REPUBLIC ACT NO.

6968

AN ACT PUNISHING THE CRIME OF COUP D’ÉTAT BY AMENDING ARTICLES 134, 135
AND 136 OF CHAPTER ONE, TITLE THREE OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT
HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. The heading of Chapter One, Title Three of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
amended to read as follows: “REBELLION, COUP D’ÉTAT, SEDITION AND DISLOYALTY”.

SEC. 2. Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection.—How committed.—The crime of rebellion or insurrection

is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”

SEC. 3. Chapter One, Title Three of the Revised Penal Code is hereby further amended by
adding a new article as follows:

“Article 134-A. Coup d’état.—How committed.—The crime of coup d’état is a swift attack
accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communications networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines
by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or
employment, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power.”

SEC. 4. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’état.—Any person who promotes,
maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

“Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or

insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.

“Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup
d’état shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

“Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of
others in undertaking a coup d’état shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period.
“Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports,
finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d’état shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its maximum period.

“When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’état shall be under the command of unknown
leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other
documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be
deemed a leader of such rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’état.“

SEC. 5. Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’état, rebellion or insurrection.—The
conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’état shall be punished by prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).

“The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished,

respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), and by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos (P2,000.00).”

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause.—All laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part
thereof inconsistent herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 7. Separability Clause.—If for any reason, any section or provision of this Act, or any part
thereof, or the application of such section, provision, or portion is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder thereof shall not be effected by such declaration.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause.—This Act shall take effect upon its approval and publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved, October 24, 1990.

COUP D’ETAT

GONZALES vs. ABAYA

G.R. No. 164007

FACTS:

Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with
an aim to destabilize the government. Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Trillanes, disarmed the security
guards, and planted explosive devices around the building.

DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers while
respondent General Abaya issued a Letter Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked
to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles
of War

The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine of absorption,"
those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military
tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the
accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup d’etat."

In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those involved be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to
submit their answer to the charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War maintaining that since the RTC has made a determination in its
Order that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected,
but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to
its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged before military
tribunal for violation of Articles of War. (YES)

HELD:

1) As to the jurisdiction of the court

GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law who commit
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special
penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.

EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be
service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
court.

It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing of their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
(under Art. 96 of Articles of War) – dismissal from the service –imposable only by the military
court.

The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not sevice-connected, but
rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat”, practically amended the law
which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or
offenses." It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal,
body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. Evidently, such
declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies
to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here,
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.
SEDITION

PEOPLE V. UMALI

G.R. No. L-5803

November 29, 1954

FACTS:

Umali, Pasumbal, and Capino were found guilty by the CFI of Quezon province of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery said to have been
committed during the raid staged by armed men in the town of Tiaong, Quezon. The said raid
resulted in the burning down and complete destruction of houses, including that of Mayor
Punzalan. Some of the raiders also engaged in looting and in robbing one house and two
Chinese stores until they were dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army
soldiers. The records revealed that Congressman Umali and Mayor Punzalan were old time
friends and belonged to the same political faction. These friendly relations, however, did not
endure. In the elections of 1951, Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, Umali picked
Pasumbal, his trusted leader. Punzalan won. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly
disappointed. It appears that on the night before the elections, Umali instructed Pasumbal to
contact the Huks so that Punzalan will be killed. The raid was then carried out by the Huk troops
numbering about 50, armed with garands and carbines. Part of the contingent went in the
direction of Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and
even with bottles filled with gasoline. It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's
house was to kill him. Fortunately, however, Punzalan left early that morning to go to Lucena,
the capital.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court is correct in finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery.

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that the principal and main (though not necessarily the most serious) crime
committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act
of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and
for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the RPC under rebellion. The raiders
did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to
attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of a public official, Mayor Punzalan. Under Article 139 of the same
Code, this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery, it was not one
of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house.
The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as
an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from
the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to
replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who
actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to
the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon a policeman with a hand grenade
causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye may be regarded as frustrated murder,
the wounding of five other people should be considered as mere physical injuries. The crimes
committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the
premeditation was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others intended
by the raiders. The killing may, however, be qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms
against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. The three murders may be punished with the penalty of death. However,
because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KAMLON HADJI

G.R. No. L-12686 October 24, 1963

Facts:

The Court of First Instance of Sulu convicts Kamlon for the (1) crime of sedition and (2)
kidnapping with murder. Kamlong Hadji appeals the trial court decision. He alleges that the
kidnapping with murder was committed in furtherance of sedition and should be absorbed in
sedition.The facts of the kidnapping case are as follows: One morning, Kamlon Hadji (Kamlon),
with two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, looked for Hatib Ajibun (Ajibun) and
Jamalul Alling (Alling), whom they suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of
the followers of the Kamlon. Threatening to kill, Kamlon and his companions seized the Ajibun
and Along and brought them to the residence of Kamlon. Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were
detained overnight. Theywere brought to a store in the nearby market place. Kamlon shot
Jamalul Aling with his automatic carbine. Ulluh, then, beheaded the corpse and tossed the
severed head and headless body to the sea. Meanwhile, Kamlon spared the life of Hatib Ajibun.
Ajibun was brought back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged
participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. Ajibun was found innocent by
Kamlon. He was ordered to pay P105.00 as fine and released. Kamlon invokes the cases
People vs Hernandez and People vs Geronimo to support his appeal.

Issue:

Whether the kidnapping with murder should be absorbed in the crime of sedition?

Ruling:

No. No law or jurisprudence allows the Court to uphold the Kamlon’s claim that acts of violence
like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. Common offenses of murder etc. are
treated as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Sedition is not the same
offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against persons.
Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the government,
and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals.

Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state;
murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any
human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied. The
offenses charged in the information for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point
of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. The crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries are not necessarily included in the information for sedition.
INCITING TO SEDITION

PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ, GR.NO L-6025

Facts:

On March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants
charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFT. Amado was also the
President of the Congress of Labour Organization (CLO). They were accused of being members
of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in an armed rebellion
against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbong Bayan
Laban sa mga Hapot), they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, plunder, looting
plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.

'The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of the crime
committed required the denial of bail. More so, the complex crime charged by the government
against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested communist leaders and
was sentenced to life time imprisonment. The accused positioned that CFI erred arguing that
rebellion cornet be a complex crime with murder, arson and robbery.

ISSUE: Whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson or robbery.

Ruling:

No, rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson or robbery.

Under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, “engaging in war against the forces of the
government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These
expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime,
Article 48 doesn't apply since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.

Here, the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as
means "necessary" for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in
the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies.

Therefore, Rebellion cannot be complexed with common-crimes such as killings, destruction of

property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking is not art,
more correct more so that there is no legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY
ONE CRIME.
 ESPIRITU V. LIM

G.R. No. 85727

In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not
warranted.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid
and protection.

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was
sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When
he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal
where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty.[7]

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition).

The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of
arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club,

"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urguing all drivers and operators to go on
nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give in to their demands to
lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of
the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further,
we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988."[8]
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but
he gave the lawmen the slip.[9] He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:

"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare
parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo
na."[10] (emphasis supplied)

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
[11]

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
SEDITIOUS SPEECH

PEOPLE V. NABONG- G. R. No. 36426

FACTS:

Appellant Ignacio Nabong, an attorney in Cabanatuan, was found guilty of sedition under
section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No, 1692 by the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Nueva Ecija. He was arrested for giving a seditious speech in a necrological
meeting in memory of one Antonio

D. Ora, the head of the communists in Philippine Island, held in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. In the
course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary, using words
substantially to the following effect:

"They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad
because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. - In view of this, we ought
to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own
government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their
sides.

The testimony for the defense tends to show that Nabong went to the meeting for the purpose of
preventing a disturbance. That the language used by him was not intended to advocate the
overthrow of the Government by force

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of sedition.

Held:

The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by
violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently
intended to be understood. The word "overthrow/ could not have been intended as referring to
an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise.

It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of
organized government by unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended
to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to
instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and
incited rebellious conspirades, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
and to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the Government, in violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended, it is not necessary, in order
to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the
constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is
also to punish utterances which may endanger public order.
SEDITIOUS WORDS

People v. Perez, G.R. No. 21049, December 22, 1923.

Perez was convicted of the crime of contempt of the ministers of the Crown for stating that “The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having recommended a bad
thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.”

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so
as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to
the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a
democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment,
seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General
passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the
words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at
the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-
General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of
executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the
Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
SCURRILOUS LIBEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

ESPUELAS V. PEOPLE No. L-2990. December 17, 1951

Facts:

In 1947, Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken as if he were hanging lifeless from tree and with
a fake suicide letter of Alberto Reveniera to his wife and children; he sent it for publishing to
different local and international newspapers. The fake letter stated that Alberto killed himself
because he was ashamed of the Roxas administration and that his wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill that the Philippine government was infested with many “Hitlers and
Mussolinis” and that his children should burn Roxas’ pictures. Espuelas was convicted of
publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether the acts of the accused constitute inciting to sedition

Ruling:

Yes. Art. 142 of the RPC states “scurrilous libel” as a form of inciting to sedition. The essence of
seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods to redress the evils which press upon
their minds. A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
persons infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.