Epistemology

Lecture 5

Goodman - The New Riddle of Induction

njhou@ntu.edu.tw
周先捷
1. Simple Induction

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 2. Inductive Inference
Probably, NTUers are smart.
Dave is an NTUer.
Probably, Dave is smart.

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 3. Inductive Justification for a Hypothesis
• Confirmation theorists of scientific justification
tried to show how observational evidence could
provide inductive justification (support) for a
hypothesis (scientific theory).

Carl Hempel
(1905 – 1997)

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A Confirmation Theory of Scientific Justification
• Hypothetico-deductivism: hypotheses in science
are confirmed when their logical consequences
turn out to be true.
(Hypothesis) All men are mortal.
(Instance) Socrates is a man.
(Prediction) Socrates is mortal.
• We can be reasonable in increasing our
confidence in the truth of a theory when it
passes more and more observational tests –
induction in spirit.
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 The Mother of All Problems
• The problem of induction: What justification do we have for
using past observations as a basis for generalization about
things we have not yet observed?
• Induction has worked in the past?
• Sure, but that's the past!

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 The Raven Problem
• The problem of defining confirmation:
– What is a positive instance of a hypothesis?

Nelson Goodman
(1906 – 1998)

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 The Raven Problem
• Any evidence that confirms a hypothesis H also
confirms any hypothesis that is logically
equivalent to H. (H iff H’)
''All ravens are black" is logically equivalent to “All
nonblack things are not ravens.”
''All nonblack things are not ravens" seems to be
confirmed by the observation of a white shoe.
Therefore, the hypothesis “All ravens are black” is
confirmed by the observation of a white shoe,
which is absurd.
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 The New Riddle of Induction
• The problem of distinguishing law-like or
confirmable hypotheses from accidental or
non-confirmable ones:
– What hypotheses are confirmed by their positive
instances?”

Nelson Goodman
(1906 – 1998)

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 The Grue Problem
• (H): “All emeralds are green.”
• (E): Examined before t, “emerald a is green,” etc.
• At t, (E) confirms (H).
• x is grue iff x is examined before t and green or x is not
examined before t but blue.
• (H’): “All emeralds are grue.”
• (E’): Examined before t, “emerald a is grue,” etc.
• At t, (E’) confirms (H’).

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 The Grue Problem
• x is grue iff x is examined before t and green or x is not
examined before t but blue.

p q r s
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 The Grue Problem
• (H) predicts: all emeralds examined after t will be green.
• (H’) predicts: all emeralds examined after t will be blue.
• (H) and (H’) make two incompatible predictions but are equally
confirmed!!

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 Solution?
• Grue: green if examined before t; blue otherwise.
• Bleen: blue if examined before t; green otherwise.
• Green
• Blue
• The first two predicates are not legitimate because they are
not purely qualitative, for their reference to a specific temporal
position.

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 It Won’t Do: Depending on What’s Basic
• Grue:
• Bleen:
• Green: grue if examined before t; bleen otherwise.
• Blue: bleen if examined before t; grue otherwise.

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Closing Questions
• Is there any way around the grue
problem?

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