The document discusses the differences between cadres and civil servants in China's government system. It begins by outlining the theoretical foundations of bureaucracy, clan, and cadre organizations. It then discusses the evolution of China's civil service laws from 1993 to 2005 to 2018, noting the laws aimed to develop rule-based administration while maintaining Party control over personnel. The civil service law unified the personnel management system but retained Party control through requirements that some posts be held by Party members only.
The document discusses the differences between cadres and civil servants in China's government system. It begins by outlining the theoretical foundations of bureaucracy, clan, and cadre organizations. It then discusses the evolution of China's civil service laws from 1993 to 2005 to 2018, noting the laws aimed to develop rule-based administration while maintaining Party control over personnel. The civil service law unified the personnel management system but retained Party control through requirements that some posts be held by Party members only.
The document discusses the differences between cadres and civil servants in China's government system. It begins by outlining the theoretical foundations of bureaucracy, clan, and cadre organizations. It then discusses the evolution of China's civil service laws from 1993 to 2005 to 2018, noting the laws aimed to develop rule-based administration while maintaining Party control over personnel. The civil service law unified the personnel management system but retained Party control through requirements that some posts be held by Party members only.
• What’s the difference between the cadre and the civil servant? • Reference • Bo Rothstein, The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber, Vol.28, Issue 4,October 2015,pp. 533–548. • William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 129-141. • William G. Ouchi. (1981). Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge. Addison- Wesley. • Henry Mintzberg, Structure in 5’s: Designing Effective Organizations ,Prentice Hall, 1983. China Paradox • China scores low in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and quality of government institutions. China lacks the predictable, rule-of- law-oriented, unpolitical, impersonal type of public administration that is known as the Weberian model of bureaucracy • China has shown high economic growth and also impressive improvements in many measures of human well-being. • Why? Corruption Perceptions Index(CPI) Year Score Rank countries 2015 37 83 168 • China’s score rose from 2.2 in 2014 36 100 175 1995 to 3.6 in 2011. In 2012, the 2013 40 80 177 system was changed from a ten 2012 39 80 176 percent system to a 100 percent 2011 3.6 75 183 system, and China rose to 40 in 2010 3.5 78 178 2013. 2009 3.6 79 180 2008 3.6 72 180 • The number of sample countries 2007 3.5 72 179 and regions was 45 in 1995, and 2006 3.3 70 163 China ranking 44th. And in 2015, 2005 3.2 78 158 the number of sample countries 2004 3.4 71 145 and regions was 177, China 2003 3.4 66 133 ranked 83th. 2002 3.5 59 102 2001 3.5 57 91 2000 3.1 63 90 1999 3.4 58 99 Generalized Trust, Confidence in Institution ,and Economic Growth Outlines • 1. Theoretical foundations • 2. CSL • 3. the Cadre System • 3.1Promotion • 3.2Rotation and Transfer • 3.3Training system • 3.4Revolving Door • 3.5Performance Measurement 1. Theoretical foundations • A central finding in the literature about the civil service in China is that there is still an overwhelming presence of CCP within the civil service. • How to understand? • Empirically, the cadre model of public administration is not confined to a specific culturally based Chinese or communist mode of public administration. • In fact, mainstream organizational theorists in the West have made occasional references to this organizational form. The Cadre Organization in Western Societies • “the missionary organization” (Henry Mintzberg 2010) • “Japanese organization managed people not by standards and procedures but by norms and beliefs—values.” ideology • “the clan organization” (William Ouchi 1980). • Although rarely theorized by public administration scholars, this type of organization have been empirically verified in countries that are very different from contemporary China such as the United States and Sweden. • More recent analysis of the “mission type” of public administration has verified the existence and importance of ideological motivation for policy doctrines among civil servants. Bureaucracy Clan and Cadre • Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy • Bureaucracy is an organizational structure that is characterized by many rules, standardized processes, procedures and requirements, number of desks, meticulous division of labor and responsibility, clear hierarchies and professional, almost impersonal interactions between employees • -Task specialization • -Organized hierarchy • -Laws or rules • - Formal selection • - Impersonal Relationships • -Career orientation Clan • William G. Ouchi’ theory of Clan: • -Rule of Traditions • -Management follow common values and beliefs that provide the harmony of interests • -A norm of reciprocity is universal, legitimate authority is accepted • -long-term employment • -team performance Cadre • Cadre administration: • -Rule of mandates or mission-orientated (使命型) • --Commitment to a specific policy doctrine of the organization in varying circumstances • -Flexible immediate “line-oriented” dynamism • by superiority over formalities and pragmatic ability to adjust to changing situations • -Office management pre-requisites professional training Comparing the Weberian Bureaucracy and the Cadre Organization delegation problem • The agents will chose the • The ability of cadres and measures the principal would professionals to differentiate have applied in the specific their efforts can be thought of situation if the principal would as a second-order impartiality. have had the same • They are not supposed to information about the case as differentiate their efforts the agent has. depending on bribes, personal connections, political leanings, or ethnic or racial prejudices. • The presumption is that that they should be able not only to differentiate their actions, according to the specific needs of each and every case, but also to show emphatic skills. 2. Civil Servants Law • 2.1 The 1993 Provisional Regulations • 2.2 The 2005 Civil Service Law (CSL) • 2.3 the new systems of CSL 2018 2.1The 1993 Provisional Regulations • The 1993 Provisional Regulations (《国家公务 员暂行条例》)sought to develop a management framework that would differentiate civil servants from cadre personnel serving in service entities such as hospitals, libraries, schools, and research organizations or in state enterprise. • According to the 1993 regulations, "state civil servants" referred only to the personnel employed in administrative organizations that hold administrative power and conduct public service according to law. 2.2 The 2005 Civil Service Law (CSL) • In 2005, preliminary civil service regulations were turned into a Civil Service Law(CSL). • CSL aims to develop rule-based administration. • In fact, CSL stipulates that when other regulations concerning the appointment, dismissal and supervision of leading civil servants exist, then these regulations apply. • In 2008, a semi-independent State Bureau of Civil Servants (公务员局)was established within the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (人力资源和社 会保障部)indicating that civil servants should be managed by the state’s personnel departments. • On the basis of the 1993 Provisional Regulations and the existing cadre personnel management system, the CSL sought to unify the personnel management system . • CSL has collapsed the distinction between cadre and civil servant. There are now three kinds of cadres in the PRC: party and state, service institute, and enterprise cadre. • The Party holds tight control over leadership change and management at various levels. CSL has turned the Party into a political institution that has become the source of both civil service empowerment and control. The Legal Intention of CSL
• -Giving Legal Status to Party Control of Cadres
• -Unifying the Personnel Management System • - Streamlining Jurisdiction and Accountability tidy up jurisdictional authority and responsibility among party committees and their organizational departments and state personnel departments at various levels • Civil service management policy is made by COD under the supervision of the Politburo and at the centre is implemented by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, and in particular by the State Bureau of Civil Servants. • According to the CSL, Party membership is not a general requirement for becoming a civil servant. • COD has determined that some civil service posts may be held only by Party members. The effect of this requirement is quite restrictive, especially for central-level posts. In recent years lists of positions and their requirements (indicating which posts are restricted to Party members) have been published on the government's website. In 2004 posts reserved for CPC members (38 percent of a total of 1,041 vacancies on one list) tended to be in politically sensitive departments. 2.3 the new systems of CSL 2018 • The State Bureau of Civil Servants became a department of COD in 2018. • CLS was reviewed and amended in 2018. 2.3 the new systems of CSL 2018 • ——Put forward requirements for strict governance of the Party and strict management and supervision of cadres. • ——Implement the requirements of concurrent posts and ranks and implement the major decisions and arrangements of the central government. • ——Improve the incentive and security mechanism for civil servants, strengthen the protection of their legitimate rights and interests. a system of post categorization for civil servants • The posts held by civil servants shall, according to their natures and characteristics and the need of management, be categorized as general management, professional and technical expertise, enforcement of laws and government regulations, etc. Where a post necessitates separate management due to its specific characteristics, a new category for such post may be established in accordance with CSL. The scope of application for different categories of posts shall be prescribed by the State. a system of concurrent posts and grades 职位、职级并行 • The State practices a system of concurrent posts and grades for civil servants, in which a sequence for the leading posts and grades held by civil servants shall be set up on the basis of the categories and duties of such leading posts and grades. posts职位 • the leading posts of civil servants • The leading posts of civil servants shall be set up in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and the ranking of their offices in the government system. The levels of leading posts(领导岗位) are as follows: • chief and deputy at the national level, • chief and deputy at the provincial and ministerial level, • chief and deputy at the bureau level, 司局级 • chief and deputy at the county and division level, 处级 • and chief and deputy at the township and section level. 科级 grades职级 • the grades of civil servants • The grades of civil servants shall be set up at the bureau level and below(局级以下). The sequencing levels of the grades of civil servants under the category of general management shall be as follows: • bureau level officials at level 1 and level 2(一级巡视员、二巡); • division level officials at level 1, level 2, level 3, and level 4; principal staff members at level 1, level 2, level 3, and level 4(一级 调研员、二级、三级、四级); • staff members at level 1 and level 2. • The sequencing levels of the grades of civil servants under categories other than that of general management shall be prescribed separately by the State in accordance with CSL. Recruitment: every entry through examinations(逢进必考) • Civil servants for the posts of principal staff member at level 1 or below and other grades at corresponding levels shall be recruited through open examination, strict review, competition on an equal footing, and merit-based selection. When recruiting civil servants in accordance with the preceding paragraph, state organs in places of ethnic autonomy may, in accordance with laws and relevant regulations, give proper preferential treatment to candidates of ethnic minorities. Transfer • The State exercises a transfer system for civil servants. Civil servants may be transferred within the circle of civil servants or to posts managed with reference to this Law; they may also be transferred to posts of a public service nature in state-owned enterprises or in public institutions that are not managed with reference to this Law. Transfer shall be in the form of assignment or direct transfer to another post. • Persons engaged in public service in state-owned enterprises, institutions of higher learning, research institutes and other institutions not managed with reference to this Law may be assigned to leading posts or to the posts of division level officials at level 4 or above, and to posts at other equivalent levels in state organs. A person who is to be assigned to a post in a state organ shall meet the requirements specified in Article 13 of this Law and the qualifications required by that post, and the person concerned must not be under one of the circumstances specified in Article 26 of this Law. The state organ that is to accept the assigned person shall, in accordance with the provisions mentioned above, conduct strictly review on the assigned person and make a decision regarding approval in accordance with the terms of reference of management; when necessary, it may give the assigned person a test. • The leading posts, grades and levels of civil servants are the basis for determining their salaries and other benefits. Salaries, Benefits and Insurance • The salaries of civil servants include basic salaries, allowances, subsidies and bonuses.
• A civil servant shall, in accordance with State regulations,
enjoy allowances such as extra regional allowances, allowances for poverty-stricken and outlying regions, and post allowances. A civil servant shall, in accordance with State regulations, enjoy subsidies and benefits such as housing allowances and medical benefits.
• Where a civil servant is determined as "excellent" or
"competent" in regular evaluation, he or she shall enjoy a year-end bonus in accordance with State regulations.
• The salary of a civil servant shall be paid on time and in full.
3. Cadre System • 1) Leadership selection and promotion • 2)Training • 3)Revolving Door • 4)Performance Measurement Cadre or Civil Servant?
• It seems clear that all civil servants are
considered cadres and are therefore also regulated by cadre regulations. • There are 40.5 million cadres in China. • The most important is the distinction between ordinary cadres and leading cadres. • Leading cadres (领导干部) are cadres ranked at division(县处级) level and above. • “Leading cadres” number 508,025, accounting for only 8% of the total cadre corps. • Fully 92% (466,355) of these people work at the provincial level and below, such as local city and county Party secretaries and mayors; the rest work in the central organs in Beijing. • The most important leading cadres are those at the ministerial (provincial) level and above. Since central ministers, provincial governors and first Party secretaries are at the same administrative rank, this level includes present as well as former cabinet ministers and provincial governors and Party secretaries. • There are only 2,562 of these “high level cadres” (高级干部), of which 888 work at the Centre (中 央干部) in Beijing. 1) Leadership selection and promotion
• (1) Leadership System
• (2) Open Selection • (3) the Reserve Cadre System • the evolution of the reserve cadre system • selecting the party’s disciples • training and evaluation (1)Leadership system • In Western countries, leaders enter the top of the power pyramid horizontally as a result of elections, whereas leadership selection and promotion occur as a vertical process within the bureaucratic apparatus in China.
• The national system can supply officials with the technical
and administrative skills needed for grassroots-level work.
• A prospective leader starts as a section member(科员) in
a Party or State organ and works his way up the hierarchy as section leader(科级), division leader(处级), department leader(局级), minister(部级)and finally may become Prime Minister or President. Personnel management (2)Open Selection • The CCP developed open selection (公选),a system which allows leaders to select cadres from the next level down. • Open selection increases competition for posts through the public nomination of candidates and differential quota elections (差额选举). • Vice division –vice bureaus (从副处到副局) (3)the Reserve Cadre System • Top leaders are not “helicoptered” into top position, but work their way up through the system observing certain rules and norms concerning age, educational qualifications, as well as gender and nationality distribution. • quota system 配额制度 • Non-CCP 无党派 • Intellectual 知识分子 • Ethnic minority 少数民族 • Female 女性 the evolution of the reserve cadre system • “Third Echelon of Cadres” 第三梯队 • It was a deliberate aim of the CCP to construct a reserve cadre management system led by the state. The CCP drew up lists of reserve cadres and divided them into three separate levels: • provincial/ministerial. 1000 • prefectural/bureau 6000 • county/division. 40000 • Each level was made up of acting cadres from the level below. the Disciples of the reserve cadre system • “correct” political ideology • youth Age Ranges for the Three Levels of Leading and Reserve Cadre Position 2)Cadre training • This process, includes the cultivation of political ideology and administrative abilities, and adaptation to the norms and culture of CCP. Training1:the cultivation of political ideology • It is a leadership system characterized by regular evaluation by colleagues and superiors and continuous training. • Party schools • Various training centers • Top civil servants and business leaders are even sent abroad on monthlong intensive training courses where they learn about alternative political, economic and social models and international management practices. The University of Cambridge, Harvard University and the Copenhagen Business School all run such programmes. It is a system where state and Party cadres are not promoted according to popular support and appeal, but according to inner Party norms of behavior and political orientation Training2:temporary transferred duty 挂职
• attracting business and investment (招商引资)
• complaint letters and visits (信访工作) 3)Revolving Door • Big business and the political world • From government to state-owned business • From state-owned business to government Revolving Door • University and the political world • Zhu rongji • Wang qishan • Wang huning • Chengxi DOC • Cheng jining • Chief procurator and Deputy Procurator of Supreme Procuratorate 4)Performance measurement system • DOC in charge of cadres (党管干部) • Managed by the higher level (下管一级) • TRS-Target Responsibility System (目标责任制) • Local governments have been required to set up performance contracts that specify the targets to be achieved and performance standards by which to measure those achievements. To encourage the accomplishment of targets, a number of local governments, especially those in wealthier regions, have developed performance-related incentive systems. performance and result based management • 县长和书记的分工 • separation of powers between the County Party secretary and County Magistrate • 官员晋升的锦标赛模式 • Promotion Tournament Model • 任期的短期性 • Short-termism of the officials • In 1995 the central Party leaders promulgated The Notice on Strengthening and Improving the Evaluation of Work Accomplishment of the Leadership Corps of Party Committees and Governments at the County (Municipal) Level《关于改进地方党政 领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》which officially launched performance measurement in local governments nationwide. • At the heart of these measures are three basic performance items: • - Party building 政党建设 • - Social development and construction of ‘spiritual civilization’ refers to the building of the people’s values by Marxist ideology education 精神文明建设 • - Economic development 经济建设 4.Number of cadre • 1) Main Forms of bianzhi: • Civil servant 8 million • Public unit more than 40.5 million
• 2) the “Concentric Circle” Structure of
Government three main forms of bianzhi:
--administrative bianzhi (行政编),
--enterprise bianzhi (企业编) --public service units (事业编) • The administrative bianzhi is crucial for the layout of the political system. It stipulates the number of organs (机构编制) and the number of personnel (人员编制) in these organs. A bianzhi list specifies and ranks the various organs and positions in an administrative setup, including detailing the administrative functions of these organs. administrative bianzhi --civil servants • Cadres in government and Party organs and agencies are the backbone of the political system. They are also called “civil servants”. • Civil servants are regulated by the civil service administrative system in addition to being managed by the CCP’s cadre regulations. • The number of civil servants has risen to about 10 million. Public Service Units– 事业单位编制 • Of the total number of cadres, 31.53 million work in the 1.11 million socalled 事业单位 (public service units or nonprofit organizations).
• 14.3 million work in production enterprises(企
业) Cadre: from a comparative perspective • A key pre-condition for democratic transition may be a split among the elite. Within competitive authoritarian regimes, elections allow for a marginal degree of opposition within the political system. • However, the CCP has been able to avoid implementing the direct election of Party cadres, and has thus retained a far higher degree of autonomy in personnel appointments. The rigorous screening and strict training programmes of the cadre system further allow the CCP to generate a legion of elite loyal disciples with a unified political ideology.