Chong-Fuk Lau

Lecture 5
October 8, 2020

PHIL 1110
Introduction to Philosophy
哲學概論
Epistemology
• Epistemology: ἐπιστήμη + λόγος
• ἐπιστήμη (episteme): Knowledge
• in contrast to δόξα (doxa): opinion
• λόγος (logos): thought, speech, reason, logic
• Epistemology = Theory of Knowledge ( 知識論 )
• What is knowledge? How to define it?
• Intensional definition ( 內涵界定 )
• Necessary and sufficient conditions
• Bachelor = unmarried man
• Extensional definition ( 外範界定 )
• Bachelor = {Tom, David, Peter…}
• Even prime number = {2}
Different Senses of “Know”
• Object Knowledge (Acquaintance)
• I know Jürgen Klopp.
• 我認識高普。（識得）
• Practical Knowledge (Competence)
• I know how to beat Jürgen Klopp.
• 我懂得怎樣戰勝高普。（識得／曉得／知道）
• Propositional (Descriptive) Knowledge
• I know that Jürgen Klopp is a German.
• 我知道高普是個德國人。
Definition of Knowledge (S knows p)
• First Condition
• S considers p to be true, or believes p.
• Consider: S knows p, but S doesn’t believe p.
• Knowledge is a kind of belief.
• Second Condition
• p is not merely considered true, but is in fact true.
• Consider: S knows p, but p is false.
• Knowledge is (a kind of) true belief.
• Third Condition
• S is justified in believing p.
• Knowledge is justified true belief. (JTB definition)
The Gettier Problem
• Edmund L. Gettier
• American philosopher (1927 -)
• “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” in Analysis 23
(1963): 121-3. www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html
• Two Presuppositions
• Justified Falsehood Principle: It is possible for a
person to be justified in believing a proposition that is
false.
• Justified Deduction Principle: If S is justified in
believing p, and p entails q, and S deduces q from p
and accepts q as a result of this deduction, then S is
justified in believing q.
JTB vs. Gettier
• Conflict between Theory & Observation
• Either the theory is wrong
• Or the observation is wrong
• Or there is no real conflict
• No real conflict?
• The theory is misunderstood or misapplied.
• Some presuppositions are wrong.
• The problem of epistemic luck
• S is justified in believing p, but it is just an accident that p
turns out to be true.
• The three (JTB) conditions are not sufficient.
• How about adding a fourth condition?
Readings
• R. Feldman, Epistemology, Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 2003, Chapter 2 & 3.