uilllllN

ri,ttll:
Published weekly by Orbis Publishing Limited
Orbis House,20-22Bedfordbury, London WC2N 4BT
Volume 1 lssue 2
Editor Consultant Editors
Ashley Brown DrJohn Pimlott
Senior Lecturer in the Department of
Executive Editors WarStudies atthe Boyal Military
Sam EldQr Academy Sandhurst
Adrian Gilbert
David Floyd
Sub-Editors Specialist writer on international
Sue Leonard polltics
Simon lnnes
lssue1 Acknowledgements
Editorial Advisoty Board
Artwork Editor Brigadier-General (Retd) James L. Associated Press 5{Tr); Camera Press 17(C); Central Office Of lnformation 3(T), 5(T1), L6;
Jonathan Reed Eshel-Dramit Ltd 21-28; Gamma lnside front cover (Cb, Cl), lnslde back cover, 2, 4(B), 5(B), 6(8),
Collins Jr 7(T1,R),8(B).9(T),10(T),111C),13(C),14l15,14(lnsetC,B)14l151B),17(T1,R),20;ReneBurri/Magnum
FormerChief of Military History, lnsidefrontcover (B). Peter Marlow/Magnum lnside front cover (Ct), Micha BarAm/Magnum nside
Artwork Buyer uS Department of the Army front cover (T), P. Fusoo/Magnum 4(T), Steele-Perkins/Magnum 1 9(T), M. Silverstone/Magnm
Jean Morley 19iB):PressAssociationg(BtRexFeaturesS(T),i1iB),12,1318),14(1nsetT1),17(Cr);Shorts1l(T);
Frani Spooner 15{lnset T,B); United Nations 13(T), All Magnum photographs trom the John
Picture Editor lanV, Hogg Hillelson Agency.
Carina Dvorak Authority on smallarms and modern Maps and diagrams: Gordon Beckett 1 O; Graham Bingham 3,7,8; Paul Bryant 1 8
weapons systems
Picture Consultant
Robert Hunt Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly KBE CB lssue 2Acknowledgements
Council member of the Institute for the Aiiociateu press:7(Br); Black Star 36(C); Eshel-Dramit Lld.43-48; Gamma 38(q),3s{e);Jta.g.qll9!!
AiitrivJ+7igl;ilustritii London News 34-35(T); liraeli covernment Tourist Office 34(B); l.W.M.
Design Studyof Conflict 35.36(B); R, Burri/Maqnum 38-39 & Front cove'j D. McCullin/Magnum 37(T); M. Riboud/MagnuJn
EDC (Partworks) Ltd gs(C), Si;ele-pertinsl-Magnum 37(B); Popperfoto 32{B').33.40(B);J. Topham 36(T); U.P.l 29,30(B),
Professor Laurence Manin Sz\ti',ql\A),qz$l;Zionisl Archives 31. Al l Magnum photographsJlomlhe John Hillelson Agencv
Editorial Secretary Vice-Chancellor at the University of wtlipi ana iiagra-s: Gordon Beckett 30(T), 351T); Mike Holland 42; Ed Stuart 4'l(T).
ClareWitherden Newcastle upon Tyne, and former
Head of the Department of War Studies
The passaqe bvJ. Bowver Bell quoted on page 30 isfrom his bookTerrorOut ofZion (1977), published
Production Coordinator at King's ColJege, University of London bv Si Martin's Press, New York. The quotdtion by lsrael LeW on page 34 is extracted from an interylew
Peter Taylor-Medhurst with Lucinda Frarks that was pu blish ed i nthe New York f imes [-.] sed with perm ssion
AirVice-Marshal S.W.B. Menaul CB
CBE DFCAFC
Contents Commandant of the Joint Services
Staff College, 1965-67, and War in Peace Price UK 75p; lR 95p; Aus & NZ $1.85; SA R1.85; USA & Canada
Director-General of the Royal United $1.85; Singapore $4.25
Battlefor Palestine 29 Services lnstitute, 1 968-76
Ashley Brown How to obtain copies of War in Peace Copies are obtainable by placing a regular
Editorial Director orderatyournewsagent,orbytakingoutasubscription Subscriptionrates:For
Outrage! 34 Brian lnnes six monihs (26 issues) f23; for one year (52 issues) C46. Send your order and
Al ex a nder M cN a i r-W i Ison remittance to Punch Subscription Services, Watling Street, Bletchley, Milton
Editorial Manager Keynes, Bucks MK2 2BW, being sureto statethe numberofthefirstissue required.
Against all odds Clare Byatt
John Pimlott Back numbersUKand Eirei Back no mbers are obtai nablefrom you r newsagent or
Cireulation Direc,tor from War in Peace Back Numbers, Orbis Publishing Lld' 20122 Bedfordbury,
Weapons of terror David Breed London WC2N 4BT at cover price. Australia: Back numbers are obtainable from
Simon lnnes War in Peace Back Numbers, Gordon & Gotch (Aus) Ltd, 1 14 William Street, PO
Marketing Director Box 767G, Melbourne, Vic 3001. South Africa, Europe & Malta: Back numbers are
KeyWeapons: Abrams M1 MBT MichaelJoyce available at cover price frbm your newsagent. ln case of difficulty write to the
address in your country given for binders. South African readers should add sales
tax.
Nextweek's issue Howto obtain binders forWar in Peace UK and Eire: Details of how to obtain your
binders {and of ourspecialoffer)willbe in issue 7. Europe: Writewith remittance of
Mountain warfare has been one of the most impor- f4"80 per binder (incl p&p) payable to Orbis Publishing Ltd, 2O/22 Bedfordbury,
ta nt forms of conf ict si nce 1 945. n the Vietna mese
I I London WC2N 4BT. Malta: Binders are obtainablethrough your local newsagent
pricef3.80. ln case of difficultywritetoWar in Peace Binders, Miller (MaltalLtd. PO
highlands, in Afghanistan and in the Himalayas, }ox272,18a Scots Street, Valetta. Australia: For details of how to obtain your
armies have struggled not only against each other binders see inserts in early issues or write to War in Peace Binders, First Post fty
Ltd, 23 Chandos Street, St Leonards, NSW 2065. The binders supplied are those
but also against the inhospitable elements. The illuitrated in the magazine. New Zealand: Binders a re availa blethrou,gh you rlocal
newsagent orfrom War in Peace Binders, Gordon & Gotch lNZ) Ltd, PO Box 1 595,
Greek Civil War in the 1940s was a war fought Wellin{ton..South Africa: Binders are availabte through your local newsag-9nt or
largely in the mountains; and we show how com- throuo'h anv branch of Central News Agency. ln case of difficulty write to War in
PeaciBinders, lntermag, PO Box 57394, Springfield 2137.
munist guerrillas, seemingly safe in mountain
strongholds, were attacked by government forces Note: Binders and back numbers are obtainable subject to availability of stocks'
Whilst every attempt is made to keep the price of the issues and binders constant,
using the advantages of air support - especially the publishbrs reserve the right to increase the stated prices at any time wh-en
circumstances dictate. BindeE depicted in this publication are those produced for
the dive-bombing capacity of Curtiss Helldivers. the UK market only and may not necessarily be identical to binders produced for
ln the weapons section we look at the Harrier, the saleoutsidethe uK.
revolutionary veftical takeoff and landing aircraft.
O 1 983 by Orbis Publishing Limiled, Typesetting by Text of Orpington. Reproducticn by Adroil
Photo Litho Ltd. P'inted in Great Br'tair byAdisar P'ess Ltd. 03832
ts-i*
PALESTINE I943-48

Irgun leaders, the key to the creation ofa Jewish state.

whereas the Haganah was equally concerned with the
delence ofthe new state against Arab attack.
1) i.b 1944 mmigrationoffrces
In 1940 a split took place in the Irgun. resulting in
21 feb
bombed
1314 Taxoffi.es bombed
the fbrmation of the Lehi (Lohame HerOt Israel -
23tul.r1944 Po cestationbombed
25J!l 1945 BridgeonHafa Fighters fbr the Freedom of Israel), better [<'nown as
Kantarrarlway
bombed
the Stem gang. The two groups now took the war to
31 Oci 1945 2po ce aunches
atiacked n harbour the British, while World War lI was still continuing.
17 Jli 1946
with mines
Leh raidonK shon Determined to assert Jewish rights, their attacks
rai wayworkshop
l3 ALrgl346 imm graionrotsat became more violent and two members of the Lehi
pod
9 S.p 1946 Erishpoliceman
k iedbyLehi
killed Lord Moyne, the British Minister for the
2': Mai1341 Lehidestroyoll
refineries
Middle East, in November 1944. This act horrified
26Air 1947 Chlef of
kr ed
EritshClD the British - and the majority of the Jewish popuiation
S.p 1947 Leh bank
13rd on
rguf r! dyr th barfe
of Palestine. But the assassination had the effect of
bo.rb on Po ce
siit;Dn
getting the terrorists the forum they wanted; and their
motivation was clearly expressed in their chilling
explanation: '[f we prove our ideals were right and
12 FEb 1945 mmigration
.fi.8S bonrbed fogsed just, then our deed was right andjust. '
:/ F.L i944 T:xotr.esbombed 29 Jr 1941 2 Brit sh sergeants
l: rVcr r944 Br iish po rceman hanqed by lra!n
12 Feb lS44 lmmigration
Begin's Irgun had decided to mount a spectacular
k iled by Lehi
2a :-.f 3f! Te(oflsts rob bank
otr ces bombed
Taxotrices series of attacks on the British to force them to take
IBrtsh po cenran bombed
ll N.ilj45
kled
V,o€ddemon. 23Apr 1946 lrg!nradon 23 Mat 1944 Po lcesiai on unpopular repressive measures. They had very few
police*aiion bombed
:5Alr 1940
sir.rlois and r ots
L6h ki ed7 Ertish
27 Sep 1944 lrgunattack resolrrces with which to mount such operations, but
4 policeSiat ons
7 J:r rl47
I a(nsra
so d ers
.g!n6tick
d
29 Sep 1944 Brltish po ceman the core of the membership in the later years of World
War II was fanatically determined * determined
k lled
mi taryHO 27 Dec 1944 lrgunattack
)17vit 94/ Maria aw mposed' po ce HO
l4Eritons ki ed
ncioents
n
22ht 1946 lrgunbombKlng
Dav d Hoie
enough to be able to live the double Iife ofthe terrorist.
24 Oct 1946
91 ki ed
Bombsexploded
As J. Bowyer Bell described it:
:: U:i 1344 Polr.€ al Brit sh road
blocksaroundclty
'Except for a few full time people, nearly everyone
si.ticn
30 Oct 1946 rguf su tcase
lD Nj:yl!:i5
Dcmbed
2m.nar bombleftat Iived above ground, often in their own homes, under
rarlwaystation
bombs
ert ode 31 Oct 1945 rslnraidon 1 Mar 1947 rg!n bomb their own names, but always with another secret life.
n6:rpo rarlwaystanon Brit sh off cers
.1:tirr
ce
25 Feb 1946 lrgun raidon RAF club There was the daiiy round of quick meetirrgs in dreary
3l Ccr l!45lpo ce a dleld
l.ri.h surk rooms with frightened hosts hovering at the door, tiny
27 D.. 945 ii!!nliia.rk
coii.e ll0 notes passed on street corners , rumours of disaster or
arrests, or the headline in a paper that could not be
acknowledged. There was never enough time or
money. Everyone lived on nerves, coffee, and
3l Oci 1945 Sevara hundreddev ces cigarettes.
exp oded on rai ways all over
Palestine
'Later. it seemed to the members that the months
lO J!n 1946 lrg!ndestoy3tra ns
l6 J!i 1946 Haganahdesiloy8b.idges
aroundthetrontierso{
and years slipped by in a delirium of heightened
Pa esl ne
reality. Neither the later open wars nor the postponed
careers would ever have the drama of life under-
British forces against Nazi Germany. In the 1 930s the ground. There was the pulse of knowledge when,
Haganah had fbrmed its own mobile lield force called walking down the dark streets of Tel Aviv, one heard
the Chish and in
1941 the Palmach tshock troops) through a strange window the whistled bar of the
came into being. By 1941 rhe Palmach had 3200 Betar song as the Irgun's illegal radio began to
members and the Chish. although poorly armed, broadcast. '
numbered 7000. The llrst operations were against govemment
In 1 93 I some right-wing Jews, djssatisfied with the buildings, and on a small scale, but as the security
Haganah's 'defencist' attitude to the Arabs, formed forces down there were often gun battles -
the Irgun whose main objective was, by means of and..ffi policemen were killed. again
terrorist attacks on police stations and govemment toffi more respectable Jewish
buildings, to make Palestine too hot fbr the British to org4.l11
'a:=:the
rule. Getting the British out was, in the view of the wi6 largest of the armed

ffi
f

s
E*.,:
ii€.=
i-

PALFST1NE 19,1J-.18

was a lirm sign of intentions unacceptable Io anv of thr

Teirorist reprisal
Of all the rnany outrages that oc-
curred n Dalestine none arolsed
n^ore controversy tnar tne k ll:ng of
two British lnterligence Corps
seigeants, Clif{ord Martin and Mer-
vyn Paice, bythe lrgun inJuly'1947.
When three lrgun members were
sentenced to death by a Br'risn coun
forterrorist activities, the lrgun deter-
mined to take hostages and on' 2 -.rry
they achieved success. Sergeants
Manin and oaice were rnarrred and
out of uriform when a car drew up
beside them and out jumped an lrgun
hit sqrad. Brndled into tne bac< of the
car they were taken to a specially
constructed cell which was, in effect,
a 3m 0 feett cubed 'box' btried
underneath a diarrond factory. Lack-
ing both l;gnt and air tne r requ re-
ments for survival consisted of a can-
vas bucket, a week's supply of food
and two oxygen cvrinders.
Martin and Paice and the lrgun
Onpage29:Jewish Jewish groups: its membership reached 45,000 in
soldierstraintheirVickers l9zt7. The Irgun. by Contrast" never had more than
Mk1 water-cooled machine 2800 membeis before lndependence.
gun on an Arab,l:tltloJ in had between 600 and 700. Bv late 19,+4. the Jewish
The bodies of Marlin and Paice in the
eucalyptus grove.
awalted the British decision, which
came on 29 Julywhen thethree lrgun
terrorists were hanged ir- Acre pr son.
The terrorists reacted swiftly. lrgun
commander Amihai Paglin and
squad drove to the diamond factory.
One of the sergeants was dragged
from the box and a hood was slipped
overhis head. After his hands andfeet
were tied he was stood on a charr. a
noose placed around his neck, and
tnen tne chair was k cked away.
Tne second sergeart was simirarly
hanged. After hanging for 20 minutes
the two corpses were taker to a near-
by eucalyprus g'ove and s;spended
from a tree. A mine was placed be-
neatn the booies and tne British au-
tnorities nforrr^ed of rhe locaton.
When the bodies were cut down they
set off the mine which blew them to
pieces. Tnis shocK rg incioent
sulted in an immediate outcry in both
Palestine and Britain.
w,hile the Lehi
Jewish organisations, and a revolt hegun t il
^1,6-p
Palestine. The Irgun and Lehi were now rvorkins tn
concefi with the striking forces of the Flaean"h,lhe
Palmach. During October and Novembef'l !4-5 lorrrt
operations destroyed refineries and railway lir,.i:s, uri
the security lorces began to losc conlroi '
The underground war soon esealahd. Anr:s rttds
led to shoot-outs: gun battles took place !n s,rall
rooms and crowded streels. There were sonre British
victories: in February 19216 they capturer'1 the I chi
radio transrr-iitter and 20 insurgents. But throrrghorrf
the early months of 1946. the Jews u,ere the nrori:
successful. ln April seven British pararooper-c u/ere
killed in a Lehi operation: in May over f6000 u,ls
stolen liom the Nablus branch of Barclay'-s Blnk; in
June there u'as a concefted attack on commrrnications
that destroyed I I road and rail bridges.
As British security became tighter with rhe opera-
tions of Black Saturday" 29 June 1916 - in which
100.000 soldiers and 10.000 police occupied the
Jewish Agency's headquarlers and 25 .lewish settle-
ments . confiscated files and detained 2700 peoplr: -- sct
the resistance became more desperate and took hos-
a tages. Palestine became a land under siege as curfews
androadblocksbecamethe norm. Then. inJuly I 946.
came the most audacious terrorist action of all. The
King David Hotel. the social as u,,ell as administratir c
The British presence
Britarn's stance in Palestine has been described
as resemblrng a 'police state with a conscience'.
Certain ly, self-imposed restraints and shorlcom-
ings in the coercive machinery were hardly con
ducive to success. The basic Brrtrsh problem was
that they had little expenence of such a situatron
and could not formulate a strategy that was
effective n an underground war
Government policy was unciear, leading to
re- widespread unwrllingness to cooperate with the
security forces. Moreover, there was frequent
capitulation to terrorism through the commuta-
tion of death sentences under duress. The re-
sourcBs available were limited and there was a
tendency to equate the situation with normal
imperial policing. The Palestrne police, however,
was ,phronically short of personnei and, as
paramilitary force, d d not enjoy good relations
a

northern Palestrne. uen:

- Terrorintt,estreets.th" Agencl . under whose umbrella the main Jervish wrth the popuiation. Less than 4 per cent of ts
aftermath of abomb organisations operated. was so worried at the possible British members spoke Hebrew and the small

. exp's'n nJerusaem
ili,+;,{{L'iffiffi:1:{i#:HTiilflfi##
ences; Irgun and Lehi werc conservative and right-
wing, whereas the Haganah contained many soclalist
elements. More than i000 lrgun suspects were
hancled overto the British in the early months of 1945:
but the lrgun managed to survive. By the summer.
with the end of the war in Europe, Haganah operations
against Begin's men ceased, and a potentially dis-
astrous split among the Jewish groups was partially
closed.
f The British Labour government elected in the
Jewish component was unreliable. Much ther-.
fore depended on army units trained for conven-
tional rather than guerrilla war Static guards on
important installations spared few for offensive
actions, which mostly consisted of cordon and
search operations the rsolation and thorough
combing of given locations. Over '1 70 such opera-
tions were mounted, usually at batta ron level
after specif ic incidents. These operarions were
not always successful and exposed troops to
false allegations, while reprisals were quickly
seized upon by terrorists whose grasp of prop,
aganda was always superior Army strengtir total-

I :il*il:J;,:lix'oilJ;',':::'-ru:;l:,..;:,?I;ff"';ff
led 100,000 in January l 947 and pol ce numbered
20,000. lnail,223 British mrlitary personnel were
kllled in Palestine and 418 wounded.
:Jn::il:[:tJ;f,:ff:,i?,f,:!"1:in:?i:t',:'.?i',,::

I
31

-
I

Above:AJewish sentry centre of the Mandate, was attackedby the Irgun, and
stands guard in a village a whole wing was destroyed by carefully placed
just taken by the Haganah.
Below: Well armed Arabs
explosives. A total of 9 1 people - Britons, Arabs and
Jews - were killed. Once again teror had done its
on theirwayto the fighting
work, and the whole world was made aware of the
atthe Mountof Olives, 11
May 1948. Below right: Jewish problem. With booby traps and assassinations
Arabs in Jerusalem openly abounding no British soldier or policeman in Pales-
purchasing arms in the tine seemed safe. When convicted Irgun prisoners
street in February 1 948. were whipped, Begin's men captured British troops
Thewoman is inspecting and whipped them in retum.
ammunition to go with her 'Ihe war was now an intense strain for the British;
Browning automatic pistol
troops had to be confined to safe areas to prevent more
hostages being taken. Large-scale sweeps had failed
to break the ability of the Jewish resistance to mount
raids. The summer of 1941 saw three incidents that
summed up the problems facing the British. First of
all , in April , two captured terrorists , Meir Feinstein of
the Irgun and Moshe Barazani of Lehi, blew them-
selves aparl with a grenade that had been smuggled
into their cell, thereby cheating the gailows by a few
hours. This kind of fanaticism was something the
British had no answer to. Then, in July, the ship
Erodus 1947, catrying 4,500 Jews fiom France to
Israel, was captured by the British Navy. Eventually
the refugees were transpofted to Germany and Britain
was seen to have returned concentration camp survi-
vors to the hated land of their suffering. The episode
put British policy towards Palestine in a very bad light
indeed as far as world opinion was concerned.
Finaily, there was the affair of the two British
sergeants, Paice and Martin, hanged by the Irgun on
29 July in retaliation for the execution of three Jewish
prisoners. Once again, the Jewish Agen6yand the
Haganah were horrified; but the hangings'demon-
strated to the British public in the clearest'possible
way just how control over Palestine had been eroded.
By the end of the summer of 1941 the BritiSh had
lost all appetite for the struggle and had handed the
problem to the United Nations, which decided in
November on a parlition of the country between Jew
and Arab, to take effect from May 1948. There had
always been simmering violence between the two
communities and from the late summer of 1941
relations worsened. The war against the British had
been unpleasant enough, but the gradual intensifica-
tion of fighting between the two communities was
even uglier. The slaughter of women and children was
common;revenge and an almost casual acceptance of
violence became the notm. The Arab practice of
mutiiating bodies horrified the Jews from Europe but
the Arabs were convinced they had right on their side
- that Palestine was theirs and should not be taken
from them.
After November 1941 the fighting became wide-
spread - in the cities where rival communities lived,
around kibbutzim and Arab villages. ln the first two
weeks of December nearly 100 Arabs and almost as
many Jews were killed. Arab volunteers fiom outside
Palestine came in to attack the Jewish settlements. A
kibbutz would be sniped at all day then. at night,
members of the Haganah would slip out and perhaps
blow up a house in a nezrby Arab village in revenge.
Whereas the war against the British had been an
undercover affair in which secrecy and evading detec-
tion hadbeenthe rule. the internecine warfare with the
Arab community involved larger formations, and had
to be directed by the Haganah if any success at all was
to be achieved. But there were n.rany problems in
subordinating the lrgun to the Haganah. The Irgun
was a small, battle-tested group, whereas the Haga-
nah was a large, more amorphous body. Then there
were the basic differences in approach. The Irgun was
almost a,religious sect; its members had a fanatical
belief in the rightness of the Jewish cause. The Arabs
were, to them, an irrelevance. If they gcx in the way of
the Jewish state then so much the worse for them. To
Ben-Gurion and the leadership of the Haganah, the
Palestinian Arabs were a people, who had to be
treated as such.
Acts of tenorbetween the two communities multi-
J
PALESTINE 1913.48

plied; a bomb near to I)amascus gate in Jerusalem

kiiled 15 Arabs at the end of 1941 , and shortly
afterwards the lrgun sent an oil drum full of explo-
sives into a group of Arabs waiting at a bns stop,
killing 17. In February. 52 people were killed as an
Arab bomb exploded in Jerusalem.
These horrible acts could not decide the war.
however. That was a question of whether the Arabs
could cut off or destroy any of the Jewish comlnunr-
ties * many of them isolated - that lay throughout
Palestine. The big prize was Jerusalem, where a
100,000-strong Jewish community was surrounded
by Arabs and could only be supplied along one road
fromTel Aviv.
By February 1948 the battie was on in earnest.
si;}t.,1.1j.t:ir&
Ben-Gurion appointed David Shaltiel commander of ;.1.:r {,rs,.:...:
the Haganah there and he had to cope with a rapidly
deteriotating situation. By March there was no meat Above: Arabs on the The first aftack was to be on the Arabs blocking the
and no milk. The Arabs commanded the heights and lookout for Jewish Tel Aviv-Jeruralcm road. The Haganah had an initial
threatened to overun outlying settlements. movements around the success when Ahdul Kader. the Arab commander.
stronghold of Castel on the
On 24 March a Jewish ionioy set out to try and gr:t was killed by a Jewish patrol. This temporarily dislo-
road to Jerusalem. Below:
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It met a road block; a The callto arms-Jewish cated Arab plans. The most critical moment came on
bulldozer trying to destroy the block was blown up bv forces on the roof of a 9 April. hou,cver. before the Jewish ollensive was
a mine. Of the 40 vehicles only 2l survived. Thc house in a villagethey have l'ully in geur. On that da1 a joint Irgun-Lehi operation
following day an 80-strong e onvot' r.r, as halted and the recently captured run for against the village ol Deir Yassin took place. After a
survivors had to be rescued by the British l-orces. coverto replyto day ol fierce house-to-house tighting 254 Arabs -
long-range f ire f rom a
So far the Jews had fought a defensive war and had men. \ omen and children lay dead. The Haganah
detachment of the Arab
not wanted to take the oft'ensive for f'ear r.rf provc.tking Legion,1948. expressed its horror, occupied the viliage and buried
the British authorities. The failure of the two convov,s the dead. But the road to Jerusalem was now open
had changed the picture" however. and Ben-Gurion (tenrporarily at least). At the same time, Arab attacks
decided it was time to unwrap the plan fbr direr:t on the coa\tal plain ialtered r.then the Jewish settle-
co-ordinated attacks on the Arahs. mcnt ol Mishmar Haemek. the kcy 10 the area.
rcsisted assau lts.
With the Arab ol'lensive har ing ended. a process
The Arab forces cc..rs'" Abdrl Kader \leanwhile, in that had hccn taking plirce since December began to
Cai,lee, !ar',2 i:l Kaujr, a Lebanese, gather pace: the flight of the Arabs lrom those areas
Aithough the Palestrnran Arabs out- con'manried a badly organ sed force designated as Jewirh undcr thc pafiition. The Arabs
numbered the Jews, and had access known as the Arab Liberation Army, hclieved that they would he ahle to retum when the
to considerable supplies of weapons, initially forrred to counter-balance the Jews were dcl'eated.
they f ailed to prevent the Jews estab- schemes of the emrr Even the help As the British began to withdraw, so the Arabs
lishing control over w de areas of f rorm nerghbour ng states was biased moved out too. In micl-April the Arabs quit Tiberias;
Palestrne by May 1948. This was towards their ow,n interests - Egypt at the end of the rrronth 60.000 were evacuated from
mainly because there was no central cons dered Gaza a su table area for Huiia. The lrgun was nou ready to take thc offcnsive
Arab comrrand. The EmrrAbdullah of expansion wh le Syria and Lebanon to capture any area\ it cou Id. and late in April took the
Transjordan controlled the best m lt- had srmilar designs on Galilee. citt'ol'Jaila, lrorn which the Arah civilians also fled.
ary forces of the region ln the Trans- These internal conflrcts considerably Haganah't rrlops took Acre.
jordan Frontier Force, but his amb- weakened the.Arab cause. for there By the time the new Jer.r ish \tate \ as proclaimed.
itions io oon'inare all Da esr re were u/as no centTal authority to bflng max- on l4 May. the Jeu ish lurrccs had deieated the British
opposed by the Grand Muft of Jeru- imum pressure to bear on the Jews' in an un$erground u ar and the Palestinian Arabs in
salem, the sp r tual head of the w'eak po,nts. So rt was that the Haga- the struggle for rhe land. But norr they had to lace the
Palestinians; the muftr was sup- nah was able to ta(e the inrtiative f rom united amries olthe neighbouring Arab states in open
ported by rregular troops under his Apr I 1 948 warto decide whether they could retain al1 theiff#ff;

\Mhen the Irgun blew up the
Above: A photograph of
the hotel taken seconds
afterthe explosion. Below:
The main entrance before
the bombing. The King
David Hotel was the socia I
as well as the
administrative centre of the
British Mandate in
Palesti ne.
J-{
o{F',I
TR GE
After the British security operations of Black Satur-
day,29 June 1946, involving the occupation of the
Jewish Agency's headquarlers and the detention of
several thousand people, the Haganah realised that
their future operations might now be jeopar-
dised. Consequently on I July the Haganah autho-
rised the lrgun to proceed with their proposed Opera-
tion Chick - the bombing of the British secretariat
housed in a wing of the King David Hotel , Jerusalem.
Despite heavy security precautions around the
hotel . barbed wire bar:ricades, high nets to prevent an
attack with grenades, and a central alam system that
would sound a general alert at the first sign ofdisturb-
ance and cause the arrival of patrol cars, police and
soldiers - despite all this the King David continued to
function as a hotel. and as the social centre of the
British community.
Amihai Paglin, who planned the Irgun raid, had
noticed that people were making regular deiiveries to
the kitchen. Paglin calculated that a huge explosive
King David Hote1
charge detonated fiom the basement area under the
secretariat would drop the entire southwest wing. He
decided that the huge amount of explosives needed
could be packed in milk churns and delivered to the
hotel under the guise of a normal milk delivery.
Furthermore . in order to draw attention from the 'milk
delivery' two smail bombs would be detonated in the
hotel grounds. lt was hoped that this would clear the
area of civilians but not raise a general alarm.
At noon on 22 July these two small bombs were
detonated. At roughly the same time a milk lony
turned into the hotel drive and pulled up outside the
basement entrance. Fourteen people dressed as Arabs
got out and began to unload seven unusually heavy
milk churns, each packed with explosives.
A Britlsh otficer strolling past the kitchens noticed
that something unusual was going on, and on seeing
the danger of the situation an Irgun man shot the
officer, who feil to the ground. Two military police-
men nearby heard the shooting and fired towards the
'l hated them lthe Britishl, we alldid; allthe young
people were joining the lrgun or the Stern gang.
My grandfather fled on foot from Egypt to come
to freedom in lsrael and I had relatives who
perished in Europe When I heard the British had
turned back Polish refugees from our shores and
that those Jews were latel killed in pogroms, I
decided l'd doanythingto getthe British out. I will
always nave blood on 'ny hands. We never rneant
to kill anyone. But wnen I walk through these
corridors now, I feel I did something worthwhile,
something historical. I remember every detail of
the operation and I think perhaps that my grand-
fatherwould be proud.'
lsrael Levy, who participated in the King David
Hotel bombing, in an interview, 1 982.
I
 PALESTINE 1943-18

French Consular"
F
T-1
!
l
LI

Right: Frantic attempts

were madeto clearthe
wreckage in orderto get
survivorsto hospital.

kitchen entrance. Their tire was drawn b),two or three

of the Irgun pafiy who were guarding the kitchen
staff.
At l2.l-5 pm Police Inspector Taylor received
some sofi of alarm fiom the King David Hotel and
despatched a patrol car to investigate. However, by

this time,the assault party had placed the seven milk

chums around the central pillars of the southwest
wing and escaped in a flurry of smallarms fire.
Shor-t1y afierwards lnspector Taylor issued a gener-
al alarm. despatched his patrol cars and sounded the
,# dB terrorist siren. At about this tirne at two-minute
intervals a t'emale member of the Irgun telephoned
"*s first the hotel switchboard. the Palestine Pos/ news-
paper and finally the French Consulate, each call
€ explaining that bombs had been placed in the base-
*$
g
l$:
ment of the King David Hotel. In this way the Irgun
hoped to clear the hotel of all personnel. But the
r,{ messages were never properly relayed, and at i 2. 3 1

Taylor called otf the general alarm.

Left: Thechargeswere
placed so precisely that the
southwest wi ng was totally
destroyed, but the r est of
the hotel was relatively
At exactly 12.37 the milk churns detonated, the
walls of the southwest wing bulged outwards and the
entire win-q collapsed. In one hor-rifying moment the
hub of the British administration lor Palestine became
one huge pile of rubble . The erplosion claimed the
lives of 9 1 people and injured 45 .

u ntouched. Alexander McNair-Wilson

35

The war that the Jewish resistance fought against the
British was not one of regular formations, formed to
flght a setpiece battle. It was a small-scale war of
terror against an occupying army, the sort of war the
Spaniards fought against Napoleon's French armies
and which they called the 5u errilla-the little war.
Guenilla warfare is nothing new. The use of small,
irregular forces to ambush, harass and gradually wear
down a large conventional army has been a recog-
nised form of warfare since time immemorial. There
are references to such tactics as early as 400 years
before the birth of Christ, in the writings of the
Chinese theorist Sun Tzu, and examples of their use
may be seen throughout the centuries in all areas ofthe
glo-be. In the modern age, such campaigns as those of
the Boer Commandos against the British in South
Africa (1900-02), of T. E. Lawrence inArabiaagainst
the Turks ( l9 I 6- 1 8), ofthe various resistance groups
against the Axis powers in World War lI were classic
eiamples. But it is only since 1945, in the host of
liberation struggles in the former European colonies,
that we have grown used to guenilla warfare as an
integral part of the military scene.
Guerrilla wars have been the most common form of
conflict in the modern world, and they have naturally
taken different forms. The war that the Viet Cong
waged against the Americans in the 1960s was not the
same as that fought by the Provisional IRA against the
govemment in Ulster; Castro's bands in the moun-
tains of Cuba were very different from the Afghan
mujahideen who resisted the Soviet intervention in
their country. Yet guerrilla armies do have something
in common. They all operate from a position of
weakness against a more powerful enemy, and they
tend to use similar methods and procedures.
Confusion often arises over principles and defini-
tions, parlicularly as gueruilla warfare is now widely
regarded as part of political revolution' We hear
constant ref'erences to such concepts as 'revolution-
ary guerrilla warthre' or 'urban guerrilia warfare',
buitaing up a picture of some complex development
that only the experls can understand. This is untbrtun-
ate, foiin reality it is not guerrilla warfare that has
changed, merely the end results of its use.
MioTse-tung, thefatherof revolutionary guenilla
warfare, never advocated any new guerrilla tactics,
but used his small, irregular bands of lighters gradu-
ally to undermine the strength of his Nationalist
enemies in China preparatory to fighting convention-
al set-piece battles and winning political power. The
same is true of urban guerrilla warfare. for although
36
Agai nst
The devastating
al I impact of the
odds il:'J:xl'f#:;x
6ffi
lfl:'';,t&l
the scene of action may have changed, the principles
and basic tactics remain the same. In both cases the
need is to create military capability from virtually
nothing and to attack the enemy with it. Lacking
manpower, military skills and weapons, the guerril-
las can hardly be expected to mount a conventional
campaign. They rnust start from scratch, atthe lowest
level of capability, and build up theirEffort slowly, in
line with the advantages they hold.
And such advantages do exist. Conventional
armies tend to be large, unwieldy organisations,
designed to overwhelmin .n.*y bytorce olsuperior
arms. For this they need to be supplied , using roads ,
rivers or railways, and they need to control the
country through which they move. As a result they
garrisontowns, occupy key positions and usually aim
for a cluick victory to minimise cost and losses.
All of this plays right into the hands of the guerril-
las. They may be weak and poorly equipped by
comparison, but they do blend into the surrounding
countryside, enjoying locai support and intimate
knowledge of terain. They are free from fixed iines of
supply and can enjoy remarkable tactical flexibility. The ever-changing image
of the guerrilla-from T.E.
ftrey do not need to garison ter:ritory and they are
Lawrence in World War
under no restraints as to the duration of their cam-
I
(above)to Che Guevara in
paign; indeed, the longer it goes on the more chance the 1960s (top left). Centre:
tt ey tau. of building up their strength. Thus, by Fidel Castro chews
sm;ding back and choosing their targets, the guerril- thoughtfully on a cigar as
Ias can 6ring overwhelming local force to bear against he di rects exercises for
Cuban troops.
vulnerable outposts, regardless ofthe overall strength
of the enemy army.

,'
t.
Regular armies may have
superior equipment and
ostensible freedom of
movement by road and rail
and air (above, an army
security patrol in El
Salvador in 1981 ), but
guerrilla ambushes and
mines are an ever-present
th reat (top, the remains of a
government jeep in Biafra,
the end of one such
security patrol).
rr--
The enemy will feel obliged to defend everything
he holds, spreading his forces thinly over ground he is
intent on protecting, Ieaving the more flexible guerril-
las to mount a campaign of attrition on their own
tetms. Moreover, as each guerrilla attack produces
captured arms and enhanced prestige, the irregular
forces will gain in strength as the conventional army
faces demoralisation and weakened capability. Even-
tually abalance of forces willbe achieved, afterwhich
the guerrillas may be able to attack to win.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that a
guemlla campaign is easy to effect. Problems
abound, making good leadership and organisation
essential throughout. Guerrilla movements, whether
in response to enemy occupation of national territory,
colonialism or indigenous political repression, rarely
GUERRILLA WARFARE
emerge spontaneously; they have to be created, nur-
tured and developed, and will always start from a
position of frightening military weakness.
The key to ultimate success lies in the reasons for
the birth of the guerrilla movement. Th'eguerrilla
feels he has a grievance of such importancothat he is
willing to risk his life for it, and the chanceSare that if
he feels that way, a substantial part of the rest of the
population may agree with him. A guerrilla army's
greatest strength is the cast-iron devotion of its sol-
diers; and its second great strength lies in the support-
even passive suppofi - of some of the general popu-
Iace. So in Palestine in the 1940s, the Irgun and the
Lehi were organisations of ruthless, indomitable
fighters, quite prepared to go to their deaths for what
they saw as a just cause. And although most Jewish
organisations might disavow these extremists, they
sympathised with the cause and were not prepared to
give the British forces the help they needed to put
down the guerrillas.
The opponents of guerrilla armies nearly always
label the insurgents as 'bandits' and treat them as they
would murderers. But the guerrilla is often mucL
rnore than a common criminal. He has sometimes to
face difficult situations alone, with the knowledge
that failure will result in certain death; and although it
is true that he is also often a terrorist to whom
atrocities may become second nature, this does not
mean that he lacks military expertise. He may have to
live a double life in a city for years; he may have to
exist for months with little food and ammunition in
desert, jungle or swamp.
Tuming the raw material of a resentful populace
into such soldiers is the task ofthe leadership. Leaders
may come from a variety of sources. The right man
could be found locally or may already be in a position
of command through tribal orregional organisations;
Mulla Mustafa Barazani of Kurdistan in the 1960s,
leading the guen'illa campaign against Iraq, is a case
in point. He may be a political leader, forced into
military action by a lack of alternative courses, as
Mao Tse-tung was in China after the failure of the
Autumn Harvest uprising in 1921 . Finally he may
come from outside, bringing expefiise and the prom-
ise of support, as Lawrence did in Arabia in 19 I 6 and
Che Guelara tried to do in Bolivia in 1967.
Essentally the leaderhas to embody the movement,
to realise what it is capable of and to drive it to the
goal. It-is hardly surprising, then, that the great
guerrilla leaders are so often charismatic figures like
Castro and Ho Chi Minh or Mao himself. But
itrespective ofpersonal inspiration the leaderhas, as a
preliminary step, to find a safe base where he can train
and mould his forces.
Because of the nature of enemy occupation, with its
emphasis upon the towns and lines of communica-
tion, the natural area for such a base is the country-
side. A remote locality, of little apparent worth to the
occupying authorities, has distinct advantages.
Enemy presence will be minimal, particularly if the
area is off the beaten track; the people will not have
been intimidated into submission; local knowledge of
difficult terrain such as mountains, forests or swamps
willbe deep. Examples include the Viet Minh bases in
the mountains of noftheast Tonkin in the early
1950s; Colonel Grivas's use of the Troodos moun-
tains in Cyprus at much the same time; and Law-
rence's dependence upon the vastness ofthe Arabian
desert between 1916 and 1918. Admittedlv it is
31
GUERRILLAWARFARE

possitlle to create even saf-er bases outside the coun-
try, in a friendly neigbouring state - as. tbr example.
ZANU guerillas liom Zin-rbab\\,,e were able to do in
Mozambique after 1975; and it is not unknown tbr
guerrillas to find sanctuary in urban centres as the
Provisional IRA has done in Belfhst and Lonciondery
since 1970. Traditonally. however, the countryside
provides the most obvious location.
Having established his basc, the next problent fbr
the leader is recruits. Many local people may want to
ioin, or he may have to persuade them with appe als to
national identity orpromises of long-ten'n econontic,
social or political gains. In a colonial setting - as in
Malaya in the 1950s or Angola and Mozambique 20
years later- the call lor national independcnce may be
enough; elsewhere it may need a popular cry along the
lines of 'Land to the Tiller'. a f'avor-u'itc antong the
more left-wing groups such as those now operating in
Central America. Even so. care must be taken to
recruit the best available people.
Guenilla lighters need to be fit. parliculariy if they
are to operate in dilficult tcrrain. and capable of living
rough for loilg periods. One ol thc reasons tbr Chc
Guevara's tailure in Bolivia in 1961 i.r,as his recmit-
ment of middle-class intcllectuals who could not
withstand the phvsical hardship of his campaign.
Similarly, men with existing skills gamekeepers.
poachers or ex-soldiers should be sought, even il
they are not ideal physical specintens, for thcy can
pass their experlise on to the younger fighters. This
,#.
does not mean that the old. unfit or inexperl should be
ignored; they can be organised to provide a passive
wing - such as the communist Min Yuen in Malaya
to provide food. supplies. intelligence and shelter to

Right: Guerrilla armies

depend on support
throughoutthe population.
Here, North Vietnamese
women and children are
taught weapons drill. Far
right: A PLO guerrilla
prepares to launch a
grenade using a special
attachment to his 7.62mm
AK assault rifle. Bottom :

The impedimenta of a
modern army laid out in a
Soviet camp in
Afghanistan. The need to
concentrate such
. :.:-1a,
equipment not only slows
E
movement; it also
provides a good target- in
this case forthe Afghan
guerrillas (bottom right).

,j,.;.

rr#.."= '

ffii;','.,r
f i :.aa:: :1n:,
"i
lii.
=:.:::'.

]ii I in

.'==:::=:+;ii
T

GUERR.ILLA WARFARE

g uori lla glngs.

the uctir e
Guerrillas are not much use without weapons.
Some may be lelt over tiom the conventional battles
which preceded the enerny takeover; others rnay be
available lrom the local people. Gucrri$as in Vict-
nam. X4alaya and the Philippines immedia*ely after
World War ll were able to equip thcnrsclves with
weapons lett behind by the def'eated Japanese, while
Grivas called in a large number of privately-owned
shotguns from sympathetic Greek-Cypliot families in
1955. Other arms may be imported fiom tiiendly
states the Soviet policy of providing weapons to
national liberation gr()ups in black Alrica is a case in
point but quitc often the guerilias wili be ieft to their
own devices. Some may be able to manulacture their
own crude weapons, as the Mau Mau did in Kenya in
the mid-1950s. but til'
most the onlv accessible
source is the enemy. lndeed, the capture of weapons
may provide the incentive fbr the beginning of mili-
tary action.
These initial attacks should not be over-ambitious.
Isolated army outposts can be overwhelmed by a
cornbination of surprise and force of local numbers,
producing not or.rly the required arms but also useful
practical training. It is unlikely that the enemy will
rcact with maxirnum lbrce - such an isolated attack
wili probably bc dismissed as banditry. leading to
little lrcire than replacement of the lost troops and
this allows the guerrillas to move on to the other
outposts. with similar resr-rlts. By the time the enemy
realises the tull extent of opposition he will already
have suft-erccl signilicant casualties. as the French did
during the aptly-namcd War of the Posts in rural
Tonkin in l9-50.
Even if this realisation results in a major anti-
guerrilla carnpaign. the enemy tbrces may still suffer
disadvantages. enterins unknown terrain and sticking
rigidly to the tracks. roads and rivers. The guerrillas,
enjoyin-u local knorvleclge and support, can easily
mount a se ries of ambushcs, waiting for enemy troops
at chosen defiles, choke-points or junctions. Using
the weapons already captured. particularly portable
items such as mortars. machine guns or mines. they
should be able to achieve surprise and success, dis-
appearing into the countryside betbre the enemy can
recovcr. The Viet Minh ambush of a French mobile
column in the Chan Muoung gorge. south of Phu
Doan, in i 952 rernains a classic example.
Faccd with such disasters, the enenry witl probably
fall baek onto his secure bases in the towns and try to
contain rather than defeat the guerrilla threat. This
gir.'cs the guerrillas a chancc to expand by fbrming
new groups in neighbouring rural areas, and to extend
their attritional tactics close to the heartland of enemy
rulc. Sabotage, bombings and selected assassinations
rra-v take place in the towns a policy favcured by
Grivas in Cyprus adding to the pressures and helping
furtl.rcr to undermine enemy morale. Although the
enemy mi-eht respond with ruthless force at this stage,
normally the initiative would now 1ie firmly n'ith the
gucnillas. Every successful ambush or attack pro-
cluces rnore weapons and greaterexpertise, siowly but
surely wearing the cnerny down and forcing hint
further into his bases. ln the end, rvith guerrilla
control of the surrounding countryside, the towns are
besiegeci. The time is now ripe fbrthe next stage of the
canrpaign, moving away fiom gr.rerrilla tactics to
more conventional battles and the hope of eventual
Vlctor)'. JohnPimlott
39

+o

Weapons
of terror
The underground arms
industry that supplied
the Jewish resistance
Above: British
paratroopers survey part of
the haul recovered during
the massive 1 946 secu rity
operation known as Black
Saturday. The haul
included 3in mortars,
German MG34 machine
guns, Bren guns, grenades,
and other assorted
home-made weapons.
Right: Defending the
Jaffa-TelAviv border-
troops ofthe lrgun fire Sten
guns while a girl prepares
grenades. Note the
Austrian 9mm Steyr M12
pistol at her knees. Far
right: Members of the
Haganah practise fire drill
with a home-made moftar.
40
On 29 January 1946 a Britishjeep and a lorry packed
with men in RAF uniform approached the rear gate of
the RAF camp at Aqir near Gaza. The Arab Legion
guards on duty at the gate saluted smartly as the
vehicles passed into the camp - but they failed to
check the identity papers of the two vehicles, $rhich
sped through the camp and pulled up outside the
aflnoury. A Jewish worker was asked to get the keys.
On refusing, he was knocked to the ground andthe
door forced open. Inside, four RAF airmen were
quickly overcome before they could raise the alarm.
Five Arabs standing nearby were press-ganged as
loaders and, with the utmost speed, 20 Bren guns and
hundreds of Sten guns were thrown into the back of
the lorry. Once loaded, the convoy moved off down
the runway, along an old sand track that took it away
from the airbase undetected. The whole operation had
taken less than 20 minutes. Jewish guerrillas of the
Irgun had made another addition to their armoury.
This raid was typical of many caried out by the
Jewish underground in their quest to obtarn arma-
ments. Although plenty of weapons were available at
the end of World War tI, with huge surplus arms
dumps lying across Europe and the Middle East, the
stringent security measures adopted by the British
occupying forces severely limited the amount of arms
that could be smuggled into Palestine. Such arms as
were purchased abroad and illegally imporled were
usually concealed within machinery, in steamrollers
or washing machines for example. ln late 1947 the
Haganah took its first delivery from Czechoslovakia
of 20mm Hispano-Suiza light artillery pieces, which
arrived concealed under a shipment of onions.
The branch of the Haganah responsible for the
procurement of arms and ammunition was known as
the Rekhesh, an organisation that maintained the
highest level of secrecy - so much so that few in the
Haganah knew of its activities. The dangers involved
in either smuggling in arms from abroad or in stealing
weapons from the British were many, and the price
paidby the Rekhesh in loss of life was high.
Despite the success of the Haganah's smuggling
missions, as a source of weaponry they were uncer-
tain and could not be relied upon to guarantee a steady
flow of arms and ammunition. And so, to gain the
necessary weapons, the Jewish terrorists used the
classic guerrilla tactic of turning the tables on the
enemy by using his strength against him. As they
needed weapons to fight the British so they took them
from the ffiitish, and in operations such as the raid on
the RAF camp at Aqir the lrgun, for example, was
able to lay in large stocks.
Not ali raids were casualty free, however. In one
operation at the Ramat Gan police station, several
members of the Irgun, dressed as Arab prisoners and
British soldiers, gained entrance into the security of
the compound. Once inside the police station they
overcame the three policemen on duty, blew out the
arnoury door and made off with 30 weapons and
7000 rounds of ammunition. At that point other
British policemen in the compound began to reaiise
that something was wrong: captive Arabs had gone
into the police station and yet armed Jews were
coming out. The raiding party quickly came underfire
from police on the rooftops and suffered heavy
casualties as they made their getaway.
While the Irgun tended to specialise in such raids,
the Haganah, less prryared to countenance direct
confrontation with the British, turned to the produc-
 PALESTINE 1943-48

Sten Gun Mk ll
magazr ne
housi ng firing pin return spring
foresig ht
assembly

t-]
tnpprng lever

sear axrs pln

barrel sleeve
++#r-TT'
trgger .l
cnanqe
ll" ).r r

splng l'-
button I

calibre 9mm length 762mm (3Oin) weight 3kg (6.621b)

operation blowback feed 32 round box magazine
mode of fire single shot, automatic muzzle velocity
390m/sec (128Oft/sec) rate of fire (cyclic) 54O rounds/min

tion of home-made weapons. The home weapons

industry, called Ta'as, had begun life in the 1930s and
consisted of a number of small and secret workshops
scattered across Palestine. At first, weapon construc-
tion was fairly primitive - tin cans fllled with explo-
sives - but after I 945 manufacture extended to hand
grenades and even sub-machine guns. The Sten was a
particular favourite of the terrorists. It was extremely
effective at close quarters, was cheap to buy and,
because of its simple construction. easy to
manufacture.
ln the early days of 1946 ammunition was in short
supply. Although some was produced by Ta'as in its
underground factories, the production could not
match the need. Consequently the Haganah was
:.€
forced to look at the possibility of raiding British
supply trains. By coincidence the Jewish Brigade of
the British Army (which had fought in Italy during
World War II) was used to guard the arms dumps
stored in the rail yards, and with help from sympathe-
tic Jewish soldiers the Haganah established a source
for the regular supply of ammunition. During 1 946 a
terrorist unit was specially trained to jump onto
moving trains and push crates of military supplies off
at pre-selected locations.
Another example of the Haganah's versatility in
supplying itself with arms was demonstrated in the
way in which its members relieved the local Arab
population of quantities of 'Chile potash', one of the
constituents used in the manufacture of explosives.
Traditionally, Imperial Chemical Industries supplied 'i.g*
potash to the Arabs of Nablus and Hebron for firing
cannon during the religious festival of Ramadan. A
few members of Rekhesh, dressed as Arabs and
bearing forged loading orders forpotash, would drive
into Nablus in a truck with false number plates,
present their orders and depart with a substantial
amount of the chemical .
As the underground atms industry established it-
self, so it extended its production to include 2 and 3in
mortars and shells. The mortars were constructed to
the highest standards, and when British security
forces captured some examples they refused to be-
lieve they were locally produced and insisted that they
were manufactured in the United States. These
weapons were often trained on police or military
establishments, usually concealed by being half-
buried in the ground. The mortar would be armed with

41

*-Y".
PALESTINE 194-?-48

barrel Packed wtth

The lrgun'harrel'homb pet:ol a nd explos ves

1. the bomb,
mounted on a truck
was d riven to its
target hidden
under a tarpaulin
ii
detonator inside truck tyre
tyre
2. released by a
pull cord in the

II;
cab, the bomb

n#,fri#::".

!:
ffi
a tirr.re-fused shell. The guer-rillas would disperse and
then a rnember of the underground would ring up the
duty officer of the establishment under threat to warn
of the imminent bombardment. The Ha-eanah found
thatthis was a usefulmethod fbroccupyingthe time of
the security forces, although the British eventually
realised that the weapons were not accurate enough to
warrant too much attention.
Aparl from mortars. a string of improvised
weapons were used to harass the occupying forces. As
one British officer recalls: 'Typical incidents were the
ambushing of anry trucks and the mining of roads

used by the trucks. They used a variety ofmeans, ot

which the most popular was a bomb in a car detonated
from the side of the road. They also used various
ingenious devices, such as replacing the milestones
along the road with dummy milestones filled with
explosives and nuts and bolts. They had some original
devices fbr bombing police stations: trucks fitted with
a throwing arm which would hurl a forty-gallon drum
of explosives over a high f'ence into the courtyard of a
police station or an arrny barracks. '
It rvas not until the huge arms searches of I 946 and
I 947 that the British actually realised the extent ofthe
clandestine arms production. One such sweep un-
covered 600 rifles, light machine guns, pistol.s and
small mortars. Yet even the most stringent measures
by the security forces could not contain the Jewish
underground armaments programme. Ta'as even
built one bul let-making fact ory 7 m (23 feet) under the
ground. the workers being given ultra-violet treat-
ment and vitamins to reduce the skin pallor that
Above right:Ayoung otherwise might have made them look suspicious.
religious student keeps By May 1947 the Haganah had an arsenal of some
guard on the Tel Aviv-Jaffa 8300 rifles, 3600 Sten guns, 700 light machine guns,
border at a heavily
200 medium machine -suns, 600 2in and 100 3in
sandbagged Haganah
checkpoint. ln his hand he mofiars. But despite the effectiveness of these home-
carries a 7.63mm Mauser made weapons. Rekhesh increased their buying
pistol. Right: Two female operations in Europe as the British departure from
membeis of the Jewish Palestine became imminent. The next round in the
undergrou nd shock troops, fight for a Jervish state of Israel would require much
the Palmach, assemble and
heavier equipment: terrorist activities against a de-
arm grenades. As the
Haganah began to increase
parting colonial power would soon become trans-
its activities, so the need for fbrmed into open confrontation with the Arab states.
better arms increaSed. Simon Innes

12

, ifI'-
: <&---'
 KEYWEAPONS

The Abrams Ml MBT (main battle tank) came inro w-ere ready forcombat evaluation in 1967 in the shape Previous page: The M 1
operation in 1980 and represents rhe laresr thinkinc in of a sleek -50-ton. three-man tank, problents soon crashing through rough
American tank design. The Ml was named alier arose. cou ntry at speed.
General Creighton W. Abrams, the fbrmerComnlan- While the Americans required the new tank fbr Above:The MBT-70
der-in-Chief in Vietnam, and Chief-of-Sraff" who worldwide deployment. the Federal Republic of Ger- prototype-a highly
approved the project personally in Septemb er 1972. many favoured a design suited to warfare in central unusualdesign with a
The United States hadbeen aparnerwithGermanv hydropneumatic
Europe. Diffbring firepow,er concepts were also a suspension system and a
in the MBT-70 project, joint-development effoit
a prontinent issue. The Germans. liorn their World three-man crew, with the
begun in August 1963 aimed at helping standardise War II combat experience. favoured a high-velocity driver's position on the
Nato's advanced tank requirements. Conceived and long-range large-calibre gun, while the An-rericans left side of the tu rret in a
nourished by experience gained afier World War II wanted to fit the Shillelagh l52mm gun/launcher contra-rotating ring.
both partners were to invest jointiy in designing what system capable of liring a variety of ammunition types Below: The M1 as itfinally
was intended to be the most advanced ardourecl appeared. with a 105mm
as rvell a Shillelagh missile. main armament and a
flghting vehicle in the world. But although protorvpes The differences betw,een the two nations seemed four-man crew.

6,{
,.i',*t' ? #J.tr!

:{
Ir
- -. '.r:.'
irreconcilable and in 1970 the US Congress ordered
thejoint project to be abandoned and allocated special
funds for a new national project. As a result, each
country went its own way, the Germans ending up
with their powerful 120mm-gun Leopard II, and the
Americans going along the painful road which finally
producedtheMl.
The Americans began work on an 'austere' version
of the MBT-70, to be known as the XM803. but this
too was found to be unsatisfactory and the project was
cancelled only a year after its inauguration. An urgent
solution had to be found if the United States was not
to be left far behind in modem tank warfare - and time
was running out fast, as news of the new Soviet tank
designs liltered through AIIied intelligence channels.
ln February 1972 the US Army set up a special task
force, which included user, trainer and developn-rent
agencies aimed at cooperating closely in the develop-
ment of the new MBT.
s r''
ABRAMSMl MBT
Foliowing the presentation of proposals in 1972, Above:An M1 with its gun
contracts were awarded in 1973 to the Chrysler traversed to the right.
Corporation and General Motors, who both set about Below left:The pilot model
developing prototypes to be designated XM 1 .In 191 6 of theXMl prototype
which was revealed to the
both prime contractors presented their pilot vehicles world in 1978. Below right:
for initial testing. The M1 showing itsteeth,
ln November 1976 Chrysler was selected as the with the driver's position at
winner of the validation phase, and a full-scale en- the centre of the tank
gineering contract was awarded, wofih $196 miilion. clearlv visible.
An interesting feature of the Chrysier power-plant
was that it was an Avco-Lycoming gas-turbine en-
gine, the first of its kind to power l battle tank. The
turbine has better acceleration antl power than con-
ventional engines and is very economical from a field
maintenance point of view, although present models
consume more fuel than the high-powered diesel
engiies ofother tanks.
In February 1980 the US Army accepted delivery
of the first two production tanks in a"ceremony held at
45
I
 KEYWEAPONS

the army production line at Lima, Ohio. Designated

the Ml, the US Army has ordered over 7000 of these
tanks ahd they will provide the advanced edge of
America' s armoured might for the next two decades at
least.
An impressive armoured vehicle, the M I is also the
most expensive tank everproduced, with its unit price
surpassing $ 1.55 million. With atop speed of 72kmlh
(45mph) on roads and up ro 50 krr/h (31mph) cross-
country, the M1 is a fast-moving tank and a marked
improvement over the existing M60A3. The same
goes also for the silhouette, which is extremely low,
enabling the tank to find belter cover from hull'down
positions. The Ml's ability to survive battlefield
conditions has been enhanced by rts quick accelera-
tion - up to 32 km/h (20mph) in six seconds - which
allows the tank to make sudden spurts from one piece
ofcover to the next. Also useful in this respect is the
M 1 's comparatively low noise and smoke signature.
As in the German Leopard II and the British Above:The driving s
Challenger, the M I is protected by compound armour
compartmentwith T-bar
technology. This covers the front hull and turet clearly visible. Below: The
structure, balancing the rest of the tank with varying interior,phowing the
thicknesses of regular amour, ranging from 3.25mm breach ofthe 105mm gun.
(7sin) to 125mm (5in). Spaced arrnour plating is
added in vulnerable areas to decrease the effect from
chemical action rounds such as HEAT and HESH.
The first production batch mounts the US 105mm
M68 tank gun, which is a variantof the British l05mm
L7 series manufactured under licence in the United
States. Already fitted to the M60 tank it is capable of
liring most ammunition types. However, it is planned
to upgun the tank with a more powerful main arma-
ment in the mid-1980s, most probably the 120mm -*:
Rheinmetall smooth-bore gun as fitted to the Geman
Leopard II.
The tank's flre-control system is very advanced:
gun and turet drive are hydraulically powered with
the gun's elevation and depression achieved by a
hydraulic cylinder; turret traverse is powered by a
hydraulic motor-gear box combination. The M 1 fea-
tures a Hughes laser rangefinder and a back-up solid-
state digital computer, with an interior seif-checking
fault control. This allows the gunner to select the
target, fix-it with the rangelinder and then press his

16
I-i
Left: A side-view of the tank
with anti-shaped-charge
plates protecti ng the
suspension. Below:An
XM1 ploughs across a field
during its proving trials.
The powerful 1500
horsepower gas-tu rbi ne
engine and rugged
torsion-bar suspension will
provide production M 1s
with the ability to cross
broken terrain at high
speeds - a great advantage
for survival on the
battlef ield.
E
l
E
L
€
.€
F
t
!
i
|>
*5
''s**a?e;
fire switch. The computer then takes over and makes
the necessary calculations and adjustments to ensure a
hit.
A 7.62mm machine gun is mounted coaxially with
the main armament and a second is fltted at the
gun-loader's position on the turret. The commander
has a I 2 .7mm anti-aircraft machine gu'rialso fitted on
the turret.
Crew protection against hits is improved by greater
obliquity of the hull and turret surfaces and by
armoured skifis overthe suspension. Several protec-
tive innovations will improve the chances of survival
following eventual penetration. Arnmunition stow-
age'has been contpartmentalised with 44 main-gun
rounds carried in the bustle behind sliding armour
doors. E,ight main-gun rounds are stowed in a com-
parlment in the hull and three more on the turet floor,
protected by spall plates. In the event of a hit, the blast
of the explosion is vented upwards and out of the
bustle by specially constructed blowout plates, thus
directing the detonating rounds away from the crew
compafiment. During operational tests at the Aber-
deen Proving Ground, a prototype XMI was fully
loaded with fuel and ammunition and subjected to
various types of fire . Not only was it not destroyed it
was later driven away under its own power.
,.G
' ** -*E:
a:i- 'TA,_- b
==tri.. 4:=:" - ...:.:;trfi5,..
ABRAMSM1 MBT
Although the shape of the turret is aimed at achiev-
ing a low silhouette over the hull, allowances for the
crew's comfort and efficiency have prevented it from
reaching the close-fitting dome shape of Soviet tanks .
Moreover, there are resulting high-explgsive pockets
in front and at the sides, especially when the turret is
traversed. The ability of the tank cre-iv to work
efficiently within the confines of an armoured vehicle
underdifficult conditions is of the greatest importance
on the battle{ield. The problem is to ensure that the
tank's combat efliciency is not seriously impaired,
and that costs do not become prohibitively expensive.
The Soviet-built tanks of the Warsaw Pact are reliable
and tough battlefield vehicles - as well as being
relatively easy to produce - but the strains involved in
operating them are considerable and would almost
cerlainly have adverse consequences during sus-
tained combat
The driver's position is situated at the front centre
of the tank and is operated from a semi-reclining
position when drivrng with the hatch closed. Steering
is done by a rotating motorcycle-type T-bar which
actuates the steering lever, with grips forthrottle and
t'uel management. A centre periscope and image
intensification periscope for night driving rs
provided.
.-
KEYWEAPONS

Above: The XM1 prototype
painted with the 1976
camouflage colour scheme
in preparation for combat
trials.
One of the most crucial questions arising on the The M t has yet to prove itself in combat, but given
present validity of the M1 is the ef'fectiveness of its its sophisticated electronic equipment, good armour
gun. While the fire-control system and advanced protection and when armed with a 120mm main gun it
optical equipment may well ensure a high rate of should be a match for any main battle tank.
lirst-hits at medium ranges, it remains debatable
whether the present 105mm gun. even with its ad-
vanced ammunition, will cope with the frontal :Abrams::M},M.ain Battle Tank,.,
arnour of the Soviet T64 and T72 tanks. However"
,CrgW4 .. ,
the adoption of l20mm smooth-bore gun should .-.... ..., ', .r .r ....',.. ...

improve the battlefield effectiveness of the M I.

Dirhensisns:Lensthlsun:included)'9,77m{32ft1;,:,
width 3,65m1,1 ft 11 1 i n );..r h Big ht .?. 8s m eties Pft li nl
Two more criticisms that have been levelled at the 11

bs},
V{eig ht Co mbat l oaded 54,432kss il 1 9r050l .:
M I are poor engine reliabil ity and high fuel consump- EngirieAto0:lySqmingAGT]T,1So0HP.c'gas i' :r:a rr:
tion. Exhaustive field testing seems to have proved rt:qrbine'developing,r! 500hp'at',3000rp.rfl :,'', :'r.,',
the reliabiliry of the Avco-Lycoming turbine, although
information is far lrom complete. Tactical advantages :Pei{ormlneB:Maximu:m i{radr$peed:7?kfilh, .',
outweigh the increased fuel consumption, especially 145mpt1; 61u*ilruiiiioss.coiiniryspead S0krnlh r
(3llrnpli); i6ngeliaad)450km,1280mjles); vertieal, .:
in close ormedium-range battle situations that would be
likely to develop in central Europe, where movement
obstacLe'l :24m {
t;'trencb?r?4m {9ftI: gradient.60
rpereeni; {oidiiiE r22m,.{4ft}; With kit2;36m,{fii 9in)
:1

is limited and staying power is emphasised. In fact,

although the M1 was developed to meet American Almouich ob'hqn1 qa rnBq Und,-tv:pe' 0 h d :S pa ced ; :

worldwide requirements, it will prove a highly effbc- detailsalassified r,: .. r:,r :r:,'
tive weapon on the European battlefleld sl-rould war AimamdntOrre1105mm M6B gun:{55 founda}i one
break out between the Warsaw Pact and Nato. Along- .7;62mn.tmachi$aguniCoiaxja.lrwith..rna'inr, .',,r,.,',.. .:

side the German Leopard and the British Chieftain
and Challenger tanks the Ml would become a central
element in Nato's ability to block the Soviet tank
armafidnti,dne,12,7nirn:,nrachirieg0nen:'1 -',':
:Comirrander.g Cqpdla; one 7:62rnmmachine g!]ni
rno.unted byload:eris haleh; six$moke diaohaigei$
o h, eithqr side of !.uir,el as well, aq,:i nte g ral Sm a-ke',. '

assault and, ofcourse, would form the spearhead of :9.enQr4!O:!.$.'.....' . ,:

r, ,...:, ,',:
any Nato armoured counter thrusts.

A f irst in tank engine development, the

Avco-Lycoming gas turbine has aroused
considerable interest in tank-design circles. lf the
eng ine proves a success for the Americans then the
lsraeli IDF maywell installthe turbine in the
Merkava MBTwhen it is due for upgrading.
Although residual doubts still remain regarding its
battlefield reliability, its advantages are many. Ease
of maintenance is a particularfeature and it has
been claimed thatthe complete engine can be
replaced in less than half-an-hour. A great
advantage of the eng ine is that it allows a variety of
fuelsto be used, including petrol, diesel and even
jetfuel. During confused campaign operations such
flexibility would be highly beneficiai, and * albeitto
a limited degree-would help solvethe logistical
nightmare that bedevils Nato's heterogeneous
organisational.structLr re.

+8

t I
Thctrfghtflmg siiitt "'q,u ' ,,,;

Nflem
%"'", "' ' 1
''..,i&
.*
5 rf*
- dii-

SAS
Ealklands I9U
;.
{
Trooper, Special Air Service Regiment, 1982

Britain's elite undercover force the SAS has

always worn a diverse variety of equipment and
dress as can be seen from this figure. The basic
uniform consists of an SAS smock and Royal
Marine issue DPM (disruptive pattern material)
trousers. Besides the personalised belt kit,
The photograph above shows
another unusual feature is the black wool balacla-
va helmet, widely used by the SAS for'behind- an SAS trooper laying an
the-lines' operations of the type encountered in explosive charge; his FN SLR
the Falklands. This trooper is armed with a US- rifle is camouflaged with
sackin g - a co m m o n p ractice
built 5.56mm Colt 'Commando' XM177, a cut
in the British Army.
down version of the M16 assault rifle; painted in
camouflage colours, a spare magazine is taped
onto the gun's 20-round magazine. Developed
during the Vietnam War, the XM177 is a handier
version of the M16, though its shorter barrel
makes it considerably less accurate at long
ranges.

Although this SAS trooper's kit con-
forms.to the standard British '58 pat-
tern, most soldiers evolve their own
arrangement of kit; the one illustrated
herewould betypical of thatworn dur-
ing the Falklands conflict. From the left
the items are a '58-pattern SLR pouch,
compass case, 'zl4-pattern water bottle,
US M16 ammunition pouch (used as a
small pack), British water bottle, US
water bottle holder, and another'58-
pattern SLR pouch.
Overseas read€rS: ThiS free binder offer applies to readers in the UK, Eire
and Australia only. Readers in Australia should complete the Special loose
insert in lssue 1 and see a(lclitional bincler information on the inside front
cover. Readers in New Zealand and South Africa and Some other countries
can obtain their binclers now. For cletails please see inside the front cover.