JGOM

ETHICS MODULE GUIDE Republic of the Philippines

Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vision: A premier university delivering world-class education that

promotes sustainable development amidst climate change.
Mission: To provide quality education to enhance food security,
sustainable communities, industry innovation, climate resilience, gender
equality, institutional development and partnership.
College of Social Sciences
Promote dynamic teaching and learning engagements, research and
extension activities towards climate change adaptation and resilience for
sustainable development
Produce globally competent and gender sensitive graduates imbued
with value systems in the preservation and respect of cultural and
environmental heritage.
Establish collaborative research and disseminate scholarly outputs
through relevant platforms towards innovation and product development.
Design and deliver mentoring expertise, management programs and
leadership in community affairs.

COURSE GUIDE COURSE TITLE: Ethics

The Commission on higher education had mandated
that Ethics be a general course required for all college students.
As stated in Memorandum Order No 20, series of 2013, “The
fundamental purpose of higher education …..is not only to
develop knowledgeable and competent graduates in a particular
field, but also well-rounded individuals who appreciate knowledge
in a general sense, are open-minded because of it, secure in their
identities as individuals and as Filipinos, and cognizant of their
role in the life of the nation and the larger community.” Ethics,
then, is one of the courses that will ideally contribute to the
development of your ability to comprehend the complexities of the
social and natural realities around us, as well as your ability to
think through the ethical and social implications of a given course
of actions. The module strives to be faithful to the pursuit of the
ideal.
The course ETHICS is a philosophical pursuit to
understand the realms of HUMAN ACT. It requires a deeper
perspective or deeper awareness on the dynamism of human
existence emanating on how the human person think and behave
yet with the attitude of questioning such thinking and behavior
because it is a philosophical endeavor.
The first part of this course lays the groundwork --- the
meaning of Ethics --- and leads the students through the analysis
of human experience, linking it to the elements of the ethical
dimension. The first chapter of tis module serves as our initial
discussion into the subject matter. Here, we recognize ethics as
a significant dimension of human existence, and start to explore
how we may engage in careful ethical thinking.
The second part of the course takes students through
the various classical ethical frameworks – utilitarianism,
deontological, and virtue ethics. These frameworks also embed
sets of values that students will be asked to examine. We go in-
depth through each one of these frameworks. This is in order to
arrive at an understanding of the different ways that these
theories provide us an avenue of determining ethical valuation. It
shall also include the analysis and evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of the various ethical frameworks and their value to
human life and society which involves an extensive engagement
of these classical ethical theories with the real life issues that
confront us, calling for moral deliberation. The end goal is for us
to be able to make informed decisions and judgments on
significant concerns after careful thought.
COURSE CREDIT: 3 Units
PRE-REQUISITE: None
COURSE DESCRIPTION: Principles of ethical behavior in
modern society at the level of the person, society, and in
interaction with the environment and other shared resources.
COURSE OBJECTIVES:
At the end of the course, the student is able to:
1. Identify the ethical aspect of human life, using
appropriately the terms that are relevant to ethical thinking,
and identifying the difficulties in certain commonly-held
notions on ethics.
2. Identify, engage, and critique the different ethical theories
and models such as Utilitarianism, Natural Law, Kantian
deontology, and Aristotelian Ethics.
COURSE CONTENT
Module 1: Introduction
Module 2: Cultural Relativism
Module 3: Religion and Morality
Module 4: Subjectivism
Module 5: Psychological Egoism
Module 6: Social Contract Theory
Module 7: Utilitarianism
Module 8: Deontology
Module 9: Virtue Ethics
Module10: Synthesis: Making Informed Decisions
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano,
M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for
moral valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th
Edition). New York: Random House, 1986.
 JGOM
COURSE PLAN
Weeks Topics Learning Outcomes Methodologies Assessment Tools
Week 3-8 The Ethical ➢ Identify the ethical aspect of human life ➢ Module ➢ Quiz
Dimension of and the scope of ethicalthinking. Discussion ➢ Reflection
Human ➢ Define and explain the terms that are ➢ Personal Paper
Existence relevant to ethical thinking. Reflection ➢ Case Analysis
➢ Evaluate the difficulties that are involved ➢ Case ➢ Midterm
in maintaining certain commonly-held Study examination
notions on ethics. ➢ Online
Lecture
➢ Discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ➢ Module ➢ Quiz
Week 9-10 ethics. Discussion ➢ Reflection
Utilitarianism ➢ Distinguish between two utilitarian ➢ Personal Paper
models: the quantitative model of Jeremy Reflection ➢ Case Analysis
Bentham and the qualitative model of ➢ Case
John Stuart Mill. Study
➢ Apply utilitarianism in understanding and ➢ Online
evaluating local and international Lecture
scenarios.
➢ Discuss the basic principles of ➢ Module ➢ Quiz
Week 11-12 deontology; Discussion ➢ Reflection
Deontology ➢ Apply the concepts of agency and ➢ Personal Paper
autonomy to one’s moral experience; and Reflection ➢ Case Analysis
➢ evaluate actions using the ➢ Case
universalizability test Study
➢ Online
Lecture
➢ Discuss the meaning and basic principles ➢ Module ➢ Quiz
Week 13-15 of virtue ethics. Discussion ➢ Reflection
Virtue Ethics ➢ Distinguish virtuous acts from non- ➢ Personal Paper
virtuous acts. Reflection ➢ Case Analysis
➢ Apply Aristotle’s ethics in understanding ➢ Case
the Filipino character. Study
➢ Online
lecture

Week 16-18 ➢ Identify the different factors that shape an ➢ Module ➢ Quiz
individual in her moral decision-making; Discussion ➢ Reflection
Synthesis: ➢ Internalize the necessary steps toward ➢ Personal Paper
Making making informed moral decisions; and Reflection ➢ Case Analysis
Informed ➢ Apply the ethical theories or frameworks ➢ Case ➢ Final
Decisions on moral issues involving the self, society, study Examination
and the non-human environment. ➢ Online
Lecture

CLASS RULES READINGREFERENCES

READING REFERENCES
A. Class Attendance and Participation: The students are expected to Allison, Henry. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. New York:
be present and participate during a scheduled online class. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

B. Modules and other Reading Materials: The students are expected
to read the modules together with the attached articles/reading materials.
C. Individual/Group Activities such as Quizzes, Reflection Papers
and Case Study: The students are expected to accomplish and submit
them on assigned due dates.
Crisp, Roger. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on
Utilitarianism. London: Routledge, 1997.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. The Philosophy of Moral
Development: Moral Stage and the Idea of Justice
(Essays in Moral Development, Volume 1). New York:
Harper & Row, 1981.

E. Attendance to Webinars (if there will be any): The students are Pope, Stephen J. (ed.). The Ethics of Aquinas.
expected to be present during the scheduled webinars. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002.

Wood, Allen. Kantian Ethics. New York: Cambridge

G. Midterm and Final Examinations: The students are expected to
University Press, 2007.
accomplish and submit it on assigned due dates.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
NOTE: PLEASE BE GUIDED THAT ONLINE CLASSES WILL BE
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
SUBJECT TO THE STUDENTS’ AVAILABILITY. MODULE GIVEN IS
OUR MAIN MEDIUM FOR LEARNING. COMPLIANCE OF ACTIVITIES Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics
CAN BE SENT THROUGH COURIER, ONLINE PLATFORMS E.G.
Babor E.R., Ethics; The Philosophical Discipline of Action.
FACEBOOK OR GOOGLE CLASS OR ANY WHICH IS MOST (2002) Sampaloc, Manila: Rex Bookstore.
CONVENIENT TO THE STUDENT.
Serrano F.M., Placido M., Ethics Modular Worktext for
College Students, (2017) Wise Ideas Publishing Co.
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 1: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. identify the ethical aspect of human life and 1. Ethics 8. Moral Issue
scope of ethical thinking; 2. Morality 9. Moral Decision
2. define and explain the terms that are relevant 3. Descriptive Ethics 10. Moral Judgement
to ethical thinking 4. Normative Ethics 11. Moral Dilemma
3. evaluate the difficulties that are involved in 5. Aesthetics 12. Immoral
maintaining certain commonly-held notions on 6. Etiquette 13. Amoral
ethics 7. Technical Valuation 14. Non-Moral

MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS

Valuation

Latimer
 JGOM
1.1 ETHICS AND MORAL

In August 2007, newspapers reported what seemed to be yet another sad incident of fraternity
violence. Chris Anthony Mendez, a twenty-year-old student of the University of the Philippines (UP),
was rushed to the hospital in the early morning hours, unconscious with large bruises on his chest,
back, and legs. He passed away that morning, and the subsequent autopsy report strongly suggests
that his physical injuries were most probably the result of “hazing” (the term colloquially used to refer
to initiation rites in which neophytes may be subjected to various forms of physical abuse). What
exactly happened remains an open question, as none of those who were with him that night came
forward to assume responsibility for the death of Cris.
Even the leaders of Sigma Rho fraternity denounced the death of Cris, those members of theirs
who had been with him that night vanished, avoiding and refusing to cooperate with legal authorities.
Meanwhile, UP students and the general public clamored for justice. In a move that surprised the
student body, the UP chancellor called on all fraternities to justify their continued existence. Meanwhile,
the case of the tragic death of Cris Anthony Mendez was left unresolved. It remains that way up to this
day.
No one knows what exactly just happened. No charges have been filed, no definitive testimony has
been forthcoming. But there is more to this for us than just a criminal mystery. Ethics: Foundations for Moral
Valuation. Page 1

NAME: YEAR/SEC/COURSE:
The questions you encountered earlier which concerns good and bad, or right and wrong- and the
question concerning value- are the kind of questions that we deal with in ETHICS. As we go further, let us
first learn what ethics is and why must we study it.
 JGOM
1.1 ETHICS AND MORAL
EXPLAIN AND ELABORATE

As we proceed, we will be discussing in particular the definitions of

“ethics” and “moral”. There similarity and differences.
We will also give clarifications of using “not” when applied to the words
“moral” and “ethical” as this can be sometimes ambiguous.

ETHICS is derived from the Greek word ethicos/ethos which means custom or
character. The good thing that we should pursue and the bad thing that we
should avoid; the right ways in which we could or should act and the wrong ways of acting. It is about what
is acceptable and unacceptable in human behavior. Ethics is also called MORAL PHILOSOPHY however,
Morality and Ethics has differences which will be illustrated by the table shown below.
Table 1.
Ethics Morality
Similarity Table 1. implies that any one can
Comes from the Greek word Comes from the Latin be ethical but not actually moral.
ethos/ethicos which means word mos/moris which For example, Ana memorized the
custom. means custom. Ten Commandments in the bible and she
knows how to explain it well. However,
Custom means long established practice among her friend John sees Ana as a hypocrite
people in particular group or place because she does not practice what it says
Differences
in the commandments. We can say that
• a theoretical science • The application Ana is Ethical but not Moral. But again, we
of good and bad or of ethics.
should remember that it does not
right and wrong • Translates
actions. necessarily mean that when you are
theories into
• provides principles real action. religious then you are ethical or moral
on the morality of *Morality is nothing because religion does not always equate
human acts else but a doing of with ethics and morality. This will be
• equips man with a ethics. further discussed on the latter part of this
(theoretical) module.
knowledge of the
morality of the
human acts. Concerning “ethics” and
*Ethics does not actually “morality”, various thinkers and writers
guarantee that man will be posits a distinction between these two
moral. and they may have good reasons for
doing so, but there is no consensus as to

MORAL how to make that distinction. Ordinary

conversation presents a much less rigid
distinction between these terms, and in
this module, we will lean in that direction,

PHILOSOPHY
we will be using the terms “ethical” and
moral” (likewise, “ethics” and
“morality”) interchangeably.
The study of what morality is and what it requires of us.
As Socrates said, it’s about “how we ought to live”—and
why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is, but
unfortunately we cannot. There are many rival theories, each expounding a different conception of what
it means to live morally, and any definition that goes beyond Socrates’s simple formulation is bound to
offend at least one of them.
 JGOM
1.1 ETHICS AND MORAL
NON-MORAL, AMORAL, AND IMMORAL

Non-Moral Act or Not Ethical

• areas of interest where moral categories
cannot be applied. These actions come out
naturally as part of our human nature.
INSERT PICTURE
Ex: Snoring while sleeping.

Amoral Act or Not Ethical

• areas of interest exhibiting indifference. At
times, these are manifested in the absence
of knowledge, freedom and voluntariness
on the part of the acting agent.

Ex: A young child who is picking a fight.

Immoral Act or Unethical

• areas of interest where moral categories do INSERT PICTURE
apply and are considered to be evil, sinful,
or wrong according to the code of ethics.

Ex: Cheating during examinations.

 JGOM
1.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ETHICS

DESCRIPTIVE study of ethics reports NORMATIVE study of ethics, as is

how people, particularly groups, make their moral
valuations without making any judgement either
for or against these valuations. This kind of study
is often the work of the social scientist:
Examples:
➢ A historian (studying different moral
standards overtime)
➢ A sociologist on an anthropologist
(studying different moral standards
across cultures).
➢ Noting how filial piety and obedience are
pervasive characteristics of Chinese
culture.
often done in philosophy or moral theology,
engages the question: What could or should be
considered as the right way of acting? In other
words, a normative discussion prescribes what
we ought to maintain as our standards or bases
for moral valuation. Ethics as a normative
philosophical science, is a theoretical science of
good and bad or right and wrong. So ethics
provides principles on the morality of human
acts; it equips man with a (theoretical)
knowledge of the morality of human acts.
Example:
➢ Studying how Confucian ethics enjoins
us to obey our parents and to show filial
piety.

A philosophical study of morality is very different from a sociological or anthropological study, or

a study from the perspective of biology or psychology. One important difference is that in moral
philosophy we do not distance ourselves from our own moral views in the way we would if we were
engaged in a study of one of these other kinds. We do not take the fact that people, including ourselves,
have moral views as merely a datum to be explained. Our goal is not merely to explain data of this kind,
whether it be the distribution of moral beliefs and attitudes, or the occurrence of selfish or altruistic actions.
Rather, in moral philosophy, the correctness or cogency or defensibility of moral claims, convictions, and
attitudes, and the probity of various behaviors, are among the things at issue.

We need to go further. A philosophical discussion of ethics goes beyond recognizing the

characteristics of some descriptive theory; also, it does not simply accept as correct any normative theory.
A philosophical discussion of ethics engages in critical consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of
these theories. This will be our primary concern throughout this module.

Ethics teaches us how to know: 2. Prohibitions that we are required to respect.

1. Obligations that we are expected to fulfill. • Prohibitions are powerful, (theoretically)

• To be under an obligation signifies being tied,
required, or to do (or from doing) something
by virtue of a moral rule, a duty, or some other
binding demand. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2 ed.)
• For example, at home, you have the obligation
to obey your parents. When they say you have
to wash the dishes, you will act on it. Why do
you do it then? Simply because you believe
that obeying your parents, ACT OF DOING
WHAT THEY WANT YOU TO DO, makes you
a good child.
enforceable, and sanctionable social and/or
legal restrictions on certain behaviours,
events, or other activities—including, for
example, sexual ‘deviations’, drug-taking or
trafficking, and trade in endangered species. A
Dictionary of Sociology (4 ed.)
• This could be understood as to the action that
we should not do because a certain
punishment will take place if we will.
• For example, your parents told you not to
have a boyfriend/girlfriend at your age so you
obeyed them by NOT DOING THE ACT, thus
makes you a good child.

3. Ideals that we are encouraged to meet.
• Ideals mean standard of perfection or
excellence. Dictionary.com
• A conception of something that is perfect
…that attempts to reproduce the best of
nature, but also to improve on it, eliminating
the inevitable flaws of particular examples.
The Oxford Companion to the Mind (2 ed.)
• Going back to your obligation on washing the
dishes, we think that doing the act makes us
already a good child however we should
remember that the process of doing the act
should also be good. It should be ideal.
JGOM
• It means that you are washing the dishes by
not showing that you don’t like what you are
doing. Minsan nagdadabog ka kapag
naghuhugas ka. Tama ba yun? Is it good to
throw tantrums while obeying your parents?
This simply means that you don’t just have
to wash the dishes but to wash it excellently
because by doing so shows that you are
excellently obeying your parents.
4. Values with particular and special significance
to human life.
The principles by which individuals or
social groups are supposed to conduct
themselves and/or which denote WHAT IS
IMPORTANT. A Dictionary of Human Geography

ACTIVITY 2. CUT!

Ethics, generally speaking is about matters as the good things that

we should pursue and the bad thing that we should avoid; the right
ways in which we could or should act and the wrong ways of acting.
It is about what is acceptable and unacceptable in human behavior.
It may involve obligations that we are expected to fulfill,
prohibitions that we are required to respect, or ideals that we are
encouraged to meet. Ethics as a subject for us to study is about
determining the grounds for the values with particular and special
significance to human life.

Your task now is to identify a list of: (a) obligations you are expected to fullfill, (b) prohibitions
you are required to respect, and (c) ideals that you are encouraged to meet. Discuss whether
this are ethical in nature or not.

ANSWER:

NAME: YEAR/SEC/COURSE:
 JGOM
1.3 VALUE AND KINDS OF VALUATION

Values are our fundamental beliefs. They are the principles we use to define that which is right, good
and just. Values provide guidance in determining the right versus the wrong, the good versus the bad. They
are our standards. Another way to characterize values is the that they are what an individual believes to be
of worth and importance to their life. It should be noted that values do not encompass all beliefs; just the
beliefs that define importance and worth. Moreover, values are our motivations behind our purposeful actions.
They are the ends to which we act. Values entail a relationship between a person and a goal. It can be said
that a valuer or a particular person who wants to achieve something. A thing cannot have a value in itself. It
only gains its value when a person acts to achieve it. Thus, value is always relational. Consider the word
“evaluate”. When we evaluate something we compare it to a standard. We determine whether it meets that
standard or falls short. To evaluate is to determine the merit of a thing or an action as compared to a standard.

1. Ethics/ Moral Valuation 2. Etiquette

• Values that we attribute to a system of
beliefs that help the individual define right
versus wrong, good versus bad. The good
thing that we should pursue and the bad
thing that we should avoid; the right ways
in which we could or should act and the
wrong ways of acting. It is about what is
acceptable and unacceptable in human
behavior.
Example: A father being a good dad by
protecting his child from danger.
• sense of approval or disapproval
concerning certain actions which can be
considered relatively more trivial in nature.
• concerned with right and wrong actions,
but those which is not considered not
grave enough to belong to the discussion
on ethics.
• to clarify this point, we can differentiate
how I may be displeased seeing a healthy
young man refuse to offer his seat on the
bus to an elderly lady, but my indignation
and shock would be much greater if I were
to see a man deliberately push another
one out of moving bus.

Example: Saying “po” at “opo” to

someone older than you.
Mahal kita,
anak!

Magandang
umaga po,
Maam Ji!
 JGOM
1.3 VALUE AND KINDS OF VALUATION

3. Aesthetics 4. Technical valuation

• derived from the Greek word aesthesis
(sense or feeling)
• refers to the judgements of personal
approval or disapproval that we make
about what we see, hear, smell, or taste.
• for instance, I could say that this new
movie I had just seen was a “good” one
because I enjoyed it, or a song I had just
heard on the radio was a “bad” one
because it had an unpleasant tone, but
these are not part of the discussion of
ethics. I may have an opinion as to what is
the “right” dip (sawsawan) for my chicken
barbecue, or I may maintain that it is
wrong “wrong” to wear a leather vest over
a Barong tagalog
• derived from the greek word techne, in
English words technique and technical
which often used to refer to a proper way
or right way of doing things.
• right and wrong technique of doing things
• for instance, I am told that the right thing
to do would be to mix the dry ingredients
first such as flour or sugar before bringing
in any liquids, like milk or cream; this is the
right to do in baking, but not one that
belongs to a discussion of ethics.
Example: The correct way of playing
basketball.

Example: Saying that the ramen is good

because it tastes delicious. Ganito ang
tamang pagshoot
ng bola.

Sarap!

Recognizing the characteristics of aesthetic and technical valuation allows us to have a rough guide
as to what belongs to a discussion of ethics. They involve valuations that we make in a sphere of human
actions, characterized by certain gravity and concern the human well-being or human life itself. Therefore,
matters that concern life and death such as war, capital punishment, or abortion and matters that concern
human well-being such as poverty, inequality, or sexual identity are often included in discussions of ethics.
However, this general description is only a starting point and will require further elaboration.
One complication that can be noted is that the distinction between what belongs to ethics and what
does not is not always clearly defined. At times, the question of what is grave or trivial is debatable and
sometimes some of the most heated discussions in ethics could be on the fundamental question of whether
a certain sphere of human activities belongs to this discussion. Are clothes always just a matter of taste or
would provocative clothing call for some kind of moral judgement? Can we say that a man who verbally
abuses his girlfriend is simply showing bad manners or does this behavior deserve stronger moral
condemnation?
 JGOM
1.4 MORAL VALUATION

MORALITY AND HUMAN EXISTENCE

1. Man as Animal
• Uses senses (sentient) and instinct.
• Looking at table 2 below, it is clear that
brutes and ordinary grades of animals do
acquire knowledge through their senses.
Their senses, undoubtedly, are indispensable
medium of knowledge. As an animal, man
also acquires knowledge through his senses.
• By appetency, we mean the drive to seek or to
strive for something. Brutes and ordinary forms
of animals are driven to seek for something out
of their instincts. Instincts are natural biological
drives of animals. Thus, man, being an animal is also a subject of these drives. Just like any
other animal, man desires food when hungry and seeks water when thirsty. There are of
course manifold kinds of psychological drives or instinctive drives. Sex is one of them. An
inasmuch as man is an animal, he is also subject to the instinctive sexual drive.
• In this given schema, nothing special can be said of man. He is just like any of the other
forms of animals. If we rely on this, man cannot be conceived of as a moral agent. His
animality does not give him license to be moral.
TABLE 2.

KNOWLEDGE: SENSES

ANIMAL APPETENCY: INSTINCT

MAN KNOWLEDGE: SENSES

AND INTELLECT

RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: INSTINCT

AND WILL

2. Man as Rational Animal

• Does not just simply perceive things but also
intellectualizes things.
• It is his being rational animal that makes a man.
It is only in this context that man’s being rational that
that makes him a unique grade of animal. Being
rational, man’s knowledge does not stop in the
senses since his sensual knowledge (perception) is
further “processed” by his intellectual abstraction.
• As rational animal, capable of reasons, man strives
for something not only through his instincts, but
also through his will. It is true man has instincts
drives, but man can transcend all these drives into a higher degree. Man, therefore, is capable of
injecting a dose of his discipline to his physiological drives because he has intellect and will.
 JGOM
1.4 MORAL VALUATION

3. Man is the only Moral Being

a. Man is a being of action.
• Man acts and knows his acts. Because he
knows he acts, he knows he is responsible
for his actions.
b. Man has intellect.
• His intellect enables him to know, what is right
Or wrong and good or bad actions. Because
He is capable of knowing, he is therefore man-
Dated to face the consequences of his actions.
Morons, idiots, imbeciles, insane persons, and
The like are not moral agents. The same thing
Can be said of infants and children who have not yet reached the age of reason.
c. Man has will.
• Man is free to act or not to act. Man’s will equips man with the power to choose either
good bad and right or wrongs actions. It is his will that enables him to enjoy freedom to
choose what course of action to perform. Man’s will, therefore, requires of man a decision
which obligates him to be responsible for the consequences of his actions.
TABLE 3.
Because man is a moral being, man possesses
INTELLECT WILL intellect and will. Through his intellect, man
knows and can know right or wrong actions.
Through his will man can choose between good
Wisdom Highest Goal Virtue or bad actions.

Man’s intellect makes him capable of

Truth Goal Good understanding right or wrong actions; his will
makes him capable of doing his choice, either
Thinking Function Doing good or bad actions.

Man’s intellect enables him to search for truth

Knowing Purpose Choosing while his will, for good. When man is in
possession of truth then he can practice what
he knows (wisdom) while his exercise of good makes him virtuous. In the fundamental moral option
between right or wrong good and good or bad actions, man is will-bound to choose what is right and what
is good. This is the moral command demanded in ethics. But, whether or not man opts for what is wrong
and what is bad, he still remains a moral being, since he has freedom.

HUMAN ACTS VS. ACTS OF MAN

Human Acts Acts of Man

• These acts are under the control of will • These are bodily actions performed
and therefore done knowingly and without deliberation and in the absence of
willingly; not acts which happen by will.
accident, as falling, or by nature, as
growing, but acts performed by choice, Ex: Palpitation of the heart, sneezing or
that is, after deliberation and decision. breathing patterns.
They are imputable to their human author
to the extent that he has knowledge of his
own activity and its import, and to the
extent that he has freedom of election.

Ex: Studying a lesson in Ethics.


Reasoning
Why do we suppose that a certain way of
acting is right and its opposite wrong? The study of
ethics is interested in questions like these: Why do
we decide to consider this way of acting as
acceptable while that way of acting, its opposite, is
unacceptable? To put it in another way, what
reasons do we give to decide or to judge that a
certain way of acting is either right or wrong?
A person’s fear of punishment or desire for
reward can provide him a reason for acting in a
certain way. It is common to hear someone say: “I
did not cheat on the exam because I was afraid that
I might get caught,” or “I looked after my father in the
hospital because I wanted to get a higher
allowance.” In a certain sense, fear of punishment
and desire for reward can be spoken of as giving
someone a “reason” for acting in a certain way. But
the question then would be: Is this reason good
enough? That is to say, this way of thinking seems
to be a shallow way of understanding reason
because it does not show any true understanding of
why cheating on an exam is wrong or why looking
after a member of my family is in itself a good thing.
The promise of rewards and the fear of punishments
can certainly motivate us to act, but are not in
themselves a determinant of the rightness or
wrongness of a certain way of acting or of the good
or the bad in a particular pursuit. It is possible to find
better reasons for finding a certain way of acting
either acceptable or unacceptable?
I am in a situation wherein I could obtain a
higher grade for myself by cheating. I make the
decision not to do so. Or I know that my friend was
in a position to get a better grade for herself by
cheating. She refuses to do so; I then make the
judgement of praising her for this. In making this kind
of moral decision or moral judgement, the question
can be asked: Why?
Asking the question “why” might bring us to
no more than a superficial discussion of rewards and
punishments, as seen above, but it could also bring
us to another level of thinking. Perhaps one can rise
above, but it could also bring us to another level of
thinking. Perhaps one can rise above the particulars
of a specific situation, going beyond whatever
motivation or incentive is present in this instance of
cheating (or not doing so). In other words, our
thinking may take on a level of abstraction, that is,
detaching itself from the particular situation and
arriving at a statement like, “Cheating is wrong”, by
by recognizing proper reasons for not acting in this
way. Beyond rewards and punishments, it is
possible for our moral valuation- our decisions and
judgements- to be based on principles.
JGOM
1.4 MORAL VALUATION
Thus, one may conclude that cheating is wrong
based on a sense of fair play or a respect for the
importance and validity of testing. From this, we can
define principles as rationally established grounds
by which one justifies and maintains her moral
decisions and judgements.
But why do we maintain one particular
principle rather than another? Why should I maintain
that I should care for fair play and that cheating is,
therefore, wrong? Returning to the case of fraternity
hazing where we started this chapter, why is it wrong
to cause another person physical injury or take
another’s life? We can maintain principles, but we
can also ask what good reasons for doing so. Such
reasons may differ. So, for example, what makes the
death of Cris such a tragedy? One person may say
that life is sacred and God-given. Another person
may declare that human life has a priceless dignity.
Still another may put forward the idea that taking
another’s life does not contribute to human
happiness but to human misery instead. How exactly
do we arrive at any of these claims? This is where
we turn to theory. A moral theory is a systematic
attempt to establish the validity of maintaining
certain moral principles. Insofar as a theory is a
system of thought or of ideas, it can also be referred
to as a framework. We can use this term,
“framework”, as a theory of interconnected ideas,
and at the same time, a structure through which we
can evaluate our reasons for valuing a certain
decision or judgement.
Ethics or Moral philosophy is the study of
what morality is and what it requires of us. As
Socrates said, it’s about “how we ought to live”—and
why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a
simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is,
but unfortunately we cannot. There are many rival
theories, each expounding a different conception of
what it means to live morally, and any definition that
goes beyond Socrates’s simple formulation is bound
to offend at least one of them. There are different
frameworks that can make us reflect on the
principles that we maintain and thus, the decisions
and judgements we make. By studying these, we
can reconsider, clarify, modify, and ultimately
strengthen our principles, thereby informing better
both our moral judgements and moral decisions.
This should make us cautious, but it need not
paralyze us. In this module, we will describe the
“minimum conception” of morality. As the name
suggests, the minimum conception is a core that
every moral theory should accept, at least as a
starting point.
 JGOM
1.4 MORAL VALUATION
Moral Issue, Moral Judgement, Moral Decision, Moral Dilemma

Moral Issue Moral Dilemma

• A situation that calls for moral valuation. • refers to the matter of choosing right over
• refers to those particular situations that are wrong, or good over bad, and considering
often the source of considerable and instead the more complicated situation
inconclusive debate. wherein one is torn between choosing one
of two goods or choosing between the lesser
Ex: Capital punishment and euthanasia of two evils.
(There is two opposing ideas) • a person is experiencing moral dilemma
when she/he can choose only one from a
Moral Decision number of possible actions, and there are
• refers to the choice of what act to perform. compelling ethical reasons for the various
choices.
Ex: You choose not to take something you • are not in themselves a determinant of
did not pay for. the rightness or wrongness of certain way
of acting or of the good or the bad in a
Moral Judgement particular pursuit.
• refers to a person who makes an
assessment on the actions or behavior of Ex: Your mother may be conflicted between
someone wanting to feed you, but recognizing that it
would be wrong for her to steal.
Ex: Your friend chooses to cheat just to
pass your ethics subject and you made an
assessment that what your friend did is TABLE 4.
wrong.
HEINZ DILEMMA
In Europe, a woman was near death from
cancer. One drug might save her, a form of
radium that a druggist in the same town had
Can you identify the moral issue,
recently discovered. The druggist was charging
moral judgement, the moral decision and
moral dilemma in the story illustrated in $2,000, ten times what the drug cost him to make.
Table 4? The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to
everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he
(a) Moral Issue: The issue in the story would could only get together about half of what it cost.
be the rightness and wrongness of He told the druggist that his wife was dying and
STEALING. Some people might say that it is asked him to sell it cheaper or let him to sell it
okay for Heinz to steal the radium as so that cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said,
he could save his wife. However, some “No.” The husband got desperate and broke into
people might say that stealing will never be the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.
right because it is against the law or against Should the husband have done that? Why?
the teaching of their religion. How about you?
Is stealing right considering Heinz’ situation
or is it wrong?
(b) Moral Decision: With Heinz’ desperation to save his wife from death, he chose to steal the
radium.
(c) Moral Judgement: Since Heinz’ chose to steal, it can be implied that for him it is right or
acceptable so long as he can save his wife from death.
(d) Moral Dilemma: Is it okay for Heinz to steal knowing that he might end up going to jail or
sacrifice himself to steal just to let her wife have the drug to cure her sickness and live?

As a student, have you thought of what might actually be your respond

when you’re in Heinz’ position?

1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER
Baby Theresa
Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, an infant known to
the public as “Baby Theresa,” was born in Florida in
1992. Baby Theresa had anencephaly, one of the
worst genetic disorders. Anencephalic infants are
sometimes referred to as “babies without brains,” but
that is not quite accurate. Important parts of the
brain—the cerebrum and cerebellum—are missing,
as is the top of the skull. The brain stem, however, is
still there, and so the baby can breathe and possess
a heartbeat. In the United States, most cases of
anencephaly are detected during pregnancy, and
the fetuses are usually aborted. Of those not
aborted, half are stillborn. Only a few hundred are
born alive each year, and they usually die within
days.
Baby Theresa’s story is remarkable only because
her parents made an unusual request. Knowing that
their baby would die soon and could never be
conscious, Theresa’s parents volunteered her
organs for immediate transplant. They thought that
her kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, and eyes should go
to other children who could benefit from them. Her
physicians agreed. Thousands of infants need
transplants each year, and there are never enough
organs available. But Theresa’s organs were not
taken, because Florida law forbids the removal of
organs until the donor has died. By the time Baby
Theresa died, nine days later, it was too late—her
organs had deteriorated too much to be harvested
and transplanted.
Baby Theresa’s case was widely debated. Should
she have been killed so that her organs could have
been used to save other children? A number of
professional “ethicists”—people employed by
universities, hospitals, and law schools, who get paid
to think about such things—were asked by the press
to comment. Most of them disagreed with the
parents and physicians. Instead, they appealed to
time-honored philosophical principles to oppose
taking the organs. “It just seems too horrifying to use
people as means to other people’s ends,” said one
such expert. Another explained: “It’s unethical to kill
person A to save person B.” And a third added:
“What the parents are really asking for is, Kill this
dying baby so that its organs may be used for
someone else. Well, that’s really a horrendous
proposition.”
JGOM
Is it horrendous? Opinions were divided. These
ethicists thought so, while the parents and doctors
did not. But we are interested in more than what
people happen to believe. We want to know what’s
true. Were the parents right or wrong to volunteer
their baby’s organs for transplant? To answer this
question, we have to ask what reasons, or
arguments, can be given on each side. What can be
said for or against the parents’ request?
The Benefits Argument.
The parents believed that Theresa’s organs were
doing her no good, because she was not conscious
and was bound to die soon. The other children,
however, could be helped. Thus, the parents seem
to have reasoned: If we can benefit someone
without harming anyone else, we ought to do so.
Transplanting the organs would benefit the other
children without harming Baby Theresa. Therefore,
we ought to transplant the organs.
Is this correct? Not every argument is sound. In
addition to knowing what arguments can be given for
a view, we also want to know whether those
arguments are any good. Generally speaking, an
argument is sound if its assumptions are true and the
conclusion follows logically from them. In this case,
the argument has two assumptions: that we should
help someone if no harm would come of it, and that
the transplant would help the other children without
harming Theresa. We might wonder, however, about
the claim that Theresa wouldn’t be harmed. After all,
she would die, and isn’t being alive better than being
dead? But on reflection, it seems clear that, in these
tragic circumstances, the parents were right. Being
alive is a benefit only if you can carry on activities
and have thoughts, feelings, and relations with other
people—in other words, if you have a life. Without
such things, biological existence has no value.
Therefore, even though Theresa might remain alive
for a few more days, it would do her no good.
The Benefits Argument, therefore, provides a
powerful reason for transplanting the organs. What
arguments exist on the other side?
The Argument That We Should Not Use People
as Means.
The ethicists who opposed the transplants offered
two arguments. The first was based on the idea that
it is wrong to use people as means to other people’s

1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER
ends. Taking Theresa’s organs would be using her
to benefit the other children; therefore, it should not
be done.
Is this argument sound? The idea that we should not
“use” people is appealing, but this idea is vague.
What exactly does it mean? “Using people” typically
involves violating their autonomy —their ability to
decide for themselves how to live their own lives,
according to their own desires and values. A
person’s autonomy may be violated through
manipulation, trickery, or deceit. For example, I may
pretend to be your friend, when I am only interested
in going out with your sister; or I may lie to you so
you’ll give me money; or I may try to convince you
that you would enjoy going to a movie, when, really,
I only want you to give me a ride. In each case, I am
manipulating you in order to get something for
myself. Autonomy is also violated when people are
forced to do things against their will. This explains
why “using people” is wrong; it is wrong because it
thwarts their autonomy.
Taking Baby Theresa’s organs, however, could not
thwart her autonomy, because she has no
autonomy—she cannot make decisions, she has no
desires, and she cannot value anything. Would
taking her organs be “using her” in any other morally
significant sense? We would, of course, be using her
organs for someone else’s benefit. But we do that
every time we perform a transplant. We would also
be using her organs without her permission. Would
that make it wrong? If we were using them against
her wishes, then that would be a reason for
objecting—it would violate her autonomy. But Baby
Theresa has no wishes.
When people are unable to make decisions for
themselves, and others must step in, there are two
reasonable guidelines that might be adopted. First,
we might ask, What would be in their own best
interests? If we apply this standard to Baby Theresa,
there would be no problem with taking her organs,
for, as we have already noted, her interests will not
be affected. She is not conscious, and she will die
soon no matter what.
The second guideline appeals to the person’s own
preferences: We might ask, If she could tell us what
she wants, what would she say? This sort of thought
is useful when we are dealing with people who have
preferences (or once had them) but cannot express
them—for example, a comatose patient who signed
JGOM
a living will before slipping into the coma. But, sadly,
Baby Theresa has no preferences about anything,
nor has she ever had any. So we can get no
guidance from her, even in our imaginations. The
upshot is that we are left to do what we think is best.
The Argument from the Wrongness of Killing.
The ethicists also appealed to the principle that it is
wrong to kill one person to save another. Taking
Theresa’s organs would be killing her to save others,
they said; so, taking the organs would be wrong.
Is this argument sound? The prohibition against
killing is certainly among the most important moral
rules. Nevertheless, few people believe it is always
wrong to kill—most people think there are
exceptions, such as killing in self-defense. The
question, then, is whether taking Baby Theresa’s
organs should be regarded as another exception.
There are many reasons to think so: Baby Theresa
is not conscious; she will never have a life; she is
going to die soon; and taking her organs would help
the other babies. Anyone who accepts this will
regard the argument as flawed. Usually, it is wrong
to kill one person to save another, but not always.
There is another possibility. Perhaps we should
regard Baby Theresa as already dead. If this sounds
crazy, bear in mind that our conception of death has
changed over the years. In 1967, the South African
doctor Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart
transplant in a human being. This was an exciting
development; heart transplants could potentially
save many lives. It was not clear, however, whether
any lives could be saved in the United States. Back
then, American law understood death as occurring
when the heart stops beating. But once a heart stops
beating, it quickly degrades and becomes unsuitable
for transplant. Thus, under American law, it was not
clear whether any hearts could be legally harvested
for transplant. So American law changed. We now
understand death as occurring, not when the heart
stops beating, but when the brain stops functioning:
“brain death” is our new end-of-life standard. This
solved the problem about transplants because a
brain-dead patient can still have a healthy heart,
suitable for transplant.
Anencephalics do not meet the technical
requirements for brain death as that term is currently
defined; but perhaps the definition should be revised
to include them. After all, they lack any hope for

1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER
conscious life, because they have no cerebrum or
cerebellum. If the definition of brain death were
reformulated to include anencephalics, then we
would become accustomed to the idea that these
unfortunate infants are stillborn, and so taking their
organs would not involve killing them. The Argument
from the Wrongness of Killing would then be moot.
On the whole, then, the arguments in favor of
transplanting Baby Theresa’s organs seem stronger
than the arguments against it.
Second Example: Jodie and Mary
In August 2000, a young woman from Gozo, an
island south of Italy, discovered that she was
carrying conjoined twins. Knowing that the health-
care facilities on Gozo couldn’t handle such a birth,
she and her husband went to St. Mary’s Hospital in
Manchester, England. The infants, known as Mary
and Jodie, were joined at the lower abdomen. Their
spines were fused, and they had one heart and one
pair of lungs between them. Jodie, the stronger one,
was providing blood for her sister.
No one knows how many sets of conjoined twins are
born each year, but the number seems to be in the
hundreds. Most die shortly after birth, but some do
well. They grow to adulthood and marry and have
children themselves. However, the outlook for Mary
and Jodie was grim. The doctors said that without
intervention the girls would die within six months.
The only hope was an operation to separate them.
This would save Jodie, but Mary would die
immediately.
The parents, who were devout Catholics, opposed
the operation on the grounds that it would hasten
Mary’s death. “We believe that nature should take its
course,” they said. “If it’s God’s will that both our
children should not survive, then so be it.” The
hospital, hoping to save Jodie, petitioned the courts
for permission to perform the operation anyway. The
courts agreed, and the operation was performed. As
expected, Jodie lived and Mary died.
In thinking about this case, we should distinguish the
question of who should make the decision from the
question of what the decision should be . You might
think, for example, that the parents should be the
ones to decide, and so the courts were wrong to
intrude. But there remains the separate question of
what would be the wisest choice for the parents (or
anyone else) to make. We will focus on that
question: Would it be right or wrong to separate the
JGOM
The Argument That We Should Save as Many as
We Can.
The rationale for separating the twins is that we
have a choice between saving one infant or letting
both die. Isn’t it plainly better to save one? This
argument is so appealing that many people will
conclude, without further thought, that the twins
should be separated. At the height of the
controversy, the
Ladies’ Home Journal commissioned a poll to
discover what Americans thought. The poll showed
that 78% approved of the operation. People were
obviously persuaded by the idea that we should save
as many as we can. Jodie and Mary’s parents,
however, believed that there is an even stronger
argument on the other side.
The Argument from the Sanctity of Human Life.
The parents loved both of their children, and they
thought it would be wrong to kill one of them even to
save the other. Of course, they were not alone in
thinking this. The idea that all human life is precious,
regardless of age, race, social class, or handicap, is
at the core of the Western moral tradition. In
traditional ethics, the prohibition against killing
innocent humans is absolute. It does not matter if the
killing would serve a good purpose; it simply cannot
be done. Mary is an innocent human being, and so
she may not be killed. Is this argument sound? The
judges who heard the case did not think so, for a
surprising reason. They denied that the operation
would kill Mary. Lord Justice Robert Walker said that
the operation would merely separate Mary from her
sister and then “she would die, not because she was
intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot
sustain her life.” In other words, the operation
wouldn’t kill her; her body’s weakness would. And
so, the morality of killing is irrelevant.
This response, however, misses the point. It doesn’t
matter whether we say that the operation caused
Mary’s death, or that her body’s weakness did.
Either way, she will be dead, and we will knowingly
have hastened her death. That’s the idea behind
the traditional prohibition against killing the innocent.
There is, however, a more natural objection to the
Argument from the Sanctity of Life. Perhaps it is not
always wrong to kill innocent human beings. For
example, such killings may be right when three
conditions are met: (a) the innocent human has no
future because she is going to die soon no matter

1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER
what; (b) the innocent human has no wish to go on
living, perhaps because she has no wishes at all;
and (c) this killing will save others, who can go on to
lead full lives. In these rare circumstances, the killing
of the innocent might be justified.
Third Example: Tracy Latimer
Tracy Latimer, a 12-year-old victim of cerebral palsy,
was killed by her father in 1993. Tracy lived with her
family on a prairie farm in Saskatchewan, Canada.
One Sunday morning while his wife and other
children were at church, Robert Latimer put Tracy in
the cab of his pickup truck and piped in exhaust
fumes until she died. At the time of her death, Tracy
weighed less than 40 pounds, and she was
described as “functioning at the mental level of a
three-month-old baby.” Mrs. Latimer said that she
was relieved to find Tracy dead when she arrived
home. She said that she “didn’t have the courage” to
do it herself.
Robert Latimer was tried for murder, but the judge
and jury did not want to treat him harshly. The jury
found him guilty of only second-degree murder and
recommended that the judge ignore the mandatory
10-year sentence. The judge agreed and sentenced
him to one year in prison, followed by a year of
confinement to his farm. But the Supreme Court of
Canada stepped in and ruled that the mandatory
sentence must be imposed. Robert Latimer entered
prison in 2001 and was paroled in 2008.
Legal questions aside, did Mr. Latimer do anything
wrong? This case involves many of the issues that
we saw in the other cases. One argument is that
Tracy’s life was morally precious, and so her father
had no right to kill her. In his defense, it may be said
that Tracy’s condition was so catastrophic that she
had no prospects of a “life” in any but a biological
sense. Her existence consisted in pointless
suffering, and so killing her was an act of mercy.
Considering those arguments, it appears that Robert
Latimer acted defensibly. His critics, however, made
other points.
The Argument from the Wrongness of
Discriminating against the Handicapped.
When the trial court gave Robert Latimer a lenient
sentence, many handicapped people felt insulted.
The president of the Saskatoon Voice of People with
Disabilities, who has multiple sclerosis, said:
JGOM
“Nobody has the right to decide my life is worth less
than yours. That’s the bottom line.” Tracy was killed
because she was handicapped, he said, and that is
unconscionable. Handicapped people should be
given the same respect and accorded the same
rights as everyone else.
What are we to make of this? Discrimination is
always a serious matter, because it involves treating
some people worse than others, for no good reason.
Suppose, for example, that a blind person is refused
a job simply because the employer doesn’t like the
idea of hiring someone who can’t see. This is no
better than refusing to hire someone because she is
Hispanic or Jewish or female. Why is this person
treated differently? Is she less able to do the job? Is
she less intelligent or less industrious? Does she
deserve the job less? Is she less able to benefit from
employment? If there is no good reason to exclude
her, then it is wrong to do so.
Should we think of the death of Tracy Latimer as a
case of discrimination against the handicapped?
Robert Latimer argued that Tracy’s cerebral palsy
was not the issue: “People are saying this is a
handicap issue, but they’re wrong. This is a torture
issue. It was about mutilation and torture for Tracy.”
Just before her death, Tracy had undergone major
surgery on her back, hips, and legs, and more
surgery was planned. “With the combination of a
feeding tube, rods in her back, the leg cut and
flopping around and bedsores,” said her father, “how
can people say she was a happy little girl?” At the
trial, three of Tracy’s physicians testified about the
difficulty of controlling her pain. Thus, Mr. Latimer
denied that Tracy was killed because of her
disability; she was killed because she was suffering
without hope of relief.
The Slippery Slope Argument.
When the Canadian Supreme Court upheld Robert
Latimer’s sentence, the director of the Canadian
Association of Independent Living Centres said that
she was “pleasantly surprised.” “It would have really
been the slippery slope, and opening the doors to
other people to decide who should live and who
should die,” she said.
Other disability advocates echoed this idea. We may
feel sympathy for Robert Latimer, it was said; we
may even think that Tracy Latimer is better off dead.
However, it is dangerous to think in this way.

1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER
If we accept any sort of mercy killing, we will slide
down a “slippery slope,” and at the bottom of the
slope, all life will be held cheap. Where will we draw
the line? If Tracy’s life is not worth protecting, what
about the lives of other disabled people? What about
the elderly, the infirm, and other “useless” members
of society? In this context, Hitler’s program of “racial
purification” is often mentioned, implying that we will
end up like the Nazis if we take the first step.
Similar “slippery slope arguments” have been used
on other issues. Abortion, in vitro fertilization (IVF),
and human cloning have all been denounced
because of what they might lead to. Sometimes, in
hindsight, it is evident that the worries were
unfounded. This has happened with IVF, a technique
for creating embryos in the lab. When Louise Brown,
the first “test tube baby,” was born in 1978, there
were dire predictions about what might be in store
for her and for society as a whole. But none of those
predictions came true, and IVF has become routine.
Since Louise Brown’s birth, over 100,000 American
couples have used IVF to have children.
Without the benefit of hindsight, however, slippery
slope arguments are hard to assess. As the old
saying goes, “It’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.” Reasonable people may
disagree about what would happen if mercy killing
were allowed in cases like Tracy Latimer’s. Those
inclined to defend Mr. Latimer may find the dire
predictions unrealistic, while those inclined to
condemn him may find the predictions sensible.
It is worth noting that slippery slope arguments are
easy to abuse. If you are opposed to something but
have no good arguments against it, you can always
make up a prediction about what it might lead to; and
no matter how implausible your prediction is, no one
can prove you wrong. That is why we should
approach such arguments with caution.
Reason and Impartiality
What can we learn from all this about the nature of
morality? For starters, we may note two points: first,
moral judgments must be backed by good reasons;
and second, morality requires the impartial
consideration of each individual’s interests.
Moral Reasoning.
The cases of Baby Theresa, Jodie and Mary, and
Tracy Latimer are liable to arouse strong feelings.
JGOM
Such feelings might be admirable; they might be a
sign of moral seriousness. However, they can also
get in the way of discovering the truth. When we feel
strongly about an issue, it is tempting to assume that
we simply know what the truth is, without even
having to consider the arguments. Unfortunately,
however, we cannot rely on our feelings, no matter
how powerful they may be. Our feelings may be
irrational; they may be the products of prejudice,
selfishness, or cultural conditioning. At one time, for
example, people’s feelings told them that members
of other races were inferior and that slavery was
God’s plan. Moreover, people’s feelings vary. In the
case of Tracy Latimer, some people feel strongly
that her father deserved a long prison term; other
people support the father passionately. But both of
these feelings cannot be correct. If we assume that
our view must be correct, simply because we hold
it, then we are just being arrogant.
Thus, if we want to discover the truth, we must let
our feelings be guided as much as possible by
reason. This is the essence of morality. The morally
right thing to do is always the thing best supported
by the arguments.
This is not a narrow point about a small range of
moral views; it is a general requirement of logic that
must be accepted by everyone. The fundamental
point is this: If someone says that you ought to do
such-and-such, then you may legitimately ask why;
and if no good reason can be given, then you may
reject the advice as arbitrary or unfounded.
In this way, moral judgments are different from
expressions of personal taste. If someone says, “I
like coffee,” she does not need to have a reason—
she is merely stating a fact about her preferences.
There is no such thing as “rationally defending” one’s
like or dislike of the taste of coffee. On the other
hand, if someone says that something is morally
wrong, he does need reasons, and if his reasons are
legitimate, then other people should accept their
force. By the same logic, if he has no good reason
for what he says, then he is simply making noise and
may be ignored.
Of course, not every reason that may be advanced
is a good reason. There are bad arguments as well
as good ones, and much of the skill of moral thinking
consists in discerning the difference. But how do we
tell the difference? How do we go about assessing
arguments? The examples we have considered
point to some answers.
The first thing is to get one’s facts straight. This may
not be as easy as it sounds. Sometimes key facts
 JGOM
1.5 THE CASE OF BABY THERESA, JODIE AND MARY AND TRACY LATIMER

are unknown. Other times, matters are so complex
that even the experts disagree. Yet another problem
is human prejudice. Often we want to believe
something because it supports our preconceptions.
Those who disapprove of Robert Latimer’s action,
for example, will want to believe the dire predictions
of the slippery slope argument, while those who
approve of his action will want to reject them. It is
easy to think of other examples: People who do not
want to give to charity often say that charities are
inefficient and corrupt, even when their evidence for
this is weak; people who dislike homosexuals may
say that gay men are all pedophiles, even though
very few are; and people who support one political
party will say that the other party is to blame for
things in Washington, even when they don’t follow
the news. The facts exist apart from our wishes, and
if we want to think intelligently, then we need to try
to see things as they are.
Next, we can bring moral principles into play. In our
examples, a number of principles were involved: that
we should not “use” people; that we should not kill
one person to save another; that we should do what
will benefit the people affected by our actions; that
every life is sacred; and that it is wrong to
discriminate against the handicapped. Most moral
arguments consist of principles being applied to
particular cases, and so we must ask whether the
principles are justified and whether they are being
applied correctly.
It would be nice if there were a simple recipe for
constructing good arguments and avoiding bad
ones. Unfortunately, there is not. Arguments can go
wrong in many ways, and we must always be open
to encountering new kinds of error. Yet this should
come as no surprise. In every field of study, the rote
application of routine methods is no replacement for
critical thinking.
why this is thought to be right. Is there something
about white people that makes them better fitted for
the highestpaying and most prestigious jobs? Are
they inherently brighter or harder working? Do they
care more about themselves and their families?
Would they benefit more from such employment? In
each case, the answer is no; and if there is no good
reason to treat people differently, then the
discrimination is unacceptably arbitrary.
The requirement of impartiality, then, is at bottom
nothing more than a rule against treating people
arbitrarily. It forbids treating one person worse than
another when there is no good reason to do so. Yet
if this explains why racism is wrong, it also explains
why some cases of unequal treatment are not racist.
Suppose a movie director were making a film about
Fred Shuttlesworth (1922–2011), the heroic African-
American civil rights leader. This director would have
a good reason not to cast Bryan Cranston in the
starring role—namely, that Cranston is white. Such
“discrimination” would not be arbitrary or
objectionable.
Did you know?
SIDE NOTE

The Requirement of Impartiality.

[PHILOSOPHY] [AXIOLOGY] [ETHICS]

Almost every important moral theory includes a

commitment to impartiality. To be impartial is to treat
everyone alike; no one gets special treatment. By
contrast, to be partial is to show favoritism.
Impartiality also requires that we not treat the
members of particular groups as inferior. Thus it
condemns forms of discrimination like sexism and
racism.
Impartiality is closely related to the idea that moral
judgments must be backed by good reasons.
Consider the racist who thinks that white people
deserve all the good jobs. He would like all the
doctors, lawyers, business executives, and so on, to
be white. Now we can ask for reasons; we can ask
 JGOM
1.6 MINIMUM CONCEPTION OF ETHICS/MORALITY
We may now state the minimum conception: Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one’s
conduct by reason—that is, to do what there are the best reasons for doing—while giving equal weight to the
interests of each individual affected by one’s action.
This paints a picture of what it means to be a conscientious moral agent. The conscientious moral
agent is someone who is concerned impartially with the interests of everyone affected by what he or she
does; who carefully sifts facts and examines their implications; who accepts principles of conduct only after
scrutinizing them to make sure they are justified; who is willing to “listen to reason” even when it means
revising prior convictions; and who, finally, is willing to act on these deliberations.
As one might expect, not every ethical theory accepts this “minimum.” This picture of the moral agent
has been disputed in various ways. However, theories that reject the minimum conception encounter serious
difficulties. This is why most moral theories embrace the minimum conception, in one form or another.

Ethics and Feelings Ethics and Law

• Ethics is not a matter of followings one’s
feelings.
• A person following his or her feelings may
recoil from doing what is right.
• In fact, feelings frequently deviate from what
is ethical.
• Some people fall into the trap of engaging in
pre-marital sex because they allow their
feelings or emotions to dominate their
rationality.
Ethics and Religion
• Ethics is not the same with religion but
speaks about it.
• Most religions, of course, advocate high
ethical standards. Yet if ethics were confined
to religion, then ethics would apply only to
religious people.
• Religion can set ethical standards and can
provide intense motivations for ethical
behavior. Ethics, however, cannot be
confined to religion nor is it the same as
religion.
HINDRANCES TO ETHICAL THINKING
Relativism
• Ethics is not the same with studying law but
is closely related to it.
• Being ethical is also not the same as
following the law. The law often incorporates
ethical standards tow which most citizens
subscribe.
• But laws, like feelings, can deviate from what
is ethical.
• What is legal is not necessarily ethical; but
what is ethical is necessarily legalizing.
For instance; gambling, divorce, abortion,
and the like can be legalized in some nations,
but they do not necessarily mean that they
are ethical.
Ethics and Society accepts
• Ethics is not the same with culture but is
closely connected to it.
• Standards of behavior in society can deviate
from what is ethical.
• If being ethical were doing “whatever society
accepts”, then to find out what is ethical, one
would have to find out what society accepts.
• Ethics is not only about etiquette or manners
like the Good Manners and Right conduct we
used to learn. Learning variety of norms is
not a guarantee of ethical evaluation.

Subjectivism

Egoism
2.4 Social Contract Theory
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 2: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. define and explain cultural relativism 1. Culture

2. identify and elaborate the five (5) claims of 2. Cultural Relativism
cultural relativism
3. evaluate the different arguments under cultural
relativism

MODULE 2: CULTURAL RELATIVISM

ESKIMOS OF THE EARLY AND MID-20TH CENTURY

Eskimos are the native people of Alaska, northern Canada, Greenland,

and northeastern Siberia, in Asiatic, Russia.The Eskimos lived in small
settlements, separated by great distances, and their customs turned out to be
very different from ours. The men often had more than one wife, and they would
share their wives with guests, lending them out for the night as a sign of
hospitality. Within a community, a dominant male might demand—and get—
regular sexual access to other men’s wives. The women, however, were free
to break these arrangements simply by leaving their husbands and taking up
with new partners—free, that is, so long as their former husbands chose not to
make too much trouble. All in all, the Eskimo custom of marriage was a volatile
practice very unlike our own custom.

Infanticide was common among Eskimos. Knud Rasmussen, an early

explorer, reported meeting one woman who had borne 20 children but had
killed 10 of them at birth. Female babies, he found, were killed more often than
males, and this was allowed at the parents’ discretion, with no social stigma
attached. Moreover, when elderly family members became too feeble, they
were left out in the snow to die. The Eskimos seemed to have little respect for
life.

For the Eskimos, infanticide is common, can we say then that it is acceptable?
 JGOM
2.1 DEFINITION OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
EXPLAIN AND ELABORATE Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th Edition).
New York: Random House, 1986.

CULTURE Our exposure to

different societies and their cultures makes us
aware that there are ways of thinking and valuing
that are different from our own, that there is in
fact a wide diversity of how different people
believe it is proper to act. There are aesthetic
differences (Japanese art vs. Indian art),
religious differences (Buddhism vs. Christianity),
and etiquette differences (conflicting behaviors
regarding dining practices). In these bases, it
may become easy to conclude that this is the
case in ethics as well. There are also various
examples that seem to bear these out: nudity can
be more taboo in one culture than in another.
Another example would be how relations
between men and women can show a wide
variety across different cultures, ranging from greater liberty and equality on one hand, to greater
inequality and a relation of dominance versus submission on the other. From the reality of diversity, it
is possible for someone to jump to the further claim that the sheer variety at work in the different ways
of valuation means there is no single universal standard for such valuations, and that thus holds true
as well in the realm of ethics. Therefore, what is ethically acceptable or unacceptable is relative to, or
that is to say, dependent on one’s culture. This position is referred to as cultural relativism.

CULTURAL
RELATIVISM
Morality differs in every society, and is a convenient
term for socially approved habits. Ruth Benedict,
PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934)
There is something appealing to this ways of
thinking because cultural relativism seems to
conform to what we experience, which is the reality
of the differences in how cultures makes their ethical
valuations. Second, by taking one’s culture as the
standard, we are provided basis for our valuations.
Third, this teaches us to be tolerant of others from
different cultures, as we realize that we are in no
position to judge whether the ethical thought or
practice of another culture is acceptable or
unacceptable. In turn, our own culture’s moral code
is neither superior to nor inferior to any other, but they would provide us the standards that are appropriate
and applicable to us. So, we would not be surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It is simple.
Just follow whatever your culture says.”
Tempting as this idea is, there are problems. In classic exposition of this topic by James Rachels, he
presents some of these difficulties. But before going further with these, let us first learn the five (5) claims of
cultural relativism.
 JGOM
2.2 FIVE (5) CLAIMS OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
1. Different societies have different moral codes.
Hello, Juan. Kaya nga
eh. Narinig ko rin yon.
Hi, Ana. Nalaman ko sa
Dito sa Pilipinas,
Ethics subject namin na
masama yon eh.
dati, okay lang ang
infanticide sa mga
Eskimos.

This is certainly true, although some values are shared by all cultures, such as the value of truth telling,
the importance of caring for the young, and the prohibition against murder. Also, when customs differ,
the underlying reason will often have more to do with the factual beliefs of the cultures than with their
values.

2. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is, if the moral code
of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right, at least within that society.

Parang ganon na
Ibig sabihin ba non,
nga. Pero sa atin
tama yon sa kanila?
dito, mali yon.

Here we must bear in mind the difference between what a society believes about morals and what is
really true. The moral code of a society is closely tied to what people in that society believe to be right.
However, that code, and those people, can be in error. Earlier, we considered the example of excision—
a barbaric practice endorsed by many societies. Consider three more examples, all of which involve the
mistreatment of women:
• In 2002, an unwed mother in Nigeria was sentenced to be stoned to death for having had sex out of
wedlock. It is unclear whether Nigerian values, on the whole, approved of this verdict, given that it was
later overturned by a higher court. However, it was overturned partly to please the international
community. When the Nigerians themselves heard the verdict being read out in the courtroom, they
shouted out their approval.
• In 2005, a woman from Australia was convicted of trying to smuggle nine pounds of marijuana into
Indonesia. For that crime, she was sentenced to 20 years in prison—an excessive punishment. Under
Indonesian law, she might have received a death sentence.
• In 2007, a woman was gang-raped in Saudi Arabia. When she complained to the police, the police
discovered in the course of their investigation that she had recently been alone with a man she was not
related to. For that crime, she was sentenced to 90 lashes. When she appealed her conviction, this
angered the judges, and they increased her sentence to 200 lashes plus a six-month prison term.
Eventually, the Saudi king pardoned her, although he said he supported the sentence she had received.
Cultural Relativism holds, in effect, that societies are morally infallible—in other words, that the morals
of a culture can never be wrong. But when we see that societies can and do endorse grave injustices,
we see that societies, like their members, can be in need of moral improvement.
 JGOM
2.2 FIVE (5) CLAIMS OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM

3. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one society’s code as better than
another’s. There are no moral truths that hold for all people at all times.
Hindi ko masasabi
yon. Siguro may
Sa tingin mo ba dahilan sila kung
masasama silang bakit nila ginagawa
tao? yon dati.

It is difficult to think of ethical principles that should hold for all people at all times. However, if we are to
criticize the practice of slavery, or stoning, or genital mutilation, and if such practices are really and truly
wrong, then we must appeal to principles that are not tethered to any particular society.

4. The moral code of our own society has no special status; it is but one among many.

Eh naniniwala tayo Tayo mismo ay may dahilan

na masama ang kung bakit bawal ang
infanticide, tingin mo infanticide. Para sa atin
mas mabuti tayo tama tayo. Pero para sa
kaysa sa kanila? Eskimos, tama rin sila.

After all, our society has no heavenly halo around its borders; our values do not have any special
standing just because they happen to be ours. However, to say that the moral code of one’s own society
“is merely one among many” seems to imply that all codes are the same—that they are all more or less
equally good. In fact, it is an open question whether a given code “is merely one among many.” That
code might be among the best; it might be among the worst.

5. It is arrogant for us to judge other cultures.

Mas mabuting respetuhin
nalang natin ang kultura
Pwede ba yon na pareho ng bawat isa.
tayong tama kahit ibang-
iba ang paninidigan natin
sa kanila?

There is much truth in this, but the point is overstated. We are often arrogant when we criticize
other cultures, and tolerance is generally a good thing. However, we shouldn’t tolerate everything.
Human societies have done terrible things, and it is progress when they stop doing those things. The
toleration of torture, slavery, and rape is a vice, not a virtue.
 JGOM
2.3 THE ARGUMENTS ON CULTURAL RELATIVISM
RACHEL’S ARGUMENT

1. We could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally
inferior to our own.

This is one of the main points stressed by Cultural Relativism—that we should never condemn a society
merely because it is “different.” However, if Cultural Relativism were true, then we would also be barred
from criticizing other, more harmful practices. For example, the Chinese government has a long history of
repressing political dissent within its own borders. At any given time, thousands of political prisoners in
China are doing hard labor, and in the Tiananmen Square episode of 1989, Chinese troops slaughtered
hundreds, if not thousands, of peaceful protesters. Cultural Relativism would preclude us from saying that
the Chinese government’s policies of oppression are wrong. We could not even say that a society that
respects free speech is better than Chinese society, for that too would imply a universal standard of
comparison. But the failure to condemn these practices does not seem enlightened; on the contrary,
political oppression seems wrong wherever it occurs. However, if we accept Cultural Relativism, then we
have to regard such practices as immune from criticism.

2. We could no longer criticize the code of our own society.

Cultural Relativism suggests a simple test for determining what is right and what is wrong: All we need
to do is ask whether the action is in line with the code of the society in question. Suppose a resident of
India wonders whether her country’s caste system—a system of rigid social hierarchy—is morally correct.
All she has to do is ask whether this system conforms to her society’s moral code. If it does, then there is
nothing for her to worry about, at least from a moral point of view. This implication of Cultural Relativism
is disturbing because few of us think that our society’s code is perfect. Rather, we can think of ways in
which it might be improved. We can also think of ways in which we might learn from other cultures. Yet
Cultural Relativism stops us from criticizing our own society’s code, and it bars us from seeing ways in
which other cultures might be better. After all, if right and wrong are relative to culture, this must be true
for our own culture, just as it is for other cultures.

3. The idea of moral progress is called into doubt. We think that at least
some social changes are for the better.

Throughout most of Western history, the place of women in society was narrowly defined. Women could
not own property; they could not vote or hold political office; and they were under the almost absolute
control of their husbands or fathers. Recently, much of this has changed, and most of us think of this as
progress. But if Cultural Relativism is correct, can we legitimately view this as progress? Progress means
replacing the old ways with new and improved ways. But by what standard do we judge the new ways as
better? If the old ways conformed to the standards of their time, then Cultural Relativism would not judge
them by our standards. Sexist 19th-century society was a different society from the one we now inhabit.
To say that we have made progress implies that present-day society is better—which is just the sort of
transcultural judgment that Cultural Relativism forbids. According to Cultural Relativism, there is only one
way to improve a society: to make it better match its own ideals. After all, those ideals will determine
whether progress has been made. No one, however, may challenge the ideals themselves, for they are by
definition correct. According to Cultural Relativism, then, the idea of social reform makes sense only in this
limited way. These three consequences of Cultural Relativism have led many people to reject it. Slavery,
we want to say, is wrong wherever it occurs, and one’s own society can make fundamental moral progress
in abolishing it. Because Cultural Relativism implies that these judgments make no sense, it cannot be
right.
 JGOM
2.3 THE ARGUMENTS ON CULTURAL RELATIVISM
BULAONG’S ARGUMENT

4. The presumption of culture as a single, clearly-defined substance or as

something fixed and already determined.
It is always possible to find examples of certain culture having a unique practice or way of life and
to distinguish it from other cultures’ practices, but it is also becoming increasingly difficult to determine what
exactly defines one’s culture.
Is my culture “Filipino”? What if I identify more with a smaller subset within this group, if for example,
I am Igorot? Is this then my culture? Why not go further and define my culture as being Kankana-ey rather
than Ibaloi? Os this then my culture? The point here precisely is the question: What am I supposed to take
as “my culture”?
We can think of many other examples that reflect the same problem. Let us say that my father is
from Pampanga and my mother is from Leyte, and I was brought up in Metro Manila: What is my culture?
On one hand, let us say that my father is American and my mother is Filipina, and I was brought up in Sand
Diego, California, but I am currently studying in a university in the Philippines: What am I supposed to take
as “my culture”?
In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a static and well-defined culture gives way to
greater flexibility and integration. One result of this is to call into question an idea like cultural relativism,
which only makes sense if one could imagine a clear-cut notion of what can be defined as my culture.
We can conclude this criticism of cultural relativism by pointing out how it is a problem in our study
of ethics because it tends to deprive us of our use of critical thought. On the positive side, cultural relativism
promotes a sense of humility, that is, urging us not to imagine that our own culture is superior to another.
Such humility, however, should go hand in hand with a capacity for a rational, critical discernment that is
truly appreciative of human values. Unfortunately, what happens in cultural relativism is that it basically
renders us incapable of discerning about the values we may wish to maintain as we are forced to simply
accept whatever or culture gives us. It keeps us from comparing and judging-either positively or negatively-
the valuations that are made by different cultures. As previously mentioned, this presumes that we can
determine culture in the first place, which becomes increasingly questionable in a transcultural world.

D I D Y O U K N O W ? SIDE NOTE

Consider again the Eskimos, who killed perfectly healthy infants, especially girls. The explanation is not that they
lacked respect for human life or that they did not love their children. An Eskimo family would always protect its
babies if conditions permitted. But the Eskimos lived in a harsh environment, where food was scarce. To quote an
old Eskimo saying: “Life is hard, and the margin of safety small.” A family may want to nourish its babies but be
unable to do so.

The Eskimos lacked birth control, and so unwanted pregnancies were common. As in many traditional societies,
THE ESKIMOS

Eskimo mothers would nurse their infants over a much longer period than mothers in our culture—for four years,
and perhaps even longer. So, even in the best of times, one mother could sustain very few children. Moreover, the
Eskimos were nomadic; unable to farm in the harsh northern climate, they had to keep moving to find food. Infants
had to be carried, and a mother could carry only one baby in her parka as she traveled and went about her outdoor
work.

Infant girls were killed more readily than infant boys for two reasons. First, in Eskimo society, the males were the
primary food providers—they were the hunters—and food was scarce. Males were thus more valuable to the
community. Second, the hunters suffered a high casualty rate, so the men who died prematurely far outnumbered
the women who died young. If male and female infants had survived in equal numbers, then the female adult
population would have greatly outnumbered the male adult population. Examining the available statistics, one writer
concluded that “were it not for female infanticide . . . there would be approximately one-and-a-half times as many
females in the average Eskimo local group as there are food-producing males.”

2.4 WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM CULTURAL RELATIVISM
First Cultural Relativism warns us, quite rightly, Second
about the danger of assuming that all of our
practices are based on some absolute rational
standard. They are not. Some of our customs are
merely conventional—merely peculiar to our
society—and it is easy to forget that. In reminding
us of this, the theory does us a service.
Consider an even more complex and controversial
example: that of monogamous marriage. In our
society, the ideal is to fall in love, get married, and
remain faithful to that one person forever. But aren’t
there other ways to pursue happiness? The advice
columnist Dan Savage lists some possible
drawbacks of monogamy: “boredom, despair, lack
of variety, sexual death and being taken for
granted.” For such reasons, many people regard
monogamy as an unrealistic goal—and as a goal
whose pursuit would not make them happy. What
are the alternatives to this ideal? Some married
couples reject monogamy by giving each other
permission to have the occasional extramarital
fling. Allowing one’s spouse to have an affair is
risky—the spouse might not come back— but
greater openness in marriage might work better
than our current system, in which many people feel
sexually trapped and, on top of that, feel guilty for
having such feelings. Other people deviate from
monogamy more radically by practicing polyamory,
which is having more than one long-term partner,
with the consent of everyone involved. Polyamory
includes group marriages such as “triads,” involving
three people, or “quads,” involving four people.
Some of these arrangements might work better
than others, but this is not really a matter of
morality. If a man’s wife gives him permission to
have an affair, then he isn’t “cheating” on her—he
isn’t betraying her trust, because she has
consented to the affair. Or, if four people want to
live together and function as a single family, with
love flowing from each to each, then there is
nothing morally wrong with that. But most people in
our society would disapprove of any deviation from
the cultural ideal of monogamy.
JGOM
lesson has to do with keeping an
open mind.
As we grow up, we develop strong feelings about
things: We learn to see some types of behavior as
acceptable, and other types as outrageous.
Occasionally we may find our feelings challenged.
Herodotus adds: For if anyone, no matter who,
were given the opportunity of choosing from
amongst all the nations of the world the set of
beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably,
after careful consideration of their relative merits,
choose that of his own country. Everyone without
exception believes his own native customs, and the
religion he was brought up in, to be the best.
Realizing this can help broaden our minds. We can
see that our feelings are not necessarily
perceptions of the truth— they may be due to
cultural conditioning and nothing more. Thus, when
we hear criticism of some element of our social
code, and we find ourselves bristling at the
suggestion, we might stop and remember this.
Then we will be more open to discovering the truth,
whatever it might be. We can understand the
appeal of Cultural Relativism, then, despite its
shortcomings. It is an attractive theory because it is
based on a genuine insight: that many of the
practices and attitudes we find natural are only
cultural products. Moreover, keeping this thought in
mind is important if we want to avoid arrogance and
be open to new ideas. These are important points,
not to be taken lightly. But we can accept them
without accepting the whole theory.
SIDE NOTE
THE ESKIMOS
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 3: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. explain religion and its connection to morality 1. Religion

2. evaluate the different arguments on religion 2. Divine Law
and morality 3. Natural Law

MODULE 3: RELIGION AND MORALITY

2.1 The Basic Idea of Ethical Subjectivism
2.2 The Denial of Value

In 1995 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

sued Judge Roy Moore of Gadsden, Alabama, for displaying
the Ten Commandments in his courtroom. Such a display, the
ACLU said, violates the separation of church and state, which
is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The voters, however,
supported Moore. In 2000, Moore successfully campaigned to
become Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, running
on a promise to “restore the moral foundation of law.” The “Ten
Commandments judge” thus became the most powerful jurist
in the state of Alabama. Moore was not through making his
point, however. In the wee hours of July 31, 2001, he had a
granite monument to the Ten Commandments installed in the
Alabama state judicial building. This monument weighed over
5,000 pounds, and anyone entering the building could not miss
it. Moore was then sued again, but the people were still behind
him: Americans supported his right to display his monument.
Yet the law disagreed. When Moore ignored a court order to
remove the monument, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary
fired him, saying that he had placed himself above the law.
Moore, however, believed that he was merely recognizing
God’s rightful place above the law. In 2012, he was again
elected Chief Justice of the state of Alabama.
 JGOM
3.1 THE PRESUMED CONNECTION OF MORALITY AND RELIGION
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
EXPLAIN AND ELABORATE Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th Edition).
New York: Random House, 1986.

RELIGION
The Good consists in always doing
what God wills at any particular
moment. Emil Brunner, THE DIVINE
IMPERATIVE (1947)

I respect deities. I do not rely upon

them. Musashi Miyamoto, at Ichijoji Temple
(ca. 1608)

Priests and ministers are assumed

to be wise counselors who will give
sound moral advice. Why are the clergy viewed in this way? The reason is not that they have proven
themselves to be better or wiser than other people—as a group, they seem to be neither better nor worse
than the rest of us. There is a deeper reason why they are seen as having special moral insight. In popular
thinking, morality and religion are inseparable; people commonly believe that morality can be understood
only in the context of religion. Thus, the clergy are assumed to be authorities on morality. It is not hard to
see why people think this. When viewed from a nonreligious perspective, the universe seems to be a
cold, meaningless place, devoid of value and purpose. In his essay “A Free Man’s Worship,” written in
1903, Bertrand Russell expresses what he calls the “scientific” view of the world: That Man is the product
of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes
and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire,
no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all
the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius,
are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s
achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not
quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.
From a religious perspective, however, things look very different. Judaism and Christianity teach that the
world was created by a loving, all-powerful God to provide a home for us. We, in turn, were created in his
image, to be his children. Thus, the world is not devoid of meaning and purpose. It is, instead, the arena
in which God’s plans are realized. What could be more natural, then, than to think of “morality” as part of
religion, while the atheist’s world has no place for values?

BR
EA
K
TI
ME
JO
KE
 JGOM
3.2 THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

DIVINE COMMAND
This is the idea that one

THEORY
is obliged to obey her
God in all things as a
foundation for ethical values. The divinity called God,
Allah, or Supreme Being commands and one is
obliged to obey her Creator. There are persons and
texts that one believes are linked to the Divine. By
listening to these figures and reading these writings,
an individual discovers how the Divine wants her to
Further, someone maintaining a more radical form of this theory might go beyond these instruments of
divine revelation and claim that God “spoke” to her directly to instruct her what to do.
Christians, Jews, and Muslims all believe that God has told us to obey certain rules of conduct.
God does not force these rules on us. He created us as free agents; so, we may choose what to do. But if
we live as we should, then we must follow God’s laws. This idea has been expanded into a theory known
as the Divine Command Theory. The basic idea is that God decrees what is right and wrong. Actions that
God commands us to do are morally required; actions that God forbids us to do are morally wrong; and all
other actions are morally neutral. This theory has a number of advantages. For one, it immediately solves
the old problem of the objectivity of ethics. Ethics is not merely a matter of personal feeling or social custom.
Whether something is right or wrong is perfectly objective: It is right if God commands it and wrong if God
forbids it. Moreover, the Divine Command Theory explains why any of us should bother with morality. Why
shouldn’t we just look out for ourselves? If immorality is the violation of God’s commandments, then there
is an easy answer: On the day of final reckoning, you will be held accountable. There are, however, serious
problems with the theory. Of course, atheists would not accept it, because they do not believe that God
exists. But there are difficulties even for believers. The main problem was identified by Plato, a Greek
philosopher who lived 400 years before Jesus of Nazareth. Plato’s books were written as conversations,
or dialogues, in which Plato’s teacher Socrates is always the main speaker. In one of them, the Euthyphro,
there is a discussion of whether “right” can be defined as “what the gods command.” Socrates is skeptical
and asks, Is conduct right because the gods command it, or do the gods command it because it is right?
This is one of the most famous questions in the history of philosophy. The British philosopher Antony Flew
(1923–2010) suggests that “one good test of a person’s aptitude for philosophy is to discover whether he
can grasp [the] force and point” of this question. Socrates’s question is about whether God makes the
moral truths true or whether he merely recognizes their truth. There’s a big difference between these
options. I know that the Burj Khalifa building in the United Arab Emirates is the tallest building in the world;
I recognize that fact. However, I did not make it true. Rather, it was made true by the designers and builders
in the city of Dubai. Is God’s relation to ethics like my relation to the Burj Khalifa building or like the relation
of the builders? This question poses a dilemma, and each option leads to trouble. First, we might say that
right conduct is right because God commands it. For example, according to Exodus 20:16, God commands
us to be truthful. Thus, we should be truthful simply because God requires it. God’s command makes
truthfulness right, just as the builders of a skyscraper make the building tall. This is the Divine Command
Theory. It is almost the theory of Shakespeare’s character Hamlet. Hamlet said that nothing is good or bad,
but thinking makes it so. According to the Divine Command Theory, nothing is good or bad, except when
God’s thinking makes it so. Thus, we would not be surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It
is simple. Just follow whatever your religion says.” However, This idea encounters several difficulties.
 JGOM
3.2 THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY
RACHEL’S ARGUMENT
1. This conception of morality is mysterious.
What does it mean to say that God “makes” truthfulness right? It is easy enough to understand how
physical objects are made, at least in principle. We have all made something, if only a sand castle or a
peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwich. But making truthfulness right is not like that; it could not be done by
rearranging things in the physical environment. How, then, could it be done? No one knows. To see the
problem, consider some wretched case of child abuse. On the Divine Command Theory, God could make
that instance of child abuse right—not by turning a slap into a friendly pinch of the cheek, but by
commanding that the slap is right. This proposal defies human understanding. How could merely saying,
or commanding, that the slap is right make it right? If true, this conception of morality would be a mystery.
2. This conception of morality makes God’s commands arbitrary.
Suppose a parent forbids a teenager from doing something, and when the teenager asks why, the
parent responds, “Because I said so!” In such a case, the parent seems to be imposing his will on the child
arbitrarily. Yet the Divine Command Theory sees God as being like such a parent. Rather than offering a
reason for his commands, God merely says, “Because I said so.” God’s commands also seem arbitrary
because he always could have commanded the opposite. For example, suppose God commands us to be
truthful. On the Divine Command Theory, he could have just as easily commanded us to be liars, and then
lying, and not truthfulness, would be right. After all, before God issues his commands, no reasons for or
against lying exist— because God is the one who creates the reasons. And so, from a moral point of view,
God’s commands are arbitrary. He could command anything whatsoever. This result may seem not only
unacceptable but impious from a religious point of view.
3. This conception provides the wrong reasons for moral principles.
There are many things wrong with child abuse: It is malicious; it involves the unnecessary infliction of
pain; it can have unwanted long-term psychological effects; and so on. However, the Divine Command
Theory does not care about any of those things; it sees the maliciousness, the pain, and the long-term
effects of child abuse as being morally irrelevant. All it cares about, in the end, is whether child abuse runs
counter to God’s commands. There are two ways of confirming that something is wrong here. First, notice
something that the theory implies: If God didn’t exist, then child abuse wouldn’t be wrong. After all, if God
didn’t exist, then God wouldn’t have been around to make child abuse wrong. However, child abuse would
still be malicious, so it would still be wrong. Thus, the Divine Command Theory fails. Second, bear in mind
that even a religious person might be genuinely in doubt as to what God has commanded. After all, religious
texts disagree with each other, and sometimes there seem to be inconsistencies even within a single text.
So, a person might be in doubt as to what God’s will really is. However, a person need not be in doubt as
to whether child abuse is wrong. What God has commanded is one thing; whether hitting children is wrong
is another. There is a way to avoid these troublesome consequences. We can take the second of
Socrates’s options. We need not say that right conduct is right because God commands it. Instead, we
may say that God commands us to do certain things because they are right. God, who is infinitely wise,
recognizes that truthfulness is better than deceitfulness, just as he recognizes in Genesis that the light he
sees is good. For this reason, God commands us to be truthful. If we take this option, then we avoid the
consequences that spoiled the first alternative. We needn’t worry about how God makes it wrong to lie,
because he doesn’t. God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are the result of his wisdom in knowing what
is best. Also, we are not saddled with the wrong explanations for our moral principles; instead, we are free
to appeal to whatever justifications of them seem appropriate. Unfortunately, this second option has a
different drawback. In taking it, we abandon the theological conception of right and wrong. When we say
that God commands us to be truthful because truthfulness is right, we acknowledge a standard that is
independent of God’s will. The rightness exists prior to God’s command and is the reason for it. Thus, if
we want to know why we should be truthful, the reply “because God commands it” does not really tell us.
We may still ask, “ Why does God command it?” and the answer to that question will provide the ultimate
reason. Many religious people believe that they must accept a theological conception of right and wrong
because it would be sacrilegious not to do so. They feel,somehow, that if they believe in God, then right
and wrong must be understood in terms of God’s wishes. Our arguments, however, suggest that the Divine
Command Theory is not only untenable but impious. And, in fact, some of the greatest theologians have
rejected the theory for just these reasons. Such thinkers as Saint Thomas Aquinas connect morality with
religion in a different way.
 JGOM
3.3 THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW

NATURAL LAW
In the history of Christian thought, the dominant
theory of ethics is not the Divine Command Theory.
That honor instead goes to the Theory of Natural
Law. This theory has three main parts.
1. The Theory of Natural Law rests on a particular
view of the world.
2. A corollary to this way of thinking is that the “laws
of nature” describe not only how things are but also
how things ought to be.
3. The third part concerns moral knowledge. How
can we tell right from wrong?

1. The Theory of Natural Law rests on a particular view of the world.

On this view, the world has a rational order, with values and purposes built into its very nature. This
idea comes from the Greeks, whose worldview dominated Western thinking for over 1,700 years. The
Greeks believed that everything in nature has a purpose. Aristotle (384–322 bc) built this idea into his
system of thought. To understand anything, he said, four questions must be asked: What is it? What is it
made of? How did it come to be? And what is it for? The answers might be: This is a knife; it is made of
metal; it was made by a craftsman; and it is used for cutting. Aristotle assumed that the last question—
What is it for?—could be asked of anything whatever. “Nature,” he said, “belongs to the class of causes
which act for the sake of something.” Obviously, knives have a purpose, because craftsmen build them
with a purpose in mind. But what about natural objects that we do not make? Aristotle believed that they
have purposes, too. One of his examples was that we have teeth so that we can chew. Biological examples
are quite persuasive; each part of our bodies does seem, intuitively, to have a special purpose—our eyes
are for seeing, our ears are for hearing, our skin exists to protect us, and so on. But Aristotle’s claim was
not limited to organic beings. According to him, everything has a purpose. To take a different sort of
example, he thought that rain falls so that plants can grow. He considered alternatives. For example, he
asked whether the rain might fall “of necessity,” which helps the plants only “by coincidence.” However, he
considered that unlikely. The world, Aristotle thought, is an orderly, rational system in which each thing has
a proper place and serves its own special purpose. There is a neat hierarchy: The rain exists for the sake
of the plants, the plants exist for the sake of the animals, and the animals exist—of course—for the sake
of people. Aristotle says: “If then we are right in believing that nature makes nothing without some end in
view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man.”
This worldview is stunningly anthropocentric, or human-centered. But Aristotle was hardly alone in having
such thoughts; almost every important thinker in human history has advanced such a thesis. Humans are
a remarkably vain species. The Christian thinkers who came later found this worldview appealing. Only
one thing was missing: God. Thus, the Christian thinkers said that the rain falls to help the plants because
that is what God intended, and the animals are for human use because that is what God made them for.
Values and purposes were thus seen as part of God’s plan.
 JGOM
3.3 THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW

2. A corollary to this way of thinking is that the “laws of nature” describe not
only how things are but also how things ought to be.

The world is in harmony when things serve their natural purposes. When they do not, or cannot, things
have gone wrong. Eyes that cannot see are defective, and drought is a natural evil; the badness of both is
explained by reference to natural law. But there are also implications for human conduct. Moral rules are
now viewed as deriving from the laws of nature. Some ways of behaving are said to be “natural” while
others are regarded as “unnatural”; and “unnatural” acts are seen as morally wrong. Consider, for example,
the duty of beneficence. We are morally required to care about our neighbors. Why? According to the
Theory of Natural Law, beneficence is natural for us, given the kind of creatures we are. We are by nature
social and need the company of other people. Someone who does not care at all about others—who really
does not care, through and through—is seen as deranged. Modern psychiatry says that such people suffer
from antisocial personality disorder, and such people are commonly called psychopaths or sociopaths. A
callous personality is defective, just as eyes are defective if they cannot see. And, it may be added, this is
true because we were created by God, with a specific “human” nature, as part of his overall plan. The
endorsement of beneficence is relatively uncontroversial. Natural-law theory has also been used, however,
to support more questionable ideas. Religious thinkers often condemn “deviant” sexual practices, and they
usually justify this by appealing to the Theory of Natural Law. If everything has a purpose, what is the
purpose of sex? The obvious answer is procreation. Sexual activity that is not connected with making
babies can therefore be seen as “unnatural,” and practices like masturbation and gay sex may be
condemned for this reason. This view of sex dates back at least to Saint Augustine (a.d . 354–430) and is
explicit in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225– 1274). The moral theology of the Catholic Church
is based on natural-law theory.

3. The third part concerns moral knowledge. How can we tell right from
wrong?

On the Divine Command Theory, we must consult God’s commandments. On the Theory of Natural
Law, however, the “natural laws” of morality are just laws of reason; so, what’s right is what’s supported by
the best arguments. On this view, we can figure out what’s right because God has given us the ability to
reason. Moreover, God has given this ability to everyone, putting the believer and nonbeliever in the same
position. Outside the Catholic Church, the Theory of Natural Law has few advocates today. It is generally
rejected for three reasons. First, the idea that “what’s natural is good” seems open to obvious
counterexamples. Sometimes what’s natural is bad. People naturally care much more about themselves
than about strangers, but this is regrettable. Disease occurs naturally, but disease is bad. Children are
naturally self-centered, but parents don’t think this is a good thing. Second, the Theory of Natural Law
seems to confuse “is” and “ought.” In the 18th century, David Hume pointed out that what is the case and
what ought to be the case are logically different notions, and no conclusion about one follows from the
other. We can say that people are naturally disposed to be beneficent, but it does not follow that they ought
to be beneficent. Similarly, it may be true that sex produces babies, but it does not follow that sex ought or
ought not to be engaged in only for that purpose. Facts are one thing; values are another. Third, the Theory
of Natural Law is now widely rejected because its view of the world conflicts with modern science. The
world as described by Galileo, Newton, and Darwin has no need for “facts” about right and wrong. Their
explanations of nature make no reference to values or purposes. What happens just happens, due to the
laws of cause and effect. If the rain benefits the plants, this is because the plants have evolved by the laws
of natural selection in a rainy climate. Thus, modern science gives us a picture of the world as a realm of
facts, where the only “natural laws” are the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, working blindly and
without purpose. Whatever values may be, they are not part of the natural order. As for the idea that “nature
has made all things specifically for the sake of man,” well, that is only vanity. To the extent that one accepts
the worldview of modern science, one will reject the worldview of natural-law theory. That theory was a
product, not of modern thought, but of the Middle Ages.
 JGOM
3.4 THE PROS AND CONS OF RELIGION ON MORALITY

First, we are presented with a Second, this is not simply

more-or-less clear code of prohibitive, but it also provides
prohibitions. ideals to pursue.

Many of us had been brought up with one
for of religious upbringing or another, so it is
very possible that there is a strong inclination
is us to refer to our religious background to
PROS back up our moral valuations. We a presented
with a more-or-less clear code of prohibitions
and many of these prohibitions given by
religion- “Thou shall not kill”, “Thou shall not
steal”, and “Thou shall not commit adultery”-
seems to coincide with our sense of what
ethics should rightly demand.
There is an advance here over the law
because religion is not simply prohibitive, but
it also provides ideals to pursue. For
instance, one may be called to forgive those
who sinned against him or be charitable to
those who have less. Further, taking religion
as basis of ethics has the advantage of
providing us with not only set of commands
but also a Supreme Authority that can inspire
and compel our obedience in a way that
nothing else can. The Divine can command
absolute obedience on one’s part as the
implications of her actions involve her
ultimate destiny.

First, on the practical level, we Second, one requires the

realize the presence of believer to clarify her
multiplicity of religions. understanding of the
connection between ethics and
Each faith demands differently from its the Divine.
adherents, which would apparently result in
conflicting ethical standards. For instance,
The conceptual framework we have seen
certain religions have prohibitions concerning
and the practical difficulties of simply basing
what food may be consumed, while others do
ethics on the divine command are reasons
not share the same constraints. Are we then
enough for us to wonder whether we have to
compelled to judge others negatively given
set this way of thinking aside. Now, let us
their different morality? Are we called upon to
clarify this point: Our calling into question of
convert them toward our own faith? How about
the divine command theory is not a calling
the problem of realizing that not everyone is
into question of one’s belief in God; it is not
CONS devout or maintains a religious faith? Would
intended to be a challenge in one’s faith.
we be compelled to admit then that if religion
Instead, it is an invitation to consider to
is the basis of morality, some people would
whether there may be more creative and
simply have no moral code? Differences,
less problematic ways of seeing the
however, are not confined to being
connection between faith and ethics, rather
problematic of varying religious traditions.
than simply equating what is ethical with
Experience teaches us that sometimes even
whatever one takes to be commanded by
within one and the same faith, difference can
God.
be a real problem. For instance, we can easily
imagine a number of Christians agreeing that
they should read and find their inspiration from
the Bible; but we could easily imagine them
disagreeing on which particular lines they
need to focus on. Which of the passages from
the sacred Scriptures are they supposed to
obey if I find them debating over how to
interpret the scripture, not to mention ethical
issues? The problem of difference thus
remains.
 JGOM
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 4: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. define and explain ethical subjectivism 1. Ethical Subjectivism

2. identify the weakness of ethical subjectivism as
a moral theory

MODULE 4: ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM

 JGOM
4.1 THE BASIC IDEA OF ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
EXPLAIN AND ELABORATE Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th Edition).
New York: Random House, 1986.

ETHICAL
SUBJECTIVISM
The starting point of subjectivism is the
recognition that the individual thinking person
(the subject) is at the heart of all moral
valuations. She is the one who is confronted with
the situation and is burdened with the need to
make a decision or judgement. Fromm this point,
subjectivism leaps to the more radical claim that
the individual is the sole determinant of what is
morally good or bad, right or wrong.
A number of clichés familiar to us would echo this idea:

“No one can tell me what is right and wrong.”

“No one knows my situation better than myself.”
“I am entitled to my own opinion.”
“It is good if I say that it is good.”

There is something appealing about these statement because they seem to express a cherished sense of
personal independence. But a close look at these statements may reveal problems and in seeing these, we
see the problems of subjectivism.

There is some validity to this. No one can compel another to accept a

“No one can tell me what is
right and wrong.”
certain value judgement if she herself does not concur with it. However,
we know that this statement cannot be taken as absolute. We realize, in
many instances, that we had maintained an idea or an opinion that further
discussion reveals it was actually erroneous. We realize that we can be
mistaken and that we can be corrected by others. Why is it not also
possibly applicable when we are speaking of ethics?

There is some validity to this. This particular person who is put in a

“No one knows my situation
better than myself.”
certain situation, which calls for a decision, has knowledge of the factors
that affect her situation and decision. But to take this fact as a ground for
not listening to others is to have a mentality that imagines that one’s own
situation or concern is so personal and unique that there is no way
another person can possibly understand her and give her any meaningful
advice. But does not it make greater sense to recognize the reality that
many human experience are common and that others may have
something useful to suggest?

“I am entitled to my own
opinion.”
“It is good if I say that it is
good.”
JGOM
4.1 THE BASIC IDEA OF ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM
Certainly, each person has the right to believe what she believes and has
the right to express this. But this right is often stubbornly misconstrued
as some kind of immunity from criticism and correction. A bigoted racist
has an opinion against anyone who is dark-skinned, an anti-Semite has
an opinion against Jew, and a misogynist has an opinion against women.
We realize that these opinions are highly problematic because there is
no basis for considering any of these groups of people as inferior. We
would rightly be indignant about an employer who pays his female
employees less than the male employees, simply because he is of the
opinion that women are inferior to men. But isn’t he entitled to his own
opinion? To insist on one’s right in to having opinions whatever these
happen to be is to exhibit a closed-mindedness that rightly invites
censure from someone trying to think more critically about values.
With this line, we get to the heart of the problem with subjectivism. The
statement implies: “It is my personal consideration of X as good that
makes X good. X is good on the basis of my saying so. The problem now
becomes: “What is my basis for saying X is good?” This renders
subjectivism an untenable view for someone who is interested in ethics.
It takes the fact that I am the subject making the valuation and uses this
fact as the very basis for that valuation. But when “I”, as subject, am
asking what is right or wrong, good or bad, with subjectivism, there is no
other basis that I can look toward.
BR
EA
K
TI
ME
ST
OR
Y
 JGOM
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 5: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. define and explain psychological egoism and 1. Psychological Egoism

ethical egoism 2. Ethical Egoism
3. evaluate the different arguments under cultural
relativism

MODULE 5: PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

ETHICAL EGOISM
5.1 Psychological Egoism
5.2 Ethical Egoism

I like cleaning the house

because my mom gives
me Fifty (50) pesos
If I’m going to honestly
after doing it.
choose, I don’t want
doing the house chores
but I must because I am
a mother, it’s my duty.
Making my husband
happy by doing it also
makes me feel like I’m a
good wife.

Can you tell which statement exemplifies Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism?
 JGOM
5.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th Edition).

PSYCHOLOGICAL
New York: Random House, 1986.

EGOISM Let us consider another cliché. It would go like this: “Human beings are
naturally self-centered, so all our actions are always already motivated by self-
Interest.
This is the stance taken by psychological egoism, which is a theory that describes the underlying
dynamic behind all human actions. As a descriptive theory, it does not direct one to act in any particular
way. Instead, it points out that there is already an underlying basis for how one acts. The ego or self has
its desires and interests, and all our actions are geared toward satisfying these interests.
This may not seem particularly problematic when we consider many of the actions that we do on
day-to-day basis. I watch a movie or read a book because I want to, or go for a walk and do some window
shopping in the mall because I enjoy that. I take a certain course in college because I think it will benefit
me, or I join an organization because I will get some good out of it. We do things in pursuit of our own self-
interest all the time.
But what about other types of behavior that we would commonly say are directed toward the other?
Consider, for example, an act of generosity, in which someone helps a friend with her thesis rather than
play videogames, or someone makes use of her free Saturday helping build houses for Gawad Kalinga?
The psychological egoist would maintain that underlying such apparently other-directed behavior is a self-
serving desire, even if one does not acknowledge it or is even conscious of it. Perhaps he only helped his
friend with her thesis because he is trying to impress her. Perhaps she helps out with Gawad Kalinga
because this is how she relieves her sense of guilt at being well-off compared to others. The idea is that
whether or not the person admits it, one’s actions are ultimately always motivated by self-serving desire.
This theory has a couple of strong points. The first is that of simplicity. When an idea is marked by
simplicity, it has a unique appeal to it; a theory that conveniently identifies a single basis that will somehow
account for all actions is a good example of this. The second is that of plausibility. It is plausible that self-
interests is behind a person’s actions. It is clearly the motivation behind many of the actions one can
perform which are obviously self-serving; it could very well also be motivation behind an individual’s
seemingly other-directed actions. It is not only plausible, but also irrefutable.
Psychological egoism is an irrefutable theory because there is no ways to try to answer it without
being confronted by the challenge that, whatever one might say, there is the self-serving motive at the root
of everything. The psychological egoist can and will insist on his stand no matter how one might try to
object. This opens up two questions: first, “Because we cannot refute it, shall we accept it as true?” and
Do we accept the consequences of this theory?”
The first question asks whether we have to accept the theory because it happens to be irrefutable.
Let us consider this analogy: A posits that B has an Oedipal complex and that everything about B and
what he does- his choice in music, course, favorite food- is all ultimately rooted in this complex. Therefore,
no matter what B says, A would be able to insist that even without his acknowledging it deep down, it is
this complex that drives him to act the way he does. In this scenario, A’s claim is irrefutable. But does B
have to accept it? Similarly, one could maintain, if he really wanted to, that human nature is intrinsically
self-interested and that human beings could not possibly be benevolent. When they seem to be so, it is
only a matter of pretense. One could maintain that but does one have to?
The second point has to do with the problematic consequences of this theory. Consider this
scenario: One woman spends her money on expensive clothes, and another woman donates to charity.
In terms of psychological egoism, they both are simply fulfilling what would serve them, they are of equal
moral worth.
 JGOM
5.2 ETHICAL EGOISM
In judging these persons and these actions, we can ask ourselves: Do we want to give up on our
moral intuition concerning the goodness and value of generosity versus the wrongness of selfishness just for
the sake of this theory? Most significantly, turning to the next consequence when we move from moral
judgement to moral decision, the question is: How then are we supposed to decide? Given psychological
egoism, it does not matter. We only think that we have a choice but actually whatever way that we end up
acting, our minds have actually already determined what serves our interests best.
So psychological egoism, when we look at its consequences, leads us to cynical view of humanity, to
a gloomy description of human nature, and finally to a useless theory for someone who is concerned with
asking herself what is the right thing to do. This is because it ends up nullifying the possibility of any normative
ethics in its view of the already – determined human being.

ETHICAL EGOISM Ethical egoism differs from psychological egoism in

that does not suppose all our actions are already

inevitably self-serving. Instead, ethical egoism prescribes that we should make our own ends, our own
interests, as the single overriding concern. We may act in a way that is beneficial to others, but we should
do that only if it ultimately benefits us. This theory acknowledges that it is a dog-eat-dog world out there
and given that, everyone ought to put herself at the center. One should consider herself as the priority and
not allow any other concerns, such as the welfare of other people, to detract from this pursuit. This is the
doctrine that each person ought to pursue his or her own self-interest exclusively. This is not the
commonsense view that one should promote one’s own interests in addition to the interests of others.
Ethical Egoism is the radical idea that the principle of self-interest accounts for all of one’s obligations.
However, Ethical Egoism does not tell you to avoid helping others. Sometimes your interests will coincide
with the well-being of others, so you’ll help yourself by helping them. For example, if you can convince your
teacher to cancel the assignment, this will benefit you and your classmates. Ethical Egoism does not forbid
such actions; in fact, it may recommend them. The theory only insists that the benefit to others is not what
makes the act right. Rather, the act is right because it benefits you. Nor does Ethical Egoism imply that in
pursuing your interests, you should always do what you want to, or what offers you the most short-term
pleasure. Someone may want to smoke cigarettes, or bet all his money at the racetrack, or set up a meth
lab in his basement. Ethical Egoism would frown on all of these actions, despite their possible short-term
benefits. Ethical Egoism says that a person ought to do what really is in his or her own best interests, over
the long run. It endorses selfishness, not foolishness. Now let’s discuss the three main arguments for
Ethical Egoism. The Argument That Altruism Is Self-Defeating. The first argument has several variations:
• Everyone is aware of his or her own wants and needs. Moreover, each of us is uniquely placed to pursue
those wants and needs effectively. At the same time, we understand other people only imperfectly, and we
are not well placed to advance their interests. For these reasons, if we try to be “our brother’s keeper,” we
will often bungle the job and do more harm than good.
• At the same time, the policy of “looking out for others” is an offensive intrusion into other people’s privacy;
it is essentially a policy of minding other people’s business.
• Making other people the object of one’s “charity” is degrading to them: it robs them of their dignity and
self-respect, and it says to them, in effect, that they are not competent to care for themselves. Moreover,
such a policy is self-fulfilling: those who are “helped” cease to be self-reliant and become passively
dependent on others. That is why the recipients of charity are often resentful rather than appreciative. In
each case, the policy of “looking out for others” is said to be self-defeating. If we want to do what is best
for people, we should not adopt so-called altruistic policies. On the contrary, if each person looks after his
or her own interests, everyone will be better off. It is possible to object to this argument on a number of
grounds. Of course, no one favors bungling, butting in, or depriving people of their self-respect. But is that
really what’s going on when we feed hungry children? Is the starving child in Somalia really harmed when
we “intrude” into “her business” by giving her food? It hardly seems likely. Yet we can set this point aside,
for this way of thinking has an even more serious defect. The trouble is that it isn’t really an argument for
Ethical Egoism at all. The argument concludes that we should adopt certain policies of behavior, and those
 JGOM
5.2 ETHICAL EGOISM
policies may appear to be egoistic. However, the reason we should adopt those policies is decidedly
unegoistic. It is said that adopting those policies will promote the betterment of society—but according to
Ethical Egoism, we shouldn’t care about that. Spelled out fully, the argument says:
(1) We ought to do whatever will best promote everyone’s interests.
(2) The best way to promote everyone’s interests is for each of us to pursue our own interests exclusively.
(3) Therefore, each of us should pursue our own interests exclusively. If we accept this reasoning, then we
are not Ethical Egoists. Even though we might behave like egoists, our ultimate principle is one of
beneficence—we are trying to help everyone, and not just ourselves. Rather than being egoists, we turn
out to be altruists with a peculiar view of what promotes the general welfare. Ayn Rand’s Argument.
Philosophers don’t pay much attention to the work of Ayn Rand (1905–1982). The major themes explored
in her novels—namely, the primacy of the individual and the superiority of capitalism—are developed more
rigorously by other writers. Yet she was a charismatic figure who attracted a devoted following. Ethical
Egoism is associated with her more than with any other 20th-century writer. Ayn Rand regarded the “ethics
of altruism” as a totally destructive idea, both in society as a whole and in the lives of those taken in by it.
Altruism, she thought, leads to a denial of the value of the individual. It says to a person: Your life is merely
something to be sacrificed. “If a man accepts the ethics of altruism,” she writes, “his first concern is not
how to live his life, but how to sacrifice it.” Those who promote the ethics of altruism are beneath contempt—
they are parasites. Rather than working to build and sustain their own lives, they leech off those who do.
Rand continues: Parasites, moochers, looters, brutes and thugs can be of no value to a human being—
nor can he gain any benefit from living in a society geared to their needs, demands and protections, a
society that treats him as a sacrificial animal and penalizes him for his virtues in order to reward them for
their vices, which means: a society based on the ethics of altruism. By “sacrificing one’s life,” Rand does
not mean anything so dramatic as dying. A person’s life consists, in part, of projects undertaken and goods
earned and created. Thus, to demand that a person abandon his projects and give up his goods is to
demand that he “sacrifice his life.” Rand also suggests that there is a metaphysical basis for Ethical Egoism.
Somehow, it is the only ethic that takes seriously the reality of the individual person. She bemoans “the
enormity of the extent to which altruism erodes men’s capacity to grasp . . . the value of an individual life;
it reveals a mind from which the reality of a human being has been wiped out.” What, then, of the hungry
children? It might be said that Ethical Egoism itself “reveals a mind from which the reality of a human being
has been wiped out,” namely, the human being who is starving. But Rand quotes with approval the answer
given by one of her followers: “Once, when Barbara Brandon was asked by a student: ‘What will happen
to the poor . . . ?’ she answered: ‘If you want to help them, you will not be stopped.’” All these remarks are
part of a single argument that goes something like this:
(1) Each person has only one life to live. If we value the individual, then we must agree that this life is of
supreme importance. After all, it is all one has, and all one is.
(2) The ethics of altruism regards the life of the individual as something to be sacrificed for the good of
others. Therefore, the ethics of altruism does not take seriously the value of the individual.
(3) Ethical Egoism, which allows each person to view his or her own life as having supreme value, does
take the individual seriously—it is, in fact, the only philosophy that does.
(4) Thus, we should accept Ethical Egoism. One problem with this argument, as you may have noticed, is
its assumption that we have only two options: Either we accept the ethics of altruism, or we accept Ethical
Egoism. The choice is then made to look obvious by depicting altruism as an idea that only an idiot would
accept. The ethics of altruism is said to be the view that one’s own interests have no value and that we
must be ready to sacrifice ourselves totally whenever anybody asks us to. If this is altruism, then any other
view, including Ethical Egoism, will look good by comparison. But that is hardly a fair picture of the options.
What we called the commonsense view stands between the two extremes. It says that one’s own interests
and the interests of others are important, and so we must strike a balance between them. Sometimes, one
should act for the sake of others; at other times, one should look after oneself. Even if we reject the extreme
ethics of altruism, we needn’t embrace the extreme of Ethical Egoism. There is a middle ground. Ethical
 JGOM
5.2 ETHICAL EGOISM
Egoism as Compatible with Commonsense Morality. The third argument takes a different approach. Ethical
Egoism is usually presented as challenging common sense. It is possible, however, to interpret it as
supporting our commonsense moral view. This interpretation goes as follows: Ordinary morality consists
in obeying certain rules. We must speak the truth, keep our promises, avoid harming others, and so on. At
first, these duties seem to have nothing in common—they are just a bunch of discrete rules. Yet there may
be a unity to them. Ethical Egoists would say that all these duties spring from the one fundamental principle
of self-interest. Understood in this way, Ethical Egoism is not such a radical doctrine. It does not challenge
ordinary morality; it only tries to explain and systematize it. And it does a surprisingly good job. It can
provide plausible explanations of the duties mentioned above, and more:

• The duty not to harm others: If we do things that harm other people, other people won’t mind
harming us. We won’t have friends; we will be shunned and despised; and we won’t get help when we
need it. If our offenses are serious enough, we might wind up in jail. Thus, it benefits us not to harm others.
• The duty not to lie: If we lie to other people, we will suffer all the ill effects of a bad reputation.
People will distrust us and avoid doing business with us. People will be dishonest with us once they realize
that we have been dishonest with them. Thus, we benefit from being truthful.
• The duty to keep our promises: It is to our own advantage to enter into mutually beneficial
arrangements with other people. To benefit from those arrangements, we need to be able to rely on others
to keep their word. But we can hardly expect them to do that if we do not keep our promises to them.
Therefore, from the point of view of self-interest, we should keep our promises. Pursuing this line of
reasoning, Thomas Hobbes (1588– 1679) suggested that the principle of Ethical Egoism leads to nothing
less than the Golden Rule: We should “do unto others” so that others will be more likely to “do unto us.”
Does this argument succeed in establishing Ethical Egoism as a viable theory of morality? It may be the
best try. However, there are two serious problems with it. First, the argument does not prove as much as
it needs to. It shows only that it is usually to one’s advantage to tell the truth, to keep one’s promises, and
to avoid harming others. But a situation might arise in which you could profit from doing something horrible,
like killing someone. In such a case, Ethical Egoism cannot explain why you shouldn’t do the horrible thing.
Thus, it looks like some of our moral obligations cannot be derived from self-interest. Second, suppose that
giving money to famine relief is somehow to one’s own advantage. It doesn’t follow that this is the only
reason to do so. Another reason might be to help the starving people. Ethical Egoism says that self-interest
is the only reason to help others, but nothing in the present argument really supports that.

A SUMMARY: ILLUSTRATION FOR THE THREE (3) SENSES OF THE SELF

 JGOM
I like cleaning the house
because my mom gives
me Fifty (50) pesos
after doing it. If I’m going to honestly
choose, I don’t want
doing the house chores
but I must because I
am a mother, it’s my
duty. Making my
husband happy by doing
it also makes me feel
like I’m a good wife.

RATIONALIZATION

This statement here is an example of Psychological
Egoism. One can like what he/she is doing because of the
underlying reason that there would be a (short-term)
reward in exchange of the behavior.
This statement is an example of Ethical Egoism.
Unlike Psychological Egoism, here the person
might not actually like what he/she must do
however he/she needs to (duty). This is for the
reason that a (long-term) reward will be obtained
in exchange of the behavior.
 JGOM
RATIONALIZATION

1. “Mag-aaral ako para makagraduate at magkaroon ng trabaho.” is an example of Ethical Egoism. As a student,
your basic duty is to study. Why would you study then? It is because of your long-term goal to have a job after
you graduate. A student might not actually want to study since it’s not really easy however he/she seems to
see the need of doing so just because he/she may want to live a better life after graduating.

2. “Ang pag-aaral ay nakabubuti sa sangkatauhan.” is an example of Subjectivism/Ethical Subjectivism. One

may argue about how significant “education” is to ones life. This statement may even become an issue since if
it really is “nakabubuti” then why does other people become more distressed in terms of their studies. This
often is disheartening because some young people tends to surrender in life just because of this. Though the
goal of education should not be misunderstood, this statement somehow may not be actually wrong however
this does not also necessarily mean that it is always right.

3. “Nag-aaral ako kasi may natatanggap akong allowance.” Is an example of Psychological Egoism. Studying in
actuality is not really easy however there are some instances where a person might really like it. But liking it
seems to have an underlying reason and that is because you are gaining something desirable to it though
only for temporary period of time.
 JGOM
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 6: SS24
OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. define and explain social contract theory 1. Social Contract Theory

2. evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 2. Law
law

MODULE 6: SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

6.1 Hobbe’s Argument
6.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
6.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Law

SCENARIO

Suppose you live in a totalitarian society, and one day, to your astonishment, you are arrested and charged
with treason. The police say that you have been plotting against the government with a man named Smith, who has
also been arrested and is being held in a separate cell. The interrogator demands that you confess. You protest
your innocence; you don’t even know Smith. But this does you no good. It soon becomes clear that your captors are
not interested in the truth; they merely want to convict someone. They offer you the following deal:

• If Smith does not confess, but you confess and testify against him, then they will release you. You will go
free, while Smith will be put away for 10 years.

• If Smith confesses and you do not, the situation will be reversed—he will go free while you get 10 years.

• If you both confess, you will each be sentenced to 5 years.

• If neither of you confesses, then there won’t be enough evidence to convict either of you. They can hold
you for a year, but then they will have to let both of you go. Finally, you are told that Smith is being offered the same
deal; but you cannot communicate with him, and you have no way of knowing what he will do.

The problem is this: Assuming that your only goal is to spend as little time in jail as possible, what should
you do? Confess or not confess?

are you going to choose?

 JGOM
6.1 HOBBE’S ARGUMENT
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
(2) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th Edition).
New York: Random House, 1986.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Wherever law ends, tyranny begins . . .
John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ( 1690 )

Suppose we take away all the traditional props for morality. Assume, first, that there is no God to
issue commands and reward virtue. Next, suppose that there are no “natural purposes”—objects in nature
have no inherent functions or intended uses. Finally, assume that human beings are naturally selfish. Where,
then, could morality come from? If we cannot appeal to God, natural purpose, or altruism, is there anything
left to base morality on?
Thomas Hobbes, the leading British philosopher of the 17th century, tried to show that morality does
not depend on any of those things. Instead, morality should be understood as the solution to a practical
problem that arises for self-interested human beings. We all want to live as well as possible; but in order to
flourish, we need a peaceful, cooperative social order. And we cannot have one without rules. Those rules
are the moral rules; morality consists of the precepts we need to follow in order to get the benefits of social
living. That—not God, inherent purposes, or altruism—is the key to understanding ethics.
Hobbes begins by asking what it would be like if there were no way to enforce social rules. Suppose
there were no government institutions—no laws, no police, and no courts. In this situation, each of us would
be free do as we pleased. Hobbes called this “the state of nature.” What would it be like?
Hobbes thought it would be dreadful. In the state of nature, he says, there would be no place for
industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving,
and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the
life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
 JGOM
6.1 HOBBE’S ARGUMENT
The state of nature would be awful, Hobbes thought, due to four basic facts about human life:

• There is equality of need. Each of us needs the same basic things in order to survive—food, clothing,
shelter, and so on. Although we differ in some of our needs (diabetics need insulin, others don’t), we are all
essentially alike.
• There is scarcity. We do not live in the Garden of Eden, where milk flows in streams and every tree
hangs heavy with fruit. The world is a hard, inhospitable place, where the things we need do not come in
abundance. We have to work hard to produce them, and even then they may be in short supply.
• There is the essential equality of human power. Who will get the scarce goods? No one can simply
take what she wants. Even though some people are smarter and tougher than others, even the strongest can
be brought down when those who are less strong act together.
• Finally, there is limited altruism. If we cannot prevail by our own strength, what hope do we have?
Can we rely on the goodwill of others? We cannot. Even if people are not wholly selfish, they care most about
themselves, and we cannot assume that they will step aside when their interests conflict with ours.
Together, these facts paint a grim picture. We all need the same basic things, and there aren’t enough
of them to go around. Therefore, we will have to compete for them. But no one can prevail in this competition,
and no one—or almost no one—will look after his neighbors. The result, as Hobbes puts it, is a “constant
state of war, of one with all.” And it is a war no one can win. Whoever wants to survive will try to seize what
he needs and prepare to defend it from attack. Meanwhile, others will be doing the same thing. Life in the
state of nature would be intolerable.
Hobbes did not think that all this was mere speculation. He pointed out that this is what actually
happens when governments collapse during civil uprisings. People hoard food, arm themselves, and lock out
their neighbors. Moreover, nations themselves behave like this when international law is weak. Without a
strong, overarching authority to maintain the peace, countries guard their borders, build up their armies, and
feed their own people first.
To escape the state of nature, we must find a way to work together. In a stable and cooperative
society, we can produce more essential goods and distribute them in a rational way. But establishing such a
society is not easy. People must agree on rules to govern their interactions. They must agree, for example,
not to harm one another and not to break their promises. Hobbes calls such an agreement “the social
contract.” As a society, we follow certain rules, and we have ways to enforce them. Some of those ways
involve the law—if you assault someone, the police may arrest you. Other ways involve “the court of public
opinion”—if you get a reputation for lying, then people may turn their backs on you. All of these rules, taken
together, form the social contract.
It is only within the context of the social contract that we can become beneficent beings, because the
contract creates the conditions under which we can afford to care about others. In the state of nature, it is
every man for himself; it would be foolish for anyone to look out for others and put his own interests in
jeopardy. But in society, altruism becomes possible. By releasing us from “the continual fear of violent death,”
the social contract frees us to take heed of others. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) went so far as to
say that we become different kinds of creatures when we enter civilized relations with others. In The Social
Contract (1762), he writes: The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable
change in man. . . . Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses . . . does man,
who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his
reason before listening to his inclinations. . . . His faculties are so stimulated and developed, . . . his feelings
so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him
below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it
forever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.
 JGOM
6.2 THE PRISONERS DILEMMA
And what does the “voice of duty” require this new man to do? It requires him to set aside his self-
centered designs in favor of rules that benefit everyone. But he is able to do this only because others have
agreed to do the same thing—that is the essence of the “contract.”
The Social Contract Theory explains the purpose of both morality and government. The purpose of
morality is to make social living possible; the purpose of government is to enforce vital moral rules. We can
summarize the social contract conception of morality as follows: Morality consists in the set of rules,
governing behavior, that rational people will accept, on the condition that others accept them as well. And
rational people will accept a rule only if they can expect to gain from it. Thus, morality is about mutual benefit;
you and I are morally bound to follow a rule only if we would be better off living in a society in which that rule
were usually followed.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Hobbes’s argument is one way of arriving at the Social Contract Theory. Another argument makes
use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma—a problem invented by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher around 1950.
Here’s how the problem goes.
Suppose you live in a totalitarian society, and one day, to your astonishment, you are arrested and
charged with treason. The police say that you have been plotting against the government with a man named
Smith, who has also been arrested and is being held in a separate cell. The interrogator demands that you
confess. You protest your innocence; you don’t even know Smith. But this does you no good. It soon becomes
clear that your captors are not interested in the truth; they merely want to convict someone. They offer you
the following deal:
• If Smith does not confess, but you confess and testify against him, then they will release you. You
will go free, while Smith will be put away for 10 years.
• If Smith confesses and you do not, the situation will be reversed—he will go free while you get 10
years.
• If you both confess, you will each be sentenced to 5 years.
• If neither of you confesses, then there won’t be enough evidence to convict either of you. They can
hold you for a year, but then they will have to let both of you go.
Finally, you are told that Smith is being offered the same deal; but you cannot communicate with him,
and you have no way of knowing what he will do.
The problem is this: Assuming that your only goal is to spend as little time in jail as possible, what
should you do? Confess or not confess? For the purposes of this problem, you should forget about
maintaining your dignity and standing up for your rights. That is not what this problem is about. You should
also forget about trying to help Smith. This problem is strictly about calculating what is in your own best
interests. What will get you free the quickest?
The question may seem impossible to answer unless you know what Smith will do. But that is an
illusion. The problem has a clear solution: No matter what Smith does, you should confess. This can be
shown as follows:
(1) Either Smith will confess or he won’t.

(2) Suppose Smith confesses. Then, if you confess you will get 5 years, whereas if you do not confess
you will get 10 years. Therefore, if he confesses, you are better off confessing.
(3) On the other hand, suppose Smith does not confess. Then, if you confess you will go free, whereas
if you do not confess you get one year. Therefore, if Smith does not confess, you will still be better off
confessing.
 JGOM
6.2 THE PRISONERS DILEMMA
(4) Therefore, you should confess. That will get you out of jail the soonest, no matter what Smith does.
So far, so good. But remember that Smith is being offered the same deal. Thus, he will also confess.
The result will be that you both get 5-year sentences. But if you had both done the opposite, you both could
have gotten only one year. It’s a curious situation: Because you and Smith both act selfishly, you both wind
up worse off.
Now suppose you can communicate with Smith. In that case, you could make a deal with him. You
could agree that neither of you will confess; then you will both get the one-year detention. By cooperating,
you will both be better off than if you act independently. Cooperating will not get either of you the best result—
immediate freedom—but it will get both of you a better result than you would have gotten alone.
It is vital, however, that any agreement between you and Smith be enforceable, because if he reneges
and confesses while you keep the bargain, you will end up serving the maximum 10 years while he goes free.
Thus, in order for you to rationally participate in such a deal, you need to be sure that Smith will keep up his
end.

Morality as the Solution to Prisoner’s-Dilemma-Type Problems.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not just a clever puzzle. Although the story it tells is fictitious, the pattern it
exemplifies comes up often in real life. Consider, for example, the choice between two general strategies of
living. You could pursue your own interests exclusively—in every situation, you could do whatever will benefit
yourself, taking no notice of anyone else. Let us call this “acting selfishly.” Alternatively, you could care about
others, balancing their interests against your own, and sometimes forgoing your own interests for their sake.
Let us call this strategy “acting benevolently.” But it is not only you who must decide. Other people also have
to choose which strategy to adopt. There are four possibilities: (a) You could be selfish while other people
are benevolent; (b) others could be selfish while you are benevolent; (c) everyone could be selfish; and (d)
everyone could be benevolent. How would you fare in each of these situations? You might assess the
possibilities like this:
• You would be best off if you were selfish while other people were benevolent. You would get the
benefit of their generosity without having to return the favor. (In this situation, you would be a “free rider.”)
• Second-best would be if everyone were benevolent. You would no longer have the advantages that
come from ignoring other people’s interests, but you would be treated well by others. (This is the situation of
“ ordinary morality.”)
• A bad situation, but not the worst, would be one in which everyone was selfish. You would try to
protect your own interests, but you would get little help from others. (This is Hobbes’s “state of nature.”)
• You would be worst off if you were benevolent while others were selfish. Other people could stab
you in the back whenever they wanted, but you would never do the same. You would come out on the short
end every time. (This is the “sucker’s payoff.”)
This situation has the same structure as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In fact, it is a Prisoner’s Dilemma,
even though it involves no prisoners. Again, we can prove that you should adopt the selfish strategy:
(1) Either other people will respect your interests or they won’t.
(2) If they do respect your interests, you would be better off not respecting theirs, at least when that
would be to your benefit. This would be the optimum situation— you get to be a free rider.
(3) If they do not respect your interests, then it would be foolish for you to respect theirs. That would
land you in the worst possible situation—you get the sucker’s payoff.
(4) Therefore, regardless of what other people do, you are better off adopting the policy of looking
out for yourself. You should be selfish.
 JGOM
6.3. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LAW

And now we come to the catch: Other people, of course, can reason in this same way, and the result
will be Hobbes’s state of nature. Everyone will be selfish, willing to knife anyone who gets in their way. In that
situation, each of us would be worse off than if we all cooperated.
To escape the dilemma, we need another enforceable agreement, this time to obey the rules of
mutually respectful social living. As before, cooperation will not yield the optimum outcome for each individual,
but it will lead to a better result than non-cooperation. We need, in David Gauthier’s words, to “bargain our
way into morality.” We can do that by establishing laws and social customs that protect the interests of
everyone involved.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LAW IN MORALITY: FILIPINO PERSPECTIVE

It is supposed that law is one’s guide to ethical behavior. In the Philippines, Filipinos are constrained
to obey the laws of the land as stated in the country’s criminal and civil codes. Making this even more
particular, in Cebu, residents are constrained to follow any provincial laws or city ordinances. One can easily
imagine this becoming even more localized to the barangay or village level, where local or municipal layers
of obligation are there for residents to follow. The term positive law refers to the different rules and regulations
that are posited or put forward by an authority figure that require compliance.
At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. We recognize that there are many acts that we
immediately consider unethical (e.g., murder or theft, which we also know are forbidden by law. Furthermore,
the law is enforced by way of a system of sanctions administered through persons and institutions, which all
help in compelling us to obey. Taking the law to be the basis of ethics has the benefit of providing us with an
objective standard that is obligatory and applicable to all. So, we would not be surprised if we were to hear
someone say, “Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever the law says.”
However, there are some problems with this. Of course, we do maintain that, generally speaking, one
should obey the law. However, the idea that we are examining here is a more controversial one: the more
radical claim that one can look to the law itself in order to determine what is right or wrong. But the question
is: can one simply identify ethics with the law?
One point to be raise is the prohibitive nature of law. The law does not tell us what we should do; it
works by constraining us from performing acts that we should not do. To put it slightly differently, the law
cannot tell us what to pursue, only what to avoid. Would we be satisfied thinking about ethics solely from the
negative perspective of that which we may not do, disregarding the important aspect of a good which we
could and maybe even should do, even if it were not required of us by the law?
In line with this, we might find that there are certain ways of acting which are not forbidden by the law,
but are ethically questionable to us. For instance, a company that pads its profits by refusing to give its
employees benefits may do so within the parameters of the law. The company can do so by refusing to hire
people on a permanent basis, but offering them six-month contracts. Constrained to work under this
contractual system, the employees are thus deprived not only of benefits, but also of job security. Here, no
law is violated, yet one can wonder whether there is something ethically questionable to this business
practice. The fact that one can make such a negative value judgement of the practice where there is no
violation of the law is already a hint that one can look to something beyond the law when making our ethical
valuations.
To make this point concrete, recall the story of a toddler who had been run over by a couple of
vehicles. While there were many passers-by who witnessed what had happened, for quite a long while, no
one did anything to help. The child later died in the hospital. The law does not oblige people to help others in
need, so none of these passers-by were guilty of breaking any law. However, many people reacting to this
sad news report share a sense that those passers-by were somewhat ethically culpable in their negligence.
In view of all this, perhaps one should think of ethics in a way that does not simply identify it with obedience
to the law. Later, we shall see how the concept of law is creatively utilized in the Deontology if Immanuel Kant
in a more ethically significant way.
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 7: ETHICS SS24

TERMS
remember:

1. discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ethics; 1. Greatest Happiness 7. Pleasure

2. distinguish between two utilitarian models; the 2. Moral Right 8. Base Pleasure
quantitative model of Jeremy Bentham and the 3. Justice 9. Legal Rights
qualitative model of John Stuart Mill 4. Utility
3. apply utilitarianism in understanding and 5. Higher Pleasures
evaluating local and international scenarios. 6. Rights

Overview

Utilitarianism

WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?
✓ Consequential or Teleological
✓ Goodness of actions is based on the end or consequence (telos)
✓ The only motive of action is pain and pleasure, “seek good and avoid pain.”
✓ An ethical theory that argues for the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior
based on the usefulness of the action’s consequences.
✓ Claims that one’s actions and behavior are good in as much as they are directed toward the
experience of the greatest pleasure over pain for the greatest number of persons.
✓ Motto: “Greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.”

superhero?

Do think

killed villains are

moral?

To save a great
number of people in a
society, will you
sacrifice one life?
 JGOM
7.1 OVERVIEW
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
7.2 ACT UTILITARIANISM
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

Jeremy Bentham begins by arguing that our Felicific calculus is a common currency framework
actions are governed by two “sovereign masters” – that calculates the pleasure that some actions can
which he calls pleasure and pain. These “masters” produce. In this framework, an action can be
are given to us by nature to help us determine what evaluated on the basis of intensity or strength of
is good or bad. The principle of utility is about our
pleasure; duration or length of the experience of
subjection to these sovereign masters: pleasure pleasure; certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihood
and pain. The principle refers to the motivation of that pleasure will occur; and propinquity,
our actions as guided by our avoidance of pain and remoteness, or how soon there will be pleasure.
our desire for pleasure. Pleasure as good if, and These indicators allow us to measure pleasure and
only if, they produce more happiness. It is not pain in an action. However, when we are to evaluate
enough to experience pleasure, but to also inquire our tendency to choose these actions, we need to
whether the things we do make us happier. consider two more dimensions: fecundity or the
Bentham equates happiness with pleasure. What chance it has of not being followed by sensations of
makes people happy is intended pleasure and what the same kind, and purity or the chance it has of not
makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The being followed by sensations of the same kind.
things that produce happiness and pleasure are Lastly, when considering-extent. Felicific calculus
good; whereas, those that produce unhappiness allows the evaluation of all actions and their
and pain are bad. The next step to is to understand resultant pleasure. This means that actions are
the nature of pleasure and pain to identify a criterion
evaluated on this single scale regardless of
for distinguishing pleasure and to calculate the preferences and values. In this sense, pleasure and
resultant pleasure or pain. pain can only quantitatively differ but not
qualitatively differ from other experiences of
To know the kind of pleasure that is morally
pleasure and pain accordingly.
preferable and valuable, to understand if all
pleasures are necessarily and ethically good,
Bentham provided a framework to evaluate
pleasure and pain which he called the FELICIFIC
CALCULUS.
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
7.2 ACT UTILITARIANISM
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

FELICIFIC CALCULUS

SCENARIO
Source: Jeremy Bentham, An intoduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London, 1789

You are a Doctor driving to a patient, a young mother who is about to give birth. It looks like she will need a
Caesarian section. It is late at night and you come across a car accident on the country road you are travelling
on. Two cars are involved in the accident and both drivers are unconcious and have visible injuries. One of
the men is the father of the child you are going to deliver, and the other man is very old. You do not know the
extent of their injuries but in your opinion, without immediate medical help, one or both may die. You as a
Utilitarian are now faced with one of three possible solutions:
1. You help the young mother who’s about to give birth.
2. You help the young woman’s husband.
3. You help the old man.
PRIMARY CONCERN 2nd PRIORITY 3rd PRIORITY

Attending to the mother first is
your primary concern as the
doctor. The death of both mother
and child is almost a certainty if
you do not act now, whereas the
death of the men is uncertain.
Furthermore, the pain of the
mother is clearly greater than that
of men at this moment in time.
There is a greater richness and
purity in saving the life of a young
child who has, in all probability, a
long happy life ahead. Therefore
the extent and duration of the
utility created by these two people
is clear likelihood.
Attending to the young husband is
the next priority. The pleasures of
a new family- it’s intensity,
duration, extent, richness, and
purity- are all clear probabilities.
If, as the doctor, you attend him
first, his wife and child would in all
probability die. The man would
then experience pain. The pain
experienced by the widowed
husband is likely to outstrip any
pleasure to be gained from
continued life without his loved
ones.
Attending to the old man is the last
priority. The duration and
certainty of his future pleasure are
questionable owing to his age- he
has all but lived his life. This is
sometimes known as the “good
innings” argument, according to
which the older you are the less
claim you have to life.
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
7.3 RULE UTILITARIANISM
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

Mill dissents Bentham’s single scale of pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The
pleasure (felicific calculus). He thinks that the same is true when exercising. If the quality of
principle of utility must distinguish pleasures pleasure is sometimes more important than
qualitatively. For Mill, utilitarianism cannot promote quantity, then it is important to consider the
the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any standards whereby differences of pleasure can be
other animals. He thinks that there are higher judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple. In
intellectual and lower base pleasures. We, as moral deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is
agents, are capable of searching and desiring important to experience both and to discover which
higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs are one is actually more preferred than the other. There
capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and is no other way of determining which of the two
primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are pleasures is preferable except appealing to the
capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. actual preferences and experiences. What Mill
For Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are discovers anthropologically is that actual choices of
appropriate for animals, are degrading to us knowledgeable persons point that higher intellectual
because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures are preferable than purely sensual
pleasures only for pigs. Human pleasures are appetites.
qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is
In defending further, the comparative choice
unfair to assume that we merely pursue pleasures
between intellectual and bestial pleasures, Mill
appropriate for beasts even if there are instances
offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks
when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. To
whether a human person would prefer to accept the
explain this, Mill recognizes the empirical fact that
highly pleasurable life on an animal while at the
there are different kinds of pleasure.
same time being denied of everything that makes
Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give
is more preferable than quantity. An excessive up human qualities of higher reason for the
quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might pleasures of a pig. In the most famous quote in Mill’s
result in pain. We can consider, for example, our Utilitarianism, we read:
experience of excessive eating or exercising.
Whereas eating the right amount of food can be
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
7.3 RULE UTILITARIANISM
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than aextreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs
and humans, but it is difficult to compare pleasures
pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
deeply integrated in our way of life. The pleasures
a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a
different opinion, it is because they only know theirof an Ilonggo eating chicken inasal and Igorot eating
own side of the question. The other party to the pinikpikan is an example. This cannot be done by
comparison knows both sides.” simply tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In the same way,
some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the
While it is difficult to understand how Mill was music of Eraserheads than that of APO Hiking
able to compare swinish pleasures with human Society.
ones, we can presume that it would be better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfies. Simply
put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that
are actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare

PRINCIPLE OF GREATEST NUMBER

Equating happiness with pleasures does not
aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent alone and
independently from others. This is not only about
our individual pleasures, regardless of how high,
intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also
about the pleasure of the greatest number affected
by the consequences of our actions. Utilitarianism
cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our
pleasure nor happiness alone; it cannot be all about
us. If we are the only one who are made happy by
our actions, it does not constitute a moral good. If
we are the only ones who are made happpy by our
actions, then we cannot be morally good. It is
necessary for us to consider everyone’s happiness,
including our own, as the standard by which to
evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that
utilitarianism is not at all separate from liberal social
practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all
persons. Utilitarianism is interested with everyone’s
happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. Utilitarianims is interested with the
best consequence for the highest number of people.
It is not interested with the intention of the agent.
Moral value cannot be discernible in the intention or
motivation of the person doing the act; it is based
solely and exclusively on the difference it makes on
the world’s total amount of pleasure and pain.

JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHT

Mill understands justice as a respect for
rights directed toward society’s pursuit for the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. For
him, rights are a valid claim on society and are
justified by utility. Rights referred are related to the
interests that serve general happiness.Society is
made happier if its citizens are able to live thier lives
knowing that their interests are protected and that
society (as a whole) defends it. Extending this
concept to animals, they have rights because of the
effect of such principles on the sum total of
happiness that follows as a consequence of
instituting and protecting their interests.It is not
accidental, therefore, that utilitarians are also the
staunchest defenders of animal rights.A right is
justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they
produce an overall happiness that is greater than
the unhappiness resulting from their
implementation. Utilitarians argue that issues of
justice carry a very strong emotional import because
the category of rights is directly associated with the
individual’s most vital interests. All of these rights
are predicated on the person’s right to life.
Participations in government and social interactions
can be explained by the principle of utility and be
clarified by Mill’s consequentialism. Mill further
associates utilitarianism with the possession of
legal and moral rights.We are treated justly when
our legal and moral rights are respected. Legal
rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights
are subject to some exceptions. Mill points out that
when legal rights are not morally justified in
accordance to the greatest happiness principle,
then these rights need neither be observed, nor b e
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
7.3 RULE UTILITARIANISM
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

respected. For him, THERE ARE INSTANCES
THAT LAW IS NOT MORALLY JUSTIFIED. Mill
seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible
to not follow, even violate, an unjust law. At an
instance of conflict between moral and legal rights,
Mill points out that moral rights take precedence
over legal rights. While it can be justified why others
violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to violate
an individual’s moral rights. However, Mill seems to
provide some extenuating circumstances in which
some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of
the greater general happiness. There is no right to
violate where utility is not served by the social
protection of individual interests.
While Mill recognizes how utilitarian principles
can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that
would regularly be understood as disregarding
individual rights, he argues that this is only possible
if it is judged to produce more happiness than
unhappiness. Mill’s moral rights and considerations
of justice are not absolute, but are only justified by
their consequences to promote the greatest good of
greatest number.
For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms of moral
rights because justice promotes the greater social
good.

SUMMARY
Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasures, Mill provide an adequate discourse on rights
not merely self-gratification, but also the greatest despite it being mistakenly argued to be the
happiness principle or the greatest happiness for weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are
the greatest number of people. We are compelled socially protected and interests that are justified by
to do whatever increases pleasure and decreases their contribution to the greatest happiness
pain to the greatest number of persons, counting principle. However, he also claims that in extreme
each as one and none as more than one. In circumstances, respect for individual rights can be
determining the greatest happiness for the greatest overridden to promote the better welfare especially
number of people, there is no distinction between in circumstances of conflict valuation.
Bentham and Mill. Bentham suggests his felicific
calculus, a framework for quantifying moral
valuation. Mill provides criterion for comparative
pleasures. He thinks that persons who experience
two different types of pleasures generally prefer
higher intellectual pleasures to base sensual ones.
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 8: ETHICS SS24

TERMS
remember:

1. discuss the meaning and basic principles of 1. Character 6. Telos

virtue ethics; 2. Virtue 7. Mesotes
2. distinguish virtuous acts from non-virtuous acts; 3. Vices 8. Arete
3. apply Aristotle’s ethics in understanding the 4. Virtue Ethics 9. Practical Wisdom
Filipino character. 5. Eudaimonia

WHAT IS VIRTUE ETHICS?

✓ An ethical framework that is concerned with understanding the good as a matter of developing the virtuous
character of a person.
✓ Focuses on the formation of one’s character brought about by determining and doing virtuous acts.
✓ Nicomachean Ethics is the first comprehensive and programmatic study of virtue ethics.
✓ Aristotle’s discourse of ethics departs from the Platonic understanding of reality and conception of the
good. Both Plato and Aristotle affirm rationality as the highest faculty of a person and having such
characteristic enables a person to realize the very purpose of her existence. But at the end, they differ in
their appreciation of reality and nature, which, in turn, results in their contrasting stand on what the
ethical principle should be.
✓ For Aristotle, the real is found within our everyday encounter with objects in the world. What makes nature
intelligible is its character of having both form and matter. Therefore, the truth and the good cannot exist
apart from the object and are not independent of our experience.

Mother Teresa?

Do you think that she

is a virtuous person?

Can you say that you

are like her?

68
 JGOM
8.1 HAPPINESS AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

HAPPINESS AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE

Aristotle begins his discussion of ethics by With the condition that there is a hierarchy of telos,
showing that every act that a person does is Aristotle then asks about the highest purpose, which
directed toward a particular purpose, aim, or what is the ultimate good of human being. Aristotle
the Greeks called telos. There is a purpose why one discusses the general criteria in order for one to
does something, and for Aristotle, a person’s action recognize the highest good of man. First, the
manifests a good that he/she aspires for. Every highest good of person must be final. As the final
pursuit of a person hopes to achieve a good. For end, it is no longer utilized for the sake of arriving at
Aristotle, the good is considered to be the telos or much higher end. In our “Example #1”, the purpose
purpose for which all acts seek to achieve. Aristotle of remembering the lessons in the course, that is
is aware that one does an act not only to achieve a why one writes down notes, is not the final end
particular purpose but also believes such purpose because it is clear that such purpose is aimed at
can be utilized for a higher goal or activity, which achieving a much higher goal. Second, the ultimate
then can be used to achieve an even higher telos of a person must be self-sufficient. Satisfaction
purpose and so on. in life is arrived at once this highest good is attained.
Nothing else is sought after and
Example #1:
desired, once this self-sufficient goal
When one diligently writes down notes while listening to a lecture given
by the teacher, she does this for the purpose of being able to remember
is achieved, since this is already
the lessons of the course. This purpose of remembering, in turn, becomes considered as the best possible
an act to achieve a higher aim which is to pass the examination given by good in life. Again, in “Example #1”,
the teacher, which then becomes a product that can help the person the goal of remembering the lessons
attain the goal of having a passing mark in the course. It is important for in the course is not yet the best
Aristotle that one becomes clear of the hierarchy of goals that the possible good because a person can
difference acts produce in order for a person to distinguish which actions still seek for other more satisfying
are higher than the other. goals in life.
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
8.1 HAPPINESS AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

WHAT IS THE HIGHEST GOAL FOR ARISTOTLE?

WHAT GOAL IS BOTH FINAL AND SELF-SUFFICIENT?
According to Aristotle, older individuals
would agree that the highest purpose and the
ultimate good of man is happiness, or for the
Greeks, eudaimonia. One can therefore say that
happiness seems to fit the first criterion of being the
final end of a human being. For it is clear that
conditions for having wealth, power, and pleasures
are not chosen for themselves but for the sake of
being a means to achieve happiness. If one
accumulates wealth, for example, she would want
to have not just richness but also power and other
desirable things as well, such as honor and
pleasures. But all of these ends are ultimately for
the sake of the final end which is happiness.
HOW DOES A PERSON ARRIVE AT HIS/HER HIGHEST GOOD?
According to Aristotle, if an individual’s
action can achieve the highest good, then one must
investigate how she functions which enables her to
achieve her ultimate purpose. If he/she performs
her function well, then she is capable of arriving at
happiness. What defines human beings is her
function or activity of reason. A person’s action to
be considered as truly human must be an act that is
always in accordance to reason. The function of a
human being is to act following the dictate of her
reasons. Any person for that matter utilizes her
reason but Aristotle further says that a person
cannot only perform her function but she can also
perform it well.
HOW DOES A HUMAN BEING
FUNCTION WHICH SETS HER
APART FROM THE REST?
IF THE FUNCTION OF A HUMAN
BEING IS SIMPLY TO DO THE ACT
OF TAKING FOOD IN ORDER TO
SUSTAIN HER LIFE AND CONTINUE
Knock knock
LIVING, THEN WHAT MAKES HER
Knock knock
DIFFERENT FROM PLANTS?
happiness seems to be the final and the highest
good of a person since no other superior end is still
being desired for. Happiness for Aristotle is the only
self-sufficient aim that one can aspire for. No
amount of wealth or power can be more fulfilling
than having achieved the condition of happiness.
Once happiness is achieved, things such as wealth,
power, and pleasurable feelings just give value-
added benefits in life. The true measure of well-
being for Aristotle is not by means of richness or
fame but by the condition of having attained a happy
life. Aristotle shows that one can arrive at the
ultimate good by doing one’s function well.
Example #2
A dancer can dance but what makes her distinct from
an excellent dancer is that the latter dances very well.
The same principle applies to human beings. What
distinguishes a good person from other human beings is
his/her rational activity that is performed well or
excellently. A good individual therefore stands closer
to meeting the conditions of happiness because her
actions are of a higher purpose.
The local saying “Madaling maging tao, mahirap
magpakatao” can be understood in the light of
Aristotle’s thoughts on the function of a good
person. Any human being can perform the activity
of reason; thus, being human is achievable.
However, a good human being strives hard in doing
an activity in an excellent way. Therefore, the task
of being human becomes more difficult because
doing such activity well takes more effort on the part
of the person.

ALSO, IF THE FUNCTION OF HUMAN

BEING IS TO DO THE ACT OF
PERCEIVING THINGS, THEN WHAT
MAKES HER DIFFERENT FROM
ANIMALS?

COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
VIRTUE AS EXCELLENCE
Achieving the highest purpose of human
person concerns the ability to function according to
reason and to perform an activity well or excellently.
This excellent way of doing things is called virtue or
arete by the greeks. Aristotle says that excellence
is an acitivity of the human soul and therefore, one
needs to understand the very structure of a person’s
soul which must be directed by her rational activity
in an excellent way. The human soul is divided into
two parts: the irrational element and the rational
faculty.The irrational element of man consists of the
vegetative and appetitive aspects. The vegetative
aspect functions as giving nutrition and providing
the activity of physical growth in a person. As an
irrational element, this part of man is not in the realm
where virtue is exercised because, as the term
suggest, it cannot be dictated by reason. The
vegetative aspect of the soul follows the natural
processes involved in the physical activities and the
growth of a person. The appetitive aspect works as
a desiring faculty of man. The act of desiring in itself
is an impulse that naturally runs counter to reason
and mist of the time refuses to go along with reason.
Thus, this aspect belongs to the irrational part of the
soul.
Example #3
Sexual impulse is so strong in a person that one tends
to ignore reasonable demands to control such impulse.
However, unlike the vegetative aspect, the desiring
faculty of man can be subjected to reason. Desires are
subject to reason even though these do not arise from
the rational part of the soul.
The rational faculty of man exercises
excellence in him. Once can rightly or wrongly apply
the use of reason in this part. This faculty is further
divided into two aspects: moral, which concerns the
act of doing, and intellectual, which concerns the act
of knowing. These two aspects are basically where
the function or reason is exercised. One rational
aspect where a person can attain excellence is in
the intellectual faculty of the soul. As stated by
Aristotle, this excellence is attained through
teaching. Through time, one learns from the vast
experiences in life where she gains knowledge on
these things. One learns and gains wisdom by being
taught or by learning. There are two ways by which
JGOM
8.2 VIRTUE AS EXCELLENCE
one can attain intellectual excellence: philosophic
and practical. Philosophic wisdom deals with
attaining knowledge about the fundamental
principles and truths that govern the universe. (e.g.
general theory on the origins of things). It helps one
understand in general the meaning of life. Practical
wisdom, on the other hand, is an excellence in
knowing the right conduct in carrying out a particular
act. In other words, one can attain a wisdom that
can provide us with a guide on how to behave in our
daily lives. Although the condition of being excellent
can be attained by a person through intellectual
aspect of the soul, this situation does not make her
into a morally good individual. Aristotle suggests
that although the rational functions of a person
(moral and intellectual) are distinct from each other,
it is necessary for humans to attain the intellectual
virtue of practical wisdom in order to accomplish a
morally virtuous act. Knowing the good is different
from determining and acting on what is good. But a
morally good person has to achieve the intellectual
virtue of practical wisdom to perform the task of
being moral. Therefore, rational faculty of a person
tells us that she is capable of achieving two kinds of
virtue: moral and intellectual. In discussing moral
virtue, Aristotle says that it is attained by means of
habit. A morally virtuous man for Aristotle is
someone who habitually determined the good and
does the right actions. Moral virtue is acquired
through habit. Being morally good is a process of
getting used to doing the proper act.
Example #4
Any craft that one does can be perfected by habitually
doing the right action necessary to be good in a
particular craft. Being a good basketball player, for
example, involves constant training and endless hours of
shooting and dribbling that ball in the right way until one
habitually does the right stroke in shooting the ball and
the right tempo in dribbling the ball. It is only when
he/she properly plays basketball consistently that
he/she will be recognized as a good basketball player.
Example #4 is same as true with moral
virtue. A moral person habitually chooses the good
and consistently does good deeds.
WHEN PRACTICAL WISDOM GUIDES THE
CONDUCT OF MAKING MORALLY RIGHT
CHOICES AND ACTIONS, WHAT DOES IT
IDENTIFY AS THE PROPER AND
THE RIGHT THING TO DO?
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCE
(1) Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
8.3 MORAL VIRTUE AND MESOTES
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

MORAL VIRTUE AND MESOTES

As maintained by Aristotle, it is the middle, wisdom would determine it.” Firstly, moral virtue is
intermediate, or mesotes for the Greeks that is the condition arrived at by a person who has a
aimed at by a morally virtuous person. Determining character identified out of her habitual exercise of
the middle becomes the proper tool by which one particular actions. Secondly, in moral virtue, the
can arrive at the proper way of doing things. Based action done normally manifests feelings and
on Aristotle, a morally virtuous person is concerned passions is chosen because it is in the middle.
with achieving her appropriate action in a manner Aristotle adds that the middle is relative to us. This
that is neither excessive nor deficient. In other does not imply that mesotes totally depends on
words, virtue is the middle or the intermediary point what the person identifies as the middle. Aristotle’s
in between extremes. One has to function in a state middle is not relative to the person but to the
that her personality manifests the right amount of situation and the circumstance that one is in. This
feelings, passions, and ability for a particular act. means that in choosing the middle, one is looking at
The rightness or wrongness of feelings, passions, the situation and not at oneself in identifying the
and abilities lies in the degree of their application in proper way that feelings and passions should be
a given situation. A morally virtuous person targets dispensed. Thirdly, the rational faculty that serves
the mesotes. For Aristotle, the task of targeting the as a guide for the proper identification of the middle
mean is always difficult because every situation is is practical wisdom. The virtuous person learns from
different from one another. Thus the mesotes is her experiences and therefore develops the
constantly moving depending on the circumstance capacity to know the proper way of carrying out her
where she is in. Therefore, the task of being moral feelings, passions, and actions. Aristotle clarifies
involves seriously looking and understanding a further that not all feelings, passions and actions
situation and assessing properly every particular have a middle point. When a mean is sought, it is in
details relevant. Targeting the middle entails being the context of being able to identify the good act in
immersed in a moral circumstance, understanding a given situation. However, when what is involved
the experience, end eventually, developing the is seen as a bad feeling, passion, or action, the
knowledge of identifying the proper way or the mean middle is non-existent because there is no good
to address a particular situation. Aristotle’s (mesotes) in somethings that is already considered
discussion ultimately leads to defining what exactly a bad act.
moral virtue is- “a state of character concerned with Example #5
choice, lying in a mean, that is, the mean relative to When one murders someone, there is nothing excessive
us, this being determined by rational principle, and or deficient in the act: murder is still murder.
by that principle by which the man of practical
Aristotle provide example of particular virtues and the corresponding excesses and deficiencies
of these: This table shows some of the virtues and their vices.

It is only through the middle that a person is able to manifest her feelings, passions, and actions virtuously.
For Aristotle, being superfluous with regard to manifesting a virtue is no longer an ethical act because one
has gone beyond the middle. Being overly courageous (or “super courageous”) for instance does not make
someone more virtuous because precisely in this condition, he/she has gone beyond the middle and
therefore has “moved out” from the state that is virtuous. Therefore, one can always be excessive in her
action but an act that is virtuous cannot go beyond the middle.
 JGOM
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Benguet State University
College of Arts and Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
La Trinidad, Benguet

MODULE 9: SS24 ETHICS

OBJECTIVES
remember:

1. identify the different factors that shape an 1. Kohlberg

individual in her moral decision-making; 2. Moral Development
2. internalize the necessary steps toward making 3. Maturity
informed moral decisions; and 4. Moral Community
3. apply the ethical theories or framework on
moral issues.

MODULE 9: SYNTHESIS
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S
Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

MORAL DELIBERATION

There is a big difference between a young child’s reasoning on the right thing to do and the manner a morally mature individual arrives at an
ethical decision. This necessary growth, which is a maturation in moral reasoning, has been the focus of the study of many theorists. One of
them is the American moral psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) who theorized that moral development happens in six stages,
which he divided into three levels. The first is what we called pre-conventional and it corresponds to how infants and young children think.
This pre-conventional and it corresponds to how infants and young children think. This pre-conventional level, whose reasoning is centered
on the consequences of one’s actions, is divided into two stages. The first stage of reasoning centers around obedience centers around
obedience and the avoidance of punishment: “bad” if it leads to punishment. Later, a child enters the second stage of reasoning and learns
to act according to what she thinks will serve her self-interest; thus, what is “good at this age is what the child thinks can bring her pleasure.
Kohlberg used the term pre-convential to refer to these two stages since at this age, a young child basically thinks only in terms of the pain
(punishment) or pleasure (reward) brought about as a consequence of her actions. Thus, her concentration is on herself and what she can
feel, instead of her society’s conventions on what is right or wrong.

The second level of moral development according to Kohlberg is the conventional since this is the age in which older children, adolescents,
and young adults learn to conform to the expectations of society. This is the time when one learns to follow the convention of her group. This
second level is divided into two stages: the third and fourth stages of moral development. The third stage is when one begins to act according
to what the larger group she belongs to expects her. The individual here assumes that what will benefit her best is when the other members
of her group approve of her actions. The general tendency at this age is to conform first to the values of one’s immediate group, such as her
family, playmates, or later on, barkada. Older children and adolescents eventually begin to value the expectations of the larger group they
belong to, whether it be their school, religion, or state. The fourth stage is achieved when a person realizes that following the dictates of her
society is not just good for herself but more importantly, it is necessary for the existence of society itself. The individual at this stage values
most the laws, rules, and regulations of her society, and thus her moral reasoning is shaped by dutifulness to the external standards set by
society.

In Kohlberg’s reasoning, people who merely follow the rules and regulations of their institution, the laws of their community or state, the
doctrine of their religion-even if they seem to be the truly right thing to do- are trapped in this second or conventional level, which is still not
yet the highest. The point of Kohlberg’s theory is not to ascertain what defines the goodness or rightness of the act. Thus, in this sense,
Kohlberg’s idea is not an ethical theory. Instead, it is a psychological theory that attempts to describe the stages of a person’s growth in moral
thinking. The morally mature individual, for Kohlberg, must outgrow both (1) the pre-conventional level, whose pleasure-and-pain logic locks
one into self-centered kind of thinking, an egoism, as well as (2) the conventional level, which at first glance looks like the sensible approach
to morality. The second level might, de facto, be the way that many (if not most) adults think about morality, that it is simply a question of
following the right rules. The great insight of Kohlberg, however, is that a truly morally mature individual must outgrow even the simple
following of supposedly right rules. This is where the third level comes in.

The third and the highest level of moral development for Kohlberg is what he calls post-conventional since the morally responsible agent
recognizes that what is good or right is not reducible to following the rules of one’s group. Instead, it is a question of understanding personally
what one ought to do and deciding, using one’s free will, to act accordingly. This level, which is also divided into two stages (the fifth and the
sixth), represents the individual’s realization that the ethical principles she has rationally arrived at take precedence over even realization that
the rules or conventions that her society dictates. Moral maturity therefore is seen in an agent who acts is in accordance with one’s
community’s law or not. An agent has attained full moral development if she acts according her well-thought-out rational principles.

In the earlier stage of this level of moral development in the fifth stage, the moral agent sees the value of the social contract, namely,
agreements that rational agents have arrived at whether explicitly or implicitly in order to serve what can be considered the common good
are what one ought to honor and follow. This notion of common good is post-conventional in the sense that the moral agent binds herself to
what this theoretical community of rational agents has identified as morally desirable, whether the agent herself will benefit from doing so or
not. Additionally, this notion of the common good is not reducible to pre-existing communal rules, traditions, or laws since even these must
be weighed using rational discourse. Thus, what is good or right is what honors the social contract; what contradicts it is bad.

The sixth and highest stage of moral development that exists even beyond the fifth stage of the social contract is choosing to perform actions
based on universal ethical principles that one has determined by herself. One realizes that all the conventions (laws, rules, and regulations)
of society are only correct if they are based on these universal ethical principles; they must be followed only if they reflect universal ethical
principles. This is, for Kohlberg, the full maturity of post-conventional thinking since this stage recognizes that in the end, the question of what
one ought to do goes back to the individual moral agent and her own rationality. Kohlberg’s insight is that, ultimately, one must think for
herself what she ought to do. This stand recognizes the supposed fact that there might be instances when the agent must choose to go
against what the community of rational thinkers deems as good if she really thinks she must, assuming that she has committed her full
rationality in arriving at the decision.
JGOM
 JGOM
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S
Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

MORAL PROBLEMS

What must a morally mature individual do when she is confronted with a moral problem? In order to answer this question, we must first
understand that there are different types of moral problems, each one requiring a particular set of rational deliberations. We may attempt to
construct an outline of what we ought to do when confronted with the potential ethical issue.

The first step that we ought to take if there is a potential ethical issue is to determine our level of involvement in the case at hand. Do we
need to make a moral decision in a situation that needs action on our part? Or are we trying to determine the right thing to do in a particular
case, but one that does not necessarily involve ourselves. We may just be reading about a case that involves other people but we are not
part of the case. In any Ethics class, students are made to imagine what they would do in a particular situation. Their moral imagination is
being exercised in the hope of cultivating moral reasoning and giving direction to the needed cultivation of their feelings through habits. But
they must be able to distinguish between making a judgment on a particular ethical situation and coming up with a morally responsible
decision for a situation that they are actually a part of. Being a moral agent specifically refers to the latter situation. We must therefore identify
which activity we are engaged in, whether we are making a judgment on a case that we are not involved in or if we truly need to make a
decision in a situation that demands that we act.

After ascertaining our involvement in the potential moral situation, we then need to make sure of the facts. The first fact to establish is whether
we are faced with a moral situation or not. Are we truly confronted with a genuinely moral situation, or one that merely involves a judgment
in the level of aesthetics or etiquette and therefore is just and amoral or non-ethical question? But if the situation we are involved in truly has
moral weight, if it strikes one to the core because it involves what it truly means to be human, then we must now establish all the facts that
might have a bearing on our decision. We must set aside all details that have no connection to the situation. We must also identify whether
an item in consideration is truly factual that might have a bearing on our decision. We must set aside all details that have no connection to
the situation. We must also identify whether an item in consideration is truly factual or merely hearsay, anecdotal, or an unfounded assumption
assumption and thus unsupportable. This is where such things as “fake news” and “alternative facts” have to be weeded out. Letting such
details seep into our ethical deliberation may unfairly determine or shape our ethical decision-making process, leading us into potentially
baseless choices or conclusions. The responsible moral individual must make sure that she possess all the facts she needs for that particular
situation, but also only the facts that she needs-no more, no less.

The third step is to identify all the people who may potentially be affected by the implications of a moral situation or by our concrete choice
of action. These people are called the stakeholders in the particular case. Identifying these stakeholders forces us to give consideration to
people aside from ourselves. The psychological tendency of most of us when confronted with an ethical choice is to simply think of ourselves,
of what we need, or of what we want. This is also where we can be trapped in an immature assumption that the only thing important is what
we “feel” at that moment, which usually is reducible to Kohlberg’s notion of pre-conventional thinking. When we identify all the stakeholders,
we are obliged to recognize all the other people potentially concerned with the ethical problem at hand, and thus must think of reasons aside
from our own self-serving ones, to come up with conclusions that are impartial (in the sense that they take consideration of everyone’s
welfare), though still thoroughly involved.

Aside from identifying the stakeholders, we must also determine how they may be affected by whichever choice the agent makes in the given
ethical situation, as well as to what degree. Not all stakeholders have an equal stake in a given moral case; some may be more favorably or
more adversely affected by a particular conclusion or choice compared to others. A person’s awareness of these probabilities is necessary
to gain a more comprehensive assessment of the matter at hand in order to arrive at hopefully stronger reasons for making a definite ethical
conclusion or choice.

After establishing the facts and identifying the stakeholders and their concerns in the matter, we must now identify the ethical issue at hand.
There are several types of ethical problems or issues:
The first one is a situation in which we need to clarify whether certain action is morally right or morally wrong. This is where the different
ethical theories or frameworks can serve. Why is murder said to be an unethical or immoral act? How will utilitarianism explain the moral
significance of this action? How about the natural law theory? Virtue ethics?

The second type involves determining whether a particular action in question can be identified with a generally accepted ethical or unethical
acton. An example would be the issue of the ethical value of the death penalty. Can we say that death penalty is tantamount to murder?
What would the different ethical theories or frameworks say regarding this issue? There is hardly an ethical problem if the agent’s question
is clearly about performing a widely-considered unethical or immoral action, such as “Ought I to murder my neighbor?” Murder in almost all,
if not all, societies is unquestionably considered one of the worst acts a human being can perform. The situation in question only assumes
an ethical identity if, in this case, there is a query as to whether a particular act of killing a human being is tantamount to murder or not. The
issue of legalizing the death penalty, for example, is precisely an ethical issue or question, since for some people, the act in which a state
executes someone guilty of a heinous crime should not be considered an act of murder, which is always wrong. The ethical debate
surrounding the imposition of the death penalty is generally not about whether some acts of murder are justifiable or not, but the rather
whether legally-sanctioned executions ought to be considered as murder or not.

The third type points to the presence of an ethical dilemma. Dilemmas are ethical situations in which there are competing values that seem
to have an equal worth. The problem can be concerned either with a choice between two competing moral goods or between two evils. The
responsible moral individual therefore must be able to recognize what exactly the ethical issue at hand is and formulate ans state it clearly
as a moral problem. She has to identify the fundamental values in conflict in such a situation in order to assess later if a workable solution to
the ethical problem can be negotiated that will somehow not end up surrendering one value for the sake of another. The individuals must try
to find the best balance possible that may honor the competing values. She must then identify the possible choices in a given ethical situation
 JGOM
What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Be Like?

Some people believe that there cannot be progress in Ethics, since everything has already been said. . . . I believe the opposite. ....... Compared with the
other sciences, Non-Religious Ethics is the youngest and least advanced.

Derek Parfit, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984)

Morality without Hubris

Moral philosophy has a rich and fascinating history. Scholars have approached the subject from many different perspectives, producing theories that both
attract and repel the thoughtful reader. All of the classical theories contain plausible elements, which is hardly surprising, because they were devised by
philosophers of undoubted genius. Yet the various theories conflict with each other, and most of them seem vulnerable to crippling objections. Thus, one
is left wondering what to believe. What, in the final analysis, is the truth?

Naturally, different philosophers would answer this question in different ways. Some might refuse to give an answer, on the g rounds that we do not know
enough to offer a “final analysis.” In this respect, moral philosophy is not much worse off than any other subject—we do not know the final truth about
most things. But we do know a lot, and it might not be rash to say something about what a satisfactory moral theory might be like.

A Modest Conception of Human Beings. A satisfactory theory would be realistic about where human beings fit in the grand scheme of things. The “big
bang” occurred some 13.7 billion years ago, and the earth was formed around 4.5 billion years ago. Life on earth evolved slow ly, mostly according to the
principles of natural selection. When the dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago, this left more room for the evolution of mammals, and a few hundred
thousand years ago, one line of that evolution produced us. In geological time, we arrived only yesterday.

But no sooner did our ancestors arrive than they began to think of themselves as the crown of creation. Some of them even imagined that the whole
universe had been made for their benefit. Thus, when they began to develop theories of right and wrong, they held that the protection of their own interests
had a kind of ultimate and objective value. The rest of creation, they reasoned, was intended for their use. But now we know better. We now know that
we exist by evolutionary accident, as one species among millions, on one small speck of an unimaginably vast cosmos. The deta ils of this picture are
revised each year, as more is discovered, but the main outlines are well established. Some of the old story remains: human be ings are still the smartest
animals we know and the only ones that use language. Those facts, however, cannot justify an entire worldview that places us at the center.

How Reason Gives Rise to Ethics. Human beings have evolved as rational beings. Because we are rational, we are able to take some facts as reasons
for behaving one way rather than another. We can articulate those reasons and think about them. Thus, if an action would help to satisfy our desires,
needs, and so on— in short, if it would promote our interests—then we take that as a reason to do it.

COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th
Edition).New York: Random House, 1986.
 JGOM
The origin of our concept of “ought” may be found in these facts. If we were incapable of considering reasons, we would have no use for such a notion.
Like the other animals, we would act from instinct, habit, or passing desire. But the examination of reasons introduces a new factor. Now we find ourselves
driven to act in certain ways as a result of deliberation—as a result of thinking about our behavior and its consequences. We use the word ought to mark
this new element of the situation: We ought to do what there are the strongest reasons for doing.

Once we see morality as a matter of acting on reason, another important point emerges. In reasoning about what to do, we can be consistent or
inconsistent. One way of being inconsistent is to accept a fact as a reason on one occasion but to reject it as a reason on a similar occasion. This happens
when one places the interests of one’s own race above the interests of other races, despite the similarity of the races. Racism is an offense against
morality because it is an offense against reason. Similar remarks apply to other doctrines that divide humanity into the morally favored and disfavored,
such as nationalism, sexism, and classism. The upshot is that reason requires impartiality: We ought to promote the interests of everyone alike.

If Psychological Egoism were true—if we could care only about ourselves—this would mean that reason demands more of us than we can manage. But
Psychological Egoism is not true; it presents a false picture of human nature and the human condition. We have evolved as social creatures, living together
in groups, wanting one another’s company, needing one another’s cooperation, and capable of caring about one another’s welfare. So there is a pleasing
“fit” between (a) what reason requires, namely, impartiality; (b) the requirements of social living, namely, adherence to rules that serve everyone’s interests,
if fairly applied; and (c) our natural inclination to care about others, at least to a modest degree. All three work together to make morality not only possible
but natural for us.

Treating People as They Deserve

The idea that we should “promote the interests of everyone alike” is appealing when it is used to refute bigotry. However, sometimes there is good reason
to treat people differently— sometimes people deserve to be treated better or worse than others. Human beings are rational agents who can make free
choices. Those who choose to treat others well deserve good treatment; those who choose to treat others badly deserve ill treatment.

This sounds harsh until we consider some examples. Sup- pose Smith has always been generous, helping you whenever she could, and now she is in
trouble and needs your help. You now have a special reason to help her, beyond the general obligation you have to be helpful to everyone. She is not
just a member of the great crowd of humanity; she has earned your respect and gratitude through her conduct.

By contrast, consider someone with the opposite history. Your neighbor Jones has always refused to be helpful. One day, for e xample, your car wouldn’t
start, and he wouldn’t give you a ride to work—he just couldn’t be bothered. Sometime later, though, he has car trouble and asks you for a ride. Now
Jones deserves to have to fend for himself. If you gave him a ride despite his past behavior, you would be choosing to treat him better than he deserves.

Treating people as they have chosen to treat others is not just a matter of rewarding friends and holding grudges against enemies. It is a matter of treating
people as responsible agents who merit particular responses, based on their past conduct. There is an important difference between Smith and Jones:
one of them deserves our gratitude; the other deserves our resentment. What would it be like if we did not care about such things?

For one thing, we would be denying people the ability to earn good treatment at the hands of others. This is important. Becau se we live in communities,
how each of us fares depends not only on what we do but on what others do as well. If we are to flourish, then we need others to treat us well. A social
system in which deserts are acknowledged gives us a way of doing that; it gives us the power to determine our own fates. Abse nt this, what could we do?
We might imagine a system in which a person can get good treatment only by force, or by luck, or as a matter of charity. But the practice of acknowledging
deserts is different. It not only gives people an incentive to treat others well but also gives them control over how they themselves will be treated. It says
to them, “If you behave well, you will be entitled to good treatment from others. You will have earned it.” Acknowledging deserts is ultimately about treating
other people with respect.

A Variety of Motives

There are other ways in which the idea of “promoting the interests of everyone alike” apparently fails to capture the whole o f moral life. (I say “apparently”
because I will ask later whether it really does.) Certainly, people should sometimes be moved by an impartial concern for others. But there are other
morally praiseworthy motives:

• A mother loves and cares for her children. She does not want to “promote their interests” simply because they are people she can help. Her
attitude toward them is entirely different from her attitude toward other children.

• A man is loyal to his friends. Again, he is not concerned with their interests only as part of his general concern for people. They are his friends,
and so they matter more to him.

Only a philosophical fool would want to eliminate love, loyalty, and the like from our understanding of the moral life. If su ch motives were eliminated, and
instead people simply calculated what was best, we would all be much worse off. Anyway, who would want to live in a world without love and friendship?

COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th
Edition).New York: Random House, 1986.
 JGOM
Of course, people may have other good motives:

• A composer is concerned, above all else, to finish her symphony. She pursues this even though she might do “more good” by doing something
else.

• A teacher devotes great effort to preparing his classes, even though he might do more good by directing his energy elsewhere.

While these motives are not usually considered “moral,” we should not want to eliminate them from human life. Taking pride in one’s job, wanting to create
something of value, and many other noble intentions contribute to both personal happiness and the general welfare. We should no more want to eliminate
them than to eliminate love and friendship.

Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism

Above, I tried to justify the principle that “we ought to act so as to promote the interests of everyone alike.” But then I n oted that this cannot be the whole
story of our moral obligations because, sometimes, we should treat different people differently, according to their individua l deserts. And then I discussed
some morally important motives that seem unrelated to the impartial promotion of interests.

Yet these concerns may be interrelated. At first blush, it seems that treating people according to their individual deserts i s quite different from seeking to
promote the interests of every- one alike. But when we asked why deserts are important, the answer was that we would all be much worse off if
acknowledging deserts was not part of our social scheme. And when we ask why love, friendship, artistic creativity, and pride in one’s work are important,
the answer is that our lives would be so much poorer without them. This suggests that a single standard might be at work in our assessments.

Perhaps, then, the single moral standard is human welfare. What is important is that people be as happy as possible. This standard can be used to assess
a wide variety of things, including actions, policies, social customs, laws, rules, motives, and character traits. But this does not mean that we should
always think in terms of making people as happy as possible. Our day-to-day lives will go better if we simply love our children, enjoy our friends, take
pride in our work, keep our promises, and so on. An ethic that values “the interests of everyone alike” will endorse this conclusion.

This is an old idea. The great utilitarian theorist Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) made the same point:

The doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that Univer- sal Benevolence is the only right or always
best motive of action . . . if experience shows that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men freque ntly act from other motives than
pure universal philanthropy, it is obvious that these other motives are reasonably to be preferred on Utilitarian principles.

This passage has been cited in support of a view called “Motive Utilitarianism.” According to that view, we should act from the motives that best promote
the general welfare.

Yet the most plausible view of this type does not focus exclusively on motives; nor does it focus entirely on acts or rules, as other theories have done.
The most plausible theory might be called Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism. This theory is utilitarian, because the ultimate goal is to maximize the general
welfare. However, it recognizes that we may use diverse strategies to pursue that goal. Sometimes we may aim directly at it. For example, a senator may
support a bill because she believes that it would raise the standard of living for everyone. Or an individual may send money to the International Red Cross
because he believes that this would do more good than anything else he could do. But usually we don’t (and needn’t) think of the general welfare at all;
instead, we simply care for our children, work at our jobs, obey the law, keep our promises, and so on.

Right Action as Living According to the Best Plan. We can make the idea behind Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism a little more specific.

Suppose we had a fully specified list of the virtues, motives, and methods of decision-making that would enable a person to be happy and to contribute
to the welfare of others. And suppose, further, that this list is optimal for that person; no other combination of features w ould work better. Such a list would
include at least the following:

• The virtues that are needed to make one’s life go well

• The motives on which to act

• The commitments that one will have to friends, family, and others

• The social roles that one will occupy, with the responsibilities and demands that go with them

• The duties and concerns associated with one’s projects and one’s choice of career
COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S
• The everyday rules that one will usually follow without even thinking Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th
Edition).New York: Random House, 1986.
 JGOM
• A strategy, or group of strategies, about when to con- sider making exceptions to the rules, and the grounds on which those exceptions can be
made

The list would also specify the relations between the different items on the list—what takes priority over what, how to adjudicate conflicts, and so on. It
would be very hard to construct such a list. As a practical matter, it might even be impossible. But we can be fairly sure that it would include endorsements
of friendship, honesty, and other familiar virtues. It would tell us to keep our promises, but not always, and to refrain from harming people, but not always;
and so on. And it would probably tell us to stop living in luxury while millions of children die of preventable diseases.

At any rate, there is some combination of virtues, motives, and methods of decision-making that is best for me, given my circumstances, personality, and
talents—“best” in the sense that it will optimize my chances of having a good life, while optimizing the chances of other people having good lives, too.

Call this optimum combination my best plan. The right thing for me to do is to act in accordance with my best plan.

My best plan may have a lot in common with yours. Presumably, they will both include rules against lying, stealing, and killi ng, together with an
understanding about when to make exceptions to those rules. They will each include virtues such as patience, kindness, and se lf-control. They may both
contain instructions for raising children, including a specification of the virtues to foster in them.

But our best plans need not be identical. People have different personalities and talents. One person may find fulfillment as a rabbi while someone else
could never live like that. Thus, our lives might include different sorts of personal relationships, and we might need to cultivate different virtues. People
also live in different circumstances and have access to different resources—some are rich; some are poor; some are privileged; some are persecuted.
Thus, the optimum strategies for living will differ.

In each case, however, the identification of a plan as the best plan will be a matter of assessing how well it promotes the interests of everyone alike. So
the overall theory is utilitarian, even though it may frequently endorse motives that do not sound utilitarian at all.

The Moral Community

As moral agents, we should be concerned with everyone whose welfare we might affect. This may seem like a pious platitude, but in reality it can be a
hard doctrine. Around the world, almost one child in five fails to get essential vaccinations, resulting in hundreds of thousands of unnecessary deaths
each year. Citizens in the affluent countries could easily cut these numbers in half, but they won’t. People would no doubt do more if children in their own
neighborhoods were dying, but the children’s location shouldn’t matter: Everyone is included in the community of moral concern. If we cared about all
children, then we’d have to change our ways.

Just as the moral community is not limited to people in one place, so it is not limited to people at any one time. Whether people will be affected by our
actions now or in the future is irrelevant. Our obligation is to consider everyone’s interests equally. One consequence of th is pertains to nuclear weapons.
Such weapons not only have the power to maim and kill innocent people, but they can also poison the environment for thousands of years. If the welfare
of future generations is given proper weight, it is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which such weapons should be use d. Climate change is another
issue that affects the interests of our descendants. If we fail to reverse the effects of global warming, our children will suffer even more than we will.

There is one other way in which our conception of the moral community must be expanded. Humans are not alone on this planet. Other sentient animals—
that is, animals capable of feeling pleasure and pain—also have interests. When we abuse or kill them, they are harmed, just as such actions can harm
humans. We must therefore include the interests of nonhuman animals in our calculations. As Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) pointed out, excluding
creatures from moral consideration because of their species is no more justified than excluding them because of their race, nationality, or income level.
The single moral standard is not human welfare, but all welfare.

Conclusion

What would a satisfactory moral theory look like? I have out- lined the possibility that seems most plausible to me: According to Multiple-Strategies
Utilitarianism, we should maximize the interests of all sentient beings by living according to our best plan. Modesty, however, is required when making
such a proposal. Over the centuries, philosophers have articulated and defended a wide variety of moral theories, and history has always found flaws in
their theories. Still, there is hope, if not for my suggestion, then for some other proposal down the road. Civilization is o nly a few thousand years old. If we
do not destroy it, then the study of ethics has a bright future.

COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (8th
Edition).New York: Random House, 1986.
 COURSE CONTENT MAIN REFERENCES/S
Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., &
Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation.
Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.

A CLOSING THAT IS REALLY OPENING

At the end of this introduction to ethical study, we should already have a more or less clear idea of how to make informed moral decisions. You should,
at this point, have sufficient mental and affective equipment to arrive at sound judgments for cases in discussion or for enacting real-life decisions.
The classical theories or frameworks that we have taken up are in no way exhaustive. There are many other theories especially in the twentieth
century that have emerged to take up the question of “What ought I to do?” and “Why ought I to do it?” These four frameworks, however, have proven
to be some of the most influential in human thought and should serve as an introduction to other theories or to further discussions on moral philosophy.
They are not to be seen as options to dictate on what one is supposed to do in a particular situation. This is the cynical way these frameworks are
sometimes employed: use them as needed to justify what one wants to do in particular situation. The more productive use of these frameworks instead
is to employ them as beginning guides to one’s further exploration into the topic of morality. Test them out: identify their strengths, recognize their
weak points, stretch them out to see up to where they can work, and think of what can be added to the parts where they do not work anymore.

In the end, there is only a beginning: We do not have a computer program here that can automatically calculate what is the right thing to do in a given
situation. It seems safe to assume that there can never be such a thing. There is only the human individual along with her community of fellow human
beings who need to accept that they must continue to explore the meaning of what is good and right while hoping to arrive at the best judgments they
can make at this point in time. Realizing the finitude of human understanding and of the capacity to make choices, but at the same time hoping that
one’s best attempt at doing what is right does mean something in the end- these are part and parcel of making informed moral decisions.

Module 9. Synthesis EVALUATION

QUIZ 7

NAME: YR/SEC/COURSE:

INSTRUCTIONS: (i) Read the statements carefully.

(ii) Tell which level of moral development the statements below pertains.
(iii) Choose your answer by writing it on the space provided.
(iv) Write the letter only.
OPTIONS
A. Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment D. Stage 4. Maintaining Social Order
B. Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange E. Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights
C. Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationship F. Stage 6. Universal Principles

1. “I won’t cheat on my husband because it’s adultery. Adultery is against the law.”

2. “Lying to the Nazis about the Jews in the basement is all right if it is going
to save an innocent life; We need to provide financial assistance to
the poor because they have no resources to assist themselves.“

3. “I won’t cheat on the test because my parents will be ashamed of me.”

4. “I will cheat because I will get a better score on the exam.”

5. “I ran a red light because it was 12 midnight, no one was around, and there
was an emergency at home.”

6. “I won’t cheat because I will get caught.”

 Benguet State University
College of Social Sciences
Social Studies Department
La Trinidad, Benguet

Acknowledgments
I acknowledge Dr. Charlie Dagwasi and Ms. Jehjirah Gale Mangangot, co-faculty members of the College of
Social Sciences, for the initial preparation of this learning packet.
The pictures, words, ideas and concepts were collected and collated from various sources to aid in the
facilitation of this course. They belong to their rightful authors.

SACANUTO, 2023