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INFORMATION GAMES
Swapnendu Banerjee
Jadavpur University
Kolkata, INDIA
1.
Games of Incomplete
Information
Bayesian Equilibrium
✘ Harsanyi, John C., 1967/1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by
Bayesian Players, I-III." Management Science 14 (3): 159-183 (Part I), 14 (5): 320-
334 (Part II), 14 (7): 486-502 (Part III).
✘ We consider a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game
Assumption:
Prisoner 1 has an influential attorney who is her relative.
If she does not confess and so does prisoner 2 then her sentence is
completely waived.
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Modified Prisoner’s dilemma game
✘ Consider the modified prisoner’s dilemma game:
P2
Confess (C) Not Confess (NC)
✘ Prisoner 2 knows that if both play (NC, NC), then Prisoner 1’s sentence will be
completely waived.
✘ Now, the prisoner 2 can be of two types
a) normal type (exhibiting the payoffs as above)
b) good type -> hates to cheat his partner, pays a psychic penalty of 6
years more in jail if she confesses
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Modified prisoner’s dilemma
P2
✘ In the “normal type” game prisoner 2’s optimal strategy is “C” and in
“good type” game optimal strategy is “ NC ”
✘ Prisoner 1 does not know the type of prisoner 2
Incomplete information
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Harsanyi’s contribution
✘ Converted the incomplete information game into a game of complete
but imperfect information by introducing a new player ‘Nature”
This formalizes prior belief of Prisoner-1
Prisoner 1 has the following belief:
With probability 𝜇 prisoner 2 is a normal type
With probability 1 − 𝜇 prisoner 2 is a good type
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Extensive form representation of modified prisoners’ Dilemma
Nature
𝜇 1−𝜇
𝑃1
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶
𝑃2 (Normal) 𝑃2 (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑)
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶 𝑁𝐶 C 𝑁𝐶 C
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Extensive form representation of modified prisoners’ Dilemma
Nature
𝜇 1−𝜇
𝑃1
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶
𝑃2 (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) 𝑃2 (Good)
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶 𝑁𝐶 C 𝑁𝐶 C
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Extensive form representation of modified prisoners’ Dilemma
Nature
𝜇 1−𝜇
𝑃1
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶
𝑃2 (Normal) 𝑃2 (Good)
𝑁𝐶
C C
𝑁𝐶 𝑁𝐶 C 𝑁𝐶 C
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Strategies
Prisoner 1 Prisoner 2
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Application: Research and development game
✘ The Model:
✘ R&D research consortium
✘ Two members: Firm 1 and 2
✘ Rule: Independent invention by one firm has to be shared fully
with the other
✘ New invention can come from any of the two firms
✘ To develop a new idea, there is cost 𝑐 ∈ 0,1
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Research and development game
✘ The ability to internalize the knowledge from the invention is
each firm’s “type”
✘ For firm 𝑖, type is 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2
✘ Type is private information
✘ Benefit from R&D is 𝜃𝑖 2 , 𝑖 = 1,2 , also private information
✘ Both firms believe that 𝜃𝑖′ s are drawn independently and
uniformly from [0,1] ⇒ Find pdf…??? f(x)=??...prior belief
✘ Firms simultaneously decide whether to innovate or not
✘ 𝑆𝑖 𝜃𝑖 = 1 if 𝑖th firm innovates, = 0 otherwise.
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✘ If firm 1 decides to innovate, then net payoff is 𝜃1 2 − 𝑐
✘ If firm 1 decides not to innovate, then expected payoff is 𝜃1 2 ×
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑆2 𝜃2 = 1)
𝑐
✘ Firm 1 will innovate iff 𝜃1 ≥ = 𝜃1 (Say)
1−𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑆2 𝜃2 =1)
✘ If 𝜃1 ≥ 𝜃1 then 𝑆1 𝜃1 = 1, otherwise 0
✘ Therefore, only a sufficiently high type firm will go for R&D.
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✘ In isolation (without any other firm), firm 1 innovates if 𝜃1 2 − 𝑐 ≥
0 ⇒ 𝜃1 ≥ 𝑐 = 𝜃1 (say)
✘ Evidently, 𝜃1 > 𝜃1
R&D range (with
Free-riding range another firm)
0 𝜃1 𝜃1 1
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Research and development game
✘ From uniform distribution we get,
P𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑆1 𝜃1 = 1]=1−𝜃1 (How?? Use the pdf)
Similarly, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑆2 𝜃2 = 1]=1−𝜃2
𝑐
From = 𝜃1
1−𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑆2 𝜃2 =1)
2 𝑐 𝑐
We get, 𝜃1 = = 1−1+𝜃
1−𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑆2 𝜃2 =1] 2
2
=>𝜃1 𝜃2 = c …(1)
Similarly, from firm 2’s condition, we will get
2
𝜃2 𝜃1 = c …(2)
From (1) and (2) we get 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 …(3)
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Research and development game
✘ Substituing (3) in (1) we get,
𝜃 ∗ = 𝑐 1/3
✘ Optimal threshold types depends on c, the parameter of the model.
✘ Since 𝑐 ∈ 0,1 , 𝜃 ∈ 0,1
✘ Optimal strategies of both players:
Player 1 Player 2
∀𝜃1 ∈ [0, 𝜃 ∗ ), 𝑆1 𝜃1 = 0 ∀𝜃2 ∈ [0, 𝜃 ∗ ), 𝑆2 𝜃2 = 0
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What else can we say?
✘ Question: What is the equilibrium probability that both firms go for
R&D?
2
✘ Answer: (1−𝜃 ∗ ).(1−𝜃 ∗ )=(1−𝜃 ∗ )
✘ Question: What is the equilibrium probability that only one firm will
opt to innovate?
✘ Answer: 2𝜃 ∗ (1−𝜃 ∗ )
✘ Question: What is the equilibrium probability that no firm will opt to
innovate?
2
✘ Answer: 𝜃 ∗
✘ Reference: MWG, Ch 8, Section 8 E, 8E.2
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Application 2:Provision of Public good Under Incomplete Info
✘ Simplified model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1981)
The Model:
✘ There are 2 players, i=1,2
✘ Players decide simultaneously whether to contribute towards a
public good or not
✗ 1-> contribute
✗ 0-> don’t contribute
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✘ Each player derives a benefit of 1 unit if at least one of them
contributes to the public good provision.
✘ Each player gets ‘0’ if no one contributes.
✘ The benefit of the players are common knowledge.
✘ Cost of contribution is 𝑐𝑖 for player 𝑖.
✘ Cost is private knowledge, 𝑐𝑖 is the type of player 𝑖.
✘ Both players believe that 𝑐𝑖 𝑠 are drawn independently from
the same continuous and strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function P(. ) on [𝑐, 𝑐].
✘ This belief is again common knowledge, where P 𝑐 = 0 and
P(𝑐)=1, => Common Priors.
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✘ We assume 𝑐 < 1 < 𝑐
✘ Pure strategy of this game is a function 𝑆𝑖 𝑐𝑖 , where 𝑐𝑖 is the type
of the player 𝑖 P2
Contribute (C) (1 − 𝑐1 ), (1 − 𝑐2 ) (1 − 𝑐1 ), 1
P1
Not contribute 1, (1 − 𝑐2 ) 0, 0
(NC)
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✘ Specific Example:
Let the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 be uniform on [0,2].
Therefore, P 𝑐 = 𝑐/2.
Now one can get specific values of 𝑐1∗ and 𝑐2∗ .
From 1 − P(𝑐2∗ ) = 𝑐1∗ and 1 − P(𝑐1∗ ) = 𝑐2∗
we get 1 − 𝑐2∗ /2 = 𝑐1∗ and 1 − 𝑐1∗ /2 = 𝑐2∗ ,
Solving
we get 𝑐1∗ = 𝑐2∗ =2/3.
Thus the thresholds are same ⇒ players are symmetric (obvious)
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Therefore,
Player-1’s Strategy:
𝑆1 (𝑐1 )=1 , if 𝑐1 ∈ [0, 2/3 ].
𝑆1 (𝑐1 )=0 , if 𝑐1 ∈ (2/3, 2 ].
Similarly
For Player-2, 𝑆2 (𝑐2 )=1 , if 𝑐2 ∈ [0, 2/3 ].
𝑆2 (𝑐2 )=0, if 𝑐2 ∈ (2/3, 2 ].
(2/3, 1 ] is the free riding range, where the benefit is greater than cost but
still the players prefer not to contribute, tries to free ride on other’s
contribution.
Reference: Fudenberg and Tirole Ch 6, Section 6.2
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