Dilthey and Gadamer

Dilthey and Gadamer: Two Theories of Historical Understanding
Author(s): David E. Linge

Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion , Dec., 1973, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec.,
1973), pp. 536-553
Published by: Oxford University Press
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CRITICAL DISCUSSION
Dilthey and Gadamer

Two Theories of Historical Understanding
DAVID E. LINGE
ST "O the impenetrable depths within myself," wrote Wilhelm D

1910, "I am an historical being.... The first condition for the
bility of historical science lies in the fact that I am myself an h
being - that the one who studies history is the same one who makes
sentences of Dilthey's give expression to the central problem of t
namely, the problem of the relation between historical understanding
historicity of human existence. Most philosophers have taken the rela
tween these two notions to be one of mutual exclusion. The unqualified
tion of man's historicity seems to lead directly to a relativism that m
kind of objective knowledge impossible. Hence it is not surprising
author of the above words is generally considered one of the fathers of
ism. Writing at the turn of the century, Dilthey was indeed one of t
thinkers to see that the result of historical scholarship - its insight int
a creature of history - threatened to undercut the very ideal of objecti
which historical scholarship itself is based.
In this paper, I shall examine the attempts of two thinkers - Wilh
they and Hans-Georg Gadamer - to work out a positive relationship b
the historicity of the knower and the objectivity of historical interpret
sharply conflicting theories of these thinkers represent two of the prin
in which German philosophy in the twentieth century has sought to
terms with the radical historicity of man while avoiding the pitfalls of
1 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (14 vols.; Stuttgart: Teubner,

Vol. VII, p. 278. (Hereafter cited as GS, with appropriate volume number fo
DAVID E. LINGE (Ph.D., Vanderbilt University) is Assistant Professor of

Studies at The University of Tennesee in Knoxville.
536

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DILTHEY AND GADAMER 537
The background of the problem

viction that has become increasi
years - the conviction usually re
sciousness" The rise of what I w
the development of scientific h
subsequent accumulation of a va
whole range of social, political, a
of its development of the natur
teenth century to our own time
torical awareness it has bequea
humanities has been left untouch
during the past century, not on
precedented mass of informatio
adopt a historical point of view
important part of its task to exa
it is concerned from the point of
and the various historical influen
The term "historical consciou
signifies more than the emergen
the methodology of present-day
standing of reality, to a convict
categories constitute the widest
"History," said Ernest Troeltsch,
of things or a partial satisfaction
of all thinking about values and
species regarding its nature, orig
has thus come to constitute a wo
to a wider framework - to absolutes or to realities not accessible to historical
thinking and historical investigation - is no longer possible.
This view of things stands in stark contrast to the sense of the meaningful-
ness of history which men had before the present century. Until the close of
the last century, men considered history intelligible and knowledge of it impor-
tant only because history itself was deemed to fit into a larger metaphysical con-
text. For medieval man, history was intelligible in terms of the supernatural
end which God had ordained for it and not in terms of itself. During the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, this supernatural framework for history and
historical understanding was more and more called into question; the meaning
of history became man himself, his struggle towards and gradual realization of
his natural capacities and ideals. Hence the foundations of historical under-
*Ernst Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (Tii-
bingen: Mohr, 1929), p. 3.

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538 DAVID E. LINGE
standing at the time of

tury reflected the gen
control and direct him
goals, the validity of
medieval and the mod
and historical knowled
was thought to be cont
providence, for the ot
Even before the collap
War, historical conscio
qualifying in principle
The German theologia
torical thinking: "The
asserts, "consists in the
torical'. What earlier a
historically, but for t
historical becomes the
relativism, the growin
longer regards history
nificance. At most, hi
tinual positing of abso
understood historically
prevents one from tak
knowledge that fill the
History does indeed kno

norm or good. These oc
of perfection, in a teleo
scendentally founded no
the processes of positin
versal validity. By trac
values, goods or norms,
the unconditional posit
the age is limited.'
Historical consciousne
ofevery man and every
But what holds for o
is a small step from D
erosion of the tradition
mode of being of the t
less immersed in histo
SGerhard Ebeling, Wor

' GS, VII, p. 173.

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silenced by the relativity of their

his own claims will fare any bett
subordinates - or better, swallow
given in the past, but now, in F
bites its own tail, this mode of in
himself.5 The final and most de
therefore, is not its ever more r
rather its radical historicization
historical knower himself.
And this, of course, is the poin
brate a logical victory over their
in the triumph of Socratic philos
goras. The critics of historicism
the knower of history as well as
dations for objective knowledge
the historicist's presuppositions r
the ideal of objective knowledge
opponents of historicism insist, t
maintain both their assertion of
and their claim to a scientific his
objectively valid knowledge of h
able enough that most would-be
affirmation of human historicity,
that has allowed them to salvage
by exempting the knower himse
historicity. The most prominent
seen in the great interest philos
have shown in methodological qu
any rate, even the brief analysis
taken leads one to suspect that th
nated historical studies at the tu
vague sense of self-contradiction
The subtle continuation by the
set out to overcome is nowhere m
interpretation he adopts. For it i
ogy - that is, by virtue of his me
control- that the knower comes
remain unaffected by his histor
understanding with which the hi
at which we gain an insight into
to history. In the following sect
5 Friedrich Meinecke, Zur Theorie

Koehler, 1959), p. 215.

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540 DAVID E. LINGE
of historical understan
main interest is not in
of historical interpreta
to the reflexive questi
thinkers make regardin
historicity of the know
II
Dilthey's philosophy of life stands within the great tradition of German his-
torical scholarship which has its roots in early nineteenth-century romanticism
and includes the work of such thinkers as Schleiermacher, Ranke, Droysen, and
the Historical School. But it is especially Dilthey, in a series of writings that
appeared between 1900 and his death in 1911, who worked out the historicist
implications of this heritage.
Throughout his writings, Dilthey posits a unique connection between life
and history. "In its subject matter," he asserts, "life is identical with history.
And history consists in life of all kinds in the most varying circumstances. His-
tory is only life viewed in terms of the continuity of mankind as a whole."6
Life is the ultimate, underlying ground of all human thought and action and the
source from which the entire socio-historical world arises. It is the compre-
hensive context in which individual, personal lives take place. But we can ap-
proach life only through the study of the myriad forms in which it manifests
itself in the course of history. "History must teach us what life is; yet, because
it is the course of life in time, history is dependent on life and derives its con-
tent from it."'
If we are to understand what Dilthey means by historicity, we must first
of all consider his concept of the organic system of consciousness that is at the
basis of human life and all its historical manifestations. The human studies
(Geisteswissenschaften) are distinct from the natural sciences precisely becaus
their mode of understanding presupposes an inner and underived mental struc-
ture which is present to the individual in experience and reflection on experienc
The continuity of life that embraces both the subject and the objects of historica
knowledge is seen in the fact that this mental structure is at the basis of the
knower's own life as well as at the basis of the phenomena he studies.
For Dilthey, the initial contact of the self with its environment is not a pas
sive recording of impersonal, neutral objects and processes. Rather, immediate
awareness of our involvement in the world occurs on the level of vital interac-
tion. Drives and instincts innate in the self run up against the resistance of what
is beyond it.8 Consequently, the basic form of our mental structure is determined
6 GS, VII, p. 256.

7 GS, VII, p. 262.
8 Cf., GS, V, pp. 98-105.

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in lived experience by the recipr

environment and responds purpo
therefore an original element of
the world is originally present in
relation in which it stands. Dilth
up out of such preconceptual inv
... There is nothing that does not

thing is related to it, the state of the
and people around it. There is not
to me; for me it involves pressure o
a restriction of my will, importanc
or resistance, distance or strangene
tory or permanent, these people a
existence or heighten my powers; or
pressure on me and drain my streng
only in the life-relation to me prod
the basis of life itself, types of beh
evaluation and the setting of purpos
other. In the course of life they for
determine all activity.'
Reflection presupposes lived ex

what is given in it. The self thus
albeit in a pre-reflective and not
which develops on this pre-conce
As reflection clarifies and draws
ness, these elements already belo
perience. The structural unity of
somehow subsequent to lived exp
only insofar as it belongs ab initi
present in it. This is not of cour
structure is consciously present i
the organic whole of mental life
manent in the particular lived exp
in that particular but rather, star
tion which uncovers and draws o
making up the total system. Thu
and future pervade each momen
spontaneously determine that mo
In this way reflection arises s
draws out and clarifies the mean
initial encounter with the world.
of the comprehensive system of t
9 GS, VII, pp. 131-32.

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542 DAVID E. LINGE
matic awareness. Neve

the mental structure,
than the mere chron
most primordial level
place according to thei
self-reflection can ran
can be transformed f
ciplined and sustained
out and accentuates m
forgetfulness. He rem
his life goals, and the
of those goals. Old let
projects into his futu
into reflection, and t
of lived experience and
with historical interp
understanding.
There are two feature
prove to be the essent
as such.
(1) Historical underst

part-whole structure.
significance for the c
to which they belong.
interpretation as the p
interrelatedness. And a
in their significance a
interpreter's view thr
familiar with the her
vidual structure that fo
of a text or a personal
historical epoch. In all
for in en them we also
parts have their signi
own study of the Prus
in Italy are, therefore
the personal self, the
of themselves because
mark them off from what went before and what follows. "It is the task of his-
torical analysis," Dilthey asserts, "to discover the climate which governs the con-
crete purposes, values and ways of thought of a period. Even the contrasts which
prevail there are determined by this common background. Thus, every action,

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every thought, every common activ

has its significance through its re
For Dilthey, hi then, the ideal of
of itself. The interpreter does no
external perspective - for instance
of eternal values - nor does he cr
of view as false or delusory. Inde
immersing oneself in the object,
a manifestation of something bey
toward the individual that rescues
ditional worldviews, each of whic
reality. "Every expression of life
expresses something that is part o
itself. There is nothing in it that
(2) Secondly, historical understa
from sensuously given manifesta
directly given, namely, the indivi
tions of life presuppose. That is t
the existence of a historico-cultu
following Hegel, calls objective sp
"the past is a permanently enduri
style of life and the forms of soci
society has created for itself, to
philosophy.... From this world of
from earliest childhood. It is the
people and their expressions take
objectified itself contains somethi
All expressions, intentional or un
the individual life structure, belo
stitute the point of departure for
expressive behavior such as gestu
tions which tell us something of t
tific expressions gain their preci
without any reference to an indiv
stances. Yet even Newton's Princi
'" GS, VII, pp. 154-55; cf. also, p. 1

limited but specific sense that they al
sufficient to justify Dilthey's procedu
larger realities, unlike personal selves
are only logical subjects. Cf. GS, VII
n GS, VII, p. 234; cf. also, p. 138.
1~ GS, VII, p. 208.

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544 DAVID E. LINGE
torical understanding
author or the mind of
primarily dependent o
the conversation, the
All of these presuppos
Indeed, such expression
than their author cons
cation of such clues to
hope to understand th
they argues, therefore,
these life-manifestatio
the individual life-who
These two essential ch
standing to be one of
knower into the horizo
for the possibility of u
known are individual s
system of life appears
organ by which I unde
effect become the oth
life-structure, not in t
by reflectively graspin
son or age.
Now is my it
content
cism are present in Di
model- dominant, at le
phy and historiography
tory. Dilthey
assumes
the very success of hi
knower's negating and
his object. The aim of
prejudices, and thus to
in terms of the life-w
his own present as a
achieved in direct prop
zons that, on Dilthey's
toricity. Paradoxically
poses no real limitatio
history a living reality
it did those of the pas
behind by the utilizati
This alienation from h
standing, has profoun
understanding liberate

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dom from the prejudices given in

cal horizons. From his methodol
comes to see the relativity and th
The historical consciousness of th

of every human social condition an
the last step towards the liberation
to enjoy every experience to the fu
as if there were no system of philo
from knowledge through concepts
webs of dogmatic thought. Everythi
relived and interpreted, opens pers
And equally, we accept the evil, hor
as containing some reality which mu
thing that cannot be conjured aw
tinuity of creative forces asserts itse
What Dilthey is offering us he

quite at odds with the one he im
manner reminiscent of Hegel, D
constitutes a kind of heightened
itself and gaining a final sovereig
standing gives life what the olde
cal consciousness could not: a con
onesidedness which, as Dilthey se
Thus the cogency of Dilthey's
knower's own transcendence of
the historicist is magically eman
universal. This conflict, implicit
tific historical knowledge and th
solved by Dilthey. At the very e
epistemological consequences tha
of historicism consistent by p
historical Weltanschauung," he sa
the final chains which natural sc
where are the means for overcom
break in? I have labored my ent
If I fall along the way, I hope my
it to the end."14 But how Dilth
hard to discern, nor did his stud
Dilthey did, however, succeed in
his conception of historical know
work leaves us with a choice betw
because of the threat it poses to
* GS, VII, pp. 290-91.

' GS, V, p. 9.

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546 DAVID E. LINGE
that model of historic

value in his historicism
unanimous in adopting
a concerted effort to e
III
It is man's situation to be present in and to understand his world in terms

of patterns of meaning that are antecedent to reflection and color reflection when
it occurs. Dilthey intended his concept of historicity to illuminate this perspec-
tival character of human consciousness. But if we now recall his proposition
that "the one who studies history is the same one who makes it," the full irony
of his position comes to light, for historicity is exactly what he cannot ultimately
attribute to the knower. His insight into the historical nature of man seems to
have a purely negative value for him.
Against this background, we can now turn our attention to the new direction
Hans-Georg Gadamer takes in his reflections on the nature of understanding. In
his systematic work Truth and Method, which appeared in 1960, and in numer-
ous essays since that time,15 Gadamer elevates the historicity of understanding to
the level of a basic hermeneutical principle and exhibits the positive role his-
toricity actually plays in every human transmission of meaning. The most im-
mediate result of Gadamer's affirmation of historicity is to diminish the sharp
distinction between the scientific interpretation that goes on in the Geisteswissen-
schaften and the broader processes of understanding that occur everywhere in
human life without any pretense of scientific precision. Scientific interpretation
too, as a mode of human activity, is subject to the universal and binding power
of man's historicity. Quite explicit in Gadamer's work, therefore, is a thorough-
going critique of the excessive claims made by Dilthey and others that methodo-
logical self-consciousness and critical self-control amount to a vehicle whereby the
knower transcends his own historicity. Such claims reflect the Cartesian and
Enlightenment ideal of the autonomous subject who successfully extricates him-
self from the immediate entanglements of history and the prejudices that come
with that entanglement. For Dilthey, historical understanding occurs only in-
sofar as the knower breaks the immediate and formative influence of history
upon him and stands over against it. Historical understanding is the action of
subjectivity purged of all prejudices.
This methodological alienation of the knower from history is precisely the
point at which Gadamer focuses his criticism. Is it the case that the knower can
leave his immediate situation in the present by virtue of adopting an attitude?
1 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundziige einer philosophischen

Hermeneutik (2nd ed.; Tiibingen: Mohr, 1965), and Kleine Schriften (3 vols.; Tiibingen:
Mohr, 1967-72). (The former work will be cited as WM, the latter as KS.) A selection
of essays from the Kleine Schriften, translated and edited by the present writer, will be
published shortly by Northwestern University Press as Essays in Philosophical Herme-
neutics.

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An ideal of understanding that as

ble only on the assumption that t
factor. But if it is an ontological
condition, then the knower's own
volved in any actual process of
knower's boundness to his presen
him from his object are no longe
come, but rather, the productive
do not cut us off from the past b
horizons have a hermeneutical sig
historical understanding commens
Precisely here is the point at whic

must critically begin. The overcomi
the Enlightenment - will itself tur
will clear the way for an appropria
only dominates our humanity but ju
standing in traditions actually mean
limited in one's freedom? Rather,
free - limited and conditioned in m
absolute reason is simply not a possi
is only real as historical, that is, wi
ways remains dependent upon the g
Prejudice is the necessary conditi

as a finite being, has no direct or
from his position in the present.
ined ways, the present is the "giv
and which reason can never entir
This is the meaning of the "herm
term. The givenness of the herm
critical self-knowledge in such fa
derstanding might disappear. "To
to be absorbed into self-knowledg
The past can now be seen to hav
of understanding. Its role cannot
or events that make up the "obje
tion, it also defines the ground th
stands. While acknowledging this
mer can still affirm the legitima
critical scholarship. Despite the a
receives its rightful and distingu
16 WM, p. 260.
17 WM, p. 285.
" Several reviewers have charged Ga
hostile and passionate of Gadamer's cr

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548 DAVID E. LINGE
less, such methodology

broader more spon and
goes on and always has
scientific self-control.1
understanding tries to
and interpretation, or
knower's present histo
standing itself - even
tinues, and adds to the
to preserve and transm
formed at all without
immediately by the pa
in and through its und
form and have formed
derstanding, either bef
historical consciousnes
standing-within tradit
this. We can tell where
But Mommsen's Histor
methodology - also bet
ten and proves to be a
"knowing subject."''
In this fashion, Gadam
knowledge and traditio
which historical under
This continuing standin
situates the knower in
productive reality, of
seen this in the Phenom
arises from a histori
reason, Hegel contende
it into knowledge. Ga
Dilthey - to the extent
gaining critical awaren
stands in close proximity

der Geisteswissenschafte
is found in his "Hermcn
second edition of WM, p
"1 Gadamer has in mind
of art ( WM, pp. 1-162) a
290-95, 307-23). Cf. also, KS, I, pp. 101-107, 119-21.
' WM, p. 289.
2Cf. KS, I, pp. 103, 120-21.
22Cf. Hegel, Phianomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), pp. 19ff.
(Baillie translation, pp. 80ff.), and Gadamer, WM, pp. 285-86.

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interaction which shapes our herm

historical interaction and the imme
all lead to the negation of its influ
ultimately of Dilthey's conceptio
equate these two--awareness of his
fluence upon us. For Gadamer, on
and finite, not absolute, and for th
"substantiality" of the past inoper
ing brings before me something
Something - but not everything, fo
torical interaction is inescapably m
never fully manifest."23 The con
negates the conditionedness. The r
of faith in a method does not cance
than does the naive unawareness of it.
It should be clear from this that Gadamer is not offering us a normative
account of historical understanding. He presents no new canon of interpreta-
tion, but rather is seeking to describe the ontological context in which all under-
standing - including critical understanding - transpires. This context cannot
be adequately grasped in terms of a model of historical understanding dominated
by the idea of a method. The emphasis upon method, in fact, blurs our sensitivity
to historical understanding as an event over which the interpreter does not
preside. Here Gadamer's philosophy joins Heidegger's attack on the "sub-
jectivism" of Western metaphysics, which has as its point of departure the self-
secured position of the knowing subject. Understanding is an event, a move-
ment of history itself in which neither interpreter nor text can be thought of as
an autonomous part. "Understanding itself," Gadamer argues, "is not to be
thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but as the entering into an event
of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated. This is what
must gain validity in hermeneutical theory, which is much too dominated by
the idea of a procedure, a method."24
In sharp contrast to Dilthey's model, Gadamer regards historical understand-
ing not as transposition, but as translation. Even in the most careful attempts
to grasp the past "as it really was," understanding remains essentially a mediation
of the past with the present. Understanding is not reconstruction, but integra-
tion. As translation, mediation, the interpreter's action belongs to and is of the
same nature as the substance of history which fills out the temporal gulf. For
this gulf, as the continuity of heritage and tradition, is precisely a process of
"presencings," that is, of mediations, through which the past already functions in
and shapes the interpreter's present. Historical understanding is always a con-
crete fusing of horizons (Horizontsverschmeltzung). The event of understand-
ing alters the horizons that existed beforehand. The text or events of the past
23KS, I, p. 127.
' WM, pp. 274-75.

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550 DAVID E. LINGE
speak anew in the lan

is enhanced and broa
overcome. This conc
critical interpretatio
rect them in our eff
longer to be regarde
free, absolute knowl
permanent, inflexibl
immersion in histori
the presupposition o
toricity is taken ser
position and becomes
indeed productive an
and fused with future
In truth the horizon o

as we must all constan
the understanding of
such testing as the las
shape at all without th
itself as there are his
understanding is alway
in themselves.... In th
there old and new gr
one or the other ever
The event of underst

genuinely learns som
This is a profoundly
much from Hegel, b
great distance betwe
continues the contem
him attains a final g
sure, this absolute g
takes place instead in
precisely this contem
a victim of the very
Man, this temporal cr

he works in time, by
objects. While under t
in lies the eternal contradiction between creative minds and the historical con-
sciousness. The former naturally try to forget the past and to ignore the better
in the future. But the latter lives in the synthesis of all times, and it perceives
in all individual creation the accompanying relativity and transience. This con-
tradiction is the silently born affliction most characteristic of philosophy today.ft
' WM, p. 289.

2 Dilthey, GS, V, p. 364; similarly, cf. GS, VIII, p. 225.

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Gadamer's philosophy is more

side of Hegel's thought. Not th
ing, dialectical life of reason fi
neutics. Historical understandin
knowledge.27 Every experience,
experience. Our efforts to un
Genuine historical understandin
our finitude. Yet this conscio
being - is not an achievement w
infinitude of absolute knowled
experience, for future historica
ity of historical interaction, th
rather contains, as an essential i
formation, that is, for fusion w
Gadamer has located the dee
Heidegger and has built upon i
event of understanding is both
ongoing dialogue with the past
only to be resumed again and a
like all new attempts at philos
evitable interinvolvement of dis
and disadvantages.
I have indicated that Gadamer
for interpretation, but seeks to
what is actually achieved in his
mer's philosophical hermeneutic
tology that more adequately illu
standing. Gadamer emphaticall
metaphysics and the consciousn
against the "subjectivism" of
standing of being that can push
ter of hermeneutical theory an
braces knower and known ali
act of subjectivity - as an adequ
tion of the original author (me
judged against an alleged mean
terpretations and is only throu
therefore, is extensive and epi
standing is a moment in the lif
are subordinate elements. It is e
going process of "presencing
present. "The real event of und
" Cf. WM, pp. 439-40.

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552 DAVID E. LINGE
beyond what can be

by methodological ef
what we ourselves ca
that through it some
Gadamer's philosoph
tion of the actual ro
should be of interes
from the ideal of on
of text or historical
situation is a constitu
is no meaning of the
But Gadamer's theor
stimulate further in
mer do away with th
himself to the charg
whatsoever and make
preter may well fin
final result of his ef
the process of traditi
of in all this." But ca
procedures he follow
determinate meanin
lar to that encounter
where a tension and
situation of ethical a
the objective, unamb
Like ethics, hermene
meaning and the cre
be that a theory of h
dialogue with ethics
linguistic analysis.
Perhaps Gadamer's t
question of the objec
through a careful de
actually come into co
conversation and agr
situation as one essen
What a text means is

stubbornly adhered to
the question of how
In this sense, underst
comprehension" whic
to understand the tex
' KS, I, pp. 80-81.

106.221.238.30 on Tue, 05 Dec 2023 05:04:59 +00:00
meaning of the text the interpre

extent, the interpreter's own hori
standpoint which one holds fast or c
and possibility which cooperates in
We have described this as a fusin
form of operation of the conversat
sion which is not only mine or my
However this may be, Gadamer

function of human historicity as
past for ever new concretizations
ing for ever new appropriations
2 WM, p. 366.

106.221.238.30 on Tue, 05 Dec 2023 05:04:59 +00:00

Dilthey and Gadamer

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Dilthey and Gadamer

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Dilthey and Gadamer: Two Theories of Historical Understanding

Author(s): David E. Linge

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1461732

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