Cognitive processes

Unit 2 – imagery and cognitive maps

Introduction to imagery

Mental imagery which is the mental representation of stimuli when those stimuli are not physically
present (Kosslyn et al., 2010). You can have a mental image for any sensory experience. However,
most of the psychology research examines visual imagery, or the mental representation of visual
stimuli. Fortunately, during the past decade, the research has increased for auditory imagery, which
is the mental representation of auditory stimuli.

Imagery relies exclusively on top-down processing. Consider why this statement must be true: Your
sensory receptors do not receive any input when you create a mental image (Kosslyn & Thompson,
2000). Perception uses previous knowledge to gather and interpret the stimuli registered by the
senses. In contrast to imagery, perception requires you to register information through the receptors
in your sensory organs, such as your eyes and ears (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). As a result,
perception requires both bottom-up and top-down processing. Mental imagery can be helpful when
you want to solve a spatial problem, or when you need to work on a task that requires creativity. As
you might expect, people who earn high scores on visuospatial working memory are also likely to
perform well on tasks that require visual imagery (Gyselinck & Meneghetti, 2011).

What kind of imagery do we use most often?

Stephen Kosslyn and his co-authors (1990) asked students to keep diaries about their mental
imagery. They reported that about two-thirds of their images were visual. In contrast, images for
hearing, touch, taste, and smell were much less common. Psychologists show a similar lopsidedness
in their research preferences. Most of the research focuses on visual imagery, though the research
on auditory imagery has increased during the last decade. In contrast, psychologists rarely
investigate smell, taste, or touch imagery. Some professions emphasize mental imagery, most often
visual imagery (Reed, 2010). Would you want to fly on an airplane if your pilot had weak spatial
imagery? Imagery is also important in clinical psychology. Therapists often work with clients who
have psychological problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, or eating disorders.
With each of these disorders, individuals sometimes report that they experience intrusive,
distressing mental images. Therapists have successfully worked with clients by encouraging them to
create alternative, more positive images (Bisby et al., 2010; Brewin et al., 2010). In addition, spatial
ability is extremely important in the STEM disciplines, that is, science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (Ganis et al., 2009). For instance, Albert Einstein is well known as one of the geniuses
of the last 100 years. Einstein reported that his own thinking processes typically used spatial images,
instead of verbal descriptions (Newcombe, 2010). Unfortunately, elementary school teachers in the
United States rarely teach children about spatial skills. In fact, the curriculum may not emphasize
spatial skills until students enroll in a geometry class. Psychologist Nora Newcombe (2010) describes
some interesting methods for enhancing young children’s spatial skills. A typical task might require
students to mentally rotate a picture until it resembles one of five options. Many high school and
college students believe that they cannot possibly improve their spatial skills. However, training in
spatial skills improves spatial performance for students of any age (Ganis et al., 2009; Reed, 2010;
Twyman & Newcombe, 2010).
History

Wilhelm Wundt is often described as the founder of psychology. Wundt and other early
psychologists considered imagery to be an important part of the discipline (Palmer, 1999). In
contrast, behaviorists such as John Watson strongly opposed research on mental imagery because it
could not be connected to observable behavior. In fact, Watson argued that imagery did not exist
(Kosslyn et al., 2010). As a result, North American psychologists seldom studied imagery during the
behaviorist period between 1920 and 1960 (Ganis et al., 2009; Kosslyn et al., 2010). For example, I
used PsycINFO to search for the term ‘‘mental imagery’’ in any part of every journal article published
during the decade from 1950 through 1959. The search identified only 34 articles. As cognitive
psychology gained popularity, however, researchers rediscovered imagery. The topic continues to be
important in contemporary cognitive psychology, especially with the development of more
sophisticated techniques in cognitive neuroscience (Ganis et al., 2009; Reed, 2010).

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VISUAL IMAGERY

Research on mental imagery is difficult to conduct, especially because researchers cannot directly
observe mental images and because they fade so quickly (Kosslyn et al., 2003; Kosslyn et al., 2006).
However, psychologists have modified some research techniques that were originally developed for
studying visual perception. These techniques can now be applied to mental images (Allen, 2004). As
a result, the investigation of imagery has made impressive advances.

Mental rotation

For the top pair of objects, labelled A, look at the object on the left. Try rotating it in any direction
you wish. Can you rotate it so that it matches the object on the right? Which of these three pairs of
objects are the same, and which are different?

C
1) Stephen Kosslyn and his colleagues (2006) use the term imagery debate to refer to an
important controversy: Do our mental images resemble perception (using an analog code),
or do they resemble language (using a propositional code). The majority of theorists believe
that information about a mental image is stored in an analog code (Howes, 2007; Kosslyn et
al., 2006; Reisberg et al., 2003). An analog code is a representation that closely resembles
the physical object. The word analog suggests the word analogy, such as the analogy
between the real object and the mental image. According to the analog-code approach,
mental imagery is a close relative of perception (Tversky, 2005a). When you look at a sketch
of a triangle, the physical features of that triangle are registered in your brain in a form that
preserves the physical relationship among the three lines. Those who support analog coding
propose that your mental image of a triangle is registered in a somewhat similar fashion,
preserving the same relationship among the lines. However, supporters of the analog
approach do not suggest that people literally have a picture in their head (Ganis et al., 2009;
Kosslyn et al., 2006). Furthermore, they point out that people often fail to notice precise
visual details when they look at an object. These details will also be missing from their
mental image of this object (Howes, 2007; Kosslyn et al., 2006).
2) In contrast to the analog-code position, other theorists argue that we store images in terms
of a propositional code (Pylyshyn, 2003, 2006). A propositional code is an abstract, language-
like representation; storage is neither visual nor spatial, and it does not physically resemble
the original stimulus (Ganis et al., 2009; Reed, 2010). According to the propositional-code
approach, mental imagery is a close relative of language, not perception. For example, when
you store a mental image of a triangle, your brain will register a language-like description of
the lines and angles. Theorists have not specified the precise nature of the verbal
description. However, it is abstract, and it does not resemble English or any other natural
language. Your brain can then use this verbal description to generate a visual image (Kosslyn
et al., 2006; Reed, 2010). In general, the neuroimaging research shows that the primary
visual cortex is activated when people work on tasks that require detailed visual imagery
(Ganis et al., 2009). This is the same part of the cortex that is active when we perceive actual
visual objects.
3) Furthermore, researchers have studied people who have prosopagnosia, people with
prosopagnosia cannot recognize human faces visually, though they perceive other objects
relatively normally (Farah, 2004). These individuals also have comparable problems in
creating visual imagery for faces (Ganis et al., 2009). The controversy about analog versus
propositional coding is difficult to resolve. The majority of people who conduct research on
visual imagery support the analog position, perhaps partly because they personally
experience vivid, picture-like images (Reisberg et al., 2003). Like most controversies in
psychology, both the analog and the propositional approaches are probably at least partially
correct, depending on the specific task.
4) Suppose that a mental image really does resemble a physical object. Then people should be
able to make judgments about this mental image in the same way that they make judgments
about the corresponding physical object (Hubbard, 2010). For example, we should be able to
rotate a mental image in the same way that we can rotate a physical object. Judgments
about distance in a mental image should also be similar, as well as judgments about shape.
In addition, a mental image should create interference when we try to perceive a physical
object. Furthermore, we should be able to discover two interpretations of a mental image of
an ambiguous figure, and we should be able to produce other vision-like effects when we
construct a mental image.
Visual imagery and rotation

A researcher who wants to study whether people rotate a mental image in the same way that they
rotate a physical object. A researcher may simply think ask people to analyze their mental images
and use these reports as a basis for describing mental imagery. However, think why these
introspective reports could be inaccurate and biased. For example, we may not have conscious
access to the processes associated with our mental imagery (Anderson, 1998; Pylyshyn, 2006). An
important problem is that people’s reports about their cognitive processes may not be accurate.
Researchers have explored the mental-rotation issue more than any other topic connected with
imagery.

Shepard and Metzler’s Research - a classic experiment by Roger Shepard and his co-author
Jacqueline Metzler (1971). Suppose that you are holding a physical, geometric object in your hands,
and you decide to rotate it. It will take you longer to rotate this physical object by 180 degrees than
to rotate it only 90 degrees. Now suppose that our mental images operate the same way that
physical objects operate. Then it will take you longer to rotate this mental image 180 degrees,
instead of 90 degrees.

Notice that, in the top pair of designs (Part A), the left-hand figure can be changed into the right-
hand figure by keeping it flat on the page and rotating it clockwise. Suddenly, the two figures match
up, and you conclude ‘‘same.’’ You can match these two figures by using a two-dimensional rotation.
In contrast, the middle pair (Part B) requires a rotation in a third dimension. You may, for example,
take the two-block ‘‘arm’’ that is jutting out toward you and push it over to the left and away from
you. Suddenly, the figures match up, and you conclude ‘‘same.’’ However, in the case of the bottom
pair (Part C), you cannot rotate the figure on the left so that it matches the figure on the right.
Therefore, you must conclude ‘‘different.’’

Shepard and Metzler (1971) asked eight extremely dedicated participants to judge 1,600 pairs of line
drawings like these. They were instructed to pull a lever with their right hand if they judged the
figures to be the same, and to pull a different lever with their left hand if they judged the figures to
be different. In each case, the experimenters measured the amount of time required for a decision.
Notice, then, that the dependent variable is reaction time, in contrast to the dependent variable of
accuracy used in most of the research we have examined in previous chapters. Now look at Figure,
Pair A - These figures require only a two-dimensional rotation, similar to rotating a flat picture. In
contrast, Pair B-These figures require a three-dimensional rotation, similar to rotating an object in
depth.

As both graphs show, people’s decision time was strongly influenced by the amount of mental
rotation required to match a figure with its mate. For example, rotating a figure 160 degrees
requires much more time than rotating it a mere 20 degrees. Furthermore, notice the similarity
between pair A and pair B. In other words, the participants in this study performed a three-
dimensional rotation almost as quickly as a two-dimensional rotation. (figures in Pair C are based on
different shapes, so these data are not included in either in pair A or pair B.) As you can see, both
figures show that the relationship between rotation and reaction time is a straight line. This research
supports the analog-code perspective, because you would take much longer to rotate an actual
physical object 160 degrees than to rotate it a mere 20 degrees. In contrast, a propositional code
would predict similar reaction times for these two conditions; the language-like description for the
figure would not vary with the amount of rotation (Howes, 2007).
Subsequent Research on Mental Rotation.

The basic findings about mental rotation have been replicated many times. Using a variety of other
stimuli, such as letters of the alphabet, researchers have found a clear relationship between angle of
rotation and reaction time (e.g., Bauer & Jolicoeur, 1996; Cooper & Lang, 1996; Dahlstrom-Hakki et
al., 2008; Kosslyn et al., 2006; Newcombe, 2002). That is, people make judgments more quickly if
they need to rotate a mental image just a short distance.

Space for diagram

If you are left-handed, you may wonder if handedness can influence the mental rotation process.
Kotaro Takeda and his co-authors (2010) asked the participants in their study to look at pictures of a
human hand and to identify whether they were viewing a left hand or a right hand. Right-handers
recognized a right hand faster than a left hand. In contrast, left-handers recognized right and left
hands equally quickly. However, both groups recognized upright pictures faster—and more
accurately—than upside-down pictures. This particular finding is consistent with the earlier research.
After all, people take less time to rotate an image 0 degrees, rather than 180 degrees. We also know
that elderly people perform more slowly than younger people on a mental-rotation task. In contrast,
age is not consistently correlated with other imagery skills, such as sense of direction or the ability to
scan mental images (Beni et al., 2006; Dror & Kosslyn, 1994). Other research shows that deaf
individuals who are fluent in American Sign Language (ASL) are especially skilled in looking at an
arrangement of objects in a scene and mentally rotating that scene by 180 degrees (Emmorey et al.,
1998).

Why should deaf people perform so well on these mental rotation tasks?

They have an advantage because they have had extensive experience in watching a narrator produce
a sign. Then they must mentally rotate this sign 180 degrees. They need to perform this rotation
frequently, so that they can match the perspective that they would use when producing this sign. (If
you are not fluent in ASL, stand in front of a mirror and notice how you and a viewer would have
very different perspectives for your hand movements.) In general, the research on rotating
geometric figures provides some of the strongest support for the analog-coding approach. We seem
to treat mental images the same way we treat physical objects when we rotate them through space.
In both cases, it takes longer to perform a large mental rotation than a small one.

Cognitive Neuroscience Research on Mental Rotation Tasks.

In one of the early neuroscience studies on this topic, Kosslyn, Thompson, and their coauthors
(2001) examined whether people use their motor cortex when they imagine themselves rotating one
of the geometric. These researchers instructed one group of participants to rotate—with their own
hands—one of the geometric figures that had been used in Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) study.
They instructed a second group of participants to simply watch as an electric motor rotated this
same figure. Next, the people in both groups performed the matching task that by rotating the
figures mentally. Meanwhile, the researchers conducted PET scans to see which areas of the brain
the participants were using during the mental-rotation task. The PET-scan results were clear-cut.
Those participants who had originally rotated the original geometric figure with their hands now
showed activity in their primary motor cortex—the same part of the brain that had been active
when they had rotated the figure with their hands. In contrast, consider the participants who had
originally watched the electric motor as it rotated the figure. On the mental-rotation task, these
people now showed no activity in the primary motor cortex. Without the ‘‘hands on’’ experience,
their primary motor cortex was not active. The nature of the instructions during the actual mental
rotation can also influence the pattern of activation in the cortex. Specifically, when people received
the standard instructions to rotate the figure, their right frontal lobes and their parietal lobes were
strongly activated (Wraga et al., 2005; Zacks et al., 2003).

However, this pattern of activation was different when researchers modified the instructions. In a
second condition, the participants were instructed to imagine rotating themselves so that they could
‘‘see’’ the figure from a different perspective (Kosslyn et al., 2001). These instructions produced
increased activity in the left temporal lobe, as well as in a part of the motor cortex (Wraga et al.,
2005; Zacks et al., 2003). Notice, then, that a relatively subtle change in wording can make a
dramatic change in the way that the brain responds to a mental-imagery task.

The research on mental rotation has practical implications for people who are recovering from a
stroke. By watching the rotation of virtual-reality figures, these individuals can provide stimulation to
their motor cortex. This form of ‘‘exercise’’ can shorten the time required before they make actual
motor movements by themselves (Dijkerman et al., 2010; Ganis et al., 2009).

Visual Imagery and Distance

The first systematic research on imagery demonstrated the similarity between rotating mental
images and rotating physical objects. Researchers soon began to examine other attributes of mental
images, such as the distance between two points and the shape of the mental image. Stephen
Kosslyn is one of the most important researchers in the field of mental imagery. For example, a
classic study by Kosslyn and his colleagues (1978) showed that people took a long time to scan the
distance between two widely separated points on a mental image of a map that they had created. In
contrast, they quickly scanned the distance between two nearby points on a mental image of that
map. Later research confirms that there is a linear relationship between the distance to be scanned
in a mental image and the amount of time required to scan this distance (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008;
Denis & Kosslyn, 1999b; Kosslyn et al., 2006).

However, some psychologists were concerned about a potential problem with the research methods
in these studies. For example, could the results of the research on imagery and distance be
explained by experimenter expectancy, rather than a genuine influence from the distance between
the two points in the mental image?

In experimenter expectancy, the researchers’ biases and expectations influence the outcomes of the
experiment. For example, when psychologists conduct research about visual imagery, they know
that longer distances should require longer scanning times. Perhaps these researchers could
somehow transmit these expectations to the participants in the study. These participants might—
either consciously or unconsciously—adjust their search speeds according to the researchers’
expectations (Denis & Kosslyn, 1999a; Intons-Peterson, 1983). To answer this potential criticism
about experimenter expectancy, Jolicoeur and Kosslyn (1985a, 1985b) repeated the mental-map
experiment that was discussed (Kosslyn et al., 1978). However, these researchers made certain that
the two research assistants—who actually administered the new study—were not familiar with the
research on mental imagery. Specifically, the assistants did not know about the typical linear
relationship found in the previous research. Instead, the assistants were given an elaborate and
convincing (but incorrect) explanation about visual imagery. This incorrect explanation described
how the participants’ results should show a U-shaped relationship between visual-imagery distance
and scanning time. Interestingly, the research assistants did not obtain the U-shaped curve that they
were told they would find. Instead, their results demonstrated the standard linear relationship: As in
the earlier research, participants needed more time to scan a large mental distance, compared to a
small mental distance. Experimenter expectancy therefore cannot account for the obtained results
(Denis & Kosslyn, 1999b; Kosslyn et al., 2006).

Visual Imagery and Shape

Visual images resemble real, physical images in the research on rotation and in the research on
distance. The research on shape imagery shows the same relationship. Another classic study on
visual imagery. Allan Paivio (1978) asked participants to make judgments about the angle formed by
the two hands on an imaginary clock. For instance, try to visualize the two hands on a standard, non-
digital clock. Next, create a visual image of the angle formed by the two hands if the time were 3:20.
Now create a visual image of the angle between the two hands if the time were 7:25.

Which of these two ‘‘mental clocks’’ has the smaller angle between the two hands?

Paivio also gave the participants several standardized tests to assess their visual imagery ability, the
high-imagery participants made decisions much more quickly than the low-imagery participants.
participants in both groups made decisions very slowly when they compared the angle formed by
the hands at 3:20 with the angle of the hands at 7:25. After all, these two angles are quite similar. In
contrast, their decisions were relatively fast if the two angles were very different in size, perhaps
3:20 and 7:05. Think about the implications of this study. With real objects, people take a long time
to make decisions when two angles are very similar to each other. When the two angles are very
different, people respond quickly. The research demonstrates that people show the same pattern
with their visual images.

According to Paivio (1978), this study demonstrates strong support for the proposal that people use
analog codes, rather than propositional codes. Additional support for analog codes comes from
research with visual images that represent more complex shapes. Shepard and Chipman (1970)
asked participants to construct mental images of the shapes of various U.S. states, such as Colorado
and Oregon. Then the participants judged the similarity between the two mental images, with
respect to their shapes. For example—without looking at a map—do you think that Colorado and
Oregon have similar shapes? How about Colorado and West Virginia? These same participants also
made shape-similarity judgments about pairs of states while they looked at an actual physical sketch
of each state (rather than only its name). The results showed that the participants’ judgments were
highly similar in the two conditions. Once again, people’s judgments about the shape of mental
images are similar to their judgments about the shape of physical stimuli.

Conclusions about the characteristics of visual images, based on the research

1) When people rotate a visual image, a large rotation takes them longer, just as they take
longer when making a large rotation with a physical stimulus.
2) People make distance judgments in a similar fashion for visual images and for physical
stimuli.
3) People make decisions about shape in a similar fashion for visual images and for physical
stimuli. This conclusion holds true for both simple shapes (angles formed by hands on a
clock) and complex shapes (geographic regions, like Colorado or West Virginia).

Visual Imagery and Interference

Many studies show that your mental image can interfere with an actual physical image (e.g.,
Baddeley & Andrade, 1998; Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Kosslyn et al., 2006; Richardson, 1999).
Think about a friend whom you have seen in the last day or two. Next, create a clear mental image
of this friend’s face. Keep this mental image in mind, and simultaneously let your eyes wander over
this page. You will probably find that the task is difficult, because you are trying to ‘‘look’’ at your
friend (in a visual image) at the same time that you are trying to look at the words on this page (a
physical stimulus). Research has confirmed that visual imagery can interfere with your visual
perception. Consider a classic study about interference, conducted by Segal and Fusella (1970). In
part of this study, they asked participants to create a visual image, for example, a visual image of a
tree. As soon as the participant had formed the requested image, the researchers presented a real
physical stimulus, for example a small blue arrow. The researchers then measured the participants’
ability to detect the physical stimulus. Segal and Fusella’s (1970) results showed that people had
more problems detecting the physical stimulus when the mental image was in the same sensory
mode. For example, when the participants had been imagining the shape of a tree, they had trouble
detecting the small blue arrow. The mental image interfered with the real visual stimulus. In
contrast, when they had been imagining the sound of an oboe, they had no trouble reporting that
they saw the arrow. After all, the imagined sound and the arrow—a visual stimulus—represented
two different sensory modes. In another study on visual interference, Mast and his colleagues (1999)
told participants to create a visual image of a set of narrow parallel lines. Next, they were instructed
to rotate their mental image of this set of lines, so that the lines were in a diagonal orientation.
Meanwhile, the researchers presented a physical stimulus, a small segment of a line. The
participants were told to judge whether this line segment had an exactly vertical orientation. The
results showed that the imagined set of lines and the real set of lines produced similar distortions in
the participants’ judgments about the orientation of that line segment.

Visual Imagery and Ambiguous Figures

Look at the figure below, and form a clear mental image of the figure

The research suggests that—when people create a mental image of an ambiguous figure—they
sometimes use analog codes and sometimes use propositional codes. In the 1970s, Stephen Reed
was concerned that mental imagery might have some limitations. Perhaps language helps us to store
visual stimuli on some occasions. Reed’s 1974 study tested people’s ability to decide whether a
specific visual pattern was a portion of a design that they had seen earlier. Specifically, Reed
presented a series of paired figures. For example, people might first see a pattern like the Star in the
above figures and then this figure disappeared. Next, after a brief delay, people saw a second
pattern, such as a parallelogram with slanted right and left sides. In half of the trials, the second
pattern was truly part of the first one (for example, a parallelogram). In the other half, it was not (for
example, a rectangle). Suppose that people actually do store mental images in their head that
correspond to the physical objects they have seen. Then they should be able to draw forth that
mental image of the star and quickly discover the parallelogram shape hidden within it.

However, the participants in Reed’s (1974) study were correct only 14% of the time on the
star/parallelogram example. Across all stimuli, they were correct only 55% of the time, hardly better
than chance. Reed (1974) argued that people could not have stored a visual image for figures like the
Star, given the high error rate on items like this one. Instead, Reed proposed that people sometimes
store pictures as descriptions, using the kind of propositional code. For example, suppose that you
stored the description of above figure i.e. star as a verbal code, ‘‘two triangles, one pointing up and
the other pointing down, placed on top of each other.’’ When the instructions asked you whether
the figure contained a parallelogram, you may have searched through your verbal description. Your
search would locate only triangles, not parallelograms. Notice that Reed’s (1974) research supports
the verbal propositional-code approach, rather than the analog-code approach.

Figure

Similar research explored whether people could provide reinterpretations for a mental image of an
ambiguous figure. For example, you can interpret the ambiguous stimulus in above figure in two
ways: a rabbit facing to the right or a duck facing to the left. Chambers and Reisberg (1985) asked
participants to create a clear mental image of this figure. Next, the researchers removed the figure.
The participants were then asked to give a second, different interpretation of that particular figure.
None of the 15 people could do so. In other words, they apparently could not consult a stored
mental image.

Next, the participants were asked to draw the figure from memory. Could they reinterpret this
physical stimulus? All of them looked at the figure they had just drawn, and all 15 were able to
supply a second interpretation. Chambers and Reisberg’s research suggests that a strong verbal
propositional code—such as ‘‘a duck that is facing left’’—can overshadow a relatively weak analog
code. Other similar research has replicated these findings. It’s often easy to reverse a visual stimulus
while you are looking at a physical picture that is ambiguous. In contrast, it’s usually more difficult to
reverse a mental image (Reisberg & Heuer, 2005). It seems likely that people often use an analog
code when they are thinking about fairly simple figures (like the two hands of a clock). In contrast,
people may use a propositional code when the figures are more complex, as in the case of the
research by Reed (1974) and Chambers and Reisberg (1985). As Kosslyn and his co-authors (2006)
point out, our memory has a limited capacity for visual imagery. We may therefore have difficulty
storing complex visual information in an analog code and then making accurate judgments about
these mental images.

Verbal labels (and a propositional code) may be especially helpful if the visual stimulus is complex.
For example, when I work on a jigsaw puzzle, I often find that I’ve attached a verbal label—such as
‘‘angel with outstretched wings’’—to aid my search for a missing piece. In the case of these complex
shapes, storage may be mostly propositional.

In summary, the research on ambiguous figures shows that people can create mental images using
both propositional and analog codes. That is, we often use analog codes to provide picture-like
representations that capture our mental images. However, when the stimuli or situations make it
difficult to use analog codes, we may create a verbal representation, using a propositional code.

Visual Imagery and Other Vision-Like Processes

Research in visual perception shows that people can see a visual target more accurately if the target
is presented with vertical lines on each side of this target. Research by Ishai and Sagi (1995) shows
that mental imagery produces the same masking effect. That is, people can see a visual target more
accurately if they create mental images of vertical lines on each side of the target. This study on the
masking effect is especially important because of a research methods issue called ‘‘demand
characteristics.’’ Demand characteristics are all the cues that might convey the experimenter’s
hypothesis to the participant. A research-methods concept called ‘‘experimenter expectancy” here
researchers may transmit their expectations to participants in an experiment. The experimenter
expectancy is one kind of demand characteristic. However, experiments provide numerous
additional kinds of demand characteristics. Some critics of the analog approach have proposed that
the experimental results in imagery experiments might be traceable to one or more of these
demand characteristics (Pylyshyn, 2003, 2006). For example, participants may be able to guess the
results that the experimenter wants. Perhaps they might guess that a visual mental image is
supposed to interfere with visual perception.

In contrast, the masking effect is virtually unknown to people. The participants in the study by Ishai
and Sagi (1995) would not know that visual targets are especially easy to see if they are surrounded
by masking stimuli. Therefore, demand characteristics cannot account for the masking effect with
mental images. As a result, we can be more confident that visual imagery really can produce the
masking effect, just as visual perception can produce the masking effect. Visual imagery can indeed
resemble visual perception. Researchers have also examined whether mental imagery resembles
visual perception in other respects. For example, people have especially good acuity for mental
images that are visualized in the center of the retina, rather than in the periphery; visual perception
operates the same way (Kosslyn, 1983). Other studies demonstrate additional parallels between
mental images and visual perception (Kosslyn, 2001; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2000; Kosslyn et al., 2006)