IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Composite System Maintenance Coordination in a
Deregulated Environment
Roy Billinton, Fellow, IEEE, and Ran Mo
Abstract—Composite system preventive maintenance scheduling
is a challenging task in both vertically integrated and deregulated
utility systems. The functional separation of generation and trans-
mission in the new market environment creates operational and
scheduling problems related to preventive maintenance. Mainte-
nance schedules must be coordinated through an independent en-
tity designated as the Independent System Operator (ISO) to as-
sure reliable and economical service. The methods adopted by an
ISO to coordinate planned outages are normally based on tradi-
tional load flow and stability analysis and deterministic operating
criteria. This paper proposes a method designated as the main-
tenance coordination technique (MCT) to coordinate composite
system maintenance scheduling in a deregulated utility system.
Index Terms—Composite system, deregulation, maintenance
scheduling, reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMPOSITE system preventive maintenance scheduling is
a challenging task in both vertically integrated and dereg-
ulated utility systems. Electric power systems have tradition-
ally been organized and operated as regulated monopolies. In
these cases, an electric power utility or entity owns and oper-
ates the generation, transmission, and distribution systems and
therefore controls all aspects of system planning, design, and
operation. The power industry is now undergoing considerable
changes due to deregulation. The main aim of restructuring is
to let market forces drive the price of electric supply and re-
duce the net cost through increased competition. Restructuring
creates an open market environment by allowing competition in
power supply and allowing consumers to choose their supplier
of electric energy.
In the new structure, generation companies (GENCOs) can
be separately owned and compete to sell energy to consumers
and are no longer controlled by the same entities that control the
transmission system. Transmission companies (TRANSCOs)
are regulated to provide nondiscriminatory connections and
comparable service for cost recovery. A TRANSCO has the role
of building, owning, maintaining, and operating the transmis-
sion system in a certain geographical region to provide services
for maintaining the overall reliability of the electrical system.
The Independent System Operator (ISO) handles the operation
and scheduling of TRANSCO facilities. The use of TRANSCO
assets is under the control of the regional ISO, although the
Manuscript received May 21, 2004. Paper no. TPWRS-00617–2003.
The authors are with the Power System Research Group, Uni-
versity of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada S7N 5A9 (e-mail:
Roy_billinton@engr.usask.ca; ram264@mail.usask.ca).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2004.840449
0885-8950/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE
1
ownership can continue to be held by the original owners
in the vertically integrated structure. Distribution companies
(DISCOs) move energy at the retail level and may aggregate
retail loads. These entities must work cooperatively to provide
cost-effective and reliable electric power supply. Independent
entities designated as ISOs coordinate the activities of the
GENCO, the TRANSCO, and the DISCO to achieve the overall
goal of serving the customers.
The ISO should collect all generation and transmission
planned outage requests from market participants, i.e., the
GENCO and the TRANSCO within a certain time (usually
declared by the ISO) prior to the start of the outages. It should
review all submissions of planned outages based on relia-
bility criteria and the time/date of request for maintenance
and then decide whether to permit, deny, or adjust planned
outage schedules to preserve the system reliability. The electric
utility industry is moving to new planning criteria in the new
market environment where broader engineering considerations
of transmission access and risks must be explicitly addressed.
Specifically, the likelihood of the occurrence of worst possible
scenarios must be recognized in the analysis and the acceptable
risk levels incorporated in the decision-making process [1].
Intense competition in power markets will result in more com-
plicated facility maintenance scheduling and create additional
pressure on the GENCO and the TRANSCO to create optimal
maintenance schedules for their facilities. It is imperative
to develop efficient decision-making tools for the GENCO,
the TRANSCO, and the ISO to create the most appropriate
maintenance schedules in a competitive situation.
Maintenance is an important part of asset management [2].
It is commonly divided into two categories: preventive main-
tenance and corrective maintenance. The former is also called
planned maintenance or scheduled maintenance and deals with
scheduled outages. The latter usually includes repair and re-
placement and deals with forced outages or random failures.
The basic objective of preventive maintenance is to prevent or
forestall future random failures of the system facilities by re-
moving these facilities from service at an appropriate time and
conducting diagnostic tests and element replacements. An op-
timized maintenance schedule can improve system reliability,
reduce operating costs, and result in savings in capital invest-
ment for new facilities [3].
After determining the individual component maintenance re-
quirements, it is necessary to coordinate all the maintenance re-
quests in terms of their impact on the system. Considerable re-
search has been done at the generation level[4]–[6]. Relatively
little work has been reported in the available literature on com-
posite system preventive maintenance scheduling and coordina-
2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
tion [7]–[9]. This is an interesting and important topic in both
vertically integrated and deregulated utility systems.
This paper proposes a method designated as the maintenance
coordination technique (MCT) to coordinate composite system
maintenance scheduling in a deregulated utility system. The
MCT is demonstrated on the two test systems using com-
mercial software known as MECORE [10]. The MECORE
program is a Monte Carlo-based composite system reliability
evaluation tool. It was initially developed at the University
of Saskatchewan and subsequently enhanced at BC Hydro.
It can be utilized to conduct a variety of composite system
reliability and reliability worth studies. MECORE is based
on a combination of Monte Carlo simulation (state sampling
technique) and enumeration techniques. The program can be
used to simulate the system component states and to calculate
annualized indices at the system peak load level. A hybrid
method utilizing an enumeration approach for aggregated load
states is used to calculate annual indices using an annual load
curve [10].
II. COMPOSITE SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE
It is difficult to coordinate all the component maintenance
requirements in the new utility environment. Generation and
transmission maintenance requests are decoupled in a deregu-
lated environment. The decision when to maintain a generator
is determined by the individual GENCO rather than by the op-
timal cost of maintenance and repair in the overall system. This
is not the case in a conventional vertically integrated utility,
where there is no competition between the various supply facil-
ities. This paper assumes that the generation and transmission
facilities are completely decoupled and that the ISO is respon-
sible for the overall integrity of the system. This could require
some companies to delay their maintenance to a more suitable
time. The process obviously has to be transparent and one in
which no individual company is treated unfairly. This may re-
quire the ISO to utilize additional information in the form of
forecast operating costs or price signals, such as the forward
price for a given future week, to assist in deciding which main-
tenance requests should be accepted and which requests should
be delayed. Excessive delays will result in increased system risk
at future times. There may also be other engineering considera-
tions external to the reliability model that dictate certain restric-
tions on maintenance activity. The focus in this paper is on a
future week in which any external considerations are known or
are forecast. The actual occurrence of an external event during a
particular week may require a previously forecast maintenance
schedule to be cancelled in response to the resulting situation.
This paper presents a procedure to assist in the maintenance
scheduling of generation and transmission facilities in a bulk
electric system. This approach is designated as the MCT. The
MCT is based on practical procedures used by most ISOs. As
indicated earlier, an ISO should collect all the generation and
transmission planned outage requests from the market partici-
pants at an agreed time (usually declared by the ISO) prior to the
start of these activities. The ISO must then determine which of
these maintenance activities can proceed as requested without
violating the system reliability. At the present time, the usual
procedure to assess the impact of a possible maintenance event
is to conduct power-flow studies under these conditions. These
studies are deterministic, in that they utilize an criterion
to assess the acceptability. The criterion implies that the
system can withstand the loss of any single element without en-
countering any difficulty. These studies do not include the likeli-
hood of element failures and the actual adequacy of the system
under the maintenance event. The criterion itself is consistent
with regard to ; the resulting system risk is, however, quite
variable. Incorporating the likelihood of element failures will
highlight actual high-risk situations when scheduling facility re-
moval for maintenance. In order to do this, the ISO should estab-
lish system and load point reliability criteria that can be used to
assess the adequacy of the system and load points when specific
facilities are removed from service. Most scheduling is done on
a weekly basis [3], although longer or shorter intervals can be
used if required. The peak load for the week is assumed to be a
constant value over the period. This is forecast in advance of the
actual occurrence. The risk criteria are a management decision.
The studies described in this paper use the annualized values
of the base case system and load point expected energy not sup-
plied (EENS) as the criterion risks. The risk for the maintenance
period in question—in this case a specified week—is also annu-
alized in order to compare it with the annualized criterion risk.
This results in the same maintenance decision as expressing the
annualized criterion risk on the specified period basis and com-
paring it with the specified period risk. Generating unit mainte-
nance outages may extend over several weekly periods. These
outages are considered in each weekly period together with the
relevant transmission outages in the particular period.
As noted earlier, weekly maintenance periods or windows
have been used in the studies described in this paper. Shorter
periods can be used, if desired, or if it is necessary to determine
the risk in an extended period involving mixed length mainte-
nance requests. In this case, the risk (EENS) is calculated for
each segment or subperiod in the overall period in question. The
risk over an extended period is the sum of the risks in the sub-
periods. The subperiods can be of any length. The focus in the
initial application described in this paper is on a single period of
one week. The MECORE software used in the studies and dis-
cussed further in the following section is a state sampling tech-
nique. More detail could be included in a sequential simulation
approach but with a considerable increase in computation time.
Relatively little work has been reported on sequential simula-
tion applied to composite system reliability assessment [11].
The system and load point reliability are a function of the
system load level, and therefore, there will be some periods
(weeks) in which certain equipment removals are acceptable and
some periods (weeks) in which their removals lead to violation
of the risk criteria.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1, in which there are two designated
areas. The one below the criterion risk level is the acceptable
area. The other area above the criterion risk level is the unaccept-
able area. Fig. 1 shows the variation of the risk with increasing
load. The intersection of the criterion risk and the risk profile
occurs at the critical load level. Any load higher than this will
violate the risk criterion. Any load level less than this has an
BILLINTON AND MO: COMPOSITE SYSTEM MAINTENANCE COORDINATION IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT
Fig. 1. Example of the risk variation with increasing peak load.
TABLE I
LOAD POINT RELIABILITY INDICES FOR THE RBTS
acceptable risk, and therefore, the system configuration associ-
ated with the risk profile is acceptable at these load levels. The
risk profile shown in Fig. 1 will change as different generation
and transmission facilities are removed from service. The risk
profile will also change slightly if load forecast uncertainty is in-
corporated in the evaluation. The risk in each case will increase
with increased uncertainty.
III. RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEMS
The two test systems used in this paper are the RBTS [12]
and the IEEE-RTS [13]. The RBTS is a small educational test
system developed as part of the graduate program in power
system reliability evaluation at the University of Saskatchewan.
The single line diagram of the RBTS is shown in Fig. 10 in
the Appendix. The RBTS has a total installed capacity of 240
MW in 11 generating units. The detailed system data are given
in [12]. The IEEE-RTS was developed by an IEEE Task Force
to provide a practical representative bulk power system for re-
search and comparative study purposes. The single line diagram
of the IEEE-RTS is shown in Fig. 11 in the Appendix. It has a
total installed capacity of 3405 MW in 32 generating units. The
detailed system data are given in [13].
The annual peak load was used in both the RBTS and the
IEEE-RTS studies. The annual peak load for the RBTS is 185
MW. The annual peak load is 2850 MW for the IEEE-RTS. The
base case annualized indices for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS
are calculated using the MECORE program and given in Ta-
bles I–III, where
ENLC Expected Number of Load Curtailments;
ADLC Average Duration of Load Curtailment;
EDLC Expected Duration of Load Curtailment;
PLC Probability of Load Curtailment;
EDNS Expected Demand Not Supplied;
EENS Expected Energy Not Supplied;
3
TABLE II
LOAD POINT RELIABILITY INDICES FOR THE IEEE-RTS
TABLE III
SYSTEM RELIABILITY INDICES FOR THE RBTS AND IEEE-RTS
ELC Expected Load Curtailed;
BPII Bulk Power-Interruption Index;
BECI Bulk Power/Energy Curtailment Index;
BPACI Bulk Power-supply Average MW Curtailment
Index;
MBECI Modified Bulk/Energy Curtailment Index;
SI Severity Index.
As shown in Tables I–III, there is a wide range of possible
system and load point indices that can be used to measure the
adequacy of a bulk power system. The individual load point in-
dices are highly dependent on the system load curtailment pri-
ority order. The overall system indices are virtually independent
of the load curtailment priority order. The priority orders for the
two test systems are based on the concept of lowest customer
interruption costs. The following studies on the two test sys-
tems utilize the EENS index to illustrate the system and load
point responses to different specified generation and transmis-
sion maintenance outages. It should be noted, however, that the
following analyses could be conducted using any of the basic
indices. The EENS is a conventional adequacy index used in
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Fig. 2. System EENS of the RBTS as a function of the load level for the
selected cases.
TABLE IV
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR THE SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES BASED
ON THE SYSTEM EENS
a wide range of applications. The effects of maintenance out-
ages as portrayed by the various basic system indices may vary
slightly, depending on the index used.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MCT TO THE RBTS
Fig. 2 shows the system EENS as a function of the load
level for four selected cases, where G2-40 means removing one
40-MW unit at Bus 2 for maintenance, L4-8 means removing
Lines 4 and 8 for maintenance, etc. The base case EENS of
1070 MWh/yr is used as the system criterion risk (CR).
As an example, the case L4-8 (i.e., removing Lines 4 and 8
for maintenance) is analyzed below.
Step 1) Assume that Lines 4 and 8 are requested for planned
outage during the next week. Assume that this pe-
riod is week 10.
Step 2) Assume that during week 10, only Lines 4 and 8
will be off for maintenance.
Step 3) Calculate and display the system EENS as a func-
tion of the load level as shown in Fig. 2.
Step 4) Determine the critical load level for this mainte-
nance outage condition. This is approximately 148
MW as shown in Fig. 2. This value exceeds the load
level of 136.3 MW for week 10 [12]. It is therefore
acceptable to remove these lines at this time.
Table IV shows the available weeks for selected maintenance
outages based on the system EENS. It can be seen from this
table that different planned outage cases usually have different
critical load levels and different possible time periods in which
the required maintenance can be scheduled.
Fig. 2 also shows the variation of the risk around the critical
load level (gradual or abrupt). This is also important information
for the decision-making process.
A planned outage, which is acceptable in terms of the system
risk, may be unacceptable based on the load point risk. It is
therefore necessary from a load point perspective to check for
unacceptable conditions created using the system risk. Criterion
Fig. 3. Bus 3 EENS of the RBTS as a function of the load level for the selected
cases.
Fig. 4. Bus 6 EENS of the RBTS as a function of the load level for the selected
cases.
risk determination is very important in this analysis. It is basi-
cally a management decision and is affected by many factors
such as customer composition and reliability requirements. It is
assumed here that the base case EENS of each load point is used
as the criterion risk.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the EENS of Buses 3 and 6 as a function
of the load level for the four cases. A similar analysis can be
conducted for the other load points.
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the comments made earlier
from a system viewpoint are also valid from a load point per-
spective. The different maintenance requests have different crit-
ical loads, which result in different opportunities for the planned
maintenance. Case G2-40 has the lowest critical load, which
means Bus 3 may be more sensitive to +-generation removals.
Cases L1-3 and L1-3-5 have the same critical load and, there-
fore, the same possible weeks for maintenance. The reason is
that these two cases are dominated by the removal of Line 1.
Fig. 4 shows that L4-8 and L1-3-5 are unacceptable at Bus
6 as the removal of Line 5 or Line 8 violates the criterion. The
available weeks for the selected maintenance outages based on
the load point reliabilities are presented in Table V together with
those based on the system EENS. It can be seen from Table V
that significant differences in the schedules exist. If the load
point criteria are applied in addition to the system criterion, then
L4-8 and L1-3-5 are unacceptable in any week of the year. Re-
moving Line 1 and Line 3 simultaneously can be done only in
week 38, and G2-40 could still be scheduled in many weeks
(9–15, 17, 27, 31–32, 34–42).
It should again be noted that the analysis is based on the as-
sumption that the base case indices are accepted as the criterion
BILLINTON AND MO: COMPOSITE SYSTEM MAINTENANCE COORDINATION IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE AVAILABLE PERIODS BASED ON THE LOAD POINT AND
THE SYSTEM EENS FOR THE SELECTED CASES
Fig. 5. System EENS as a function of the load level (cases G1-40, L1, and
G1-40-L1).
TABLE VI
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES
BASED ON SYSTEM EENS
risks. Determination of the criterion risk at a load point is a prac-
tical management issue. It is important from a load point view-
point to check for unacceptable conditions created using overall
system analysis.
Fig. 5 shows the system EENS as a function of the load
level for three cases (G1-40, L1, and G1-40-L1). The weeks in
which these maintenance removals can be conducted are given
in Table VI. It can be seen from Fig. 5 and Table VI that the risk
associated with removing one 40-MW unit at Bus 1 is much
higher than that associated with removing Line 1, and therefore,
there are more opportunities available for maintenance on Line
1. The difference between the risks associated with G1-40 and
G1-40-L1 is very small, which indicates that the G1-40-L1 risk
is dominated by G1-40. In other words, whenever one 40-MW
unit at Bus 1 is removed for maintenance, removing Line 1
5
Fig. 6. System EENS as a function of the load level (cases G1-40, L1-3, and
G1-40-L1-3).
TABLE VII
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR THE SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES BASED
ON THE SYSTEM EENS
Fig. 7. System EENS as a function of the load level for the six cases.
does not significantly increase the risk. It should be appreciated
that the risk associated with G1-40-L1 cannot be obtained by
simply adding the risks associated with G1-40 and L1.
Fig. 6 shows the system EENS as a function of load level for
the three cases of G1-40, L1-3, and G1-40-L1-3. The weeks in
which these maintenance removals can be conducted are given
in Table VII. The risk associated with G1-40-L1-3 is higher than
those of the other two cases, and the opportunities for mainte-
nance in these three cases are also different.
In practice, it is possible that different generation and trans-
mission element owners may request that different facilities be
removed for maintenance in the same time period. From their
own perspectives, these removals are acceptable. From a system
point of view, however, they may not be acceptable. For in-
stance, it can be seen from Table VII that G1-40 and L1-3 are
acceptable in weeks 28 and 29 from an individual point of view,
but G1-40-L1-3 is unacceptable during these two weeks from
a system viewpoint. This clearly indicates that an overall body
such as an ISO should coordinate the many possible requests for
maintenance removals.
Fig. 7 shows the system EENS as a function of load level
for another six cases (G1-40, L4, L8, and some of their com-
binations). The weeks in which these outages can be done are
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
TABLE VIII
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR THE SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES BASED
ON THE SYSTEM EENS
Fig. 8. System EENS of the IEEE-RTS as a function of the load level for the
selected cases.
shown in Table VIII. It can be seen from Fig. 7 and Table VIII
that L4 can be done at any time of the year. Cases G1-40 and
G1-40-L4 have almost the same response to the load variation
and therefore the same opportunities for planned outage. When
one 40–MW unit at Bus 1 is removed for maintenance, the re-
moval of Line 4 minimally increases the system risk. This is not
the case for L4-8. Case G1-40-L4-8 is quite different from either
G1-40 or L4-8. G1-40-L4-8 is unacceptable at any time. This re-
inforces the point made earlier that the risk associated with two
maintenance requests cannot be assessed by simply summing
the risks associated with each individual request.
V. APPLICATION OF THE MCT TO THE IEEE-RTS
The RBTS is a relatively small system, and many factors con-
strain removing elements for maintenance. The IEEE-RTS is
relatively large compared to the RBTS. It has a strong transmis-
sion network and a weak generation system. It has more room
for removing elements, especially transmission lines, from the
system for maintenance than does the RBTS. The weekly peak
loads are given in [13].
Fig. 8 shows the system EENS of the IEEE-RTS as a func-
tion of the load level for the selected cases. The weeks in which
these outages can be done are shown in Table IX. It can be seen
from Fig. 8 and Table IX that the six cases that involve removing
transmission have little impact on the system EENS and can be
done in any week of the year except week 51. This again in-
dicates that the IEEE-RTS has a very strong transmission net-
work. Cases G18-400 and G23-350 are sensitive to the load
level, and there are fewer opportunities than for the six transmis-
sion cases. Cases G18-400-13-197 (removing one 400-MW unit
at Bus 18 and one 197-MW unit at Bus 13) and G23-350-13-197
TABLE IX
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR THE SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES BASED ON
THE SYSTEM EENS OF THE IEEE-RTS
TABLE X
SYSTEM EENS (IN MEGAWATTHOURS PER YEAR) OF THE MRTS AT DIFFERENT
LOAD LEVELS FOR THE SELECTED CASES
are more sensitive to the load level than G18-400 and G23-350,
and the impact of removing an additional 197-MW unit is sig-
nificant. The impact of removing transmission elements in ad-
dition to generating units is seen in G18-400-13-197-L2-8-9-12
(removing one 400-MW unit at Bus 18 and one 197-MW unit
at Bus 13 as well as Lines 2, 8, 9, and 12). This condition has a
similar critical load to G18-400-13-197 and the same possible
weeks for maintenance. This is also the case for G23-350-13-
197-L2-8-9-12 and G23-350-13-197.
In order to stress the transmission network, the original
IEEE-RTS generating units and load profile were doubled with
the transmission system unchanged. The total capacity of the
modified IEEE-RTS (MRTS) is 6810 MW with a peak load of
5700 MW. The system EENS of each case for the MRTS at the
different load levels are shown in Table X. The corresponding
curves are presented in Fig. 9, except L5. The weeks in which
these maintenance outages can be done are given in Table XI.
It can be seen from Table X that the transmission system of the
MRTS is stressed significantly and that some line removals are
restricted. For example, removing Line 5 is unacceptable when
BILLINTON AND MO: COMPOSITE SYSTEM MAINTENANCE COORDINATION IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 7

Fig. 9. System EENS of the MRTS as a function of the load level.

TABLE XI
AVAILABLE WEEKS FOR THE SELECTED MAINTENANCE OUTAGES BASED
ON THE SYSTEM EENS OF THE MRTS

Fig. 10. Single line diagram of the RBTS.

the load is greater than or equal to 4000 MW. Similarly, L23

and L15-16 cannot be conducted when the load is greater than
or equal to 5000 MW.
Fig. 9 indicates that the risk associated with L1-6-21-31 is
higher than that of G18-400 or G23-350. The system EENS
for G18-400-13-197-L2-8-9-12 is much larger than that of the
G18-400-13-197, particularly at high loads. This is also the
case for G23-350-13-197-L2-8-9-12 and G23-350-13-197. As
shown earlier, this is not the case for the IEEE-RTS, where
removing the same transmission lines has very little impact
on the system EENS. Although the MRTS has 1110 MW of
reserve capacity, which is almost three times the largest unit,
the risk when removing generating units is still very sensitive
to the load growth. This can be seen by comparing the two
generation cases G18-400 and G18-400-13-197 in Fig. 9.
Table XI shows that L5 has the lowest critical load, and
this maintenance cannot be done in any week of the year.
The critical loads for L23 and L15-16 are lower than those Fig. 11. Single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS.
of the other cases, and these maintenance activities have rel-
atively few opportunities. The difference between the critical cannot be considered to have a strong transmission network,
loads of G18-400-13-197 and G18-400-13-197-L2-8-9-12 (or and removing transmission lines has a significant impact on the
G23-350-13-197 and G23-350-13-197-L2-8-9-12) is relatively system reliability. Increasing the size of the RTS to create the
small due to the criterion value and load model. The MRTS MRTS reflects a situation that is becoming common in North
8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
America. Relatively little transmission is being built or pro-
posed in the near future. Under these circumstances, reliability
will degrade, and removing elements for maintenance will be
restricted significantly as load grows and additional generation
is added.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Removing system elements for maintenance can create sig-
nificant increases in the system risk. The MCT proposed in this
paper was applied to the two test systems to examine the impact
of removing elements for maintenance. The object is to deter-
mine if a certain planned outage could be conducted during a
designated period.
The analysis described in this paper indicates that different
cases have different critical loads, which result in different
opportunities for the planned maintenance. Some cases can be
done in any week during the year. Some cases can not be done
at any time. In certain cases, if one element is removed for
maintenance, another element can be removed simultaneously
without significantly increasing the risk. Generally, removing
more components from service results in the related curves
moving to the left, which means that the corresponding risks
increase, and the weeks available for the maintenance decrease.
Planned maintenance outages, which are acceptable based on
the system risk, may be unacceptable based on load point risks.
Determination of the criterion risks, particularly for load points,
is a practical management issue and can have a large impact on
maintenance scheduling decisions. It is important to appreciate
that it is necessary from a load point perspective to check for
unacceptable conditions created by using system risk criteria.
APPENDIX
Fig. 10 shows the single line diagram of the RBTS, and Fig.
11 shows the single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS.
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Roy Billinton (S’59–M’64–SM’73–F’78) came to Canada from England in
1952. He received the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees from University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, MB, Canada, and the Ph.D. and D.Sc. degrees in electrical engi-
neering from the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
He joined the University of Saskatchewan in 1964. He is the author and coau-
thor of eight books on reliability evaluation and over 800 papers on power
system reliability evaluation, economic system operation, and power system
analysis.
Dr. Billinton is a Fellow of the EIC, the CAE, and the Royal Society of Canada
and a Registered Professional Engineer in the Province of Saskatchewan.
Ran Mo was born in Harbin, China, and received B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees from
the Harbin University of Science and Technology in 1984 and 1990, respec-
tively, and the M.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from the University of
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, in 2004.
He worked for the Research Institute of Machinery Science and Technology
and the China Aero Polytechnology Establishment, Beijing, China.