Professional Documents
Culture Documents
• SmarTS‐Lab
• Anti‐Islanding Protection
• Future focus
• Conclusion
2
Enabler of the evolving Smart Grid
3
Synchrophasor Fundamentals
1
0.4
0.2
-0.2
-0.8
Represented
Substation Clock
-1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 as
Sinusoidal waveform Phasors Synchronized Time‐Tag
Synchrophasors
C37.118.2
• Data rate upto 50 / 60
msgs per sec
• Numerous potential
applications like islanding
detection, state
estimation, early warning
Typical Hierarchical Communication Layout of systems, model validation,
PMUs and PDCs SIPS, RAS, etc
4
Platform for developing WAMPAC Applications
5
Architecture
ECS
6
Our Architecture
7
RT‐HIL Design and Testing
WAMPAC APPLICATIONS
8
Application developments
Syncrhophasors‐Assisted WAMPAC Applications
(Developed within STRONg2rid Project)
Compliance
• Large number of PMU‐ Monitoring Protection Control
Testing /
Apps Apps Apps Integration
assisted WAMPAC
applications have been Nordic Oscillation
Anti‐ Steady‐state
developed within the WAMS
Islanding
Damping
compliance
Network Controller
STRONg2rid project.
• All these applications Sub‐ Feeding
Synchronous Synchronism Excitation Dynamic
Check Control PSS Compliance
have been tested Oscillation through PMU
using Real‐Time
Real‐Time PMU
Hardware‐in‐the‐loop Mode
Auto‐
reclosing
Auto‐
reclosing
integration
Estimation into SCADA
(RT‐HIL) facility at
SmarTS‐Lab Phase Angle Effect of GPS
Monitoring loss/spoofing
(PAM) on WAMPAC
DFIG
9 Parameter
Estimation
RT‐HIL Setup : Minimum Requirement
Important piece
of the puzzle
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WIDE AREA PROTECTION APPLICATIONS
• Anti‐Islanding Protection
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1. Anti‐Islanding Protection
(Local and Wide Area Measurements)
Simulink Model
IEEE 3 Machine, 9 bus System
12
1. Anti‐Islanding Protection
(Local and Wide Area Measurements)
13
1. Anti‐Islanding Protection
(
(Local and Wide Area Measurements))
14
Wide‐Area Local
1. Anti‐Islanding Protection
(
(Local and Wide Area Measurements))
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Cybersecurity : Threats & Challenges
Reference: https://ics‐cert.us‐cert.gov/alerts/IR‐ALERT‐H‐16‐056‐01
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PMU Vulnerabilities
GPS
Spoofing/Jamming
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Impact of Time‐Synchronization Signal Loss
(Jamming) on WAMPAC Applications
Phase Angle Monitoring (PAM) application
Time (s)
2
mismatch and 0.62 s for 30 % 1.5
active power mismatch. 1
0.5
0
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
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Conclusions/Recommendations
Conclusion
– Demonstrated the utilization of synchrophasor measurements for developing
Wide‐Area Protection Applications.
– Wide area measurements can decrease the tripping time and reduce the Non Detection Zone
(NDZ) for the scheme
– The test‐bench demonstrated is useful for a myriad of applications in which
simulation exercises in power system CAD software provides no realistic
insight into the practical design and implementation challenges
– Real‐Time QoS requirements (end‐to‐end delay) needs to be addressed for
each type of WAMPAC applications
– A protocol parser is required to translate / unwrap legacy protocols into raw
measurements.
– With more automation and dependence on IT infrastructure, cyber‐security
threats are a real concern.
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Acknowledgements
• The work presented here is a result of the collaboration between iITC, KTH
SmarTS Lab (Sweden), Statnett SF (Norway)
• This work has been financed by:
– Statnett SF, the Norwegian transmission system operator, through its Smart Operation
R&D program.
– The Nordic Energy Research through the STRONg2rid project.
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Thank you!
• Questions?
• http://www.kth.se/en/ees/
omskolan/organisation/avd
elningar/eps/research/smar
ttslab
• http://www.vanfretti.com
• luigiv@kth.se
• msalmas@kth.se
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