves to be skeptical about the role of the
UN in such situations, but we have rarely been able to accuse the UN of
undermining state sovereignty. it must be noted that the role of the United Nations
as the spokesperson of the international community sometimes allows it to
intervene in this type of situation by preemptively determining whether a possible
secession has a chance of gaining international legitimacy. Regional international
organizations are also sometimes involved in secessionist conflicts. The situation
in Western Sahara, for example, is unique in that it involves two international
organizations on opposite sides of the conflict. The organization of African Unity
welcomed the Sahrawi Arab Republic (Western Sahara) among its member states
in 1984, prompting Morocco to leave the organization.97 The League of Arab States,
for its part, supports Morocco in its claim of sovereignty over the territory of
Sahrawi.98 This bipolarization thus creates a constant ambiguity of the situation
that complicates the conflict and maintains the status quo. The intervention of
regional organizations in this and other frameworks, although minimal, can
therefore contribute to complicating the situation. Turning now to the intervention
of third countries in the secessionist conflict, we distinguish two different situations:
the situation where the third country comes to the aid of the central authorities and
the one when it supports the separatists in their struggle for independence. The
interest in making this distinction lies in the legal issues involved. Foreign
intervention at the invitation of the central authorities of the state should not a priori
cause problems related to the violation of sovereignty.99 Ultimately, the state is free
to dispose of its sovereignty as it wishes and to limit it as it sees fit. Calling on a
third country to intervene militarily on its territory would then not constitute a
violation of sovereignty but rather a measure of its preservation. However, the call
of the central authorities alone is not sufficient to justify the legitimacy of foreign
intervention. in secession, unlike other types of internal conflicts, the warring
parties are not fighting for the same power.100 Secessionists aim to secure control
96
Georg Nolte, op.cit., pp. 72–76.
97
“The Legal issues involved in the Western Sahara Dispute”, Committee on the United Nations,
New York City Bar Association, 2012, p. 7.
98
Ibid., p. 9.
99
John Dugard, op.cit., p.100.
100
Georg Nolte, op.cit., p. 79.
only over a part of the territory that is not subject to the central government. in this
sense, its legitimacy to manage this part of the territory is disputed. The dynamics
are therefore different, especially when the secessionists have managed to establish
a degree of authority in the territory that allows them to become a de facto state.
The situation becomes even more complicated when certain actors of the
international community recognize this new entity as having the quality of a state
in order to strengthen its international legal credibility. Then we fall into the area
of ambiguity where it is difficult to qualify an internal or international conflict. in
this perspective, we encounter the problem of the people’s right to self-
determination, because if the central authorities are guilty of neglecting this right,
then foreign actors are also doubly guilty of violating this basic right, violating the
principle of non-interference. in any case, these issues do not seem to have posed
any major problems in practice. France’s latest intervention in Mali after the Tuareg
from the north of the country declared the independence of Azawad points to this
practice. Especially if you take into account that the mentioned intervention was
not condemned, on the contrary, it was even blessed by the Security Council
resolution!101 The intervention of African forces in 2008, in the conflict between
Comoros and Anjouan separatists, did not provoke reactions from the international
community. However, the situation becomes quite different when foreign
intervention aims to support the separatists for a successful secession. Then the
central authorities’ open opposition to foreign intervention means at the same time
an attack on the sovereignty of the state. Antonio Caseze assessed that this type of
intervention can be accepted as long as it is not military. in his opinion: “Third
States are legally authorized to support peoples who have the right to self-
determination by giving them any assistance other than sending armed troops.” in
contrast, interventionist third states must refrain from aiding and abetting oppressor
states”.102 in practice, when this kind of intervention occurs, secession is never an
explicit motive for interference.103 The intervention is either characterized as
“humanitarian” or is justified by the protection of the interests of the state that
intervened or its citizens. A fairly good example that is flagrant of such an
occurrence is Turkey’s role in the secession of Northern Cyprus, a state recognized
only by Ankara. Without Turkish military intervention, this entity would probably
never see the light of day, and if it did establish all the structures of an independent
state, the legality of its independence would be questioned by the Security Council
and the wider international community. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey
is considered to have violated the norms of jus cogens with its participation in the
conflict and that it follows that the independence of Northern Cyprus cannot be
valid under international law. The Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 led to
101
102
Cassese (A.), op.cit., p. 62.
103
Pakistan and Bangladesh also recognized the Republic of Northern Cyprus the day after its
declaration of independence, but they turned back under pressure from the United Nations.
the independence of the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South ossetia.104

According to Moscow, this intervention was initially carried out for humanitarian
reasons. Many countries accuse Russia of neglecting Georgia’s sovereignty with
this intervention, but its position as a permanent member of the Security Council
and political influence allowed Russia not only not to be condemned, but also for
these satellite republics to gain limited international recognition. other secessions
brought about by the intervention of a third country, however, have been accepted
in practice. Thus, india’s intervention in the conflict between East Pakistan and
West Pakistan was crucial for the creation of Bangladesh. india, of course, has
never explicitly admitted that it intervened to effect secession, instead citing
legitimate self-defense on humanitarian grounds.105 Although india’s role in the
secession may have been condemned, the secession succeeded, and Bangladesh is
now part of international society as an independent and sovereign member.
Examples are more common when we delve a little further into history: the conflict
between the United States of America and Colombia was the cause of the secession
of Panama, which was immediately recognized by the international community.
Without the logistical and military support of the Americans, Panama might even
be under the sovereignty of Bogota today. The hypocrisy of the American position
on the Crimean crisis of 2014 is all the more flagrant as an incredible parallelism
emerges between this situation and the one in the state of Texas. Namely, this
territory, which today makes up the second largest state of the USA, was originally
part of Mexico, but the Texas separatists, with the support of Washington, managed
to achieve a short and internationally recognized independence before their allies
quickly annexed them to the USA.106 All of the above shows that foreign
interventions, although condemned for achieving secession, do not have to be
completely unsuccessful in the final outcome. The legal consequences for the
intervener and for the separatist entity will depend a lot on this outcome. We limit
the discussion here only to state sovereignty in its external aspect, which affects
interstate relations, including the field of action of international organizations.
Respect for state sovereignty in international law is guaranteed by the principle of
non-interference (or non-intervention), a principle that prohibits states and
international organizations from interfering in the internal affairs of independent
and sovereign states. However, conflicts related to secession are almost always
internal affairs of the state, and hence there is an interest in deepening the role of
foreign intervention in that process. Here we limit ourselves to observing how
foreign intervention can take different forms, considering that it can resort to the
use of armed force, economic coercion or political means, forms that have different
repercussions on the life of international relations, and as already stated above.107
104
CiJ, Kosovo, Avis consultatif, para. 81
105
Georg Nolte, op.cit., pp. 88–91.
106
Ibid., pp. 406–410.
107
NEKA PRELiMiNARNA MEĐUNARoDNoPRAVNA

RAZMATRANJAo SECESiJi
APSTRAKT
Predmetna međunarodnopravna rasprava bavi se fenomenom secesije. Kroz
sintezu pravne doktrine i prakse, autor je ovom raspravom pokrenuo veliki broj
pravnih i političkih pitanja od suštinskog značaja za postojanje država. Kroz jasnu
teorijsku raspravu, autor ukazuje na odsustvo kodifikovanih pravila o secesiji, što
ostavlja dosta prostora za nedovoljno pouzdane kriterijume po kojima bi se ova
pojava mogla smatrati pravno opravdanom i međunarodnopravno utemeljenom.
Dosadašnja empirijska iskustva o secesiji zasnovana na konceptu dekolonizacije
i oslobađanja od dominacije, eksploatacije i ugnjetavanja imaju akcesorno značenje
za savremenu međunarodnu praksu. To je donekle i razumljivo, jer legitimitet
savremenih secesija proizilazi pre svega iz domaćih razloga koji pretpostavljaju
postojanje teških oblika državne represije, sistemske diskriminacije ili grubog
kršenja ljudskih prava, što u krajnjoj liniji onemogućava ostvarivanje prava
različitih društvenih grupa na unutrašnje samoopredeljenje. Na osnovu ovih
okolnosti, autor ukazuje na određene probleme u pogledu spoljašnje i unutrašnje
dimenzije prava na samoopredeljenje, kao i na sukob normi koji postoji u
međunarodnom pravu i od čijeg regulisanja zavisi realizacija secesije u praksi. Da
li će i u kojoj meri realizacija secesije biti uspešna u praksi zavisi ne samo od
međunarodnih političkih prilika, već i od realnih društvenih uslova unutar država
u kojima se primenjuju pravila i principi pozitivnog međunarodnog prava. S tim
u vezi, autor je sistematski ispitao ulogu međunarodno-pravnog principa
suvereniteta u procesu secesije, ukazujući da se njegovo poštovanje nameće u
kontekstu poštovanja principa nemešanja (ili neintervencije), koji zabranjuje
državama i međunarodnim organizacijama mešanja u unutrašnje stvari nezavisnih
država. S obzirom na to da strane intervencije u vezi sa secesijom često krše
pomenutu zabranu, autor je smatrao da njihovu ulogu i implikacije u ovom procesu
treba detaljnije ispitati.
Ključne reči: Secesija, samoopredeljenje, suverenitet, nezavisnost, međunarodno
pravo.
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CHOICES STATES MAKE:

THE PECULIAR CASE OF THE SELECTIVE APPROACH
olga MAGoMEDoVA*
ABSTRACT
in this legal study, attention is paid to research related to the role of free choice in
international legal policy from the perspective of argumentation theory. if
international legal policy is viewed as a reasoned strategy for determining the
optimal international legal position, the choice acquires a strategic character.
States therefore choose between specific options regarding international courts
and legal sources that should serve when regulating some open international
issues. Depending on the international legal situation, the state will try to achieve
good results on that front, while making legal maneuvers hints at the possibility
of a selective approach in international legal policy. With a selective approach,
the state may not rely on international legal rules, but will refer to separate parts
of the whole set of legal provisions and will give interpretations focusing on
individual elements of these provisions in order to prove that its position quite
naturally derives from the rules of general international law. The inner workings
of selective access are illustrated by Norway’s position regarding its sovereignty
over the Svalbard archipelago. A retrospective review of Norway’s positions on
the matter allows one to assess the consistency of its international legal policy
and to better understand the current controversies arising from the divergent
expectations that this policy causes.
Key words: Selective approach, international legal policy, argumentation,
legitimation, Spitsbergen/Svalbard
INTRODUCTION
international law is universal with its normative force. in this sense the
international legal norms are equally binding for all subjects of international law.
However, international law is not universal with its content. international law
provides many options of juridical constructions, legal instruments,
*
UniverMoscow State institute of international Relations (MGiMo-University);Russian Foreign
Trade Academy of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia (VAVT), expert of the
Russia-oECD VAVT Club. E-mail: olga.magomedova.96@mail.ru
understandings, interpretations, applications of international legal norms. Thereby

it enables States to make choices. international Law would not have progressively
developed if it was applied in the same way. States act in conformity with
international law, but not repeat formal patterns of conduct underlying international
legal rules. States contribute to development of international law by understanding,
interpreting and applying international legal rules in different ways. in this regard
the choice appears natural part of international legal practice of States. The
diversity of understandings in international law results from difference in interests
and preferences among States (generally in national approaches to international
law).1 Likewise choices States make in international law are not spontaneous, they
are contingent on a system of national preferences, context, previous decisions
and their outcomes. Moreover, States make choices in the pursue of concrete goals
and have particular expectations. it may be said choices are made on a strategic
basis. Therefore the problem of choice in international law should be regarded
within a State’s special strategy of conduct in the international legal field, what
the French international lawyer Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière called ‘politique
juridique extérieure’ or in English – international legal policy.2 The ultimate
purpose of State’s international legal policy is to legitimate international legal acts
and positions of the State.3 Unlike political means of influence, the international
legal policy finds its power in strong legal argumentation. The coordination of
sovereign wills in the international legal field creates both the constraint on choice
of the most persuasive arguments and the temptation to appeal exclusively to
suitable evidence leaving all other discordant facts without consideration. Bound
by the objective of legitimation the State has to choose applicable norms of
international law which most accurately support its international legal position, to
choose the most convincing arguments for reasoning its view on concerned
situations, etc.in this context choice becomes not just essential element of State’s
practice, but strategically necessary. From this point of view we can suggest that
States can benefit from opportunities of choice and even use the choice as a
strategic mean. The selective approach to international law might be a bright
1
Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mila Versteeg, “Comparative
international Law: Framing the Field”, American Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 109,
no. 3, pp. 467–74; Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mila Versteeg (eds.)
Comparative International Law, oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 640.
2
The concept of international legal policy as a strategy of State’s conduct in the international legal
field should not be confused with the theory of international legal process, developed by A.
Chayes, T. Ehrlich, A. Lowenfeld in the 60-s. While the authors look into the whole system of
institutions and procedures involved in the international law-making, the concept of international
legal policy concentrates on principles and regularities of individual participation of a State in
the international legal processes from the perspective of its interests and objectives. See. Abram
Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, Andreas Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials for an
Introduction Course, Little, Brown, Boston, 1969. pp. xxiii, 1403.
3
Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure. Economica, Paris, 1983, pp. 22, 229.
illustration. The selective approach might be more familiar on the national level
in the context of situations where a State selects international legal norms (or their
parts, interpretations) to implement on the national level according to its
possibilities and – the most important – social expectations. on the international
level State faces to similar situation where it needs to conciliate its views with
existing international law and others’ expectations. Notably, the selective approach
does not undermine international law but brings to light different dimensions of
agreed international legal rules. State can take existing rules of international law
as starting points for developing own assumptions on some international legal
issue and thereupon advance new legal structures. So the selective approach
obtains creative capacity at the strategic level. in the present research paper i
analyze the phenomenon of the selective approach in States’ international legal
practice and seek to characterize its possible impact on the international law. Part
i provides a short insight into the concept of international legal policy. it is
necessary to explain the place of choice-making in the range of stratagems and
why the selective approach does not frustrate the coherence of international legal
policy. Part ii examines the coordination of sovereign wills as an argumentative
practice. From the perspective of the theory of argumentation the international
legal policy can be considered as an argumentative strategy. Part iii highlights
how selective approach contributes to development of argumentative maneuvers.
This part brings to light the question of legitimacy as a result of correct
argumentative practice drawing on the views of the contemporary scholarship.
These theoretical explorations demand a vivid illustration. Part iV presents the
experience of Norway in the extension of its sovereignty over areas beside
territorial waters of Svalbard. This practice selectively relies on provisions of the
Spitsbergen Treaty 1920. Nonetheless, Norway seeks to validate taken steps
through common acquiescence and even through formal arrangements. in
conclusion i resume how the selective approach allows States to implement their
particular solutions into the integral legal framework of international relations and
what impact these solutions exert on international law.
THE ROLE OF CHOICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL POLICY OF STATE
it is an eternal question for international legal scholarship why international
legal rules are filled with the existing content and not another. in the midst of
numerous hypothesis Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere suggested that a State constructs
a special policy on legal aspects of international relations – so called ‘politique
juridique exterieure’ or international legal policy.4 Likewise, a State leads economic,
trade or other policies in the relevant spheres, State might plan and take tactical
decisions about international law. The concept of international legal policy explains
4
Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière, op.cit., p. 236.
how States contribute to the development of international law.5 Therefore the content
of international legal rules is the main target of the international legal policy. Every
State is presumed to participate in the coordination of wills for international law –
‘creating’, to the extent that every State strives to influence international law in
such a way that its international legal positions and actions could have a strong
legal rationale behind them. Participation of State in the coordination of wills does
not necessarily imply advancing of arguments, since the silence of State also
indicates its position (for instance, its acquiescence of some international legal
practice, or its tolerance to any scenario of international legal regulation of a
concerned issue). in this regard, the international legal policy of a State is always
active.6 The participation of the State in the development of international law is not
limited to the law-making process, since the content of international legal norms
gets shaped up at every stage of a norm cycle, including interpretation and
application.7 State’s positions might be verbalized, like a suggestion of amendments,
supplements, guiding principles for implementation, or be expressed in State’s
conduct. in practice we can see that State’s contribution to development of
international law following the establishment of norms is under constraints of the
achievements at the first creative level.8 Nevertheless, the vigor of initial concord
among States is not decisive. Under the concept of international legal policy States
are aware of options for further refinement of the agreed-upon norms. it means that
States, legal positions of which are fully satisfied in the international legal norms
on a particular issue, put efforts to maintain the achieved ‘status quo’, while the
others strive to ‘refine’ the existing regime with their international legal practice.
States might intentionally ensure at the law-making level the opportunity to revisit
an issue or to correct a solution in the long run with special provisions. Moreover,
States might ensure such opportunity implicitly – with ambiguous formulations,
which allow for interpretive creativity.9 So ‘consensus-like’ broad formulations
satisfy to positions of counterparts in the international legal dialogue to the extent
that both adversaries have equal chances to promote their pure (unadjusted)
positions in further practice. in this regard the ambiguity of international legal norms
keeps interpretive options open. At the same time, the contextual maneuvers of a
State within its international legal policy are confined by its final objective of
legitimation of State’s position.10 it means that State has to choose those positions,
5
Alexander N. Vylegzhaninm, inna P. Dudikina, “The Politics of international Law as a Concept”.
Moscow Journal of International Law, 2016, vol. 4, pp. 21–37, pp. 25–26 (in Russ.)
6
7
Ibid., p. 102.
8
This assumption is elaborated within the doctrine of inertia in the theory of legal argumentation.
See: Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969, pp. 566, 218–220.
9
10
Ibid., p. 22.
the feasibility of which it can prove in front the international community of States
and to choose those arguments, which are generally acceptable for their audience.
Nowadays the international legal scholars treat the problem of choice in
international law from the sociological point of view, where choice is contingent
on moral principles. For instance, Anna Spain Bradley explores a choice in
international legal and political decision-making with illustrations starting on the
decision about atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to decisions within
collective institutions, like international courts or the UN bodies. The author
concludes that no decision is devoid of aspects of human choice like emotions, bias,
trust, etc.11 indeed, we can see how these aspects embedded within national cultural
factors underpin State’s international legal policy.12 on the other side the choice is
often treated in the context of compliance problem.13 in quest of reasons why a
State may choose to comply or not to comply with international legal rules
researches developed many theories either in logic of consequences (like
reputational model of compliance by Andrew Guzman) or in logic of
appropriateness (like international legal managerism by oran Young).14 But in all
of these examples the choice serves a sort of dividing line between two incompatible
options. in contrast thereto the choice within the international legal policy is not a
dilemma between opposite options, but an essential technical operation in the
constant creative process of developing strong and coherent international legal
positions. Basically the secret of an effective international legal policy is that the
national interests behind advanced positions should be legitimate per se – so they
form the position’s potential to legitimation. The general recognition of an act or
position legitimate results from the internal conviction about its rightness and
necessity.15 The position cannot be legitimated with repetitive practice of a State,
neither with pressure against disagreeing parties. The only way to legitimation is
through consistent persuasion during the coordination of wills. it means that State
has to watch for consistency of its positions on the same issue and consistency
among interrelated positions on different issues. Definitely, the idea cannot receive
legitimizing approval without the cumulative effect of supporting arguments.16 This
11
Anna Spain Bradley,. Human Choice in International Law, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2021.
12
Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière, op.cit., pp. 208–210.
13
Jacob Katz Cogan, “Noncompliance and the international Rule of Law”, The Yale Journal of
International Law, 2006, vol. 31, pp. 189–210.
14
James G. March, Johan P. olsen, “The institutional Dynamics of international Political orders”,
International Organization, 1998, vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 943–969, 949–954; Andrew T. A. Guzman,
“Compliance-Based Theory of international Law”. California Law Review, 2002, vol. 90, no.
6, pp. 1823–1887.
15
Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy in the international System”. American Journal of International
Law, 1988, vol. 82, pp. 705–759, 705, 706.
16
Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., pp. 471–479; iain Scobbie exactly resumed
Perelman’s view on the cumulation of argument as follows: ’if several distinct arguments lead
is what the coherence of international legal policy is responsible for. Since the
international legal policy covers all stages of the life cycle of a legal rule – from
law-making to application of this rule, the State makes choices at every stage of its
international legal practice. At the law-making stage the State has to choose a law
source for fixing an agreed upon legal rule, to choose a legal instrument for
declaring its position on legal rules (like interpretive declarations), to choose
relevant international legal norms to apply for some matter, to choose an interpretive
method, which would highlight proper details of existing legal rules, to choose
appropriate means of dispute settlement, etc. The choice of applicable international
legal rules for dispute settlement is a particularly bright example. in the context of
such phenomena as fragmentation of international law and proliferation of
international institutes for dispute settlement the problem of choice for international
legal practice of a State gets a clear shape – State has to choose a direction for
developing its line of reasoning upon the norms of certain legal (might be
autonomous) regime. But actually every choice that State makes can figure large.
Therefore the ‘right’ choice in the international legal policy should be free from the
conjecture of the present day and respect the coherence of international legal policy.
The strategic attitude of a State to international law, like ‘pondering about better
option for justification’ might cause erroneous perception of the concept of
international legal policy as an apology to the instrumentalism.17 it should be
clarified that instrumental approach to international law does not deny international
law as a legal framework of international relations, but it attributes the compliance
not to the authority of international law, but to inner motivation of government to
benefit from some rules of international law.18 So the instrumental approach
devalues State’s conduct in conformity with the existing international law since
assumed primacy of national interest allows for abandoning a norm in favor of
national interest. For the same reason, the instrumental propensity of the
international legal policy might have led to choices imprudently based on the
‘utility’ criteria. Therefore it is important to distinguish the concept of international
legal policy with essential role of deliberate choices from the instrumentalist view.
From the instrumentalist view on international law, the appeal to international legal
rules serves only legal justification a posteriori. But the strategic approach of the
international legal policy pursues a more ambitious objective to incorporate some
international legal views of a State into generally accepted content of international
to the same conclusion, the value the audience attributes to it, and to each argument individually,
will be increased’. See iain Scobbie, “Rhetoric, persuasion, and interpretation in international
law” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, Matthew Windsor (eds.), Interpretation in international
law (1st ed., vol. 1, 2015), p. 74.
17
Vincent Coussirat-Coustère, “Guy de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure [compte-
rendu]”. Politique étrangère, 1983, vol. 48, p. 1000.
18
Robert Keohane, “international Relations and international Law: Two optics”. Harvard
International Law Journal, 1997, vol. 38, pp. 487, 490.
law. The far-reaching ‘legitimating’ effect is attainable only with the coherent well-
considered strategy, which is all based on States’ adherence to international law.
De Lacharrière highlighted that the existence of the international legal policies of
States is justified only by the role of international law for interstate relations.
otherwise, States would not have to refer to international legal rules at all.19
Therefore the continuous work at the promotion of an international legal position
does worth it once this view of a State finds its place in the international legal
environment.20 Despite the common truth ‘silent enim leges inter arma’, the gains
attained with power rather than with the authority of law stay only due to current
power relations, while the gains of legal reasoning are much better defended with
their common recognition as ‘just’. So, the momentary effect claims durable
consolidation, common recognition demands persuading efforts. Persuasion during
the coordination of wills should not be regarded as a procedure for justification of
non-compliance, since it is inherent to international legal policy due to the objective
of legitimation.21 in the concept of international legal policy the convictions and
beliefs of decision-makers in the foreign policy of States are not a goal in itself, but
an integral element in the international normative process. The influence on opinion
of audience in a particular case does not legitimate the pattern of this conduct in
international legal practice. As result, similar controversial conduct every time
causes a similar reaction and objections. The mechanism of international legal
policy works on the accumulative principle: all actions and declared positions
contribute to the general perception of international law. So once legitimized views
do not require further arguments. Semantic shifts in the understanding of
international law result from the cumulative effects of steady progress. in contrast
to this persuasion for evolution of legal framework the persuasion for justification
gets necessary only due to insufficient legal background for unconditional
acceptance of a State’s conduct. For instance, if conduct is treated as a violation or
it meets some grey area in international law.22 The drawn distinction between
persuasion for justification and persuasion for the evolution does not defeat the fact
that the former type of persuasion also can constitute part of the international legal
policy. However, persuasion for pure justification is rather an exception.23 Generally
States choose persuasive arguments for evolution of international law.
19
20
Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and the Far Right: reflections on law and cynicism,
Fourth Annual T.M.C. Asser Lecture, 2019, p. 53.
21
David Hughes,”How States Persuade: An Account of international Legal Argument Upon the
Use of Force” Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2019, vol. 50, no. 4, pp.839–946, 871.
22
Ibid., p. 869; Abram Chayes, Antonia Hundler Chayes, The new sovereignty: compliance with
international regulatory agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 417, 118.
23
Unfortunately, the history of international law knows examples of outrage violations of
international law accompanied with justificatory rhetoric. Rarely do States acknowledge
committed errors. The United States even use the formula of ’illegal but legitimate’ in regard of
NATo bombing of Yugoslavia. With this formula the State recognizes that no international legal
COORDINATION OF WILLS AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE PRACTICE

international law is an outcome of coordination of wills by words of Grigory
Tunkin, or otherwise said, argumentative practice, by words of Martti
Koskenniemi.24 Both terms come down to the same idea of tactical efforts in the
international legal field. indeed, the coordination of wills imply some common
field of interests, equal discussants (in the sense that each of them could be a rhetor
and an audience), objective of discussion (like settlement of an unresolved
problem), individual interests, underlying every proposal being discussed. All these
elements we find in the theory of argumentation, even in its very protogenic form
originally presented by Aristotle. The legitimation of international legal positions
of State depends both on the strength of arguments and recognition of a point as
legitimate by the international community of States. in terms of Aristotelian logic,
it depends on the quality of the argument and acceptability by the audience.
Likewise the contestants argue in search for ‘truth’ (aletheia, ἀλήθεια), States
compete for the development of international law. in the Aristotelian terms the
‘truth’ is an objective reflection of things as they are, presents itself only in the
knowledge (episteme), as opposed to ‘opinion’ (doxa).25 opinions are changeable
with time and variable among people. To this extent, they bring forth only
probability (eikos), not the truth. it means that opinion refers only to the plausible
observance or relatively frequent phenomenon. Nevertheless such probabilities
can pretend to the general recognition as ‘true’, once they constitute ‘endoxa’,
kind of consensus achieved through the concurrence of opinions. Combination of
good arguments and their general acceptance prove argumentative validity of
opinion. it means, that while no one can declare his opinion as true, he can at least
choose those arguments, as means of persuasion, which make his separate opinion
a part of common understanding what could be true. By examining the theory of
argumentation, we reveal many analogies with what we observe in the international
legal practice of States. So did ingo Venzke in his work on Harold R. Wohlrapp’s
concept of argument.26 The scheme of argumentative process, as presented by
norm could justify its actions, but there might be some moral foundation not reflected in the
international law. See: Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz, “Legalization and the Legitimation of the Use
of Force: Revisiting Kosovo”. International Organization, 2018, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 725–757.
24
Grigory Tunkin, Teoriya mezhdunarodnogo prava [Theory of international law] (1st ed. 1970),
Moscow, 2006, p. 241 (in Russ.); Martti Koskenniemi, “Methodology of international Law”,
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 2007, internet: https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law: epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1440; Presenting international
law as argumentative practice means to describe “international law as process of articulating
political preferences into legal claims that cannot be detached from the conditions of political
contestation in which they are made”. Martti Koskenniemi, “international law and hegemony: a
reconfiguration”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2004, vol. 17, pp. 197–198.
25
Paolo Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge University Press, Cambidge, 2004, pp. 354.
26
ingo Venzke, “international Law as an Argumentative Practice: on Wohlrapp’s Concept of
Argument”. Transnational Legal Theory, 2016, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 9–10.
Wohlrapp, perfectly reflects conduct of sovereign States by argumentation of their

legal positions.27 in his opinion there are two types of validity claims: epistemic
claims constitute part of knowledge to the extent that they rely on strong theory
verified in practice, while thetic claims are designed to impose thesis as valid.28 in
this regard, the audience of the speaker appears in the opposition to his claims: it
should accept or dismiss the proposition. Therefore the validity of thesis is assessed
through three basic operations: asserting, justifying, criticizing.29 Unlike mere
suggesting of a new view the asserting refers to a statement, which can be proved
as valid. For this purpose the assertion is followed by the justifying operation,
which implies creating good reasons for opinions generated by practice.30 Finally,
the criticizing operation is designed to indicate the difference between statements.31
Thereby the argumentation comes down to ‘testing new theses for orientation
within reality’.32 it should be underlined, that ‘no one is forced to take a thesis that
is attainable without any objections as a practical guide’. The thesis is finally
accepted due to its ‘credibility’.33 This subjective condition completes the
argumentative validity of a statement. However, the achieved agreement does not
constitute a discovery of some ‘knowledge’ in the sense that the outcome is not
final.34 The original judgments always remain in the sphere of probability.
Therefore every argument continues going through counter-arguments and doubts
of the peers. Nowadays the studies of States’ argumentative practices form a school
of thought, which Andrea Bianchi termed as ‘law and literature’.35 This research
area is rich in challenging questions related to particularities of argumentation on
the level of sovereign States. For instance, the character of ‘discussants’ is decisive
since legal argument ‘aims at securing the assent or adhesion of those to whom
the argument is addressed’.36 Then argument succeeds if it persuades the audience
27
“international law is an argumentative practice. it is about persuading target audiences such as
courts, colleagues, politicians, and readers of legal texts about the legal correctness—lawfulness,
legitimacy, justice, permissibility, validity, etc—of the position one defends”. See: Martti
Koskenniemi, “Methodology of international Law”, op. cit.
28
Most of State’s legal positions are essentially ‘thetic claims’, since they are based on State’s
interests, perceptions, understandings and interpetations of a concerned situation.
29
Harold R. Wohlrapp, The Concept of Argument. A philosophical foundation, Springer, 2014, pp.
510, 134.
30
Ibid., p. 142.
31
Ibid., p. 153-54.
32
ingo Venzke, op. cit., p. 10.
33
Harold R. Wohlrapp, op. cit., p. 88.
34
The same holds for international legal argumentative practice, where no agreement among States
may be regarded as final, since the international law develops upon transformation of States’
relations.
35
Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry Into Different Ways of Thinking, oxford
University Press, 2016, pp. 334, 287–310.
36
iain Scobbie op. cit., p. 64.
of relevant quality.37 Differentiation of audiences is driven by difference of interest

groups they represent.38 Within the international community of States this matter
is particularly sensitive since ‘power relations sideline the role of good reasons’.39
Therefore the nature of parties to the discussion is a significant factor for framing
the argumentative strategy.40 Furthermore, States do not communicate in pure legal
terms. Every position has multidimensional background from cultural world view
to political interests and even has different weight for the audience due to current
power balance in the international arena – ‘the public culture is only partially
rational’.41 Therefore, in the international legal field of argumentation there can
be no ‘ideal speech situation’ by terms of Jurgen Habermas.42 The outcome of
argumentative practice is material shaped up by subjective factors on the way to
the international legal validity. obviously, the arguments of low legal quality are
a priori powerless despite all non-argumentative forces behind them. Оnly
inherently legitimate positions find support in international law.43 indeed the worth
of claims is closely associated with their objectivity.44 However, the rationalizing
capacity of legal arguments is not free of effects of particular circumstances, to
the extent that their force is based equally on the criteria of normativity and
37
Ibid., p. 68 ; Referring to Chaim Perelman, Logique Juridique: Nouvelle Rhetorique (Methodes
du droit). Dalloz, 1976, pp. 193, p. 107. This thesis can be further developed to suggestion that
the category of ’quality’ extends to historical and cultural considerations. The Australian scholar
Lyndel V. Prott made a note of the iCJ sensitivity to cultural and legal features of the targeted
audience in its judgements. See: Lyndel V. Prott, “Argumentation in international Law”.
Argumentation, 1991, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 299, 309. For instance, in the Case concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in iran (United States v. iran) the Court took into account
that the audience of its judgement has more appreciation of tenets of islam rather than the classical
international law of the Grotian tradition and advanced the argument with the relevant reference:
“... the principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of
diplomatic missions is one of the very foundations of this long-established regime, to the
evolution of which the traditions of islam made a substantial contribution”. See: international
Court of Justice (iCJ), Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran
(United States v. iran), Judgment, 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 4, p. 41.
38
Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., pp. 31–35, 65–66.
39
ingo Venzke, op. cit., p. 18.
40
Steven R. Ratner, “Persuading to Comply: on the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal
Argumentation” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L., Mark A. Pollock (eds.), International Law and
International Relations: Synthesizing Insights from Interdisciplinary Scholarship. Cambridge
University Press, 2012, pp. 680, 568.
41
Harold R. Wohlrapp, op. cit., p. p. xvi.
42
Jurgen Habermas, “Wahrheitstheorien” in Fahrenbach H. (ed.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion,
Pfüllingen, Neske, 1973, pp. 211–265.
43
Grigory Tunkin, Osnovy Sovremennogo Mezhdunarodnogo Prava [Foundations of
Contemporary international Law] Moscow, 1958, p. 260 (in Russ.)
44
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 37, 704.
concreteness.45 in this regard, the assessment of legal arguments is always a matter

of context, including power relations among parties involved in the concerned
legal issue. Consequently, strong argumentation implies a solid normative
background that embraces a legal problem in its context and downplays the
opportunities for subjective discretion. in other words, strong arguments do not
leave room for power demonstration. Even when State’s positions stay marginal
and do not find enough support in the international law, particularly, when State’s
conduct is discordant with the general perception of ‘what conforms to
international law’, the State does not stop to argue, but thinks how to persuade.
The State just cannot disengage from the international legal discourse (every his
step receives either positive or negative assessment, that impacts the efficiency of
the State’s following international legal policy) and the national decision-makers
have to accomplish, what Harold Koh calls ‘the duty to explain’.46 David Hughes
indicates a strong logic behind such ‘oration for defense’. First, a State identifies
and appeals to shared values embedded in international law to provide a common
context for mutual understanding.47 indeed, the effective arguments are based on
the premises, with which interlocutors already agree.48 That allows to justify the
non-compliant conduct: even in case of violation of a particular legal rule, a State
can still appeal to its ‘general commitment to international law’.49 Second, a State
maintains its reputation of legal fidelity that is key to the reciprocity and
cooperation in international relations.50 Such good faith reputation allows making
the audience attentive to the State’s arguments. Third, a State demonstrates its
interpretive authority through legal rhetoric in order to attach weight to its
arguments.51 Fourth, a State has to make its legal arguments plausible with a special
interpretation of legal provisions, which proves the acceptability of these
arguments within that given interpretation. All the more because such opportunity
is previewed in ‘broad permissive legal formulations’.52 Finally, a State
demonstrates that his arguments rely on the previous experience of similar conduct
among other actors. Thereby its actions are proved to follow familiar patterns of
45
Ibid., p. 25.
46
Harold Hongju Koh, “The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain”. The Yale Journal of International
Law, 2016, vol. 41. pp. 189–211.
47
David Hughes, “How States Persuade: An Account of international Legal Argument Upon the
Use of Force”, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2019, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 839–946,
871–872.
48
49
David Hughes, op. cit., p. 874.
50
ian Johnstone, The Power Of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organization.
oxford: oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 7, 240.
51
Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: the Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and
International Law. oxford: oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 288, p. 14.
52
David Hughes, op. cit., pp. 880–881.
conduct acceptable in the existing international legal practice. From the perspective
of the theory of argumentation we see the same problem of choice in the
international legal practice of States, but here it transforms from the choice of
concrete actions or positions to the choice of arguments justifying State’s action
or position. in this regard the theory of argumentation drives international legal
scholars to more detailed view on the coordination of wills among States. At the
same time the ‘choice’ as a category transforms from a mere technical operation
in development of international legal policy to the strategic instrument. Any
instrument implies its purposeful application. in case of international legal policy
the State chooses arguments satisfying to some criteria of an argumentative vigor
or of the most moving effect for the relevant audience. Furthermore, application
of ‘the instrument’ demands certain mastership. in practice States rarely choose
between legally correct and evidently illegal positions: the mastership presents in
details. For instance, the famous ‘war of diplomatic notes’ between Canada and
the United States around the transit of the American ice-breaker through the
Canadian arctic waters resulted in the outright victory of Canadian diplomats. in
the case summary in 1985 The United States notified Canada about the planned
transit of the ice-breaker USCG Polar sea through the waters of the Northwest
Passage, which Canada and the United States qualified differently – in the view
of the United States the concerned waters constituted the international strait, while
Canada considered them the inner waters. Therefore under the Canadian legislation
the American ice-breaker should have received a permission for passage. Since
the United States had no intentions to follow the legal procedure, the Canada
received from the United States all necessary information about the transit and on
this ground the Canadian Embassy sent the note: “[…] in the exercise of the
Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the Government of Canada is
pleased to consent of the proposed transit, and that, on the basis of information
and assurances provided, on conformity with subsection 12(2) of the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, it is also pleased to issue an order exempting the Polar
Sea from the application of Canadian Regulations under subsection 12(1) of the
said Act”.53 Thereby the Canada satisfied the demand of the United States without
departing from its international legal position. Contemplating about details in
States’ arguments on more generalized level, we could suggest that successful
argumentative practice does not require strict following existing international legal
provisions or engaging in a controversy against other arguments. in fact potentially
‘legitimate’ positions are not necessarily legal in the present international law at
the moment of their presentation. Disputants can not only rely on existing rules in
their conventional meaning but can construct legal arguments either with original
interpretations or even with new suggestions. on the one side, this perception
53
Canadian Embassy, Washington DC, Note No. 433, dated July 31, 1985, State Department File
No. P85 0118-0711/0714, ii Cumulative Digest 2047-2048. As cited in: J. Ashley Roach, Robert
W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 323, 925.
encourages the development of international law. on the other side, it allows States
not to base their legal positions fully on international law, but only to draw on
selected international legal rules. The choice in the elaboration of international
legal policy does not come to the choice only between international legal rules,
their interpretations and arguments. What if the State could turn an international
legal rule for its benefit by appealing to a selected part of this norm? in this case
we could regard such ‘selective approach’ to international law as one of
argumentative stratagems in the State’s international legal policy.
THE SELECTIVE APPROACH IN THE

ARGUMENTATIVE PRACTICE
Actually the idea of the selective approach in State’s practice is not new in the
legal field. For instance, Pitter Potman advanced the term of ‘selective adaption’
indicating the implementation of non-local rules, such as international law, where
‘nonlocal institutional practices and organizational forms are mediated by local
norms’.54 As the scholar explains, the selective adaptation is contingent on three
factors. First, the understanding of non-local rules depends on perception of
purpose, content and effects from their practices in a local system. in other words,
non-local norms are interpreted and applied in light of local norms. Second,
selective adaptation provides complementarity by virtue of which contesting
elements of contradictory legal phenomena may ‘operate together in a mutually
reinforcing and effective manner’.55 Third, the results of selective adaptation are
effective to the extent that they are locally accepted. Therefore effectiveness of
adapted norms depends on ‘legitimacy of the content and process of selection’.56
The process of selective adaptation gets intelligibly illustrated with China’s
treaty practice. Chao Wang developed the idea of selective adaptation as a
normative approach of the Chinese government to compliance with WTo
requirements. He exemplifies the perception element with interpretation how
regime of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SoEs) is compatible with the WTo
rules. As to complementarity between Chinese SoEs and WTo legal regime, the
coexistence of contradicting phenomena gets a peculiar form: ‘socialist market
economy’ based on the dominant power of SoEs turns out ‘de facto ‘state
capitalism’ in disguise’.57 Notably, this illustration presents the selective adaptation
as an attempt to overcome the cultural divergence, notably, the difference between
54
Pitman B. Potter, “Legal Reform in China: institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation”, Law
& Social Inquiry, 2004, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 465, 478.
55
Ibid., p. 479.
56
Pitman B. Potter, op.cit.
57
Chao Wang, “Сhina’s treaty compliance with the WTo: perspectives of selective adaptation and
institutional capacity”. Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2019, vol. 6, no. 1,
pp. 139146.
two market visions, socialist and liberalist, as embodied in SoEs and WTo
principles correspondingly.58 Notwithstanding that selective adaptation demands
much effort of legal reasoning, rare States explicitly abandon their international
legal commitments in favor of national legal rules. in view of State’s adherence to
international norms, the question arises whether the need for selective adaptation
in the legal realm could stem from such strategically important ground as defense
of a State’s positions in international law. We can suppose that the selective
adaptation is a part of general selective approach of international legal policy of a
State on a particular issue. Hence selective approach may cover not only
compliance contingent on internalization of international legal rules, but also
compliance with international legal rules in interstate relations. Furthermore,
selective approach is not limited to a particular normative stage, but may be applied
to a legal issue in general, commencing with the very law-creating moment.
Therefore the selective approach might be freely used in State’s argumentative
strategy in general. Admittedly, the argumentation is always selective due to
constraints of a particular context (material circumstances of a dispute, character
of relations between involved parties, duration of a controversial situation,
normative foundations for solution etc.).59 Basically, the attention of audience is
limited, while its focus shift depends on its inner prioritization of interests and
concerns. indeed the audience is not a tabula rasa.60 in result States differently
appreciate the same norm and can put the focus on different parts of the rule. Thus
wise States have to select the most persuasive legal references depending upon a
targeted audience (for instance, participants to some regional legal regime or
contesting parties in the conflict situation).The selective approach in the
international legal argumentation should not be confused with a mere ‘cherry-
picking’ (more popular in the context of international legal disputes). The emphasis
on some norms and the deliberate overshadowing of other provisions leads to
distortion of the argumentative balance. Therefore such practice presents a logical
fallacy. it is impossible to draw just conclusions in legal reasoning which allows
for ignorance of substantial legal evidences. Moreover, the nature of international
law prevents the expansion of ‘cherry-picking’ practices. The systemic
interrelationships of international legal rules do not allow to extract separate
provisions without detriment to their legal meaning.61 in this regard the selection,
as a category, has more creative power than ‘choice’ between concrete options. it
can be illustrated with the stage of interpretation of a legal rule, where State avoids
58
This view resembles the invitation to treat law as constituted by culture. See: Lawrence Rosen,
Law as Culture: An Invitation, Princeton University Press, Princeton/oxford, 2006, p. 214.
59
60
Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., pp. 169–170.
61
The integrality and comprehensiveness of the international legal system is demonstrated in Para.
9 Ch. Vii ’importance of disputes as a test of justiciability’ in: Hersch Lauterpacht, Functions of
international law, oxford University Press, oxford, 2011, pp. 512, pp. 165–168.
of admitting a rule in its pure form, by laying emphasis on a particular detail or a

meaning of terms.62 This is one of the ways how the international legal policy of
State puts up with ‘inconveniences’ of unfavorable legal provisions. States do not
have to choose between two clear options, if a legal provision may cover both
options.63 But it is possible only if a concerned provision does not explicitly
exclude alternative interpretations. Therefore de Lacharrière suggested that States
might intentionally elaborate more vague formulations due to unwillingness to
cede at the law-making stage.64 in this respect, the ambiguity of legal provisions
is a ‘technique of compromise’.65 it enables the creative capacities of international
legal policy of State and calms the tension between concurring views on a
regulated issue. For this reason States may consciously abscond from the
codification of a legal regime based on international customary norms. Thereby
vague provisions make it possible to postpone a clear-cut solution unless the
involved parties are ready to recognize the predominance of one understanding
over the other. Such ‘preferability’ of ambiguous provisions in the international
legal field resembles the theory of universal values by Ch. Perelman. in his view
the universal audience can adhere to some universal values as long as they remain
abstract categories.66 indeed ambiguous legal provisions result either from the
immature legal issue, or from the struggle of unreconciled positions, while
intentional strive for flexibility comes from the unwillingness to cede at the present
moment. Therefore de Lacharrière called the stage of interpretation and application
‘la seconde manche’ (the second round) in the sense that States have the chance
to recoup after the law-making stage. The ambiguity of international legal rules
does not mean complete discretion. Vague provisions nonetheless determine
permissible scope of interpretation. Thereby States can find necessary support
within the framework integrated in the international legal system. Furthermore,
the choice of the supportive element in a legal provision is constrained by the
requirement of coherence in the argumentative strategy of State.67 Coherent
simultaneous and successive positions on some issue make State’s view more
62
The classic example is the interpretation by israel of the provisions of the United Nations Security
Council resolution 252, adopted on 21 May 1968. The israel insisted on partial withdrawal of
israeli forces from the occupied territories according to the French text of the Resolution, while
the English text provided for withdrawal from all occupied territories. This case is examined in
depth by many researches. See e.g. Toribio De Valdés, “The “Authoritativeness of the English
and French Texts of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) on the Situation in the Middle
East”,American Journal of International Law, 1977, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 311–316.
63
in some cases such dilemma might mean labelling one State as ’a winner’ and another one as ’a
loser’, that is undesirable for a party which has lesser or weaker legal arguments in favour of its
version of a rule.
64
65
Lyndel V. Prott, op. cit., p. 302.
66
Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., pp. 74–79, 133–138.
67
persistent in the international argumentative practice.68 Admittedly, positions based

on an earlier admissible pattern seem much more credible. The search for the
coherence of international legal policy prevents States from spontaneous reactions
to extra-legal factors and contributes to the cumulation effect.
international legal solutions cannot be sudden. The necessity of legal
background for decision-making originates from the concept of ‘topoi’ in the
classical theory of argumentation. in the Aristotelian logic ‘topoi’ means a group
of interrelated ideas and perceptions common for participants of the discussion.
Notably, the concentration of arguments is also familiar to the international
discussions.69 But in studies of international legal argumentation researches might
use alternative terms, like ‘common lifeworld’ (David Hughes adopts this term
from the scholarly apparatus of Jurgen Habermas).70 To make the audience
appreciate some deductions, the rhetor should reason from premises to which the
audience holds on. in this way the rhetor proves his commitment to the initial
common opinion, or in other words, continuity of his suppositions with the
recognized legal rules. in this sense, such topical approach underlies the stratagems
of international legal policy. The State usually limits its arguments, emphasizing
the selected elements of ‘topical’ common ground. This focus in the argumentative
line is comparable with the notion of ‘presence’ in the rhetoric theory of Ch.
Perelman.71 ‘Giving presence to certain aspects of the argument’ means
concentration on some sort of factors. it should be noted, that selection of certain
provisions does not imply the denial of non-selected provisions, but rather a
departure from the mainstream thinking in international law. Usually the selective
approach to rules of international law (if possible) manifests itself at the ‘second
round’ by interpretation or by arguing in dispute settlement. Nonetheless, the most
significant choices occur by law-making where a State chooses a ‘steppingstone’
for a new direction in international law.72 Since the existing rules of international
68
David Hughes, op. cit., pp. 882–885.
69
iain Scobbie op. cit., p. 70 citing Stoljar, ‘System and Topoi’, at 389.
70
David Hughes, op. cit., p. 871.
71
Chaïm Perelman, Lucie olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., p. 116.
72
it may be said that the selective approach in international law attains the apogee in the form of
separate agreements, particular customs and other interstate arrangements differing in some way
from the general rules. This is the case of mutual treaty arrangements made further to the adoption
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLoS) in April 1982. Since the
achieved consensus on resources regulation in the ’area’, as exposed in Part Xi of the Convention,
stirred up resentment among participants, some States enacted their national legislation on deep
seabed mining. Therefore States had to conclude arrangements on the resolution of conflicts in
matters of the deep seabed. For instance, in September 1982 the USA, Great Britain and the
Federal Republic of Germany concluded an Agreement concerning interim Arrangements
relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed; in 1984 Belgium, italy, Japan, the
Netherlands signed the Provisional Understanding regarding Deep Seabed Mining; in 1987
Belgium, Canada, italy, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the
law mostly reflect the power landscape at the moment of their creation, we can
assume that the selective approach to international law is a kind of maneuver for
self-exempting from the legal impact of some power relations. once a State is
unhappy with an outcome law-making on a certain issue, this State will be the
most prone to use resulting arrangements on a selective basis. Thereby a State
might try to cease the consequences of non-legal factors at the law-creating stage.
indeed, since the law-making process gets under influence of non-legal factors,
the further realization of international legal rules cannot be attributed exclusively
to their legal quality. Nevertheless, a State can take a ‘good reason’ literally from
multi-factor context. if a State does not break free of subjective impact, it can
‘reset’ these subjective factors. For instance, a State can advance a new solution
to some settled question and receive a new subjective context. This case can be
illustrated with the international legal policy of Norway regarding the legal regime
of the Svalbard archipelago.
CASE STUDY: NORWAY’S POSITION

ON THE SVALBARD ARCHIPELAGO
The remarkable example of the selective approach is the position of Norway
on the maritime areas around the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago, ‘Arctic
archipelago lying in the Barents Sea, with land mass of 62,400 km2. it is illustrative
in two aspects. First, the State selects applicable rules of international law in
general. Second, the State selects concrete provisions of the Treaty, determining a
legal regime of the archipelago. To trace the development of the selective approach
in Norway’s international legal policy (hereafter – iLP), we should make an
overview of established legal rules and their historical background. The legal status
of the Spitsbergen was fixed with provisions of the Paris Treaty in 1920 with the
participation of nine States and remains in full force till present.73 According to
Resolution of Practical Problems with respect to Deep Seabed Mining Areas. As result, two
international legal regimes for the mineral resources of the deep seabed were formed. Such
situation might have led to international conflicts, since the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea did not recognize any rights to mineral resources acquired outside the conventional regime,
and the particular multilateral agreements did not recognize any rights to the same resources
acquired outside the scope of these agreements. See: Boris M. Klimenko, “Mezhdunarodno-
pravovoj rezhim glubokovodnogo morskogo dna i ego resursov” [international legal regime of
the deep-water seabed and its resources] Soviet state and law, 1989, no. 4, p. 119 (in Russ.)
73
United States of America; Great Britain; Denmark; France; italy; Japan; Norway; Netherlands;
Sweden. The former dominions of the Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South
Africa, india, are also considered as original parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty. Geir Ulfstein
noted, that ’the Svalbard Treaty has already survived for 100 years through big changes, and
there is reason to believe it will survive another 100 years’ as cited in: Siri Gulliksen
Tømmerbakket, “The Svalbard Treaty 100 Years: A Journey from Terra Nullius to All man’s
land”, High North News (31 January 2020), internet: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/
svalbard-treaty-100-years-journey-terra-nullius-all-mans-land
the Article 1 contracting parties recognized the full and absolute sovereignty of
Norway over the Spitsbergen Archipelago and all of the islands situated between
10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North
(geographic scope of the Svalbard Treaty, or in other terms ‘treaty box’) within
the special regime of the Treaty. Thereby States fixed a status quo of the territory
with no sovereignty over the Archipelago, including Norwegian sovereignty.74 The
exclusive right of Norway to exercise sovereignty is balanced with the guarantees
of the equitable treatment of nationals of contracting parties. As D.H. Anderson
noted, the sovereignty provision and the stipulations on rights of access constitute
a single indissoluble ‘package deal’.75 The treaty endowed nationals of Parties with
the equal rights of fishing and hunting (Article 2), ‘equal liberty of access and
entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports’(Article 3),
opportunity to carry ‘all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations
on a footing of absolute equality […] both on land and in the territorial waters‘
(Article 3), equal rights in telegraphy communications (Article 4), equal rights of
ownership (Article 7), etc. So all necessary measures and regulations that Norway
adopts should conform to the non-discrimination principle when they are
‘applicable equally without any exemption, privilege or favor whatsoever’ (Article
2).The sovereignty of Norway over the archipelago was recognized by the parties
of the international treaty only within the scope of this agreement.76 it means that
Norway exercises the sovereign rights as its international legal obligation ‘to assure
their development and peaceful utilization’.77 Norway acts as a Party vested with
powers by interstate agreement for solving certain task. Consequently, the
concerned treaty provision (Article 1) was designed for practical reasons rather
than for confirmation of its historical rights.78 As Fred K. Nielsen commented on
the outcome of the Paris conference, the sovereignty of Norway was recognized
“in view of the interests of that country in Spitsbergen, its proximity to the
74
ida Caracciolo, “Unresolved controversy: the legal situation of the Svalbard islands maritime
areas; an interpretation of the Paris Treaty in light of UNCLoS 1982”, Presented at the
International Conference on Disputed Territory and Maritime Space, Durham University, 2010,
p. 5, internet:https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/ida_caracciolo_paper.pdf
75
D. H. Anderson, “The Status Under international Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard”.
Ocean Development & International Law, 2009, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 373–384.
76
That is reflected in the formulation of Article 1 “The High Contracting Parties undertake to
recognize, subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of
Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen”. Emphasis added.
77
The Preamble of the Spitsbergen Treaty 1920. See: Vera M. Savva, “Norwegian State Practice
and the Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen (Current international Law issues)”, Moscow Journal of
International Law, 2016, no. 3, pp. 95–103. (in Russ.)
78
“it was deemed unnecessary to take into account ancient claims of certain governments which
had never been perfected and accorded international recognition”. See: Fred K. Nielsen, “The
Solution of the Spitsbergen Question”, American Journal of International Law, 1920, vol.14,
pp. 232–233.
archipelago and the desirability of an early definitive solution”.79 if historical rights

were meaningful for the intentions of the contracting parties, those negotiations
would not have gone without participation of Russia in view of its strong long-
standing presence in the area of Spitsbergen. indeed due to geographic proximity
to the archipelago, Russian nationals had historically been performing economic
activities and founding settlements on the southern shores of the Spitsbergen. if
the right of discovery might be claimed by Scandinavian Vikings, the presence of
the Russian Pomors on the Archipelago from the times immemorial is
undisputable.80 Moreover, the occupation of Spitsbergen by the Russian Pomors
was recognized at the international level and even regarded as a sign of sovereignty
in the correspondence of monarchs.81 Therefore, when in 1871 the Sweden-
Norwegian government decided to ‘take possession’ of the Spitsbergen, the
relevant diplomatic notes were addressed to foreign governments, including that
of Russia.82 The subsequent exchange of notes between Russia and Sweden-
Norway constituted an international agreement, under which the Spitsbergen was
treated as a territory that could not be the object of exclusive possession of any
state. This first treaty source on the Spitsbergen archipelago provided for the
equality of rights of all states in the exploitation of the natural resources of the
islands, in the conduct of scientific research, in the establishment of settlements
or enterprises on them, on condition that these activities were to be of a peaceful
79
Ibid., p. 233.
80
igor Mikhailov noted that most of the names of islands and rocks in the Spitsbergen Archipelago
are toponyms of Russian origin. See: igor A. Mikhailov, Arhipelag Shpicbergen. Perekrestok
sobytii i sudeb, [Spitsbergen Archipelago. Crossroads of events and destinies]. Nauchny Mir,
Moscow, 2004, pp. 20–21, 222 (in Russ.)
81
Leonid D. Timchenko, Shpitsbergen: istoriya i sovremennost, [Timchenko L. D. Spitsbergen:
history and present time]. Karkiv, 1992, pp. 7–8 (in Russ.)
82
in the diplomatic note of 17/29 March of 1871 the Swedish-Norwegian Government notified its
intention to take formal possession of the Spitsbergen islands on several grounds. Firstly, as of
the date of the note, there were no Norwegian settlements in Spitsbergen, but “for many years
the inhabitants of the northern regions of Norway, who are in the habit of fishing off the
Spitsbergen islands, have persistently requested protection and subsidies from the Government
in order to establish a settlement there”. Secondly, the inhabitants of Northern Norway wished
to build on the islands “their permanent dwellings, which would become a support for scientific
expeditions”. Thirdly, Norwegian diplomats suggested, that “these islands, which” were never
considered to belong to any state”, “ by their nature and geographic location, should most likely
belong to the Norwegian continent”. Therefore the note indicated the wish of the King of
Sweden-Norway “to be sure that no State whose subjects are in the habit of visiting those lands
will object on the basis of an earlier title against such actions on His part”. in the response
diplomatic note of 15/27 May of 1871 Russia stated that “it would seem more practical […] to
confine ourselves to the current situation where, by tacit agreement between the Governments,
this group of islands is considered a territory on which a decision has not been made, accessible
to all those States whose subjects seek to exploit there natural resources”. See:”Diplomatic
correspondence”, Spitsbergen, 1871–1872. Appendix to the book iii – “izvestia MFA” for 1912,
St. Petersburg, 1912, pp. 27–48.
nature.83 Although Russia had never claimed sovereignty over the Spitsbergen, it
neither accepted the extension of the sovereignty of other States over the
archipelago, especially since ‘prescriptive right of occupation, undoubtedly,
belongs to the Russian people, more than to any other’.84 Although the Spitsbergen
Treaty was initially concluded without participation of the Russian government,
it contains the special provision, that ‘Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy
the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties’ (Article 10). The
Soviet government adhered to the Treaty on 7 May 1935. Nowadays 46
governments are committed to the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty.
Nevertheless, Norway takes steps that find no justification in the Treaty provisions.
With the Royal Decree of 1 June 2001, Norway adopted regulations relating to
the limits of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard.85 These regulations
provide for straight baselines around Svalbard, which, as can be seen in maps
produced by the Norwegian Mapping Authority, cover maritime areas significantly
wider than areas determined in 1970.86 Thereafter Norway notified all State parties
to the Treaty on Svalbard with a copy of the new regulations in the two official
languages of the Treaty, English and French. With reference to Article 16 of the
UNCLoS Convention Norway published the list of new coordinates and
forwarded it to the UN Secretary-General.87 This action did not meet explicit
objections of any governments, nonetheless the legal reasoning behind those steps
83
R.V. Dekanozov, “Demilitarizatsiya i neytralizatsiya Shpitsbergena” [Demilitarisation and
Neutralisation of Spitsbergen], Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1968, pp. 181–192 (in
Russ.)
84
Note of the Ministry of internal Affairs of Russia, published in the journal ’Russian shipping’,
1898, No. 195, 8–20 as cited in A.F. Fedorov, V.S. Zlobin, V.A. Slobodyanik, “Norvegija:
suverenitet nad Shpicbergenom ili nechto bol’shee?” [Norway: Sovereignty over Svalbard or
More?], Fisheries Journal, 2005, vol. 6, pp. 13–15 (in Russ.)
85
“Royal Decree of 1 June 2001”, No 556, Regulations Relating to the Limits of the Norwegian
Territorial Sea Around Svalbard (FoR 2001–06–01 nr 556: Forskritt om grunnlinjene for
sjøterritoriet ved Svalbard), UN Law of the Sea Bulletin, 2001,No. 49, pp. 72–81, internet:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGiSLATioNANDTREATiES/PDFFiLES/NoR_2001_DecreeT
S.PDF. This Royal Decree repealed the Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 no. 3390, providing
the first list of geographic coordinates of its straight baselines around Svalbard. Pursuant to the
Royal Decree no. of February 22, 1812 on the territorial sea the Royal Decree of 2001 previews
4-mile breadth of the territorial sea around Svalbard. The Act of 27 June 2003 relating to
Norway’s territorial waters and contiguous zone extended the territorial sea up to 12 miles. The
list of geographical coordinates of points defining the outer limits of the territorial sea around
mainland Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen was also deposited to the UN Secretary General.
86
“Limits in the Seas”, No. 148, Norway Maritime Claims and Boundaries [28 August 2020] office
of ocean and Polar Affairs Bureau of oceans and international Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 18–19.
87
M.Z.N. 38. 2001. LoS of 8 June 2001: Deposit of the list of geographical coordinates of points
for drawing the baselines for measuring the width of the territorial sea around Svalbard, as
contained in: Regulations of 1 June 200internet: available at https://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGiSLATioNANDTREATiES/STATEFiLES/NoR.htm
stirred up controversy among legal scholars: whether Norway has the legal merits
to extend its national regulation beyond the territorial scope of the Treaty of
Svalbard. indeed, the Treaty of 1920 did not provide for maritime zones
delimitation as far as its scope is limited with the coordinates indicated in the
Article 1. it means that the maritime area beyond outer limits of territorial waters
of the Svalbard, covered islands and rocks, as determined by the Treaty provisions,
presents the high seas.88 The sovereign right to draw the territorial sea and other
maritime zones results from the sovereignty over the territories they are adjacent
to, whereas sovereign rights of Norway over Svalbard are confined to the tasks
established in the Treaty. Therefore it is mistaken to equate the conventional notion
of ‘territorial sea’ with the particular notion of ‘territorial waters’ introduced in the
Spitsbergen Treaty. From the erroneous equation one may deduce Norway’s right
to draw contiguous zone, exclusive economic zones, fishery conservation zones
as well as to make regulations for the presumed jurisdiction over the continental
shelf. Therefore it is important to clearly distinguish legal regimes of ‘territorial
sea’ and ‘territorial waters’.89 in contrast to the regime of territorial sea that of
territorial waters does not imply exclusive sovereignty of the coastal state over the
natural sources. on the contrary, all nationals of the contracting States have equal
access to that natural wealth). it does not imply the obligatory consent of the coastal
State to research works in the area. it does not have such specific component as
the right of innocent passage, but provides for unconstrained freedom of
navigation. Consequently, misinterpretation of the used terms distorts the initial
intentions of the Parties to the Treaty. From this perspective the assumption of
rights to delimit maritime zones means the attempt of unilateral change of the
established regime.90 However, Norway does not intend to modify nor derogate
from the Spitsbergen Treaty: it intends to justify its exclusive rights with other
sources of international law, distinct from the Treaty of 1920.91 The legal position
of Norway can be outlined in several arguments. Firstly, the regime that the
Spitsbergen Treaty created presents a unique combination of Norwegian
sovereignty over the archipelago and the possibility of access to economic
activities on it by any State party to the Treaty.92 Secondly, as following from the
88
Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Vyacheslav K. Zilanov, Vera M. Savva, Pravovoj rezhim
Shpicbergena i prilegayushchih morskih rajonov [Legal regime of Svalbard and adjacent sea
areas], Norma, Moscow,2019, pp. 65, 308 (in Russ.)
89
Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Vyacheslav K. Zilanov, Vera M. Savva, op.cit., p. 68.
90
As the iCJ pointed out in 1982, ‘an attempt by a unilateral act to establish international maritime
boundary lines regardless of the legal position of other States is contrary to recognized principles
of international law’. See: iCJ, Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgement,
24 February 1982, i.C.J. Reports 18, para. 87.
91
92
Norwegian international lawyer Geir Ulfstein proves that the sovereignty of Norway over
Svalbard is of ordinary nature, therefore Norway’s sovereignty is prevalent unless otherwise
provided by the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty. See: Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty;
sovereignty over Svalbard, Norway has the right to establish a 200-mile exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf around the archipelago.93 Thirdly, the
Norwegian government states that the shelf of the Spitsbergen is an extension of
the continental part of Norway.94 Finally, Norway benefits from its historical title
to the Spitsbergen archipelago, to the extent that Norway had been present in the
area for centuries and its long-standing effective application of national regulations
for Svalbard meets the common acquiescence.95 Therefore, Norway does not wish
for a new international conference on the maritime areas around Svalbard, as it
would mean “a return to the situation before the First World War”. Thereby
Norway aims at justifying the customary nature of its sovereignty over the
Svalbard Archipelago.96 Then in the Norwegian understanding the role of the treaty
of 1920 comes down to specification of ways how Norway rules the territory of
multi-national interests. Herewith Norwegian jurists deny the contradiction
between its legal arguments and the Treaty provisions. As it was explained in the
ministerial report on Svalbard to the Norwegian parliament, ‘limitations have not
been placed on sovereignty as such, but rather on how Norwegian authority may
be exercised in certain specifically defined areas’.97 Thereby Norway puts the
accent on one element of the treaty provision (‘recognize the full and absolute
sovereignty’), making an element of conditions (‘subject to the stipulations of the
From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty, Scandinavian University Press, oslo, 1995,
pp. 512, 124–129.
93
Ibid., p. 418–419.
94
in the Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in respect of areas
in the Arctic ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea of 27 November 2006, Norway
explicitly indicated, that its continental slope constituting the southern flank of the Nansen Basin
included Svalbard. The statement is confirmed by the topographic map. See: “Continental Shelf
Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian
Sea”, Executive Summary no. 10, p. 14, internet: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,
95
Norway argues, that it declared its position on Svalbard yet by the presentation to the Supreme
Council of the Paris Peace Conference on 10 April 1919: ’The Norwegian Government is
convinced that it is serving the interests of peace in submitting to the Conference this question,
which has been for so long in litigation, and expresses the hope that all the Powers will agree to
return this archipelago definitively to Norway, the only country which has ever exercised
sovereign rights there’. As cited in Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, Svalbard
Meld, St. 32, 2015–2016, Report to the Storting (white paper), p. 18, internet: https://www.
regjeringen.no/contentassets/379f96b0ed574503b47765f0a15622ce/en-gb/pdfs/stm20152016
0032000engpdfs.pdf; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, Svalbard. St. meld.,
No 22, 2008–2009, Report to the Storting, p. 34, internet: https://www.regjeringen.
no/contentassets/e70b04df32ad45f483f2619939c5636d/en-gb/pdfs/stm200820090022000en_
pdfs.pdf.
96
Carl A. Fleischer, Folkerett, Universitetsforlaget, oslo, 2005, pp. 136–7; Geir Ulfstein, op. cit.,
p. 128.
97
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, op. cit., p. 20.
present Treaty’) complementary regardless of the ‘package deal’ nature of the

provision.98 While Norway insists on the long standing of its sovereign rights over
Svalbard, it is then surprising why the polemic on the issue has only recently
resurged. it seems questionable that Norway has been always committed to this
view. in fact Norway had been rigidly respecting the Svalbard Treaty for a long
time before it directed its iLP for proving its absolute and unconditional
sovereignty. Norway has diligently fulfilled its duty to legislate under stipulations
of the Treaty, beginning with the mining regulations adoption of which is required
under Article 8. in respect of the requirement on accommodating the text of the
mining regulations with the Contracting Parties (section 4 Article 8), Norway
engaged in negotiations with other Parties before putting in force the Mining
Code.99 The application of other legislation is limited by the special provision of
the Svalbard Act of 1925: other acts than private law, criminal law and the
legislation on the administration of justice do not apply to Svalbard, except when
specifically stipulated.100 Furthermore, Norway confirmed the special character of
its sovereignty over Svalbard in its legislative practice. By the Act on Fisheries
Borders of 1961, Norway extended the fishing zone previously established off its
mainland and Jan Mayen island to 6 nautical miles, and by the Act of 1966 – to
12 nautical miles.101 These regulations did not affect the right to fish in Svalbard,
which was open to ships of all States-parties to the Paris Treaty of 1920. Thereby
98
This selective approach is particularly visible in the conflict of Norway with the EU over capture
of the snow crab on the seabed of the Barents Sea. The root of the conflict is in different
understanding of the regime applicable to the activity in the concerned area. The EU insists on
the broad interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty, while Norway prefers to rely on the UNCLoS
provisions on the continental shelf (Article 77 para. 4), interpreting Spitsbergen Treaty in a
restrictive way. on the occasion of the centenary anniversary of the Svalbard Treaty, Norway
clearly exposed its position: “The provisions on equal treatment apply only to nationals and
companies from states that are parties to the Treaty. (…) The right to equal treatment is not the
same as the right to resources. The Norwegian authorities can both regulate and prohibit
activities, as long as there is no discrimination on the basis of nationality. (…) Under the Treaty,
ships and nationals from states that are parties to the Treaty have equal rights to engage in fishing
and hunting on land in Svalbard and in the territorial waters around the archipelago, i.e. up to
12 nautical miles from land”. See: ‘Celebrating 100 years of the Svalbard Treaty’
speech/statement of 09/02/2020 by Minister of Foreign Affairs, ine Eriksen Søreide, Minister
of Justice and Public Security, Monica Mæland, internet: https://www.regjeringen.
no/en/aktuelt/treaty_hundred/id2689324/; Christopher R. Rossi, “Norway’s imperiled
Sovereignty Claim over Svalbard’s Adjacent Waters”, German Law Journal, 2017, vol. 18, no.
6, pp. 1497–1530; Øystein Jensen, “The Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Sovereignty”. Arctic
Review on Law and Politics, 2020, no. 11, pp. 82–107.
99
Øystein Jensen, Ibid., pp. 90–91.
100
“Svalbard Act no, 11 (Lov om Svalbard)”, 17 July 1925, Chapter 1, para. 2.
101
“Act on Norway’s fisheries borders (Lov om Norges fiskerigrense)”, 24 March 1961; “Act No.
19 relating to Norway’s prohibition against fishing by foreign nationals in Norwegian territorial
waters (Lov om forbud mot at utlendinger driver fiske m.v. i Norges territorialfarvann)”, 17
June 1966..
in 1961 and 1966 Norway, it reaffirmed the difference between the exercise of
sovereignty over the state mainland of the country and over the Jan Mayen island
and the exercise of sovereignty over Svalbard on the terms stipulated by the Paris
Treaty.102 in the same vein the Act of 1976 relating to the Economic Zone of
Norway did not cover the Svalbard Archipelago.103 As the Royal Decree of the
same date clarified, the economic zone was established in the waters off the
Norwegian mainland with effect from 1 January 1977.104 Finally, unlike Canada
and Russia Norway had never attempted to determine the borders of its polar
possessions in the Arctic. Hence its position on the maritime border with Russia
in the Arctic was not explicitly articulated before Norwegian-Russian negotiations,
which resulted in the Treaty concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation
in the Barents Sea and the Arctic ocean of 2010.105 Thus, by its implicative conduct
Norway consistently recognized the legal regime of Spitsbergen as fixed in the
Treaty of 1920. The detour from the coherent and predictable iLP inevitably causes
concerns of stakeholders in the issue. in the Norwegian iLP on the status of
Svalbard such turning point occurred with the adoption of Regulation No. 6 of 3
June 1977 on fishery protection zone around Svalbard.106 The Regulation
established the protected marine area, the outer limits of which were determined
at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines determined in 1970.
Naturally, this action aroused a ‘spate of zone objections’ from the interested States
in the region, including United States, United Kingdom, France, Western Germany,
USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia.107 Notably, in the diplomatic note of 15
June 1977 USSR pointed to ‘the lack of consistency between international legal
obligations undertaken by Norway under the Svalbard Treaty and the unilaterally
adopted decision based on national legislation regarding the special territory
regulated by the mentioned treaty’.108 The USSR underlined that Norway’s
measures affected its national interests since the Soviet Union ‘is traditionally
engaged in fishing in the waters of Archipelago’ [emphasis added]. This detail of
formulation highlighted the Soviet position on the distinction between waters of
102
103
“Act No. 91 relating to the Economic Zone of Norway (Lov om Norges økonomiske sone)”,
17 December 1976.
104
“Royal Decree relating to the Establishment of the Economic Zone of Norway (Kongelig
resolusjon om Norges økonomiske sone)”, 17 December 1976.
105
“Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic ocean”, 15 September 2010.
The Treaty is done in Norwegian and Russia (Article 8). internet: https://www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGiSLATioNANDTREATiES/PDFFiLES/TREATiES/NoR-RUS2010.PDF
106
“Regulation No. 6 on fishery protection zone around Svalbard (Forskrift om fiskevernsone ved
Svalbard)”, 3 June 1977.
107
Torbjørn Pedersen, “The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy”. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2008,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 236–262.
108
Note of the Russian Embassy in Norway of 15 June 1977.
Norway and waters of Archipelago as subject to the special regime.109 The conflict
was settled with the agreement expressed in the common Soviet-Norwegian
communiqué of 1978, known as communiqué of ishkov and Evensen. Without
arranging jurisdictional questions, States agreed upon ‘the necessity of establishing
zones to limit or prohibit fishing activity on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent
over-fishing’.110 The matter was not exhausted in the 1970s and saw its
repercussions in the relations of Norway with other States, such as Spain,
Denmark, iceland.111 For instance, the divergences between Norway and iceland
over fishery issue ultimately led to the dispute over icelandic fishing in the
Loophole (the area beyond economic zones of Norway and Russia in the east of
the Norwegian-administered Svalbard archipelago) in the Barents Sea in July
1993.112 iceland’s Foreign Minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson emphasized the
obligation of Norway to ‘respect the commitment it has made to other states in
accordance with the Svalbard Treaty’, there from it must be concluded that
‘principle of equality applies within the 200-mile limits to all states acceding to
the treaty’.113 in sum, we can see that the conduct of Norway as a sovereign in the
traditional sense in regard to the Svalbard’s regime faced resistance of affected
States. Therefore the argument of acquiescence in further justification of Norway’s
position seems untenable. Nonetheless it is noteworthy how Norway promotes its
position. The State does not seek to impose its view by insisting on its rightness.
on the contrary, Norway tries to round off rough corners of its divergent position
with other States in a diplomatic way. Ultimately Norway manages to guard the
effects of the adopted measures, just considering necessary refinements and
specifications from the interested States. As a side note, Norway did not annul the
disputable Act in the fishery protected zones around Svalbard. Thereby Norway
frames the legal grounds for justification of its position on Svalbard as a part of
Norway in the customary perspective. Some scholars consider the exercise of
sovereignty by virtue of the Treaty provisions for a long time as a sufficient legal
reason to treat such sovereignty as customary. As Robin Churchill and Geir
Ulfstein noted in 2010, ‘it may be debatable whether today Norway’s sovereignty
109
it should be clarified, that the treaty stipulates expresis verbis that Norway exercises sovereignty
over land – precisely over the listed islands. The borders of the ’Treaty box’ are not the limits
of Norway’s sovereignty; the geographic coordinates are indicated in the Treaty in order not to
list all the islands and rocks that are attributed to the Svalbard archipelago by the Treaty. The
sovereignty and territorial supremacy of Norway does not extend to the entire area of the 1920
Treaty, but to these islands and rocks. Therefore, in case when a foreign ship (not Norwegian)
enters Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Vyacheslav K. Zilanov, Vera M. Savva, op. cit., p. 72.
110
The common communique of the USSR and the Kingdom of Norway of 16 March 1978.
111
Torbjørn Pedersen, op. cit., p. 246.
112
Thorir Gudmundsson, “Cod War on the High Seas: Norwegian-icelandic Dispute over Loophole
Fishing in the Barents Sea”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 1995, vol. 64, pp. 557.
113
Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, ’Norge Har Tatt Seg Til Rette’, Dagbladet, 19 August 1994.
Translated from Norwegian as cited in Torbjørn Pedersen, op. cit., p. 246.
over Svalbard derives (entirely) from the Svalbard Treaty. For non-parties,
Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard derives from its practical exercise over more
than 80 year’.114 indeed due to the passage of time treaty norms can become
customary.115 However, such conversion does not entail the extension of the
geographic scope of the initial treaty norms nor the extension of obligations and
rights provided in these norms. Since for Norway there is no use in relying
exclusively on the Spitsbergen Treaty with primarily limited scope, the State
chooses other sources of international law, international customary rules and the
UNCLoS provisions, to exempt itself from the conditions, arrangements and
interstate relations fixed in 1920. it would be a different matter, if Norway’s
practice under treaty provisions went beyond these prescriptions and was tacitly
accepted first of all by States-parties to the treaty and then by other States.
However, at this moment such Norway’s practice for extension of its jurisdiction
over Svalbard and abutting maritime areas lacks concordant support (opinio
juris).116 Therefore the current task of Norway’s iLP is not only to accumulate
abstract arguments in favor of its view, but to consistently maintain them in
relations with other States.
CONCLUSION
The selective approach to international law is natural part of international legal
policy of State. The selection practice is inherent to the argumentative practice
inasmuch as disputants need to accumulate certain weight of mutually supportive
arguments. Notably, the application of the selective approach is necessitated by
the task to promote a selected position, different from the mainstream view on the
state of international affairs. Whereas the common understandings proceed from
topoi of international law in the terms of Aristotelian rhetoric, a differing national
position does not follow the current line of legal reasoning and suggests a new
direction. Selective approach does not challenge the rule of international law, since
114
Robin Churchill, Geir Ulfstein, “The Disputed Maritime Zones around Svalbard” in Nordquist
Myron H., Heidar Tomas H., Moore John Norton (eds) Changes in the Arctic Environment and
the Law of the Sea, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, pp. xxx, 594, p. 572.
115
in North Sea Continental Shelf case the iCJ confirmed, that a rule conventional or contractual
in its origin can pass into the general corpus of international law and be accepted as such by the
opinion juris. iCJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports,
para 71. See: Thirlway Hughes, “The Sources of international Law” in: Malcolm D. Evans (ed.),
International Law, oxford University Press, oxford, 2010, pp. 95, 102–103.
116
This is the reason why Norway would be reluctant to resort to the negotiations on revision of
the Spitsbergen Treaty, in case such opportunity presents itself: for the moment Norway does
not have strong enough arguments to persuade other contracting parties in open discussion. As
Prof. Geir Ulfstein remarked: ’That would open up for a debate about Norwegian sovereignty,
for instance, which one does not want to risk. Thus, i do not believe there will be formal changes.
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing talk about change, about how the Treaty is interpreted and
can be adjusted through interpretation’. See: Siri Gulliksen Tømmerbakket, op. cit., p. 57.
it does not imply denial of ‘inconvenient’ legal arguments. on the contrary,

selective approach demands adherence to the legal background of a concerned
issue. Without renouncing existing norms, State may select those legal rules or
their interpretations to rationalize its view in legal terms. Consequently, the
selective approach always implies the contribution of new ideas (at least not yet
generally accepted) to competitive solution-making. There through the selective
attitude of a State puts its audience in a dilemma to deny or accept its suggestion.
Either outcome brings the legal issue to the next qualitative level. once legitimated
view acquires normative force, whereas objections fix the degree of disagreement
which still needs to be overcome by the efforts of international legal policy. As
we can see by the example of Norway’s position on Svalbard’s status, the selective
approach is not confined to the choice of treaty provisions. it is creative practice,
which can benefit from the whole fleet of international legal norms, as well as
interpretation techniques. State can emphasize concrete conditions exposed in
treaty provisions or resort to restrictive interpretation. Moreover, State can
prioritizes one source of international law over another. Norway continues
underlining its commitment to provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty, while it builds
its position essentially upon customary international law and limits the role of the
Treaty to selected provisions. This approach does not prevent from legitimating
State’s differing view, if correct international legal policy makes State’s reasoning
enough persuasive for the international community of States. in this regard,
Norway’s position on the status of Svalbard remains controversial despite long-
standing and consistent efforts to exercise ordinary sovereignty till it affects the
interests of other subjects which are adherent to the classical interpretation of
relevant legal rules.
iZBoR DRŽAVA: PoSEBAN SLUčAJ SELEKTiVNoG PRiSTUPA
APSTRAKT
U ovoj pravnoj studiji pažnja je posvećena istraživanjima vezanim za ulogu
slobodnog izbora u međunarodnoj pravnoj politici iz perspektive teorije
argumentacije. Ako se međunarodno-pravna politika posmatra kao obrazložena
strategija za određivanje optimalne međunarodnopravne pozicije, izbor dobija
strateški karakter. Države stoga biraju između konkretnih opcija u vezi sa
međunarodnim sudovima i pravnim izvorima koji bi trebalo da služe prilikom
regulisanja nekih otvorenih međunarodnih pitanja. U zavisnosti od
međunarodnopravne situacije, država će nastojati da postigne dobre rezultate na
tom frontu, dok pravnim manevrima nagoveštava mogućnost selektivnog pristupa
u međunarodnoj pravnoj politici. Selektivnim pristupom, država se možda neće
oslanjati na međunarodnopravna pravila, već će se pozivati na zasebne delove
čitavog skupa zakonskih odredbi i davaće tumačenja fokusirajući se na pojedine
elemente ovih odredbi kako bi dokazala da njena pozicija sasvim prirodno
proizilazi iz pravila opšteg međunarodnog prava. Unutrašnje funkcionisanje

selektivnog pristupa ilustruje pozicija Norveške u pogledu njenog suvereniteta
nad arhipelagom Svalbard. Retrospektivni pregled stavova Norveške po tom
pitanju omogućava da se proceni konzistentnost njene međunarodne pravne
politike i da se bolje razumeju aktuelne kontroverze koje proizilaze iz različitih
očekivanja koja ova politika izaziva.
Ključne reči: Selektivni pristup, međunarodnopravna politika, argumentacija,
legitimacija, Špicbergen/Svalbard
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JAVNI POREDAK U MEĐUNARODNOM

PRIVATNOM PRAVU
Vladimir čoLoVić*
APSTRAKT
U savremenom međunarodnom privatnom pravu, jedan od instituta koji pokreće
mnoga pitanja vezana za primenu stranog prava, kao i za priznanje stranih odluka,
jeste institut javnog poretka. Zakon o rešavanju sukoba zakona sa propisima
drugih zemalja Republike Srbije definiše javni poredak kao osnove društvenog
uređenja naše zemlje. Smatramo da je, navedena, javnopravna definicija,
neadekvatna. No, i u drugim pravima se javni poredak definiše na opšti način ili
se uopšte ne određuje njegov pojam. U Švajcarskoj se ne definiše ovaj institut,
već samo navodi da se strano pravo neće primenjivati, ako je protivno javnom
poretku te zemlje. osnovna funkcija javnog poretka u ovoj oblasti odnosi se na
zaštitu pravnog poretka domaće zemlje u kojoj se primenjuje strano pravo,
odnosno, priznaju strane odluke čije sadržine mogu biti u suprotnosti sa osnovnim
normama domaćeg pravnog poretka koje se, u svakom slučaju, moraju poštovati.
No, da li bi u svakoj situaciji mogli govoriti o zaštiti javnog poretka na navedeni
način. odnosi koje reguliše Međunarodno privatno pravo obuvhata odnose sa
elementom inostranosti, a dejstva primene stranog prava, odnosno, priznanja
strane odluke su mnog šira, nego u situaciji kada elementa inostranosti nema.
Samim tim, postavlja se pitanje, da li javni poredak možemo definisati u ovoj
oblasti, kao i u oblasti javnog prava, odnosno, koje vrednosti u domaćem pravnom
poretku možemo štititi neprimenom stranog prava ili nepriznavanjem strane
odluke čija je sadržina u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom domaće zemlje?
Ključne reči: Javni poredak, element inostranosti, merodavno pravo, strana
odluka, građanskopravni odnos
UVOD
Pojam „javni poredak”, trebalo bi da nas upućuje na pravni ili zakonodavni
poredak država. Međutim, takvo poimanje nije u potpunosti ispravno imajući u
vidu da se javni poredak ne može definisati bez određivanja pojma „suvereniteta
države”, u okviru kojeg je javni poredak kao institut, definisan načelima na kojima
treba da počiva jedan državni sistem. U predmetnom radu, ne posmatramo javni
*
institut za uporedno pravo Beograd. E-mail: v.colovic@iup.rs
poredak sa stanovišta funkcionisanja države, već sa stanovišta funkcionisanja i

poštovanja pravnog sistema. Stoga je definisanje javnog poretka kao osnova
državnog ili društvenog uređenja jedne zemlje prihvatljivo. Međutim, definicija
omogućava da se ovaj institut tumači nešto šire od uobičajenog tumačenja budući
da bi u suprotnom, to jest u slučaju nedefinisanja ili nedovoljnog definisanja javnog
poretka došlo do sitauacija u kojima bi sudovi i drugi nadležni organi arbitrarno
donosili odluke o sadržaju ovog pojma, primenjujući istovremeno i odgovarajuće
norme koje su ovim pojmom obuhvaćene. Za političku i pravnu fizionomiju država
utvrđivanje javnog poretka zbog toga je veoma značajno, jer se javnim poretkom
označava i obeležava njihov pravni identitet. To je ona determinanta prema kojoj
se države međusobno razlikuju. Kad nestane javni poredak, nestaće i država.1 Na
ovom mestu nas, pre svega, interesuje zaštita javnog poretka od primene stranog
prava, kao i priznanja i izvršenja stranih odluka. Naime, pokušaćemo da damo neke
odgovore na pitanja koja se postavljaju u međunarodnom privatnom pravu, kad se
radi o zaštiti javnog poretka. odmah na početku valja uočiti da su norme javnog
poretka imperativne norme, odnosno, njihov uži deo. Sledstveno, ove norme moraju
zaštiti javni poredak ukoliko bi strano pravo ili strana odluka bili sa njim u
suprotnosti. ovde mislimo na javni poredak domaće zemlje, to jest, države u kojoj
bi trebalo primeniti strano pravo, odnosno, u kojoj dolazi do priznanja i izvršenja
strane sudske odluke, bilo da je ona sudska ili arbitražna. U zakonodavstvima većine
zemalja, bez obzira da li se radi o posebnom aktu koji reguliše ovu oblast ili ne,
postoje odredbe koje se odnose na zaštitu javnog poretka, kao i na pretpostavke za
priznanje stranih odluka od kojih se jedna odnosi na zaštitu javnog poretka.
Uglavnom su te odredbe opšte, odnosno, odredbe samo pominju zaštitu javnog
poretka, ne upuštajući se u definisanje ovog instituta. Drugačije je u zakonodavstvu
Republike Srbije, o čemu ćemo kasnije posvetiti pažnju.
JAVNI POREDAK I JAVNI INTERES

Pojam javnog poretka pokreće pitanje, da li javni poredak možemo upodobiti
sa pojmom javnog interesa? činjenica je da se ova dva pojma razlikuju, iako je,
kako to pojedini autori tačno definišu, javni interes podloga javnom poretku, jer
je javni poredak skup najbitnijih javnih interesa, koje je neophodno štititi.2
Razlikuju se tri osnovna elementa javnog interesa. Prvi se tiče neophodnosti
ostvarivanja i zaštite ljudskih sloboda i prava. Drugi se tiče omogućavanja
odvijanja društvenog života. Treći element se odnosi na nesmetan i uredan rad
državnih organa i javnih ustanova.3 U Španiji, samo javnopravne norme mogu biti
1
M.Mitrović, Međunarodnopravni kontinuitet i sukcesija država, Savetnički rad, SMiP, Beograd
1991, str. 5.
2
Z. Tomić, Javni poredak: pojam i struktura, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2019., god.
LXVii, br. 2, str. 35.
3
Ibid., str. 36.
obavezne norme, obzirom da doprinose zaštiti javnog interesa za razliku od normi

privatnog prava. Najčešće ove norme štite javni interes, ali one mogu obuhvatiti i
norme koje štite privatne interese, kao što je to, na primer u Danskoj, Poljskoj i
Sloveniji.4 Nekada je teško razlikovati da li norma štiti samo javni ili samo privatni
interes, odnosno, da li služi zaštiti i jednih i drugih interesa?5 S obzirom da se u
ovom radu bavimo pitanjem zaštite javnog poreka u Međunarodnom privanom
pravu, valja sagledati da pojedini autori ističu da je odbijanje primene stranog
prava uzrokovano zaštitom javnih interesa domaće države. Javni poredak ne može
obuhvatiti norme koje štite privatne interese. Strano pravo i strana odluka se neće
primeniti samo ako su u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom zemlje primene prava,
odnosno, zemlje priznanja strane odluke. Javni poredak u tim situacijama
pojavljuje se kao instrument izbora prava, to jest, on ne dozvoljava primenu prava
do kojeg smo došli primenom kolizione norme.6
DEFINICIJA JAVNOG PORETKA

Definisanje javnog poretka jedne zemlje nije lako, a kod nas se ovaj pojam
definiše kao osnov društvenog uređenja, što takođe, nije dobilo svoje određenje.7
Generalno uzevši, pojam „društveno uređenje” ostao je iz ranijeg poretka koji je
vladao u našoj zemlji. Bilo bi, možda, uputnije prihvatiti pojam „javni poredak”.
Videćemo, kasnije, da se i u zakonodavstvu Republike Srbije, koje reguliše oblast
međunarodnog privatnog prava, upotrebljava pojam „osnove društvenog
uređenja”. Šta konretno čini javni poredak, određuj po pravilu najviši zakonski
akti jedne države. To su osnovni principi na kojima počiva jedan pravni sistem.8
Norme javnog poretka moramo, pre svega, definisati kao supstancijalne norme
domaće države, koje se, u svakom slučaju, moraju zaštiti. Naime, radi se o
normama koje nisu enumerisane, odnosno, norme su određene opštim pojmom.
ipak, sud ili drugi organ moraju odrediti šta spada u te norme, kako bi mogli da
definišu njihovu zaštitu. Zaštitu javnog poretka regulišu i unutrašnji propisi koji
definišu norme međunarodnog privatnog prava, ali i međunarodne konvencije.
ono što može praviti problem kod zaštite javnog poretka, odnosi se na činjenicu
da navedeni akti ne definišu koje su norme javnog poretka, odnosno, ne definišu
njihovu sadržinu, već definisanje istih prepuštaju nadležnim organima, koji ih
4
T. Szabados, „overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Autonomous Private international Law
of the EU Member States — General Report“, ELTE Law Journal, 2020, no.1, p. 17.
5
Ibid.
6
T.M. de Boer, “Unwelcome foreign law: public policy and other means to protect the fundamental
values and public interests of the European Community”, University of Amsterdam, 2008, p. 4.
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/4158129/58767_285248.pdf , 10.10.2022.
7
T. Varadi, B. Bordaš, G. Knežević, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Novi Sad 2001, str. 134.
8
Vladimir čolović, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Panevropski Univerzitet „Apeiron”, Banja Luka
2010, str. 95.
primenjuju, odnosno, koji ocenjuju kad je povređena odnosna norma javnog

poretka.9 opravdanost pozivanja na zaštitu domaćeg javnog poretka zavisi i od
činjenice, da li pravni odnos u pitanju ima usku vezu sa domaćom zemljom i
njenim pravom ili ne?10 Ako je ta veza labava, onda nema opravdanja za odbijanje
primene stranog prava.11 Naš stav je u tom pogledu negativan iako se ovakva
opravdanja pojavljuje u nekim predlozima zakonskih akata u ovoj oblasti s
obzirom na činjenicu da merodavno pravo strane države, u slučaju primene
proizvodi dejstvo na teritoriji domaće zemlje. Bez obzira da li se radi o pravnom
odnosu koji se tiče nekog fizičkog ili pravnog lica, kao i bez obzira na činejnicu
kojeg su državljanstva, odnosno, državne pripadnosti ta lica, moramo imati na
umu da bi primena merodavnog prava koje je u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom
domaće zemlje, dovelo do urušavanja pravnog sistema, kao i do nejednakog
postupanja prema licima na koja se ne može primeniti merodavno pravo. Zato i
ne možemo da kažemo da nije bitna primena javnog poretka, u slučaju kada pravni
odnos u pitaju ima labavu vezu sa domaćom zemljom. Dve glavne zamerke
navedenom načinu primene pravila koja imaju zadatak da zaštite javni poredak,
odnose se na činjenicu da se daje široko diskreciono pravo sudu i drugim organima.
Druga zamerka se odnosi na tešku identifikaciju normi koje definišu javni
poredak.12 italijanska škola pod vođstvom Manćinija, definisala je postojanje prava
i obaveza države i u privatnoj sferi. Naime, zakoni jedne nacije određeni su pod
uticajem različitih okolnosti kao što su klima, priroda, teritorija, tradicija, istorija,
itd. Zakoni jednog čoveka, kao njegovi nacionalni zakoni, određeni po njegovom
državljanstvu, trebalo bi da se primenjuju uvek, osim ako on dobrovoljno ne
izabere drugi zakon koji će se primeniti na slučaj tog pojedinca. Prema takvom
načinu shvatanja nacionalnog prava, postoje tri principa u određivanju jednog
nacionalnog zakona, kao i javnog poretka jedne države: princip državljanstva,
princip autonomije volje stranaka i princip suvereniteta.13 iako navedeno shvatanje
proizlazi iz načela suverenosti i nacionalnosti, danas, navedeni principi nemaju
značaj kao u vreme kada su definisani (krajem 19.veka), s obzirom da se pojedinac
ne može vezivati samo za svoje državljanstvo i državu u kojoj živi. Da li bi norme
javnog poretka mogli da svrstamo, delom, i u norme običajnog prava? Mišljenja
smo da ne, iako neki autori tvrde da sudovi razlikuju tri kategorije normi, kad
definišu javni poredak na navedeni način. Te norme su osnovne moralne norme,
norme zajednice izražene u običajnom pravu i norme zajednice koje su nezavisne
od običajnog prava. Neke norme javnog poretka mogu se svrstati u više navedenih
9
Krešimir Sajko, 2005. Međunarodno privatno pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb 2005, str. 253.
10
Ibid., str. 256–257.
11
Ibid., str. 257.
12
A. Mills, “The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private international Law”, (2008) Journal of
Private International Law, 2008, no. 4 (2), p. 202.
13
J. Kosters, „Public Policy in private international Law”, The Yale Law Journal Vol. 29, No. 7,
May, 1920, p. 750.
kategorija.14 običajno pravo ne sme da bude osnov za definisanje javnog poretka,

ako uzmemo u obzir prirodu običajnog prava, kako nastaje i kako se menja. Na
osnovu svega, možemo zaključiti da je formalna definicija javnog poretka
„neuhvatljiva”, što dovodi do pogrešnog tumačenja ovog instituta, kao osnove za
donošenje odluka. inače, sudovi su generalno nespremni da se oslanjaju na javni
poredak, tako da izbegavaju često pozivanje na ovaj institut, što predstavlja grešku.
Javni poredak možemo upoređivati sa javnim interesom, ali ova dva pojma
međusobno se razlikuju, s obzirom da se javni interes odnosi na uži predmet
zaštite. Javni interes je kategorija koja je više sklona promeni od javnog poretka.
JAVNI POREDAK U MEĐUNARODNOM PRIVATNOM PRAVU

Svaka država mora imati sistem međunarodnog privatnog prava, a države ne
mogu, u potpunosti, isključiti primenu stranog prava, one mogu samo odbiti
primenu stranog prava pozivanjem na ustanovu javnog poretka.15 Znači, obim
primene stranog prava je ograničen javnim poretkom. U kojoj će meri jedna država
dozvoliti primenu stranog prava, zavisi od definisanja samog javnog poretka. Na
ovom mestu ćemo reći i da su moguće i zloupotrebe pojma javnog poretka, radi
odbijanja primene stranog prava, što, u određenoj situaciji i iz političkih ili drugih
razloga, može odgovarati određenoj državi. isto tako do zloupotrebe pojma može
doći i radi primene stranog prava koje je protivno interesima određene države, a
što odgovara određenim političkim snagama u toj državi. Znači, kad govorimo o
javnom poretku u međunarodnom privatnom pravu, ukoliko dođe do povrede ovog
instituta, tada će sud ili drugi organ domaće zemlje, morati da odbije pravo strane
zemlje, odnosno, odluku stranog suda ili strane arbitraže. Međunarodno privatno
pravo se kao naučna disciplina zasniva na poštovanju pravila koja se primenjuju
u slučajevima sa elementom inostranosti. No, poštovanje javnog poretka
neophodno je, kako bi mogao da bude poštovan pravni poredak domaće zemlje.
Sa druge strane, preterano insistiranje na poštovanju javnog poretka, dovelo bi do
negiranja međunarodnog privatnog prava i do nemogućnosti pravilnog rešavanja
sporova i drugih slučajeva u kojima je prisutan element inostranosti. U
međunarodnom privatnom pravu javni poredak posmatramo u tri oblasti. Dve smo,
već pomenuli: sukob zakona, odnosno, određivanje i primena merodavnog prava,
kao i priznanje i izvršenje stranih odluka. No, o javnom poretku govorimo i kad
je u pitanju oblast koja reguliše prava stranaca. Mi nećemo detaljno govoriti o
pretpostavci poštovanja javnog poretka u oblasti priznanja stranih odluka, a
14
K. Chng, “A theoretical perspective of the public policy doctrine in the conflict of laws”,
Research Collection School of law, Singapore Management University institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University, 5-2018, p. 3, internet: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4700&context=sol_research, 09.10.2022.
15
K. Lipstein, “The general principles of Private international Law”, Académie de Droit
International Recueil des Cours, Leyden, 1972, p. 168.
nećemo se uopšte posvećivati ovom institutu u oblasti prava stranaca, već ćemo
se fokusirati, uglavnom, na neka opšta pitanja vezana za određivanje ovog instituta
u oblasti sukoba zakona, odnosno, primene merodavnog stranog prava. Sledstveno,
zakonodavac kod regulisanja priznanja i izvršenja stranih odluka, ne definiše šta
je javni poredak. To znači da će se primenjivati, ista pravila u tumačenju ovog
instituta, kao i kod odeđivanja i primene merodavnog prava. Strane odluke, kako
sudske, tako i arbitražne, odluke su iz građanskopravne materije, tako da je i to
jedan od razloga za oprezno korišćenje ove pretpostavke u materiji priznanja
stranih sudskih odluka.16 institut javnog poretka u građanskopravnim odnosima
sa elementom inostranosti je sa stanovišta sudskog odlučivanja veoma osetljiv.
Takva karakteristika javnog poretka može dovesti do različitih shvatanja ovog
pojma.17 Ako bi rekli da se javni poredak sastoji od normi koje štite društveno
uređenje, bili bi u pravu, ali navedeno bi bilo nedovoljno primenljivo u slučajevima
kad imamo prisutan element inostranosti i kada primenjujemo norme
međunarodnog privatnog prava. Javni poredak trebalo bi u ovoj oblasti usko
tumačiti kako se ne bi ugrozila međunarodna saradnja. obzirom na sadržinu i način
definisanja javnog poretka u velikoj većini država, možemo govoriti o njegovoj
relativnosti. institut javnog poretka se ne definiše precizno, obzirom na vrednosti
koje štiti i mogućnost promena istih.18 otud, kad govorimo o zaštiti javnog poretka
jedne zemlje, odnosno, o pozivanju na zaštitu javnog poretka, govorimo o
relativizaciji primene klasične kolizione pravne metode, čime se negira osnovno
načelo međunarodnog privatnog prava, koje se odnosi na primenu prava koje je
u najbližoj vezi sa pravnim odnosom.19 Merodavno pravo strane države neće se
primeniti, ako bi dejstvo te primene dovelo do narušavanja neke od osnovnih
vrednosti domaćeg pravnog poretka.20 U tom smislu, javni poredak ima dvostruku
funkciju: pozitivnu, kada postoji nametnuta primena domaćeg prava - prava države
u kojoj se postavlja pitanje i negativnu, kada se isključuje primena merodavnog
stranog prava, to jeste, kada bi primena tog prava bila nespojiva sa osnovnim
vrednostima domaćeg prava.21 Da bi se prva funkcija ispunila, neophodno je da
se ispuni druga. To znači da će se domaće pravo primeniti, tek kad ne bude moglo
da se primeni strano pravo. Domaći organi mogu da vode računa samo o zaštiti
domaćeg javnog poretka, što znači da, ako je povređen javni poredak strane države,
domaći organi nisu dužni da vode računa o tome.22 Javni poredak u međunarodnom
16
T. Varadi, B. Bordaš, G. Knežević, op. cit., str. 142.
17
V. čolović, op. cit., str. 94.
18
D. Klasiček, „Autonomija u međunarodnom privatnom pravu – novije tendencije”, Zbornik
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 2006., vol. 56, no. 2–3, str. 696.
19
Ibid., str. 690.
20
Ibid., str. 695.
21
K. Sajko, op. cit.,str. 259.
22
Ibid., str. 263.
privatnom pravu funkcioniše tako da odbija primenu stranog prava, a funkcija tog
odbijanja je da spreči nepravdu među strankama u posebnim okolnostima, što utiče
na izbor prava. A često pozivanje na javni poredak u građanskopravnim odnosima
sa elementom inostranosti ne ide u prilog smislu osnovne svrhe međunarodnog
privatnog prava. Pozivanjem na pravilo lex fori, stvara se situacija koja dovodi do
odbijanja primene stranog prava koje je u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom domaće
zemlje.23 No, da li primena pravila lex fori, može u svim situacijama da dovede
do pravičnog rešenja, odnosno do pravilnog rešenja pravnog odnosa u pitanju?
JAVNI POREDAK I SUKOB ZAKONA:

PRIMENA MERODAVNOG PRAVA
U pogledu pravca dejstva, sukob zakona može imati vertikalni i horizontalni vid.
Vertikalni sukob zakona javlja se sa jedne strane, kao pitanje odnosa međunarodnog
prava i prava pojedinih država, a sa druge strane kao pitanje međusobnih odnosa
primenljivosti univerzalnih, regionalnih i bilateralnih međunarodnih normi. ovde
se pojavljuje kategorija domaine reserve, kao vrsta javnog poretka, koja obezbeđuje
isključivu primenu domaćih normi. Merodavno pravo određuje se u situacijama kad
valja rešiti spor ili bilo koji drugi slučaj u kome je prisutan element inostranosti. Da
bi odredili merodavno pravo, moramo da primenimo kolizionu normu, što znači da
je neophodan uslov za ocenu da li je strano pravo u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom,
upravo ta činjenica.24 To ističemo, uzimajući u obzir da kod prinudnih propisa ili
normi neposredne primene nije neophodna primena kolizione norme da bi se
primenili prinudni propisi domaće zemlje, što znači da nije potrebno određivanje
merodavnog stranog prava. Drugačije je kod zaštite javnog poretka, jer o povredi
ovog instituta, možemo govoriti, tek, kad saznamo sadržinu stranog prava kao
merodavnog prava.25 Koliziona norma, upućivanjem na jedno od prava koje treba
da reši taj društveni odnos ili problem, ne može uticati da pravo bude pravilno
primenjeno, odnosno, da ono ne bude u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom zemlje, u
kojoj se ono primenjuje.26 Do primene instituta javnog poretka dolazi tek, kada se
utvrdi da je merodavno pravo u suprotnosti sa tim institutom, odnosno nakon
primene kolizione norme.27 Kod primene normi javnog poretka, radi se o zadržavanju
primene domaćeg prava. U nemačkom pravu postoji termin Vorbehaltsklauzel, koji
23
M. Ročkomanović, „Nadležnost lex fori u međunarodnom privatnom pravu Srbije de lege lata
i de lege ferenda”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, 2012, no. 59, str. 59.
24
T. Rajčević, „Zakoni obavezne primene i javni poredak u međunarodnom privatnom pravu”,
Strani pravni život, 1998, no. 3, str. 85; M. Dika, G. Knežević, S. Stojanović, Komentar Zakona
o međunarodnom privatnom i procesnom pravu, Nomos, Beograd 1991, str. 14.
25
J. G. Collier, Conflict of Laws, Cambridge 2001, p. 361.
26
V. čolović, „odstupanja od redovne primene kolizionih normi („korekcije” kolizionih normi) –
potreba za drugačijim stavom”, Strani pravni život , 2009, br. 3, str. 28.
27
T. Varadi, B. Bordaš, G. Knežević, op. cit., str. 146.
označava zadržavanje primene domaćeg prava.28 Zakon o rešavanju sukoba zakona

sa propisima drugih zemalja Republike Srbije (ZRSZ), određuje da se pravo strane
države neće primeniti „ako bi bi njegovo dejstvo bilo suprotno Ustavom SRJ
utvrđenim osnovama društvenog uređenja”.29 Navedena definicija javnog poretka
odraz je vremena u kome je ZRSZ donet. Mogli bismo da kažemo da se radi o
ustavnopravnom određenju javnog poretka. No, pre bi za navedeni pojam mogli reći
da se odnosi na sistem jedne države. U svakom slučaju, ovakvo definisanje javnog
poretka je, pogotovo danas, neprihvatljivo, sa stanovišta sadašnjeg regulisanja ove
oblasti. ovakav način definisanja navedenog instituta je nespojiv sa materijom
međunarodnog privatnog prava. ipak, ZRSZ se fokusirao samo na osnovnu
definiciju javnog poretka, što je slučaj i u zakonodavstvima drugih zemalja. Na
primer, švajcarski Savezni zakon o međunarodnom privatnom pravu u članu 17.
navodi da se strano pravo neće primenjivati, ako je protivno javnom poretku
Švajcarske.30 ovaj Zakon ne definiše šta predstavlja javni poredak, ali reguliše
primenu javnog poretka na jednostavan način, tako što određuje da je isključena
primena stranog prava, ako je ono nespojivo sa švajcarskim javnim poretkom.
Pomenuti način određivanja ovog instituta, dovodi do mogućnosti širokog
tumačenja javnog poretka i diskrecionog odlučivanja suda ili drugog organa. To je
uostalom i slučaj sa drugim zakonima. Pomenućemo jedan akt EU koji reguliše
pitanje zaštite javnog poretka i odbijanje primene stranog prava. Uredba 593/2008
Evropskog parlamenta i Saveta od 17. juna 2008. godine, o pravu koje se primjenjuje
na ugovorne obaveze (Uredba Rim i), određuje da primena prava bilo koje države
može biti odbijena, ako bi ta primena dovela do povrede javnog poretka države
foruma, što je predviđeno članom 21.31 Kod pitanja javnog poretka, Uredba Rim i
prihvata opšte pravilo međunarodnog privatnog prava. No, i ovde moramo reći da
zaštita javnog poretka, odnosno regulisanje istog mora biti usko u materiji kojom se
bavi Uredba Rim i. i ne samo to. Uredba Rim i pominje, jedino, zaštitu poretka
države foruma, što znači da će se o zaštiti javnog poretka voditi računa jedino u
zemlji u kojoj se primenjuje merodavno pravo, bez obzira što činjenice i subjekti u
građanskopravnom odnosu mogu biti vezani za više zemalja.32 Pomenućemo, ovde,
i Nacrt Zakona o međunarodnom privatnom pravu Republike Srbije (Nacrt ZMPP),
koji drugačije definiše zaštitu javnog poretka u odnosu na ZRSZ.33 Naime, u članu
43. Nacrta ZMPP se određuje da se odredba stranog prava neće primenjivati, ako je
28
M. Pak, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Beograd 2000, str. 341.
29
„Zakon o rešavanju sukoba zakona sa propisima drugih zemalja Republike Srbije”, Sl.list SFRJ
br.43/82 i 72/82-ispr., Sl.list SRJ br.46/96 i Sl.glasnik RS br. 46/2006-dr.zakon; član 4 ZRSZ
30
“Federal Act on Private international Law”, internet: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/
1988/1776_1776_1776/en, 12.10.2022.
31
“Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome i)”, Official Journal of the European
Communities L 177, 04.07.2008., pp. 6–16.
32
V.čolović, op. cit., str. 42.
33
internet: https://www.mpravde.gov.rs, 06.10.2022.
dejstvo te odredbe očigledno suprotno javnom poretku Srbije. Nacrt ZMPP ne

definiše javni poredak. U ovoj odredbi problem stvara reč „očigledno”. Pre svega,
sud je taj koji mora da oceni očiglednu suprotnost stranog prava sa javnim poretkom
domaće zemlje. Ne možemo da izbegnemo diskreciono odlučivanje, ali je na sudu
veliki teret koji se odnos na ocenu normi javnog poretka. Veći je problem stepena
suprotnosti. Ako bi pravilno tumačili reč „očiglednost”, onda bi morali da zaključimo
da će se odbijati primena samo onog stranog prava koje je u većem stepenu u
suprotnosti sa najvišim normama domaćeg pravnog poretka. Veće zamerke imamo
na ostale odredbe navedenog člana. Naime, Nacrt ZMPP navodi da će se kod ocene
suprotnosti stranog prava sa domaćim javnim poretkom, voditi računa o stepenu
povezanosti stranog prava i domaće zemlje. ovom odredbom se stavlja veliki teret
na sud, koji, osim utvrđivanja suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom mora da oceni koliko
je i na koji način povezano strano pravo sa domaćom zemljom. ovde se mora utvrditi
dosta činjenica, kao i dejstva, odnosno posledice, što usložnjava ovu ocenu.
Smatramo da je ova odredba nepotrebna, imajući u vidu da sama suprotnost sa
javnim poretkom mora da dovede do odbijanja stranog prava. Najzad, i sledeći stavi
(treći), zahteva kritiku, a o tome smo, već, govorili. Primena prava po lex fori, umesto
stranog, koje je odbijeno, može dovesti do ugrožavanja prava stranaka na koje se
odnosi strano pravo, kao i do donošenja neadekvatne odluke. Mišljenja smo da bi
odredba Nacrta ZMPP koja se odnosi na zaštitu javnog poretka trebalo da sadrži
samo opšti deo koji se odnosi na odbijanje primene stranog prava, ako je ono u
suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom Republike Srbije. činjenica je da zadatak akta koji
reguliše ovu oblast nije definicija javnog poretka, a nije ni ocena intenziteta
suprotnosti stranog prava sa najvišim normama naše zemlje. Sledstveno, bez obzira
što predlog ima svoje negativne strane, ipak, smatramo da ne treba definisati javni
poredak na način kao što je to učinjeno u ZRSZ, već da samo treblo bi voditi računa
o primeni reciprociteta kod primene stranog prava, kao i o predmetu međunarodnog
privatnog prava. Kod primene reciprociteta, ipak, treba voditi računa o tome da se
ne može postići potpun reciprocitet, s obzirom na funkciju međunarodnog privatnog
prava. Naime, saradnja pravnih poredaka se gradi pretežno jednostranim akcijama.34
Svaka država sama odlučuje do koje će mere i u kojim će situacijama da uvaži strano
pravo, strane odluke, odnosno, koja će prava učiniti dostupnim strancima. U osnovi
ovih ustupaka koje čini jedno pravo svakako leži očekivanje da će i strani pravni
sistem postupiti na sličan način, to jeste, da će ustupci biti paralelni. Međutim, ma
kako je logična i opravdana težnja za uravnoteženošću ustupaka, to još ne znači da
bi bio opravdan zahtev koji ide da ti ustupci budu simetrični.35 Moramo imati na
umu da se javni poredak kod nas, kao i u većini zemalja, definiše opštom definicijom
da se kod svake primene merodavnog stranog prava odlučuje da li je ono u
suprotnosti sa našim javnim poretkom.36
34
V. čolović, op. cit., str. 107–108.
35
Ibid., str. 108.
36
V. čolović (2009), op. cit., str. 40.
POSLEDICE ZAŠTITE JAVNOG PORETKA U SLUČAJEVIMA

SA ELEMENTOM INOSTRANOSTI
Veoma je bitno odrediti šta predstavlja posledicu suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom
domaće zemlje, a to je primena normi domaćeg prava ili nekog drugog prava sa
sličnom sadržinom, a ne samog merodavnog prava.37 Pitanje je stoga, da li primena
nekog drugog prava, bilo da je ono strano ili domaće, dovodi do istih dejstava kao i
primena stranog prava koje je u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom, a koje je određeno
primenom kolizione norme ili koje je primenjeno u postupku pred stranim sudom a
određenoje po pravilma testrane države? U slučajevima sa elementom inostranosti,
veoma je bitno poštovati sva pravila vezana za primenu merodavnog prava, kao i za
priznanje stranih odluka.38 Postavlja se pitanje koje će se pravo primeniti u slučaju
odbijanja stranog prava kao merodavnog, s obzirom na suprotnost njegove sadržine
sa javnim poretkom domaće zemlje, odnosno, kako će stranka, koja je podnela zahtev
za priznanje i izvršenje strane odluke, ostvariti svoja prava u slučaju odbijanja
priznanja? Kad je u pitanju odbijanje primene stranog prava, postavlja se pitanje
koje ćemo pravo primeniti, da li ono koje se može primeniti u datom slučaju, a koje
nije u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom domaće zemlje bez obzira da li se radi o pravu
druge države ili je u pitanju pravo domaće zemlje, odnosno, da li ćemo u svakom
slučaju primeniti pravo određeno po lex fori? Prva solucija je prihvatljivija sa
stanovišta donošenja pravilne odluke. Naime, ako bi moglo da se primeni pravo
druge zemlje, čija je sadržina bliska sadržini onog prava koje je odbijeno, onda bi
bilo uputno primeniti to pravo, pravo neke druge države. Ali, navedeno nosi sa sobom
jednu opasnost i jedan problem. opasnost se sastoji u tome, što i norme tog prava
druge države mogu biti u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom, a problem se odnosi na
činjenicu da bi sud morao da „traži” neko drugo pravo koje bi mogao da primeni u
tom slučaju. Praktično, tada bi sud imao još jednu obavezu, vezanu za utvrđivanje
sadržine stranog prava. Ako govorimo o bezuslovnoj primeni prava po lex fori, onda
bi mogla da nastanu dva problema. Prvi, koji se odnosi na neadekvatnost normi
domaćeg prava, odnosno na nemogućnost njihove primene na dati slučaj, a drugi
koji se odnosi na opravdano očekivanje stranaka da sud donese odluku koja će
odgovarati njihovim interesima. Znači, ni jedna solucija ne mora doneti pravilno
rešenje slučaja, što predstavlja dodatni problem. Najbitniji element normi javnog
poretka je njihova zaštitna funkcija, koja se odnosi na zaštiti pravnog poretka domaće
zemlje. Norme javnog poretka imaju usku zaštitnu funkciju.39 U vezi sa tim, moramo
reći da se norme javnog poretka ne primenjuju direktno, već se samo konstatuje da
se one protive merodavnom stranom pravu. Zbog toga, nije uvek lako odrediti koje
će pravo ili propis biti primenjen nakon intervencije instituta javnog poretka koje
37
T. Varadi, B. Bordaš, G. Knežević, op. cit.,str. 141.
38
Na ovom mestu ćemo se, ipak, kratko osvrnuti na ulogu zaštite javnog poretk kod priznanja i
izvršenja stranih odluka.
39
D. Klasiček, op. cit., str. 704.
dovodi do nemogućnosti primene stranog prava.40 Međutim, ukoliko je jedan pravni

pojam ili institut iz strane države nepoznat u domaćem pravu, to ne znači da je on
istovremeno i protivan javnom poretku. Ako je jedan pojam nepoznat u domaćem
pravu, onda je potrebno izvršiti kvalifikaciju tog pojma. Naime, kod kvalifikacije u
slučajevima sa elementom inostranosti može se raditi o određivanju pravne
kategorije ili tačke vezivanja kao delova kolizione norme. Građanskopravni odnos
koji reguliše koliziona norma predstavlja pravnu kategoriju, odnosno predstavlja
ono na šta se ta norma odnosi.41 Tako dolazi do sukoba pravnih kategorija. Kad
kažemo da dolazi do sukoba kategorija, mislimo na činjenicu da se sličan pravni
pojam drugačije reguliše u različitim zakonodavstvima ili da se reguliše u različitim
oblastima prava.42 Znači, kod kvalifikacije pravne kategorije odgovaramo na pitanje
u koju oblast treba svrstati taj pojam. od navedenog zavisi i primena kolizione norme
koja reguliše tu oblast. Nećemo govoriti o kvalifikaciji tačke vezivanja, obzirom da
se u toj situaciji zna koja koliziona norma se primenjuje. Kod odbijanja priznanja
stranih odluka, stranka, koja je zainteresovana da ostvari svoje pravo u domaćoj
zemlji, može pokrenuti postupak u vezi iste stvari. No, i ovde mogu nastati problemi
vezani za sledeće: Da li se može odrediti nadležnost domaćeg suda u odnosnoj stvari?
Da li će druga stranka pristati da domaći sud donese odluku u odnosnoj stvar? Da li
će domaći sud moći da primeni pravo strano države ili neko drugo adekvatno pravo
(što smo, već, istakli, kao problem). Kao što vidimo, i u slučaju odbijanja priznanja
strane odluke, neće uvek postojati mogućnost da se ostvare interesi stranaka
donošenjem druge odluke od strane domaćeg suda.
Odstupanje od kolizione norme
Zaštita javnog poretka dovodi do ostupanja od primene kolizione norme. Kad

kažemo da dolazi do odstupanja, mislimo na odstupanje od primene merodavnog
prava do kojeg nas dovodi koliziona norma. Uglavnom, kad se ne primenjuje
koliziona norma u redovnim okolnostima, koristi se tremin „korekcije” kolizionih
normi. No, ovde se ne radi ni o kakvoj izmeni same kolizione norme, odnosno, ne
radi se o stvaranju druge kolizione norme, već se odstupa od samog rezultata koji
proizvodi koliziona norma. Kod zaštite javnog poretka radi se o neprimeni stranog
prava, odnosno, o primeni nekog drugog prava na dati slučaj bilo da se radi o pravu
neke druge države ili onom određenom po lex fori. Naravno, o odstupanjima od
primene kolizione norme kod zaštite javnog poretka, možemo govoriti samo kod
određivanja merodavnog prava, ne i kod odbijanja priznanja stranih odluka. Kod
odbijanja priznanja stranih odluka, sud utvrđuje da li je meritum te odluke u
suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom zemlje priznanja, zbog čega ona ne bi mogla da
40
Ibid., str. 705.
41
V. čolović, „Kvalifikacija kolizione norme”, Strani pravni život 2018, br. 3, str. 8.
42
Ibid.
proizvede dejstvo nnjnoj teritoriji. Kod priznanja stranih odluka, zaštita javnog
poretka predstavlja pretpostavku koju strana odluka treba da ispuni, kao i sve druge
zakonom predviđene pretpostavke za priznanje i izvršenje stranih odluka.
Zaštita javnog poretka i poštovanje stečenih prava

Sledeće pitanje u vezi sa zaštitom javnog poretka koje izaziva pažnju, odnosi
se na poštovanje stečenih prava. Naime, da li se stečena prava mogu izgubiti u
drugoj zemlji, to jeste, ona prava koja su po zakonu stečena u zemlji državljanstva,
domicila ili nekoj drugoj zemlji, a zbog zaštite javnog poretka u zemlji u kojoj
jedno ili više lica zahtevaju da im se to pravo ili prava priznaju?43 Ako je neko
pravo stečeno po pravu jedne zemlje, tako da ne postoje uslovi za poništaj tog
prava ili za bilo kakvo njegovo umanjenje, odnosno, tako da ne postoje mogućnost
za njegovo ukidanje na bilo koji način, to pravo se mora poštovati i u drugim
zemljama. Princip zaštite stečenih prava je princip prihvaćen u međunarodnom
privatnom pravu po kojem novo pravo, novi javni poredak, ne ukida automatski
u svim oblastima stari poredak. od početka se tretiraju u nizu oblasti, kad nastupe
takve okolnosti i kada se rešavaju svi privatnopravni odnosi „biranjem” odredjenog
prava, koje je merodavno za odnos u pitanju.44 Stečena prava se ne moraju
poštovati, ako su stečena u inostranstvu, jer ne odgovaraju pozitivnom pravu
države ili ako se protive domaćem javnom poretku.45
JAVNI POREDAK I PRINUDNI PROPISI

Ukratko ćemo se osvrnuti na odnos javnog poretka i prinudnih propisa, odnosno,
normi neposredne primene. Te norme definišemo kao norme unutrašnjeg pravnog
poretka jedne zemlje, čija je primena u svakom slučaju obavezna bez obzira što se
na određeni pravni odnos mogu primeniti i druga pravila koja sadrže drugačija
rešenja u odnosu na pomenute norme. Njih moramo posmatrati šire nego javni
poredak, jer o tim normama ne govorimo samo kad primenjujemo pravo domaće
zemlje – zemlje u kojoj se postavlja pitanje rešenja datog pravnog odnosa, već i kada
primenjujemo pravo druge zemlje čije je pravo određeno kao merodavno. To su
samoograničavajuće norme koje unapred definišu polje sopstvene primene, tako da
isključuju primenu kolizionih pravila odnosno, kad te norme regulišu određeni pravni
odnosi one će se direktno primeniti na taj odnos.46 U tome je i najveća razlika između
tih normi i normi javnog poretka s obzirom da kod zaštite javnog poretka moramo
43
V. čolović (2010), op. cit., str. 96.
44
F. X. Affolter, Geschichte des Intertemporalen Privatrecht, Leipzig 1902, p. 572.
45
Milan Bartoš, Problem stečenih prava u MPP, Beograd 1930, str. 10.
46
Dušan Kitić, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta „Union”, Beograd 2016,
str. 118.
da saznamo sadržinu stranog prava da bi mogli da odredimo da li je ono u suprotnosti

sa javnim poretkom ili ne. Pogrešno je da norme neposredne primene svrstavamo
na bilo koji način u javni poredak.
ZAKLJUČAK
Kod definisanja javnog poretka moramo poći od činjenice da se radi o najvišim
normama, koje, u svakom slučaju, moraju biti zaštićene. one su deo imperativnih
propisa, i to njihov uži deo. osnov definisanja normi javnog poretka postavljen je
u najvišem pravnom aktu – ustavu, što ne znači da bi zakonski akti morali da bliže
utvrde njihovu sadržinu. Praktično, ne možemo govoriti o enumeraciji ovih normi,
za razliku od prinudnih propisa odnosno, normi neposredne primene koje se mogu
tačno odrediti i koje takođe, moraju biti zaštićene od odredaba stranog prava s tim
što je kod ovih normi sistem zaštite drugačiji u odnosu na zaštitu javnog poretka.
Kad govorimo o mestu javnog poretka u međunarodnom privatnom pravu, moramo
imati na umu da se kod postavljanja pitanja zaštite javnog poretka u okviru sukoba
zakona, mora odrediti merodavno pravo da bi uopšte mogli da ocenimo da li je došlo
do povrede najviših normi domaće zemlje, kao zemlje primene stranog prava. Kad
se radi o priznanju stranih odluka, da bi došlo do njenog odbijanja, sadržina merituma
te odluke mora biti u suprotnosti sa javnim poretkom. Kod prava stranaca je
jednostavnije zaštititi javni poredak s obzirom da se u ovoj oblasti primenjuju domaći
propisi koji određuju obim prava stranih državljana na teritoriji domaće zemlje. No,
sama činjenica da se javni poredak u našem ZRSZ, kao i u drugim zakonodavstvima,
definiše na opšti način, daje mogućnost širokog tumačenja ovog instituta, kao i
diskrecionog postupanja sudova i drugih organa. To predstavlja problem i u
slučajevima sa elementom inostranosti. Javni poredak mora biti sadržinski određen,
odnosno, moraju se definisati principi na kojima počiva ovaj institut. Sa druge strane,
sigurno je da se u okviru svake oblasti koja spada u građansko pravo, mogu odrediti
koje su to najviše norme koje moraju biti zaštićene i koje ne smeju biti ugrožene
kako primenom stranog prava, tako i priznanjem stranih odluka.
PUBLiC PoLiCY iN PRiVATE iNTERNATioNAL LAW
ABSTRACT
one of the institutes that in the field of Private international Law opens up many
questions related to the application of foreign law, as well as of the recognition of
foreign decisions, is the institute of public policy. The Act on Resolving Conflicts
of Laws with Regulations of other Countries of the Republic of Serbia defines
public policy as the basis of the state system of our country. We consider that the
mentioned public law definition is inadequate. However, in other countries, public
policy is defined in a general way or its concept is not defined at all. in Switzerland,
this institute is not defined, but only states that foreign law will not be applied, if it
is contrary to the public policy of that country. The basic function of public policy
in this area refers to the protection of the legal order of the domestic country where
foreign law is applied, that is, it recognizes foreign decisions, the contents of which
may be in conflict with the basic norms of the domestic legal order, which, in any
case, must be respected. However, could we, in every situation, talk about the
protection of public policy in the above way. Relations regulated by Private
international Private Law are relations with foreign element, and the effects of the
application of foreign law, that is, the recognition of a foreign decision, are wider
than in a situation where there is no foreign element. Therefore, the question arises
whether we can define public policy in this area, as well as in the area of public
law, that is, which values in the domestic legal order can be protected by not
applying foreign law or not recognizing a foreign decision whose content is in
conflict with the public policy of the domestic country.
Key words: Public policy, foreign element, applicable law, foreign decision, civil
law relation
REFERENCE
1. Affolter F.X., Geschichte des Intertemporalen Privatrecht, Leipzig 1902.
2. Bartoš M., Problem stečenih prava u MPP, Beograd 1930.
3. Collier J.G., Conflict of Laws, Cambridge 2001.
4. Chng K., “A theoretical perspective of the public policy doctrine in the conflict
of laws”, Research Collection School of law, Singapore Management University
institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University, 2018, internet:
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4700&context=sol_res
earch, 09.10.2022.
5. čolović V., „odstupanja od redovne primene kolizionih normi („korekcije”
kolizionih normi) – potreba za drugačijim stavom”, Strani pravni život 2009.,
br. 3.
6. čolović V., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Panevropski Univerzitet „Apeiron”,
Banja Luka 2010.
7. čolović V., „Kvalifikacija kolizione norme”, Strani pravni život, 2018., br. 3.
8. de Boer T.M., “Unwelcome foreign law: public policy and other means to
protect the fundamental values and public interests of the European
Community”, University of Amsterdam, 2008, internet: https://pure.uva.nl/
ws/files/4158129/58767_285248.pdf, 10.10.2022.
9. Dika M., Knežević G., Stojanović S., Komentar Zakona o međunarodnom
privatnom i procesnom pravu, Nomos, Beograd 1991.
10. Kitić, D. Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta „Union”,
Beograd, 2016.
11. Klasiček D., „Autonomija u međunarodnom privatnom pravu – novije

tendencije”, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 2006., vol.56, no. 2-3
12. Kosters J., “Public Policy in private international Law”, The Yale Law Journal,
1920, Vol. 29, No. 7.
13. Lipstein K., “The general principles of Private international Law”, Académie
de Droit International Recueil des Cours, Leyden, 1972.
14. Mills A., “The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private international Law”,
Journal of Private International Law, 2008, no. 4(2).
15. Mitrović M., Međunarodnopravni kontinuitet i sukcesija država, Savetnički
rad, SMiP, Beograd 1991.
16. Pak M., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Beograd 2000.
17. Rajčević T., „Zakoni obavezne primene i javni poredak u međunarodnom
privatnom pravu”, Strani pravni život, 1998, no. 3.
18. Ročkomanović M., „Nadležnost lex fori u međunarodnom privatnom pravu
Srbije de lege lata i de lege ferenda”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, 2012,
no. 59.
19. Sajko K., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb 2005.
20. Szabados T. “overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Autonomous Private
international Law of the EU Member States — General Report”, ELTE Law
Journal, 2020, no. 1.
21. Tomić Z, „Javni poredak: pojam i struktura”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u
Beogradu, 2019, god. LXVii, br. 2.
22. Varadi T., Bordaš B., Knežević G., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Novi Sad
2001.
23. “Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome i)”,
Official Journal of the European Communities, L 177, 04.07.2008.
24. Swiss Federal Act on Private international Law, https://www.fedlex.
admin.ch/eli/cc/1988/1776_1776_1776/en (pristup: 12.10.2022.)
25. „Zakon o rešavanju sukoba zakona sa propisima drugih zemalja Republike
Srbije”, Službeni list SFRJ, br.43/82 i 72/82-ispr., Službeni list SFRJ, br.46/96;
Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 46/2006-dr.zakon.
26. „Zakon o Međunarodnom privatnom pravu Republike Srbije (nacrt)”, internet:
https://www.mpravde.gov.rs, 06.10.2022.
MEĐUNARODNOPRAVNE POLEMIKE
(International Legal Controversies)
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IN THE

UKRAINIAN ARMED CONFLICT
Ewa SAŁKiEWiCZ-MUNNERLYN*
ABSTRACT
The right to self-defense is the subject of one of the fundamental disagreements
in international legal doctrine and practice. The fact is that the modern
international legal order established by the UN Charter served to maintain peace
and security in the world. That order generally prohibits the use of force in
international relations. The possibility of using the right to self-defense is
connected with the illegal use of force in situations and under the condition that
self-defense is carried out legally, that is, by legal means in order to achieve
legitimate goals. According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
“nothing in this Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense in the event of an armed attack.” However, Article 51 does not
contain a definition of an armed attack or the initiation of such an attack, nor does
it propose strict criteria for the use of force in self-defense. Hence, it is only
assumed that the use of the right to self-defense is limited in itself, which leaves
the content of this norm extremely uncertain, opening up space for different
doctrinal interpretations.
Key words: UN Charter, self-defence, armed attack, use of force, collective
security, Jus ad Bellum
INTRODUCTION
Jus ad Bellum rules relating to the exercise of the right of self-defense remain a
controversial topic that is intensely debated and often difficult to apply in practice.
in particular, there are arguments that a certain threshold of violence is required
before the right of self-defense applies. Then, that this right functions in relation to
armed attacks by state and non-state actors (NSA), and that the right of self-defense
can be used in a limited time context, which limits the possibility of applying the so-
called anticipatory self-defense. it is common knowledge that defensive force must
be both “necessary” and “proportionate” to be lawful. Historically speaking, self-
*
Calisia University, Kalisz, Poland. E-mail:ewasalkiewiczmunnerlyn@gmail.com
defense is a very old concept that originates from ancient Greece and ancient Rome.
in the classical period, all war conflicts were classified as “just” or “unjust”.1 in the
ancient Roman Empire, perists called fetiales judged whether an action was right or
wrong. Their power extended so far that they could declare a state responsible to
Rome. if the responsible state refused to compensate Rome, the fetials would inform
the Roman Senate that there was cause for a “just war”.2 With the Christianization
of the Roman Empire, St. Augustine defined “just wars” as those that avenged
injuries caused by the state against which warlike actions were taken.3 Elaborating
further on this concept, St. Thomas Aquinas argued that certain conditions must be
met in order to wage a “just war” – in addition to the illegal act, there should also be
a need to punish the intentions of the offender. A “just war” can only be waged by a
sovereign nation with the intention of promoting good or avoiding evil.4 When
European sovereign states emerged, the concept of a ‘just war’ began to lose
importance as both sides could claim to be waging a just war in order to punish the
other side for its misdeeds.5 The famous Grotius tried to redefine the concept of ‘just
war’ by connecting it with self-defense, protection of property and punishment for
injustices suffered by the citizens of a certain state.6 The Peace of Westphalia of
1648, with its promotion of equality between states and the established obligation
to settle disputes peacefully, eliminated the concept of a “just war”.The evolution of
international relations at the beginning of the 20th century, and the establishment of
the League of Nations, imposed an obligation on states to strive for international
peace. Consequently, with the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Paris Agreement of 1928,
formally and legally there was a general renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy, the signatory states promised not to use war to resolve “disputes or
conflicts of any nature or of any origin that may arise between them”. The pact was
signed by Germany, France and the United States on August 27, with most other
countries following soon after. The parties condemned the resort to war and agreed
to settle their disputes only peacefully.7 This became a principle of international law
accepted by the United Nations after World War ii, as a legal successor to the League
of Nations. The principle of solving disputes by peaceful means is contained in
Articles 2(3)”All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
1
Coleman Phillipson , The International Law And Custom Of Ancient Greece And Rome, London,
1911, at 179.
2
Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 63
3
St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos, Book XiX, x Vii (6 Loeb Classical ed. 150–1
(W. C. Greene trans., 1960)).
4
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Quaestio 40, 1 (35 Blackfriars ed.,
80–3 (1972)).
5
Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, at 1121.
6
Ibid.
7
“The Kellogg-Briand Pact”, Articles 1 and 2. League of Nations, Treaty Series, 1929, vol. 94,
p. 57 (No. 2137).
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.” Article 2(4) prohibits not only war but force in general and also the
threat of force. it says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.” This prohibition has two exceptions in the Charter: self-defense as stated
in Article 51 and the actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter Vii.
CONDITIONS FOR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT

OF SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Self-defense in international law refers to the inherent right of a state to use
force in response to an armed attack. Self-defense is one of the exceptions to the
prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary
international law. Article 51 of the Charter provides that: “Nothing in this Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the event
of an armed attack on a member of the United Nations (…)”. The right to collective
self-defense arises under customary international law and depends on the
fulfillment of its basic requirements, regardless of bilateral or multilateral defense
treaties. These are: (1) the existence of an armed attack directed against a state that
has the right to individual self-defense (victim state); (2) notification to the Security
Council about the measures taken and compliance with the “until” clause from
Art. 51 of the UN Charter; and (3) respect for the principles of necessity and
proportionality.
Armed attack and the victim state

in accordance with the first stipulated condition, it is clear that Ukraine is under
an unprovoked, full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation, and
therefore has a common right to defend itself and seek assistance from other states.
in the case of Nicaragua, the iCJ identified two procedural conditions for the lawful
exercise of the right to collective self-defense. First, the attacked state must request
support. Second, there must be an express declaration by that state that it is
attacked. Although the common nature of these conditions is controversial among
scholars, both are met in this case. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi has
repeatedly declared the Russian Federation’s act of aggression against Ukraine
and asked for help from the international community, especially demanding that
NATo declare and implement a no-fly zone.
Security Council Notification and the “Until” Clause

This requirement from Article 51 of the UN Charter obliges the countries of
collective self-defense to immediately report the measures taken to the Security
Council and to continue the military operation until the Council takes its own
actions to maintain or restore international peace and security. in this case, the
Security Council cannot be considered a viable international mechanism for the
restoration of international peace due to the existence of the Russian Federation’s
veto. However, this is not an obstacle to the application of defensive measures –
they can continue as long as the Security Council is inactive and the conditions of
necessity and proportionality are met. However, once the blockade is lifted and
the Security Council regains its authority over international peace and security,
the parties to the conflict must comply with its resolutions.
The principle of necessity and proportionality

According to the author’s opinion, the “special military operation” launched
by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, with an armed attack on Ukraine,
represents aggression condemned by 141 member states of the UN General
Assembly. This act may consequently lead to the opening of investigations for
alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Prosecutor of the iCC.
Due to the Russian aggression, the international Court of Justice in The Hague
ordered urgent temporary measures to stop the military operation, while the ECtHR
called on Russia to refrain from military attacks on civilians. Despite this, the
humanitarian situation in Ukraine worsens every day and civilian objects have
become common targets of Russian airstrikes, including evacuation routes or
objects such as maternity hospitals or the theater in Mariupol. According to recent
reports, over a thousand civilians have already been killed and injured during these
hostilities. The author therefore believes that no less invasive measures can end
aggression and that the application of collective self-defense meets the condition
of necessity. on the other hand, the principle of proportionality requires that this
self-defense strictly adhere to the rules governing the humanitarian conduct of war
(ius in bello). Self-defense should primarily aim to prevent further casualties,
protect civilians and protect critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants.
This must in no way turn into a punitive action and must stop immediately if and
when there is any prospect of a peaceful settlement of the dispute. According to
the author’s opinion, there is no doubt that according to international customary
law and Article 51 of the UN Charter, states have the right to collective self-defense
in connection with Russian aggression in Ukraine.
RUSSIA’S “SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION”

AND THE CLAIMED RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
in order to clarify the current situation in the Ukrainian armed conflict, we will
refer only to a few facts and circumstances that are not and cannot be disputed. in
his speech on 24.02.2022, Putin said: “in this regard, in accordance with Article
51 of Part 7 of the UN Charter, with the sanction of the Federation Council of
Russia and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance ratified
by the Federal Assembly on 22 February this year with the Donetsk People’s
Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, i decided to conduct a special
military operation. its goal is to protect people who have been subjected to bullying
and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years. And for this we will strive for
the demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine, as well as bringing to justice
those who committed numerous, bloody crimes against civilians, including citizens
of the Russian Federation.”8 As Prof. Michael N. Schmit, Professor of Public
international Law at the University of Reading rightly pointed out: “The problem
for Putin is that the right to request military action in self-defense (or intervention
of military forces more broadly, as in the case of assistance in fighting an
insurgency) is limited to States.”9 The day Russia launched its operations, its
Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations notified the UN
Secretary-General that the military action was “taken in accordance with Article
51 of the UN Charter in theexercise of the right of self-defence.” And he appended
a speech Putin had made earlier in the day of 24.02.2022 and he transmitted the
notification to the Security Council (UN Doc. S/2022/154).
As we can see from the jurisprudence of the iCJ, for example in Paramilitary
Activities (para. 246), the Court emphasized this point: “[T]he principle of non-
intervention derives from customary international law. it would certainly lose its
effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a mere
request for assistance made by an opposition group in another State.” Also in in its
2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence (para. 81), the
international Court of Justice said: “[T]the illegality attached to the declarations of
independence thus stemmed not from the unilateralcharacter of these declarations
as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connectedwith the
unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international
law, inparticular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. Even if the Luhansk
and Donetsk People’s Republics had qualified as States, the Russian action in
collective self-defense failed to satisfy the two universally accepted criteria of self-
defense, necessity and proportionality (see, e.g., Paramilitary Activities, paras. 194,
237; Nuclear Weapons, para. 41; oil Platforms , paras. 43, 73–74, 76). For the
reasons stated above, the author is of the opinion that the Russian “special military
operation” does not represent self-defense, but an act of aggression and the use of
force in violation of international law.
8
The Spectator, full text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine, see: https://www.spectator.
co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine
9
Michael N. Schmitt, “Russia’s “Special Military operation” and the (Claimed) Right of Self-
Defense”, Lieber institute West Point, 28 February 2022, p.5; internet: https://lieber.westpoint.edu/
russia-special-military-operation-claimed-right-self-defense/
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the “inherent” right to collective self-defense is
recognized. The same right is confirmed and recognized in international customary
law. Specifically, the international Court of Justice dealt with the mentioned issue in
its decision on military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
Case) from 1986. The United States argued that its actions on behalf of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Costa Rica against Nicaragua were justified on grounds of collective
self-defense. The iCJ ruled against the US. The Court did not find that there was an
armed attack by Nicaragua that could justify the right of self-defense. in the Nicaragua
Case, the Court identified three conditions for the existence of the right to collective
self-defense. First, there must be an armed attack on a member state. Second, the state
under said attack must declare that it is the victim of an armed attack and, third, it
must request the assistance of another state. The additional criteria of necessity,
proportionality and obligation to report to the Security Council do not condition the
existence of the right to self-defense, but whether the act of self-defense was
performed in accordance with international law or not. Failure to comply with one of
the last criteria would therefore constitute an additional ground for illegality. if the
recent shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant (the largest nuclear power
plant in Europe), followed by Russian military forces, it also raises the need for
collective self-defense.10 The bombing of nuclear facilities directly threatens global
security and concerns the international community as a whole. Collective action
through the exercise of collective self-defense can be justified not “only” as a need to
help the victim state, but to protect the entire world from total destruction. The nuclear-
weapon States appearing before the Court, including the United States, accepted that
“their independence of action was indeed limited by the principles and rules of
international law” (iCJ opinion, para. 239). in the end, the Court came to several
conclusions relevant to the situation: “Neither in customary nor conventional
international law does there exist any specific authorization of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons (...), neither in customary nor conventional international law does
there exist any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such (…), the threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular
with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law (…)”. (iCJ opinion,
para. 266). Furthermore, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, self-defense is
permitted until the Security Council takes “measures necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security.”
10
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, i.C.J. Reports 1996, p.
226; Jay Jackson, Kenneth Daniel Jones, “Ukraine Symposium – Lawful Use of Nuclear
Weapons”, Lieber institute West Point, Apr 26, 2022, pp. 1–13. internet:https://lieber.westpoint.
edu/lawful-use-nuclear-weapons/
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

OF JUSTICE ON SELF-DEFENCE
in the Nicaragua Case, the international Court of Justice confirmed that the UN
Charter recognizes the existence of a “natural” or “inherent” customary right to
individual and collective self-defense (paras. 176, 193). By doing so, he indirectly
admitted that the UN Charter does not regulate all aspects of this right, but that this
right prescribed by the Charter functions alongside existing international customary
law, including requirements of necessity and proportionality (paras. 176, 194).
Although we may argue that the UN Charter rule and the customary rule on the use
of force and self-defense are not identical, the international Court’s approach in the
Nicaragua Case shows that it considers the two regimes to be equivalent. The only
difference identified by the Court is the absence of a customary obligation to report
the exercise of the right to self-defense to the Security Council (paras. 181, 188, 200).
This jurisprudence of the international Court of Justice is a very important legal source
for the interpretation of the right of self-defense. Although in most of its judgments
the Court did not decide on this issue on the merits of the dispute. So far, the rnational
Court of Justice has directly dealt with the substantive rules of self-defense in five
cases. There were three decisions on the merits: “Nicaragua, oil Platforms and Armed
Activities”.11 Two were advisory opinions: “Nuclear weapons and the Palestinian
wall”.12 in addition, the Court touched on claims related to the use of force in a more
limited way, the most obvious example being the “Corfu Channel” case, where Great
Britain claimed to be acting in accordance with the broadly understood right of “self-
help”.13 The prevailing view among international lawyers is that Article 51 excludes
any pre-UN Charter customary law that is inconsistent with the UN Charter.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE
The Caroline Affair is considered a test of customary international law upheld
by the Nuremberg Tribunal after the Second World War, which refers to the necessity
of preventive self-defense.14 in this sense, it was determined that in order to be legal,
11
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986]
iCJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua’); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (iran v US) (Judgment) [2003] iCJ
Rep 161 (‘oil Platforms’); Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2007] iCJ Rep 168 (‘Armed
Activities’).
12
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory opinion) [1996] iCJ Rep 226
(‘Nuclear Weapons’); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (Advisory opinion) [2004] iCJ Rep 136 (‘Palestinian Wall’).
13
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] iCJ Rep 4 (‘Corfu Channel’); Corfu
Channel, Reply Submitted, Under the order of the Court of 26th March 1948, by the Government
of the UK of Great Britain and Northern ireland, 284.
14
The Caroline incident – an 1837 raid by British Canadian militia across the Niagara River border
to sink an American steamboat being used by Canadian insurgents. See: United States, 11 U.S.
496 (1813).
preventive self-defense must be “immediate, irresistible and leave no choice of

means, and no moment for consideration.” The “Caroline test” has two criteria: 1)
The use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent and therefore
seeking peaceful alternatives is not an option (necessity), and 2) The response must
be proportionate to the threat (proportionality). Analysis of states and UN practice
shows that the vast majority of states firmly believe that the UN Charter does not
allow for anticipatory self-defense.15 However, a number of countries have the
opposite opinion, including israel and the US. Considering the importance and role
of these states, the author believes that it cannot be claimed that there is universal
agreement on the illegality of anticipatory self-defense according to the UN Charter.
Preventive strikes should be banned, because they can easily lead to abuse, and they
are based on subjective and arbitrary assessments of individual states.16 The “Caroline
test” is applied in cases where a defensive action was taken before an armed attack,
which does not correspond to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Since the adoption of the Charter, there has been a great deal of debate about
whether anticipatory self-defense would be permissible under Article 51. There are
two schools of thought on this subject. one school argues that Article 51 is the only
relevant law on self-defense and properly interpreted prohibits anticipatory self-
defense. Another school rejects this view, pointing to the failure of collective
security after 1945.17 Generally speaking, there are three main types of anticipatory
self-defense: interceptive, preemptive and preventive. Each has its supporters and
opponents.
PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

in the doctrine of international law, there are two approaches to the mentioned
topic. First, according to the traditional interpretation of the right of self-defense,
an actual attack by the aggressor state must occur before an armed defensive
response. The second, broader interpretation of the right to self-defense, recognizes
the possibility of self-defense through the immediate threat of an armed attack.18
Generally speaking, most doctrine recognizes that the abstinence from the use of
force and the threat of force remains a general principle of law. According to
classical international law, the UN Charter allows states to use only self-defense
measures in response to an armed attack, and preventive measures are the exclusive
15
Charlotta Nilsson, The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defence in International Law, Faculty of
Law, University of Lund, Master thesis, Spring 2008.
16
Antonio Cassese, International Law, oxford University Press,New York, 2005, p. 361.
17
John o'Brien, International Law, Routledge Cavendish, London, 2001, p. 683.
18
S. E. Naryshkin, “The Coup D'etat in Kiev in February 2014 and international Law”. interview
with Sergey Naryshkin, Chairman of the state Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation, Eurasian Law Journal, 2015, vol 2, no. 81. internet: https://eurasialaw.ru/nashi-
rubriki/persona-grata/intervyu-s-naryshkinym-sergeem-evgenevichem.
competence of the UN Security Council. Preemptive self-defense refers to the

unilateral actions of a state (or states), to remove a non-imminent security threat.
As further described by W. Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong in The Past
and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense: “The claim to preemptive
self-defense is a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without prior international
authorization, high levels of violence to arrest an incipient development that is not
yet operational or directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be
seen by the potential preemptor as susceptible to neutralization only at a higher
and possibly unacceptable cost to itself”.19 Preemptive self-defense relies on the
mere possibility of an attack at some unspecified, future period of time. The United
Nations (UN) Charter recognizes the “inherent right” of states to act in self-
defense, proclaiming, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations” (Charter of the United Nations, art. 51). This kind
of reactive self-defense is different from preemptive self-defense, where
preventative action occurs against a non-imminent threat.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this brief overview of the international legal meaning of the right
to self-defense, the author came to the conclusion that in the Ukrainian conflict,
Ukraine has the right to self-defense against a Russian armed attack. The Russian
"special military operation" fulfills the condition of Article 51 of the UN Charter
and it represents the conditio sine qua non for the application of self-defense from
the aspect of international customary law (referred to by the statement of the
international Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua, par. 195). The case in
question involves an apparent armed attack by the Russian Federation against a
UN member state. Moreover, that attack is treated as an invasion which satisfies
the requirement of gravity, in terms of scale and effect which distinguishes an
armed attack from the (mere) use of force. it also meets both the qualitative
(animus aggressionis) and quantitative (weight and scale) conditions to be
considered an act of aggression (Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the
international Criminal Court). it should be noted that Russia and Ukraine are not
signatories to the Statute of the iCC, but Ukraine has made a relevant declaration
under Article 12(3), accepting the jurisdiction of the iCC for acts committed since
February 20, 2014, which, however, will not extend to the crime of aggression.
We agree with Professor Andre de Hoogh, that “the right of self-defence allows
other states upon request of the state attacked to use military force in support of
the victim of that armed attack (Nicaragua Case, paras. 194–195, 196–199 and
232–236). The right to collective self-defense can be used, regardless of the
19
Michael W. Reisman, Andrea Armstrong. “The Past and Future Claim of Preemptive Self-
Defense.” The American Journal of International Law, 2006, vol.100, no.3, pp. 525–550; 526.
existence of a previous agreement or membership in a regional organization for

collective security”.20 Last but not least, we must mention the slow procedure or
even the impossibility, due to personal immunity, to prosecute those responsible
for the aggression. Allow me to quote the opinion of my compatriot Joanna
Siekiera from the University of Bergen: “Will Russia’s evasion of responsibility
for war crimes before international courts contribute to the consideration of the
question of the effectiveness of legal solutions by states that form international
institutions? Will the exclusion of the Russian Federation from the Council of
Europe trigger exclusions from other international organizations? Will there be a
transformation in the largest intergovernmental organization of the United Nations,
which bases (un)peace, (dis)order and (in)stability in the world on the Big Five of
the Security Council? if so, it will mean a new global order, where, hopefully,
international law will be provided with relevant enforcement measures”.21
PRAVo NA SAMooDBRANU
U UKRAJiNSKoM oRUŽANoM SUKoBU
APSTRAKT
Pravo na samoodbranu predmet je jednog od fundamentalnih neslaganja u
međunarodnoj pravnoj doktrini i praksi. činjenica je da je savremeni međunarodni
pravni poredak uspostavljen Poveljom UN služio održavanju mira i bezbednosti
u svetu. Taj poredak generalno zabranjuje upotrebu sile u međunarodnim
odnosima. Mogućnost korišćenja prava na samoodbranu povezana je sa
nezakonitom upotrebom sile u situacijama i pod uslovom da se samoodbrana
sprovodi legalno, odnosno legalnim sredstvima radi postizanja legitimnih ciljeva.
Prema članu 51. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija, „ništa u ovoj Povelji neće narušiti
inherentno pravo na individualnu ili kolektivnu samoodbranu u slučaju oružanog
napada“. Međutim, član 51. ne sadrži definiciju oružanog napada ili pokretanja
takvog napada, niti predlaže stroge kriterijume za upotrebu sile u samoodbrani.
otuda se samo pretpostavlja da je korišćenje prava na samoodbranu ograničeno
samo po sebi, što sadržaj ove norme ostavlja krajnje neizvesnim, otvarajući
prostor za različita doktrinarna tumačenja.
Ključne reči: Povelja UN, samoodbrana, oružani napad, upotreba sile, kolektivna
bezbednost, Jus ad Bellum
20
André de Hoogh, “The Elephant in the Room: invoking and Exercising the Right of Collective
Self-Defence in Support of Ukraine against Russian Aggression”, opiniojuris.org, 03.07.2022.
See also: The attack of North Korea against South Korea in 1950, and the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait by iraq in 1990. (Resolution 83 from 1950; Resolution 84 from 1950;
Resolution 661 from 1990; Resolution 678 from 1990.
21
Joanna Siekiera, “The war in Ukraine and international law – what causes its ineffectiveness?”
institute of New Europe, April 25, 2022.
REFERENCES
1. Cassese, Antonio, International Law, University Press, oxford/New York,
2005.
2. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (iran v US) (Judgment) [2003] iCJ Rep 161
(‘oil Platforms’).
3. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2007] iCJ Rep 168 (‘Armed
Activities’).
4. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] iCJ Rep 4 (‘Corfu
Channel’).
5. Corfu Channel, Reply Submitted, Under the order of the Court of 26th March
1948, by the Government of the UK of Great Britain and Northern ireland,
284.
6. de Hoogh, André, “The Elephant in the Room: invoking and Exercising the
Right of Collective Self-Defence in Support of Ukraine against Russian
Aggression”, opiniojuris.org, /2022/03/07.
7. Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, University Press,
Cambridge, 2005.
8. Florea, D. “The Right to individual or Collective Self-Defense. Preventive
Attack According to the Provisions of the UN Charter”. Jurnalul de Studii
Juridice, 2021, vol. 16, nos. 3-4, internet: https://doi.org/10.18662/jls/16.3-
4/89.
9. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (Advisory opinion) [2004] iCJ Rep 136 (‘Palestinian Wall’).
10. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory opinion) [1996]
iCJ Rep 226 (‘Nuclear Weapons’).
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
US) (Merits) [1986] iCJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua’).
12. Naryshkin, S. E., “The Coup D’etat in Kiev in February 2014 and international
Law. interview with Sergey Naryshkin, Chairman of the state Duma of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, Eurasian Law Journal, 2015,
vol. 2, no. 81, internet: https://eurasialaw.ru/nashi-rubriki/persona grata
/intervyu-s-naryshkinym-sergeem-evgenevichem
13. Nilsson, Charlotta, The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defence in International
Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lund, Master thesis, Spring 2008.
14. o’Brien, John, International Law, Routledge Cavendish, London, 2001.
15. Phillipson, Coleman, The International Law And Custom Of Ancient Greece
And Rome, London, 1911.
16. Reisman, W. Michael, Armstrong,. Andrea, “The Past and Future Claim of
Preemptive Self-Defense.” The American Journal of International Law, 2006,
vol. 100, no. 3.
17. Shaw, M. Malcolm , International Law, University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
18. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos, Book XiX, x Vii (6 Loeb
Classical ed. W. C. Greene trans., 1960).
19. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Quaestio 40, 1
(35 Blackfriars ed., 1972).
20. “The Kellogg-Briand Pact”, Articles 1 and 2. See certified true copy of the text
of the treaty in League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 94 (No. 2137).
21. United States, 11 U.S. 496 (1813).
PITANJE NIŠTAVOSTI VOJNO TEHNIČKOG

SPORAZUMA IZ KUMANOVA?
igor JANEV*
APSTRAKT
Vojno-tehnički sporazum potpisan je u Kumanovu 9. juna 1999. godine, između
Međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR) i Vlada Savezne Republike
Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije. Sporazumom je okončana oružana agresija NATo
saveza protiv SR Jugoslavije. Prema pravnim karakteristikama, Vojno-tehnički
sporazum predstavlja ugovor o primirju sa ograničenim pravnim dejstvom.
Naime, njime se pored prekida neprijateljstava još predviđa i ulazak
međunarodnih mirovnih snaga na prostor južne srpske pokrajine Kosova i
Metohije (KiM), sa misijom zaštite mira i bezbednosti, što uključuje i zaštitu
ljudskih prava svih stanovnika bez obzira na etničku ili drugu pripadnost. Takođe,
njime se predviđa i demilitarizacija područja i uspostavljanje zone bezbednosti
od administrativne linije sa KiM unutar teritorije Republike Srbije i Republike
Crne Gore. Nakon zaključenja Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma, 10. juna 1999.
godine, Savet bezednosti usvojio je Rezoluciju 1244 kojom je predviđeno
uspostavljanje vojnog i civilnog prisustva na području KiM. Nakon sprovedene
analize, autor je došao do određenih zaključaka prema kojima je Vojno-tehnički
sporazum iz Kumanova zaključen bez adekvatnih ovlašćenja, potom da je usledio
kao izraz pretnje, odnosno upotrebe sile, te da su njime u priličnoj meri povređeni
i neki od opštih principa ugrađenih u Povelju Ujedinjenih nacija koji se tiču
suverene jednakosti, zaštite teritorijalnog integriteta i političke nezavisnosti, a što
uz sve druge pravne nedostatke može uticati na pokretanje pitanja proglašavanja
ovog Sporazuma pravno ništavim. ovo tim pre, ako se uzme u obzir da bi dalji
pogrom preostalog srpskog stanovništva na KiM mogao biti tertian za ozbiljnu
povredu osnovnih ljudskih prava čija zaštita je u nadležnosti privremene uprave
i međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga.
Klјučne reči: Vojno-tehnički sporazum iz Kumanova, Kosovo i Metohija,
Ujedinjene nacije, UNMiK, KFoR, NATo
*
institut za političke studije, Beograd. E-mail: igorjanev@mts.rs
UVOD
Posle jednostrano preduzetih mera privremenih institucija KiM, te ulaska
jedinica specijalnih jedinica Rosu 20. septembra 2021. godine, u severno kosovsko
područje, nastupila je nova faza u krizi na KiM koja nagoveštava buduće
ekstremne poteze vlasti u Prištini. Ako se uzme u obzir i izjava predsednice
privremenih vlasti na KiM – Vjose osmani da, „Srbija ne može ništa da uradi, jer
je iza Kosova podrška SAD”, tada se može predvideti mogućnost vojne
intervencije „Kosovskih bezbednosnih snaga” (KBS) i jedinica Rosu na Severu
Kosova, sa cilјem proterivanja sprskog stanovništva. ovakva akcija bi,
pretpostavlja se, nalikovala već viđenoj „oluji” u Hrvatskoj. Pre direktne vojne i
policijske intervencije na području Zajednice srpskih opština (odnosno Severa
KiM), došlo bi do izazivanja humanitarne katastrofe kako bi se veći deo
nealbanskog naroda iselio i time taktikom kršenja lјudskih prava proteralo
preostalo srpsko stanovništvo, u cilјu da se vojna akcija svede na „minimum”. Da
bi se suzbila moguća ili eventualna humanitarna katastrofa nad Srbima, koja je
očigledno deo planova privremenih vlasti na KiM za etničkim čišćenjem, potrebno
je sagledati mogućnosti najgoreg scenarija koji bi izazvao potrebu da Vojska Srbije
uđe na prostor Severa KiM. Da bi se ovo izvelo na legalan način, trebalo bi uzeti
u obzir da je Kumanovski sporazum iz 1999. godine, zaklјučen od strane generala
vojske i policije tadašnje SR Jugoslavije i britanskog generala Majkl Džeksona
kao predstavnika KFoR-a (Kosovo Force).1 ovaj tip međunarodnog ugovora
zaključen je pod očiglednom prisilom koja je usledila od strane NATo-a, pa se
postavlja pitanje mogućnosti njegovog okončanja. Naime, pitanje je, da li postoji
mogućnost pozivanja na relativnu ili aposlutnu ništavost njegovih odredbi. Potom
da li bi bilo bi moguće okončati Vojno-tehnički sporazuma ako bi došlo do
masovnog kršenja lјudskih prava Srba na prostoru KiM gde su međunarodne snage
KFoR-a i NATo-a preuzele ulogu zaštitnika i garanta mira i bezbednosti? U
poomenutom smislu, trebalo bi uzeti u obzir da Vojno-tehnički sporazum nije
ugovor o kapitulaciji države (pa čak ni kapitulaciji vojske), već je po svojim
pravnim svojstvima samo sporazum o primirju kojim se trenutno prekidaju
međusobna neprijateljstva i kojim se operacionalizuje dogovor o demilitarizaciji
područja južne srpske pokrajine. ovakav ugovorni akt ograničava mogućnost
intervencije Vojske Srbije budući da predviđa povlačenje vojnih i policijskih
formacija sa prostora KiM. Trebalo bi istaći da Rezolucija Saveta bezbednosti
Ujedinjenih nacija 1244 ne predviđa nikakve druge vojne snage na teritoriji KiM
koja i dalje predstavlja međunarodnopravno deo teritorije SR Jugoslavije odnosno
danas, Republike Srbije. Nakon raspada Državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora,
Srbija je postala pravni sledbenik ove državne tvorevine koja je nasledila SR
1
“Military-technical agreement between the international security force (KFoR) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia”, S/1999/682,
9.06.1999.
Jugoslaviju i njen članski status u Ujedinjenim nacijama. obaveze iz Rezolucije

Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija 1244, kao i obaveze na koje ona upućuje,
a koje se tiču Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma, stoga i dalje obavezuju Republiku
Srbiju. ovo tim pre, jer Rezolucija Saveta bezbednosti počiva na odredbama iz
Glave Vii Povelje, što povlači njen erga omnes karakter. Pritom, valja imati u vidu
da Rezolucija predstavlja samo pravni i politički okvir za realizaciju ovog
Sporazuma, ne utvrđujući bliže njegov sadržaj niti mogućnost raskida. Prema
mišljenu autora, ako se ne bi postigao osnovni cilj Sporazuma ili ako bi u
međuvremenu došlo do pogoršanja političke situacije koja bi uslovila njegovo
izvršenje, moglo bi se postaviti pitanje njegovog poništaja. Tim pre, ako bi takva
nova situacije dovela do ozbiljnog kršenja osnovnih ljudskih prava kao što bi bilo
etničko čišćenje ili pogrom nealbanskog ili preostalog srpskog stanovništva sa
KiM. Valja primetiti da je Vojno-tehnički sporazum iz Kumanova već prekršen
kada su KFoR i UNMiK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo), dopustili formiranje vojske Kosova u vidu KBS. ove snage su po
formiranju započele sa operacijama tihog progona srpskog stanovništva slanjem
jedinica Rosu na Sever KiM i oduzimanjem registarskih tablica srpskim
građanima. Cilj je bio jednostrano nametanje političkih rešenja koja bi trebalo da
dovedu do uspostavljanja efektivne vlasti na čitavoj teritoriji KiM, to jest, do
ostvarivanja potrebnih elemenata državnosti kojim bi se vlast kosovskih Albanaca
proširila na preostalim delovima KiM. Međutim, ovi potezi ne dovode do
stabilnosti već naprotiv, izazivaju novu humanitarnu krizu koja može eskalirati u
pravcu izolacije i onemogućavanja snabdevanja životnim namernicama
nalbanskog stanovništva, što dovodi u pitanje i fizički opstanak Srba na KiM.
OGRANIČENJA I PRAVNI DOMET

REZOLUCIJE 1244 SAVETA BEZBEDNOSTI
Rezolucija Saveta bezbednosti 1244 jeste klјučni dokument kojim se potvrđuje
suverenitet Srbije i definiše postojanje spora sa KiM, koji, kao bezbednosno
problematični entitet, bez suvereniteta ne može da postane članica Ujedinjenih
nacija.2 Nemogućnost realizacije Rezolucije 1244 predstavlja prema mišljenu
autora, bezbednosni problem koji može da se zatvori samo novom rezolucijom
Saveta bezbednosti. Aneksom ii Rezolucije 1244, predviđena je mogućnost
zaključenja vojno-tehničkog sporazuma.3 U preambuli Rezolucije izražava se
odlučnost Ujedinjenih nacija da se reši ozbilјna humanitarna situacija na KiM.
Pored toga Rezolucija „reafirmiše” suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije i drugih država u regionu, u skladu sa aktom iz Helsinkija
2
“UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo”, 10 June 1999, United Nations Documents
S/RES/1244. internet: http://www.unint/usa/sres1244.htm
3
“Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the
Kosovo crisis (…). Videti: UNSC 1244 (1999), Annex ii.
i Aneksom ii ovog dokumenta. iz Rezolucije 1244 proizilazi zahtev Savet

bezbednosti da SR Jugoslavija prekine sa nasilјem na KiM i da otpočne postepeno
povlačenje svojih snaga, da bi nakon povlačenja manjem broju pripadnika vojske
i policije bio omogućen povratak radi održavanja prisustva na srpskim istorijskim
lokalitetima in a graničnim prelazima, saglasno Aneksu ii. Nadalјe, Savet
bezbednosti je ovlastio države i međunarodne organizacije da se uključe u civilnu
i vojnu misiju na KiM. odgovornost međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga
uklјučivala je odvraćanje od neprijatelјstava, nadgledanje povlačenja SR
Jugoslavije, demilitarizaciju oslobodilačke vojske Kosova (oVK) i drugih
albanskih formacija, kao i obezbeđivanje okruženja u koje se slobodno mogu
vratiti izbeglice. Generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija ovlašćen je da uspostavi
međunarodno civilno prisustvo na KiM, a glavne odgovornosti međunarodnog
prisustva uklјučuju promociju autonomije za Kosovo, vršenje civilnih
administrativnih funkcija, nadgledanje razvoja institucija, održavanje izbora,
održavanje reda i mira, zaštitu lјudskih prava i siguran povratak izbeglica. Pored
ostalog, u Rezoluciji se ističe da će određenom broju srpskog vojnog i civilnog
osoblјa biti dozvolјeno da se vrate i da održavaju prisustvo na KiM. Smeštanje
KiM pod privremenu upravu Ujedinjenih nacija trebalo je da se vrši preko
uspostavlјanja ovlašćenih mirovnih snaga KFoR-a pod okrilјem NATo-snaga, a
civilno upravlјanje vrši bi se posredstvom UNMiK-a, do uspostavlјanja institucija
lokalne samouprave na Kosmetu, u skladu sa Aneksom ii odnosno postignutim
dogovorom. Kao što zaklјučujemo iz teksta, sav pravni domet Rezolucije postaje
u osnovi zavisan od Aneksa ii i njime se u stvari određuje, da li Vojska Srbije
(ranije Jugoslovenska Vojska), može da se vrati na KiM ili da interveniše na ovom
prostoru. ovaj pravni aspekt je od posebnog značaja, jer se Rezolucijom potvrđuje
suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet SR Jugoslavije (danas Republike Srbije kao
njene pravne sledbenice). U slučaju da izostane dogovor dve strane o svim
pitanjima, tada postaje nejasno u kojoj meri Vojska Srbije može da se vrati na
teritoriju KiM ili pod kojim uslovima? Predmet rezolucije 1244 bilo je
zamrzavanje trenutnog stanja, gde se načelno previđalo povlačenje Jugoslovenske
vojske, to jest, predviđalo je se i uslovno postizanje sveobuhvatne autonomije za
KiM. Međutim, u kontekstu očuvanja teritorijalnog integriteta i suvereniteta
Republike Srbije, od posebnog značaja je utvrđenje pravnog karaktera Aneksa ii,
jer se njime određuje i karakter obaveza iz same Rezolucije 1244 Saveta
bezbednosti. Kao što primećujemo, Aneksa ii započinje uslovnom odredbom o
tome da bi trebalo uspostaviti ugovor kojim bi se utvrdili principi za rešavanje
krize na KiM. U tekstu se navodi: „Ugovor treba da bude postignut o sledećim
principima da bi se ostvarilo rešenje Kosovske krize (…).4 iz sadržaja teksta
primećujemo da je ugovor o ovome već postignut u vidu Vojno-tehničkog
sporazuma, koji je zaklјučen da ranije 9. juna 1999 u Kumanovu. Zaključak
proizilazi iz intrpretacije tačke 10. Aneksa u kojoj je predviđeno zaklјučivanje
4
Ibid.
„tehničkog sporazuma” kojim bi se regulisalo povlačenje Vojske Jugoslavije sa

KiM. U tom smislu se navodi: „U svrhu obustave vojnih aktivnosti biće potrebno
prihvatanje gore navedenih principa pored saglasnosti sa drugim, prethodno
navedenim, identifikovanim i potrebnim elementima, koji su navedeni u fusnoti.
Vojno-tehnički sporazum biće potom brzo zaključen da bi se njime predvideli
dodatni modaliteti uključujući uloge i funkcije jugoslovenskog/srpskog osoblјa na
Kosovu (…).”5 U nastavku u tački 10. se potom određuju uslovi sadržani u
Kumanovskom sporazumu, posebno o povlačenju Vojske (Jugoslavije), i povratku
srpskog personala na KiM. Među „Primedbama” na kraju Aneksa se određuje da,
„rasprava i postizanje Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma neće produžiti ranije određeno
vreme za završetak povlačenja.”6 Kao što možemo zaklјučiti, Aneks ii Rezolucije
1244 samo upućuje na već postignuti Sporazum iz Kumanova, čijim se odredbama
definiše i sam domet ovog Aneksa, pa time i ove Rezolucije. osnovna ideja
Rezolucije bila je da se uslovno u tekstu ugradi faktička kapitulacija SR Jugoslavije
na delu njene teritorije, tako što bi se Aneksom, ugovor o vojnoj kapitulaciji de
facto ugradio u Rezoluciju, kao njen sastavni deo. Logično bi bilo postaviti pitanje,
da li se u slučaju Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma stvarno radi o ugovoru o kapitulaciji,
imajući u vidu prirodu i sadržaj ovog ugovora, kao i potpisnike tog dokumenta?
Pored toga, da li je Rezolucija 1244 Saveta bezbednostni jednim delom
kondicionirana postizanjem ugovora o kapitualaciji? ostaje nejasno i da li Vojno-
tehnički sporazum može da ima efekte ugovora o kapitualciji u praksi, posebno
ako se uzme u obzir da se u Rezoluciji potvrđuje da SR Jugoslavije (danas
Republika Srbija), i zadržava teritorijalni integritet, pa time i suverenitet (doduše,
limitiran prisustvom međunarodne civilne i vojne misije na KiM)? ovakva
protivrečna formulacija gde na jednoj strani imamo zaštitu suvereniteta i
teritorijalnog integriteta, a na drugoj strani uslovnu obavezu da deo teritorije koja
je suverena prepustimo međunarodnim snagama, očigledno predstavlјa politički
kompromis između velikih sila (Rusije i SAD), koje su hibridnom rezolucijom
nastojale da pomire potpuno suprotstavlјene interese. Pored toga, može se primetiti
da se odluke u Rezoluciji 1244 Saveta bezbednosti odnose na jednu tada
suspendovanu članicu Ujedinjenih nacija, koja je prema shvatanju Zapada trebalo
„ponovo da aplicira za članstvo u UN”. Pozitivna stranaovog dokumenta je što
Rezolucija 1244 potvrđuje suveretitet i teritorijalni integritet SR Jugoslavije (danas
Srbije) i što se njome ujedno potvrđuje postojanje spora između Srbije i i njene
pokrajne Kosovo i Metohija koji nije rešen uspostavljanjem međunarodne uprave
5
Annex ii (10): “Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth
above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are
specified in the footnote below. 1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded
that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions
of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo ()”.
6
Ibid., par. 10: “The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend
the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals”.
na teritoriji, a što sve osporava osnov da KiM na osnovu jednostrane deklaracije

o nezavisnosti može da ishoduje status države i međunarodno priznanje unutar
Ujedinjenih nacija. Sledstveno, ograničenje suvereniteta Jugoslavije (Srbije) koje
je predviđeno Aneksom, u slučaju da se ne materijalizuje, ne dovodi u pitanje
ostvarivanje same Rezolucije 1244 Saveta bezbednosti, jer i u takvoj konstelaciji
Rezolucija ostaje na snazi. U nastavku analize posebnu pažnju poklanjamu
razmatranju odredbi Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma iz Kumanova, kao mirovnog
sporazuma koji je nametnut SR Jugoslaviji.
VOJNO-TEHNIČKI SPORAZUM IZ KUMANOVA

– NAMETNUTI MIROVNI SPORAZUM
Agresija koju je NATo izveo protiv SR Jugoslavije završio se uspostavljanjem
međunarodne uprave Ujedinjenih nacija i drugih međunarodnih organizacija na
području KiM. Teritorija južne srpske pokrajine je faktički okupirana (occupatio
bellica), iako je ta okupacija formalnopravno zaodenuta u ruho međunarodnog
bezbednosnog prisustva.7 Na ovakav zaključak navodi činjenica da je vojna
intervencija NATo-a sprovedena bez autorizacije Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih
nacija, te da nema opravdanje u međunarodnom pravu.8 Pozivajući se na tešku
humanitarnu situaciju, Ujedinjene nacije stavile su deo teritorije SR Jugoslavije
(Republike Srbije), pod zaštitu međunarodne zajednice s pozivom na odredbe Glave
Vii i Glave Viii Povelje. U predmetnom slučaju ne radi se o međunarodnom
protektoratu, budući da ne postoji ugovor o protektoratu, niti se od trenutku
donošenja Rezolucije 1244 može smatrati da je KiM područje nad kojim je
uspostavljen tzv. starateljski sistem Ujedinjenih nacija. o različitima aspektima
ovog problema napisano je mnogo radova kod nas i u stranoj naučnoj literaturi.9
„Vojno-tehnički sporazum između Međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR) i
Vlade Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije zaključili su brigadni
general Majkl Džekson, general Vojske Jugoslavije Svetozar Marjanović i policijski
general obrad Stevanović. Predstavnici vojske i policije SR Jugoslavije, koliko je
poznato autoru, nisu imali pravno valjana ovlašćenja da potpišu bilo kakav
dokument kojim bi se ograničavao suverenitet Jugoslavije (Srbije) nad KiM, a što
ostavlja prostora za tumačenje o relativnoj ništavosti Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma.
7
Na ovakav zaključak upućuje pravno nedefinisano uspostavljanje vojne baze Bondseel kod
Uroševca, kojom upravlja vojska SAD, u okviru multinacionalne operativne grupe KFoR-a za
istok (Multinational Task Force East), kasnije preformulisane u multinacionalnu borbenu grupu
za istok (Multinational Battle Group East). Savet Evrope optužio je SAD da koriste ovu bazu za
namene slične onima u Gvantanamu.
8
Ved P. Nanda, Legal implications of NATo's Armed intervention in Kosovo”, International Law
Studies, 2000, vol. 75, pp. 313–314.
9
Michael Geistlinger, “Pravni status Kosova prema Rezoluciji 1244 (1999) SBUN”, Zbornik
pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, 2004, vol. 38–39, br. 4. internet: http://www.prafak.ni.ac.rs/files/
zbornik/sadrzaj/zbornici/z3839/05z3839.pdf
Konkretno bi to značilo mogućnost preispitivanja da li je pristanak predstavnika

SR Jugoslavije (Republike Srbije) bio pravno manjkav u pogledu kršenja odredaba
o nadležnostima za zaključenje međunarodnih ugovora, i to saglasno paralelnim
odredbama prisutnim u članu člana 46. Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora 1969.
godine i Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora između država i međunarodnih
organizacija ili između međunarodnih organizacije iz 1986. godine?10
imajući u vidu da KFoR (NATo), pod mandatom Ujedinjenih nacija
formalnopravno nije okupaciona sila, već vrši ulogu mirovnih snaga s pozivom
na odredbe Povelje, tako i u predmetnom slučaju, Vojno-tehnički sporazum
predstavlja pre preliminarni mirovni sporazum, nego li sporazum o kapitualciji.
U vreme potpisivanja Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma 9. juna 1999. godine, njegov
pravni status je bio totalno konfuzan budući da je agresiju na SR Jugoslaviju izvršio
NATo, da bi nakon okončanja oružanog sukoba NATo kroz formu međunarodnih
bezbednosnih snaga dobio potrebnu autorizaciju da faktički zauzme južnu srpsku
pokrajinu. Ujedinjene nacije, saglasno Rezoluciji 1244 od 10. juna 1999. godine,
unose malo više svetlosti u značenje postignutog Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma.
Njome se kao što je već rečeno, potvrđuje suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet SR
Jugoslavije (Republike Srbije), a KFoR pod okriljem NATo-a i formalno
preuzima ulogu mirovnih snaga na teritoriji KiM. ovim postaje jasno da Vojno-
tehnički sporazum okončava ratne sukobe kroz zaključenje primirja između
zaraćenih strana što mu uz odredbe Rezolucije 1244 daje karakteristike
svojevrsnog preliminarnog mirovnog sporazuma na koji je moguće primeniti
pravila kodifikovana u Bečkoj konvenciji o pravu ugovora iz 1969. godine i Bečkoj
konvenciji o pravu ugovora između država i međunarodnih organizacija ili između
međunarodnih organizacije iz 1986. godine (koji pravno nije na snazi, iako sadrži
mutatis mutandis jednake odredbe u vezi ništavosti ugovora). Konačno, trebalo bi
ponoviti i da Vojno-tehnički sporazum nije bio zaključen u skladu sa nadležnostima
propisanim Ustavom SR Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije, te se navedena povreda
pravila može tretirati kao očigledna povreda pravila unutrašnjeg prava od
10
Prema ovom članu, „činjenica da je pristanak države na obvezivanje ugovorom bio izražen
povredom nekog propisa njenog unutrašnjeg prava o nadležnosti za zaključenje ugovora ne može
se isticati odstrane te države kao razlog za ništavost njenog pristanka, ukoliko ova povreda nije
bila očevidna i ne odnosi se na pravilo njenog unutrašnjeg prava od osnovnog značaja“. Videti:
“Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, UN Doc. A/CoNF.39/11 and Adds. 1–2,
international Legal Materials, vol. 8, 1969, pp. 679–735; “Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties between State and international organisation or between international organisations”,
official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and
international organizations or between internationalorganizations, vol. ii, United Nations
Publication, Sales No. E.94.V; UN doc. A/CoNF.129/15. Konvencija zbog nedovoljnog broja
ratifikacija još nije stupila na pravnu snagu. Videti: Stevan Đorđević, Duško Dimitrijević, Pravo
međunarodnih ugovora, institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2011, str. 55;
Borut Bohte, Tomislav Mitrović, „Bečka konvencija o pravu ugovora između država i
međunarodnih organizacija ili između međunarodnih organizacija”, Jugoslovenska revija za
međunarodno pravo, 1986, broj 1, str. 18–45.
suštinskog značaja koja je odudarala od uobičajene prakse i savesnosti (član 46.

Bečkih konvencija).11 U nastavku ćemo se osvrnuti na neke po nama značajnije
odredbe Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma, kako bi ukazali na njegove pravne
manjkavosti.
ANALIZA ODREDABA VOJNO-TEHNIČKOG

SPORAZUMA IZ KUMANOVA
Strane Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma pozivajući se na Sporazum o političkim
principima od 3. juna 1999. godine, između SR Jugoslavije, Republike Srbije i
predstavnika Evropske unije i Rusije (tzv. dokument Ahtisari-černomirdin), koji
je predsednik Ahtisari podneo predsedniku Miloševiću, a kojeg su odobrile
Skupština Srbije i Savezna vlada SR Jugoslavije, prihvatile su legalizaciju
prethodno planiranog međunarodnog civilnog i vojnog prisustva na KiM,
najavljujući usvajanje Rezolucije 1244 Saveta bezbednosti kojom bi rešavanje
kosmetske krize praktično bilo vraćeno na politički kolosek, u okvire zajedničkih
načela, koja su trebalo da dovedu do rešavanja problema unutar sistema
Ujedinjenih nacija.12 U Sporazumu se ističe da su vlade SR Jugoslavije i Republike
Srbije saglasne da se međunarodne bezbednosne snage (KFoR), rasporede nakon
usvajanja pomenute Rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti, te da neometano funkcionišu
u okviru KiM. Međunarodne bezbednosne snage ovlašćene su da u okviru svojih
nadležnosti preduzimaju sve neophodne mere i akcije u cilјu uspostavlјanja i
održavanja bezbednog okruženja, kao i da na druge načine obavlјaju svoju misiju.
Strane Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma saglasno potvrđuju id a su spremene da poštuju
sve obaveze iz ovog Sporazuma i da olakšaju raspoređivanje i funkcionisanje ovih
snaga.13 Zanimljivo je, da se kao strana potpisnica Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma
pojavljuje predstavnik KFoR-a, a ne NATo saveza, što znači da su prava i
obaveze prihvaćene od međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga pod mandatom
Ujedinjenih nacija, što se ne može tumačiti stricto sensu, kao okupacijska sila
budući da su iste uspostavljene na osnovu Glave Vii Povelje svetske organizacije.
osnovna svrha njihovog formiranja bilo je „uspostavlјanje i održavanje bezbednog
11
Milenko Kreća, „o formalnoj protivustavnosti međunarodnih ugovora”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta
u Beogradu, 1983, br. 1–4, str. 440–454; Zoran Radivojević, „Protivustavnost ugovora
međunarodnih organizacija”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, 1985, br. 3,
str. 510–536.
12
“Agreement on Political Principles between the FRY and EU and Russian envoys, Martii
Ahtisaari and Victor Tchernomyrdine”, 3 June 1999, United Nations Documents S/1999/649;
“Military Tehnical Agreement between the international Security Force (KFoR) and the
Governments of FRY and Republic of Serbia”, Kumanovo, FYRoM, 9 June 1999, International
Legal Materials, 1999, n° 38, p. 14; Duško Dimitrijević, „Privremena uprava Ujedinjenih nacija
na Kosovu i Metohiji i zaštita imovinskih prava”, Teme, 2007, vol. 31, br, 3, str. 473–510.
13
Governments of FRY and Republic of Serbia”, Ibid., član 1.
okruženja za sve građane KiM”, kao i na drugi način obavlјanje mirovne misije,
iz čega dalje sledi da bi kršenje ili izostanak vršenja prihvaćenih ugovornih
obaveza značilo i nepoštovanje Vojno-tehničkog sporazume, a što na kraju može
predstavljati valjan pravni razlog za raskidanje ovog ugovornog akta. Budući da
se radi o mirovnoj misiji, a ne o vojnoj okupaciji, pravno gledano to je mirovni
sporazum (a ne kapitulacija). U stavu 4. člana 1, navodi se da je svrha Sporazuma,
jednostrano nametanje obaveza (odnosno uspostavljanje asimetrične pozicije
ugovornih strana): „Uspostavlјanjem trajnog prestanka neprijatelјstva, ni pod
kojim uslovima bilo koje snage SR Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije neće ući, ponovo
ući, niti ostati na teritoriji Kosova ili u zoni kopnene bezbednosti odnosno zoni
vazdušne bezbednosti kako su opisane u tački 3, člana 1, bez prethodne izričite
saglasnosti komandanta međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR). Lokalna
policija će moći da ostane u zoni kopnene bezbednosti. ova tačka (a) neće uticati
na dogovoreni povratak osoblјa SR Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije koje će biti
predmet naknadnog sporazuma kako se predviđa u tački 6 dokumenta koji se
pominje u tački 1 ovog člana”. Dalje, u tački (b) navodi se još i, „obezbeđenje
podrške i ovlašćenja međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR), a posebno da
bi se međunarodne bezbednosne snage ovlastile da preduzimaju akcije koje su
potrebne, uklјučujući i upotrebu nužne sile da bi se obezbedilo poštovanje ovog
Sporazuma i zaštitile međunarodne bezbednosne , kao i da bi se doprinelo
bezbednom okruženju za međunarodno civilno prisustvo i druge međunarodne
organizacije, agencije i nevladine organizacije (detalјi navedeni u Dodatku B).”
interpretacijom pomenutih odredbi Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma može se zapaziti
da postoji ultimativno nametanje obaveza, kojima se ruši državni suverenitet na
delu teritorija SR Jugoslavije. odavde sledi da je sporazum KFoR-a i SR
Jugoslavije/Republike Srbije, u stvari nastao pod pritiskom i da nije zaklјučen
shodno opštim pravilima međunarodnog ugovornog prava. Da podsetimo, ugovori
zaklјučeni pod pritiskom, na prevaru, u zabludi, ucenom ili kršenjem jus cogens
normi, pa i načela bona fide, nemaju pravno dejstvo! U savremenom
međunarodnom pravu, osnovna pravila iz člana 2. Povelјe se, uz kršenje očiglednih
normi genocida i elementarnih narodnih i lјudskih prava, takođe smatraju jus
cogens normama. ovde spadaju i, suverena jednakost (stav 1. člana 2), politička
nezavisnost i teritorijalni integritet (stav 4. člana 2), i nemešanje u unutrašnje stvari
(unutrašnju jurisdikciju) drugih država (stav 7. člana 2). Sva navedena načela su,
kako zaklјučujemo, Vojno-tehničkim sporazumom prekršena. Uz navedeno, u
stavu 3. člana 1. u tačkama (d) i (e) propisuju se i sledeća restriktivna ograničenja:
„Zona vazdušne bezbednosti (ASZ), definisana je kao zona od 25 km koja se
proteže izvan granice pokrajine Kosova unutar ostalog dela teritorije SR
Jugoslavije. ona uklјučuje vazdušni prostor iznad te zone od 25 km”. Dalje se
navodi, „zona kopnene bezbednosti (GSZ), definisana je kao zona od 5 km koja
se proteže izvan granice pokrajine Kosova unutar ostalog dela teritorije SR
Jugoslavije. ona uklјučuje teritoriju u okviru te zone od 5 km”. Potom sledi i čitav
niz drugih naredbodavnih ograničenja, koja su inače tipična za neke ugovore o
kapitulaciji ili diktatu i nametanju političkih rešenja od strane sila pobednica u

ratu. U članu 2. Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma predviđa se da: „Snage SRJ će se
odmah nakon stupanja na snagu ovog Sporazuma uzdržati od bilo kakvih
neprijatelјskih ili provokativnih akata bilo koje vrste, uperenih protiv bilo kog lica
na Kosovu i narediće oružanim snagama da prekinu sve takve aktivnosti. one neće
podsticati, organizovati niti podržavati neprijatelјske ili provokativne
demonstracije”. Sledeći navedeno, još se dodaje i kako će fazno povlačenje
kopnenih snaga SR Jugoslavije sa KiM na lokacije u Srbiji uslediti uz obavezu
čišćenja teritorija na kojima su postavljena minska polja, a potom i uz raščišćavanje
linija komunikacije uklanjanjem svih mina, narušavanja, zamaskiranih
eksplozivnih naprava, prepreka i eksplozivnih punjenja. Kopnene oružane snage
SR Jugoslavije takođe su preuzele obavezu da obleže sva minska polјa. Ulazak i
razmeštanje međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR) na prostor KiM trebalo
je biti sinhronizovano sa povlačenjem oružanih snaga SR Jugoslavije u skladu sa
sledećim redosledom: „Do dana stupanja na snagu Sporazuma + 1 dan, snage SR
Jugoslavije locirane u zoni 3 napustiće označenim putnim pravcima tu zonu kako
bi pokazale poštovanje Sporazuma (ucrtano na mapi u Dodatku A Sporazuma).
Nakon što se verifikuje da su snage SR Jugoslavije postupile u skladu sa ovim
stavom kao i tačkom 1. ovog člana, vazdušni napadi NATo-a će biti suspendovani.
Ta suspenzija će se nastaviti pod uslovom da se u potpunosti poštuju obaveze iz
ovog Sporazuma i da Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacaija što hitnije usvoji
rezoluciju o razmeštanju međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga (KFoR), da bi se
izbegao vakum (…)”.14
imajući u vidu nametnute obaveze iz Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma, moglo bi
se zaključiti da se radi o ugovoru o primirju koji je nametnut pod pritiskom
zapadnih sila, to jest, NATo-a.. okolnosti koje upućuju na ovaj zaklјučak su više
nego evidentne iz činjenice da bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije ne bi prestalo da
nije potpisan ovakav Sporazum, koji uklјučuje ograničenje i suspenziju njenog
suvereniteta. Stoga, polazeći od nesporne činjenice da je ugovor nametnut pod
pretnjom dalјeg oružanog napada ili vojne intervencije, a da intervencija nije
odobrena od Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, već je sprovedena bez njegove
autorizacije, da bi potom bila okončana Vojno-tehničkim sporazumom zaključenim
sa KFoR-om (ali opet pod pretnjom i pritiskom), dolazimo do zaklјučka da je
ovakav ugovor ništavan imajući u vidu ne samo odredbu člana 52. Bečke
konvencije o pravu ugovora iz 1969. godine, već i odredbe domaćeg Ustava
kojima se štiti suverenitet i zabranjuje zaklјučivanje ovakvih akata. Ako se
analizira odredba člana 52. Bečke konvencije koja nosi naslov: „Prinuda nad
državom izvršena putem pretnje ili upotrebe sile”, videće se da se njome stipuliše
da je, „ništavan svaki ugovor čije je zaklјučenje postignuto pretnjom ili upotrebom
sile kršenjem principa međunarodnog prava koji su uneti u Povelјu Ujedinjenih
14
Governments of FRY and Republic of Serbia”, op. cit., član 2.
nacija”.15 Ako se pođe od stanovišta da su u predmetnom slučaju povređeni opšti

međunarodnopravni principi o zabrani pretenje i upotrebe sile, suverene jednakosti
država, teritorijalnog integriteta i političke nezavisnosti, onda je jasno da je
zaključenjem Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma u izvesnoj meri došlo i do povreda
Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija i to u onom njenom delu koji predstavlja lex lata, to
jest koji je obuhvaćen imperativnim normama opšteg međunarodnog prava (jus
cogens). Prema odredbi člana 53 Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora: „Ništavan
je svaki ugovor koji je u trenutku svoga zaklјučenja u sukobu sa imperativnom
normom opšteg međunarodnog prava”. Ništavost Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma iz
razloga suprotnosti sa nekom od pomenutih kogentnih normi ne povlače samo
njegovu ništavost, nego i zajedničku obvezu ugovornih strana da deluju u pravcu
usklađivanja međusobnih odnosa sa sadržajem ovih normi i da otklone, ukoliko
je to moguće, posledice radnji koje su bile s njom u suprotnosti.
Ako se uzme u obzir i činjenica da je Vojno-tehnički sporazum zaključen od
KFoR-a kao međunarodnih bezbednosnih snaga, u trenutku kada je trebalo
legitimisati međunarodno prisustvo na KiM, onda je jasno da je Sporazum zaključen
pod neravnopravnim uslovima i u momentu kada je procenjeno da valja
suspendovati oružani napad NATo saveza na SR Jugoslaviju. Pritom, postizanje
primirja bilo je uslovljeno i povlačenjem vojnih i policijskih snaga SR Jugoslavije
i Republike Srbije sa teritorije KiM, što dalje navodi na pomisao da je zaključenje
Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma bila posledica pretnji daljom upotrebom oružane sile
od strane NATo-a. Na takvu pomisao ukazuje i donošenje Rezolucije Saveta
bezbednosti 1244, koje je usledilo svega dan posle zaključenja Vojno-tehničkog
sporazuma, čime je u stvari došlo do „zamagljivanja” izostanka valjanog pravnog
osnova za oružanu intervenciju NATo-a proti SR Jugoslavija, a kojom je u
izvesnom smislu naknadno autorizovan čin sklapanja Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma.
Budući da savremeno međunarodno pravo ne priznaje rezultate postignute
zaključenjem ugovora pod prinudom i da se svi ugovori zaključeni pod prinudom
smatraju apsolutno ništavim i lišenim pravnog dejstva ab initio, onda bi bilo logično
da Republika Srbija ima pravo da se pozove na njegovu ništavost shodno članu 52.
Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora, to jest, po osnovu kršenja načela opšteg
međunarodnog prava unetih u Povelju Ujedinjenih nacija.16 Takođe, Republika
Srbija bi mogla da odustane od Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma pozivanjem na razloge
relativne ništavosti budući da je Vojno-tehnički sporazum zaključen od lica koja
nisu imala potrebna ovlašćenja (u pogledu suspenzije suvereniteta i ograničavanja
teritorijalnog integriteta SR Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije). Sledeći proceduru
predviđenu Bečkom konvencijom o pravu ugovora, Republika Srbija bi mogla
pokrenuti postupak za proglašavanje ništavosti Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma, što bi
15
„Bečka konvencija o pravu ugovora”, Službeni list SFRJ, dodatak Međunarodni ugovori, br.
30/1972.
16
Enrico Milano, “Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality”, European
Journal of International Law, 2003, No. 14, pp. 999–1022.
prema proceni autora moglo uslediti, ako bi KFoR zanemario svoje dužnosti u
pogledu zaštite preostalog srpskog stanovništva na KiM.17
ZAKLЈUČAK
iz predmetne analize proizilazi zaključak da je Vojno-tehnički sporazum
zaključen bez adekvatnih ovlašćenja, to jest pod pretnjom sile ili upotrebe sile u
svrhu okončanja oružanih sukoba na prostoru KiM. Sporazum je zaključen pod
neravnopravnim uslovima i sadrži brojna ograničenja suverentiteta SR Jugoslavije
(danas Republike Srbije kao njenog pravnog sledbenika). ovakva situacija dovodi
u pitanje dalje održavanje ovog Sporazuma na snazi. iako ima karakteristike
ugovora o primirju, Sporazum je očigledno nametnut kako bi se postigli politički
ciljevi pre svega zapadnih sila uključenih u NATo savez. Kako savremeno
međunarodno pravo ne priznaje rezultate postignute zaključenjem ugovora pod
prinudom, Vojno-tehnički sporazum može se smatrati ništavim i lišenim pravnog
dejstva shodno pravilu iz člana 52. Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora koja
elaborira opštu zabranu pretnje i upotrebe sile između država u materiji ugovornog
prava.18 U ekstremnim okolnostima nasilјa ili pretnje nasilјem, u cilјu spašavanja
srpskog stanovništva od daljeg pogroma sa područja KiM, Republika Srbija bi
imala legitimno pravo da pokrene postupak za utvrđivanje ništavosti ovog
ugovornog akta, pozivajući se na odredbe Bečke konvencije o pravu ugovora.
QUESTioN oF NULLiTY oF THE MiLiTARY-TECHNiCAL

AGREEMENT FRoM KUMANoVo?
ABSTRACT
The military-technical agreement was signed in Kumanovo on June 9, 1999,
between the international Security Forces (KFoR) and the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The agreement ended
the armed aggression of the NATo alliance against FR Yugoslavia. According to
its legal characteristics, the Military-Technical Agreement is an armistice
17
Republika Srbija bi mogla pokrenuti ovu procedure prosleđivanjem diplomatske note ili
notifikacije KFoR-u (Generalnom sekretaru NATo-a), u kojoj bi bili konkretno navedeni razlozi
ništavosti. U slučaju odsustva prigovora KFoR-a, Republika Srbija bi imala pravo proglasiti
ništavost Vojno-tehničkog sporazuma. U suprotnom, došlo bi do spora koji bi se rešavao nekim
od mirnih načina rešavanja iz člana 33. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija. Videti: Stevan Đorđević,
Duško Dimitrijević, Pravo međunarodnih ugovora, op.cit., str. 411–426.
18
H.G de Jong, Coercion in the conclusion of treaties: A consideration of Articles 51 and 52 of the
Convention on the the Law of Treaties, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1984, Vol.
15, pp. 210, etc.
agreement with limited legal effect. Namely, in addition to the cessation of

hostilities, it also foresees the entry of international peacekeeping forces into the
territory of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), with
the mission of protecting peace and security, which includes the protection of the
human rights of all residents, regardless of ethnicity or other affiliation. it also
foresees the demilitarization of the area and the establishment of a security zone
from the administrative line with Kosovo and Metohija within the territory of the
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. After the conclusion of the
Military-Technical Agreement, on June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1244, which provided for the establishment of a military and civilian
presence in the area of Kosovo and Metohija. After the analysis, the author came
to certain conclusions according to which the Military-Technical Agreement from
Kumanovo was concluded without adequate authorizations, then it followed as
an expression of a threat, i.e. the use of force, and that some of the general
principles incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations concerning sovereign
equality, protection of territorial integrity and political independence are violated
to a considerable extent, which, along with all other legal deficiencies, may affect
the initiation of the issue of declaring this Agreement legally null and void. This
is all the more so, if it is taken into account that the further pogrom of the
remaining Serbian population in KiM could be a tertian for a serious violation of
fundamental human rights, the protection of which is the responsibility of the
interim administration and international security forces.
Key words: The Military-Technical Agreement from Kumanovo, Kosovo and
Metohija, United Nations, UNMiK, KFoR, NATo
REFERENCE
1. “Agreement on Political Principles between the FRY and EU and Russian
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Metohiji i zaštita imovinskih prava”, Teme, 2007, vol. 31, br. 3.
3. de Jong, H.G, Coercion in the conclusion of treaties: A consideration of Articles
51 and 52 of the Convention on the the Law of Treaties, Netherlands Yearbook
of International Law, 1984, Vol. 15.
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SBUN”, Zbornik pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, 2004, vol. 38–39, br. 4. internet:
http://www.prafak.ni.ac.rs/files/zbornik/sadrzaj/zbornici/z3839/05z3839.pdf
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Legality”, European Journal of International Law, 2003, No. 14.
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REŽIM TURSKIH MOREUZA I IZGRADNJA KANALA

ISTANBUL: SRBIJA KAO STRANA KONVENCIJE
IZ MONTREA OD 1936. GODINE
Aleksandar V. GAJić*
APSTRAKT
U predmetnom radu, autor razmatra pitanja vezana za davanje izjave Republike
Srbije o sukcesiji Konvencije o režimu moreuza iz Montrea iz 1936. godine.
Pomenutom Konvencijom reguliše se status i plovidba trgovačkih i ratnih brodova
kroz Bosfor, Mramorno more i Dardanele. U analizi se ukazuje na strateški značaj
članstva u ovoj Konvenciji, kao i na pitanja koja mogu uticati na njeno tumačenje
i primenu u slučaju izgradnje Kanala istanbul. Autor takođe, ukazuje na
mogućnost podnošenja predloga za njenu izmenu. Sagledavajući trenutnu
situaciju u vezi primene ove Konvencij, on nalazi da Konvencija iz Montrea u
momentu zaključenja nije predviđala izgradnju kanala istanbul. Ugovorne
odredbe, posebno kada je reč o ratnim brodovima, temelje se na interesu
bezbednosti crnomorksih država. iz analize proizilazi zaključak da bi eventualna
izmena režima crnomorskih moreuza, verovatno bila povod i za revizuju
Konvencije o režimu plovidbe Dunavom. Autor ukazuje da su Konvencije o
režimu plovidbe na Dunavu iz 1948. godine i Konvencije iz Montrea iz 1936.
godine, međusobno povezane budući da su i podunavski i crnomorski region
toliko vezani da se mogu smarati jednom geopolitičkom celinom. Republika
Srbija je geografski i politički deo ovog regiona i kao strana ugovornica
Konvencije iz Montrea, Srbija je garant uspostavljenog režima, te je i nužan
učesnik u svakoj budućoj izmeni tog režima.
Ključne reči: Konvencija o režimu moreuza iz Montrea, izjava o sukcesiji, Bosfor
i Dardaneli, Kanal istanbul
*
Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu; Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije. E-mail:
gajic@ius.bg.ac.rs. Stanovišta iznesena u ovom radu nisu nužno i stanovišta Ministarstva spoljnih
poslova ili Vlade Republike Srbije.
UVOD
Konvencija o režimu moreuza iz Montrea potpisana je 20. jula 1936. godine,
a stupila je na snagu 9. novembra 1936. godine.1 Njome je ukinut i zamenjen režim
uspostavljen Ugovorom o miru iz Lozane iz 1923. godine. Cilj Konvencije iz
Montrea jeste obezbeđenje slobode plovidbe Turskim (crnomorskim) moreuzima
(Bosfor, Mramorno more, Dardaneli – koji su Konvencijom obuhvaćeni opštim
terminom Moreuzi), „na takav način da obezbedi unutar okvira bezbednosti Turske
i bezbednost priobalnih država u Crnom moru“.2 Republika Turska nije strana
ugovornica opštih međunarodnih konvencija iz oblasti prava mora: Konvencije o
teritorijalnom moru i spoljnom morskom pojasu , Konvencije o otvorenom moru
i Konvencije o pravu mora iz 1982. godine. Režim turskih moreuza utvrđen je
Konvencijom iz Montrea kao međunarodnim ugovorom koji je, „odavno na
snazi“.3 Potom, ovaj režim je regulisan i jednostranim aktima.4 Kraljevina
Jugoslavija bila je originalna strana ugovornica Konvencije iz Montrea. Po osnovu
međunarodno-pravnog kontinuiteta, nesporno je taj status imala i posleratna
Jugoslavija (Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija – DFJ, Federativna Narodna
Republika Jugoslavija – FNRJ i Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija
- SFRJ). Nestankom SFRJ, pitanje statusa Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (SRJ),
a potom i Državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora (SCG), te konačno Republike
Srbije (koja nastavila međunarodno-pravni kontinuitet državne zajednice Srbija i
Crna Gora), sve do 2021. godine, bilo je zanemareno. od devedestih godina 20
veka, do danas, promenila se politika Jugoslavije (danas Republike Srbije), po
pitnju pravne kvlifikacije teritorijalih promena na području bivše Jugoslavije, od
nastojanja da se obezbedi automatsko važenje svih međunarodnih ugovora bivše
Jugoslavije do naglog prekida sa takvom politikom koja je kulminirala davanjem
sukcesorske izjave u pogledu ugovora čiji je depozitar generalni sekretar UN.
Međutim, pojedini veoma značajni multilateralni ugovori čiji depozitar nije
generalni sekretar UN bili su prosto zanemareni. Jedan od takvih ugovora jeste i
1
“Convention regarding the Regime of the Stairs, signet at Montreux, July 20th, 1936”, League
of Nations – Treaty Series, Vol. CLXXiii, No. 4001–4002, 1936–1937.
2
Milan Bartoš, Međunarodno javno pravo, ii knjiga, Kultura, Beograd 1956, str. 246–249; Kurtuluş
Yücel, The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits: Regulation of the Montreux Convention and its
Importance on the International Relations after the Conflict of Ukraine, dissertation, Johann
Qolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 2019, pp. 25–142.
3
Konvencijom o pravu mora i obličajnim međunarodnim pravom nesporno je da se režim koji se
njima ustanovljava ne primenjuje na moreuze čiji je režim utvrđen međunarodnom ugovorima
koji su odavno na snazi. Međunarodno pravo mora u pogledu režima prolaza moreuzima nije
dovelo do formiranja običajnih pravnih pravila, i stoga režim prolaza pojedinim moreuzima, za
države koje nisu obvezane Konvencijom o pravu mora (1982) nije obavezujući. Videti: Yoshifumi
Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, second ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2015, pp. 280. etc.
4
Gunduz Aybay, Niluder oral, “Turkey’s Authority to Regulate Passage of Vellels Throuhgh the
Turkish Straits”, Perceptions – Journal of International Affairs, 1998, no. 2.
Konvencija iz Montrea. Repubika Srbija je putem izjave o sukcesiji, „obnovila”

status strane ugovornice Konvencije iz Montrea 2021. godine.5
Ne bi trebalo posebno obrazlagati da je biti strana ugovornica Konvencije iz
Montrea kojom se regulišu bitna pitanja plovidbe turskim ili crnomorskim
moreuzima (Bosfor, Mramorno more i Dardaneli), i kojom se obezbeđuje
suverenitet Turske i bezbednost crnomorskih država – nesumljivo od strateškog
značaja od momenta kada je predsednik Republike Turske Taip Redžep Erdogan
najavio izgradnju „kanala istanbul” postavljena su brojna pitanja vezana za
Konvenciju iz Montrea. To se posebno odnosi na pitanja mogućnosti izigravanja
režima plovidbe koji je njome uspostavljen. ideja izgradnje kanala istanbul nije
nova. iako je još uvek reč samo o projektu, prvi koraci ka njegovoj realizaciji su
učinjeni tokom 2021. godine, i to u dobrom pravcu, mada su izazvali čitavu lavinu
rasprava i diplomatskih aktivnosti, posebno po pitanju uticaja na režim
uspostavljen Konvencijom iz Montrea.6
SRBIJA KAO DRŽAVA NASLEDNICA KONVENCIJE

O REŽIMU MOREUZA IZ MONTREA
Kraljevina Jugoslavije bila je strana ugovornica Konvencije o režimu moreuza
iz Montea iz 1936. godine. Nesporno je i Jugoslavija u svim njenim posleratnim
oblicima (DFJ, FNRJ i SFRJ), bila strana ove Konvencija. Događaji devedesetih
godina 20. veka, otcepljenje Slovenije, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Makedonije
(danas Severne Makedonije), ili kako je to kvalifikovala Badinterova komisija –
„raspad” Jugoslavije, doveli su do pokretanja pitanja, da li je SR Jugoslavija (SRJ)
strana ugovornica Konvencija iz Montrea čija je strana ugovornica bila SFRJ?
Drugim rečima, da li SRJ može automatski da nastavi članstvo (da bude strana
ugovornica) Konvencije? ovo pravo joj je (uglavnom) osporavano iz naročitih
političkih razloga. Prilikom proglašenja Ustava SRJ 1992. godine, usvojena je
politička Deklaracija Skupštine koja već u tački 1. sadrži sledeću odredbu:„SRJ,
nastavljajući državni, međunarodno-pravni i politički kontinuitet SFRJ, striktno će
poštovati sve obaveze koje je SFR Jugoslavija na međunarodnom planu preuzela u
prošlosti“ Drugim rečima, SRJ (čiji međunarodnopravni kontinuitet nesporno
nastavlja Republika Srbija), sebe je smatrala stranom ugovornicom svih ugovora
koji su važili za SFRJ. Međutim, već od 1991 godine, i pred Ujedinjenim nacijama
pojavila se lavina pritisaka da se Jugoslaviji uskrati kontinuitet u pogledu
međunarodnih ugovora, odnosno da ne može automatski da se smatra stranom
5
Republika Srbija smatra se sukcesorom bivše SR Jugoslavije. Međutim, Srbiji je priznat i državni
kontinuitet sa državama prethodnicama u kojima je konstitutivni status. Danas Srbija obeležava
više od 140 godina diplomatskih odnosa sa SAD, italijom i mnogim drugim državama. Videti:
internet: www.mfa.rs
6
“Erdogan takes first step in controversial istanbul canal project”, internet:https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2021/6/26/turkey-erdogan-takes-first-step-in-controversial-istanbul-canal-project
ugovornicom i pored prvobitnog stava Sekretarijata UN da Jugoslavija ima

kontinuitet u ovoj oblasti.7 Međutim, pravni savetnik je u vezi s tim zauzeo stav da
generalni sekretar nije bio u poziciji, kao depozitar, da odbaci ili zanemari tvrdnju
SRJ da je ona nastavila pravni subjektivitet bivše SFRJ, bez bilo kakve odluke o
suprotnom bilo od strane nadležnog organa Ujedinjenih nacija koji ga upućuje u
vršenju njegovih depozitnih funkcija, ili od strane nadležnog ugovornog organa
stvorenog ugovorom, ili od strane država ugovornica na ugovor koji ga upućuje u
vršenju njegovih depozitnih funkcija u pogledu tog konkretnog ugovora, ili od strane
nadležnog organa predstavnika međunarodne zajednice država u celini o opštem
pitanju kontinuiteta i diskontinuiteta državnosti na koje je potekla tvrdnja SRJ.8,9 od
oktobarskih političkih promena 2000. godine, SRJ je prihvatila poziciju ravnopravne
države sukcesora bivše SFRJ. ovakav pristup je kulminirao podnošenjem zahteva
za prijem u UN kao nove države i podnošenjem sukcesorskih izjava u pogledu 237
međunarodnih ugovora čiji je depozitar bio generalni sekretar UN. Budući na
različitost prakse raznih međunarodnih organizacija u pogledu nasleđivanja
međunarodnih ugovora, pitanje sukcesije Republike Srbije je ostalo otvoreno za
određeni broj ugovora, uključujući i određeni broj konstitutivnih akata koji se tiču
sukcesije u međunarodnim organizacijama.10 Uz ovo valja još napomenuti da je
Sporazumom o pitanjima sukcesije SFRJ koji je zaključen 2001. godine (a stupio je
na snagu 2004. godine), između država sukcesora (SRJ/danas Republike Srbije,
7
Šef Biroa za pravne poslove i zamenik podsekretara UN za pravna pitanja (R. Zaklin), izneo je pravni
stav Sekretarijata, pozivajući se na publikaciju Multilateralni ugovori deponovani kod generalnog
sekretara UN, da „status Jugoslavije kao članice ugovora nije izmenjen rezolucijom Generalne
skupštine 47/1 od 22. decembra 1992. godine (…). ona se ne odnosi na status Jugoslavije kao članice
ugovora (…). Kao članica Ugovora o maslinovom ulјu, Jugoslavija može da potpiše bilo koji
protokol otvoren za pristup članicama Ugovora”. Videti: Miodrag Mitić, Međunarodno pravo u
Jugoslovenskoj krizi, NiU Službeni list SRJ, Beograd 1996; Vladislav Jovanović, The Status of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, Fordhamm International Law Journal, 1998,
no. 21, pp. 1719–1736.; Duško Dimitrijević, „Sukcesija članstva u Ujedinjenim nacijama – Slučaj
SFR Jugoslavije”, Međunarodni problemi, 2007, бр. 1, str. 71–100.
8
“The Legal Counsel took the view in this regard that the Secretary-General was not in a position,
as depositary, either to reject or to disregard the claim of Yugoslavia that it continued the legal
personality of the former Yugoslavia, absent any decision to the contrary either by a competent
organ of the United Nations directing him in the exercise of his depositary functions, or by a
competent treaty organ created by a treaty, or by the contracting States to a treaty directing him
in the exercise of his depositary functions with regard to that particular treaty, or by a competent
organ representative of the international community of States as a whole on the general issue of
continuity and discontinuity of statehood to which the claim of Yugoslavia gave rise”. internet:
https://treaties.un.org/pages/historicalinfo.aspx#Yugoslavia(FederalRepublicof)
9
od bivših republika SFRJ, posebno je Slovenija bila aktivna po pitanju nepriznavanja kontinuiteta
SRJ. Videti: Miodrag Mitić, op. cit., str. 201.
10
Valja uočiti da je status u multilateralnim međunarodnim ugovorima odvojeno pravno pitanje u
odnosu na nasleđivanje ili pristupanje međunarodnim organizacijama i njihovim statutarnim
aktima. Videti: Duško Dimitrijević, „Sukcesija ugovora u savremenoj međunarodnoj praksi”,
Međunarodni problem, 2012, br. 2, str. 144–179.
Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatske, Slovenije i Makedonije/danas Severne Makedonije),

izostavljeno pitanje sukcesije multilateralnih međunarodnih ugovora države
prethodnice.11 Tako su mnoga pitanja ostala i dalje otvorena, dok proces osnaženja
ili konvalidacije važenja pojedinih ugovora bivše SFRJ nije još uvek privedena kraju.
Prema informacijama kojima raspolažemo, od 1992. godine (kada je proklamovan
Ustav SR Jugoslavije), do 2021. godine, francuskom Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova,
kao depozitaru Konvencije iz Montrea nije dostavljena nikakva izjava o sukcesiji.
Depozitar ovog ugovora je bivšu SFRJ vodio kao stranu ugovornicu. Registracija
međunarodnih ugovora kod generalnog sekretara UN predstavlja pravnu obavezu
prema Povelji UN i podaci o ugovorima (strane ugovornice, datum potpisivanja,
stupanja na snagu, izmene ugovora, reserve, itd), objavljuju se u publikaciji: United
Nations Treaty Series (UNTS).12 ove podatke po pravilu dostavljaju depozitari
međunarodnog ugovora. Međutim, u bazi podataka UNTS kao strana ugovornica
Konvencije iz Montrea figurira SRJ, a ne bivša SFRJ. Konkretno se navodi da je
podnosilac Ugovora na registraciju bila Turska, a ne Francuska kao depozitar. Podaci
o stranama ugovornicama u UNTS i kod Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Francuske
nisu u saglasnosti.13 Ugovor iz Montrea je ugovor sa ograničenim brojem strana
ugovornica, odnosno zatvoreni međunarodni ugovor. Kraljevina Jugoslavija bila je
originalna strana ugovornica Konvencije koja je bila otvorena za pristup samo
potpisnicama Ugovora o miru iz Lozane od 24. jula 1923. godine (član 27.
Konvencije). Nakon stupanja na snagu Konvencije iz Montrea strane ugovornice
su, prema podacima depozitara, postale Kipar (kao sukcesor Velike Britanije) i
Ukrajina (kao država sukcesor SSS-a), dok je Japan otkazao Konvenciju 1951.
godine. Dostupna je samo sukcesorska izjava Kipra kojom je dato obaveštenje da
se smatra stranom ugovornicom Konvencije iz Montrea.14 Sudeći po podacima koje
je objavio depozitar, ne postoje reakcije na notu Kipra da sebe smatra vezanom
Konvencijom iz Montrea. U kontaktu sa turskim zvaničnicima, autor ovih redova
dobio je informaciju da Turska ne smatra Kipar stranom ugovornicom, iako depozitar
nije primio bilo kakavo formalno saopštenje u tom pravcu.
11
Crna Gora nije neposredno država sukcesor bivše Jugoslavije, već je sukcesor Državne zajednice
Srbija i Crna Gora. Pitanja sukcesije uređena su Poveljom državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora.
12
Videti član 102. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija.
13
Prema navodima Francuskog Ministarstva spoljnih poslova strane ugovornice su Australija,
Bugarska, Kipar, Ruska Federacija, Francuska, Grčka, italija, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, Rumunija,
Turska i Ukrajina. Prema UNTS, kao strane ugovornice figuriraju Australija, Bugarska,
Francuska, Grčka, Japan, Rumunija, Turska, SSSR, Velika Britanija i Jugoslavija (SRJ).
14
U Noti Ministarstva spolјnih poslova Kipra od 18.03.1969. godine, koja je upućena Francuskoj
kao depozitaru, između ostalog se navodi: “(…) the Republic of Cyprus considers itself bound
by the above Convention, which was ratified by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern irleand on 9th November, 1936, and was extened by the latter to Cyprus before the
attainment of its independence, by virtue of the devolution clause of article 8 of the Тreaty
concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and in accordance with the „inherence
Rules” of Public international Law”.
IZJAVA O SUKCESIJI REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

imajući u vidu napred naveden kontekst, teškoje bilo prihvatiti automatsko
nasleđivanja Konvencije iz Montrea od strane Republike Srbije. Stoga je
Republika Srbija preduzela aktivnosti kako bi davanjem izjave o sukcesiji nastavila
člansto u ovom međunarodnom ugovoru. Napominjemo da je Republika Srbija
podunavska zemlja (zbog čega i poseban interes u pogledu regulisanja plovidbe
Bosforom, Dardanelima i Mramornim morem). ona baštini tradiciju i nastavlja
politički i istorijski kontinuitet sa Kraljevinom Srbijom i Kraljevinom
Jugoslavijom. Uzimajući u obzir posebne istorijske okolnosti zaključenja Ugovora
o miru iz Lozane iz 1923. godine, kao i Konvencije iz Montrea iz 1936. godine,
čini se da Republika Srbija može da pruži adekvatno političko i istorijsko
obrazloženje pravnog i istorijskog osnova da bude strana ugovornica Konvencije
iz Montrea.15 oktobra 2021. godine, Republika Srbija je Ministarstvu spoljnih
poslova Francuske Republike uputila izjavu sledeće sadržine: „Ministarstvo
spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije ovim izražava visoko poštovanje Vladi
Francuske Republike kao depozitaru Konvencije o režimu Moreuza (sa
protokolom), koja je potpisana u Montreu 20 jula. 1936. godine, i ovim obaveštava
da Republika Srbija smatra sebe vezanom Konvencijom, koju je ratifikovala
Kraljevina Jugoslavija 9. novembra 1936. godine, kao država sukcesor bivše
Jugoslavije u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom i svojim istorijskim zahtevima”.
Do današnjeg dana, prema saznanjima autora, ni jedan država nije uputila prigovor
na sukcesorsku izjavu Republike Srbije (niti je Ministarstvo spoljnih polsova
Francuske tehnički izmenilo podatke na web stranici posvećenoj Konvenciji).
Budući da je od davanja sukcesorske izjave proteklo više od godinu dana a da se
ni jedna strana ugovornica nije usprotivila niti uputila bilo kakvu notu može se
smatrati da je Republika Srbija prihvaćena za stranu ugovornicu.
STRATEŠKI ZNAČAJ ČLANSTVA

U KONVENCIJI IZ MONTREA
Države ugovornice su „garanti“ režima uspostavljenog Konvencijom iz
Montrea, ali takođe i obavezni akteri eventualne izmene tako uspostavljenog
režima. Kako je cilj Konvencije da se osigura sloboda prolaza i plovidbe
moreuzima, kao i bezbednost Turske i država Crnog Mora, članstvo u Konvenciji
je nesumnjivo od strateškog značaja. Republika Srbija, kao strana ugovornica, javlja
15
Postavlja se pitanje, da li i druge države sukcesori bivše SFRJ (BiH, Hrvatska, Slovenija,
Makedonija ali ne i Crna Gora, koja prema shvatanu autora nije njena sukcesorka), mogu
pretendovati na status strane ugovornice? Ukoliko bi sve bivše republike SFRJ pretendovale da
budu strane ugovornice Konvencije iz Montrea, znatno bi se povećao broj strana ugovornica,
što može biti neprihvatljivo za ostale strane ugovornice. Državama bivše SFRJ bi se u tom slučaju
dao nesrazmerno veliki značaj u bilo kom postupku izmene Konvencije iz Montrea bilo u
pogledu članova za koje se traži jednoglasnost bilo ¾ većina (čl. 14–18).
se i kao garant režima turskih moreuza i kao nezaobilazan akter eventualnih izmena
tog režima.16 Ne vidimo razloge zbog kojih bi Srbija odustala od nastojanja da
„produži članstvo“ u Konvenciji iz Montrea ili da joj se uskarati pravo da bude
njena strana ugovornica. Za Republiku Srbiju je od posebnog značaja očuvanje
režima slobode plovidbe Dunavom (kako je to regulisano Beogradskom
konvencijom o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu od 18. avgusta 1948. godine). To
konkretno uključuje i ostvarivanje slobode plovidbe za sve trgovačke brodove
pomorskim putevima koji vode preko Bosfora, Mramornog Mora i Dardanela.
Drugim rečima, sloboda plovidbe za sve trgovačke brodove putem Dunava i turskih
moreuza je od ključnog značaja za Republiku Srbiju kao neobalnu državu. Uz
navedeno, Srbija se i zvanično zalaže za stabilnost, teritorijalnu celovitost i
suverenitet država uz ostvarivanje legitimnih prava u pogledu trgovine i
bezbednosti.
KANAL ISTANBUL I KONVENCIJA IZ MONTREA

Međunarodno pravo mora razlikuje režim plovidbe moreuzima i kanalima.
Kanali su unutrašnje vode države na čijoj teritoriji se nalaze i u pogledu njih ne
važe režimi plovidbe kao u moreuzima poput režima neškodljivog ili tranzitnog
prolaza. U odsustvu međunarodnog ugovora kojim bi se regulisao režim plovidbe
kanalom istanbul (kao u slučaju Panamskog kanala i Sueckog kanala), režim kanala
mogao bi biti regulisan jednostranim aktima države na čijoj teritoriji se kanali nalaze
(slično kao u slučaju Kortinskog kanala).17 Da bi bio regulisan jednostranim aktom,
režim bi isto tako jednostranim aktom bio i predmet izmene. izgradnja kanala
istambul ne dira u važenje i primenu Konvencije iz Montrea koja reguliše prolaz
Bosforom, Mramornim morem i Dardanelima, što pruža mogućnosti da se u
16
Turska ima obavezu blagovremene notifikacije stranama ugovornicama informacija koje se tiču
prolaza ratnih brodova crnomorskih država, posebno veće tonaže nego je predviđena (capital
ships), potom o prolasku podmornica crnomorskih država koje su izrađene ili kupljene van Crnog
mora kako bi se pridružile svojim bazama u Crnom moru, o prolasku i zadržavanju ratnih
brodova, o ukupnoj tonaži ratnih brodova necrnomorskih država u vreme mira. obaveza je
Turske da odmah pošto primi notifikaciju o nameravanom prolazu kroz moreuze strane pomorske
sile da informiše predstavnike visokih strana ugovornica o kompoziciji te sile, njenoj tonaži,
datumu određenom za ulazak u vode moreuza i ukoliko je nužno, mogućem datumu povratka
(čl. 24 Konvencije). Turska je u obavezi da dostavlja generalnom sekretaru Ujedinjenih nacija
(nekada Društva naroda), i stranama ugovornicama, godišnji izveštaj u kome se navode detalji
o prolasku stranih ratnih brodova kroz moreuze i da pruži sve informacije koje mogu biti od
koristi za trgovinu i plovidbu. Valja uočiti i da Pravila koja su ustanovljena Konvencijom iz
Montrea predviđaju da se ključne odluke o izmeni konvencije donose jednoglasno ili (kada je
reč o izmeni članova od 14. do 18), tročetvrtinskom većinom strana ugovornica.
17
Međunarodni morski kanali, odnosno kanali čiji je režim regulisan međunarodnim ugovorima u
vreme zaključenja tih ugovora bili su „formalno ili faktički nesamostalne države (Egipat,
Panama)”. Videti: Milenko Kreća, Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu,
Beograd, 2014, str. 411.
izvesnoj meri „zaobiđe“ režim koji je njome uspostavljen. Naime izgradnja „kanala
istanbul“ bi povezivao Mramorno more (unutrašnje more Turske), i Crno More u
dužini od oko 45 kilometara kroz teritoriju Turske. Pritom, Turska ostaje u poziciji
da iznosi tvrdnje da nije vezana pravilima međunarodnog prava o režimu plovidbe,
zadržavanja ratnih brodova i sl. Razlozi za izgradnju kanala ne leže samo u potrebi
da se „rastereti“ Bosfor i očuva bezbednost istambula, već i u geostrateškom
značaju takvog kanala. U tom kontekstu je predsednik Republike Turske Erdogan
istakao da, „ukoliko Turska želi da bude globalni akter, projekat “kanal istanbul”
postaje nužnost, a ne samo san.“18 Mnoštvo je političkih i pravnih rasprava o
primeni ili izigravanju primene Konvencije iz Montrea u vezi sa kanalom istanbul.
Jednostranim aktom Turske regulisala bi se pitanja koja se tiču ne samo načina
plovidbe kanalom, već i pitanja taksi i drugih dažbina. Takođe, tim načinom bi se
regulisala i druga pitanja popoput, da li je kanal otvoren za plovidbu samo
trgovačkim ili i ratnim brodovima, čijim i kakvim ratnim brodovima, potom bi se
utvrdio režim zadržavanja na području kanala, i slično.19 ipak , prolazak ratnih
brodova ne bi mogao da u potpunosti zanemari Konvenciju iz Montrea budući da
ona reguliše prolaz kroz Dardanele (u, i iz Mramornog mora u Egejsko More), kao
što pruža pregršt mogućnosti različitog tumačenja bez unapred ustanovljenog
obavezujućeg mehanizma rešavanja eventualnih sporova. Dok se, s jedne strane, u
diplomatsim komunikacijama navodi privrženost i poštovanje Konvencije iz
Montrea, sa druge strane navodi se i da je predsednik Erdogan Konvenciju iz
Montrea proglasio obavezujućom samo za turske moreuze dok je kanal istanbul
ostavio „potpuno van Montrea”.20 osnovno pravno pitanje koje se otud postavlja
je, da li, uzimajući u obzir ciljeve Konvencije iz Montrea, režim koji bi bio
uspostavljen na kanalu istanbul može potpuno da zanemari obzire i ciljeve koji su
njome zaštićeni? Ukoliko bi prolaz bio rezervisan samo za trgovačke brodove (na
bazi nediskriminacije), režim ne bi posebno pogodio primenu Konvencije iz
Montrea, budući da se time ne sprečava i prolazak kroz moreuze, a izbor između
Bosfora i kanala istanbul bio bi stvar ekonomske računice (brzina i bezbednost
prolaza, takse i druge dažbine za prolazak kanalom itd.). Međutim , posebno pitanje
koje zabrinjava jeste mogućnost da se dopusti prolaz ratnih brodova, što je od
interesa za bezbednost Turske i drugih crnomorskih država, posebno Rusije. „Nova
18
“istanbul Canal: A Megaproject with Strategic implications”, internet: https://armenianweekly.
com/2021/06/16/istanbul-canal-a-megaproject-with-strategic-implications/
19
izvesni problemi postoje i danas po onim pitanjima koja Republika Turska može da reguliše
jednostranim aktima. Videti: “Letter dated 13 November 1995 from the Permanent
Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, Navigation in the Black Sea Straits”, A/50/754, 14 November 1995; “Letter dated 7
December 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, Navigation through the Turkish Straits”, UN Doc A/50/809, 8
December 1995.
20
Ali Tuygan, “The Montreux Convention: Russia’s Perspective”, 28/01/2020, internet: https://
edam.org.tr/en/the-montreux-convention-russias-perspective/
arterija”, novi plovni put ukoliko ne bi bio obuhvaćen istim režimom otvara pitanja
među kojima se obično navode ona vezana za obavezu prethodne notifikaciju
prolaza (za ratne brodove crnomorskih država 8 dana, a za ratne brodove
necrnomorskih država 15 dana). Potom, tu su i pitanje zadržavanja ratnih brodova
u vodama kanala instabul duže od 21 dana, pitanje ukupne tonaže brodova koji bi
bili prisutni u kanalu i pitanje obaveze notifikacije prolaska ratnih brodova stranama
ugovornicama, itd.21 iz navedenog se može naslutiti da je glavna zabrinutost da se
izgradnjom kanala ne priprema teren za raspoređivanje stranih ratnih brodova.22
Kako je cilj Konvencije iz Montrea, izrečen u njenom preambularnom delu koji
navodi potrebu uspostavljanja režima moreuza „na način koji obezbeđuje unutar
okvira bezbednost Turske i bezbednost u Crnom moru priobalnih država”,
neprihvatljiv bi bio svaki novi režim na kanalu istanbul koji bi bio u oštroj
suprotnosti sa Konvencijom iz Montrea. U pogledu ratnih brodova, zainteresovane
države mogu osnovano tvrditi i zagovarati tezu da Truska ima obavezu da se drži
duha Konvencije iz Montrea koja je usvojena u interesu slobode plovidbe i
bezbednosti Turske i priobalnih država Crnog mora. Ako se tumači u istorijskom
kontekstu, od Ugovora iz Lozane kojim je demilitarizovana zona Moreuza (Bosfora,
Dardanelia, Mramornog mora i drugih područja), i kojim je uspostavljen poseban
međunarodni nadzor, preko priznavanja Turskoj punog suvereniteta Konvencijom
iz Montrea (kroz režim plovidbe ratnih brodova i podmornica, izgradnjom kanala
istanbul), „matematika” tonaže brodova teško da može da se zaobiđe. Režim
21
By establishing the Canal, “Turkey will have the capacity to strategically set regulations on
maritime traffic at discretionand hence increase its own geopolitical infl uence in the area. The
opening of a new waterway, subjected to Turkey’ssovereignty and disengaged from the Montreux
Convention, will give Ankara the chance to bypass the limits imposed toits strategic control of
the straits by the Convention,” according to iARi’s analyst Alessandra Casareggio. (…), in order
to increase Turkey’s strategic value, the istanbul Canal could be considered the cornerstone of a
strategicproject that Turkish military and strategist circles call “Mavi Vatan” (the blue homeland).
This project aspires tostrengthen Turkey’s maritime power, dominance and sovereignty over its
bordering seas. in addition to the istanbul Canal, the Turkish naval military power was
strengthened immensely during recent years. The process of research,exploration and extraction
of natural resources from the sea is taking new leaps, and mutual agreements of maritimeboundary
treaties are taking place between Turkey, Libya and others. The aforementioned Turkish endeavors
aim toenhance Turkey’s strategic position, value and capabilities so that it may play greater roles
on the regional and international arena. (…) Between 2018 and 2021, Russia raised on many
occasions its concerns over the building of a new canal under Turkish full sovereignty, an
understandable position since the canal would undermine Russia’s strategic interests. According
to Jamestown analyst Paul Goble, by not legally abiding to the terms of the Montreux Convention
“Moscow fears that NATo or some other anti-Russian combination of states could introduce any
amount of warships at any time into the Black Sea—which would both encourage other littoral
states to look away from Moscow and ostensibly threaten Russian national security. Russian
officials and commentators have long expressed those concerns.”
22
“Canal istanbul won’t affect governance of stairs: Turkish foreign minister”, 30.06.2021, internet:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/canal-istanbul-wont-affect-governance-of-straits-turkish-foreign-
minister/2290398
uspostavljen Konvencijom iz Montrea je, ne samo režim plovidbe trgovačkih i

ratnih brodova, već i režim bezbednosti Turske i država Crnog mora. Ukoliko
projekat kanala istanbul bude napredovao neminovno će uslediti i zahtevi za
njegovom internacionalizacijom ili revizijom Konvenicije iz Montrea koja bi pored
„osavremenjavanja”, obuhvatila i režim plovidbe budućim kanalom. Dok bi Turskoj
verovatno bilo priznato puno pravo da na osnovu nesiskriminacije u pogledu zastave
broda posebno reguliše režim plovidbe za trgovačke brodove (bez diranja u režim
slobode plovidbe ustanovljen Konvencijom iz Montrea), režim prolaska ratnih
brodova bi trebalo da bude upodobljen režimom prolaska kroz Moreuze (Bosfor,
Mramorno more i Dardaneli). Za očekivati je, da će uslediti „napori” da se Turska
ograniči da svojim jednostranim aktima uređuje plovidbu trgovačkim i ratnim
brodovima na budućem kanalu. Takođe, i da se njena pozicija uslovi obezbeđenjem
prolaza trgovačkih brodova na načelu nediskriminacije u pogledu zastave broda.
Drugim rečima, neminovno je da će uslediti pozivi da se kanal istanbul
internacionalizuje i pre nego što projekat njegove izgradnje bude okončan. S druge
strane, nema aktuelnih zahteva za reviziju Konvencije iz Montrea revidira, iako se
lako uočavaju anahrone formulacije koje i ne odgovaraju savremenoj pomorskoj
tehnici, niti imaju dodira sa stvarnošću (poput odredaba koje se tiču Društva naroda
koje je potrebno upodobiti sa sistemom Ujedinjenih nacija).23 iako se na
akademskom nivou može polemisati o potrebi izmene Konvencije iz
Montrea,veoma je teško i pretpostaviti da bi se različiti politički i ekonomski interesi
uskladili na način da dovedu do izmene postojeće ili do zaključenja nove
konvencije.24 okidač za podnošenje predloga izmene Konvencije iz Montrea mogao
bi da bude napredak u izgradnji kanala istanbul.
USLOVI I POSTUPAK IZMENE KONVENCIJE IZ MONTREA

Konvencijom iz Montrea predviđeno je da će biti na snazi 20 godina od dana
stupanja na snagu. Međutim, ukoliko dve godine pre isteka navedenog perioda ni
jedna visoka strana ugovornica ne izda notifikaciju o otkazu Konvencije, ona će
ostati na snazi dve godine nakon što se da takvo obaveštenje. Ukoliko bilo koja
23
Poslednji formalni predlog za reviziju Konvencije iz Montrea usledio je nakon Drugog svetskog
rata.
24
“(…), in the past, any revision of the Straits regime took place only after dangerous events that
would never be desired. in this context, a balance has been by the final regime, the Montreux
Convention, between the Black Sea states and the others. its provisions have been applied over
eighty years and as such it has become customary and also offers some advantages and
disadvantages to powers in today’s conditions. As experienced in the past, it can be argued that
any revision or denunciation possibility of the continuation of the passage regime of the Straits
has close relation to the political counterbalance between powers.” Videti: Kurtulus Yucel, The
Legal Regime of the Turkish Stairs: Regulation of the Montreux Convention and its Importance
on the International Relations after the Conflict of Ukraine, Dissertation, supervisor Prof. Dr
Stefan Kadelbach, Frankfurt am Main, 2019, p. 225.
strana da obaveštenje o otkazu, visoke strane ugovornice su se saglasile da budu

predstavljene na konferenciji koja bude sazvana radi zaključenja nove
konvencije.25 izričito je predviđeno u odredbi člana 28(2), da će princip slobode
prolaza i plovidbe, koji je afirmisan članom 1. Konvencije , nastaviti da važi bez
vremenskog ograničenja.
članom 29. Konvencije, predviđeno je da nakon svakog perioda od 5 godina
od dana stupanja na snagu Konvencije, bilo koja visoka strana ugovornica oima
pravo da uputi predlog za izmenu jednog ili više članova Konvencije. Kako bi
predlog bio validan, zahtev za reviziju koju formuliše jedna strana ugovornica
mora da podrži barem jedna strana ugovornica u slučaju predloga izmene članova
od 14. do 18, dok predlog izmene ostalih članova moraju podržati najmanje dve
strane ugovornice.26 Svaki zahtev za izmenu Konvencije mora se dostaviti ostalim
stranama ugovornicama tri meseca pre isteka perioda od 5 godina i mora biti
obrazložen (moraju biti navedeni razlozi zbog kojih se traži izmena). Ukoliko se
pokaže nemogućim da se diplomatskim kanalima postigne sporazum o
predloženim izmenama, strane ugovornice se saglašavaju da budu predstavljene
na konferenciji koja će biti sazvana u tu svrhu. odluke na konferenciji donose se
jednoglasno, izuzev u slučajevima predloga izmena članova 14. do 18. za koju se
zahteva tro-četvrtinska većina visokih strana ugovornica, koja uključuje tri
četvrtine visokih strana ugovornica koja su crnomorske države uključujući tu i
Tursku. Drugim rečima, bez pristanka Turske ni u kom slučaju ne može doći do
izmene Konvencije iz Montrea! Stoga, svaka izmena režima moreuza, ili dopuna
koja bi se odnosila na kanal istanbul, morala bi da bude prihvatljiva i za Tursku i
za strane ugovornice Konvencije iz Montrea (među kojima je i Republika Srbija).
ZAKLJUČAK
U momentu zaključenja Konvencije iz Montrea nije bila ni na vidiku izgradnja
kanala istanbul. Međutim, njene odredbe, posebno kada je reč o ratnim brodovima,
temelje se na interesu bezbednost crnomorksih država. Ukoliko režim turskih
(crnomorskih) moreuza bude bio predmet pažnje, neminovno će se postaviti
pitanje i revizije Dunavske konvencije (Konvencije o režimu plovidbe Dunavom).
Većina podunavskih zemalja je istovremeno i članica NATo, dok se Konvencija
o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu mahom smatra „sovjetskom konvencijom.” 27 i danas
se globalni politički odnosi sagledavaju u odnosima Rusije (nekada Sovjetskog
25
član 28. Konvencije iz Montrea.
26
„(...), koji se odnose na tonažu brodova koji prolaze moreuzima, upotreba vojnih vazduhoplova
sa brodova koji plove vodama moreuza, zadržavanju ratnih brodova u vodama moreuza,
kurtoazna poseta ratnih brodova bilo koje tonaže i na poziv Vlade Turske i ukupna tonaža ratnih
brodova necrnomorskih država i pravilo da se ne mogu zadržavati duže od 21. dana”.
27
Jozef L. Kunz, “The Danube Regime and Belgrade Conference”, American Journal of
International Law, 1949, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 104–113.
Saveza) i Zapada, a ti odnosi će se i u budućnosti najverovatnije sagledavati na

ovoj relaciji.28 Režim sankcija Evropske unije uveden prema Rusiju primenujuju
se i u pogledu plovidbe Dunavom bez obzira na Smernice EU o primeni sankcija
kojima je predviđeno da će se prilikom primene sankcija poštovati međunarodno
pravo (a Konvencija o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu je nesumnjivo deo
međunarodnog prava).29 U slučaju podnošenja predloga za izmenu Konvencije iz
Montrea nije isključeno da će simultano uslediti i predlozi za izmenu Konvencije
o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu, o čemu se „tiho govori” još od kraja Hladnog rata.30
Konvencije o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu i Konvencije iz Montrea usko su vezane
budući da su i podunavski i crnomorski region toliko vezani da se mogu smarati
jednom geopolitičkom celinom. Republika Srbija geografski je, ali i politički deo
ovog regiona. Kao strana Konvencije iz Montrea, Srbija je i garant režima koji je
njome uspostavljen, te ne može biti izostavljena iz procesa njegove eventualne
revizije.
THE REGiME oF THE TURKiSH STRAiTS AND CoNSTRUCTioN

oF THE iSTANBUL CANAL: SERBiA AS A PARTY To THE MoNTREUX
CoNVENTioN SiNCE 1936
ABSTRACT
in the subject paper, the author considers the issues related to the declaration of the
Republic of Serbia on the succession of the Convention on the Regime of the
Montreux Straits from 1936. The aforementioned Convention regulates the status
and navigation of merchant and warships through the Bosphorus, the Sea of
Marmara and the Dardanelles. The analysis indicates the strategic importance of
28
Kako iznosi Jozef Kunc, „iza gvozdene zavese Sovjetski savez je praktično obezbedio monopol
nad plovidbom Dunavom. Kao posledica, Konferencija o Dunavu je konačno okončana krajem
jula 1948., i nije bilo razloga za optimizam u pogledu ishoda te konferencije”.U zaključku članka
Kunz navodi: “The Belgrade Conference presents the picture of a caricature of an international
conference under totalitarian domination. Last, though not least, the Belgrade Conference has
once more shown the crisis of our whole Western Christian culture, the danger of a new era of
barbarism, by the tremendous decline of good manners in diplomacy. Such decline is, as Anthony
Eden has stated, “at the same time, one of the most troubling factors in the present situation of
the world”.
29
“Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework
of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Council of the European Union, Sanctions
guidelines update, Brussels, 4 May 2018. Prema para. 9. Smernica: “The introduction and
implementation of restrictive measures must always be in accordance with international law.”
30
Prema članu 46. Konvencije o režimu plovidbe na Dunavu: „izmene ove Konvencije mogu se
izvršiti na zahtev većine država potpisnica. Zahtev će se uputiti Vladi Federativne Narodne
Republike Jugoslavije, koja će, u najkraćem roku, odrediti sazivanje konferencije na koju će biti
pozvane da učestvuju sve države potpisnice. izmenjene odredbe stupiće na snagu tek posle
deponovanja ratifikacionih instrumenata šest država potpisnica ove Konvencije”.
membership in this Convention, as well as the issues that may affect its interpretation
and application in the case of the construction of the istanbul Canal. The author also
indicates the possibility of submitting a proposal for its amendment. Looking at the
current situation regarding the application of this Convention, he finds that the
Montreux Convention at the time of its conclusion did not foresee the construction
of the istanbul Canal. The contractual provisions, especially when it comes to
warships, are based on the interests of the security of the Black Sea states. The
analysis results in the conclusion that a possible change in the regime of the Black
Sea straits would probably be a reason for revising the Convention on the Danube
Navigation Regime. The author points out that the Conventions on the Navigation
Regime on the Danube from 1948 and the Montreux Convention from 1936 are
interconnected since both the Danube and the Black Sea regions are so connected
that they can be treated as one geopolitical entity. The Republic of Serbia is a
geographical and political part of this region, and as a contracting party to the
Montreux Convention, Serbia is the guarantor of the established regime, and is also
a necessary participant in any future changes to that regime.
Key words: Convention on the Regime of the Straits of Montreux, Declaration of
Succession, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, istanbul Canal
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University Press, Cambridge 2015.
17. Tuygan, Ali, “The Montreux Convention: Russia’s Perspective”, 28/01/2020,
internet: https://edam.org.tr/en/the-montreux-convention-russias-perspective/
18. Yücel, Kurtuluş, The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits: Regulation of the
Montreux Convention and its Importance on the International Relations after
the Conflict of Ukraine, dissertation, Johann Qolfgang Goethe University,
Frankfurt am Main, 2019.
KRIZA MULTILATERALIZMA U OBLASTI

UPRAVLJANJA SAVREMENIM MIGRACIJAMA
I ODGOVORI MEĐUNARODNE ZAJEDNICE
Bojan T. SToJANoVić*
APSTRAKT
U radu se razmatra upravljanje savremenim masovnim i mešovitim migracijama
karakterističnim za drugu deceniju i početak treće decenije ovog milenijuma.
Postojeći pravni okvir vezan za prava izbeglica ogleda se u Konvenciji o statusu
izbeglica, dok u pozitivnom međunarodnom pravu ne postoji pandan te vrste za
migrante. iako je zajednička za obe kategorije ljudi u pokretu primena normi
međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava u praksi nailazi na mnogo poteškoća i izazova.
oprečni stavovi država u pogledu upravljanja migracijama oslikavaju krizu
multilateralizma, što u ovoj oblasti za posledicu ima odsustvo jedinstvenog sistema
univerzalno primenjivog u ovoj oblasti. Rezultat ovakvog stanja je partikularizacija
upravljanja migracijama, koja često dovodi i do protivpravnih radnji uperenih prema
izbeglicama i migrantima. Napori učinjeni od strane Ujedinjenih nacija rezultirali su
usvajanjem Njujorške deklaracije o izbeglicama i migrantima (2016) i dva globalna
kompakta – Globalni kompakt za izbeglice i Globalni kompakt o sigurnim, uređenim
i regularnim migracijama (2018). iako je reč o izvorima mekog prava, značaj
navedenih pravnih dokumenata ogleda se u novom vidu međunarodne saradnje u
ovoj oblasti koji je rezultirao promenom pogleda na savremene migracije. Naime,
oni su pružili okvir u kom se upravljanje migracijama postavlja u horizontalnu ravan
te su učesnici u upravljanju migracijama pored država i međunarodnih organizacija
i drugi relevantni subjekti, poput nevladinih organizacija, privrednih društava, verskih
i sportskih društava i akademske zajednice.
Ključne reči: izbeglice, migranti, mešovite migracije, Njujorška deklaracija,
globalni kompakti, Ujedinjene nacije
UVOD
Usled izbegličko-migrantskih kriza karakterističnih za drugu deceniju ovog
veka i početak treće, međunarodna zajednica se našla pred zahtevnim zadatkom da
reguliše upravljanje ovim krizama i rešavanjem istih. Veliki broj oružanih sukoba,
kriznih žarišta širom sveta, masovnog i sistemskog kršenja ljudskih prava, ali i
*
Predstavništvo UNHCR-a u Beogradu. Email: bojantstojanovic@gmail.com. Stavovi izneti u
članku ne predstavljaju stavove UNHCR-a već lične stavove autora.
posledice klimatskih promena i narušavanja zdrave životne sredine, te siromaštvo,

izazvalo je izbegličko-migrantske krize širom sveta. To je rezultiralo različitim
reakcijama pojedinih država i oprečnim stavovima u pogledu upravljanja
izbegličko-migrantskim krizama. U jeku navedenih kriza, 2016. godine, a pod
okriljem Ujedinjenih nacija, usvojena je Njujorška deklaracija o izbeglicama i
migrantima. Reč je o pravnom dokumentu kojim je pokrenuta multilateralna i
multisektorska inicijativa u pogledu sagledavanja stanja u oblasti upravljanja
savremenim, masovnim i mešovitim migracijama i pronalaženja adekvatnog načina
upravljanja njima. Uz Njuoršku deklaraciju usvojena su i dva zasebna pravna
dokumenta kojima se regulišu pitanja vezana za izbeglice sa jedne strane i migrante,
sa druge. ovi dokumenti usvojeni su u decembru 2018. godine. Prvi je Globalni
kompakt za izbeglice (GKi), a drugi je Globalni kompakt o sigurnim, uređenim i
regularnim migracijama (Globalni kompakt o migracijama/GKM).1 Postupak
usvajanja Njujorške deklaracije i oba globalna kompakta, a naročito GKM, usledilo
je nakon opsežnih rasprava vođenih u cilju regulisanja upravljanja masovnim i
mešovitim migracijama. U raspravama vođenim tim povodom mogli su se videti
suprotstavljeni stavovi država. To je najizraženije bilo u procesu usvajanja teksta
GKM. Ta činjenica ne čudi, jer na univerzalnom planu ne postoji međunarodni
pravni instrument koji reguliše prava migranata, za razliku od Konvencije o statusu
izbeglicakojim su na univerzalnom nivou regulisana prava izbeglica.2 Treba imati
u vidu da su Njujorška deklaracija i oba globalna kompakta usvojeni pre izbijanja
pandemije virusa korona, ali i pre otpočinjanja oružanog sukoba u Ukrajini, koji su
u različitim domenima ostavili brojne posledice širom sveta.3 ovi događaji dodatno
komplikuju i otežavaju upravljanje migracijama te postavljaju prepreke u ovom
procesu i realizaciji svih prethodnih napora učinjenih u cilju pronalaženja održivog
rešenja. ovo je posebno vidljivo u narušavanju stanja i ravnoteže u međunarodnim
1
“Global Compact on Refugees”, UN dok. A/RES/73/151 (17 December 2018); “Global Compact
for Safe, orderly and Regular Migration”, UN dok. A/RES/73/195 (19 December 2018).
2
Sredinom osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, pod okriljem UN-a usvojena je Deklaracija o
ljudskim pravima pojedinaca koji nisu državljni države u kojoj žive. Navedenom deklaracijom
propisan je niz prava i jedna obaveza stranaca, kao i obaveze država u pogledu postupanja prema
strancima. imajući u vidu pravnu formu u kojoj je usvojena, Deklaracija predstavlja izvor mekog
prava. Videti: “UN GA, Declaration on the Human Rights of individuals Who are not Nationals
of the Country in which They Live”, Resolution 40/144, 13 December 1985; “Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 137. Stupila je na snagu
22. aprila 1954. godine. Do 1. novembra 2022. godine ovom konvencijom obavezano je 146
država. o Konvenciji o statusu izbeglica videti: ivana Krstić, Ljubimka Mitrović, „Sedamdeset
godina od usvajanja Konvencije o statusu izbeglica”, Branič, 2021, br. 4, str. 23–33.
3
Za pravo na zdravlje i međunarodnu zaštitu videti: Bojan Stojanović, Bogdan Krasić, Zoran T.
Stojanović, „Međunarodna zaštita i primena načela zabrane proterivanja u države sa neadekvatnim
zdravstvenim sistemima ili nedostupnom zdravstvenom zaštitom”, Zbornik radova Pravnog
fakulteta u Nišu, 2021, br. 93, god. LX, str. 127–152; o pandemiji u zemljama trećeg sveta vidi
Zoran T. Stojanović, „Siromašni i sami na udaru bolesti”, Vreme, br. 1632, 14.4.2022. Dostupno
na: https://www.vreme.com/svet/4590211/.
odnosima zaoštrenim navedenim krizama (npr. problemi sa proizvodnjom i

distribucijom vakcina – tzv. „vakcinaški nacionalizam”, sankcije dela međunarodne
zajednice uvedene Ruskoj Federaciji, te njeno isključivanje iz različitih
međunarodnih procesa i aranžmana, itd.).
KRIZA MULTILATERALIZMA
Kriza savremenog multilateralizma se može sagledati u različitim oblastima
međunarodnog prava. odsustvo velikih kodifikatorskih poduhvata imanentnih za
drugu polovinu 19. veka i za 20. vek, pokazuje različite tendencije. U zavisnosti od
raspoloženja u međunarodnoj zajednici povodom nekog pitanja, a u vezi sa stanjem
u međunarodnim odnosima, rezultira odsustvom kompromisa i izostanku rešenja za
aktuelne probleme u međunarodnoj zajednici. Upravo po pitanju upravljanja
savremenim masovnim i mešovitim migracijama može se sagledati kriza
multilateralizma. Konvencija o statusu izbeglica predstavlja ugaoni kamen
međunarodne zaštite i njome je definisan pojam izbeglice, ali i propisana prava i
obaveze izbeglica i obaveze države u pogledu obezbeđivanja uživanja prava
izbeglica.4 Međutim, na planu regulisanja statusa migranata i propisivanju prava i
obaveza istih, ne postoji „krovni” međunarodnopravni instrument koji bi ovo
regulisao. istina, do sada je na univerzalnom nivou usvojena Međunarodna
konvencija o pravima svih radnika migranata i članova njihovih porodica, koja je
ratifikovana od manjeg broja država, ali ona se odnosi samo na „radnike migrante i
članove njihovih porodica”.5 To je rezultiralo time da je znatno veći broj drugih
kategorija migranata ostalo izvan opsega navedene konvencije.6 Problem u pogledu
suvereniteta država koji je okrunjen humanizacijom međunarodnog prava, posebno
4
Konvencija o statusu izbeglica je dopunjena Protokolom uz Konvenciju o statusu izbeglica
(Njujorški protokol). Videti: “Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations”, Treaty
Series, Vol. 606, p. 267. Stupio je na snagu 4. oktobra 1967. godine. Do 1. novembra 2022. godine,
Njujorškim prtokolom je obavezano 147 država.
5
“international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families”, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2220, p. 3; A/RES/45/158. Stupila je na
snagu 1. jula 2003. godine. Do 1. novembra 2022. godine 58 država je obavezano ovom
konvencijom. Zanimljivo je da su među državama koje nisu obavezane ovom konvencijom države
članice EU, SAD i Kanada koje primaju veliki broj radnika migranata, posebno imajući u vidu
da je udeo radnika migranata koji borave u regionu severne, južne i zapadne Evrope u 2019.
godini iznosio čak 24.2%, a u regionu Severne Amerike 22.1% od ukupnog broja radnika
migranata u svetu. Videti: ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and
Methodology, international Labour organization, Third edition, Geneva 2021, p. 15. ograničenja
ratione personae u članu 3. Međunarodne konvencije o pravima svih radnika migranata i članova
njihovih porodica isključuju brojne kategorije ljudi: lica angažovana od strane međunarodnih
organizacija, pomorce i radnike na priobalnim postrojenjima, studente i druge.
6
o poteškoćama i u ranijim periodima u pogledu obavezivanja država na međunarodni ugovor
kojim bi se regulisala prava migranata – radnika migranata videti: Tomislav Mitrović, „Nacrt
Međunarodne konvencije o zaštiti prava svih radnika migranata i članova njihovih porodica”,
Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, 1998, br. 3, str. 486–499.
nakon završetka Drugog svetskog rata usvajanjem većeg broja deklaracija i

međunarodnih ugovora iz oblasti ljudskih prava, navodi države da sve teže prihvataju
dalje zadiranje u njihov suverenitet, odnosno, u krug prava koja su spadaju u domaine
réservé. Takođe, od nemalog značaja je i prelazak iz bipolarnog u unipolarni sistem
odnosa u međunarodnoj zajednici, koji je poslednjih godina počeo da prerasta u
multipolarni sistem, imajući u vidu jačanje pojedinih sila u različitim delovima sveta.
Zaoštravanje situacije u međunarodnim odnosima s početkom sukoba u Ukrajini,
doveli su do najveće krize u međunarodnim odnosima nakon Hladnog rata. Da
problem bude još veći, upravo je ovaj sukob rezultirao masovnim prinudnim
raseljavanjem ljudi iz Ukrajine, a to je za posledicu imalo da se preko 10 miliona
ljudi iz Ukrajine nađe van svojih domova, bilo na teritoriji Ukrajine ili van nje. Kriza
u međunarodnim odnosima i polarizacija na relaciji EU i zapadni saveznici sa jedne
strane, i Ruske Federacija i njenih saveznika sa druge, dovode u pitanje postizanje
kompromisa u skoro svim sferama međunarodnog života. Navedeno može imati
posledice i u oblasti upravljanja međunarodnim migracijama, koje su, pri tom
intenzivirane, posebno prisilne prekogranične migracije.
SAVREMENE MASOVNE I MEŠOVITE MIGRACIJE

Savremene prekogranične migracije karakteriše njihova masovnost i mešovit
sastav ljudi u pokretu. U ovom milenijumu, naročito od početka druge decenije 21.
veka, karakteristično je da su migracije mešovitog tipa i da je čine istovremeno
izbeglice i migranti, ali i trend sve većeg rasta broja ljudi u pokretu. Reč je o
mešovitim migracijama koje se mogu razložiti prema kriterijumu razloga napuštanja
države porekla. Sa jedne strane, reč je o ljudima koji se nalaze u prisilnim
migracijama, koji beže iz različitih razloga – od opravdanog straha od progona
(izbeglice), usled oružanih sukoba, ali i usled narušavanja zdrave životne sredine.
Sa druge strane, među ljudima u masovnim migracijama su i ljudi koji napuštaju
državu porekla usled nepovoljnih ekonomskih uslova u njima. Kada je reč o
mirnodopskim, dobrovoljnim migracijama decenijama je prisutan porast ljudi koji
migriraju iz ekonomskih razloga usled potrebe za potragom posla van granica države
porekla (radnici migranti). Pod pojmom migranta u najširem smislu podrazumevaju
se različite kategorije ljudi u pokretu, bilo da je reč o dobrovoljnim ili prisilnim
migracijama ili, pak, migranti koji se kreću u okviru jedne države (interne migracije)
ili van teritorije države porekla (prekogranične migracije). U tom smislu, pod
migrantima u najširem smislu reči, podrazumevaju se: radnici migranti, izbeglice,
interno raseljena lica, i drugi. Migranti u masovnoj migraciji su osobe koje
kolektivno, u veliko broju, napuštaju svoju državu radi utočišta ili naseljavanja u
drugoj državi.7 Međutim, potrebno je stalno imati u vidu različite pravne režime koje
7
“Mass Migrations, Final Resolution, Sixteenth Commission”, institut de Droit international,
Rapporteur M. Maurice Kamato, Yearbook of Institute of International Law, Session of
Hyderabad, 2017, vol. 78, pp. 207–213, art. 3.
se odnose na izbeglice, sa jedne strane i migrante, sa druge, te neophodnost

garantovanja i pružanja međunarodne zaštite izbeglicama. Brojna krizna žarišta
širom sveta (Avganistan, Sirija, Jemen, Mjanmar, Ukrajina i druga), generisala su
više miliona izbeglica u periodu za nama. Politička trvenja i nestabilni politički
sistemi, kao i ekonomska situacija u mnogim državama, nagnali su milione ljudi
širom sveta da migriraju van granica svoje zemlje. Splet okolnosti doveo je do toga
da se savremene migracije odvijaju na način da se u migratornim pokretima nalaze
zajedno i izbeglice i migranti sa svim implikacijama koje to nosi sa sobom (pitanje
regulisanja statusa, uživanje prava, upravljanje migracijama, promena demografske
slike, itd.). To je dodatno otežalo upravljanje migracijama i omogućavanje uživanja
niza prava izbeglica, sa jedne i migranata, sa druge strane.
PARTIKULARIZACIJA UPRAVLJANJA MIGRACIJAMA

Trend koji se odražava u vidu partikularizacije upravljanja migracijama
predstavlja izazovan teren kojim se kreću kreatori politikâ, zakonodavci na nivou
država i tvorci normi međunarodnog prava. Razvoj nauke i tehnologije, brzih i
sigurnih sredstava kretanja ljudi i robe za posledicu je imalo i sve veću mobilnost
ljudi. Krizna žarišta širom sveta, a u poslednje vreme i negativne promene u
životnoj sredini, uzrokovali su i stalni rast broja prisilno raseljenih ljudi širom
sveta. Tako se već polovinom 2022. godine u svetu našlo preko 100 miliona
prisilno raseljenih ljudi.8 Poređenja radi, samo deset godina ranije, 2012. godine,
u svetu je bilo 45.2 miliona prisilno raseljenih.9 Prema podacima Međunarodne
organizacije za migracije u svetu se nalazi oko 281 milion migranata.10 Trend rasta
i ubrzanja dobrovoljnih i prisilnih migracija, postavilo je brojne izazove pred
države, ali i druge činioce u međunarodnoj zajednici kojima je sfera interesovanja
i učešće u upravljanju migracijama veoma bitni. odgovor država i regionalnih
vidova saradnje na migracije u mnogim sferama je postalo problematično. Kriza
pokrenuta Arapskim prolećem 2011. godine izazvala je masovne migracije iz
Severne Afrike i Bliskog istoka. Veliki broj izbeglica i migranata pribežište su
pronašli u Turskoj i nekoliko zemalja Bliskog istoka (Liban, Jordan, do izbijanja
oružanih sukoba u Siriji i u toj državi). Migratorni pritisak postavljen pred
navedene države u jednom trenutku je izazvao da veliki broj ljudi krene put država
Zapadne Evrope, što je najčešće vodilo preko tzv. Zapadnobalkanske rute. Sličan
trend karakterističan je i za migracije pomorskim putem preko Sredozemnog mora,
što je često rezultiralo stradanjem izbeglica i migranata.11 Problem sa migracijama
8
“Mid-Year Trends 2022”, UNHCR, Geneva 2022, pp. 2–4.
9
“Global Trends 2012”, UNHCR, Geneva 2013, p. 2.
10
M. McAuliffe, A. Triandafyllidou (eds), World Migration Report 2022, international
organization for Migration, Geneva 2021, p. 3.
11
Prema procenama Međunarodne organizacije za migracije (ioM) u 2020. godini je u
Sredozemnom moru stradalo 1.460 migranata. Ibid., p. 18.
na moru predstavlja gorući problem dugi niz godina. Posebno su problematični

bilateralni i multilateralni sporazumi kojima se preraspodeljuje odgovornost za
upravljanje migracijama, koji se u praksi neretko izvrgavaju u ophođenje prema
izbeglicama i migrantima na način da bivaju sprečavani pristupu teritorijama
sigurnih država, a u suprotnosti sa normama međunarodnog izbegličkog prava,
međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava i međunarodnog prava mora. Takvim
ponašanjem, često se krši princip non-refoulement, koji predstavlja normu
međunarodnog običajnog prava te obavezuje sve države sveta na njeno poštovanje.
Već postojeća pravna arhitektura kojom se štite ljudska prava pojedinca, usled
izmenjenih politikâ i zakonodavstva pojedinih država, vode ka omalovažavanju i
razgradnji globalnog uređenja upravljanja migracijama i uopšte sistema zaštite
ljudskih prava. Međutim, upravo kroz konkretizaciju i ispunjavanje ciljeva zadatih
u GKi i GKM, međunarodna saradnja na svim nivoima može biti održana. To se,
na osnovu tekstova oba kompakta, čini na međunarodnom, regionalnom,
nacionalnom i lokalnom nivou, te se saradnja u pogledu upravljanja
međunarodnim migracijama može držati pod kontrolom i u duhu vrednosti UN,
kao univerzalne međunarodne organizacije i najšireg međunarodnog foruma.
EKSTERNALIZACIJA AZILA
Jedan od trendova u pogledu upravljanja migracijama a koji se odnosi na
izbeglice jeste pojava eksternalizacije. Eksternalizacijom se može označiti
izmeštanje pristupa postupku azila van teritorije potencijalne države prijema.12
Trendu eksternalizacije pribegavaju države koje žele da izbegnu da se veći broj
potencijalnih tražilaca azila nađu na njihovoj teritoriji. Razlog za ovaj vid postupka
azila čini im se jednostavnijim, posebno u situaciji u kojoj se utvrdi da potencijalni
tražilac azila nije „podoban” da mu bude omogućen prijem na teritoriju i pružena
međunarodna zaštita. Na taj način se izbegavaju obaveze vezane za vraćanje takve
osobe i svi rizici i troškovi koji idu uz to. U poslednjih nekoliko godina,
eksternalizacija azila se očituje u više primera u različitim delovima sveta
(Mađarska i konzulat u Beogradu, Velika Britanija i izmeštanje tražilaca azila u
Ruandu, Australija u Papua Novu Gvineju i Nauru u ranijem periodu, itd.). Brojna
su pitanja koja se mogu pokrenuti u pogledu već pomenute eksteranizacije azila.
Naime, potencijalni tražioci azila borave na teritoriji jedne države, a pokreću
postupak azila u drugoj državi. Dok u borave u državi na čijoj teritoriji se nalaze
12
ovaj vid eksternalizacije azila različit je od onih slučajeva kada se lice u potrebi za
međunarodnom zaštitom boravi u diplomatsko-konzularnom predstavništvu države koja želi da
mu pruži zaštitu, poznat kao diplomatski azil čiji je koncept različit od tradicionalnog koncepta
teritorijalnog azila koji je deo pozitivnog međunarodnog prava. Bio je posebno karakterističan
za period Hladnog rata i u pojedinim državama Latinske Amerike, ali i nadaleko čuveni slučaj
Džulijana Asanža koji je godinama (od 2012. do 2019. godine), boravio u ambasadi Ekvadora
u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu, koji je na kraju uhapšen i pritvoren.
regulišu pitanje boravka (legalizacija boravka, uslovi smeštaja, itd.) i podležu

nadležnosti države boravka. Država pred kojom podnose zahtev za azil se na taj
način „ograđuje” od odgovornosti za zbrinjavanje tih ljudi dok se postupak ne
okonča, kada bi, u slučaju pozitivnog ishoda, prihvatilo izbeglicu na svoju teritoriju
i nadležnost. Zanimljivo je da pojedine države i pored navedenih sistemskih
nedostataka, pristaju na ovakav vid saradnje sa državama koje eksternalizuju
postupak azila. Loši aspekti eksternalizacije azila su brojni. Tražilac azila „na
daljinu” ostaje na teritoriji države gde se nalazi i gde je u diplomatsko-
konzularnom predstavništvu potencijalne države prijema podneo zahtev za azil,
odnosno izrazio nameru za traženjem azila. Takva situacija otvara brojna sporna
pitanja – od toga da tražilac azila ostaje pod jurisdikcijom države na čijoj teritoriji
se nalazi, pitanje snošenja troškova smeštaja i ostalih potrepština koji takođe padaju
na teret države na čijoj teritoriji se nalaze, zatim pitanja vezana za regulisanje
statusa u periodu dok čeka poziv potencijalne države prijema, itd. Navedena pitanja
su vrlo ozbiljna i nisu u skladu sa tradicionalnim vidovima međunarodne zaštite
koji počivaju na teritorijalnom principu, gde ovakvih dilema nema. Pomenuti vid
akcija država, ali i međusobne saradnje između pojedinih država, može se oceniti
obrnutim slučajem konstruktivnog multilateralizma. odnosno, reč je pre o
izbegavanju ranije preuzetih međunarodnopravnih obaveza negoli pomakom
unapred iako se takvi čini često predstavljaju kao neka vrsta olakšanja
(pred)pristupa postupku azila i navodnom efikasnijem upravljanju izbegličkim
tokovima koji bi vodili efikasnijem realizovanju radnji u postupku azila. Stav
UNHCR-a zauzet povodom pitanja eksternalizacije azila je, da međunarodni
sistem zaštite izbeglica zavisi od međunarodne saradnje.13 Ta saradnja je
dozvoljena ukoliko države postignu dogovore međusobno u pogledu
obezbeđivanja međunarodne zaštite, sve dok ti dogovori poboljšavaju podelu
odgovornosti i u skladu su sa najširim mogućim uživanjem osnovnih prava i
sloboda izbeglica.14
SEKURITIZACIJA MIGRACIJA I ANTIMIGRANTSKI NARATIV

Pristup savremenim migracijama već godinama prolazi kroz više različitih
faza. Karakteristika koja dobrim delom prednjači u pogledu upravljanja
migracijama vezana je za bezbednosni okvir i prizmu koja je osobena za ovo
stanovište. Nakon terorističkih napada na Sjedinjene Američke Države 11.
septembra 2001. godine, došlo je do razvoja trenda sekuritizacije migracija.15 To
13
“UNHCR Note on the “Externalization” of international Protection, UNHCR, 28 May 2021,
para. 2. internet: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/60b115604.pdf.
14
Ibid, para. 2.
15
o terorizmu i međunarodnom izbegličkom pravu vidi Geoff Gilbert, “Terrorism and international
refugee law” in Ben Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism, second
edition, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham 2020, pp. 423–435.
se nastavilo i u potonjem periodu u zavisnosti od različitih događaja koji su stvorili

klimu podozrivosti prema izbeglicama i migrantima. Politika u pojedinim
državama otvoreno je antimigrantska, što ne čudi imajući u vidu rast uticaja
desnice na političkoj sceni te osvajanju vlasti u mnogim državama gde navedene
političke strukture vladaju populističkim metodima. Masovne i mešovite migracije
karakteristične za drugu deceniju i početak treće decenije ovog milenijuma dodatno
su pojačale već prilično oštre mere koje se preduzimaju prilikom postupanja prema
strancima, naročito u pogledu pristupa teritorijama država. Problem predstavlja
kada norme vezane za regulisanje prelaska međunarodnih granica i pristupa
teritoriji države dođu u sukob sa normama kojima se regulišu ljudska prava.
Zapravo, sporno je tumačenje normi i njihova primena u praksi, kada se u nekim
situacijama prednost daje normama koje regulišu zaštitu i prelazak međunarodnih
granica nad normama koje su vezane za izbegličku zaštitu i ljudska prava.
Sužavanje suvereniteta država humanizacijom međunarodnog prava i
internalizacijom ljudskih prava stvara otpor država koji rezultira čestim kršenjem
ljudskih prava ili sporom implementacijom tih normi, što za posledicu ima
uskraćivanje pojedinih prava izbeglicama. Problem predstavlja i pristup teritoriji
potencijalne države prijema (ograde na granicama – između SAD i Meksika,
Melilla, španska enklava u Africi, ograde duž granica na tzv. Zapadnobalkanskoj
ruti – na granici između Mađarske i Srbije, Srbije i Severne Makedonije, itd.),
potiskivanje na moru i tako dalje. Teži se ka tome da što manji broj ljudi koji je u
potrebi za međunarodnom zaštitom uopšte i pristupi teritoriji potencijalne države
prijema.16 Takva praksa se često pravda bezbednosnim rizicima i sprečavanju
iregularnih migracija ne čineći dovoljno da se tim ljudima obezbedi pristup
teritoriji države prijema i pristup efikasnom i fer postupku azila. Znatno je primetan
trend povećanja broja slučajeva diskriminacije, govora mržnje i zločina iz mržnje
prema strancima u mnogim državama sveta. Ksenofobija, islamofobija,
antisemitizam, ali i porast napada i progona uperenih protiv hrišćana predstavljaju
ozbiljan bezbednosni rizik u državama u kojima se nalaze izbeglice i migranti ili
onih država iz kojih potiču. ovakve pojave ugrožavaju mirno uživanje ljudskih
prava izbeglica i migranata, ali i doprinose destabilizaciji društava država tranzita
i prijema, što je posebno karakteristično za države koje na svojoj teritoriji imaju
veliki broj izbeglica i migranata. ovom aspektu sekuritizacije migracija trebalo bi
posvetiti više pažnje, a diskurs vezan za sekuritizaciju migracija obogatiti stranom
medalje koja se odnosi na bezbenost i uživanje ljudskih prava i izbeglica ne samo
rizicima koji potencijalno nose sa sobom, što izaziva polarizaciju odnosa prema
izbeglicama i migrantima i doprinosi negativnom narativu uperenom prema ovoj
populaciji. oprečna mišljenja koja već godinama za nama predstavljaju
16
U tom smislu razvija se trend eksternalizacije azila i odagnjavanja izbeglica od mogućnosti
pristupa teritoriji potencijalne države prijema. Videti: Cantor David, et. al., “Externalisation,
Access to Territorial Asylum, and international Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law,
2022, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 120–156.
dijametralno suprotne stavove država, odražavaju tenziju između suvereniteta

država i poštovanja ljudskih prava. Primetno je da neke države izražavaju bojazan
prema uplivu ljudskih prava i holističkom pristupu u oblasti upravljanja
migracijama, na „štetu” suvereniteta država. Međutim, često prenebregavajući da
u drugim oblastima i same prekoračuju norme kojima su obavezane. Takođe, trend
uticaja međunarodnog prava i njegove humanizacije, kroz primenu normi
međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava nije nova pojava. ona je posebno prisutna u
periodu nakon završetka Drugog svetskog rata uz saglasnost, naravno, država.
Populističke metode vladanja i nesigurnost različitih političkih režima često kao
izgovor za svoje neuspehe u različitim sferama javnog života pronalaze u
novopridošlim članovima društva – izbeglicama i migrantima. Fokus je stavljen
na bezbednosni rizik koji pojedinci i grupe, iz redova izbegličko-migrantske
populacije, potencijalno donose sa sobom.
ETIČKE DILEME
Brojna pitanja vezana za upravljanje savremenim migracijama predstavljaju
plodno tle za raspravu o etičkom postupanju. Ukoliko se razmotre statistički podaci
vezani, primera radi, za prisilne migracije, opravdana je rasprava na ovu temu. U
2021. godini je bilo 89.3 miliona prisilno raseljenih ljudi u svetu, a u poređenju sa
periodom od deset godina ranije kada je u svetu bilo 42.5 miliona prisilno
raseljenih, taj broj je više nego udvostručen.17 Najveći broj izbeglica dolazi iz
nerazvijenih država ili država u razvoju, a isto tako najveći broj izbeglica je
utočište pronašlo u nerazvijenim zemljama ili zemljama u razvoju (Turska,
Kolumbija, Uganda i Pakistan sa izuzetkom Nemačke i SAD) čak 83% izbeglica.18
Pitanje snošenja tereta za prijem i zbrinjavanje izbeglica ne bi trebalo da bude
prevaljeno samo na države koje su države utočišta ili tranzita, posebno ne u
situacijama kada su te države najbliže pribežište izbeglicama koje u strahu od
progona beže u prvu državu u susedstvu (72% je smešteno u susednim
državama).19 Uz statistiku vezanu za izbeglice, važno je napomenuti da ove zemlje
na svoju teritoriju primaju i veliki broj migranata, a ne samo prisilno raseljenih
ljudi. Važno je napomenuti položaj pojedinca pred državom sa posebnim akcentom
na to da, kada je reč o izbeglicama i migrantima, reč je o strancima koji se nalaze
na teritoriji države čije državljanstvo ne poseduju. Ta lica se nalaze u
nepovoljnijem položaju u poređenju sa pojedincima koji su domaći državljani, te
su ranjiviji i izloženiji brojnim rizicima u državama tranzita ili prijema. Ranjiv
položaj izbeglica i migranata u državama tranzita i odredišta, otvara dodatne etičke
dileme u pogledu toga da su te kategorije ljudi u pokretu u neravnopravnom
položaju sa drugima, a da ih neretko politike pojedinih država ili grupa država
17
“Global Trends – Forced Displacement 2021”, UNHCR, Geneva, 2022, pp. 2–3.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
dovode u dodatno tešku situaciju postavljajući različite preprepke pred njih. Sporno
je i pitanje rešavanja uzroka masovnih migracija, bilo da je reč o prisilnim ili
dobrovoljnim migracijama. Brojna krizna žarišta postoje širom sveta, a neka od
njih godinama ili čak i decenijama (Avganistan, Sirija, Jemen, itd.). održivo ili
trajno rešenje kriza za ova krizna žarišta nisu pronađena. Takođe, i dobrovoljne
migracije mogu biti problematične, imajući u vidu da se o kategoriji ljudi u
masovnim migracijama te vrste uglavnom nazivaju „ekonomskim” migrantima,
često bez opsežne analize uzroka masovnosti takvih migracija i bez adekvatnog i
održivog odgovora na njih. Zato se usvajanje Njujorške deklaracije i dva propratna
kompakta može smatrati uspehom imajući u vidu da se saradnja država u pogledu
upravljanja migracijama podiže na globalni nivo, izbegavajući bilateralnu saradnju
ili regionalnu multilateralnu saradnju osim u slučajevima realizacije konkretnih
aktivnosti na koje su se države obavezale na forumima za pregled implementacije
globalnih kompakata, koja često bude izvrgavana suprotnosti kada su u pitanju
zaštita izbeglica i migranata (npr. saradnja pojedinih država u cilju sprečavanja
izbeglica i migranata da pristupe njihovoj teritoriji, pull-back na moru, itd.).
ULOGA RAZLIČITIH AKTERA

U UPRAVLJANJU SAVREMENIM MIGRACIJMA
Pitanje upravljanja savremenim masovnim i mešovitim migracijama pokazuje
potrebu za širenjem kruga subjekata koji bi trebalo da budu uključeni u taj proces.
iako se tradicionalno smatra da su države, a kasnije i međunarodne organizacije,
jedini činioci kojima je povereno upravljanje migracijama, u novije vreme se kao
primer dobre prakse pokazuje uključivanje i drugih aktera u taj proces. U
savremeno doba, kretanje ljudi i robe, razvoj nauke i tehnologije, brz protok
informacija, uslovili su izuzetno visok stepen povezanosti i isprepletanosti
različitih činilaca. Tako je danas nezamislivo da ne postoji međunarodna saradnja
u brojnim oblastima – međunarodna trgovina, telekomunikacije, vazdušni,
pomorski i drumski saobraćaj, pa i u oblasti migracija – upravljanje doborovoljnim
i prisilnim migracijama, a naročito prekograničnim. Upravljanje migracijama nije
sadržano u univerzalnim međunarodnim ugovorima. Naime, primera radi, u
Konvenciji o statusu izbeglica propisano je da država koja se obavezala na njenu
primenu ima obavezu da sarađuje sa UNHCR-om, ali ne i sa drugim državama i
međunarodnim organizacijama.20 iz toga proizilazi da je kohezioni faktor u
pogledu implementacije Konvencije o statusu izbeglica i generalno o brizi o
izbeglicama jeste UNHCR. Konvencija o pravima svih radnika migranata i
članova njihovih porodica obraća se državama koje su njom obavezane, odnosno
konkretnoj državi pod čijom jurisdikcijom se nalazi radnik migrant i članovi
njegove porodice. Sam prihvat izbeglica i migranata na teritoriju države prijema
jeste u suštini pitanje iz nadležnosti država. Ali, pomoć međunarodnih organizacija
20
čl. 35 Konvencije o statusu izbeglica.
je značajna, a često i neophodna. U periodima kriza, izazvanih oružanim sukobima,

ali i sistemskim kršenjem ljudskih prava, a u novije vreme i klimatskim
promenama, iziskuje učešće UNHCR-a i drugih međunarodnih vladinih i
nevladinih organizacija. Za proces integracije izbeglica i migranata u društvo
države prijema, pored država i međunarodnih organizacija, sve više je neophodno
aktivno učešće nevladinih organizacija (međunarodnih i domaćih), privrednih
subjekata, verskih zajednica, akademske zajednice, sportskih društava i drugih.
Sve navedene kategorije prepoznate su u GKi i GKM.21 Disperzija učešća različitih
činilaca, spustila je iz vertikalne ravni (države i međunarodne organizacije), u
horizontalnu ravan (pored navedenih činilaca i ostali, nedržavni činioci), te je na
taj način omogućeno aktivnije učešće različitih aktera koji ne pripadaju državama
i međunarodnim organizacijama. Povezanost različitih činilaca oslikava savremeno
društvo koje prati međunarodne trendove a usled izuzetno velike međudržavne
saradnje i kretanja ljudi širom sveta, čini da je gotovo nezamislivo da ne postoji
međunarodna saradnja i zavisnost pojedinca od različitih vidova prekogranične
saradnje i kretanja. Boravak izbeglica i migranata u državi tranzita ili odredišta
otvara brojna pitanja vezana za njih – od regulisanja statusa, preko uživanja prava
i izvršavanja obaveza. Njihova integracija oslanja se na širok spektar činilaca koji
deluju u društvu. Zato se, usled masovnih i mešovitih migracija, ne može više
oslanjati samo na aktivnosti država i međunarodnih organizacija. iz navedenog se
može zaključiti da je na savremene vidove saradnje i širenja kruga činilaca
uključenih u zbrinjavanje izbeglica i migranata, bilo neophodno prepoznati veliki
broj različitih subjekata.
Naravno, ostaje kao dilema i tema različitih rasprava, posebno akademskih,
upitnost adekvatnosti regulisanja upravljanja migracijama na način na koji su
predviđeni Njujorškom deklaracijom i globalnim kompaktima. odnosno, sporan
je izbor pravne forme koja im je data (meko pravo), uz vidno odsustvo saglasnosti
volja država da se ovo pitanje reguliše čvršćim pravnim oblikom (tvrdo pravo).
Korišćenje instrumenata mekog prava, kako pravilno tvrdi Aleksander orakelašvili
(Alexander Orakhelashvili), često olakšava konsenzus koji je teže postići u vezi
sa instrumentima tvrdog prava.22
21
U godinama pre usvajanja Njujorške deklaracije i globalnih kompakata postojale su inicijative
kojima bi se doprinelo upravljanju prekograničnih migracija. Videti: Cottier Thomas, Losada
Rosa Maria, “Migration as a Common Concern of Humankind”, in: Cottier Thomas, Ahmad
Zaker (eds), The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2021, pp. 205–308.
22
Alexander orakhelashvili, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Ninth edition,
Routledge, London-New York 2022, p. 51.
ODGOVOR MEĐUNARODNE ZAJEDNICE

NA IZBEGLIČKO-MIGRANTSKE KRIZE
Različiti su odgovori na izbegličko-migrantske krize. Sa jedne strane postoji
odgovori pojedinih država ili grupa država u različitim delovima sveta, sa jedne
strane i međunarodne zajednice u celini, sa druge strane.23 Pojedine države su
zaoštrile politike i izvršile niz zakonodavnih promena u cilju prilagođavanja datoj
situaciji koja se ogleda u sve većem broju izbeglica i migranata na njihovim
granicama i teritoriji. Takve aktivnosti neretko prerastaju u zakonodavne politike
koje su u suprotnosti sa načelima humanosti, ali i normama međunarodnog prava
ljudskih prava, onemogućavajući adekvatan tretman izbeglicama i potencijalnim
tražiocima azila koji se nalaze na putu ka sigurnoj državi odredišta. U pogledu
globalnog odgovora, najzapaženiji je onaj dat pod okriljem UN-a, koji je otpočeo
usvajanjem teksta Njujorške deklaracije, a zatim i dva globalna kompakta.
Usvajanje navedenih međunarodnih instrumenata, naišlo je na oštru kritiku. Još u
periodu pripreme tekstova oba kompakta bilo je oštrih reakcija predstavnika
pojedinih država koji su izražavali bojazan posebno prema migrantima. Primera
radi, u raspravi povodom usvajanja GKM, predstavnik Mađarske, je na zasedanju
Generalne skupštine UN-a izneo vrlo oštre stavove poput onog da je bezbednost
građana Mađarske i Mađarske tema broj jedan.24 Veliki deo zamerki država na
GKM odnosio se zapravo na pitanje suvereniteta država. Upravljanje migracijama
na način predložen u GKM posmatra se kao atak na suverenitet država. Za razliku
od njih, predstavnici većine država koje su glasale za usvajanje GKM, afirmativno
su govorili o tekstu GKM, poput navoda da je reč o „trijumfu multilateralizma”.25
Grupa afričkih država „snažno veruje u multilateralizam”, dok je predstavnik
Namibije istakao sledeće: „Marakeški kompakt je čist produkt multilateralizma”.26
GKi je usvojen uz manje dilema i oprečnih stavova, ali ne treba gubiti iz vida da
23
Responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ have been notable mainly through national and regional punitive
measures against people crossing borders – and their tragic consequences – rather than through
protective multilateral agreements. Videti: Christine Schwöbel-Patel, “Multilateralism” in:
Haskell John D., D’Aspermont Jean (eds), Tipping Points in International Law, commitment and
critique, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2021, p. 231.
24
“[T]he security and safety of the Hungarian people and Hungary itself are the number-one issue.”
UN GA, 60th plenary meeting, 19 December 2018, A/73/PV.60, p. 4.
25
Predstavnik Filipina UN GA, 60th plenary meeting, A/73/PV.60, 19 December 2018, p. 5.
26
UN GA, 60th plenary meeting, A/73/PV.60, 19 December 2018, p. 9; Na prvom skupu Foruma
za razmatranje međunarodnih migracija usvojena je Deklaracija o napretku koja sadrži deo
posvećen osnaživanju međunarodne saradnje u oblasti međunarodnih migracija. Predstavnici
država učesnica videli su korist od ovog vida multilateralne saradnje. Videti: “Progress
Declaration of the international Migration Review Forum”, UN GA, A/AC.293/2022/L.1, 12
May 2022, para. 51–77. o prvom zasedanju Foruma za razmatranje međunarodnih migracija
videti: Zoran T. Stojanović, „Prvo zasedanje Foruma za razmatranje međunarodnih migracija,
Njujork, 17–20. maj 2022. godine”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, 2022, br. 95,
str. 155–158.
je u pogledu izbeglica situacija, makar u pogledu pravnog okvira daleko bolja

imajući u vidu da postoji univerzalni međunarodnopravni instrument – Konvencija
o statusu izbeglica sa propratnim protokolom (Njujorški protokol). Lakše
postizanje konsenzusa u okviru međunarodne zajednice je bio očekivan, što se
pokazalo i u okviru prvog zasedanja Globalnog foruma za izbeglice, univerzalnog
foruma koji služi operacionalizaciji GKi.27 Naučna i stručna javnost je, pak, na
drugačiji način argumentovano izrazila bojazan i kritiku o potencijalnoj efikasnosti
kompakata. Zamerke su upućene na različite aspekte oba kompakta, a posebno je
zamerana forma u kom su usvojeni.28 Ketlin Njulend (Kathleen Newland), pravilno
primećuje da je GKM „najmekši meki izvor prava”.29 Međutim, ne treba
zanemariti prednosti ovih vidova međunarodne akcije preduzete u cilju poboljšanja
položaja izbeglica i migranata u svetu. Njujorška deklaracija i oba globalna
kompakta pošla su od vrednosti predviđenih Poveljom UN-a, Univerzalnom
deklaracijom o ljudskim pravima i drugih univerzalnih međunarodnopravnih
instrumenata kojima se štite ljudska prava i slobode. Njima je skrenuta pažnja na
brojna aktuelna pitanja i procese, među kojima je i održivi razvoj. Takođe, oba
kompakta su prepoznala migracije uzrokovane klimatskim promenama i
narušenom životnom sredinom. Poduhvat učinjen naporima da se usvoje Njujorška
deklaracija i oba globalna kompakta rezultirali su bližom saradnjom brojnih
činilaca, između ostalog i saradnja koja se razvija na relaciji UNHCR-ioM, što
se, opravdano, može smatrati dobrim stranama navednih međunarodnopravnih
dokumenata.30 „Spuštanjem” na niži nivo saradnje, pored neobavezujuće pravne
prirode, postiže se da sve veći broj subjekata može da utiče na operacionalizaciju
postavljenih ciljeva u kompaktima i tako utiču na njihovu implementaciju. Tamo
gde ne bi postojala spremnost državnih vlasti da uzmu učešće u sprovođenju
odredbi kompakata, to bi mogli da čine drugi, nedržavni subjekti – međunarodne
vladine i nevladine organizacije, domaće nevladine organizacije, privredni subjekti,
akademska zajednica i drugi. To se sa punim pravom može smatrati
komparativnom prednošću od onoga što nude tvrđi oblici pravnog obavezivanja,
27
o prvom zasedanju Globalnog foruma za izbeglice vidi - Bojan Stojanović, „Prvi skup Globalnog
foruma za izbeglice, Ženeva, 16-18. decembra 2019”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu,
86/2020, str. 195–198. Globalnom fourumu za izbeglice i uopšte globalnim kompaktima
prethodilo je usvajanje Sveobuhvatnog okvira za odgovor na izbegličke krize (Comprehensive
refugee response framework) kao aneksa Njujorške deklaracije i dodatnog foruma za razmatranje
upravljanja krizama koje uključuju veliki priliv izbeglica.
28
Za kritike vidi tematsko izdanje International Journal of Refugee Law, Volume 30, issue 4,
December 2018.
29
Kathleen Newland, “The Global Compact for Safe, orderly and Regular Migration: An Unlikely
Achievement”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 660.
30
Bojan Stojanović, „Savremeno međunarodno izbegličko pravoi i nove tendencije u njegovom
razvoju” u Vesna Petrović (ur.), Sedam decenija pravne zaštite izbeglica – Zbornik radova
povodom sedamdeset godina od usvajanja Konvencije o statusu izbeglica, Beogradski centar za
ljudska prava, Beograd 2021, str. 48. Vidi fusnotu 44 na istoj strani.
koji, istina, za sobom imaju i aparaturu koja osigurava implementaciju pravnih

normi i sistem za sankcionisanje neizvršavanja ili kršenja istih. Međutim, imajući
u vidu da su savremene migracije masovne i mešovitog karaktera i često vrlo
nepredvidive, ovaj vid obavezivanja se može smatrati lakšim za prilagođavanje
datom stanju na terenu. Takođe, ostavlja prostora da se stvara pozitivna praksa i
da se na taj način, indirektno, utiče na buduće kodifikatorske poduhvate koji bi
mogli da ovakvu praksu pretoče u obavezujuće pravne norme, ili, pak, da dovedu
do formiranja normi međunarodnog običajnog prava.31
POTENCIJALNI DOPRINOS NJUJORŠKE DEKLARACIJE

I GLOBALNIH KOMPAKATA GLOBALNOM
UPRAVLJANJU MIGRACIJAMA
iako je reč o izvorima tzv. mekog prava, Njujorška deklaracija i oba globalna
kompakta predstavljaju korak unapred u pogledu upravljanja izbegličko-
migrantskim krizama širom sveta. Kako je već konstatovano, reč je o izvorima
prava slabijeg intenziteta koji su usvojeni upravo u tom pravnom obliku zbog
odsustva konsenzusa u međunarodnoj zajednici da se ova pitanja reše čvršćim
oblicima pravnog obavezivanja. Međutim, masovnost kriza, te izuzetno veliki broj
ljudi u pokretu, primorali su međunarodnu zajednicu na reakciju, makar i ove vrste.
U tom smislu, imajući u vidu da se pred državama, međunarodnim organizacijama
i drugim činiocima, nalaze izvori mekog prava, njihovo postojanje treba shvatiti
kao sredstvo kojim se može služiti u cilju rešavanja kriza i obezbeđivanja prava
izbeglica i migranata. U tom smislu, neophodno je sagledati primenu odredbi
navedenih međunarodnopravnih dokumenata u praksi. Prvi koraci u njihovoj
primeni realizovani su nakon usvajanja Njujorške deklaracije, što je rezultiralo
usvajanjem GKi i GKM. Zatim, pošto su usvojeni ovi dokumenti, različiti akteri
su krenuli u njihovu realizaciju. Takođe, slabija pravna snaga Njujorške deklaracije
i oba globalna kompakta ne znači i nužno njihovu slabost i nemogućnost da se u
budućnosti pravno reguliše materija koju sadrže. Naime, na ponašanju država je
koji način će se razvijati norme međunarodnog izbegličkog i međunarodnog
migrantskog prava. Takođe, oba globalna kompkta se naslanjaju na norme
pozitivnog međunarodnog prava, kako iz oblasti ljudskih prava, tako i iz izbegličkog
prava i migrantskog prava. onaj deo normi koji nije sadržan u izvorima tvrdog
prava iz navedenih oblasti, predstavljaju test za međunarodnu zajednicu u pogledu
spremnosti država da kroz praksu pojedina pravila prihvate kao pravo. Tako bi se,
31
Bogdan Krasić, Bojan Stojanović, „Globalni kompakt o migracijama: pravna priroda i
potencijalni uticaj na razvoj međunarodnog migracionog prava”, Pravni zapisi, 2020, br. 2, str.
645–662. U tom smislu, indikativna je i savetodavno mišljenje Međunarodnog suda pravde u
slučaju Legalnost pretnje ili upotrebe nuklearnog oružja (iCJ. Reports 1996), p. 226, para. 70:
“The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”
putem međunarodnih običaja i primera dobre prakse, mogao postići napredak u

kodifikaciji i progresivnom razvoju u oblastima međunarodnog izbegličkog prava
i međunarodnog migrantskog prava. ovi, labaviji vidovi međunarodne saradnje po
bitnim i aktuelnim pitanjima mogu se tumačiti i kao put kojim bi se postepeno
gradila normativna struktura čvršćeg karaktera. Trasiranjem puta data globalnim
kompaktima na taj način pruža mogućnost da se države na dobrovoljnoj osnovi
mogu uključiti u različite procese i unapređivati multilateralnu saradnju, za šta je,
naravno, potreban protok izvesnog vremena. Kriza multilateralizma u oblasti
upravljanja migracijama može se prevazići na način da se države i drugi subjekti
uključeni u ovaj proces zainteresuju za temu na način da pronađu širi interes koji
bi uključivao postupanje po standardima propisanih za izbeglice i migrante, ali i
interese koji su vezani za ciljeve održivog razvoja. Korist od toga bi bila višestruka
i odnosila bi se i na države prijema, ali i na međunarodnu zajednicu. Bitno je imati
u vidu da države mogu biti istovremeno i države porekla, tranzita i prijema izbeglica
i migranata. Taj trend je promenljiv te je upravo zato neophodna globalna
multilateralna saradnja u cilju preveniranja nepredviđenih situacija vezanih za
masovne i mešovite migracije i upravljanja njima.
ZAKLJUČAK
Napori učinjeni u pogledu usvajanja Njujorške deklaracije i dva globalna
kompakta rezultat su krize multilateralizma i sve težeg postizanja saglasnosti volja
u međunarodnoj zajednici u pogledu rešavanja osetljivih pitanja, među koje spada i
pitanje vezano za upravljanje savremenim mešovitim migracijama. U ovoj oblasti,
kriza multilateralizma ogleda se u oprečnim stavovima država po važnim pitanjima
vezanim za prihvat izbeglica i migranata, regulisanja njihovog statusa kao i obima
prava koja su im na raspolaganju. Stavovi su polarizovani po mnogim pitanjima, pa
je teško postići kompromis, a ukoliko se u nekim pitanjima konsenzus i pronađe,
teško ga je pretočiti u čvršći oblik pravnog obavezivanja. U tom smislu, različite
polemike povodom masovnih i mešovitih migracija ilustruju odsustvo čvrste volje
da se ova pitanja reše na globalnom planu. Prisutni su različiti aranžmani između
država i u pojedinim delovima sveta, koji bi se mogli označiti kao ad hoc aranžmani,
dok se pomak na globalnom nivou vidi u okviru aktivnosti UN-a usvajanjem
Njujorške deklaracije i dva propratna kompakta nastalih na njenim osnovama. iako
Njujorška deklaracija o izbeglicama i migrantima i oba globalna kompakta – GKi i
GKM predstavljaju izvore tvz. mekog prava, reč je o koracima napravljenim u cilju
podele odgovornosti za prihvat izbeglica i migranata koji je u savremenoj
međunarodnoj zajednici goruće pitanje dugi niz godina. Primetno je odsustvo
saglasnosti u međunarodnoj zajednici u cilju postizanja kompromisa i usvajanja
čvršćih oblika pravnog vezivanja, usvajanje navedenih međunarodnih dokumenata
predstavlja korak unapred. Gotovo je nezamislivo da usled brojnih izbegličko-
migrantskih kriza koja su postali konstanta u poslednjih nekoliko decenija u
savremenom međunarodnom društvu, a naročito masovni od početka druge decenije
ovog veka, nije preduzeto ništa. Vrednost i značaj Njujorške deklaracije i njene
konkretizacije kroz globalne kompakte ostaje da se sagleda u narednom periodu.
Prilikom razmatranja globalnih kompakata i rasprava o njihovom značaju, uglavnom
se ocenjuje pravna forma kojom su obavijeni, sa povremenim osvrtom na neke
delove tih pravnih dokumenata uz komentarisanje njihove vrednosti i potencijalnog
značaja. Međutim, često se gube iz vida savremeni trendovi i mnoge promene u
ljudskom društvu u novom milenijumu. Deluje da su stanovišta mnogih komentatora
izraz vizure iz prošlih vremena kada je uloga države bila jača, odnosno, kada je
suverenitet država bio neokrnjen normama međunarodnog prava. Njujorška
deklaracija i globalni kompakti daju priliku u pogledu sagledavanja savremenih
migracija, upravo iz drugog, novog ugla, koji bi se mogao nazvati i „izbegličko-
migrantskim”. To je posebno bitno ukoliko se ima u vidu disperzija odgovornosti i
uključivanja različitih činilaca koji su od značaja za brojna pitanja vezana za izbeglice
i migrante kojih je u svetu iz godine u godinu sve više.
MULTiLATERALiSM CRiSiS iN CoNTEMPoRARY MiGRATioN

MANAGEMENT AND iNTERNATioNAL CoMMUNiTY RESPoNSE
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses management of the contemporary mass and mixed migration
which are characteristic for the second decade and the beginning of the third decade
of this millennium. The existing legal framework related to the rights of refugees is
reflected in the Convention on the Status of Refugees, while in positive international
law there is no such instrument for migrants. Although common to both categories
of people on the move, the application of norms of international human rights law
in practice is faced by many difficulties and challenges. The conflicting positions
of the states in terms of migration management reflect the crisis of multilateralism,
which in this area results in the absence of a single system that would contain norms
that would be universally applied. The result is the particularization of migration
management, which often leads to illegal actions directed at refugees and migrants.
The efforts made by the United Nations resulted in the adoption of the New York
Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (2016) and two global compacts – the Global
Compact for Refugees and the Global Compact on Safe, orderly and Regular
Migration (2018). Although they belong to sources of soft law, the importance of
the mentioned legal documents is reflected in a new type of international
cooperation in this area, which resulted in a change of view on contemporary
migration trends. Namely, they provided a framework in which migration
management is placed on a horizontal plane, and in addition to states and
international organizations, other relevant subjects, such as non-governmental
organizations, businesses, religious and sports associations, academic communities
and others, are taking active role in migration management.
Key words: Refugees, migrants, mixed migration, New York Declaration, global
compacts, United Nations
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2. “Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nation”s, Treaty Series,
Vol. 189.
3. Cottier Thomas, Losada Rosa Maria, “Migration as a Common Concern of
Humankind”, in: Cottier Thomas, Ahmad Zaker (eds), The Prospects of
Common Concern of Humankind in International Law, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2021.
4. “Declaration on the Human Rights of individuals Who are not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live, Resolution 40/144”, UN GA, 13 December 1985.
5. Geoff Gilbert, “Terrorism and international refugee law” in Ben Saul (ed.),
Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism, second edition,
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham 2020.
6. “Global Compact for Safe, orderly and Regular Migration”, UN dok.
A/RES/73/195 (19 December 2018).
7. “Global Compact on Refugees”, UN dok. A/RES/73/151 (17 December 2018).
8. “Global Trends – Forced Displacement 2011”, UNHCR, Geneva 2012.
9. “Global Trends – Forced Displacement 2021”, UNHCR, Geneva 2022.
10. “Global Trends 2012”, UNHCR, Geneva 2013.
11. ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and
Methodology, international Labour organization, Third edition, Geneva 2021.
12. Krasić, Bogdan, Stojanović, Bojan, „Globalni kompakt o migracijama: pravna
priroda i potencijalni uticaj na razvoj međunarodnog migracionog prava”,
Pravni zapisi, 2020, br. 2.
13. Krstić, ivana, Mitrović, Ljubimka, „Sedamdeset godina od usvajanja
Konvencije o statusu izbeglica”, Branič, 2021, br. 4.
14. “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Advisory opinion,
international Court of Justice Reports, 1996.
15. “Mass Migrations, Final Resolution”, institut de Droit international, Sixteenth
Commission, Rapporteur M. Maurice Kamato, Yearbook of Institute of
International Law, Session of Hyderabad, 2017, vol. 78.
16. “Mid-Year Trends 2022”, UNHCR, Geneva 2022.
17. McAuliffe, M., Triandafyllidou, A. (eds.), World Migration Report 2022,
international organization for Migration, Geneva.
18. Newland, Kathleen, “The Global Compact for Safe, orderly and Regular
Migration: An Unlikely Achievement”, International Journal of Refugee Law,
2018, Vol. 30, No. 4.
19. orakhelashvili, Alexander,Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International

Law, ninth edition, Routledge, London – New York 2022.
20. “Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations, Treaty Series,
Vol. 606.
21. Schwöbel-Patel, Christine, “Multilateralism” in: Haskell John D.,
D’Aspermont Jean (eds.), Tipping Points in International Law, commitment
and critique, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2021.
22. Stojanović, Bojan, „Prvi skup Globalnog foruma za izbeglice, Ženeva, 16–18.
decembra 2019”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, 2020, br. 86.
23. Stojanović, Bojan, „Savremeno međunarodno izbegličko pravoi i nove
tendencije u njegovom razvoju” u Vesna Petrović (ur.), Sedam decenija pravne
zaštite izbeglica – Zbornik radova povodom sedamdeset godina od usvajanja
Konvencije o statusu izbeglica, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd
2021.
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zaštita i primena načela zabrane proterivanja u države sa neadekvatnim
zdravstvenim sistemima ili nedostupnom zdravstvenom zaštitom”, Zbornik
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migracija, Njujork, 17–20. maj 2022. godine”, Zbornik radova Pravnog
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28 May 2021.
MEĐUNARODNA PRAKSA
(International Practice)
SUDSKA PRAKSA MEĐUNARODNIH I NACIONALNIH SUDOVA

U VEZI SA JURISDIKCIONIM IMUNITETOM DRŽAVA
Slavolјub CARić*
APSTRAKT
The paper analyzes the issue of jurisdictional immunity in a theoretical and
practical sense. The analysis includes consideration of the rule that is widely spread
and recognized in international and state practice, according to which one state
cannot be tried before the judicial authorities of another state. Starting from the
conceptual determination of jurisdictional immunity that is present in international
public law, the author tried to look at some of its aspects that dominate the practice
of national and international courts. Following the conceptual meanings of
jurisdictional immunity, the author partially considered international jurisprudence
using in the analysis cases from the practice of the international Court of Justice
in The Hague and the European Court of Human Rights, and then through the
analysis of cases present in the practice of national courts in countries that have
adopted special legislation dedicated to this matter, came to conclusions that can
be useful for the development of domestic judicial practice. The possibility of
further improving the effectiveness of the practice of the courts in the Republic of
Serbia, in relation to the observance of the rules on jurisdictional immunity, will
depend, in the author's opinion, on the acceptance of obligations from international
multilateral conventions, as well as on the harmonization of domestic legislation
with international legal standards, which ultimately determine the direction of
progressive development of judicial practice in this area.
Klјučne reči: Jurisdikcioni imunitet, sudska praksa, Republika Srbija
UVOD
imunitet je pravo pravnog ili fizičkog lica da zbog svog specijalnog svojstva
bude izuzeto od jurisdikcije u građanskom, krivičnom ili upravnom postupku.1 U
međunarodnom pravu o imunitetu se govori na tri načina. Najpre, kada je reč o
pojedincima, pravila o privilegijama i imunitetima jedne posebne grupe pojedinaca
*
Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije. E-mail: slavoljub.caric@mfa.rs
1
Maja Stanivuković, M. Živković, Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad, 2006,
str. 192–193. Pomenuta Konvencija nije stupila na snagu s obzirom da je za njeno stupanje na
snagu potrebno 30 ratifikacija, a do sada ju je ratifikovalo 19 država.
koji uživaju status diplomata, regulisana su Bečkom konvencijom o diplomatskim

odnosima iz 1961. godine i Bečkom konvencijom o konzularnim odnosima iz
1963. godine. Pitanja vezana za imunitete međunarodnih organizacija regulisana
su Konvencijom o privilegijama i imunitetima Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1946. godine
i Konvencijama o privilegijama i imunitetima specijalizovanih agencija iz 1947.
godine. Kada je reč o stranim državama, Evropska konvencija o imunitetu država
sa dodatnim Protokolom koja je usvojena u okviru Saveta Evrope 1972. godine i
Konvencija Ujedinjenih nacija o jurisdikcionom imunitetu država i njihove
imovine iz 2004. godine, podrobnije regulišu pomenutu materiju. iako među
različitim kategorijama privilegija i imuniteta postoji dosta sličnosti, oni se
međusobno razlikuju po izvorima, polјu primene, obimu, subjektima i načinu
zaštite. U ovom radu bavićemo se samo pitanjem jurisdikcionog imuniteta država.2
POJAM I NASTANAK JURISDIKCIONOG IMUNITETA

Klasično određenje jurisdikcionog imuniteta stranih država nalazimo u presudi
The Parlament Belge iz 1880. godine, u kojoj se inter alia, navodi: „Princip (…)
je, da se, kao posledica apsolutne nezavisnosti svake suverene vlasti i međunarodne
kurtoazije koja nalaže svakoj suverenoj državi da poštuje nezavisnost i
dostojanstvo svake druge suverene države, odbija vršenje bilo koje teritorijalne
nadležnosti preko svojih sudova u odnosu na ličnost bilo kog suverena ili
ambasadora bilo koje države ili u odnosu na javnu imovinu bilo koje države
namenjene javnoj upotrebi (…)“.3 S obzirom na to da su u međunarodnom poretku
države jednake i ravnopravne u međunarodno pravnoj teoriji i praksi, uvedeno je
pravilo o imunitetu države pred sudovima druge države. Posledice primene pravila
o imunitetu ogledaju se u tome da na teritoriji druge države, pred njenim
pravosudnim institucijama, izostaje kontrola akata strane države i njenih
predstavnika. Pitanje prava jedne države da se pozove na sudski (jurisdikcioni)
imunitet postavlјa se kada se strana država pojavi kao stranka u sudskom postupku
pred sudom druge države. ovaj imunitet zasniva se na međunarodno pravnom
principu suverene jednakosti država (par in parem non habet imeprium), koji se
u slučaju jurisdikcionog imuniteta zasniva na principu (par in parem non habet
judicium), što znači da jedna država ne može biti podvrgnuta jurisdikciji druge
države. ovo pravilo predstavlјa institut kod koga se susreću međunarodno javno
pravo i nacionalno (međunarodno privatno i građansko procesno pravo). Međutim,
kod ovog instituta moguća je i primena pravila međunarodnog prava о ljudskim
pravima. iako su uslovi pod kojima se stranoj državi garantuje imunitet diktirani
međunarodnim pravom, nacionalni sud nadležan za vođenje postupka protiv strane
2
Sanja Đajić, Praktikum za međunarodno javno pravo, opšti deo,Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad, 2007,
str. 326.
3
Milenko Kreća, Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2016, str. 215; Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1980, vol. ii, part ii, p. 144.
države određuje tačan obim i način garantovanja tog prava. Dok se jurisdikcioni
imunitet odnosi prvenstveno na pokretanje i vođenje postupka, postoji i izvršni
imunitet koji države štiti od prinudnih mera obezbeđenja i prinudnog izvršenja.
TEORIJSKA SHVATANJA O IMUNITETU

Postoje dva shvatanja imuniteta država. Prva koncepcija zasnovana je na
apsolutnom imunitetu država i nastala je u anglosaksonskom pravu. Po ovoj
koncepciji nisu moguća nikakva odstupanja od imuniteta država, osim onih s
kojima se država koja je tužena, sama saglasila. ovaj imunitet obuhvata sve
aktivnosti države, pa i aktivnosti komercijalnog karaktera. Dakle, konceptualno
se priznaje državi svojstvo „suverena“ i kada obavlјa komercijalnu delatnost.
Druga koncepcija ograničenog ili funkcionalnog imuniteta nastala je u
kontinentalnom pravu. ona se zasniva na pretpostavci da je imunitet neraskidivo
povezan sa ostvarivanjem suverenih prerogativa države. Po ovoj koncepciji, kada
država zaklјučuje u svojstvu učesnika građanskog prometa komercijalne poslove
koje mogu da zaklјučuju i privatna lica, država nema pravo da se pozove na
imunitet i da koristi svoj status „suverena“. Dakle, po ovoj koncepciji pravi se
jasna razlika između dve vrste akata: acta jure imperii i acta jure gestionis.
imunitet se priznaje samo za prvu vrstu akata. Zajedničko za navedene koncepcije
jesu činjenice da obe koncepcije priznaju da imunitet država ima
međunarodnopravni karakter, tj. da je garantovan međunarodnim pravom, a ne
nacionalnim zakonodavstvom, i da obe koncepcije predviđaju da se država svojom
saglasnošću može odreći imuniteta kako u sudskom, tako i u izvršnom postupku.
Brz tok promena od apsolutnog prema ograničenom imunitetu država, zbog
rastućih komercijalnih aktivnosti vezuje se za jednu odluku Vrhovnog suda
Australije, tako da je teorija ograničenog, tj. funkcionalnog imuniteta počela da
uzima prevagu u nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj sudskoj praksi.4
PRIMERI IZ MEĐUNARODNE SUDSKE PRAKSE

Slučajevi pred Međunarodnim sudom pravde
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State

Predmetni postupak pokrenut je 2008. godine, od strane Nemačke u sporu koji
je izbio sa italijom oko kršenja prava na jurisdikcioni i izvršni imunitet. Grčka je
u ovom postupku bila interventijent. Javna rasprava održana je 16. septembra 2011.
godine. Presuda je doneta u februaru 2012. godine, usvajanjem zahteva Nemačke.
Nemačka je tražila od suda da donese presudu kojom će se konstatovati da je
4
Dralle v. The Republic of Czechoslovakia 17 i.L.R., 1950, p. 155, Rodoljub Etinski, Međunarodno
javno pravo, Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad, 2010, str. 137.
Republika italija prekršila međunarodnu obavezu na poštovanje jurisdikcionog

imuniteta, koji SR Nemačka uživa na osnovu međunarodnog prava time što je: 1)
prihvatila nadležnost u odnosu na građanske tužbe koje su podnete protiv Nemačke
zbog kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog prava za vreme Drugog svetskog rata
(između septembra 1943. do maja 1945. godine); 2) preduzela prinudne mere u
odnosu na objekat Villa Vigoni, koji je u svojini Nemačke i koji se upotreblјava
za državne, nekomercijalne svrhe; 3) priznala i proglasila izvršnim presude koje
su doneli grčki sudovi u sličnom slučaju. Sledstaveno navedenom, SR Nemačka
je od Suda zatražila da presudi i objavi da je Republika italija: 1) međunarodno
odgovorna; 2) obavezna, po svom izboru, da preduzme mere kako bi odluke njenih
sudova i drugih pravosudnih organa kojima je prekršen suvereni imunitet SR
Nemačke bile neprimenjive; 3) obavezna da preduzme mere kako bi obezbedila
da italijanski sudovi više ne zasnivaju nadležnost na osnovu tužbi koje imaju gore
navedeni karakter.5
Savetodavno mišlјenje u slučaju Dato Param Cumaraswamy iz 1999. godine

Međunarodni sud pravde doneo je u hitnom postupku savetodavno mišljenje 29.
aprila 1999. godine, a na zahtev Ekonomskog i socijalnog saveta. Mišljenje je traženo
u vezi pitanja primenlјivosti člana Vi odelјka 22. Konvencije o privilegijama i
imunitetima Ujedinjenih nacija na slučaj Dato Param Cumaraswamy – slučaj
malezijskog pravnika imenovanog za specijalnog izvestioca za pitanja nezavisnosti
sudija i pravnika od strane Komisije za lјudska prava Ujedinjenih nacija, da bi se
ukazalo na primat međunarodnog prava nad unutrašnjim pravom. Naime, u
predmetnom slučaju, gospodin Cumaraswarmy je povodom jednog intervjua, koji
je dao kao specijalni izvestilac za pitanja nezavisnosti sudija i pravnika koji je
objavlјen u jednom magazinu, bio izložen seriji sudskih postupaka pred malezijskim
sudovima. Tim povodom, 7. novembra 1997. godine, generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih
nacija ukazao je na razlike u gledištima između Ujedinjenih nacija i malezijske vlade
u vezi s mogućnošću da se vodi sudski postupak za reči iznete u službenom svojstvu
i na mogućnost da se zatraži savetodavno mišlјenje od Suda, shodno klauzuli
sadržanoj u odelјku 30 Konvencije o privilegijama i imunitetima Ujedinjenih nacija.
Kako ovo pitanje nije moglo da se reši ni neposrednim pregovorima, uz posredovanje
specijalnog izvestioca generalnog sekretara Y. Fortiera iz Kanade, koji je u dva
navrata posetio Kuala Lumpur, Ekonomski i socijalni savet Ujedinjenih nacija je,
kao ovlašćeni organ, zatražio savetodavno mišlјenje od Suda. U savetodavnom
mišlјenju Sud je našao da gospodin Cumaraswarmy, kao specijalni izvestilac za
pitanja nezavisnosti sudija i pravnika, uživa imunitet od bilo kog sudskog postupka
pred organima države svog porekla. Posebno je interesantno to što je Sud u mišlјenju
utvrdio i konkretnu obavezu za malezijsku vladu da obavesti malezijske sudove o
stavu, koji je preliminarno izneo generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija u vezi s
5
internet: www.icj-cij.org
imunitetom koji gospodin Cumaraswarmy uživa pred tim sudovima, što je

malezijska vlada propustila da učini oglušivši se o obavezu koju ima po članu 105.
Povelјe, ali i u skladu s odredbama Konvencije o privilegijama i imunitetima
Ujedinjenih nacija. Shodno tome, utvrđena je i obaveza za malezijske sudove da se
bave pitanjem imuniteta od sudskih postupaka, kao preliminarnim pitanjem koje bi
se rešilo po hitnom postupku in limine litis. Najzad, utvrđena je i obaveza malezijske
vlade da mišlјenje Suda bude dostavlјeno i malezijskim sudovima kako bi
međunarodne obaveze Malezije u vezi s imunitetom gospodina Cumaraswarmy-ja
bile poštovane. Na pomenti način, ovo savetodavno mišlјenje u velikoj meri podseća
na presudu, jer slično izreci presude utvrđuje konkretne obaveze za jednu državu.
Slučaj DR Kongo v. Belgija

U slučaju DR Kongo protiv Belgije, Međunarodni sud pravde doneo je presudu
14. februara 2002. godine kojom je ustanovio neke osnovne principe vezane za
imunitet od krivičnog gonjenja bivšeg predstavnika države. U konkretnom slučaju
radilo se o naredbi za privođenje bivšeg ministra spolјnih poslova DR Kongo od
11. aprila 2000. godine. U vezi s ovim pitanjem, Sud je zaklјučio da lice u pitanju
ne uživa imunitet od krivičnog gonjenja u svojoj državi. osim toga, privilegija
imuniteta od nadležnosti strane države biće otklonjena ukoliko se država koju to
lice predstavlјa odrekne imuniteta. Takođe, nakon prestanka mandata nije moguće
uživati privilegije i imunitete po osnovu međunarodnog prava. Najzad, u
konkretnom slučaju, moguće je voditi krivični postupak pred određenim
međunarodnim sudovima.
Slučajevi pred Evropskim sudom za lјudska prava

Pred Evropskim sudom za lјudska prava pitanje imuniteta država najviše se
javlјalo u vezi s povredom prava na pristup sudu, što je garantovano članom 6.
stav 1. Evropske konvencije o lјudskim pravima. U takvim slučajevima Sud se
najčešće pozivao na Evropsku konvenciju o imunitetu država sa dodatnim
Protokolom, usvojenu u okviru Saveta Evrope 1972. godine.
ova Konvencija primenjena je u većem broju slučajeva pred Evropskim sudom
za lјudska prava (Jones and Others v. The United Kingdom, Wallihauser v. Austria,
Oleynikov v. Russia, Sabeh El Leil v. France, Čudak v. Lithuania, Manoilescu and
Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia, Hirschhorn v. Romania, Al-Adsani v. the United
Kingdom, McElhinney v. Ireland).6 U slučaju Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom,
podnosilac predstavke je istovremeno britanski i kuvajtski državlјanin, koji je u
vreme rata u Golfskom zalivu služio u Ratnom vazduhoplovstvu Kuvajta.
Boraveći u Kuvajtu, došao je u posed video traka sa seksualnim sadržajem na
kojima se pojavlјivao rođak kuvajtskog emira. ove trake su postale dostupne
6
internet: hudoc.echr.coe,int
javnosti, a šeik je za to okrivio podnosioca predstavke. Zbog toga je podnosilac

prebijen, otet i protivpravno pritvoren, nakon čega je bio izložen torturi. Podnosilac
je naknadno pušten, ali je morao da provede šest nedelјa u bolnici u Engleskoj,
gde je lečen od opekotina koje su prekrivale 25% njegovog tela. Pored toga, kod
njega je ustanovlјen i ozbilјan posttraumatski poremećaj. Zbog svega toga
podnosilac predstavke je avgusta 1992. godine, pokrenuo građanski postupak u
Engleskoj zahtevajući naknadu štete od kuvajtske vlade. Na zahtev engleskog
Višeg suda postupak je prekinut, jer britanski zakon iz 1978. godine, suverenim
državama pruža imunitet za dela počinjena na teritoriji van nadležnosti
Ujedinjenog Kralјevstva. Naime, navedeni zakon zasnovan je na gore pomenutom
principu iz međunarodnog prava, pa je ovaj princip primenio i Evropski sud za
lјudska prava, kome se kasnije podnosilac obratio ističući inter alia, i povredu
člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije, koja se odnosi na pristup sudu. Evropski sud za lјudska
prava smatrao je da pružanje imuniteta državi u građanskom postupku teži
opravdanom cilјu poštovanja međunarodnog prava i održavanja dobrih
diplomatskih odnosa između država, zbog čega primena odredbi zakona iz 1978.
godine, u konkretnom slučaju, nije predstavlјala neopravdano ograničenje pristupa
sudu podnosioca predstavke. ovaj princip Sud je primenio i u slučaju McElhinney
v. Ireland, u kome je irski sud prihvatio zahtev britanske vlade da se prekine
postupak po zahtevu za naknadu štete protiv britanske vlade i Fogarty v. The
United Kingdom, u kome se radilo o radnom sporu protiv SAD pred britanskim
sudom, a u vezi sa zaposlenjem podnositelјke predstavke u američkoj ambasadi u
Londonu. U oba ova slučaja Evropski sud za lјudska prava smatrao je da je načelo
imuniteta države primenlјivo, tako da je bilo opravdano isklјučivanje razmatranja
podnetih tužbi od strane domaćih sudova, tj. nije došlo do povrede prava na pristup
sudu. ipak, Sud je bio prilično podelјen prilikom donošenja navedenih presuda,
jer opravdano se može postaviti pitanje da li navedeno načelo treba da ima prednost
nad opštom zabranom mučenja, koja ima karakter ius cogensa, kao i da li bi ovo
načelo trebalo da podjednako važi u građanskim i krivičnim slučajevima. Stav o
priznanju imuniteta državi u vezi s postupkom za naknadu štete potvrđen je ponovo
u slučaju Jones and Others v. The United Kingdom, u kome su britanski državlјani
pred sudovima Ujedinjenog Kralјevstva pokrenuli postupak protiv Saudijske
Arabije za torturu kojoj su bili izloženi dok su bili u toj zemlјi. Princip priznavanja
jurisdikcionog imuniteta, kao opšte prihvaćeni princip međunarodnog prava u
ovom slučaju nadvladao je pravo na pristup sudu, na koji su se pozvali podnosioci
predstavke. ipak, Sud je naglasio da razvoj događaja u vezi s ovim pitanjem
međunarodnog prava moraju stalno pratiti države ugovornice. Međutim u gore
pomenutom slučaju Fogarty može se postaviti isto ono pitanje koje važi i za slučaj
Čudak v. Lithuania, u kome je podnositelјka predstavke, telefonistkinja u polјskoj
ambasadi u Litvaniji zaposlena kao lokalno osoblјe, tvrdila da ju je seksualno
uznemiravao jedan diplomata, što je dovelo do njenog otpuštanja. Naime, ugovori
o zaposlenju državlјana države prijema u stranim ambasadama izuzeti su od
principa imuniteta države, pa je bilo neopravdano pozivanje litvanskih sudova na
ovaj princip kada su odbili da postupaju povodom njene tužbe s pozivom na načelo
imuniteta.7 Slučaj Sabeh El Leil v. France takođe se tiče zaposlenja u DKP. Naime,
ovde je podnosilac predstavke bio bivši zaposleni u ambasadi Kuvajta u Parizu,
koji je istakao da je bio lišen prava na pristup sudu da tuži bivšeg poslodavca koji
ga je otpustio s posla, s obzirom na to da su francuski sudovi smatrali da Kuvajt
ne može biti tužen jer uživa jurisdikcioni imunitet. Razmatrajući ovaj slučaj, Sud
je istakao da se koncept imuniteta države zasniva na međunarodnom pravu i da
ima za cilј očuvanje dobrih odnosa između država kroz poštovanje suvereniteta
jedne države od strane druge. ipak, koncept apsolutnog imuniteta znatno je
oslablјen jer su i Konvencija Ujedinjenih nacija, a pre nje i Konvencija Saveta
Evrope ustanovile značajne izuzetke od njega. Jedan od njih se upravo odnosi na
ugovore o zaposlenju između država i osoblјa u njihovim DKP-ima. Stoga slučaj
podnosioca predstavke koji nije diplomatski ili konzularni predstavnik Kuvajta,
niti državlјanin te države, potpada pod izuzetke iz pomenutih konvencija. istina,
Francuska nije ni potpisala ni ratifikovala Konvenciju Saveta Evrope, ali je
potpisnica Konvencije Ujedinjenih nacija pa imajući u vidu da su pravila iz ovih
konvencija postala deo međunarodnog običajnog prava, Sud je zaklјučio da ova
pravila obavezuju Francusku, koja je priznajući jurisdikcioni imunitet Kuvajtu, u
konkretnom slučaju, povredila član 6. stav 1. Konvencije. interesantna je presuda
Evropskog suda za lјudska prava Wallishauser v. Austria, u kome su SAD odbile
da im bude uručena tužba koju je protiv njih pred austrijskim sudom podnela
njihova bivša uposlenica tražeći da joj bude isplaćena plata. Austrijski sudovi su
prihvatili da se radi o aktu suvereniteta smatrajući da SAD uživaju imunitet u
konkretnom slučaju, iako se radilo o potraživanju iz radnog odnosa, gde se ne
priznaje imunitet. Dovodeći u vezu neuručenje sudskog akta s prirodom spora,
Evropski sud za lјudska prava zauzeo je stav da je priznavanjem imuniteta SAD,
u konkretnom slučaju, austrijski sud povredio pravo na pristup sudu podnositelјke
predstavke. U slučaju Oleynikov v. Russia (2013), radi se o ruskom državlјaninu
koji se žalio da su ruski sudovi odbili da razmotre njegov zahtev u vezi sa naplatom
zajma prema trgovinskom predstavniku DR Koreje. Evropski sud za lјudska prava
je u ovom slučaju smatrao da postupanje ruskih sudova predstavlјa povredu člana
6. stav 1. Konvencije, jer u komercijalnim stvarima, poput ovog slučaja, država
uživa restriktivni imunitet, što je jedan od izuzetaka od imuniteta država, shodno
Konvenciji Saveta Evrope o imunitetu država. odluka doneta u slučaju Manoilescu
and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (2005) tiče se postupaka restitucije zgrade
koja je pripadala podnosiocima, a koja je dodelјena za potrebe Ambasade Rusije
u Rumuniji. U postupku restitucije podnosiocima je vraćena predmetna zgrada,
ali su podnosioci u više navrata bezuspešno pokušavali da uđu u njen posed.
7
inače, ovaj slučaj okončan je sklapanjem prijatelјskog poravnanja (decembar, No. 15869/02 od
2. marta 2006. godine). Da nije bilo tako, podnositelјka predstavke bi verovatno bila uspešna.
Videti: Lucius Caflisch, International Law and European Court of Human Rights, Dialogue
between judges, Strasbourg 2007, p. 36.
Nјihov zahtev je konačno odbijen s obrazloženjem da je sada zgrada imovina

Rusije. Zbog neizvršenja predmetne odluke od strane rumunskih vlasti, podnosioci
su se obratili Evropskom sudu za lјudska prava ističući, između ostalog, povredu
člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije. Sud je istakao da, prema razvijenoj međunarodnoj
praksi, a i prema članu 23. Konvencije Saveta Evrope o imunitetu država, imovina
strane države ne može biti predmet izvršenja, zbog čega je predstavka proglašena
neprihvatlјivom. okolnosti u slučaju Hirschhorn v. Romania (2007) slične su
činjenicama u slučaju Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia osim što
se u ovom slučaju radilo o zgradi koja je bila u zakupu međunarodne organizacije.
Sud je zbog toga napravio razliku u odnosu na slučaj Manoilescu and Dobrescu,
u kome je Rusija bila vlasnik zgrade u pogledu koje se tražilo izvršenje odluke o
restituciji, zbog čega je utvrdio povredu člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije, kao i člana 1.
Protokola 1. uz Konvenciju. U ovom slučaju Sud se takođe pozivao na Konvenciju
Saveta Evrope o imunitetu država. Pitanje državnog imuniteta i prava na pristup
sudu postavilo se na izvestan način i u slučaju Marković protiv Italije. ovaj slučaj
tiče se i Srbije, jer je proistekao kao posledica bombardovanja zgrade RTS-a i
odbijanja italijanskih sudova da pruže pravnu zaštitu članovima porodice žrtava s
pozivom na doktrinu političkih akata, tj. takvih akata koji ne podležu sudskoj
nadležnosti. Naime, većinsko mišlјenje Suda (presuda je doneta sa 10: 7 glasova
da nije bilo povrede člana 6. u vezi s pravom na pristup sudu), priklonilo se stavu
da je odluka vezana za bombardovanje predstavlјala akt u vođenju spolјne politike,
a takvi akti ne podležu nadležnosti sudova, tj. priznat je imunitet državi zbog
prirode predmetnog dela. Nasuprot tome, sedam sudija, koji su ostali u manjini,
iznelo je kritički stav prema italijanskim vlastima, koje po njihovom mišlјenju
nisu uspele da objasne razlog zbog koga su smatrali da se radilo o delu političke
prirode, s obzirom na to da je predmetni postupak za naknadu štete imao osnov u
italijanskom Građanskom zakoniku. čitavoj priči o državnom imunitetu i pravu
na pristup sudu valјa dodati činjenicu da je Sud imunitet od sudske nadležnosti
priznavao ne samo državama već se u nekim situacijama radilo i o međunarodnim
organizacijama (na primer, slučaj Waite and Kennedy protiv Nemačke).
Primeri iz prakse nacionalnih sudova

Pred nacionalnim sudovima takođe se često postavlјalo pitanje jurisdikcionog
imuniteta države.8 Neke države, poput SAD ili Ujedinjenog Kralјevstva Velike
Britanije i Severne irske, usvojile su i posebne zakone u vezi s jurisdikcionim
imunitetom država. Tako se pred Vrhovnim sudom SAD 1989.godine, vodio spor
po tužbi dve liberijske korporacije protiv Argentine zbog naknade štete koja je
pričinjena njihovim brodovima dok su plovili otvorenim morem, van zone ratnih
dejstava, tokom sukoba oko Foklandskih ostrva (Argentina v. Amerada Hess
8
Sanja Đajić, op.cit., str. 328, etc. Slučaj pred italijanskim sudom naveden je iz arhive Ministarstva
spolјnih poslova.
Shipping Corp. 488 U.S. 428). Tom prilikom vojska Argentine uništila je brodove
i njihov kargo. Američki sud je ustanovio da Zakon o imunitetu stranih država
(Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act), uskraćuje mogućnost uspostavlјanja
nadležnosti nad Argentinom, nezavisno od pitanja njene odgovornosti za očigledno
kršenje međunarodnog prava. U jednom drugom slučaju, koji je vođen
1980.godine, pred Saveznim sudom SAD po tužbi jedne državlјanke Paragvaja
protiv nekadašnjeg glavnog inspektora policije u Paragvaju, u vreme vladavine
vojne hunte, tražena je naknada štete zbog mučenja i ubistva brata tužitelјke
(Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876). Posle neuspešnog vođenja postupka pred
sudovima u Paragvaju, s obzirom na to da su se u međuvremenu i tužitelјka i tuženi
preselili u SAD, pokrenuta je ova parnica. Američki sud je našao da ne postoji
prepreka imuniteta da se vodi postupak povodom zahteva za kršenje osnovnih
lјudskih prava zaštićenih međunarodnim pravom. Naime, Sud je smatrao da
priroda zaštićenih prava (zabrana torture i pravo na život), imaju karakter ius
cogensa, zbog čega se proglasio nadležnim i dosudio naknadu štete. interesantno
je uporediti stav američkog suda sa stavom britanskog suda i Evropskog suda za
lјudska prava u slučaju Al-Adsani protiv Ujedinjenog Kralјevstva, jer se u oba
slučaja radilo o pitanju nadležnosti suda jedne države za suđenje zbog povrede
zabrane mučenja od strane druge države, tj. njenih predstavnika koji je se javlјaju
kao tužena strana. isto tako, u jednom postupku koji je vođen 1977. godine, pred
Apelacionim sudom Velike Britanije po tužbi jedne britanske korporacije protiv
Narodne banke Nigerije zbog neispunjenja ugovorne obaveze (plaćanje cene) iz
kupoprodajnog ugovora, Sud nije priznao imunitet Narodnoj banci Nigerije.
Naime, predmet ugovora odnosio se na nabavku cementa radi izgradnje nekoliko
vojnih objekata u Nigeriji. Međutim, sud se ovde nije oslonio na svrhu posla
(izgradnja vojnih objekata), već na njegovu prirodu (komercijalni ugovor), zbog
čega nije prihvatio imunitet nacionalne banke u ovom slučaju. Pred Apelacionim
sudom Velike Britanije 1949. godine, pokrenut je postupak protiv novinske
agencije SSSR TAS zbog prenete vesti. U postupku se tvrdilo da je TAS državna
agencija, bez obzira na to što je ona istupala u svoje ime, da je imala svoje
prostorije i bila registrovana kao zasebno pravno lice. Prema mišlјenju Suda, to je
nije lišilo javnopravnog karaktera za davanje imuniteta u ovom sporu. Pred
italijanskim sudovima vođen je postupak za naknadu štete protiv Republike Srbije
u vezi sa zahtevom porodica pilota stradalih u obaranju helikoptera posmatračke
misije Evropske zajednice kod mesta Podrute – Madžarevo, za vreme sukoba u
Republici Hrvatskoj 6. januara 1992. godine. iako je redovni sud u Rimu svojom
presudom od 28. septembra 2009. godine, odlučio da nema nadležnost da odlučuje
o zahtevu za naknadu štete protiv Republike Srbije, s obzirom na to da ona uživa
sudski imunitet, u postupku po žalbi Apelacioni porotni sud u Rimu presudom od
22. maja 2013. godine, zauzeo je stav da je Republika Srbija odgovorna da
solidarno s odgovornim pilotima JNA nadoknadi štetu porodicama stradalih pilota
helikoptera. U postupku pred Vrhovnim kasacionim sudom italije, kojim je
potvrđena presuda Apelacionog porotnog suda u Rimu, zauzet je stav da država

ne uživa imunitet kada su u pitanju ratni zločini i zločini protiv čovečnosti.
Primer iz sudske prakse sudova u Srbiji

U Republici Srbiji u odluci Vrhovnog kasacionog suda, od 10.12.2014. godine,
iznet je stav da imunitet strane države važi u imovinskim, ali i u radnim sporovima
i ne može joj se suditi pred domaćim sudom ukoliko nije dala pristanak na to ili
se upustila u raspravlјanje.9 ovakav stav na liniji je shvatanja o apsolutnom
imunitetu, ali je kao podrška ovom stavu iznet i stav koji je Evropski sud za lјudska
prava izneo u slučaju Fogarty v. UK. U obrazloženju ove odluke kaže se: „Tužilac
je protiv strane države podneo tužbu radi poništaja rešenja o otkazu ugovora o
radu od 18. 8. 2009. godine tražeći da se to rešenje poništi i reintegriše u proces
rada. Tužilac je kao tuženog označio stranu državu – ambasadu, koju zastupa
ambasador. Notom strane države ambasada je vratila sudska pismena i navela da
ona nema svojstvo posebnog pravnog lica u odnosu na državu koju zastupa i ne
može biti tužena stranka u sporu. Prvi osnovni sud u B. se oglasio apsolutno
nenadležnim za postupanje po tužbi, na osnovu člana 26. stav 1. ZPP-a u vezi sa
čl. 16. i 77. ZPP-a. Pravilno je stanovište nižestepenih sudova da je domaći sud
nenadležan za presuđenje ovog radnog spora jer njegova nadležnost za spor sa
međunarodnim elementom nije izričito predviđena zakonom ili međunarodnim
ugovorom niti nadležnost domaćeg suda proizlazi iz odredaba zakona o mesnoj
nadležnosti domaćeg suda (član 26. ZPP-a). Naime, Bečka konvencija o
diplomatskim odnosima od 18. 4. 1961. godine (Službeni list SFRJ, dodatak 2/64),
ne sadrži pravilo po kome se strana država oslobađa od imuniteta u radnim
sporovima (ili drugih vrsta sporova), u kojima su tužioci zaposleni u diplomatsko
konzularnom predstavništvu. ograničenja od imuniteta (...), (nesporan je imunitet
država u građanskim postupcima) ne sadrži ni bilateralna konvencija između Srbije
i (...), koja određuje prava, imunitete i privilegije konzularnih agenata od 14.
oktobra 1881. godine. Takođe, ograničenja i izuzetaka nema ni u trgovinskom
ugovoru između istih stranaka ugovornica od 14 oktobra 1881. godine.
Tumačenjem note koju je tuženi uputio Ministarstvu spolјnih poslova može se
zaklјučiti da tuženi nije dao pristanak da mu u konkretnom radnom sporu sudi
redovan srpski sud. Kako tužena strana država nije dala pristanak podnošenjem
odgovora na tužbu niti se upustila u raspravlјanje, to se ne može primeniti pravilo
iz člana 50. Zakona o rešavanju sukoba zakona sa propisima drugih zemalјa o
nadležnosti domaćeg suda. Neosnovani su revizijski navodi da tuženi ne uživa
imunitet u građanskom postupku ako se o radi o sporu koji potiče iz ugovora o
zapošlјavanju na osnovu Konvencije Ujedinjenih nacija o sudskom imunitetu
država i njihove imovine iz 2004. godine, jer tu Konvenciju naša država nije
ratifikovala i ona ne predstavlјa deo unutrašnjeg prava. Takođe, naša država nije
9
Presuda Kasacionog suda Republike Srbije, 10.12.2014, Rev 485/2014
ratifikovala ni Evropsku konvenciju o imunitetu država iz 1978. godine koja po

tvrdnji revidenta sadrži pravilo ʻda se država ne može pozvati na imunitet od
jurisdikcije sudova druge države govornice u sporovima koji potiču iz ugovora o
zapošlјavanju koji je tužena država zaklјučila sa nekim fizičkim licemʼ.
Neosnovani su i revizijski navodi u kojima se ističe da odredbe ove dve konvencije
bez obzira da li su ili ne ratifikovane, predstavlјaju sastavni deo međunarodnog
običajnog prava i da je Evropski sud za lјudska prava u nekoliko svojih donetih
odluka utvrdio da ove konvencije predstavlјaju običajno pravo i da donošenjem
rešenja o apsolutnoj nenadležnosti krši pravo na pristup sudu. iz prakse Evropskog
suda za lјudska prava proizlazi upravo suprotan zaklјučak (koji ide u prilog
stanovištu nižestepenih sudova), jer je u predmetu Fogarty v. UK od 21. 11. 2001.
godine, zauzeto stanovište da je za oslobođenje od građanskopravnog imuniteta i
u radnim sporovima bitan pristanak tužene strane države“.
Kada je reč o Republici Srbiji, valјa primetiti da Republika Srbija: 1) nije
članica niti potpisnica nijednog od gore navedenih međunarodnih ugovora; 2)
nema poseban Zakon o imunitetu država; 3) odredbe o ovom pitanju nalaze se u
procesnim zakonima (zakonima kojima se uređuje parnični postupak, opšti upravni
postupak i izvršni postupak).10 S obzirom na ovakvo stanje u regulisanju pitanja
jurisdikcionog imuniteta, bilo bi dobro da Republika Srbija pristupi Konvenciji
Ujedinjenih nacija o jurisdikcionom imunitetu država i njihove imovine iz sledećih
razloga: Konvencija Ujedinjenih nacija je univerzalni instrument; Potpisale su je
neke od vodećih država, kao što su npr. Kina i Rusija, a ratifikovale su je i neke
evropske države; Države članice Saveta Evrope Evropsku konvenciju o imunitetu
država smatraju prevaziđenom. Takođe, bilo bi dobro da Republika Srbija donese
i poseban zakon kojim bi se podrobnije uredilo pitanje jurisdikcionog imuniteta
stranih država pred domaćim sudovima.
JUDiCiAL PRACTiCE oF iNTERNATioNAL AND NATioNAL CoURTS

REGARDiNG THE JURiSDiCTioN iMMUNiTY oF STATES
ABSTRACT
The paper analyzes the issue of jurisdictional immunity in a theoretical and
practical sense. The analysis includes consideration of the rule that is widely
spread and recognized in international and state practice, according to which one
state cannot be tried before the judicial authorities of another state. Starting from
the conceptual determination of jurisdictional immunity that is present in
10
U ZPP-u sadržana je odredba da u slučaju sumnje o postojanju i obimu imuniteta objašnjenje
daje organ nadležan za poslove pravde. U Zakonu o opštem upravnom postupku kaže se da u
slučaju sumnje o postojanju i obimu imuniteta objašnjenje daje organ nadležan za inostrane
poslove. oba zakona upućuju na pravila međunarodnog prava za slučaj imuniteta država,
međunarodnih organizacija i lica koja uživaju diplomatski imunitet.
international public law, the author tried to look at some of its aspects that
dominate the practice of national and international courts. Following the
conceptual meanings of jurisdictional immunity, the author partially considered
international jurisprudence using in the analysis cases from the practice of the
international Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, and then
through the analysis of cases present in the practice of national courts in countries
that have adopted special legislation dedicated to this matter, came to conclusions
that can be useful for the development of domestic judicial practice. The
possibility of further improving the effectiveness of the practice of the courts in
the Republic of Serbia, in relation to the observance of the rules on jurisdictional
immunity, will depend, in the author's opinion, on the acceptance of obligations
from international multilateral conventions, as well as on the harmonization of
domestic legislation with international legal standards, which ultimately determine
the direction of progressive development of judicial practice in this area.
Key words: Jurisdictional immunity, jurisprudence, Republic of Serbia
REFERENCE
1. Caflisch L., International Law and European Court of Human Rights,
Dialogue between judges, Strasbourg 2007
2. Đajić S., Praktikum za međunarodno javno pravo, opšti deo, Novi Sad, 2007
3. Etinski R. Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakulet, Novi Sad, 2010.
4. Kreća M., Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakulet, Beograd, 2016
5. Stanivuković M., Živković M., Međunarodno privatno pravo, Pravni
fakulet, Novi Sad, 2006.
6. internet: hudoc.echr.coe,int
7. internet: www.icj-cij.org
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Tijana ŠURLAN*
ABSTRACT
The European Court of Human Rights is not equipped with its own Statute,
meaning that the European Convention on Human Rights functions as a Statute
for the Court. Also, the Court is not instructed on the applicable law that it is to
use when deliberating a case, leaving this within the terms of its jurisdiction, that
is, the interpretation and application of the ECoHR. Throughout its jurisprudence,
the Court has developed the approach of interpreting the ECoHR within general
terms of interpretation, which is in the light of the VCLT. The methodology of
the Court is to reach a comprehensive overview of relevant international law in
the process of interpreting human rights defined in the ECoHR. Through its
reasoning, the Court has to reach towards “hard law” and “soft law”
comprehensively. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the Court, through
implementation of the VCLT, has offered another understanding of notions used
within it, specifically whether the Court has developed its own specific
understanding of the concept of formal sources of international law.
Keywords: Application, interpretation, relevant rules of international law, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, European Court of Human Rights
INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or Court), in contrast to other
international courts, is not equipped with its own statute. The ECHR`s foundation
rests on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties (Convention or ECoHR). Thus, the Convention itself
functions as a statute for the Court. For every court, as well for subjects of law
that are subsumed to that court, it is of vital interest to clarify what the function of
a court is and how that court is going to fulfil its function. These issues are
*
University of Criminalistics and Police Studies, Department of Criminalistics, Belgrade;
Constitutional Court; UN Human Rights Committee. E-mail: tijana.surlan@kpu.edu.rs
prescribed primarily in provisions on jurisdiction and applicable law. From the

point of view of jurisdiction, it is well known that the primary function of the
international Court of Justice is to decide disputes between states, while the
jurisdiction of the international Criminal Court (iCC) is to investigate and
prosecute individuals responsible for international crimes. on the other hand, the
jurisdiction of the ECHR is the application and interpretation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, thus ensuring that States respect the rights and
freedoms set out in that Convention, either towards another state or towards an
individual. Similarly to the ECHR, the international Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (iTLoS) is also attached to the specific convention – United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. its jurisdiction is to adjudicate disputes between
states parties to the Convention arising from application and interpretation of that
Convention. on the other hand, the iTLoS is equipped with its own Statute. The
above statutes, besides defining the jurisdiction, instruct respectful courts on the
law that is to be applied when performing their task. The most prominent Article
38 of the iCJ’s Statute even supersedes the mere function of defining the applicable
law for the purpose of the Court`s adjudication, becoming the rule that governs
the overall comprehension of the formal sources of the international law.1 Statutes
of the iCC and the iTLoS also prescribe the law that courts should apply when
deciding a case. Unlike the previous examples, the ECHR is not instructed on the
applicable law, leaving the Court only with a prescription regarding its
jurisdiction.2 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court appears at the same time as
guidance on the law that the Court shall apply and interpret. it rests solely on the
Court to develop a methodology of application and interpretation of the rights and
freedoms set in the Convention. Bearing in mind that all rights and freedoms within
the Convention are defined in broad terms, it is not difficult to understand that the
Court has a challenging task to fulfill. Nonetheless, as an already long-standing
institution, the Court provides scholars with rich material for discussion. Setting
the scene for the text that follows, i would like to clarify that my research covers
only cases instituted by individual applications, meaning that my conclusion does
not cover other proceedings before the Court. in addition, i would like to make it
clear that the Court itself does not use the notion of sources of law generally.
However, it is common knowledge that when deliberating a case instituted on an
individual application, the European Court of Human Rights pays attention to
domestic law, domestic case law, international law, international case law and
scholarly writings, all of them capable of coming under the title of sources of law.
in the structure of the ECHR judgments, the heading Relevant Law is usually
divided into domestic and international law, with further identification of what
specific law the Court deems relevant. This text, however, is confined to
1
Hugh Thirlway,The Sources of International Law, oxford University Press, 2019, p. 12.
2
Tijana Šurlan, “Primena prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u postupcima pred ustavnim
sudovima”, Pravna riječ, 2019, pp. 115–135.
elaboration of the international law that the Court considers relevant, i.e. to the
sources of international law. Therefore, the main task of this paper is to discuss
the sources of international law that the Court builds its judgments on. The
outcome of this Paper should provide a conclusion whether the law used by the
Court when elaborating an individual case is within its function of defining sources
of law or not. i will not however enter the broader field of the theory of sources of
international law, but rather will use the most generally accepted understanding.3
FROM INTERPRETATION TO SOURCES OF LAW

in order to apply the Convention and thus to fulfill its task, the Court has to
interpret its provisions. Ergo, the first step is interpretation. interpretation,
nevertheless, is not confined solely to interpretation of the ECoHR itself, but
extensively to its interpretation in the light of other relevant rules of international
law. Back in history the Court defined:” 29. The submissions made to the Court
were in the first place directed to the manner in which the Convention, and
particularly Article 6 Para. 1 (art. 6–1), should be interpreted. The Court is prepared
to consider, as do the Government and the Commission, that it should be guided
by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of
Treaties. That Convention has not yet entered into force and it specifies, at Article
4, that it will not be retroactive, but its Articles 31 to 33 enunciate in essence
generally accepted principles of international law to which the Court has already
referred on occasion. in this respect, for the interpretation of the European
Convention account is to be taken of those Articles subject, where appropriate, to
“any relevant rules of the organization” – the Council of Europe – within which it
has been adopted (Article 5 of the Vienna Convention).30. in the way in which it
is presented in the “general rule” in Article 3l of the Vienna Convention, the
process of interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a single combined operation; this
rule, closely integrated, places on the same footing the various elements
enumerated in the four paragraphs of the Article.”4 From that judgment up to now,
the interpretation has been governed by the methods of interpretation of
international law as prescribed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Articles 31–33.5 This stand has however yet further significance. Although the
3
Hugh Thirlway, op.cit.; Milenko Kreća, Tijana Šurlan, Međunarodno javno pravo,
Kriminalističko policijski univerzitet, Beograd, 2019.
4
“Court (Plenary), Case of Golder v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no. 4451/70, 21
February 1975.
5
The Golder case is referred to as one of the most important cases in the history of the ECHR, as
it contains the first and perhaps most extensive discussion of the VCLT and the relevant rules of
interpretation, although at that time the VCTL itself had not entered into force. See: George Letsas,
“intentionalism and the interpretation of the ECHR”, in: Malgosia Fitzmaurice, olufemi Elias,
PanosMerkouris (eds), The Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30
Years on, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2010, pp. 257–272.
Court is a regional court, authorized for the field of Human Rights, the Court has
manifested that the European Convention on Human Rights is part of the
international legal system, and that it has to be interpreted in accordance with the
general international rule of interpretation of a treaty.6 Besides mere interpretation,
the Court has expressed the position of the Convention: “The Court reiterates in
this connection that the Convention is an international treaty which, in accordance
with the principle of pacta sunt servanda codified in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, is binding on the Contracting Parties and must
be performed by them in good faith.”7 Another important earlier judgment, for
setting the main approach of interpretation of the ECoHR, was delivered in the
Marckx v. Belgium case. Furthering the approach of evolutive interpretation of the
Convention, the Court has encompassed two international conventions, which it
deemed relevant for the subject matter.8 The said position relied on the previously
adopted approach in the case Tyrerv. the United Kingdom, where the Court
expressed its view on the Convention as a “living instrument” including domestic
law within its interpretation.9 The approach that is specifically interesting in this
case relies on the conventions to which Belgium at that specific moment had not
been a state party to. The approach undertaken in two cited judgments of the Court,
both rendered in the 1970s, presents the main direction that has been followed
until present days and richly developed. There are a number of cases in which the
Court expressed that it was interpreting the Convention according to the general
rule of interpretation in the light of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Articles 31–33.10 For the topic of sources of international law, considered in
conjugation with the interpretation, i will focus only on one aspect of the Article
6
ineta Ziemele, “European Consensus and international Law”, in: Anne Van Aaken, iulia Motoc
(eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, oxford
University Press, 2018, p. 35
7
“Case of Janowiec and others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09 ,
Judgment 21 october 2013 , par. 211.
8
“Case of Marckx v. Belgium”, ECHR, Application no. 6833/74, Judgment13 June 1979, par. 20
and 41. The Brussels Convention of 12 September 1962 on the Establishment of Maternal
Affiliation of Natural Children prepared by the international Commission on Civil Status and
entered into force on 23 April 1964 and the Convention of 15 october 1975 on the Legal Status
of Children born out of Wedlock, which was concluded within the Council of Europe and entered
into force on 11 August 1978.
9
“Case of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no. 5856/72, Judgement 25 April
1978, par. 31: “The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as
the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. in
the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly
accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this
field.”
10
Alexander orakhelashvili, “Restrictive interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, The European Journal of International
Law, 2003, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 529–568.
31.11 When reasoning on the context of the treaty that has to be interpreted, not
only should that subsequent agreement and practice be taken into account, but also
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties” (Article 31 (3) (c)). From that point of view, the stand taken in the Case
of Loizidou v. Turkey, bears specific significance. The Court said: 43. “it is recalled
that the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the rules of interpretation
set out in the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties and that
Article 31 Para. 3 (c) of that treaty indicates that account is to be taken of “any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”
(…). in the Court’s view, the principles underlying the Convention cannot be
interpreted and applied in a vacuum. Mindful of the Convention’s special character
as a human rights treaty, it must also take into account any relevant rules of
international law when deciding on disputes concerning its jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 49 of the Convention (art. 49).”12 This approach has been repeated many
times throughout the Court’s judgments, establishing the position of this stand as
of one of the main directions for the Court`s deliberation.13 The wording of the
cited Article 31 (3) (c), nevertheless, could be subjected to interpretation itself,
raising in concreto the question of the meaning of the words “any relevant rules
of international law” as well as the applicability between parties’ criteria.14 General
understanding directs that relevant rules of international law are nothing else but
sources of law, as enumerated in Article 38 of the iCJ Statute, and that the
applicability criteria means that only sources which are binding, and cover relations
between parties could be understood as relevant.15 on the other hand, although the
Court constantly refers to relevant international law, it has never defined in general
terms how it understands the wording ‘relevant international law’ and what the
Court deems to be a rule of international law. Also, there are no instructions on
the Court’s understanding of the importance of the term “applicable in relations
between parties” for its procedure in individual cases. The Court obviously
developed its own approach, decided on a case-by-case basis, allowing it to
develop manifold approaches toward understanding of the mentioned expressions.
11
Rodoljub Etinski, Tumačenje međunarodnih ugovora: pravila i praksa, Univerzitet Donja Gorica,
Podgorica, 2020; Rodoljub Etinski, “The object and Purpose of a Treaty as a Means of its
interpretation”, Srpski godišnjak za međunarodno pravo, Beograd, 2021, pp. 181–208.
12
“Case of Loizidou v. Turkey”, ECHR, Application no. 15318/89, Judgment 18 December 1996.
13
See for example the Case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 35763/97,
Judgment 21 November 2001, par. 55; “Case of Hassan v. the United Kingdom”, Application
no. 29750/09, Judgment 16 September 2014, par. 77; “Case of Al-Dulimi and Montana
Management inc. v. Switzerland”, Application no. 5809/08, Judgment 21 June 2016, par. 134.
14
Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2009, pp. 433–434; Ulf Linderfalk, “on The interpretation
of Treaties The Modern international Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties”, Law and philosophy library, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, vol. 83, pp.177–182.
15
Ibid.
The most frequent approach is linked to the terms that are used in the VCLT.
The approach that differs, visible in the cited Marckx case or the Loizidou case, has
been further elaborated. in the case of Demir and Bayakara v. Turkey, the Court
elaborates: “78. The Court observes in this connection that in searching for common
ground among the norms of international law it has never distinguished between
sources of law according to whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the
respondent State.”16 Concluding that part of its observations, the Court concludes
as follows: “85. The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text
of the Convention, can and must take into account elements of international law
other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs,
and the practice of European States reflecting their common values. The consensus
emerging from specialized international instruments and from the practice of
Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it
interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases. in this context, it is
not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of
instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case
concerned. it will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international
instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in
international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the
Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in
modern societies (see, mutatis mutandis, Marckx, cited above, § 41).”17 The cited
paragraphs show that the Court refers not only to relevant rules of international law,
but also to “elements of international law” and that the interpretation is a quest for
the common ground that is to be found in “relevant international instruments”,
notwithstanding the fact whether the respondent state is bound by that law or not.
This approach emancipates the Court from the specific wording of Article 31 (3)
(c) of the VCLT, leaving the door wide open to its own discretion on interpretation
of the ECoHR. Also, the cited paragraphs are clear illustrations of devotion to
interpretation and not to generalization on the issue in terms of sources of
international law. The Court did not miss the opportunity to underline its own
discretion: “it is for the Court to decide which international instruments and reports
it considers relevant and how much weight to attribute to them.”18 The cited stand
disclosed that the Court has avoided generally accepted terminology of formal
sources of international law, subsuming the choice of relevant law to its main role,
and that is application of the rights and freedoms set out in the ECoHR. Thus, the
term “relevant” appears to be the most important direction for the reasoning of the
Court when it finds itself faced with a number of rules of international law that
16
“Case of Demir and Bayakara v. Turkey”, ECHR, Application no. 34503/97, Judgment12
November 2008.
17
Ibid.
18
“Case of Tanase v. Moldova”, ECHR, Application no. 7/08, Judgment 27 April 2010, par. 176;
Case of A.-M.V. v. Finland, Application no. 53251/13, Judgment 23 March 2017, par. 74.
could be linked to the subject matter of each and every case. Direction on what is
deemed relevant is however touched with the stand that relevance functions to
provide harmony between various provisions of the ECoHR itself, as well as
harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part.19 This
approach, from the aspect of generally accepted terms of interpretation, could be
understood as systemic interpretation, which is also encompassed in the VCLT
itself.20 However, resorting to systemic interpretation brings us back to the field of
sources of law.21 indeed, in order to find “harmony with other rules of international
law of which it forms part” it is of the utmost significance to know what is
considered under rules of international law, and whether it is important to decide
on the source of law that rules stem from it or not.
SOURCES OF LAW
international law has achieved certainty on what is to be considered as the
formal sources of international law. on the other hand it has not achieved consensus
on what is not to be considered as a formal source of international law.22 Even
analysis of Article 38 of the Statute of the international Court of Justice comes with
the conclusion that the list of sources encompassed within is not the exhaustive
list.23 Development of international law contributes to the conclusion that besides
international treaties and international customs, which are considered as main
formal sources of international law, there are other rules expressed in various legal
acts or instruments that could also be considered as sources of international law.24
However, divergence on their enumeration, comprehension of their place within
the system of international law, and their role and impact still exist. Jurisprudence
of the ECHR is yet another ground itself for the development of disagreement on
what formal sources of international law are or are not, leading even to a dilemma
about whether the generally accepted theory of the sources is still sufficient.
19
“Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia”, ECHR, Application no. 25965/04, Judgment 7 January
2010, par. 274.
20
Ulf Linderfalk, op.cit.,, p. 265; Campbell McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic integration
and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
2005, Vol. 54, pp. 279–320.
21
Mads Andenas, Johann Ruben Leiss, “The Systemic Relevance of ʻJudicial Decisionsʼ in Article
38 of the iCJ Statute”, ZaoRV, 2017, vol. 77, 907–972; Pieter Jan Kuijper, “The European Courts
and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story”, in: Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The Law of Treaties
Beyond the Vienna Convention, oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 256–276.
22
Samantha Besson, Jean d’Aspremont, “The Sources of international Law: An introduction”, in:
Samantha Besson, Jean d’Aspremont (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of
International Law, oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 1–43.
23
“Article 38 in itself is not the ‘source of sources’.” See: Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of
International Law, oxford University Press, 2019, p. 10.
24
Ibid., p. 14.
in the formal structure of the ECHR judgments there is a section headed

Relevant Law. That section is also titled either relevant domestic and international
law, or relevant domestic law and practice, or relevant international law and
practice.25 other versions could be found, such as “international material” or
“provisions of public international law”.26 Under that section the Court enumerates
law that it deems relevant for the individual case that it is deliberating. in the part
dedicated to international law, literally every rule that is “international” could be
found, as well as the interpretation of a rule given by various international courts
or bodies that function in the field of international law. The variety of the inner
structure of the section itself is adjusted to the specific subject matter of the case.
Thus, the heading or structure of the section does not offer any grounds for any
conclusion whatsoever on the importance or difference between rules or sources
of law that could be listed within the section. overall jurisprudence direct the
conclusion that a list of the relevant law is under the discretion of the Court and
that the same significance is given to international treaties and international customs,
as well as to jurisprudence of other international courts as a subsidiary means of
determining the rule of law, or to soft law and soft jurisprudence.27 Listed relevant
law could be further on interpreted and used throughout the Court`s Assessments
and in the concluding parts of judgments. This again is at the full disposal of the
Court. To sum it up, an integrative approach towards the enumeration of relevant
international law primary gives ground for the conclusion that the Court’s approach
is adjusted to each concrete case. Since individual cases could arise literally from
every international law issue, the Court’s goal is to adapt its reasoning to
circumstances of a specific case.28 i will focus on specific cases that offer grounds
for further generalization on the approach toward different sources of international
law. international treaties, although not disputably the main formal source of
international law, nevertheless are applied in a manner that shows variety itself.
Throughout its jurisprudence the Court has considered as relevant both treaties from
the fields of international public law and international private law. The Court has
not drawn difference between treaties that are bilateral or multilateral. it has not
drawn a distinction between human rights treaties and treaties from other branches
25
“Case of Demir and Bayakara v. Turkey”, ECHR, Application no. 34503/97, Judgment12
November 2008; “Case of Cudak v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application no.15869/02, Judgment 23
March 2010.
26
“Case of Y v. Poland”, ECHR, Application no. 74131/14, Judgment 17 February 2022; Case of
Żurek v. Poland, Application no. 39650/18, Judgment 16 June 2022; “Case of Gafgen v.
Germany”, ECHR, Application no. 22978/05, Judgment 1 June 2010.
27
Geir Ulfstein, Evolutive interpretation in the Lights of other international instruments: Law and
Legitimacy, in: Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights
and General International Law, oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 83–94.
28
“Case of Kononov v. Latvia”, ECHR, Application no. 36376/04, Judgment 17 May 2010, is a
striking example of the complexity of legal issues and breadth of legal instruments that could be
employed in one case.
of international public law. When it comes to a treaty, every treaty that is

international by its subject matter has been treated equally and with the same
significance. This approach is legalistic and stems from the legal nature of an
international treaty. However, the Court has developed an extensive approach
toward the use of treaties, turning to treaties that are not in force, or to treaties that
a respondent state has not given its consent to. This approach departs from the
generally accepted understanding that the treaty is binding from the moment it
enters into force and only towards the subjects of law that are parties to the treaty,
and that only a treaty that is binding could be a source of law. Nevertheless,
although this logic is rational and aligned with the jurisdiction of application and
interpretation of the ECoHR, the outcome of reaching towards international treaties
is not onefold. A twofold impact could be noticed – treaties that are identified as a
part of the overall scope of rules that influence interpretation of human rights and
treaties that are themselves interpreted and as such embedded in the Court`s
assessment or in the final conclusion on a specific case as a source of international
law. Thus, the Court has found itself reasoning both on topics that come within the
field of human rights and on topics that belong to general international law or other
branches of international law.29 The striking example, when it comes to the Court’s
role in interpreting rules deriving from other branches of international law, is the
Case of Hassan v. the UK.30 Although this case is significant itself, especially the
outcome of the case, at this point i will focus only on the application and
interpretation of an international treaty other than the ECoHR. This case directed
the Court to address the challenging issues of international law, that is the relation
between international Humanitarian Law and international Human Rights Law.31
The Court expressed its general understanding that these two branches co-exist,
leaning its conclusion on the findings of the international Court of Justice.32 it
underlined that both legal regimes should be interpreted as mutually influencing:
“As with the grounds of permitted detention already set out in those subparagraphs,
deprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under international humanitarian law must
29
Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc, Johann Justus Vasel, “The European Convention on Human
Rights and General international Law”, in: Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc (eds.), The European
Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, oxford University Press, 2018,
pp. 1–20.
30
“Case of Hassan v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no. 29750/09, Judgment 16
September 2014.
31
Fausto Pocar, “Some Remarks on the Continuity of Human Rights and international
Humanitarian Law Treaties”, in: Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.),The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna
Convention, oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 279–295.
32
it should be noted that the Court missed the opportunity to address this issue in previous cases
dealing with iHL. For example, the notable Case Al-Skeini v. the UK also raised fundamental
issues of the iHL, the Court had listed Geneva Conventions in the section Relevant international
law, also relied heavily on the reasoning of the iCJ, but did not refer to any of them in the Court`s
assessment, nor expressing its stand on the relations between two regimes of law. Similarly,
“Case of Kononov v. Latvia”.
be “lawful” to preclude a violation of Article 5§1. This means that the detention
must comply with the rules of international humanitarian law and, most importantly,
that it should be in keeping with the fundamental purpose of Article 5§1, which is
to protect the individual from arbitrariness (…).”33 However, in another paragraph
the Court expresses understanding “that there are important differences of context
and purpose between arrests carried out during peacetime and the arrest of a
combatant in the course of an armed conflict”34 furthering the interpretation of the
regime created within the Third and Forth Geneva Convention. The Courts
approach in interpreting the norms of the Geneva Conventions is itself unusually
extensive.35 Although the Court invoked VCLT Article 31 and by it created a
possibility to apply a subsequent agreement in situations where there is no such
agreement, the Court opted “that a consistent practice on the part of the High
Contracting Parties, subsequent to their ratification of the Convention, could be
taken as establishing their agreement not only as regards interpretation but even to
modify the text of the Convention”.36 The Hassan case is striking example of the
Courts implementation and application of conventions other than the ECoHR,
directing the understanding of the external observer that another international treaty
was applied as a source of international law itself. Another illustrative example
concerning the discussion on treaties as a source of international law is the Case of
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. one of the human rights deliberated within this case
was the prohibition of slavery and forced labour prescribed in Article 4 of the
ECoHR. The Court first went into in-depth analysis of the notions slavery and
trafficking in human beings, establishing whether the scope of Article 4 of the
Convention covers trafficking in human beings. The first task was achieved through
the enumeration of a number of relevant international rules, among which were the
1926 Slavery Convention, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Palermo Convention and Council of Europe Anti-
Trafficking Convention. Besides building the notion of trafficking in human beings,
in the light of the notion of slavery defined and independently in cited conventions,
the Court went on to elaborate the positive obligations of a state toward the victims
of trafficking, investigation methods, adoption of legislative and administrative
frameworks and a positive obligation to investigate potential trafficking. The scope
of positive obligations has been analysed through the application and interpretation
of the rules set out primarily in the Palermo Convention and the Anti-Trafficking
33
“Case of Hassan v. the United Kingdom”, par. 105.
34
Ibid, par. 97.
35
The judgement was followed by four judges’ strongly worded dissenting opinions. As well, this
judgment has been labeled as judicial imperialism, and elaborated in a number of scholarly articles.
See: “Cedric De Koker, “Hassan v. the United Kingdom: The interaction of Human Rights Law
and international Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed
Conflicts”, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 2015, vol. 81, pp. 90–96.
36
“Case of Hassan v. the United Kingdom”, op. cit., par.101.
Convention. it is evident that the Court has been applying directly provisions set
forth in these Conventions when deliberating this case. For example, the Court
reasoned: “The Court recalls the obligations undertaken by the Cypriot authorities
in the context of the Palermo Protocol and, subsequently, the Anti-Trafficking
Convention to ensure adequate training to those working in relevant fields to enable
them to identify potential trafficking victims (see paragraphs 155 and 167 above).
in particular, under Article 10 of the Palermo Protocol, States undertake to provide
or strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration and other relevant officials
in the prevention of trafficking in persons. in the Court’s opinion, there were
sufficient indicators available to the police authorities, against the general backdrop
of trafficking issues in Cyprus, for them to have been aware of circumstances giving
rise to a credible suspicion that Ms Rantseva was, or was at real and immediate risk
of being, a victim of trafficking or exploitation. Accordingly, a positive obligation
arose to investigate without delay and to take any necessary operational measures
to protect Ms Rantseva.”37 This case is another significant example of the direct
application and interpretation of treaties other than the ECoHR, leading to the
conclusion that treaties are treated as a formal source of law and not just as guidance
for interpretation of the ECoHR. There are many examples of this kind, all of them
fitting within the same formula – whenever the Court is faced with notions of
general international law or notions defined in a specific branch of international
law, it reaches for the application and interpretation of basic rules that define these
notions.38 Thus, international treaties can provide independent source of law, other
than the ECoHR, when deliberation of a specific case deems that necessary. in the
interpretation and application of a human right defined within the ECoHR, the Court
also referred to other human rights treaties.39 There are a number of cases in which
the Court cited other human rights treaties, as well as their interpretation given by
human rights treaty bodies. At this point, i would refer only to one case. The Court,
interpreting Article 3 of the ECoHR, stated: “it is an absolute right, permitting of
no exception in any circumstances” referring to its own jurisprudence.40
Nevertheless, the Court deemed it necessary to empower this statement by
enumerating other human rights treaties and the provisions on torture within, as
well as judicial statements. Although this was not necessary, it shows the Courts`
devotion to its “harmonizing” role.
The Court has reached towards international customs as well, either as a
direction for the interpretation of rights set in the ECoHR or through identification
37
“Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia”, ECHR, Application no. 25965/04, Judgment 7 January
2010, par. 97.
38
Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc, Johann Justus Vasel, op.cit.
39
Robert Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of
Subsidiarity”, Human Rights Law Review, 2014, Vol.14, no. 3, pp. 487–502.
40
“Case of Al-Adsani v. the UK”, ECHR, Application no.35763/97, Judgment 21 November 2001,
par. 59.
and application of a rule of customary law.41 in the second task, which is

challenging and delicate, the Court has generally followed and relied on the
reasoning and findings of other international courts.42 The Case Cudak v. Lithuania
is an interesting example for discussion on how the ECHR uses international
custom.43 it is not unimportant to stress that within this case the Court had to
elaborate on the concept of State immunities, which is a notion of general
international law, but also on law on diplomatic relations between states. Under
the heading Relevant international Law and Practice, the Court listed relevant
provisions of the 1972 European Convention on State immunity (“the Basle
Convention”), the UN Convention on Jurisdictional immunities of States and their
Property, and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As for the
UN Convention on Jurisdictional immunities of States and their Property, the Court
specifically expressed “31. Lithuania did not vote against the adoption of this text
but has not ratified it either”.44 Besides the conventions, the Court enlisted the UN
iLC’s Draft Articles of 1991 on jurisdictional immunities of States and their
property, underlying specifically: “Lithuania never made any negative observation
on those drafts. The Draft Articles that were used as the basis for the text adopted
in 2004 dated back to 1991.“45 The Court deemed it necessary to clarify at this
point: “29. in the commentary on the iLC’s Draft Articles of 1991, it was stated
that the rules formulated in Article 11 appeared to be consistent with the trend in
the legislative and treaty practice of a growing number of States (iLC Yearbook,
1991, Vol. ii, Part 2, p. 44, paragraph 14).”46 Custom was not referred to. However,
in the part of the judgment under the heading The Court`s Assessment the VCLT
Article 31 (3) (c) was invoked, stressing specifically that when interpreting the
ECoHR “it must also take the relevant rules of international law into account,
including those relating to the grant of State immunity”.47 Continuing, the Court
went into in-depth analysis of the concept of State immunity, starting from the
principle par in parem non habet imperium, over via the iLC Draft Articles, to
several striking conclusions. The Court expressed that “it is a well-established
principle of international law that, even if a State has not ratified a treaty, it may
41
ineta Ziemele, Customary international Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Human
Rights – The Method, The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2013, vol.
12, no. 2.
42
Notable cases from the point of customary international law are “Al-Adsani v. the United
Kingdom”, Application no. 35763/97, Judgment 21 November 2001; “Korbely v. Hungary”,
Application no. 9174/02, Judgment 19 September 2008; “Cudak v. Lithuania”, Application no.
15869/02, Judgment 23 March 2010, deliberated by the Grand Chamber, and the” Case Jones v.
the United Kingdom”, Applications nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, Judgment 14 January 2014.
43
Geir Ulfstein, op. cit.
44
“Case of Cudak v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application no. 15869/02, Judgment 23 March 2010.
45
Ibid. par. 28.
46
Ibid. par. 29.
47
Ibid. par. 56.
be bound by one of its provisions in so far as that provision reflects customary

international law, either “codifying” it or forming a new customary rule”.48
Establishing the grounds to refer to an international custom, the Court used another
argument: “Moreover, there were no particular objections by States to the wording
of Article 11 of the iLC’s Draft Articles, at least not by the respondent State. As to
the 2004 United Nations Convention, Lithuania has admittedly not ratified it but
did not vote against its adoption either.”49 The final conclusion was that “it is
possible to affirm that Article 11 of the iLC’s 1991 Draft Articles, on which the
2004 United Nations Convention was based, applies to the respondent State under
customary international law”.50 This reasoning shows that even when the Court
referred to a rule of international law, it nevertheless sought the formal source of
international law from which that rule stems. in presented case, although the Court
did not employ itself with the challenging task of establishing the general existence
of a custom, it applied the doctrine of the persistent objector empowering by it the
draft rule.51 Turning back to the main topic of this Paper, it could be concluded
that the Court, besides rules of international law, reaches for the notion of a formal
source of international law, i.e. international custom, empowering through it the
significance of that rule, i.e. its binding nature. in the Case Korbely v. Hungary,
customary international humanitarian law was enumerated in the section relevant
to international law.52 in this case, the Court relied on the view of the Red Cross
(iCRC) expressed within its study on customary international humanitarian law.
Following the structure of Article 38 of the iCJ`s Statute, judicial decisions
as‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ have been used by the
Court as well. Notwithstanding the Court’s own jurisprudence, which is always
used as an illustration of judicial consistency, i will here focus on the choice of
other courts’ jurisprudence. As already mentioned above, in the Hassan case, the
Court relied on the reasoning of the international Court of Justice.53 Besides, it
used the reasoning of other international courts, such as the international Criminal
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia,54 international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,55
international Criminal Court,56 as well as inter-American Court of Human Rights57
48
This stand was leaned on the reasoning of the iCJ, expressed in the “North Sea Continental Shelf
cases”.
49
“Case of Cudak v. Lithuania”, op. cit., par. 66.
50
Ibid. par. 67.
51
Ricardo Pavoni, “The Myth of the Customary Nature of the United Nations Convention on State
immunity: Does the End Justify the Means?”, in: Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc (eds.), The
European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, oxford University
Press, 2018, pp. 264–283.
52
“Case of Korbely v. Hungary”, ECHR, Application no.9174/02, Judgment 19 September 2008.
53
“Case of Savickis and others v. Latvia”, ECHR (Application no. 49270/11), Judgment 9 June
2022; “Case of Jorgic v. Germany”, ECHR, Application no. 74613/01, Judgment 12 July 2007;
“Case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no.27021/08, Judgment 7
July 2011.
or the Court of Justice of the European Union.58 The breadth of the Court’s
approach towards jurisprudence of other courts is also visible, inter alia, in the
Kononov Case, where the Court invoked, inter alia, charters and judgments of the
international Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. The Court was keen to
elaborate on certain aspects of law already reasoned by other international courts,
although not necessarily reasoning in the same way. For example, in the Case of
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, the Court referred to the reasoning of the
international Court of Justice, the inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well
as the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee against Torture, but
accepted a different approach from them. Besides invoking rules stemming from
“hard law”, the Court has constantly referred to rules stemming from “soft law”.59
Having no consensus of what exactly “soft law” is or what legal acts come under
the heading of soft law, further on i will use this expression for all legal acts that
have not gone through a typical international law-making procedure, the procedure
that allows without doubt the expression of content of subjects of law.60 There is
a useful working definition of a soft law, saying that it is a system of international
commitments or obligations that are not regarded by those concerned as binding
54
“Case of Al-Adsani v. the UK”, ECHR, Application no.35763/97, Judgment 21 November 2001;
“Case of Jorgic v. Germany”, ECHR, Application no. 74613/01, Judgment 12 July 2007; “Case
of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application no. 35343/05, Judgment 20 october 2015;
“Case of Korbely v. Hungary”, ECHR, Application no. 9174/02, Judgment 19 September 2009;
“Case of Perincek v. Switzerland”, ECHR, Application No. 27510/08, Judgment 15 october
2015.
55
“Case of Korbely v. Hungary”, ECHR, Application no. 9174/02, Judgment 19 September 2009;
“Case of Perincek v. Switzerland”, ECHR, Application No. 27510/08, Judgment 15 october
2015;”Case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application no.. 35343/05, Judgment 20
october 2015.
56
“Case of Korbely v. Hungary, Application no. 9174/02”, ECHR, Judgment 19 September 2009;
“Case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application no. 35343/05, Judgment 20 october
2015.
57
“Case of Savickis and others v. Latvia, ECHR, (Application no. 49270/11), Judgment 9 June
2022; “Case of Gafgen v. Germany”, ECHR, Application no. 22978/05, 1 June 2010; “Case of
Gudmundur Andri Astradsson v. iceland”, ECHR, Application no. 26374/18, Judgment 1
December 2020.
58
“Case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no.27021/08, Judgment 7 July
2011; “Case of Gudmundur Andri Astradsson v. iceland”, ECHR, Application no. 26374/18,
Judgment 1 December 2020; “Case of Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania”, ECHR, Application
no. 41288/15, Judgment 14 January 2020.
59
“Case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey”, ECHR, Applications nos. 46827/99 and
46951/99, Judgment 4 February 2005; Angelika Nusberger, “Hard Law or Soft Law – Does it
Matter?: Distinction Between Different Sources of international Law in the Jurisprudence of the
ECtHR”, in: Anne van Aaken, iulia Motoc (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights
and General International Law, oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 41–58.
60
Jean d’Aspremont, “Softness in international Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal
Materials”, The European Journal of International Law, 2008, Vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 1075–1093.
in the sense that can be enforced in the same way as those imposed by international
law proper, but yet are considered as something more than mere political gestures,
so that there is an expectation of compliance even if there is no legal duty.61
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has been referring to a plethora of
international legal texts which to a greater or lesser degree regulate, or purport to
regulate, State action, such as resolutions, declarations, decisions,
recommendations, reports, commentaries, strategy statements and explanatory
observations. At the moment, the conceptual category of soft law seems to be the
most appropriate means of generalization for all of them. Soft law materials used
by the Court are products of either international organizations or NGos. At this
point of discussion, i will refer to those legal acts that are not considered for
decisions of international organizations that themselves have acquired an
independent position in the list of possible new sorts of formal sources of
international law, but rather to those whose binding effect is missing or is at least
questionable.62 Turning to materials produced by the Council of Europe and its
various organs and bodies, itis understandable and expected that they are
acknowledged and applied by the Court. Being part of the Council of Europe, the
Court is generally expected to apply the reasoning of other parts of the same
regional system. its systemic interpretation approach, governed by the aim of
harmonizing the regional human rights system, in this sense is obvious and
desirable and it has resulted in the rich enumeration of various legal texts.
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has referred to recommendations of the
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.63 For example, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to
human rights for internet users, adopted on 16 April 2014;64 The Council of
Europe’s Disability Strategy 2017-2023, entitled “Human Rights: A reality for all”,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 November 2016; or
“Recommendation Rec(2006)5 on the Council of Europe Action Plan 2006-2015
to promote the rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society”,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers;65 or Recommendation of the Committee
of Ministers CM/Rec(2019)11 of March 2020, entitled “Effective guardianship
for unaccompanied and separated children in the context of migration”.66 Similarly,
acts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have been listed,
61
Hugh Thirlway, op. cit., pp. 188–189.
62
UN SC Resolution, in: “Case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom”, Application no.27021/08,
Judgment 7 July 2011.
63
“Affaire de Giorgi c. italie, Requête no 23735/19”, ECHR, 16 juin 2022; “Case of Ananyev and
others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos.42525/07 and 60800/08, Judgment, 10 January 2012.
64
“Case of Standard Verlagsgesellschaft MBH v. Austria (No. 3)”, ECHR, Application no.
39378/15, Judgment 7 December 2021.
65
“Case of ArnarHelgiLarusson v. iceland”, ECHR, Application no. 23077/19, Judgment 31 May
2022.
such as Resolution 189 (1960) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe, entitled “Situation in the Baltic States on the twentieth anniversary of their
forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union”, adopted on 29 September 1960,
Resolution 1810 (2011) “Unaccompanied children in Europe: issues of arrival,
stay and return”, 15 April 2011;Recommendation no. 1985 (2011) “Undocumented
migrant children in an irregular situation: a real cause of concern”, 7 october 2011,
etc.67 Besides acts adopted by the main organs of the Council of Europe, acts
adopted by other bodies have been listed as well. For example: The Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe material published on 31 August 2010
– Human Rights Comment entitled “Forced divorce and sterilization – a reality
for many transgender persons”,or The Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights – “Realizing the right to family reunification of refugees in
Europe”, February 2017.68 Material adopted by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General has been listed as well, for example: “The Thematic Report on
migrant and refugee children” prepared by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General on migration and refugees (SRSG), 10 March 2017.69 Also,
general legal texts produced by the Venice Commission have been cited, such as
The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe (CDL-AD (2002) 23 rev), or The Report by the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the
Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion (CDL-
AD(2008)026, 23 october 2008), or Venice Commission, Report on the Freedom
of Expression of Judges, adopted at its 103rd Plenary Session (Venice, 19–20 June
2015, CDL-AD(2015)018).70 Conclusion by the Venice Commission considering
specific legal act that has been supervised by this body, has also been into account,
for example, conclusions concerning the Russian Foreign Agents Act.71 in addition
to the list, another body that is a part of the CoE`s wider system and whose work
has been acknowledged by the Court is the European Commission against Racism
and intolerance (ECRi). For example, the Court has cited its General Policy
66
“Case of Darboe and Camara v. italy”, ECHR, Application no.5797/17, Judgment 21 July 2022.
67
“Case of Savickis and others v. Latvia”, ECHR (Application no. 49270/11), Judgment 9 June
2022; “Case of Darboe and Camara v. italy”, ECHR, Application no.5797/17, Judgment 21 July
2022.
68
“Case of Y v. Poland, Application no. 74131/14”, ECHR, Judgment 17 February 2022; “Case
of Darboe and Camara v. italy, Application no.5797/17”, ECHR, Judgment 21 July 2022.
69
“Case of Darboe and Camara v. italy, Application no.5797/17”, ECHR, Judgment 21 July 2022.
70
“Case of Tanase v. Moldova”, ECHR, Application no. 7/08, Judgment 27 April 2010; “Case of
Scoppola v. italy (No.3)”, ECHR, Application no. 126/05, Judgment 22 May 2012; “Case of
Taganrog LRo and others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos. 32401/10 and 19 others see
appended list, Judgment 7 June 2022; “Case of Żurek v. Poland”, ECHR, Application no.
39650/18, Judgment 16 June 2022.
71
“Case of Ecodefence and others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos. 9988/13 and 60 0thers,
Judgment 14 June 2022.
Recommendation No. 15 on combating hate speech, adopted on 8 December 2015

and the understanding of hate speech as indicated in this recommendation.72
Similarly, the Court invoked a General Policy Recommendation No. 13 on
combating anti-gypsyism and discrimination against Roma, adopted on 24 June
2011 and amended on 1 December 2020, citing specific measures that states were
recommended to apply.73 Besides selected examples that cover general findings
of respectful organs or bodies, the Court referred to texts that have been adopted
specifically toward a respondent state as well, for example, the Report adopted
during the fourth monitoring cycle on Latvia, adopted by ECRi on 9 December
2011.74 The Court has employed the same diligence when listing legal texts
produced by other international organizations. According to the needs of each case,
the Court has turned to materials produced by various organs and bodies of the
United Nations, European Union, organization for Co-operation and
Development, organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, international
Labor organization, World Health organisation, etc.75 The Court has encompassed
the reasoning of non-governmental organizations as well. These bodies, unlike in
the rest of international law where they are not considered as a subject of law, hold
strong position in procedures before the Court. Not only can they participate in
72
“Case of Taganrog LRo and others v. Russia, Applications nos. 32401/10 and 19 others see
appended list”, ECHR, Judgment 7 June 2022.
73
“Case of X and others v. Albania, Applications nos. 73548/17 and 45521/19”, ECHR, Judgment, 31
May 2022.
74
“Case of Savick is and others v. Latvia”, ECHR (Application no. 49270/11), Judgment 9 June 2022.
75
“Case ofGafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05”, ECHR, Judgment 1 June 2010; “Case
of Ananyev and others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos.42525/07 and 60800/08, Judgment, 10
January 2012; “Case of Standard Verlagsgesellschaft MBH v. Austria (No. 3)”, ECHR, Application
no. 39378/15, Judgment 7 December 2021; “Case of Abdi ibrahim v. Norway”, ECHR, Application
no. 15379/16, Judgment 10 December 2021; “Case of ArnarHelgiLarusson v. iceland”, ECHR,
Application no. 23077/19, Judgment 31 May 2022; “Case ofT.C. v. italy”, ECHR, Application no.
54032/18, 19 May 2022; “Case of Żurek v. Poland”, ECHR, Application no. 39650/18, Judgment
16 June 2022.; “Case of Ecodefence and others v. Russia”, ECHR, Applications nos. 9988/13 and
60 0thers, Judgment 14 June 2022; “Case of Perincek v. Switzerland, ECHR, Application No.
27510/08”, Judgment 15 october 2015;” Case of Leuska and others v. Estonia”, ECHR, Application
no. 64734/11, Judgment, 7 November 2017; “The Case of Kurt v. Austria”, ECHR, Application no.
62903/15, Judgment 15 June 2021; “Case of X and others v. Albania”, ECHR, Applications nos.
73548/17 and 45521/19, Judgment 31 May 2022; “Case of Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania”,
ECHR, Application no. 41288/15, Judgment 14 January 2020; “Case of Jivan v. Romania”, ECHR,
Application no. 62250/19, Judgment 8 February 2022; “Case of Samoylova v. Russia”, ECHR,
Application no. 49108/11, Judgment 14 December 2021; “Case of Maktouf and Damjanović v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, ECHR, Applications nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, 18 July 2013;”Case of
Reczkowicz v. Poland”, ECHR, Application no. 43447/19, Judgment 22 July 2021; “Case of National
Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom”, ECHR, Application no.
31045/10, Judgment8 April 2014; “Case of Vlahov v. Croatia”, ECHR, Application no. 31163/13,
Judgment 5 May 2022; “Case of Makshakov v. Russia”, ECHR, Application no. 52526/07,
Judgment, 24 May 2016; “Case of Belane Nagy v. Hungary”, ECHR, Application no. 53080/13,
Judgment 13 December 2016; “Case of Petukhov v. Ukraine (No. 2)”, ECHR, Application no.
41216/13, Judgment, 12 March 2019.
the procedure as a third-party intervener, but their findings could be taken into
account by the Court as well.76 Although this position is understandable from the
wider “human-rightist” perspective, it is yet in divergence from general
international law. There are a number of cases where the Court reached for
materials produced by NGos, either in their general outcome on certain topic or
directly towards a concrete state. For example, in the Case of Y v. Poland, the
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and European Centre for Law and Justice
acted as third-party interveners, but the Court did not further elaborate on their
addition to the case.77 in the Case Žurek v. Poland, the Court took into account a
report published by Amnesty international entitled “Poland: Free Courts, Free
People, Judges Standing for Their independence”, citing parts of their findings.
However, this case, significant as it is for Poland itself, and even more for the
general understanding of the concept of the judicial independence, from the point
of view of sources of law, is an excellent example how the role and work of NGos
can be influential. Not only did a number of NGos submit their written statements
from the position of the third-party interveners, but the Court took into elaboration
statements of NGos expressed toward the applicant himself, for the period prior
to the procedure before the Court. Another group of legal texts coming under the
title of soft law or even more precisely “soft jurisprudence” that have been taken
into account by the Court, are texts that have been adopted by bodies whose own
mandate is to monitor the implementation of specific treaties in the field of human
rights.78 These bodies function either under the auspices of the Council of Europe
or the United Nations. There is also a variety of legal acts that those bodies can
adopt, with different legal significance to the specific subject matter. Adapting its
search for relevant international rules, the Court has reached either to general
observations, or reports and recommendations adopted for concrete state, as well
as general comments adopted by treaty bodies or specific decisions adopted in
individual cases brought against states. The use of these texts has been directed
either in the search for more information on specific issue concerning concrete
states, or in the search for understanding of specific human rights that treaty bodies
are specialized to protect. For example, in the Case of Darboe and Camara v. Italy,
the Court took into account reports submitted by italy and reports on italy adopted
by the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Being (GRETA),
concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings. Similarly, findings by GRETA were used
in the Case S.M. v. Croatia, both general findings of this body and specific reports
concerning Croatia.79 in the Case of Samoylova v. Russia, the Court based its
76
Rachel A. Cichowski, “Civil Society and the European court of Human Rights”, in: Jonas
Christoffersen, Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law
and Politics, oxford Academic, online edn, 2011, pp. 77–97.
77
“Case of Y v. Poland”, ECHR, Application no. 74131/14, Judgment 17 February 2022.
78
Geir Ulfstein, op. cit.
79
“Case of S.M. v. Croatia”, ECHR, Application no. 60561/14, Judgment 25 June 2020.
findings on the General Activity Report adopted by GRECo in 2019, the body
established by the Council of Europe to monitor States` compliance with the
organization’s anti-corruption standards. in the Case Kurt v. Austria, the Court in
extenso presented the istanbul Convention and findings by GREVio – the body
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the istanbul Convention,
concerning Austria.80 one of the CoE bodies whose findings have been often used
by the Court is the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – CPT, the body monitoring
implementation of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.81 For example, several cases
brought against Serbia for violation of Article 3 of the ECoHR, have been
elaborated by the Court with reference to findings of the CPT.82 Special attention
has been given to the work of UN treaty bodies in the field of human rights.83 Since
there are ten treaty bodies, authorized for monitoring the implementation of
specific human rights treaties, each of them has achieved its own more-or-less
significant role in interpretation and application of human rights. Thus, it is
welcomed that the Court is keen on using the knowledge and experience that these
bodies collect. More than once, materials of these bodies have been used by the
Court. i will illustrate this statement with a few examples. in a very complex and
voluminous case initiated by sixty NGos, the Case of Ecodefence and Others v.
Russia, the Court listed comprehensive relevant international law under the
heading “intergovernmental organisations and advisory bodies”. Findings
concerning Russia, inter alia, encompassed a report on Russia by the UN Human
Rights Committee, Committee against Torture and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. The focus of the Court in that part was on clarification
of the “foreign-agent” legislation, where findings of the UN bodies supplied the
Court with additional information for deliberation of Article 11 of the ECoHR.in
another complex case, in which the Court found the violation of articles 3, 8 and
14 of the ECoHR, the Case of Darboe and Camara v. Italy, the Court referred,
inter alia, to several General Comments adopted by the UN Committee on the
Rights of a Child, besides rich legal material stemming from the work of the
Council of Europe. Comprehensive elaboration was focused on the overall legal
position of a child in the specific circumstances of that case. in the Case of Abdi
80
“Case of Kurt v. Austria”, ECHR, Application no. 62903/15, Judgment 15 June 2021.
81
“Case Shirkhanyan v. Armenia”, Report to the Armenian Government on the visit to Armenia
carried out by the CPT from 5 to 15 october 2015, as well as the response of Armenian
Government to it; “CPT – the Case of Haghilo v. Cyprus”, ECHR, Application no. 47920/12,
Judgment 26 March 2019.
82
“Case of Krsmanovic v. Serbia”, ECHR, Application no. 19796/14, Judgment 19 December
2017; “Case of Gjini v. Serbia”, ECHR, Application no. 1128/16, Judgment 15 January 2019;
“Case of Jevtovic v. Serbia”, ECHR, Application no. 29896/14, Judgment 3 December 2019.
83
Tijana Šurlan, Univerzalna međunarodna ljudska prava – mehanizmi zaštite, Kriminalističko
policijska akademija, Beograd, 2014.
Ibrahim v. Norway, the Court took into account not only the UN CRC General
Comment No.14 (2013), but also its Concluding observations on the combined
fifth and sixth periodic reports of Norway.84 Since the CRC is the body specialized
for the rights of a child, under the regime created by the UN Convention on the
Rights of a Child it is understandable that harmonizing the role of the Court did
lead it to elaboration of stands taken by the Committee as a specialized body. in
the Case Kurt v. Austria, the Court undertook extensive enumeration of relevant
law. Besides relying on texts and findings stemming from the Council of Europe
convention and monitoring body, it furthered the “relevant legal framework” to
the universal convention and the body monitoring it – Convention on the
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women and the findings of
CEDAW. it cited findings of CEDAW gained in the procedure on individual case,
as well as Concluding observations concerning Austria and two General
Recommendations. Not only has the Court relied on findings of bodies monitoring
treaties on specific human rights, such as rights of a child or rights for protection
of women, it has also relied on findings of bodies that protect the same human
rights as those enlisted in the ECoHR. Findings of the UN Human Rights
Committee are used by the Court in enlightening specific aspects of certain human
rights, in all forms of its work. For example, the HRC General Comment No.25,
and Views adopted in the individual case in the Case of Scoppola v. italy (No.3),
or HRC Concluding observations on Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Case of
Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications nos. 2312/08
and 34179/08, 18 July 2013.All these examples of soft law present a variety of
legal texts that are considered by the Court under the general title “relevant rules
of international law”. A description of the application of these texts, is the same as
it has been offered for the elaboration of the twofold application of the hard law
above in the text. All soft law materials have also been enumerated either in the
section “Relevant Law” or through the Court`s Assessments and Conclusion.
Weight given to them relies on the Courts discretion, with no generally accepted
formula, but on a case-by-case basis. Rules stemming from soft law instruments
have been treated in the same manner as rules stemming from the decisions of
international organizations that are considered as a formal source of international
law. on the other hand, there is no visible predominance of hard law sources of
law, which could lead to the conclusion that there is legal difference between them
from the Court’s standpoint. Summing up this presented analysis, it could be
concluded that the Court has given different readings of Article 31 of the VCLT.85
Although it refers to the generally accepted means of interpretation as defined
84
“Case of Abdi ibrahim v. Norway”, ECHR, Application no. 15379/16, Judgment 10 December 2021.
85
Pieter Jan Kuijper, “The European Courts and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story”, in:
Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, oxford University
Press, 2011, pp.256-276; Françoise Tulkens, “Judicial Activism v Judicial Restraint: Practical
Experience of This (False) Dilemma at the European Court of Human Rights”, European
Convention on Human Rights Law Review, 2002, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 293–300.
within this article, its own reading of Article 31 (3) (c) differs from the usual
understanding.86 Thus, if in the general understanding the notion “rules of
international law” is in fact reference to the formal sources of international law,
then from the Court’s standpoint soft law comes under that heading as well. in
contrast, it can be stated that the Court has developed different approach to the
concept of “binding rules”. The predominant understanding is that a source of
international law derives its authority from the direct consent of subjects of law
that are entitled to create a law. The Court has added to that list those legal
instruments that derive their authority from the indirect consent of subjects of law,
which is embodied in the performance of international organizations or
international treaty bodies. indeed, every legal instrument carries a certain scope
of consent, but expressed using different techniques. At least, to use iCJ`s wording,
even if they are not binding, they “may sometimes have normative value”.87 The
jurisprudence of the ECHR itself comes under the heading ‘subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law’. Although its role is not to create a theory on
sources of international law it certainly influences how theory will be formulated.
The jurisprudence of the ECHR is thus added value for all those lawyers who are
advocating understanding that soft law is source of international law.
CONCLUSION
For the final conclusion, it is very important to acknowledge another aspect
important for the overall overview. The Court’s task is not to develop a theory of
international law or nomenclature of its notions. it is not for the Court to elaborate
within a judgment whether a certain legal text is a formal source of international
law or not. The Court’s task, from the point of view of an applicant, is to decide
whether his or her human right has been violated. However, from the Court’s
point of view, the Court sees itself as a “Constitutional Court of Europe”.88 From
that position, the ECoHR is eo ipso a Constitution of Europe, in the part covering
human rights.89 Thus, the essence of the Court’s work is not consumed in mere
86
Georg Nolte, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Sources of international Law”,
Seminar, The Contribution of the ECtHR to the Development of Public International Law,
internet: https://rm.coe.int/the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-the-sources-of-international-
la/1680a05733
87
“Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, iCJ Reports,
1996, par.70.
88
Luzius Wildhaber, “A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?”, Human
Rights Law Journal, 2002, vol. 23, pp. 161–165; Steven Greer, Luzius Wildhaber, “Revisiting
the Debate about ‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights
Law Review, 2012, vol.12, pp. 655–687.
89
Evert A. Alkema, “The European Convention as a Constitution and its Court as a Constitutional
Court”, in: Paul Mahoney et al. (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European perspective –
Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdall, Cologne, 2000, pp. 41–63.
decisions on whether an individual is the victim of a human rights violation but,

through that decision, in harmonizing the legal system of European States that are
members of the CoE. From that level of abstraction it becomes more clear that
through the process of interpreting and applying the ECoHR the Court is at the
same time influencing the creation of law or at least directs how the law on human
rights is to be understood and applied.in the final conclusion on sources of law i
would not state that the Court has gone beyond the usual understanding of the
sources of law. its approach is legally anchored in the VCLT which directs the
Court to apply “any relevant rule of international law” with no further confines
on the understanding of the source of the law that the rule is stemming from. Also,
the VCTL directs the Court to use, among others, the systemic method of
interpretation. That means further that through its work the Court has added to the
understanding of the sources of international law, confirming that soft law, at
present, can be added to the list of sources of international law.For lawyers that
are orientated to stiffer formalistic approaches toward binding nature as a genuine
quality of a source of a law, the Court’s comprehensive overview of relevant legal
materials is criticized as “extrajudicial approach and activism”. But even a strict
positivistic approach acknowledges that, besides classical or traditional sources
of law, there are other forms, named as either law in making or material source of
law, in understanding that normativity of international law is relative. From my
point of view even that criticism, which has its strong ground, can be eased by the
quality and constancy of the Court’s approach and that is its consistency of judicial
reasoning. if the Court carries on with its comprehensive overview of relevant
rules of international law, then there is no fear that it will go beyond the law that
is generally accepted as law. Finally, i would like to refer to the many times
repeated statement that theorists have long agreed to disagree about sources of
international law. Another agreement between theorists is that the question of the
sources of international law is highly important since it touches the legitimacy of
international law. As for the attempt to add to the discussion on the sources of
international law in the light of jurisprudence of the ECHR, there is certainly
another aspect that is also not disputable. Jurisprudence of the ECHR itself comes
under the heading judicial decisions that are themselves subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law. Through application of the vast scope of relevant
rules of international law, the jurisprudence of the ECHR has added legal value
for each rule that has been encompassed within its reasoning. Although the Court’s
task, from the strict positivistic approach, is application and interpretation of the
ECoHR, throughout its work, the Court has applied other relevant rules of
international law. These rules stem from generally accepted sources of international
law, but also from other legal materials that are under scrutiny as to whether they
have emerged as a new source of law or not. Application of other rules of
international law have been either guidance for interpretation of human rights or
sources of law that have directed the reasoning of the Court, i.e. been applied as a
rule. in the final outcome, even if the broad concept of soft law is not to be
considered as a formal source of international law it nevertheless has gained a new

portion of its overall authority. in the end, the scope of human rights that are
applied and interpreted has been built on a comprehensive overview of “all relevant
rules of international law” that are giving content to their abstract definitions.
iZVoRi MEĐUNARoDNoG PRAVA U JURiSPRUDENCiJi EVRoPSKoG

SUDA ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
APSTRAKT
Evropski sud za ljudska prava nema sopstveni statut, stoga Evropska konvencija
o ljudskim pravima vrši funkciju statuta za Sud. Takođe, za Sud nije definisano
merodavno pravo koje treba da koristi prilikom odlučivanja u predmetu,
ostavljajući ga u okvirimadefinicije nadležnosti, a to je primena i tumačenje
EKLJP. Sud je kroz svoju jurisprudenciju razvio pristup tumačenju EKLJP-a u
opštem smislu tumačenja, odnosno u svetlu VCLT-a. Metodologija Suda je
posezanje za sveobuhvatnim pregledom relevantnog međunarodnog prava u
procesu tumačenja ljudskih prava definisanih u Evropskoj konvecijio ljudskim
pravima i osnovnim slobodama. Svojim obrazloženjem Sud je sveobuhvatno
obuvatao i „tvrdo pravo“ i „meko pravo“. Cilj ovog rada je da se razmotri da li je
Sud kroz implementaciju VCLT ponudio drugačije razumevanje pojmova koji se
u njemu koriste, konkretno da li je Sud razvio svoje specifično razumevanje
koncepta formalnih izvora međunarodnog prava.
Ključne reči: Primena, tumačenje, relevantna pravila međunarodnog prava, Bečka
konvencija o pravu međunarodnih ugovora, Evropski sud za ljudska prava
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26. Villiger Mark E., Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2009.
27. Wildhaber Luzius, “A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human
Rights?”, Human Rights Law Journal, 2002, vol. 23.
28. Ziemeleineta, “Customary international Law in the Case Law of the European
Court of Human Rights – The Method”, The Law and Practice of International
Courts and Tribunals, 2013, vol. 12.
29. Ziemeleineta, “European Consensus and international Law”, in: Anne Van
Aaken, iulia Motoc (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and
General International Law, oxford University Press, oxford, 2018.
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRACTICE

OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Dijana SAVić BoŽić*
ABSTRACT
Regardless of the level of economic development or the social, political or religious
structure of the community, human trafficking is a global issue that affects all
cultures and societies in the modern world. Human trafficking is one of the most
challenging types of illegal acts when it comes to human rights. These acts most
seriously threaten the basic rights of those who become victims of human
trafficking. The adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is perhaps one of the most significant
international legal instruments protecting human rights in this area in Europe. The
member states of this Convention have undertaken to respect and implement the
rules contained in the Convention in their territories. The convention defines goals
that, among other things, include the prevention of human trafficking, the care of
victims of human trafficking, and the implementation of criminal proceedings
against the perpetrators of these crimes. Due to its comprehensiveness, the
Convention contains adequate solutions for some current global issues and is also
available to countries that are not members of the Council of Europe. in the subject
paper, the author examines the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in
the field of human trafficking in order to point out some open issues, the solution
of which through judicial practice can contribute to a greater degree of protection
at the internal legal level as well.
Key words: European Court of Human Rights, human trafficking, obligations of
states
INTRODUCTION
in addition to illegal drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking is among
the three most profitable criminal activities. it is a highly profitable and low-risk
criminal activity. According to estimates, human traffickers earn hundreds of
billions of dollars annually. The business is started and maintained with minimal
funds, while a huge material benefit is realized. Statistically speaking, a minimal
*
Basic Court; Faculty of Law, Bijeljina, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina. E-mail:
dinabozic@gmail.com
number of human traffickers appear in court and are sentenced to (high) prison
terms, while it is rare for them to have their criminal property confiscated.
According to the estimate of the international Labor organization, the total annual
profit made through human trafficking is US$ 33.6 billion, namely: US$ 18.4
billion (49%) – in industrialized countries, US$ 10.2 (30.6%) – in Asia and
oceania, 1.5 US$ (4.1%) – in Central and South America, 1.8 billion US$ (5%) –
in sub-Saharan Africa, 1.7 billion US$ (4.7%) – in the Middle East and North
Africa.1 Human trafficking is a global phenomenon that threatens all countries –
countries that are going through political and economic transition, underdeveloped
and developing countries, countries affected by war and countries where conflicts
have lasted until recently, and which appear as countries of origin and transit of
victims. Also, more economically developed countries are affected, which appear
as destination countries.2 According to the report of the UN office for the fight
against drugs and crime, cases of human trafficking were recorded in 161
countries, with 127 countries appearing as countries of origin and 137 as countries
of destination.3 According to the estimate of the international Labor organization,
2.6 million people suffer exploitation in the chain of human trafficking at all times,
whether it is sexual exploitation or some other form of forced labor, namely: 1.5
million (54%) – in Asia and oceania, 270,000 (11.8%) – in industrial countries,
250,000 (10%) – in Central and South America, 230,000 (10.2%) – in the Middle
East and North Africa, 200,000 (8%) – in countries in transition, 130,000 (5.2%)
– in sub-Saharan Africa.4 The United Nations Global initiative to Combat Human
Trafficking (UN.GiFT) was created to promote the global fight against human
trafficking on the basis of international agreements reached in the UN. Until now,
140 parties have signed the Protocol on Preventing, Suppressing and Punishing
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which complements the
Palermo Convention. According to UN.GiFT data: victims of human trafficking
are usually between 18 and 24 years old, it is estimated that 1.2 million children
become victims of human trafficking every year, 95% of victims survived physical
or sexual violence during exploitation, 43% of victims are forced to engage in sex
work, of which women and girls make up 98%, 32% of victims are exposed to
labor exploitation, and women and girls make up 56%.5 Human traffickers in the
1
Patrick, Besler, Forced Labourand Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits, Working paper,
international Labour office, Geneva, 2015, p. 8.
2
Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, United Nations office on Drugsand Crime, Vienna,
2016, pp. 11–12.
3
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016, UNoDC, United Nations publication, New York,
2016, p. 24.
4
Forced Labour Statistics Factsheet, international Labour organization, Geneva, 2017, p. 11.
5
Human Trafficking – TheFacts, UN.GiFT, United Nations publication, New York, 2019, p. 16;
The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Stolen smiles: a summary report on the
physical and psychological health consequences of womenan adolescents trafficked in Europe,
London, 2016, p. 4.
world are: persons who recruit victims of human trafficking are mostly men (52%);
women themselves are recruited in 42% of cases, while in 6% the recruitment is
carried out jointly by men and women, in 54% of cases the recruitment is carried
out by an unknown person, while in 46% of cases the victim was drawn into the
human trafficking chain by a known person, the majority of people suspected of
human trafficking are citizens countries where the process of human trafficking
takes place.6 Human trafficking is one of the most serious forms of human rights
violations. Victims have no freedom of movement or freedom of choice; more
precisely, the victims are deprived of control over their own lives. The mentioned
phenomenon is also referred to as “modern slavery”, because the victims are kept
in conditions similar to slavery and are treated as the property of the people who
bought them.7 Human trafficking is mainly a form of organized crime (although
this is not always the case), but also a form of criminal business that starts and
functions according to the principle of market supply and demand. The main goal
of human trafficking is to make money through exploitation, regardless of whether
it is sexual exploitation, forced labor, forced begging, coercion related to the
commission of criminal acts, illegal adoption, forced marriages, organ trafficking
or some other form. one of the common stereotypes is that human traffickers
expose their victims exclusively to sexual exploitation, and that only women and
girls are at risk, while other forms of exploitation, such as labor exploitation, whose
victims are mostly men, are ignored.8 Formally speaking, the European Court of
Human Rights’ decisions have an inter partes effect, which means that they only
apply to the parties to the case and so only apply to the state that the petition was
filed against. The court’s decisions are nevertheless carefully examined in the
nations that are signatories to the Convention but are not parties to the proceedings,
and they have a similar orienting impact. The European Court of Human Rights
rules in its decision whether the petition’s defendant state breached the Convention,
and if so, it finds that an individual’s right is in jeopardy.9 The member state is
then required to execute the ruling by taking the necessary steps. They have no
cascading effect against actions that, in the opinion of the European Court of
Human Rights, jeopardize the rights protected by the Convention. in addition, a
satisfaction clause is included in the ruling. Specifically, if it finds that the
Convention has been violated, it requires the defendant state to compensate the
injured party by paying the amount awarded in the form of just satisfaction, as
well as to decide, with the approval of the Committee of Ministers, what general
and/or specific measures should be adopted in its internal legal system to end the
6
Forced Labour Statistics Factsheet, op.cit., p. 19.
7
Maggy Lee, Human Trafficking, William Publishers, Portland, 2007, р. 11.
8
Tomoya obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Towards a
Holistic Approach, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2006, р. 9.
9
ian Hulboch, Cornelis Moens, Perspectives on trafficking in human beings’ phenomenon –
legislations – assistance, CCEM, Paris, 2002, p. 26.
violation found by the Court and to eliminate and correct the consequence.10 it is
hardly unexpected that human trafficking is not specifically included in the
European Convention on Human Rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly but did not
directly identify human trafficking, served as the foundation for the convention.
The Declaration of independence’s Article 4 forbade slavery and the slave trade
in all of its manifestations.11 However, one must keep in mind the Convention's
unique qualities and the fact that it is a living document that must be read in light
of the circumstances of the present while determining the extent of Article 4 of
the Convention. Greater rigor in judging infractions of the fundamental principles
of democratic societies is obviously and reasonably necessitated by the
progressively higher standards demanded in the field of protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRACTICE

OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Today, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia serves as a crucial reference point for accepted
international norms pertaining to the fight against human trafficking and the
protection of those who have been victimized by these crimes. Using a
combination of preventive and repressive measures, this judgment made it
abundantly clear for the first time that human trafficking is a type of contemporary,
non-institutional slavery that member states of the Council of Europe and the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must
actively combat. in this regard, the Court set down a number of requirements in
this ruling by establishing what are known as “positive responsibilities”, which
nations must uphold in order to prevent and punish any instances of human
trafficking that endanger the rights and liberties of the victims of this modern
scourge.12 in the paragraphs that follow, a random sampling technique will be used
to describe some of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
involving human trafficking as well as the duties resulting from those judgments.
Siliadin v. France is the first decision of the European Court of Human Rights to
take into account the problem of human trafficking as a whole in accordance with
the Convention on Combating Traffic in Human Beings.13 The petitioner is Miss
10
Jean Allain, “on the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General international
Law”, Journal of the History of International Law, 2009, vol.11, no. 2, pp. 303–332.
11
Marco Marochini, The interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, Proceedings
of the Faculty of Law in Split, 2014, no. 1, pp. 34–48.
12
Tom T. obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Towards a
Holistic Approach, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2016, p. 29.
13
“Siliadin v. France”, Application no. 73316/01, Judgment of July 2005.
Siliadin, a 15-year-old Togolese native, who arrived in France in 1994 with Mrs.
D, a French national of Togolese ancestry. Mrs. D. agreed to oversee the applicant's
immigration status and plan her schooling in exchange for the applicant
maintaining her home until she was able to pay Mrs. D. back for the debt incurred
for the airline ticket. The applicant basically became an unpaid servant to Mrs.
and Mr. D, who also took her travel permit. Mrs. D. “lent” the applicant to Mr.
and Mrs. B. at some point in october 1994 in order to assist them with domestic
duties and watch over their children. She was just meant to be here for a couple of
days while Mrs. B. was not in labor. However, Mrs. B. chose to retain the applicant
after the baby was born. She developed into the “everyone’s assistant” who worked
nonstop from 7.30 am to 10.30 pm every day, granting her special permission to
attend Mass on specific Sundays. The applicant was simply dressed in old clothing
and was dozing off on a mattress on the floor of the kids' room. She was never
paid a wage, but Mrs. B’s mother sent her two 500-franc bills, which are equal to
EUR 76.22.The applicant complained that the French penal code did not offer her
adequate and effective protection against the “servitude” in which she was held,
or at least against the forced and compulsory labor which she was required to
perform and which in practice turned her into a slave in the household. She cited
Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which prohibits
slavery and forced labor. The Court determined that Article 4 of the Convention,
which is composed by the Council of Europe, incorporates one of the fundamental
principles of a democratic society. it has to do with one of the Convention’s clauses
where a state’s failure to violate a fundamental right does not mean that its
commitment under the clause has been met. it imposes a positive duty on the state
to enact and effectively enforce criminal legislation, under which the behavior
described in Article 4 is regarded as a crime that is punished. The petitioner in
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia is a Russian citizen; he is also the father of oksana
Rantseva, who died in Cyprus.14 Russian national and the applicant’s daughter fell
from the window of a private flat in Cyprus in March 2001 and perished
mysteriously. A Cyprus inquest found no evidence of foul play and that Miss
Rantseva’s death while attempting to flee the flat where she was a guest looked to
be an accident. The body was returned to Russia after additional autopsies, but the
Russian authorities felt that the results of the investigation were not satisfactory.
The Cypriot authorities deemed the investigation to be closed, and they refused to
conduct any further inquiries unless the Russian authorities had proof of criminal
activity. The petitioner claimed that two young Russian women who lived there
worked with his daughter in a cabaret and could provide evidence of sexual
exploitation there were not questioned by either the Russian or the Cypriot
authorities. The Court said it was unnecessary to decide whether the behavior the
Applicant had complained about qualified as “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced or
coercive labor” since it was required to interpret the Convention in light of current
14
“Rantsev v. Cyprusand Russia”, Application number 25965/04, Judgment of January 7, 2010.
circumstances. instead, the European Convention’s Article 4 covers human

trafficking as it is described in Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article
4(a) of the Convention against Traffic in Human Beings. The terms of the Palermo
Protocol and the Convention against Trafficking in Human Beings made it very
plain that the signatory nations believed that only a combination of measures could
effectively combat human trafficking. This led to affirmative responsibilities to
conduct actions targeted at stopping human trafficking, safeguarding its existing
and future victims, and bringing cases against and punishing those involved. By
its very nature, human trafficking was frequently not restricted to a single nation’s
borders. From one nation to another, victims were frequently trafficked. There
may be witnesses and relevant evidence in more than one nation. in order to ensure
a thorough international approach to human trafficking in the countries of origin,
transit, and destination, member states in cross-border cases of human trafficking
were also required to cooperate effectively with other states involved in the
investigation. This was in addition to the obligation to conduct a domestic
investigation of events that occurred on their territory. Cyprus fell short of
upholding its positive obligations under Article 4 for two reasons: first, it failed to
create a sufficient legal and administrative framework to combat human
trafficking; second, the police failed to take sufficient investigative steps to
safeguard Miss Ranceva from trafficking. The Cypriot ombudsman and the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe criticized the artist’s
visa system for encouraging a lot of foreign women to travel to Cyprus where they
ran the risk of being trafficked, despite the fact that domestic legislation on human
trafficking did not appear to be problematic in and of itself. Since the police had
enough information to reasonably anticipate that Miss Rancev was in imminent
risk of being trafficked and exploited, the State had a duty to safeguard her. The
police made a number of errors; including failing to investigate right away if she
was a victim of human trafficking, turning her over to the cabaret management
rather than releasing her, and failing to uphold their legal obligation to safeguard
her. The petitioner, a Ghanaian national, claimed that she had been trafficked to
the UK and coerced into prostitution in the case of F. A. v. the United Kingdom.15
She explicitly stated that going to Ghana would put her in danger of ending up in
the hands of current or past traffickers. She also argued that because she contracted
HiV in the UK as a direct result of being trafficked and sexually exploited, the
State had a duty to enable her to stay there so she could receive the necessary
medical care. The applicant’s appeals based on Articles 3 (prohibiting cruel or
humiliating treatment) and 4 (prohibiting slavery and forced labor) were ruled to
be inadmissible by the court. She did not comply with the requirements of Article
35, paragraph 1 (admissibility criteria) of the Convention since she did not request
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The allegation of a Nigerian national who
15
“F. A. v. United Kingdom”, Application no. 20658/11, Decision on admissibility of 10 September
2013.
was coerced into prostitution in Greece was the subject of the case L. E. v. Greece.16
The applicant was obliged to wait more than nine months after telling the
authorities of her position before the legal system recognized her as a victim of
trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. in particular, it claimed that the
Greek State had broken this clause by failing to uphold its affirmative
commitments under Article 4 of the Convention, which forbids slavery and forced
labor. The court believed that Article 4 of the Convention had been violated
(prohibition of slavery and forced labor). He discovered, in particular, that a
number of flaws made the preliminary inquiry and subsequent examination of the
case less successful. The Court also found several delays and omissions in relation
to the Greek State’s procedural requirements in administrative and judicial
processes. The duration of the procedure in issue was excessive for one level of
jurisdiction, and the “reasonable time” criteria was not met, according to the court,
which also found that Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial
within a reasonable period) was violated in this case. The lack of a legal remedy
under domestic law that would allow the applicant to compel the right to a hearing
within a day was the last reason the Court concluded that Article 13 of the
Convention (right to an effective legal remedy) had been violated. in Chaudhry
and Others v. Greece, the plaintiff’s l–42 Bangladeshi nationals – were hired in
Athens and other regions of Greece between late 2012 and early 2013 to work on
the primary strawberry farm in Manoladi without a Greek work visa.17 Their
employers failed to pay them money and made them perform arduous physical
labor while being watched over by armed guards. The applicants claimed that they
had to perform forced or required work. They added that the state had a duty to
protect them from human trafficking, to take proactive measures in that regard,
and to punish employers. Due to the petitioners’ lack of effective protection from
the Greek government, the court found that Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Convention (which prohibits forced labor) had been violated. The applicant’s
condition involved both forced labor and human trafficking, according to the court,
and labor exploitation is one of the characteristics of human trafficking. The state
failed to carry out its responsibilities to protect the victims, prevent the situation
of human trafficking, carry out an efficient investigation of the crimes committed,
and punish those who were behind it, according to the court’s findings.
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES ARISING FROM

THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
in the case of Siliadin v. France, the Court noted that, in view of certain
provisions of the Convention, such as Articles 2, 3 and 8, the fact that a state
refrains from violating guaranteed rights is not sufficient to conclude that it has
16
“L. E. v. Greece“, Application number 71545/12, Judgment of January 21, 2016.
17
“Chaudhry and others v. Greece“, Application no. 21884/15, Judgment of 30 March 2017.
fulfilled its obligations under Article 1 of the Convention. in this regard, the Court
considered that limiting the observance of Article 4 of the Convention only to
direct actions of state authorities would not be in accordance with international
instruments that specifically concern this issue. Therefore, he ruled that states have
positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention.
A positive obligation to establish an appropriate legislative

and administrative framework
Article 4 requires States Parties to punish and effectively prosecute any act
which has the purpose of keeping a person in a situation of slavery, forced or
compulsory labor (C.N. v. United Kingdom, Para. 66; Siliadin v. France, Para.
112). in order to fulfill this obligation, member states are required to establish a
legislative and administrative framework to prohibit and punish such acts (Rantsev
v. Cyprus and Russia, Para. 285). in the special context of human trafficking, the
Court emphasized that the Palermo Protocol and the Convention against Human
Trafficking refer to the need for a comprehensive approach to the fight against
human trafficking, which includes measures to prevent human trafficking and
protect victims, in addition to measures to punish human traffickers. in his opinion,
it was clear from the provisions of these two instruments that the contracting states,
including almost all member states of the Council of Europe, formed the position
that only a combination of measures related to all three aspects can be effective in
the fight against human trafficking. Therefore, the Court emphasized that the duty
to punish and prosecute human trafficking is only one aspect of the general
engagement of member states in the fight against human trafficking and that the
range of positive obligations arising from Article 4 must be considered in a wider
context. in this regard, the Court considered that the range of protective measures
provided for by national legislation must be adequate in order to ensure practical
and effective protection of the rights of victims or potential victims of human
trafficking. Accordingly, the Court considered that, in addition to criminal law
measures to punish traffickers, Article 4 requires Member States to establish
adequate measures to regulate the business that is often used as a cover for human
trafficking. Moreover, national immigration rules must address relevant concerns
relating to the incitement, facilitation or tolerance of human trafficking (Rantsev
v. Cyprus and Russia, Para. 284). Moreover, states are required to provide relevant
training for law enforcement officials (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Para. 287).
The court emphasized that the principles mentioned above are equally relevant
when it comes to human trafficking and the exploitation of individuals through
work. The Court therefore accepted that human trafficking includes the recruitment
of persons for the purpose of exploitation and that exploitation includes forced
labor. in this sense, he underlined that Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Convention
implies the positive obligation of states to deal with this category of human
trafficking in the form of a legal and regulatory framework that enables the
prevention of human trafficking and their exploitation through work, the protection
of victims and the investigation of disputed cases of human trafficking of this
nature. Together with the characterization as a criminal offense and the effective
prosecution of any act aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation (Chowdry
and Others v. Greece, Paras. 86–89 and 103–104). The Court found that the
legislation in force at the relevant time did not provide the applicants with practical
and effective protection against unsuccessful treatment under Article 4 of the
Convention in the case of Siliadin v. France (Para. 148) and in C. N. v. United
Kingdom (Para. 76). While in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, based on the evidence
presented to it and bearing in mind the limits of Russia’s competence in the specific
facts of the case, the Court did not find such an omission in the legislative and
administrative framework in Russia with regard to human trafficking. in that case,
Cyprus was found to be in breach of this obligation because, despite evidence of
trafficking in Cyprus and concerns expressed in various reports, Cyprus’
immigration policy and legislative deficiencies encourage trafficking in women
in Cyprus, the artist visa regime is not afforded the applicant’s daughter, Mrs.
Ranceva, practical and effective protection against human trafficking and
exploitation (Paras. 290–293). Likewise, the Court considered that the legislation
in force at the relevant time afforded the applicant practical and effective protection
against human trafficking in L. E. v. Greece.
A positive obligation to take operational measures

Article 4 of the Convention may, in certain circumstances, require the state to
take operational measures to protect victims or potential victims from acts contrary
to that article (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Para. 286; C.N. v. the United
Kingdom, Para. 67). in order for there to be a positive obligation to take operational
measures in the circumstances of the particular case, it must be shown that the
state authorities were aware or should have been aware of circumstances giving
rise to a credible suspicion that the identified person was in real and imminent
danger of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Convention. if
the answer is yes, there will be a violation of that article when the authorities do
not take appropriate measures within their powers to remove the individual from
that situation or risk.
However, given the difficulties in managing modern societies and the
operational choices that must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the
obligation to take operational measures must be interpreted in a way that does not
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (Rantsev v.
Cyprus and Russia, Para. 287). in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the various
failures of the police, in particular to inquire further as to whether Ms. Rantseva
was a victim of human trafficking and their failure to comply with various
provisions of domestic law, led the Court to consider that the Cypriot authorities
had failed to take action to protect Ms. Ranceva from human trafficking (paragraph
298). in V. F. v. France the Court found that, although it was aware of the extent
of the phenomenon of trafficking of Nigerian women in France and the difficulties
these persons face in identifying themselves before the authorities for the purpose
of protection, it could only observe, in the light of the circumstances of the case,
that the applicant had not attempted to make contact with the authorities about her
situation.18 Therefore, he considered that the evidence submitted by the applicant
was not sufficient to show that the police authorities knew or should have known
that the applicant was a victim of a human trafficking network when they decided
to deport her. in the case of Chaudhry and Others v. Greece, the Court found that
Greece had failed to comply with its positive obligations because the authorities,
who had known through official reports and the media about the situation of the
migrant workers long before the shooting incident involving the applicants, did
not take adequate measures to prevent human trafficking and to protect the
applicants (Paras. 111–115).
Procedural obligation for investigation

Article 4 of the Convention implies a procedural obligation to investigate
where there is a credible suspicion that an individual’s rights under that article
have been violated (C.N. v. the United Kingdom, Para. 69; Rantsev v. Cyprus and
Russia, Para. 288). The court emphasized that the request for an investigation does
not depend on the complaint of the victim or the next of kin, but that the authorities
must act at their own discretion after the situation has come to their attention. He
further confirmed that the investigation must be effective, it must be independent
of those involved in the events and it must be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of the individuals responsible, not as a result, but
as a means. Moreover, the requirement of speed and reasonable expedition is
implicit in all cases, but when there is a possibility of extricating an individual
from a harmful situation, an investigation must be undertaken immediately. Finally,
the victim or the next of kin must be involved in the proceedings to the extent
necessary to protect their legitimate interests (L.E. v. Greece, Para. 68). in the
special context of human trafficking, in addition to the obligation to conduct a
domestic investigation into events occurring on their territory, member states are
also subject to the obligation in cases of cross-border trafficking to cooperate
effectively with the competent authorities of other states in the matter of
investigation into events occurring outside their territories (Rantsev v. Cyprus and
Russia, Paras. 289). in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the Court found that the
Russian authorities did not investigate the possibility that individual agents or
networks operating in Russia were involved in the trafficking of Ms. Rantsev to
Cyprus (Para. 308). in the case of M. and others against Italy and Bulgaria,
18
“V. F. v. France”, Application no. 7196/10, Decision on admissibility of 29 November 2011.
however, the Court found that the circumstances of the case did not lead to human
trafficking, a situation that would include the responsibility of the Bulgarian state
if human trafficking had begun there (Para. 169).19 in that case, he further found
that the Bulgarian authorities assisted the applicants and maintained constant
contacts and cooperation with the italian authorities (Para. 169). in the case of J.
and others v. Austria, where the applicants appealed against a prosecutor’s decision
not to investigate alleged trafficking offenses committed abroad by non-citizens,
the Court held that Article 4 of the Convention, under its procedural part, does not
require from States to ensure universal jurisdiction over crimes related to human
trafficking committed abroad.20 in this regard, it was pointed out that the Protocol
on Preventing, Suppressing and Punishing Trafficking in Human Beings,
Especially in Women and Children, which supplements the United Nations
Convention against Transnational organized Crime, does not address the issue of
jurisdiction. The Council of Europe Convention on Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings requires signatory states only to provide jurisdiction over any
criminal offenses related to human trafficking committed on their territory, or
against one of their nationals (Para. 114). in Chaudhry and Others v. Greece, the
Court held that Greece had failed to comply with its procedural obligations, in
particular because the Prosecutor had refused to initiate proceedings against
twenty-one applicants on the grounds that they had submitted their complaints out
of time, without taking into account in view of the broader issues of human
trafficking and forced labor that they complained about (Para. 117–121). The Court
further noted that the domestic courts took a very narrow view of the applicants’
situation, analyzing it from the point of view of whether it constituted a status of
service, which resulted in none of the accused being convicted of human trafficking
and therefore no appropriate penalties being applied (Para. 123–127).
CONCLUSION
The Convention on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings represents a
unique form of a mix of criminal and legal activities and the Convention on Human
Rights. The universal instruments, namely, treat the phenomenon of human
trafficking as a transnational and organized crime phenomenon, whereas the
Council of Europe Convention views this issue much more broadly and includes
all forms of human trafficking, including cases of human trafficking committed
by an individual and at the national level. The case law cited in this essay includes
decisions or judgments rendered by the Court as well as reports or conclusions
issued by the European Commission for Human Rights. All remarks pertain to the
panel of the Court’s decision on the merits. Based on the analyzed judgments of
19
“M. and others against italy and Bulgaria”, Application number 40020/03, Judgment of July 31,
2012.
20
“J. and others v. Austria”, Application number 58216/12, Judgment of January 17, 2017.
the European Court of Human Rights, it is concluded that trafficking in human

beings represents a serious violation of the entire set of human rights and
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 1950. Finally, it can be said
that the analyzed judgments clearly define the Council of Europe member states’
positive obligation that, in addition to making human trafficking illegal under their
national laws and effectively prosecuting those who commit crimes related to it,
they have a duty to engage in a long-term campaign against the practice and to
put in place a functioning system to combat it.
TRGoViNA LJUDiMA U PRAKSi EVRoPSKoG SUDA

ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
APSTRAKT
Bez obzira na stepen ekonomskog razvoja ili društvenu, političku ili versku
strukturu zajednice, trgovina ljudima je globalno pitanje koje pogađa sve kulture
i društva u savremenom svetu. Trgovina ljudima je jedna od najizazovnijih vrsta
protivpravnih akata kada su u pitanju ljudska prava. ova dela najozbiljnije
ugrožavaju osnovna prava onih koji postanu žrtve trgovine ljudima. Usvajanje
Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda predstavlja
možda jedan od najznačajnijih međunarodnopravnih instrumenata kojima se štite
ljudska prava u ovoj oblasti na području Evrope. Države članice ove Konvencije
obavezale su se da će poštovati i sprovoditi pravila sadržana u Konvenciji na
svojim područjima. Konvencijom su definisani ciljevi koji, između ostalog,
obuhvataju prevenciju trgovine ljudima, zbrinjavanje žrtava trgovine ljudima i
sprovođenje krivičnog postupka protiv izvršilaca ovih krivičnih dela. Konvencija
prema svojoj sveobuhvatnosti sadrži adekvatna rešenja za neka aktuelna globalna
pitanja a dostupna je i državama koje nisu članice Saveta Evrope. U predmetnom
radu autorka ispituje praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u oblasti trgovine
ljudima kako bi ukazala na neka otvorena pitanja čije rešavanje kroz sudsku
praksu može doprineti većem stepenu zaštite i na unutrašnjem pravnom nivou.
Ključnereči: Evropski sud za ljudska prava, trgovina ljudima, obaveze država
REFERENCES
1. Allain, Jean, “on the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General
international Law”, Journal of the History of International Law, 2009, vol.11,
no. 2.
2. Besler, Patrick, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits,
Working paper, international Labour office, Geneva, 2015.
3. “Chaudhry and others v. Greece“, Application no. 21884/15, Judgment of 30

March 2017.
4. “F. A. v. United Kingdom“, Application no. 20658/11, Decision on
admissibilityof 10 September 2013.
5. Forced Labour Statistics Factsheet, international Labour organization,
Geneva, 2017.
6. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016, UNoDC, United Nations
publication, New York, 2016
7. Hulboch, ian, Moens, Cornelis, Perspectives on trafficking in human beings’
phenomenon – legislations – assistance, CCEM, Paris, 2002.
8. Human Trafficking – TheFacts, UN.GiFT, United Nations publication, New
York, 2019.
9. “J. and others v. Austria“, Application number 58216/12, Judgment of January
17, 2017.
10. Lee, Maggy, Human Trafficking, William Publishers, Portland, 2007.
11. “L. E. v. Greece“, Application number 71545/12, Judgment of January 21,
2016.
12. “M. and others against italy and Bulgaria”, Application number 40020/03,
Judgment of July 31, 2012.
13. Marochini, Marco, The interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Proceedings of the Faculty of Law in Split, 2014, no. 1.
14. “Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia“, Application number 25965/04, Judgment of
January 7, 2010.
15. “Siliadin v. France“ , Application no. 73316/01, Judgment of July 2005.
16. obokata, Tom T., Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights
Perspective: Towards a Holistic Approach, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden, 2016.
17. obokata, Tomoya, Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights
Perspective: Towards a Holistic Approach, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden, 2006.
18. The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Stolen smiles: a
summary report on the physical and psychological health consequences of
womenan adolescents trafficked in Europe, London, 2016.
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Crime, Vienna, 2016.
20. “V. F. v. France“, Application no. 7196/10, Decision on admissibility of 29
November 2011.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION OF

REFUGEES ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW,
EU LAW AND THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION
OF THE NETHERLANDS AND SERBIA
Nemanja BEZAREVić*
ABSTRACT
in the subject paper, the author considers the legal framework for the integration
of refugees according to international law, EU law and the national legislations
of the Netherlands and Serbia. The goal of the research was to answer the question
of compliance with international legal standards on the protection of refugees in
the context of the wider issue of European integration. The case study included
the legal systems of the Netherlands, a member of the EU, and Serbia, as
candidate countries for joining this regional organization. interpreting and
clarifying national laws, the author compares them with the obligations stipulated
by the international legal framework and EU law. in this sense, the author focused
on the most relevant legal sources in this area, which determine the process of
European integration. Using the comparative law method, the author considered
the content and context of five rights in the international legal framework that are
particularly interesting for the analysis of the integration of refugees, and which
refer to the right to education, the right to work, the right to health care, the right
to documents and the right to naturalization. Although Serbia has adopted an
adequate Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, according to the author, the
Law is not sufficiently harmonized with other legislation, which creates legal
vacuums and omissions. Finally, from this study comes the author's proposal to
change the domestic legislation so that refugees will have the opportunity to enjoy
the rights that are guaranteed to them by the international and European legal
framework and legal standards.
Key words: Refugees, integration, asylum, international law, EU law, Netherlands,
Serbia
*
Leiden University, Netherlands. E-mail: bezar.nemanja@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION
A framework of international law revolving around the 1951 Refugee
Convention1 has developed out of the fundamental human desire to assist those in
need, having the primary goal of helping individuals and enabling them to rebuild
their lives, rather than just grant them asylum. Prior to the 1967 Protocol, the
Convention only applied to refugees from Europe, after that, its territorial effect
was expanded to include all refugees worldwide.2 Seven decades after the
Convention, Europe continues to face a large influx of refugees. How are refugee
rights protected in terms of their ability to begin a new life and integrate into a
new society? Under refugee law, foreigners seeking international protection, as
well as those who have been granted asylum or subsidiary protection, encounter
a number of challenges in integrating into society and face restrictions of their
rights, mainly because these persons' rights are not recognized by the law. Asylum
laws are not uniformly regulated between countries, and as a result, local
integration rights are not uniformly regulated either, as we will see in the analysis
that is being provided. integration begins in the asylum process before a decision
is made, and its main part continues when a person receives refugee status or
subsidiary protection. A brief overview of my work includes the definition of local
integration, the international legal framework of refugee law and the right to
integration, the group of human rights relevant to this analysis, and finally, a
comparative study of legal frameworks and challenges inside the EU, the
Netherlands and the Republic of Serbia. i would like to highlight a certain set of
rights that are crucial for integration. The right to education, the right to work, the
right to health care and health insurance, the right to identity and travel documents,
the right to naturalization and acquisition of citizenship.
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES IN THE CONTEXT

OF INTEGRATION
Definition of local integration

Durable solutions are an essential component of the refugee system, they
include voluntary repatriation, resettlement and integration.3 in circumstances
where voluntary repatriation and resettlement are not viable options for some
refugees, local integration as part of a strategy for durable solutions is the only
1
“Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” UNTS, vol. 189, p. 137; The Convention was
adopted on 28 July 1951, and entered into force on 22 April 1954 (Refugee Convention).
2
“Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” UNTS, vol. 606, p. 267. Protocol was adopted on
31 January 1967, and entered into force on 4 october 1967 (Protocol)
3
“Statute of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”, UNGA Res. 428
(V), Art. 1; Stute was adopted on 14 December 1950 (UNHCR Statute)
choice left.4 With the assumption that refugees will remain in their asylum country
indefinitely, local integration is a legal, economic, and cultural process.5
“First, [local integration] is a legal process, whereby refugees are granted a
progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host State that are
broadly commensurate with those enjoyed by its citizens. These include freedom
of movement, access to education and the labor market, access to public relief and
assistance, including health facilities, the possibility of acquiring and disposing of
property, and the capacity to travel with valid travel and identity documents.
Realization of family unity is another important aspect of local integration.”6
integration is a process that should result in obtaining permanent residence and,
eventually, acquiring the citizenship of the receiving state.7
International law framework

States are accountable for protecting people' rights.8 if governments are incapable
or unwilling to protect people, they may be compelled to leave their own countries
in pursuit of safety.9 if this happens, a different country will have to step in to ensure
that the refugees' basic rights are upheld.10 The 1951 Refugee Convention and its
1967 Protocol provide the backbone of the international protection system.11
international refugee law is built on the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. The Convention is a document that specifies the requirements one must
fulfill in order to be considered as a refugee.12 This implies that the person fled his
or hers country because of fear of persecution due to their religion, race, nationality,
political beliefs, or social group affiliation.13 Additionally, the issue is so severe that
the person is unable to return to their nation because there is no protection there.14
When these qualifications are met, a person is considered a refugee.15 in accordance
4
“UNHCR Local integration: Global Consultations on international Protection” UN Doc
EC/GC/02/6 25 April 2002, para 5.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., para. 6.
7
Ibid., para. 7.
8
James C. Hathaway, Rights of Solution, The Rights of Refugees under International Law,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
“A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems”, UNHCR
Handbook for Parliamentarians, 2017, no. 27, p. 15.
12
“Durable Solutions and Refugee Protection”, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, 1989, no. 56 (XL), A/44/12/Add.1.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Refugee Convention, op.cit., n 1, Art. 1.
with the Convention's articles, persons have the right to housing, healthcare,
education, employment opportunities, and enjoyment of all socioeconomic rights.16
They are a prerequisite for fulfilling the Convention’s purpose of allowing people to
live in security while respecting all of their human rights.17 The 1967 Protocol exists
independently of, yet closely related to, the 1951 Convention. The Protocol
eliminates the geographical and temporal restrictions of the Convention.18 States that
ratify the Protocol agree to apply the 1951 Convention’s core principles to all
individuals covered by its definition of a refugee, regardless of time or location.19
The 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol constitute international refugee law.20
However, international refugee law is not entirely independent, especially in the case
of integration, where it is mainly supplemented by international human rights law.21
Asylum seekers and refugees are equally protected by international human rights
law as everyone else who lives on a State’s territory or is under its authority or
jurisdiction.22 As stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948,
“all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.23 Alongside the
development of refugee law, a system of international human rights law has emerged.
Despite being ratified by all nations at the UN General Assembly, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding document.24 Nevertheless, after
decades of widespread use, some elements of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights have evolved into customary international law.25 The objective was to
transform the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a binding agreement that
would cover a variety of human rights.26 instead of one, two conventions were
adopted: the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,27 and the
international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.28
16
“Durable Solutions and Refugee Protection”, op. cit., n 12.
17
Ibid.
18
Protocol, op. cit., n 2; “A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum
systems”, op. cit., n 11, p. 16.
19
Ibid.
20
“A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems”, op.cit., n 11,
p 15.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., p. 23.
23
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” UNGA, Res 217 A(iii) (UDHR), Art. 1; Univeral
Declaration was adopted on 10 December 1948.
24
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, oxford University Press,
oxford 2012, p. 522.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
“international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, UNTS, vol. 999, p. 171; international
Covenant was adopted on 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 23 March 1976 (ICCPR).
28
“international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3; Covenant
was adopted on 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 3 January 1976 (ICESCR).
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS INSIDE

THE EU, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Right to education
The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights underlines that everyone
has the right to education, which includes the opportunity to acquire free
mandatory education.29 The Reception Conditions Directive’s Article 14 mandates
that minors, including those who are refugees and those seeking asylum, have
access to the educational system.30 it states that the state should provide secondary
education to minors even after they reach the age of majority.31 Additionally, the
ECHR upholds the right to education and outlaws prejudice based on national
origin.32 “Article 22 (1) of the Refugee Convention and the EU asylum acquis
provide for the right to education of asylum-seeking children and those granted
refugee status or subsidiary protection.”33 in the Netherlands, every child under
the age of 18 must attend school,34 unless they have obtained a minimal
qualification, including asylum seekers, minors with refugee status, or children
with subsidiary protection.35 To enter the labor market in the Netherlands, a
secondary education diploma is required.36 The same educational possibilities are
available to adults who have residence permits as Dutch nationals.37 The
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia guarantees the right to education, which is
further defined through the Law on Basics of the Education System, the Law on
Primary Education, the Law on Secondary Education and the Law on Higher
Education.38 Asylum seekers, refugees, and children with subsidiary protection are
29
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, 2012, oJ C 326/02, Art. 14.
30
“Recast Reception Conditions Directive”, 2013/33/EU [2013], oJ L 180/96, Art. 14, para 1.
31
Ibid.
32
“Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Council of
Europe, Protocol 1 to the ECHR [1952] ETS 9 (European Convention on Human Rights, as
amended) (ECHR), Arts. 2, 14; “Protocol 12 to the ECHR”, 1952 ETS 177.
33
For information on asylum applicants, see: “Reception Conditions Directive” art 14, 2013, oJ
L 180/96; For information on refugees and subsidiary protection status holders, see:
“Qualification Directive” 2011, oJ L 337/9, Arts. 26–27.
34
“Compulsory Education Act”, Government Gazette of the Netherlands no 14773, 2012, Art. 3.
35
“Recast Qualification Directive”, 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
2011, oJ L 337, Art. 27.
36
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Netherlands”, The European
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 2021, p 131.
37
Ibid.
38
“Law on Basics of the Education System”, Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia, no 88/17
and 27/18; “Law on Primary Education”, Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 55/13,
101/17 and 27/18; “Law on Secondary Education”, Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia, no.
55/13, 101/17 and 27/18; “Law on Higher Education”, Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia,
no. 88/17, 27/18 and 73/18.
eligible to free primary and secondary education.39 The regulations mentioned

above also govern the education of foreign nationals and stateless people, as well
as the acknowledgment of foreign degrees. According to the Act on the Basis of
the Education System, foreign nationals and stateless persons are entitled to enroll
in basic, secondary, and higher education under the same conditions as Serbian
citizens.40 The Council of Europe’s proposal to create a “European Qualification
Passport for Refugees” now includes both Serbia and the Netherlands, facilitating
the nostrification of foreign qualifications.41 The integration Decree of the Republic
of Serbia also authorizes the Commissariat for Refugees and Migrations to assist
persons who have been recognized as refugees in gaining access to the educational
system,42 but in the case of asylum seekers, this is not the case.43 Regardless of
this oversight, every kid has the right to an education, and all refugee children
attend school.44 Both nations permit additional education, including higher
education, under the same conditions as their citizens, even though the Refugee
Convention simply calls for elementary education and equitable treatment for all
children.45 We can draw the conclusion that Serbian and Dutch legal systems do a
good job of protecting people's right to an education. i notice that the laws of Serbia
and the Netherlands are in line with article 13, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the iCESCR,
recognizing the right of everyone to education, the Covenant ratified by both
countries.46 They are also in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and the ECHR.47
Right to work
Article 1 of the European Social Charter guarantees everyone's right to
employment and prohibits job discrimination by enabling everyone to make a
living through a freely chosen profession.48 it is also stated that foreigners,
including refugees, are prohibited from pursuing careers in national security, senior
39
“Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection”, Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia, no.
24/2018, (Serbian Asylum Act), Arts. 55 and 64.
40
Ibid., Art. 64.
41
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, European Council on
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 2021, p 141.
42
“integration Decree”, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 101/16, 56/2018, Art. 2.
43
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op.cit., n 45, p. 162.
44
Ibid., p 163
45
Refugee Convention, op.cit., n 1, Art 22.
46
“international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, op.cit., n 28, Art 13.
47
Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951: Articles 2–11, 13–37,
Division of international Protection, Geneva, 1997, p. 87.
48
“Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration”, European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe, 2020, p. 250.
government posts, or other fields that are only open to nationals.49 Article 15 of
the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights includes additional
guarantees, “the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted
occupation”.50 This freedom is restricted by national law, particularly by laws
governing the right of foreign workers to employ.51 The European Commission
therefore adopted “A European Partnership for integration offering opportunities
for refugees to integrate into the European labor market”, recognizing the
importance of fast and efficient job placement as well as refugee integration into
the labor market.52 it also underlined in its Action Plan on the integration of third-
country nationals that a crucial element of integration is employment.53,54 The
Commission also emphasizes how crucial it is to provide an effective legislative
framework for integration that guarantees nationals and refugees equal opportunity
and treatment.55 Based on international and European law, the Netherlands' Aliens
Labour Act, governs the ability of those seeking asylum, refugees, or subsidiary
protection to work and enter the labor market.56 For the first six months following
the filing of an asylum claim, the law prohibits access to the labor market.57 Even
after that time period has elapsed, those seeking asylum still have a restricted right
to work. The time period is fairly limited, with a maximum of 24 weeks per year,
and the work license that an employer must get for an asylum seeker is also rather
limited.58 Refugees and persons with subsidiary protection, unlike asylum seekers,
enjoy free access to the job market in the Netherlands as soon as they get a
residence permit.59 it should be noted that persons with unfettered access to the
Dutch labor market do not require a work permit.60 The Serbian Asylum Act
contains provisions allowing the right to work to refugees and those receiving
subsidiary protection, but not to asylum seekers.61 Asylum seekers are included in
49
“Report concerning conclusions 2012 of the European social charter”, GC(2013)25, ECSR, 31
october 2013, Art. 1 para 2.
50
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, op. cit., n 29, Art 15, para 1.
51
Handbook on European law relating to asylum (n 52) p. 251.
52
“A European Partnership for integration offering opportunities for refugees to integrate into the
European labour market”, European Commission CoM/2020/758 2020, p. 1.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Government Gazette of the Netherlands, no. 45592”, 2021; “The Asylum information Database
(AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op. cit., n 37, p. 95.
57
“Aliens Labour Decree” Government Gazette of the Netherlands, no. 48624, 2021, Art. 2.
58
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op. cit., n 37, p 95; “Aliens
Labour Decree”, op.cit., n 62, Art 2.
59
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op. cit., p. 129.
60
Ibid.
61
Serbian Asylum Act (n 43)
a certain category of foreigners eligible for work permits under the Employment
of Foreigners Act.62 “Asylum seekers whose asylum applications have not been
decided upon through no fault of their own within nine months of being lodged
have the right to be issued a work permit valid for six months with the possibility
of extension for as long as they remain in the asylum procedure.”63 The rights and
obligations with regard to the right to work are the same for persons who have
been given subsidiary protection as well as refugee status as permanently residing
foreigners.64 it is clear that both Serbia and the Netherlands' legislative frameworks
grant refugees the right to work. Both Dutch and Serbian legislation make no
distinction between refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, providing
them equal rights. in contrast to the Netherlands, where refugees have the same
right to work as nationals, refugees in Serbia have the same right to work as
foreigners. Article 17 of Refugee Convention obliges countries to grant refugees
equal treatment as other aliens in similar situation, although the Netherlands goes
a step further.65 Although the right to work for refugees is not denied, it is not equal
to that of Serbian citizens, which adds to the difficulty of issuing work licenses
and finding employment. We can see that the period during which asylum seekers
are not permitted to work is longer than under Dutch law, which is even more
challenging given the longer application process for asylum in Serbia than under
Dutch law.66 it takes 130 days to file an asylum application after asylum seekers
have been registered at a police station.67 According to iCESCR articles 6 and 23,
which provide everyone the right to work without discrimination and the freedom
to choose their employment, both nations deny asylum seekers the right to work,
Serbia even for a longer period of time.68 Even when they eventually gain the right
to work, it is only for a limited time. Furthermore, the work permit in Serbia can
be continuously extended, but the time period for the ability to work in the
Netherlands is quite limited within one year. i propose that both countries alter
their laws to give asylum seekers the right to work immediately, and that the
Netherlands lift the restriction on the maximum period of work of 24 weeks every
12 months.
62
“Employment of Foreigners Act” art 2(1)(9) official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no
128/2014
63
Ibid., Art. 13.
64
Serbian Asylum Act, op.cit., n 43, Arts. 59 and 65.
65
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Its History, Contents and
Interpretation p 103, Division of international Protection, Geneva 1997.
66
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op.cit, n 35, p. 138.
67
Ibid.
68
“international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, op.cit., n 28, Arts 6, 23.
Right to health care

Although there is no specific right to healthcare in the ECHR, it is
acknowledged in case law as a component of Article 8, which guarantees the right
to respect for private life.69 in contrast, the ESC ensures the right to health and
medical assistance.70 These rights also apply to refugees.71 A right to health is not
included in the EU Charter, but it recognizes the right of “access to preventive
healthcare and the right to benefit from medical treatment”.72 Regardless of
nationality, everyone has the right to healthcare.73 The Charter, however, states that
the exercise of this right is subject to national laws and practices.74 in the
Netherlands, national law guarantees that anyone seeking asylum have access to
basic healthcare.75 The Healthcare for Asylum Seekers Regulation also supports
this.76 People with subsidiary protection and refugee status are eligible for the same
healthcare as Dutch nationals as soon as the permission is issued.77 Due to the fact
that they are equal with nationals, they must likewise pay for health insurance.78
The Serbian Asylum Act mandates that all people who have been granted asylum
and asylum seekers have equal access to healthcare in accordance with the laws
governing healthcare for foreigners.79 Healthcare for foreigners is regulated by the
Health Care Act and the Health insurance Act.80 The Health Care Act ensures that
asylum seekers and those who have been granted asylum have equal access to
healthcare as Serbian citizens.81 The Health insurance Act, on the other hand, solely
acknowledges refugees from the former Yugoslav republics.82 As a result, this Act
does not recognize other refugees and asylum seekers as being qualified for the
requirement of health insurance and the distribution of health insurance cards.83 The
69
“Bensaid v. the United Kingdom”, no. 44599/98 ECtHR, 6 February 2001.
70
Ibid., Art. 13.
71
“international Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FiDH) v. France”, no. 14/2003 ECSR, 8
September 2004; “European Committee for Home-Based Priority Action for the Child and the
Family (EURoCEF) v. France” no. 114/2015 ECSR, 24 January 2018.
72
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, op. cit., n 29, Art. 35.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
“Regulation on benefits for asylum seekers and other categories of foreigners in the Netherlands”,
The Minister for immigration and integration 26 January 2005, Art. 6.
76
“Dutch Medical Care Regulations for Asylum Seekers” EMN Netherlands 13 March 2020.
77
“Health Care Act” , Government Gazette of the Netherlands, 2006, Art. 2.
78
AiDA Netherlands, op. cit., n 37, p. 134.
79
“Serbian Asylum Act”, op.cit., n 43, Arts. 54, 63.
80
“Health Care Act”, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 25/19; “Health insurance Act”,
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no, 107/25.
81
“Law on Health Care” , Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 25/19, Arts 236, 239.
82
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op.cit, n 45, p. 164.
83
“Health insurance Act”, op.cit., Arts. 11, 25.
laws of the Netherlands are consistent with the European Union’s right to health
care. The Netherlands is a good example of a country where people with subsidiary
protection, refugees, and asylum seekers all have access to health care. However,
due to the non-issuance of health care cards, which are required for the treatment
of nationals in the Republic of Serbia, those seeking asylum and those who have
been granted asylum in Serbia, unlike Serbian citizens with whom they should be
treated equally under the law, have limited access to the health care system.84
Although provided for in the Asylum Act, this omission in the Health insurance
Act leads to a violation of article 23 of the Refugee Convention, where mandatory
provisions attempt to ensure that refugees legally remaining in the host country are
able to participate in national social assistance and welfare systems even if they do
not meet any of the local residence or affiliation requirements that may be imposed
on residents.85 it is also in violation of article 12 of the iCESCR that recognizes
everyone’s right to the best physical and mental health possible, including medical
assistance and care. The government is willing to offer health treatment for refugees,
as evidenced by the fact that Serbia let all refugees and asylum seekers to receive
CoViD-19 immunizations under the same conditions as nationals.86 The omission
in the Health insurance Act must be replaced with a provision allowing the exercise
of the right currently guaranteed by the Asylum Act.
Right to identity papers and travel documents

Member states are required by EU legislation to produce a document outlining
the legal status of those seeking asylum and refugees.87 The issuance of documents
enables individuals to exercise their legal rights under the laws of the host state,
including the right to healthcare, employment, and education.88 Under EU rules,
the right to travel documents comes with international protection status.89 The
format for such documents is set down in the 1946 London Agreement relating to
the issuance of a travel document to refugees.90 Throughout the EU, using the same
form is required.91 A passport is required to exercise that right because EU law
84
“The Asylum information Database (AiDA) Country Report: Serbia”, op. cit, p. 142.
85
Nehemiah Robinson, op.cit., n 72, p. 104
86
‘Refugees and migrants hosted in Serbian reception centers get their CoViD-19 vaccine doses’
, WHo, 12 May 2021, internet:https://bit.ly/3jZUsFb, 25 october 2022.
87
“Recast Reception Conditions Directive”, op. cit., n 30, Art 6.
88
‘identity Documents for Refugees’, UNHCR, EC/SCP/33,20 July 1984, internet:https://
bit.ly/2oz7Le0, 9 october 2022, para 2.
89
“Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, oJ 2012 C326/47 2012, Art 78(1); “Case
C-604/12 HN v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform” CJEU 2014.
90
“London Agreement relating to the issuance of a travel document to refuges”, United Nations
Treaty Series, 1946, Vol. Xi, No. 150”.
91
“Recast Reception Conditions Directive”, op. cit., n 36, Art. 25.
forbids refugees and asylum seekers from traveling freely between member states
without it.92 Also, the recast Qualification Directive of the EU makes a distinction
between the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.93 States are urged to exclusively
issue travel documents to refugees and establish their own legal rules for those
who have acquired subsidiary protection.94 Asylum seekers, refugees, and those
under subsidiary protection all need to register in the Persons Database and get
identity cards in order to be considered a legal resident of the Netherlands.95 The
Netherlands has agreed to standardize the criteria determining the length of time
and validity of travel permissions for both refugees and those receiving subsidiary
protection.96 They are therefore qualified to apply for a refugee passport.97 The
Asylum Act in Serbia provides an identity card for persons who have applied for
asylum, been granted asylum, or been granted temporary protection, but only those
who have been given refugee status are eligible to obtain a travel document.98 it
also requires the relevant ministry to adopt a bylaw regarding the format of
such travel document.99 However, because such a bylaw has not yet been approved,
there is a legal gap that limits the freedom of movement for refugees. The
Netherlands is a good example since it has made it possible for refugees and those
receiving subsidiary protection to receive travel documents under equal conditions,
even if the EU does not mandate it. on the other hand, this entitlement is only
granted to refugees under Serbian asylum law. The Asylum Act also allows, but
only in extraordinary circumstances and for very brief periods of time, the issuance
of travel documents to individuals who have been given subsidiary protection.100
This gap in the legal framework, in my opinion, limits the freedom of movement
guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the European
Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR is currently considering whether the
freedom of movement under Article 2(3) Protocol 4 ECHR is violated.101 At the
time of writing, a decision has not yet been issued. Again, we see a disparity
between Serbian legislation, it is important to establish a bylaw as soon as possible,
as required by the Asylum Act.
92
‘Unravelling Travelling Travel documents for beneficiaries of international protection’, AiDA,
ECRE 2016, p 1.
93
“Recast Reception Conditions Directive”, op. cit., n 35, Arts .15, 25.
94
‘Legal briefing on travel documents for beneficiaries of international protection’ AiDA, ECRE
2016, p. 3.
95
“Persons Database Act”, Government Gazette of the Netherlands, 6 January 2014.
96
Unravelling Travelling Travel documents for beneficiaries of international protection’, op. citl,
n 100, p. 5.
97
“Act of Passports”, Government Gazette of the Netherlands, no, 9359, 2017.
98
“Serbian Asylum Act”, op. cit., n 43, Arts. 89, 90 and 101
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid., Art. 91.
101
“Seraj Eddin v. Serbia”, no. 61365/16 ECtHR, 23 February 2018.
Right to naturalization
The European Convention on Nationality, a new unifying convention
incorporating contemporary answers to nationality issues that are relevant to all
European countries, was accepted by the Council of Ministers.102 Article 6 of the
Convention emphasizes the need for States Parties to facilitate refugees’ nationality
claims and states that: “4. Each State Party shall facilitate in its internal law the
acquisition of its nationality for the following persons: […] (g) Stateless persons and
recognized refugees lawfully and habitually resident on its territory”.103 The right to
nationality is not acknowledged as a distinct human right by the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or any of its protocols.104
The EU legislation does not govern the conditions of naturalization, leaving states
free to manage the issue in their own internal laws and thus avoid interfering with
members’ sovereign powers.105 it’s also important to keep in mind that the ECHR
does not guarantee the right to acquire a nationality.106 However, in the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights, the right to citizenship is indirectly preserved
through defending other human rights granted by the Convention and supplementary
Protocols, such as the right to privacy given by article 8 of the Convention.107 The
concepts of acquiring, maintaining, losing, and regaining citizenship, as well as
procedural and legal concerns, and multiple citizenships, are governed by the
European Convention on Nationality.108 The European Convention on Nationality
is crucial because it affirms that every human being has an entitlement to
nationality.109 States are expected to reduce or eliminate legislative barriers, such as
decreasing the required time limit to five years, lowering application expenses,
making decisions promptly, and not requiring from refugees to prove the loss of their
previous citizenship.110 Refugees and those with subsidiary protection are eligible to
apply for an EU long-term residency permit under the Dutch Aliens Act., or apply
for permanent asylum status.111 After five years of holding a temporary asylum
residence status, both refugees and recipients of subsidiary protection may apply for
102
“European Convention on Nationality” Council of Europe, CETS 166, 1997.
103
Ibid., Art. 6.
104
“Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, op. cit. n 32.
105
“Case C-135/08 Rottmann”, para 32, CJEU, 2010.
106
Ibid.
107
“Slivenko and others v Latvia”, no. 48321/99 ECtHR, 9 october 2003, p. 77; “Genovese v.
Malta” no, 53124/09 ECtHR, 11 october 2011, p. 30.
108
“European Treaty Series, No 166” Strasbourg, 6 Nov 1997
109
“Everyone has the right to a nationality”, European Convention on Nationality, (n 110), Art 4,
para. 1.
110
“Recommendation no. R. (84) 21, on the Acquisition by Refugees of the Nationality of the Host
Country” Committee of Ministers, 14 Nov 1984.
111
“Aliens Act 2000”, Government Gazette of the Netherlands, no, 27584, 2021, Arts. 33, 45.
a permanent asylum residence permit in the Netherlands.112 The beneficiary must be

sufficiently integrated and have lived in the Netherlands continuously for at least
five years with a valid residence permit.113 A beneficiary with an asylum residence
permit must first acquire a permanent residency permit.114 A person does not have to
give up their nationality in order to become a Dutch citizen after receiving a
permanent asylum residency status.115 The requirements for neutralization that apply
to both refugees and persons with subsidiary protection are equal according to the
law. Sufficiently integrated condition is more closely determined by the Civic
integration Act, which states that all third-country nationals who receive lawful
residence are subject to an integration commitment.116 it obliges them to take the
exam, that is required as part of the naturalization process, which includes the
participation declaration procedure and knowledge of the Dutch language and
culture.117 Despite the fact that refugees and persons with subsidiary protection have
the right to permanent residence in the Republic of Serbia, the Serbian legal
framework does not recognize the institute of long-term residency since the Long-
Term Residence Directive is not applicable in Serbia.118 The Asylum Act mandates
that the Government oversee the requirements and processes for refugee
naturalization.119 The Citizenship Act, however, does not recognize a refugee as
someone who is entitled to Serbian citizenship.120 When a foreigner applies to
become a citizen of the Republic of Serbia, one of the requirements is that they live
there permanently.121 The qualifications for permanent residency are outlined in the
Law on Foreigners. Permanent residence is defined as a permit for a foreign national
to stay in the Republic of Serbia for a long-term stay.122 Given that asylum is defined
under the Asylum Act as “temporary residence,” it is evident that someone who has
been granted asylum does not meet the criteria, of Article 14 of the Law on
Citizenship and Article 67 of the Law on Foreigners, regarding permanent residence.
Because of this, it is impossible for a refugee or a person under subsidiary protection
to apply for citizenship in the Republic of Serbia. The necessary amendments to the
112
“AiDA Netherlands”, op. cit., n 37, p. 116.
113
“Dutch Nationality Act”, Government Gazette of the Netherlands, no. 3503, 2022.
114
Ibid.
115
“AiDA Netherlands”, op. cit., p. 118
116
“Civic integration Act” art 3. Government Gazette of the Netherlands no 38, 2021
117
Ibid., Art. 7.
118
“Serbian Asylum Act”, op. cit., n 43, Art. 60; “The Asylum information Database (AiDA)
Country Report: Serbia”, op.cit, n 45, p. 154.
119
“Serbian Asylum Act”, op. cit.,n 43, Art.71.
120
“Law on Citizenship”, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 135/2004, 90/2007 and
24/2018.
121
Ibid.
122
“Law on Foreigners” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 24/2018 and 31/2019.
Citizenship Act that would oversee this situation have not yet been adopted. Thus,
it is impossible for refugees to obtain citizenship in Serbia. This legal gap affecting
naturalization was also brought to the attention of the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, pointing out this problem and calling for a solution.123
The right of refugees to citizenship is governed differently by each of the EU member
states.124 Some states provide the usual procedure and time for obtaining citizenship,
with conditions regarding length of stay, language skills, impunity and financial
independence.125 As for the length of stay, it varies from 3 to 10 years.126 EU candidate
countries Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania do not envisage such a
possibility for refugees to naturalize.127 The Netherlands is a good role model within
the EU, as it has equalized conditions for refugees and persons with subsidiary
protection in acquiring citizenship, adhering to the five year minimum required
residence period proposed by the EU. Although Serbia has not ratified the European
Convention on Nationality, other international agreements that have been signed call
for lawmakers to match domestic laws with the provisions of those agreements that
govern the right to nationality.128 The right to citizenship is still an internal matter
for each state, which autonomously imposes conditions and takes judgments in the
naturalization process. However, as the Permanent Court of international Justice
pointed out in its advisory opinion on the national decrees of Tunisia and Morocco
in 1923, “the question of whether or not a question is within the internal competence
of a State is a relative question; it depends on the development of international
relations”.129 With various international agreements recognizing nationality as a
human right, there is no question that this subject is no longer within the state’s
narrow domestic competence, particularly in relation to those who are not protected.
Article 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees lays out three
responsibilities for the States in this area: “1) to enable naturalization as much as
possible; 2) to speed up the naturalization procedure and 3) to reduce the fees and
costs of that procedure as much as possible”.130 The Republic of Serbia should
123
“List of issues in relation to the third periodic report of Serbia”, CESCR, E/C.12/SRB/Q/3, 12
November 2019, para 12.
124
ivana Krstić, “The right to citizenship for persons with international protection” Universitas
Iuris Naturalis Copaonici, Belgrade 2021, p. 271.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid., p. 277.
128
Bojan Stojanović, Aleksandar R. ivanović, “The right to citizenship as a human right, on the
example of the integration of refugees in the Republic of Serbia, solutions de lege and de lege
ferenda”, Collection of the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, 2019 Vo.
38, no. 2, pp. 87–105.
129
“Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on 8 November 1921”,
Advisory opinion PCiJ, 7 February 1923, para 40.
130
ivana Krstić, op. cit., p. 281.
completely uphold its obligations to the international community, including treaties

it has ratified that contain provisions governing the right to nationality, and should
align its legal framework with these agreements. Changes to the Citizenship Act are
also necessary to enable naturalization of refugees and their full integration into
Serbian society. The most favorable way would be the one that would make changes
to the current Citizenship Act, which would mean that refugees will be able to meet
the condition of continuous residence in the Republic of Serbia for five years from
the finality of the decision granting them asylum in accordance with the Asylum
Act.131 As a result, the status of refugees and those with subsidiary protection would
be ended and they could fully integrate.
CONCLUSION
As one of the durable solutions for refugees, integration requires the enjoyment
of certain rights so that refugees can be equal members of the new society.
Although integration encompasses a wide range of rights, this analysis addressed
those rights that are most important to refugees and enable them to exercise
internationally recognized human rights that are equally important to the
integration process. We have seen that the international legal framework largely
deals with the exercise of these rights as well as the integration of refugees. Thus,
they are guaranteed by the above-mentioned 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose many provisions are
part of customary international law, as well as the iCCPR and the iCESCR,
covenants that are binding. in my analysis, i demonstrated how the legal systems
of the Netherlands and the Republic of Serbia are in compliance with international
and regional legal frameworks. The Netherlands has proven to be an excellent
example of an EU Member State that has a very harmonized asylum system with
that envisaged by the EU, as well as more favorable provisions than other Member
States that, for instance, fully equate refugees and persons with subsidiary
protection. on the other hand, Serbia has turned into a territory where many
refugees ultimately settle and attempt to integrate as it is the last country on the
route for refugees attempting to reach the EU states. Serbia is an example of a
non-EU country whose laws have not yet been fully completed in accordance with
international responsibilities, including the legislative framework of the refugee
system and consequently integration in Serbia. We observed in the last chapter
that although Serbia has an appropriate Asylum Act, it is not in accordance with
other national legislation, leading to legal gaps and omissions that impede refugees
from exercising their given rights. Firstly, in both countries, we observed good
examples of the right to education in practice. The right to education is fully upheld
in both Serbia and the Netherlands for refugees, people under subsidiary
protection, and asylum seekers. They even go one step farther by granting refugees
131
Bojan Stojanović, Aleksandar R. ivanović, op. cit., p. 101.
the same access to higher education as nationals. Secondly, although the right to
work is well regulated for refugees and those under subsidiary protection in both
countries, it is still only partially available to those who have applied for asylum.
However, Serbia should treat refugees and state nationals equally, not merely
equally with other foreigners. Serbia and the Netherlands should amend their laws
to bring them into compliance with international conventions, particularly the
iCESCR, which guarantees everyone the right to work without discrimination and
the freedom to choose their employment, in order to give asylum seekers the ability
to exercise their right to employment. Thirdly, Dutch regulations are compliant
with international legal frameworks and the EU’s guarantee to health care. Despite
the fact that Serbia’s asylum legislation guarantees everyone access to healthcare,
the law’s inconsistency with other health care rules makes it difficult for people to
exercise their rights as promised by international accords, particularly the iCESCR.
in order to fully facilitate the exercise of the right to health care, it is necessary to
amend the Health insurance Act to conform to other legal frameworks in the
Republic of Serbia. Fourthly, the Netherlands provides yet another illustration of
great practices with regard to the right to personal documents, ensuring that
conditions for refugees and those under subsidiary protection are equal. Despite
being included in the Asylum Act, Serbia’s inconsistent legal system precludes the
adoption of a bylaw that would regulate the issuance of travel documents. There
are no plans by the government to enact such a bylaw at the moment, therefore it
would be interesting to see how the ECtHR decides on this matter.Finally, the most
intriguing topic to examine is naturalization, which is the final stage in exercising
the right to complete integration. Refugee status is terminated if an individual
becomes a citizen of the receiving state, enabling them to exercise all of their legal
rights there.132 By maintaining the minimum residency requirement of five years,
which is a requirement for naturalization, the Netherlands has equalized the
requirements for citizenship for refugees and those with subsidiary protection. it
so reflects cutting-edge solutions within the EU as well, giving priority to refugees
and those with subsidiary protection demanded by international agreements.
Although the Asylum Act demands that the conditions and process for the
naturalization of refugees be ensured in Serbia, the Citizenship Act does not
acknowledge a refugee as someone who is entitled to naturalization. As we have
seen, there are three laws that govern the right of refugees to naturalization, and
they are not in harmony in this instance either. The legislator may introduce an
amendment to the Citizenship Act requiring that those awarded refugee status or
subsidiary protection begin the time of residence required for attaining citizenship
on the day the decision to grant asylum becomes final.133 That would be the
simplest adjustment that may result in the achievement of refugees’ rights to
132
James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University
Press, 2021, pp. 977–995.
133
Stojano Bojan Stojanović, Aleksandar R. ivanović, op. cit., p. 99.
naturalization in Serbia and ending their status as refugees. in order to respond to

the research question, i examined whether or not asylum legislation in the EU,
specifically the Netherlands, and non-EU, specifically Serbia, were compliant with
international norms. However, in order to guarantee the full right to integration, a
system of laws governing human rights in this area is required, not just asylum
laws. Governments should model their legal frameworks after the well-balanced
asylum and refugee law system in the Netherlands, which equates the rights of
individuals with subsidiary protection with those with refugee status. Despite
having well-regulated labor laws, both nations still have restrictions on asylum
seekers’ ability to work, which i believe can also be remedied by changes to the
labor laws. Although i consider that Serbia has a good asylum act that complies
with the Refugee Convention and other international treaties that protect human
rights, we found that it primarily contradicts with other Serbian regulations. i think
that these omissions by the Serbian system constitute violations of international
law. Therefore, the Netherlands can serve as a useful model for revising Serbian
legislation that limit the human rights of refugees, particularly in the areas of health
care, travel papers, and naturalization. This would result in utmost adherence to
the right of refugees to integration as protected by international law and EU
legislation, of which Serbia wishes to join. This study, in my opinion, has
demonstrated that numerous international agreements protect the right to
integration as a fundamental human right, because refugee right is a human right.
PRAVNi oKViR ZA iNTEGRACiJU iZBEGLiCA PREMA

MEĐUNARoDNoM PRAVU, PRAVU EU i NACioNALNiM
ZAKoNoDAVSTViMA HoLANDiJE i SRBiJE
APSTRAKT
U predmetnom radu, autor razmatra pravni okvir za integraciju izbeglica prema
međunarodnom pravu, pravu EU i nacionalnim zakonodavstvima Holandije i
Srbije. Cilj istraživanja bilo je davanje odgovora na pitanje poštovanja
međunarodnih pravnih standarda o zaštiti izbeglica u kontekstu šire problematike
evropskih integracija. Studija slučaja je obuhvatila pravne sisteme Holandje
članice EU i Srbije, kao zemlje kandidata za pristupanje ovoj regionalnoj
organizaciji. Tumačeći i pojašnjavajući nacionalne zakone, autor ih upoređuje sa
obavezama predviđenim međunarodnim pravnim okvirom i pravom EU. U tom
smislu autor se fokusirao na najrelevantnije pravne izvore u ovoj oblasti, koji
determinišu proces evropskih integracija. Služeći se uporednopravnom metodom,
autor je razmotrio sadržaj i kontekst pet prava u međunarodno-pravnom okviru
koji su posebno interesantni za analizu integrisanja izbeglica, a koja se odnose
na pravo na obrazovanje, pravo na rad, pravo na zdravstvenu zaštitu, pravo na
dokumenta i pravo na naturalizaciju. iako je Srbija donela adekvatan Zakon o
azilu i privremenoj zaštiti, prema mišljenju autora, Zakon nije u dovoljnoj meri
usklađen sa ostalim zakonodavstvom, čime se stvaraju pravni vakuumi i propusti.
Konačno iz ove studije proizilazi i predlog autor za izmenu domaćeg

zakonodavstva kako bi izbeglice dobile mogućnost da uživaju prava koja su im
zagarantovana međunarodnim i evropskim pravnim okvirom i pravnim
standardima.
Ključne reči: izbeglice, integracija, azil, međunarodno pravo, pravo EU,
Holandija, Srbija
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DECLARATIONS DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE:

PRIMAUTE DE L’EFFICACITE SUR LA LEGALITE?
Antonia JUTRoNić PANTić*
ABSTRAiT
L’Union européenne depuis son établissement connaissait une structuration
institutionnelle avec de différents éléments et caractéristiques supranationales qui
d’une manière spécifique arrangent les relations parmi ses Etats membres, et après
les années de la pratique concrète et le développement de son propre droit, elle a
introduit de nouveautés dans les relations internationales contemporaines, ainsi
que dans le droit international public contemporain. Un d’instrument de l’Union
européenne largement utilisé et surtout développé dans le travail de ses
institutions, qui est devenu tellement fréquent dans le travail de ses organes à tous
niveaux, est l’utilisation des déclarations de l’Union européenne. En prenant en
compte la portée limitée des effets légaux des déclarations unilatérale d’Etats ou
groupes d’Etats dans le droit international public, cet article a une tendance à
démontrer que les déclarations de l’Union européenne non seulement qu’elles ne
produisent pas les conséquences légales per se, mais elles contribuent à la
tendance de fragmentation du droit international. Dans le but d’affirmation de ce
thèse, cet article tout d’abord va interroger la nature légale des actes unilatéraux
y compris déclarations unilatérales d’Etats ou groupes d’Etats, et ensuite se
concentrera sur la présentation de tous les aspects de légalité et efficacité de
l’utilisation des déclarations de la part de l’Union européenne, avec un accent
particulier sur leur autonomie par rapport aux autres instruments légaux de
communication en droit international, en conformité avec les principes
fondamentaux du droit international public. Finalement, à travers d’une analyse
de concrètes déclarations de l’Union européenne dans le contexte de
crises/conflits internationaux, ce travail affirmera dans quelle mesure les
déclarations de l’Union européenne dans leur hyper-production peuvent
contribuer dans la perspective future au phénomène de la fragmentation du droit
international.
Mots clé: Déclarations, actes unilatéraux, Union européenne, fragmentation du
droit international, légalité
*
Ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Serbie. E-mail: antonia.jutronic@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION
Une prolifération des déclarations de l’Union européenne (l’UE) sur la scène
internationale suscite beaucoup d’attention parmi les politiciens ainsi que dans les
cercles scientifiques y compris les juristes. En disposant de la politique extérieure,
l’UE utilise les déclarations afin d’exprimer sa position vis-à-vis une situation
politique dans les affaires internationales. Ce n’est pas rare d’entendre que “l’Union
européenne condamne un état ou une activité telle ou telle (…)”, qui se passe soit
dans un Etat membre de l’Union européenne soit dans un Etat tiers. De suite, ce sont
les organes divers qui adoptent les déclarations qui ont une longue portée et ces
déclarations même donnent la possibilité aux Etats tiers d’y joindre en se qualifiant
comme les sujets qui partagent la vision et la politique extérieure de l’UE. Cette
adhésion aux déclarations européennes est surtout pertinente pour les pays candidats
à joindre l’Union européenne en tant que les Etat membres de plein droit, comme
les pays provenant de la région des Balkans occidentaux. L’UE, étant l’organisation
internationale, depuis les années 1990 se positionne politiquement les dans crises
internationales, ce qui fait part de sa politique extérieure aujourd’hui. La première
fameuse déclaration de l’UE a été adoptée sous la forme de résolution par le
Parlement européen en mars 1991. Par ladite résolution le Parlement européen reflète
son propre opinion qui soutient le droit à l’autodétermination des républiques
constitutives de la République socialiste fédérale de Yougoslavie au sein des
frontières internationalement reconnues et au long des frontières administratives.1
Donc, un organe interparlementaire publiquement donne l’avis sur les questions qui
touchent d’abord le droit international public, et plus précisément les principes
fondamentaux du droit international tel que la souveraineté nationale, l’intégrité
territorial et le droit à l’autodétermination des peuples en traduisant le droit à
l’autodétermination des peuples en droit à l’autodétermination des républiques. Par
la suite, le 16 décembre 1991, à la réunion extraordinaire des ministres des affaires
étrangères à Bruxelles, l’Union européenne adopte “Déclaration des pays de la
Communauté européenne économique sur la question de la reconnaissance des
républiques yougoslaves”, qui conjointement avec la Déclaration sur les “Lignes
directrices sur la reconnaissance de nouveaux Etats en Europe orientale et en Union
soviétique” adoptée par la Conseil, représentaient le fondement de la procédure de
reconnaissance des Etats – les lignes directives qui prétendaient une portée
universelle, ce qui veut dire non exclusivement pour les Etats membres de l’UE, à
l’époque de la Communauté économique européenne.2 Sachant que les deux
déclarations exposent la position commune de douze Etats membres de l’UE, il faut
bien interpréter le sens des déclarations de l’UE, en prenant en compte la valeur
1
Srđan Gligorijević, “Balkan – od bureta baruta do evropske budućnosti”, Balkanija, Časopis za
balkanske studije, Beograd, Prvi semestar 2003, str. 58.
2
Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 52–53.
légale des déclarations unilatérales étant la forme d’actes unilatéraux que le droit
international public connaît depuis les siècles. Si le droit coutumier arrange la
question de reconnaissance d’Etats par quelques principes qui reflètent opinio juris
de la communauté internationale, il est important d’analyser la portée juridique
d’actes unilatéraux d’Etats, groupes d’Etats ou voire organisations internationales
ce qui est devenue l’UE par l’adoption de ses propres actes constitutifs, en
s’appropriant la personnalité juridique propre et distincte de celle de ses Etats
membres. En comparaison avec le droit coutumier, le droit des traités connaît
l’institut de réserves par lesquelles “un État ou une organisation internationale à la
signature, à la ratification, à l’acte de confirmation formelle, à l’acceptation ou à
l’approbation d’un traité ou à l’adhésion à celui-ci ou quand un État fait une
notification de succession à un traité, par laquelle cet État ou cette organisation vise
à exclure ou à modifier l’effet juridique de certaines dispositions du traité dans leur
application à cet État ou à cette organisation”.3 D’ailleurs la Convention de Vienne
sur le droit de traités indique les conditions générales selon lesquelles les réserves
peuvent être formulées. Selon le droit coutumier une réserve peut être aussi formulée,
mais comme le coutume exprime une acceptance d’un comportement non proclamée
de la part d’Etats et la pratique répétitive d’Etats qui est suivie par une conscience
juridique, une réserve devrait être claire qu’elle ne puisse pas s’inscrire dans la
pratique, comme la Court internationale de justice a trouvé dans son arrêt “Haya de
la Torre” en 1951, où le silence ou l’absence d’une action d’Etat lors de la création
d’une coutume lors d’absence d’un règle clair existe, démontrent la création de
réserve à un droit coutumier.4 Dans ce contexte, il faut admettre qu’une opposition
à la formation d’une coutume peut être aussi formulée dans la forme de déclaration,
pas seulement avec l’absence d’y donner un consentement ou avec l’absence d’une
action concrète. Pourtant, comment les actions unilatéraux d’un groupe d’Etats ou
d’une organisation internationale peuvent modifier ou abroger les règles du droit
coutumier? Comment ces actes unilatéraux s’inscrivent dans le droit international
contemporain déjà caractérisé par l’absence d’une hiérarchie centrale dotée d’un
organe juridique à se prononcer ultérieurement sur la conformité ou non d’un acte
légal avec le droit international? Si le droit international connaît l’institut d’actes
unilatéraux, il faut surtout faire l’attention à la nature légale des autorités qui
l’adoptent et au contenu de ses actes, surtout quand ils se prononcent sur
l’interprétation de normes du droit international, en risquant sa violation ou
fragmentation. Ce qui distingue le droit international de droits internes de différentes
disciplines, c’est aussi que les Etats sont en même temps ses créateurs et adressées,
et c’est bien dans l’intérêt d’Etats à créer une certitude légale afin de promouvoir
3
international Law Commission, “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties”, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. ii, Part Two, p. 26.
4
“Haya de la Torre affaire (Colombie v. Pérou)”, Cour internationale de justice, Arrêt du 13 juin
1951, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances, C.i.J. Recueil 1951, Société d’éditions
A. W. Sijthoff, Leyde, 1951, p. 71.
leurs propres intérêts. L’apparition des organisations internationales, en tant que les
acteurs et régulateurs d’affaires intergouvernementaux, y compris l’Union
européenne, est accompagnée de l’esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies (la Charte
de l’oNU), comme le document fondateur de la seule vraie organisation
internationale de caractère universelle. Surtout, leur pertinence est valable dans le
contexte du maintien de la paix internationale. Le Chapitre Viii de la Charte de
l’oNU promulgue un rôle subsidiaire aux organisations internationales régionales
dans le régi de maintien de la paix internationale en admettant aux accords régionaux
“de régler d’une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les
différends d’ordre local, avant de les soumettre au Conseil de sécurité”.5 De suite,
selon l’article 52 (3), le Conseil de sécurité encourage “le développement du
règlement pacifique des différends d’ordre local par le moyen de ces accords ou de
ces organismes régionaux, soit sur l’initiative des Etats intéressés, soit sur renvoi du
Conseil de sécurité”, ce qui veut dire que la Charte de l’oNU donne un privilège à
tout règlement pacifique des différends en utilisant tous les moyens disponibles, y
compris les mécanismes développés par les accords régionaux qui peuvent avoir la
structure d’une organisation intergouvernementale régionale comme l’UE.6 Par
contre, la Charte de l’oNU est silencieuse par rapport aux mécanismes eux-mêmes
et leur conformité avec le droit international, qui est sous-jacent. Sans doute, si un
groupe d’Etats ou un “accord régional” adopte une déclaration qui établit les règles
et la procédure de gestion de la crise internationale, cette déclaration devrait suivre
quelques critères de légalité prescrits en droit international, comme tout ordre
juridique connaît un mode de formation de règles, soit primaires soir secondaires.
Le terme de légalité présume l’existence de certaines règles juridiques autres que les
faits.7 Ainsi, le principe de légalité met un accent sur l’état de droit, où il existe une
distinction entre les normes primaires et les normes secondaires. Si la question de
légalité en droit interne ne permet pas aux organes du pouvoir législatif d’adopter
les actes qui contredisent les normes primaires, le droit international ne connaît pas
une hiérarchie de normes juridiques. Quand même, l’anarchie de la communauté
internationale connaît la primauté de normes, selon le critère de leur valeur.8 A part
de normes impératives du droit international, quelques provisions de la Charte de
l’oNU, ne sont pas à négliger dans la structuration de la hiérarchie des normes. En
parlant des obligations d’Etats, il faut citer l’article 103 de la Charte de l’oNU: “En
5
Article 52 (2) de la “Charte des Nations unies”, Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of
the international Court of Justice, [ST/]DPi/2587, UN Public Documentation, San Francisco,
1945, l'internet: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/. 17 octobre 2022.
6
Ibid.
7
Arthur W. Phelps, “What is a Question of Law”, William & Marry Lawschool Scholarship
Repository, Faculty Publications, Williamsburg, 1949, pp. 259–282, l'internet: https://scholarship.
law.wm.edu/facpubs/810. 17 octobre 2022.
8
Alberto de Amaral, “El ,,Dialogo’’ de las Fuentes: Fragmentación y Coherencia en el Derecho
internacional Contemporáneo’’, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, 2010,Vol LXii, i,
p. 65.
cas de conflit entre les obligations des Membres des Nations Unies en vertu de la
présente Charte et leurs obligations en vertu de tout autre accord international, les
premières prévaudront”.9 De même manière, les obligations erga omnes c’est-à-dire
les obligations envers la communauté internationale dans sa totalité, en reflétant
l’intérêt de la communauté internationale ont une valeur supérieure vis-à-vis les
obligations inter se, qui reflètent les obligations bilatérales entre les Etats.10 L’intérêt
de leur accomplissement est intégral et universel. Dans ce sens les normes de
caractère secondaire doivent obéir aux normes primaires du droit international afin
d’atteindre l’universalité, la cohérence et l’unité du droit international. La question
d’efficacité, dans cet article, se traduit, tout simplement, par la réalisation de but
concrétisé, en dégageant la question de légitimité. Quoi que soit la nature légale des
déclarations unilatérales de l’UE, leur portée a pour l’objectif de régir les relations
entre les Etats, en interprétant les principes fondamentaux du droit international en
ce propre moyen pour achever les but propres politiques et ainsi les déclaration de
l’UE contribuent à la fragmentation du droit international public. Pour atteindre ce
but d’une entité hyper politique, il faudra démontrer dans cet article que les
déclarations de l’UE non seulement qu’elles une vocation politique parfaite et qu’en
isolation elles ne produisent pas les conséquences légales, mais avec les formulations
qui n’enrichissent que littérairement leurs contenu contribuent au phénomène de la
fragmentation du droit international public.
L’EFFET LEGAL D’ACTES UNILATERAUX DANS

LES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES
Le droit international public connaît une vaste diversité d’actes unilatéraux des
sujets du droit international. Depuis le XViiie siècle la pratique des actes unilatéraux
est fréquente et surtout elle porte sur les déclarations d’indépendance faites par les
Etats. En outre, les actes unilatéraux afin de produire un effet légal doivent accomplir
quelques critères objectifs. Dans le cas des Etats, étant les sujets primaires et
originaires du droit international, les actes unilatéraux comme les traités
internationaux où la règle pacta sunt servanda s’applique, doivent être adoptés par
les organes étatiques habilités à adopter un tel acte, qu’ils reflètent la vraie volonté
d’Etat et que la licité de son objet existe.11 La nature légale des actes unilatéraux des
Etats a même été l’objet d’étude de la part de la Commission du droit international.
Dans son Rapport la Commission du droit international définit l’acte unilatéral de
9
Article 103 de la “Charte des Nations unies”, op. cit., 3.
10
Hans-Peter Kaul, Eleni Chaitidou,”Balancing individual and Community interests: Reflections
on the international Criminal Court”, Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan,
Andreas Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, Christoph Vedder (Eds), From Bilateralism to
Community Interest. Essays in Honor of Judge Bruno Simma, oxford University Press, oxford,
2011, pp. 975–1003.
11
Milenko Kreća, Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2012, str. 108.
l’Etat d’être “une manifestation de volonté́ non équivoque de l’Etat, formulée par
l’intention de produire des effets juridiques dans ses relations avec un ou plusieurs
Etats, ou une ou plusieurs organisations internationales, et dont ledit ou lesdits Etats
ou ladite ou lesdites organisations internationales ont connaissance”.12 Les formes
d’actes unilatéraux sont diverse et leur portée et validité juridique permet une certaine
catégorisation d’actes unilatéraux dans les cas où un Etat crée un droit ou une
obligation soit pour lui-même soit pour un Etat tiers ou renonce à un droit ou une
obligation. Pourtant les déclarations d’indépendance qui présentent la forme d’acte
unilatéral sont plutôt le suivi de la situation actuelle qu’à la création ou à la
renonciation à un droit particulier. Donc, l’effet légal dans une telle situation n’est
pas clair, et une même constatation peut être retrouvée dans les déclarations politiques
des Etats ou groupes d’Etats qui envisageant la reconnaissance ou la condamnation
d’une activité concrète ou d’un aspect politique, en absence d’instruments juridiques
à le corriger. Logiquement, les Etats, comme les acteurs parfaitement politiques,
dont les activités sont motivées par leurs intérêts politiques, élaborent des déclarations
politiques afin de souligner leurs positions politiques. Dans ce sens les actes
unilatéraux des Etats ne sont pas une source formelle du droit, mais plutôt l’élément
qui fait activer l’application des normes du droit international. La situation concernant
les actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales est plus complexe. Tout
d’abord les organisations internationales diffèrent elles-mêmes selon leurs
compétences, structures, actes constitutifs etc., et bien dans ce contexte les actes
adoptés par les organisations internationales sont de différente nature. Toute
organisation internationale peut adopter un acte unilatéral parce que son adoption
est nécessaire pour que les organisations accomplissement leur buts et objectifs et
leurs rôles en général. Quel que soit leur effet légal, la volonté d’une organisation
internationale qui adopte un tel acte est de produire un effet ou bien une conséquence
dans les relations internationales. Dans cette distinction, il faut tout d’abord mettre
en lumière les actes qui ont l’importance légale et qui produisent les conséquences
légales en créant les droits et obligations des Etats membres. Généralement, ces actes
sont adoptés par les organes des organisations internationales dont la compétence
de créer le droit est bien prescrite dans l’acte constitutif d’organisation internationale.
La terminologie utilisée pour ces actes connaît une certaine imprécision et c’est à
dire que le terme lui-même ne donne pas une vraie information sur la nature légale
de l’acte et surtout ne répond pas à la question si cet acte est juridiquement
contraignant. Si la Charte de l’oNU prévoit que l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil
de sécurité adoptent les décisions, ce sont bien les règlements intérieurs de ces deux
organes qui définissent la méthodologie d’adoption de décisions ainsi que la
terminologie concrète de ces décisions.13 Si les deux organes de l’organisation des
12
Víctor Rodríguez Cedeño, rapporteur spécial, “Cinquième rapport sur les actes unilatéraux des
États”, Document A/CN.4/525 et Add.1 et 2, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international,
Documents de la cinquante quatrième session, Vol. ii, Deuxième partie, 2022, p. 100.
13
Michel Virally, “Les actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales”, Mohammed Bedjaoui
(Ed.), Droit international: Bilan et perspectives, Paris, Pedone, 1991, p. 254.
Nations Unies (oNU) peuvent adopter les actes comme les résolutions, il faut
souligner que la nature légale des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité est
drastiquement différente de celles adoptées par l’Assemblée générale comme les
résolutions du Conseil de sécurité adoptées dans le cadre du Chapitre Vii de la Charte
de l’oNU sont légalement contraignantes pour chaque Etat membre de l’oNU.14
Leur valeur légale s’inscrit également dans la question de portée juridique comme
ces résolutions sont valables et leur respect est obligatoire pour chaque Etat membre
de l’oNU, sans exceptions. Au contraire, les résolutions de l’Assemblée générale
ont généralement une valeur morale, comme elles ne produisent pas instantanément
les conséquences juridiques. Certaines résolutions adoptées par l’Assemblée
générales portent un titre descriptif comme “déclarations”, et certaines parmi elles
ont réussi à acquérir la valeur légale avec l’écoulement du temps. il faut surtout noter
les déclarations de l’Assemblée générale adoptés dans les années 1950, 1960 et 1970
dont les objectifs sont à éclaircir certains principes fondamentaux du droit
international public. Ainsi la Résolution de l’Assemblée générale A/RES
/2625(XXV) adoptée en 1970 est dénommée “Déclaration relative aux principes du
droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les Etats
conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies”. Même si les résolutions de
l’Assemblée générales per se ne représentent pas une source formelle du droit
international public, la Cour internationale de justice a affirmé que les formulations
et l’élaboration des principes mentionnés dans la Déclaration susmentionnée reflètent
opinio juris des Etats qui forment la communauté internationale, c’est à dire que ces
principes s’inscrivent dans la catégorie des coutumes internationaux.15 Le même
peut être conclu pour “Déclaration sur l’inadmissibilité de l’intervention dans les
affaires intérieures des Etats et sur la protections de leur indépendance et de leur
souveraineté” et “Déclaration sur l’octroi de l’indépendance aux pays et aux peuples
coloniaux”, aussi adoptées sous la forme de résolutions de l’Assemblée générale.
Dans ce sens, l’Assemblée générale reflète la volonté de la majorité d’Etats – le
groupe d’Etats rassemblés dans une organisation internationale où selon les
fonctionnalistes les Etats formulent l’intérêt commun en traduisant les intérêts
particuliers en coopération internationale. Les internationalistes aussi traduisent cette
idée en disant que les résolutions des organisations internationales sont une forme
de la manifestation de la pratique des Etats.16 La participation des Etats dans le travail
14
Susan Lamb, “Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers”, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
Stefan Talmon (Eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honor of Ian Brownlie, oxford
University Press, oxford, 1999, pp. 361–362.
15
“Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States)”, Judgement of 27 June 1986, Reports of judgements, advisory opinions and
orders, i.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 191, p. 91.
16
Bartłomiej Krzan, “Unilateral acts of international organizations as a source of international
law”, Jan Kolasa (Ed.), The Nature of Source in International Legal Order, University of
Wroclav, Wroclav, 2017, p. 91, l'internet: https://repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/95302 .
17 octobre 2022.
des organisations internationales clairement indique que les organisations

internationales, ayant leur propre subjectivité internationale distincte de la somme
des subjectivités d’Etats, ne peuvent pas passer un acte unilatéral qui vise l’adoption
des normes contraignantes pour les Etats. La façon d’adopter un tel acte varie:
consensus, majorité qualifiée ou majorité simple, mais cette façon ne contredit pas
la validité de l’acte, surtout dans les organes intergouvernementaux des organisations
internationales universelles. Quoi que soit le règlement de vote d’une résolution, ce
sont les Etats qui y donnent le consentement ce qui accentue la règle pacta sunt
servanda, même dans le cas des actes unilatéraux. Leur accord de formuler une
position commune est un même accord qui reflète la volonté non équivoque d’Etats
de conclure un traité international.17 Par la suite, l’effet légal des actes unilatéraux
dépend de la nature d’actes pris par les Etats au sein d’une organisation internationale
et leur validité juridique n’a pas un effet immédiat. il serait même dangereux pour
la souveraineté et l’indépendance politique d’Etats d’octroyer aux organisations
internationales la capacité d’imposer les normes contraignantes aux Etats, parce que
c’est bien la volonté des Etats qui est manifestée dans leurs propres actes unilatéraux
et les actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales dont le travail est nourri par
les activités d’Etats membres. Quand même il y a des organes des organisations
internationales qui produisent les actes unilatéraux propres, comme c’est le cas du
secrétaire général de l’oNU ou directeur générale de l’UNESCo. Ces déclarations
ou les communiqués expriment la position du principal gouverneur administratif de
l’organisation internationale, mais elles ne produisent pas d’implications légales dans
le droit international. Leur valeur est purement morale, ou voire politique. Cependant
il ne faut pas rater de mentionner que les organisations internationales de caractère
supranationale, par rapport aux organisations internationales de caractère
interétatique, peuvent passer un acte unilatéral qui pose les obligations aux Etats
membres d’une telle organisation dans sa totalité, et non seulement aux Etats
membres mais aux Etats tiers. En mentionnant le cas des organisations
supranationales, il faut surtout analyser le cas de l’UE, dans les chapitres qui suivent.
En constatant que le droit international connaît une pratique de longue durée d’actes
unilatéraux, il faut aussi dire que la Cour international de justice dans ses deux arrêts
sur les essais nucléaires en 1974 a constaté de même façon que les actes unilatéraux
peuvent produire les effets légaux dans le droit international.18 La Cour international
de justice, en analysant les cas des déclarations unilatérales dans quelques cas, a
traité la question de légalité de concrètes déclarations, comme certaines parmi elles
produisaient les droits et les obligations d’Etats. Ainsi, la question de légalité est
étroitement liée à la question d’interprétation des déclarations unilatérales. La
17
Eva Kassoti, “interpretation of Unilateral Acts in international Law”, Netherlands International
Law Review, 2022, Vol. 69, p. 300.
18
“Nuclear Tests cases (Australia/France)”, Reports of judgements, advisory opinions and orders,
i.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253; “Nuclear Tests cases (New Zealand/France)”, Reports of judgements,
advisory opinions and orders, i.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457.
définition de la Commission du droit international d’acte unilatéral rejette l’élément

de changement de l’ordre légale, mais contrairement à ce point de vue, par exemple,
Francis Rigaldies définit l’acte unilatérale comme “l’expression de volonté envisagée
dans le droit international publique qui provient d’un sujet singulier du droit et qui
résulte en modification de l’ordre légal” et Jean-Paul Jacqués note que “l’acte
unilatéral émane de l’expression de volonté singulière et crée normes supposées
d’être appliquées aux sujets du droit qui not pas pris participation dans le processus
de formulation de l’acte”.19 Pourtant, la question de volonté n’est pas la seule question
pertinente pour affirmer la légalité d’un acte unilatéral, mais cet acte doit être en
quelque sorte conforme aux normes du droit international, c’est-à-dire qu’il ne peut
pas être cliniquement isolé. Dans les cas des reconnaissances d’Etats et
gouvernements, une simple reconnaissance n’est pas valable si l’acquisition de
l’indépendance n’est pas conforme aux normes valables du droit international
coutumières. Alors, dans ce cas la publicité d’une déclaration de reconnaissance n’est
pas un critère objectif de légalité. Ainsi le contenu d’une déclaration n’est pas
nécessairement conforme aux normes du droit international, ou voire une déclaration
peut contenir les formulations soupçonneuses quant il vient au processus de
l’interprétation. Certains actes unilatéraux ont un effet légal en conjonction avec
d’autres actes juridiques, comme les réserves aux traités internationaux. il s’agit dans
ce cas d’un processus large de création du droit. Aussi une déclaration d’Etat tiers
peut avoir les conséquences légales entre deux Etats qui ont établi un régime en
créant les devoirs et les obligations, comme c’était le cas de déclaration de Chili dans
l’Arrêt de la Cour internationale de justice “obligation de négocier un accès à l’océan
Pacifique” entre la Bolivie et le Chili.20 Ainsi, il faut conclure que les actes unilatéraux
sont parmi eux distincts selon leur effet légal, quand il s’agit des actes adoptés par
les Etats, groupes d’Etats ou organisations internationales de caractère universel.
Certains actes en communication avec d’autres normes du droit international, quand
il vient au processus d’interprétation, peuvent devenir la source du droit international.
Le contenu d’actes unilatéraux relève de grande importance dans le contexte de leur
application dans le droit international. Dans ce sens, comme dans certains cas
d’organes intergouvernementaux du système de l’oNU déjà exposé ci-dessus, il
faut, ce qui est l’objet de cette étude, examiner le cas d’UE, étant l’organisation
internationale supranationale et un exemple du sujet du droit international avec une
vocation politique.
19
Victor Rodríguez Cedeño, “Deuxième rapport sur les actes unilatéraux des États”, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/500 and Add. 1, Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, Documents de la
cinquante et unième session, Vol. ii, Première partie, 1999, p. 231.
20
“obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific ocean Case (Bolivia v. Chile)”, Judgement of 1st
october 2018, Reports of judgements, advisory opinions and orders, i.C.J. Reports 2018, paras.
146–148. pp. 51–52.
LES ACTES UNILATERAUX DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE – LA

COMPLEXITE QUI VISE L’AFFIRMATION DE L’AUTONOMIE DE
L’UNION EUROPEENNE AU DETRIMENT DE SAUVEGARDE DE
L’UNITE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Afin de voir quelle position occupent les déclarations adoptées par l’UE dans
le droit international il faut d’abord explorer leur validité et portée juridique dans
le droit européen – droit de l’UE. Le droit de l’UE contient les normes primaires
et secondaires, et leurs sources sont tous les actes juridiques, les actions légales et
les principes légaux non-écrits qui produisent l’effet légal dans l’ordre que l’UE
établit.21 Ainsi les normes primaires se trouvent en principe dans le Traité sur
l’Union européenne (TUE) et le Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union
européenne (TFUE), qui tout particulièrement définit les compétences de l’UE.
Egalement, les normes primaires se trouvent dans les annexes au TUE et TFUE.
Dans ce sens, il faut conclure que les actes constitutifs de l’UE contiennent les
normes primaires du droit européen ce que indique leur valeur en quelque sorte
constitutionnelle dans le sens matériel, même si ils ne présentent pas la constitution
dans le sens formel, ce que la Court de justice de l’Union européenne voulait
démontrer dans sa jurisprudence.22 En ce qui concerne les normes secondaires du
droit européen, ce sont tous les actes et instruments adoptés par les institutions et
les organes de l’UE, en conformité avec les normes primaires. La hiérarchie des
normes établit par l’UE indique une autonomisation de l’ordre juridique de l’UE,
sur quoi insiste la Court de justice de l’Union européenne. La législation de l’UE
est immense parce qu’elle règle les différentes questions appartenantes aux
politiques de l’UE comme la Politique agricole commune (PAC), la Politique
extérieure et de sécurité commune (PESC) etc. Certains actes adoptés par les
organes de l’UE, dans le sens d’actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales,
sont juridiquement contraignants – actes législatifs, et certains n’ont qu’une valeur
déclarative – parmi lesquels figurent les déclarations de l’Union européenne. Par
la démonstration de la diversité d’actes du droit dérivé de l’UE, la nature
supranationale de l’UE s’impose comme le cas per se. Pour que l’UE adopte un
acte législatif, il faut que le projet d’acte passe par la procédure législative ordinaire
ou spéciale décrites dans l’article 294 du TFEU.23 Cette procédure inclut la
participation de trois institutions de l’UE: le Conseil, le Parlement européen et la
Commission prennent participation – donc trois organes de caractère différent –
un organe intergouvernemental, un organe de caractère législatif où les députés
21
Budimir P. Košutić, Osnovi prava Evropske unije, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu,
Beograd, 2010, str. 97.
22
Rainer Arnold, European Constitutional Law, The Process of Constitutionalisation of the EU
and Related Issues, Europa Law Publishing, Washington, 2008, p. 41.
23
Article 294 du “Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne” (version consolidée),
Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, C 326/174, 26.10.2012. p. 171.
ne représentent pas les Etats mais les groupes politiques, et un organe expert
européen dont les activités ne reflètent pas les politiques d’Etats membres de l’UE.
L’article 288 donne la liste d’actes juridiques de l’UE: règlements, directives,
décisions et avis, en soulignant que les recommandations et les avis ne lient pas.24
il s’agit donc d’actes juridiques non contraignants. De suite, l’article 289 du TFEU
indique quels sont les formes d’actes législatifs: règlement, directive ou décision.25
Ainsi, en comparaison avec les actes unilatéraux d’organisations internationales
de caractère classique intergouvernemental, le consentement d’Etats relève moins
important, comme il ne s’agit plus d’organes proprement intergouvernementaux.
La délégation ultérieure de compétences d’Etats sur les organes de caractère non-
intergouvernemental implique les procédures différentes d’adoption des actes
unilatéraux des organisations internationales. Ce n’est qu’un exemple de procédure
législative de l’UE, comme les organes experts comme la Commission ou la Cour
de justice de l’Union européenne ou bien la Banque centrale peuvent avoir ses
propres compétences dans la procédure législative dépendant de la politique
concrète de l’UE. Dans ce sens il faudra tout particulièrement faire attention à la
PESC, les compétences d’institutions d’UE et les procédures d’adoption d’actes
de l’UE au sein de la PESC. Tout d’abord la PESC est initialement régulée par le
TUE. Un entier titre du TUE est consacré aux “Dispositions générales relatives à
l’action extérieure de l’Union et dispositions spécifiques concernant la politique
étrangère et de sécurité commune”, tout en suivant les buts d’établissement de
l’UE exposés dans son article 3(5): “Dans ses relations avec le reste du monde,
l’Union affirme et promeut ses valeurs et ses intérêts et contribue à la protection
de ses citoyens. Elle contribue à la paix, à la sécurité, au développement durable
de la planète, à la solidarité et au respect mutuel entre les peuples, au commerce
libre et équitable, à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à la protection des droits de
l’homme, en particulier ceux de l’enfant, ainsi qu’au strict respect et au
développement du droit international, notamment au respect des principes de la
Charte des Nations unies”.26 De suite, un sujet politique, ayant sa propre politique
extérieure comme l’UE, dispose d’un réseau d’institutions qui adoptent et
exécutent la PESC: le Conseil européen et le Conseil, voire la Commission et le
Parlement, et l’institution du Haut représentant de l’Union pour les affaires
étrangères et la politique de sécurité (Haut représentant) qui préside le Conseil des
affaires étrangères et gouverne le Service européen pour l’action extérieure
(SEAE). Si la PESC comprend les actions et les positions communes des Etats
membres de l’UE, afin d’achever les buts promulgués du fondement de l’UE,
comme décrit dans l’article 3 du TUE, ces actions établies par les actes législatifs
le l’UE doivent être conformes au droit international public, et surtout aux ces
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., p. 172.
26
Article 3 du “Traité sur l’Union européenne” (version consolidée), Journal officiel de l’Union
européenne, C 326/7, 26. 10.2012, p. 17.
normes primaires et principes fondamentaux dont le respect et l’interprétation

garantissent l’unité et la cohérence de droit international. Pourtant, même les actes
unilatéraux de l’UE dont la force est juridiquement obligatoire pour les Etats
membres de l’UE, dans la pratique, peuvent contourner la primauté de normes
générales du droit international. il est mentionné ci-dessus que les résolutions du
Conseil de sécurité de l’oNU quand adoptées sous le Chapitre Vii de la Charte
de l’oNU sont contraignantes pour chaque Etat membre de l’oNU, étant ou non
Etat membre de l’UE. Par contre, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne avait
une interprétation différente dans l’Arrêt “Yassin Abdullah Kadi et Al Barakaat
international Foundation contre Conseil de l’Union européenne et Commission
des Communautés européennes” datant du 2008. Dans son Arrêt la Cour a accepté
la requête de Kadi et l’entreprise Al Barkaat d’annuler le Règlement du Conseil
881/2002 qui prescrit le gel des fonds et des autres ressources financières détenus
à l’étranger par les Taliban, qui a été adopté afin de permettre à l’UE d’appliquer
les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité afin d’entreprendre les mesures efficaces
contre le terrorisme et mettre en place la position commune adopté par la Conseil
999/727/PESC, relative aux mesures restrictives à l’encontre des Taliban. Ce qui
est intéressant c’est que le Tribunal de première instance des Communautés
européennes - précurseur de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, a rejeté la
demande de Kadi et Al Barkaat, en soulignant que la Cour doit dans la plus grande
mesure interpréter les actes juridiques à la manière compatible avec les obligations
des Etats membres provenant de la Charte de l’oNU. De plus, la Tribunal indique
que seulement les normes péremptoires peuvent limiter l’application absolute des
résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Ainsi la décision de la Cour d’annuler le
Règlement du Conseil 881/2002 soulève la question d’exceptionnalisme et
d’exclusivité de l’UE de l’application des normes du droit international ce qui
implique une certaine autonomie d’actes de l’UE et ouvre la question de la
fragmentation de droit international dans le sens formel et matériel.27 Comme il
est démontré dans l’arrêt de la Cour de juste de l’Union européenne, dans le cadre
de la PESC, l’UE prend la position commune – le cadre politique afin de mener
sa propre politique extérieure et de sécurité. Ce n’est pas par le développement
d’instruments juridiques et appareil technique que l’UE s’est dotée d’une
compétence spéciale, sachant que l’Acte unique européen permettait aux Etats
membres de la Communauté économique européenne d’adopter les positions
communes et que le droit international par ces règles n’interdisait l’issu de
déclarations de groupes d’Etats. De suite, il faudra explorer quelles sont les
dispositions du droit européen permettant l’utilisation de déclarations unilatérales
dans le cadre de la PESC, comme les actes unilatéraux de l’UE ayant les traits
communs avec les actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales de caractère
intergouvernemental ne font pas l’objet de cette étude. Si un acte unilatéral résulte
27
Branko Rakić,” Fragmentacija međunarodnog prava i evropsko pravo - na Zapadu nešto novo”,
Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2009, vol. LVii, br. 1, str. 122–147.
en “modification de l’ordre légal” et vise les “sujets du droit qui not pas pris
participation dans le processus de formulation de l’acte”, sa porté n’appartient pas
seulement aux acteurs qui participaient dans le processus de négociation d’acte
adopté. Une déclaration unilatérale de l’UE peut présenter aussi un instrument
proprement juridique, n’ayant pas l’objectif politique, mais quand même la
complexité de l’ordre légal de l’UE peut intervenir dans le champ de l’application
des normes du droit international, en empêchant les Etats tiers de réclamer leurs
droits comme c’était le cas dans le fameux arrêt de l’usine Mox. Le cas de l’usine
Mox entre le Royaume-Uni et la République d’ irlande s’est trouvé devant trois
instances juridiques internationales. L’irlande, en réclamant le comportement de
l’usine de recyclage de déchet nucléaire qui contaminait la mer, a déposé deux
requêtes devant le Tribunal international du droit de la mer et l’arbitrage établi
selon la Convention pour la protection du milieu marin de l’Atlantique du Nord-
est (Convention oSPAR). Au lieu d’attendre la prononciation du droit par les
instances, en entretemps l’irlande s’est trouvée en position de l’accusé par la
Commission européenne. La Commission européenne, comme la gardienne l’ordre
de l’UE, a trouvé que l’irlande a violé ses obligations provenantes des actes
constitutifs de l’UE.28 En partant de l’argumentation de la Commission européenne
que la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM) est un “traité
mixte”, où l’UE et les Etats membres de l’UE sont les signataires, la Cour de justice
de l’Union européenne a trouvé que l’irlande a violé la compétence exclusive de
la Cour de régler les différends en ce qui concerne l’interprétation du droit
communautaire - droit européen.29 C’est bien à la base de l’accession de l’UE à la
CNUDM, sous la forme d’acte unilatéral, qui contenait la déclaration des
compétences de l’UE que la question de différends entre ces Etats membres que
c’est la compétence de l’UE. De plus, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a
trouvé dans son arrêt que les obligations internationales d’Etats membres de l’UE
ne peuvent pas modifier les obligations d’Etats membres provenantes d’actes
constitutifs de l’UE, ce que remet en question les relations des normes primaires
et secondaires du droit international.30 Comme les traités mixtes tombent sous la
compétence des affaires extérieures de l’UE, il faut surtout faire attention à la
PESC, comme le champ de production d’actes unilatéraux de l’UE spécifique, qui
produisent les conséquences dans l’ordre international. il est démontré que les
déclarations de l’UE per se ne produisent pas les effets légaux, qu’elles ne peuvent
pas être isolées d’autres instruments juridiques internationaux comme les
28
Robin Churchill, Joanne Scott, “The MoX Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life”, The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2004, Vol. 53, issue 3, pp. 643–676.
29
Maja Lukić, “Autoritet Suda EU ispred pravne sigurnosti – presuda Mox”, Anali Pravnog
fakulteta u Beogradu, 2013, vol. LXi, br. 1, str. 228.
30
“Mox Plant Case (Commission of the European Communities v. ireland)”, Judgment of the Court
(Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Union, C-459/03, 2006,
pp. 4659–4720.
conventions internationales ou principes généraux du droit international. Même

les déclarations adoptées sous la forme de position commune de l’UE suivent les
documents légalement contraignants comme il a été présenté dans l’arrêt de Kadi
et Al Barkaat. En agissant comme le groupe d’Etats, dont le fonctionnement de la
communauté est réglé par les normes secondaires du droit international, dont la
valeur est nulle sans les normes primaires du droit international, l’UE agit comme
le sujet du droit international et le sujet politique. D’ailleurs, en définissant la PESC
dans le TUE, l’UE fait une exception dans le TFUE en décrivant la politique de
bon voisinage, en excluant les pays voisins de la PESC, et en les incluant dans les
compétences de l’UE. Les déclarations de l’UE trouvent leur place dans deux
sphères: la PESC et les affaires générales de l’Union. Dans ce contexte, il faut
conclure que certains pays ne font pas les pays avec lesquels l’UE développé les
relations extérieures, mais une autre catégorie. Si les déclarations et les résolutions
du Parlement européen existaient avant l’adoption de l’Acte unique européen, c’est
à dire que le règlement intérieure de l’UE permettaient à un organe de caractère
législatif d’exprimer son propre opinion. Aujourd’hui le Parlement européen
adopte les déclarations sous la forme de résolution et leur valeur légale est
pratiquement nulle. De suite, par ses résolutions le Parlement européen exprime
une opinion sur telle ou telle question, et dans ses compétences de relations
extérieures de l’UE, ces déclarations ont une force morale jusqu’au moment de la
prise de décision où le Parlement est muni par quelques fonctions. Ces résolutions,
étant une catégorie séparée d’actes unilatéraux de caractère intergouvernemental
des organisations internationales, expriment une sorte de réserve vis-à-vis les
politiques menées par les autres institutions de l’UE comme le Conseil européen
ou le Conseil des affaires étrangères, qui sont les principaux organes de l’UE dans
la gouvernance de la politique extérieure de l’UE. Ainsi, l’Acte unique européen
a ouvert “les portes” aux autres institutions de l’UE d’adopter les déclarations qui
expriment la position unique dans les affaires politiques de l’UE, y compris les
affaires politiques extérieures. il faut donc analyser les cas concrets de déclarations
de l’UE quand elle mène sa PESC, surtout ayant en esprit le critère de leur légalité
dans les termes du droit international, et leur efficacité dans les termes de l’objectif
ultime de l’UE décrit par son dans l’Article 3 du TUE. Une acte unilatéral de
quelconque sujet du droit international doit subir le contrôle des critères de légalité,
comme les actes unilatéraux d’Etats ou d’organisations internationales puissent
devenir avec l’écoulement du temps les sources du droit international. C’est bien
le contenu des déclarations qui pourraient, dans la perspective future, fortement
influencer la formation de règles du droit international particulièrement de règles
coutumiers régionaux, en contribuant à la perte de certitude juridique, comme dans
un système anarchique où les sujets internationaux coexistent et coopèrent, il n’y
a pas un organe à vérifier la conformité des déclarations unilatérales au droit
international public. Et même dans les cas apportés devant la Court internationale
de justice, les interrogations sur la nature légale de déclarations unilatérales ont
une perspective incertaine, comme la Cour n’ose pas à ce prononcer chaque fois
sur leur conformité au droit international public, comme c’était surtout le cas de
son avis consultatif sur la “Conformité au droit international de la déclaration
unilatérale de l’indépendance relative au Kosovo”, du 22 juillet 2010.31
LES DECLARATIONS DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE DANS

LE CONTEXTE DES CRISES INTERNATIONALES – UNE
APPROCHE POLITIQUE CONTOURNANT LES DISPOSITIFS
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
La PESC, formellement instaurée par le Traité de Maastricht en 1992, sera
clarifiée dans le sens de compétences du Conseil européen et le Conseil de l’Union
par le Traité d’Amsterdam en 1997. Ainsi selon l’article 13 du Traité d’Amsterdam,
le Conseil “recommande des stratégies communes au Conseil européen et les met
en œuvre, notamment en arrêtant des actions communes et des positions
communes”.32 Le Traité dans son article 15, de suite, définit les positons
communnes de l’UE en disant que “Les positions communes définissent la position
de l’Union sur une question particulière de nature géographique ou thématique.
Les Etats membre veillent à la conformité de leurs politiques nationales avec les
positions communes”.33 il faut encore mentionner que les positions communes du
Conseil prennent la forme de décision, ce qui fait un de types d’actes que l’UE
peut adopter.34 Par contre, les déclarations, par lesquelles les institutions de l’UE
précisent leur point de vue sur un sujet spécifique, ne sont pas mentionnées dans
les traités constitutifs de l’UE en tant que les actes que l’UE adopte. Les
déclarations ainsi ne sont pas utilisées à initier une procédure législative, ni à
publier un programme de l’UE. Quand même leur adoption procède par la
procédure de vote. L’adoption d’une décision passe par le vote à l’unanimité, tandis
que certaines décisions peuvent être adoptées par le vote à majorité qualifiée selon
l’article 24 du TUE.35 Certainement, il ne faut pas confondre les déclarations
susmentionnées, avec les communiquées et les déclarations de presse, ni avec les
déclarations conjointes de l’UE, dont la production est surtout présente dans le
travail des Etats membres auprès d’autres organisations internationales telles que
l’oNU, le Conseil de l’Europe, l’UNESCo etc. Si les institutions de l’UE étant
équipées du pouvoir d’adopter les déclarations ne procèdent pas souvent à
l’adoption des déclarations, il faut faire parallèle avec le nombre de déclarations
conjointes d’Etats membre de l’UE dans le travail des organisations internationale
31
“Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale de l’indépendance relative au
Kosovo”, Avis consultatif du 22 juillet 2010, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances,
C.i.J. Recueil 2010, pp. 403–453.
32
Article 13 du “Traité sur l’Union européenne”, op. cit., p. 9.
33
34
Ibid.
35
parce que leur fréquence n’est pas à négliger, surtout leur contenu. En s’appropriant
de compétences du contrôle stratégique et de la direction stratégique d’une
opération de gestion de crise, l’UE publiquement réclame ses compétences en
matière de gestion de crises. Dans les termes du droit international public, la
qualification “crise internationale” ne relève pas beaucoup sur la nature d’un
événement où un autre acteur international peut y intervenir. La “crise
internationale” est plutôt un terme sociologique ou un terme provenant de la
discipline des relations internationales. Dans ce sens, il est difficile d’identifier les
éléments génériques d’une crise internationale comme une crise peut être un
événement soudain ou le résultats de dysfonctionnements cumulatifs, qui les deux
s’opposent à la situation dite “normale” ou “habituelle”.36 Dans le sens de crises
sécuritaires ou de menaces au maintien de la paix et de sécurité internationale,
l’autorité unique à diagnostiquer la violation de la paix est le Conseil de sécurité,
et les activités de gestion de crises sécuritaires par les organisations internationales
régionales doivent être autorisées par ce même organe selon les provisions de la
Charte de l’oNU. Voire l’article 52 de la Charte de l’oNU dit que “Aucune
disposition de la présente Charte ne s’oppose à l’existence d’accords ou
d’organismes régionaux destinés à régler les affaires qui, touchant au maintien de
la paix et de la sécurité internationales, se prêtent à une action de caractère régional,
pourvu que ces accords ou ces organismes et leur activité soient compatibles avec
les buts et les principes des Nations Unies”, en ajoutant que “Les Membres des
Nations Unies qui concluent ces accords ou constituent ces organismes doivent
faire tous leurs efforts pour régler d’une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits
accords ou organismes, les différends d’ordre local, avant de les soumettre au
Conseil de sécurité”.37 C’est dans cet esprit que le TUE, en définissant les objectifs
de la création de l’UE dans l’article 3, souligne inter alia que l’UE dans les
relations avec le reste du monde “contribue à la paix, à la sécurité, au
développement durable de la planète, à la solidarité et au respect mutuel entre les
peuples, au commerce libre et équitable, à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à la
protection des droits de l’homme, en particulier ceux de l’enfant, ainsi qu’au strict
respect et au développement du droit international, notamment au respect des
principes de la charte des Nations unies”.38 Mais cette même provision du TUE
dit que l’UE “affirme et promeut ses valeurs et ses intérêts”, ce qui la distingue en
quelque sorte du reste du monde - les autres sujets du droit international. il est déjà
démontré dans l’arrêt de Kadi et Al Bakaat et l’arrêt de l’usine Mox, qu’elle vise
à un exceptionnalisme. En dépit d’un réseau complexe que le SEAE développe
pour implémenter la politique extérieure de l’UE, y compris la prévention des
crises, le support à la médiation etc., il y a les domaines ou l’UE, surtout sans
36
Thierry Tardy, Gestion de crise, maintien et consolidation de la paix, De Boeck Supérieur, Paris,
2019, p. 13.
37
Article 52 de la “Charte des Nations Unies”, op. cit., p. 3.
38
l’accord explicit du Conseil de sécurité, reste hors la gestion de crises. Dans ces
situations, l’UE quand même prend la position politique et adopte les déclarations
dont les formulations peuvent être problématiques face à l’interprétation du droit
international et ses principes fondamentaux. L’ordre légal de la communauté
international est établi par la Charte de l’oNU. Cette même Charte contient les
principes selon lesquels la communauté internationale doit fonctionner, et ces
principes sont en même temps les obligations d’Etats membre de l’oNU, comme
dans le moment de l’adhésion à l’oNU, les Etats se lient à les respecter. Ce sont
donc les principes qui imprègnent le droit international dans son entier, en
garantissant son unité et cohérence.39 Encore, la plupart de ces principes a été
développé avec la pratique des relations internationale, ce que les mets dans la
catégorie du droit coutumier.40 il s’agit notamment de la souveraineté nationale,
l’indépendance politique, l’intégrité territoriale, le droit à l’autodétermination des
peuples, la prise des mesures collectives efficaces en vue de prévenir et d’écarter
les menaces à la paix et de réprimer tout acte d’agression ou autre rupture de la
paix, le développement de relations amicales entre les peuples etc. Puisque c’est
déjà noté que la question de l’interprétation du droit international est dans une
relation étroite avec la question de légalité, afin d’exposer dans quelle manière les
déclarations de l’UE continuent à contribuer à la fragmentation matérielle du droit
international public, cet article prendra pour le cas d’étude les déclarations du Haut
représentant de l’Union pour les affaire étrangères et la politique de sécurité
concernant la guerre en Ukraine.
LA PRÉSENTATION DE LA GUERRE EN UKRAINE

PAR L’UE – LE CONTENU DES DÉCLARATIONS DONNANT
UNE INTERPRÉTATION INHABITUELLE DES NORMES ET DES
PRINCIPES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
La guerre en Ukraine a officiellement commencé le 24 février 2022 quand la
Russie a attaqué l’Ukraine. il s’agit, dans les termes du droit international public
et le droit international humanitaire, d’un conflit armé entre deux Etats dans lequel
un Etat souverain attaque militairement un autre Etat souverain, en réclamant la
violation de ses intérêts vitaux par l’Etat attaqué. Depuis l’établissement de l’oNU
en 1945, la communauté internationale ne connaît que quelques vraies guerres
entre deux Etats souverains: l’iraq et Koweït et l’iraq et l’iran. Le reste de menaces
à la paix et à la sécurité internationale provenaient plutôt de conflit intra-étatiques
qui terminaient en sécession d’un Etat comme la guerre entre deux Corées. Ce
sont bien les Protocoles optionnels aux Conventions de Genève qui reconnaissent
et distinguent deux situations factuelles différentes, mais qui ne donnent pas les
39
Vojin Dimitrijević, obrad Račić, Vladimir Đerić, Tatjana Papić, Vesna Petrović, Saša obradović,
Osnovi međunarodnog prava, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2005, str. 54.
40
Boris Krivokapić, Međunarodno javno pravo, Megatrend univerzitet, Beograd, 2013, str. 95.
définition de qualification d’un conflit armé inter-étatique – internationaux et d’un

conflit armé non-étatique - non internationaux. Leur but est de prescrire les normes
qui visent la protection des victimes de conflit. En ce qui concerne le terme
d’agression, comme le Chapitre Vi de la Charte de l’oNU porte le titre “Action
en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d’acte d’agression”, il n’y
a pas un consensus sur sa qualification. A l’issue de longues négociations
intergouvernementales, l’Assemblée générale adopte le 14 décembre 1974 la
Résolution 3314 (XXiX) qui contenait non dans son texte mais dans son annexe
la définition de l’agression adoptée par le quatrième comité spécial. Le texte
commence par une définition générale de l’agression largement inspirée de celle
du paragraphe 4 de l’article 2 de la Charte de l’oNU (mais sans référence aux
menaces), avant de proposer une liste indicative d’actes d’agression. Ainsi les
actes mentionnés dans l’article 3 sue l’Annexe sont qualifiés d’être actes
d’agression sous réserve des dispositions de son article 2, aux termes duquel le
Conseil de sécurité peut décider de ne pas conclure qu’un acte d’agression ait été
commis compte tenu des circonstances, y compris du fait que les actes en cause
ne sont pas d’une gravité suffisante.41 La définition d’agression qui n’est pas
contenue dans un texte législatif ne fait pas la terme de référence qui pourrait suivre
aider le travail des instances juridiques internationaux qui interprètent les normes
du droit international.42 Quand même la notion de l’agression subsiste dans les
instruments internationaux y compris les conventions internationales, les actes
unilatérales, et les arrêts d’instances juridiques internationaux. Donc, il n’est pas
rare que l’UE mentionne dans ses déclarations l’acte d’agression. Le même jour
de l’attaque militaire de la Russie contre l’Ukraine, le Haut représentant déclare
que “l’UE condamne avec la plus grande fermeté l’invasion non provoquée de
l’Ukraine par les forces militaires de la Fédération de Russie”.43 il s’agit bien de
la première phrase de la déclaration qui introduit la notion de “l’invasion non
provoquée”. Comme le droit international ne connaît pas la notion de “l’invasion
provoquée”, il faudra bien analyser les cas où l’utilisation de force est permis selon
la Charte de l’oNU. La Charte de l’oNU interdit, dans son ensemble, le recours
à la force dans les relations internationales entre les Etats, à part dans les cas de
défense légitime, ce qui veut dire que la légitime défense ne peut pas être la
corrélée avec une “invasion provoquée”. D’ailleurs le terme de l’invasion, quoi
que soit son contenu en faits, selon l’utilisation du terme largement politique, selon
41
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, “Définition de l’agression”, United Nations Audiovisual Library of
International Law, United Nations, New York, 2010, p. 1, l'internet: www.un.org/law/avl. 17
octobre 2022.
42
Jaroslav Zourek, “Enfin une définition de l’agression”, Annuaire français du droit international,
1974, Vol. 20, pp. 9-30.
43
“Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the invasion of
Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation”, communiqué de presse du 24 février 2022,
l'internet: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases. 17 octobre 2022.
l’article 3 de l’Annexe à la Résolution 3314 (XXiX), correspond à “une attaque

du territoire d’un Etat par les forces armées d’un autre Etat, ou toute occupation
militaire même temporaire, résultant d’une telle invasion ou d’une telle attaque,
ou toute annexion par l’emploi de la force du territoire ou d’une partie du territoire
d’un autre Etat”.44 La Charte de l’oNU clarifie dans son l’article 52 que “la
légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, est la réponse d’un Etat membre de
l’oNU à une agression armée”.45 Donc, la Charte de l’oNU ne distingue pas les
invasions provoquées des invasions non provoquées, mais la réponse à une
agression explicitement armée peut être la défense armée conduite en termes du
droit à la légitime défense. Force de dire que l’utilisation de la force contre
l’indépendance politique ou l’intégrité territoriale d’un Etat membre est
explicitement interdite, et c’est dans les cas le Conseil de sécurité constatant la
rupture de la paix que l’oNU prend d’urgence des mesures d’ordre militaire, ce
qu’il ne faut pas confondre avec les mesures coercitives généralement étant les
moyens politiques comme les sanctions, que le Conseil de sécurité utilise et même
autorise les accords régionaux de les appliquer. Ce qui relève intéressant dans la
déclaration du Haut représentant du 24 février 2022, c’est que dans son texte il est
écrit que l’UE va comme la réponse à l’attaque contre l’Ukraine “inclure les
mesures restrictives à la fois sectorielles et individuelles”, sans attendre la décision
du Conseil du sécurité et ayant une pratique développée de sanctions. Si le droit
international ne connaît pas l’institut d’une “invasion provoquée”, il connaît encore
moins l’institut d’une “invasion injustifiée”, comme l’utilisation de la force peut
être justifiée dans les cas énumérés dans la Charte de l’oNU ou plus précisément
l’utilisation de la force peut être légale sous les conditions claires. Ainsi, en
ignorant la validité des principes du droit international, le Haut représentant dans
ses déclarations successives au sujet de la guerre en Ukraine, commence à utiliser
l’expression “invasion ou agression non provoquée et injustifiée”. Dans sa
Déclaration du 22 septembre 2022 le Haut représentant dit que "l’UE condamne
avec la plus grande fermeté la dernière escalation de l’agression illégale, non
provoquée et injustifiée contre l’Ukraine par la Russie”.46 Une agression selon le
droit international ne peut pas être légale, ni provoquée ni justifiée, comme l’acte
d’agression en soi est interdit comme comme le moyen de règlement des différends
entre les Etats. Même la Résolution de l’Assemblée générale du 2 mars 2022,
adoptée lors de sa session extraordinaire, dit qu’il s’agit d’une agression, sans
adjectifs qui y donnant une valeur légale ou morale. Donc tout simplement, il s’agit
44
Article 3 de l’Annexe à la “Résolution 3314 (XXiX) “Définition de l’agression”, Document
A/RES/29/3314 adopté par l’Assemblée générale le 14 décembre 1974, Documents officiels de
l'Assemblée générale, vingt-neuvième session, Supplément n° 19 (A/9619 et Corr.l), pp. 149–150.
45
Article 52 de la “Charte des Nations Unies”, op. cit., p. 3.
46
“Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine”, communiqué de presse du 22 septembre 2022, l'internet:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases. 17 octobre 2022.
d’une utilisation de la force dans un conflit inter-étatique.47 Le Haut représentant,

de suite, dans sa Déclaration fait un appel à la Russie de respecter la Charte de
l’oNU et le droit international. Une question relative au respect de la Charte de
l’oNU et du droit international se pose dans les formulations inhabituelles
d’instituts du droit international. Même si les déclarations unilatérales des
institutions de l’UE tel que les déclarations du Haut représentant n’ont pas une
valeur légale en soi, leur contenu a une portée à ne pas négliger dans l’ordre
juridique international. Quoique soit le sujet qui adopte les déclarations, leur
contenu doit être conforme aux principes universellement reconnus. Si la
qualification d’une agression ou d’une invasion ajournée par les adjectifs n’ayant
pas la valeur légale se répète consciemment beaucoup de fois, elle ouvre les portes
à la création de nouvelles normes secondaires du droit international ou voire la
pratique d’Etats qui peut contribuer à la création d’une norme régionale. Si l’UE
ou ses Etats membres insistent sur la distinction entre l’agression légale et
l’agression illégale, ou l’invasion provoquée et l’invasion non provoquée, cette
distinction met en danger l’unité du droit international en permettant aux acteurs
politiques d’interpréter le droit international selon leurs propres intérêts en y
ajoutant des qualifications morales. Bien que la validité juridique des déclarations
de l’UE est nulle sans corrélation avec les autres instruments légaux du droit
international, avec l’absence d’un organe à contrôler leurs conformité avec le droit
international, il y a un risque de fragmentation du droit international ce qui
implique l’application des normes du droit international aléatoire dépendant de
l’organe qui les interprète et applique, en ignorant leur interprétation classique
dont l’autorité incombe sur la Cour internationale de justice. Aussi, les répétitions
de telles formulations, surtout pendant le travail des Etats membres de l’UE auprès
les autres organisations internationales, qui ont une tendance à démontrer une sorte
de réserves verbales vis-à-vis les actes unilatéraux de ces organisations
internationales, n’est pas sans effets sur le comportement d’autres Etats. L’ampleur
des déclarations de l’UE se reflètent dans le processus de l’adhésion d’Etat
candidats à l’UE qui participent au processus de stabilisation et adhésion en faveur
des “Balkans occidentaux” comme l’UE le formule en 2000, y pensant aux pays
et aux entités territoriales des Balkans en excluant les pays déjà Etats membres de
l’UE. Comme le processus de stabilisation et adhésion concerne les critères
d’adhésion de nouveaux Etats membres de l’UE, certains critères sont exposés
dans l’article 49 du TUE, et non dans le TFUE, qui décrit les compétences et les
politiques de l’UE y compris la PESC. Afin d’accomplir les critères pour adhérer
à l’UE un Etat candidat selon les provisions de traités sur la stabilisation et
adhésion à l’UE doit concilier progressivement sa législation et autres actes avec
le droit de l’UE, et ainsi avec la PESC. Dans la pondération de pourcentage de la
conciliation des politiques étrangères de pays candidats avec la PESC compte dans
47
“Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 ‘Agression contre l’Ukraine’”, adoptée par l’Assemblée générale
le 2 mars 2022, Documents officiels de l’Assemblée générale, onzième session extraordinaire
d’urgence, p. 2, l'internet: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290?ln=fr. 17 octobre 2022.
une importante mesure le nombre d’attachements aux déclarations de l’UE. Ainsi,

l’UE exerce son rôle souple dans les relations avec les Etats souverains dans son
voisinage, en refusant de qualifier ces relations comme les relations extérieures.
C’est bien le conditionnement d’un groupe d’Etats qui change le cursus d’autres
groupements d’Etats soit formels soit informels. Ainsi, les deux groupes régionaux
à l’oNU appartenant au continent de l’Europe ne correspond pas à la situation
factuelle comme un numéro important d’Etats membres de l’oNU restent, en dépit
de l’adhésion à l’UE, dans le Groupe informelle des Etats d’Europe orientale et
ainsi bloquent tout consensus au sein du Groupe. Finalement, en affirmant que les
déclarations de l’UE dont légalité peut être soupçonneux en ayant à l’esprit la
sauvegarde de principes du droit international, il faudra citer la Commission du
droit international qui qualifie la fragmentation, en tant que le phénomène qui a
entraîné la diversification croissante, “’apparition de règles ou d’ensembles de
règles, d’institutions juridiques et de domaines de pratique juridique spécialisés et
(relativement) autonomes”.48 Un de soucis, à citer la Commission du droit
international, tient à ce que l’élaboration d’un droit et la création d’institutions
aussi spécialisés tendent à plus ou moins méconnaître l’activité législative et
institutionnelle qui se déploie dans des domaines voisins, et les pratiques et
principes généraux de droit international. D’où des conflits entre règles ou
ensembles de règles, des pratiques institutionnelles divergentes, voire peut-être la
perte d’une perspective globale du droit.”49 En dépit du fait que la Cour de justice
de l’Union européenne n’a est pas compétente à contrôler la légalité de déclarations
de l’UE, il faut constater que ces déclarations de l’UE en tant que telles, en
isolement d’instruments légalement contraignants du droit international n’ont pas
sa valeur propre légale, ainsi que leurs efficacité ne compte que sur la politique de
stabilisation et d’adhésions, ce qui reste purement dans le domaine de son exercice
du “pouvoir souple” dans les relations internationales.
CONCLUSION
Les actes unilatéraux en soi ne produisent pas les effets légaux dans l’ordre du
droit international public ce qui veut dire qu’ils ne peuvent pas être les sources du
droit international dans le sens d’énumération des sources selon l’article 38 du Statut
de la Cour internationale de justice. Par contre, en corrélation avec les autres
instruments légaux du droit international, les actes unilatéraux acquièrent un sens et
effets légaux dans l’ordre du droit international. Etant les actes de caractère dépendant
du droit international, leur développement ainsi que l’hyper-production, surtout en
48
international Law Commission, “Fragmentation of international Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of international Law – Report of the Study Group of the
international Law Commission”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr.13, 2006), as corrected UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, Vol. 1, p. 11.
49
Ibid.
absence d’une autorité centrale de garantir l’unité et la cohérence du droit

international dans un ordre anarchique tel que la communauté internationale, a
entamé la piste pour en faire du droit international un champ de normes à interpréter
par les sujets internationaux les plus présents dans la vie de la communauté
internationale. L’UE, en tant que le sujet du droit international de nature secondaire
par rapport aux Etats souverains, étant les sujets du droit international primaires qui
obéissent aux obligations provenantes de la Charte de l’oNU y compris la primauté
des obligations prescrites par les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, fait sa propre
politique extérieure, même si sa nature est intergouvernementale comme dans le cas
de tout acte unilatéral adopté par une organisation internationale. En s’appropriant
de ses propres institutions et organes de nature non gouvernemental, l’UE dans son
champ de régi de la politique extérieure exerce les fonctions d’un Etat et non d’une
organisation internationale quand il s’agit de déclarations unilatérales. Non seulement
que les institutions de l’UE par ces actes unilatéraux produisent les effets inattendus
en ce qui concerne l’unité du droit international en s’appropriant le droit à
l’exceptionnalisme du droit international comme c’était démontré dans la
jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, mais les déclarations de
l’UE par lesquelles l’UE exprime son opinion ou position sur une situation de
caractère extérieure comme les crises internationales, avec leurs contenus, peuvent
contribuer à la fragmentation du droit international. Une interprétation de principes
fondamentaux du droit international inhabituelle, même aléatoire, et quand il n’y a
pas d’une prétention de validité juridique, mais d’une affirmation politique, risque
d’irréparablement à nuire à la cohérence et l’unité du droit international, comme les
régimes autonomes ou autosuffisants, selon la terminologie de Bruno Simma, créent
la collision de normes. Le plus grand risque des interprétations atypiques d’instituts
du droit international par l’UE réside dans l’ampleur politique de ces déclarations à
l’égard des pays qui nourrissent les relations étroites avec l’UE, y compris ceux
émanants de la politique de voisinage de l’UE et la politique de stabilisation et
stabilisation de l’UE, comme l’UE avec son pouvoir souple et attractivité politique
regroupe atour soi un certain nombre d’Etats à suivre inconditionnellement la PESC
au détriment du droit international. Une crise sécuritaire, sans doute, comme celle
en Ukraine ouvre la boîte de Pandore quand il faut interpréter le droit à la légitime
défense, et même les déclarations de l’UE créent l’espace pour la validation politique
de certains principes du droit international, comme c’était le cas d’essai de validation
légale du concept politique échoue de la “responsabilité de protéger” à la fin du
XXème siècle, lors de nombreux conflits intra-étatiques. Ainsi la légalité des
déclarations de l’UE dans la gestion de crises a de faibles fondements en droit
international, comme leur contenu exonère du contexte quelques principes vitaux
du droit international. Quant à leur efficacité, il faut sans doute compter sur leur force
politique, qui se traduit en qualifications morales ou politiques de normes du droit
international comme l’agression qui porte en soi, par les provisions de la Charte de
l’oNU, le caractère illégal, comme l’agression porte menaces au respect de principes
fondamentaux du droit international tel que la souveraineté nationale, l’indépendance
politique, l’intégrité territoriale, le développement de relations amicales entre Etats

et le règlement pacifique des différends.
iZJAVE EVRoPSKE UNiJE:

PRiMAT EFiKASNoSTi NAD LEGALNoŠćU?
APSTRAKT
Evropska unija je od svog osnivanja poznavala institucionalno uređenje sa
različitim oblicima i karakteristikama nadnacionalnosti koji na poseban način
uređuju odnose između njenih država članica, a tokom godina je u pravu i praksi
počela da razvija moduse međunarodnog opštenja sa drugim subjektima
međunarodnog prava, a koji su uveli novine kako u savremene međunarodne
odnose, tako i u savremeno međunarodno javno pravo. Jedan od tih modusa,
razvijen u praksi, je upotreba izjava i deklaracija Evropske unije, koja je postala
sve učestalija i to na različitim institucionalnim nivoima. S obzirom na ograničen
domet pravnih posledica izjava država ili grupe država u međunarodnom javnom
pravu, ovaj rad teži da prikaže da su izjave Evropske unije najčešće izraženo
političke prirode, kao i da ne samo što samostalno ne proizvode pravne posledice,
već svojim formulacijama doprinose tendenciji fragmentisanja međunarodnog
prava. U cilju dokazivanja ove teze, u radu će se najpre ispitati pravna priroda
jednostranih izjava država ili grupa država, a zatim i analizirati sa aspekta
legalnosti, ali i efikasnosti upotreba izjava od strane Evropske unije, sa posebnim
osvrtom na njihovu samostalnost u odnosu na druge legalne instrumente opštenja
u međunarodnom pravu u skladu sa opšte priznatim principima međunarodnog
prava. Najzad, kroz analizu konkretnih izjava Evropske unije u kontekstu
međunarodnih oružanih sukoba, u radu će se dokazati na koji način izjave
Evropske unije u hiperprodukciji mogu u perpektivi doprineti fragmentaciji
međunarodnog javnog prava.
Ključne reči: Deklaracije, jednostrani akti, Evropska unija, fragmentacija
međunarodnog prava, legalnost
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SRPSKI godišnjak za međunarodno pravo = The Serbian yearbook of international

law / Duško Dimitrijević (ur.). - 2. izd. - Beograd : Srpsko udruženje za međunarodno
pravo =Serbian International Law Association, 2022 (Beograd :
Pharmalab laboratorija). - 352 str. ; 24 cm
Radovi na srp. i eng. jeziku. - Tiraž 30. - Str. 9-12: Predgovor = Foreword / Duško
Dimitrijević. - In memoriam Profesor dr Đorđe N. Lopičić (1938–2022): str. 13-15. -
Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz većinu radova. -
Abstracts ; Apstrakti.
ISBN 978-86-903836-1-0
1. Димитријевић, Душко, 1965- [уредник] [аутор додатног текста]
а) Међународно право -- Зборници б) Међународни односи -- Зборници
COBISS.SR-ID 82490377
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SRPSKI GODIŠNJAK ZA MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO (The Serbian Yearbook of

Book · December 2022

Hans Köchler Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Olga S. Magomedova Vladimir Čolović

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Serbian International Law Association

(Drugo izdanje/Second annual edition)

Duško Dimitrijević (ur.)

Glavni i odgovorni urednik

Zamenici glavnog i odgovornog urednika

Odricanje od odgovornosti: Stavovi izneti u objavlјenim radovima ne izražavaju stavove Glavnog

MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO U SAVREMENIM

Gian Luigi CECCHINI

Dijana SAVIĆ BOŽIĆ

Antonia JUTRONIĆ PANTIĆ

Imamo čast i zadovoljstvo da široj naučnoj javnosti pružimo na uvid drugo

sredstvao u pravcu daljeg osposoblјavanja mladih naučnih radnika, pravnika i

U ime Uređivačkog odbora:

On behalf of the Editorial Board

Profesor dr Đorđe N. Lopičić (1938–2022)

pravničko i diplomatsko iskustvo, uz teorijsko znanje preporučilo ga je da drži

Među naučnim radovima Profesora Lopičića valja istaći sledeće:

pomorsku državu sa veoma razvijenom privredom i visokim životnim standardom.

USPOSTAVLJANJE I RAZVOJ DIPLOMATSKIH ODNOSA

međuvremenu stekli nezavisnost). Holandski putopisci koji su za vreme Krstaških

u 82 godini – 4. juna 1941. godine.13 očigledno da je Kraljevina Holandija

DIPLOMATSKI ODNOSI ZA VREME

RAZVOJ DIPLOMATSKIH ODNOSA

RASPAD SFR JUGOSLAVIJE I MEĐUSOBNI

Jugoslavija je isključena iz svih međunarodnih odnosa i manifestacija. Zatim, nas

Haškog tribunala bio je Ričard Goldston iz Južnoafričke Republike. S obzirom da

podleže sankcijama. Nisu vredeli argumenti da se radi o dugovanju, jednostavno

DiPLoMATiC RELATioNS oF THE REPUBLiC oF SERBiA

31. Mitrović, Andrej, Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920, Zavod za

THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER:

Notwithstanding the grand proclamations in the wake of Europe’s, or the world’s,

THE REALPOLITIC PARADOX OF THE WORLD ORDER

NEW GLOBAL REALIGNMENT

power, particularly by a state claiming hegemony, provokes a counter-assertion.

is essentially revisionist. it is part of a larger struggle for power in the beginning

adopted15 can only be of declaratory nature – as an act of what we in German call

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER –

overlapping membership of these structures (global-regional) has enormous

have the role of moral conscience, or of a corrective of the excesses of realpolitik

BoRBA ZA SVETSKi PoREDAK: REFLEKSiJE U VREMENiMA

7. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934 in: M. Jestaedt (Ed.), Mohr

EVOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON THE PHENOMENON

based on economic relations and precisely on the progressive integration of people

of other countries in any way.16 According to a skeptical perspective, it would be

to emphasize multiple networks of relationships between citizens, communities, states,

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY IDENTIES

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

democracy of global dimensions. His perspective is interesting because he

EVoLUCiJA PRAVA DRŽAVLJANSTVA

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS AN EMERGING

DIFFERENT LEGAL MEANINGS

remaining in the shadow. The development as such has been understood as

governments but also transnational companies, charities, the public, NGos,

6. Where human activities may cause a significant impact on the environment