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Microeconomics 2nd Edition Karlan
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Chapter 09 Test Bank
Student: _______________________________________________________________________________________
1. While everyone wants a clean environment, it can be very hard to achieve. An approach governments
could take to promote that outcome is to:
A. create social norms.
B. create and enforce strict laws and heavy fines.
C. influence individual's incentives.
D. All of these are ways governments can get the "green" behavior they want.
2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

A. in which people make rational choices that lead to a less-than-ideal result for all.
B. in which people make rational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
C. that leads everyone to be as well off as possible without making another worse off.
D. that leads people to make irrational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
3. To economists, games are:

A. just recreational pursuits like chess, Monopoly, or poker.
B. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
C. situations in which individuals act against their own interest for fun.
D. None of these statements are true.
4. To economists, a game is:

A. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
B. a trivial pursuit that should not be used to analyze the economy or its actors.
C. a way to simplify and minimize the true importance of situations like war.
D. All of these statements are true.
5. Economic games can be used to analyze decisions around which of the following situations?
A. War
B. Business
C. Environmental protection
D. All of these situations.
6. The study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances is called:
A. game theory.
B. game strategy.
C. strategy optimization.
D. strategy theory.
7. Game theory is:

A. the study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances.
B. used by economists to evaluate behavior in a variety of settings.
C. a useful tool in predicting strategic behavior.
8. Game theory is:

B. used to predict the winners of only certain types of strategic games.
C. used to evaluate the microeconomic choices that involve probabilities of different outcomes.
D. the study of games of chance like solitaire or betting on horse races.
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Copyright © 2017 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent
of McGraw-Hill Education.
9. When the trade-offs you face are determined by the choices someone else will make, behaving
rationally involves:
A. behaving strategically.
B. ignoring the behavior of other actors.
C. acting in a way to help others.
10. Behaving strategically:

A. means recognizing that the actions of others will affect the trade-offs you face, and acting accordingly.
B. is an essential part of game theory.
C. involves rational decision making.
11. Behaving strategically means:

A. evaluating decisions in which players act in their own self-interest, but the interplay of those decisions
does not exist.
B. acting to achieve a goal by withholding key information from the person with whom an exchange is
being made.
C. acting to achieve a goal by anticipating the interplay between your own and others' decisions.
D. evaluating the impact of your choices on an uninvolved third party.
12. When your outcomes depend on another's choices, asking __________________ is the key to good
decision making.
A. how will others respond
B. what the wants and constraints are of those involved
C. what the trade-offs are
D. why everyone isn't already doing it
13. All games involve which of the following?

A. Multiple players
B. Strategies
C. Payoffs
D. All games involve all of these things.

A. Rules
B. Chance events
C. Dice
D. Cards

A. Strategies
B. Someone to enforce the rules
C. Cards or dice
D. Full information

A. A predictable outcome
B. Payoffs
C. Full information
D. A game master
17. In games, rules:

A. define the actions that are allowed in a game.
B. need to be loosely adhered to in order to predict an outcome.
C. define the winners of a game.
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D. outline the wrong choices that could be made in a game.
18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

A. laws of nature.
B. legislated rules of society.
C. costs of various actions.
D. All of these are rules that constrain people's behavior.
19. An example of a real-life rule that might constrain people's behavior is:
A. minimum wage legislation.
B. having 24 hours in a day.
C. the earth's limited supply of oil.
D. All of these are examples of real-life rules.
20. In games, strategies are:

A. the outcomes players want to achieve.
B. the same for everyone to achieve the same goal.
C. the plans of action that players follow to achieve their goals.
21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

A. is the same for everyone.
B. can be different for different players and still achieve the same goal.
C. should be similar to what others have chosen to reach the same goal.
D. has begun to be documented by economists.
22. In games:
A. there is only one strategy associated with each outcome.
B. there are several strategies that can achieve a single goal.
C. all strategies followed in one particular game should all be similar in order to be successful.
D. if one person's strategy is wildly different from those of others, he will typically come in first or last.
23. Payoffs are:

A. the rewards that come from particular actions.
B. always monetary.
C. things that are only enjoyed by the winner.
D. bribes made to gain some advantage unfairly during a game.
24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

A. a salary.
B. winning an election.
C. having clean drinking water.
D. All of these are examples of payoffs.
25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

A. being the first mover in a game.
B. sharing information with a select few that others aren't privy to.
C. monetary gains made by a player.
D. giving an advantage to only one player.
26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

A. only two players.
B. more than two players.
C. multiple organizations.
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27. The prisoner's dilemma:
A. can be summarized in a payoff matrix.
B. can involve two players.
C. leads to a less-than-ideal outcome for all players.
28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

A. a strategy matrix.
B. a strategy tree.
C. a decision matrix.
D. a flowchart.
29. A decision matrix:

A. summarizes the players, strategies, and payoffs associated with a game.
B. outlines the clear outcome of any strategy-based game.
C. shows only the decisions of one player.
D. is not useful in evaluating the strategic choices.
30. When a strategy is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose, it is called a:
A. golden decision.
B. dominated strategy.
C. dominant strategy.
D. zero-sum strategy.
31. A dominant strategy is one:

A. that is the best one to follow, no matter what strategy other players choose.
B. in which a player is forced to choose given the rules of the game.
C. in which a player must choose, even though it does not optimize his outcome.
D. provides a player with the highest payoff in the game.
32. A dominant strategy:

A. exists in every game.
B. is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose.
C. is always the same for all players of a game.
D. awards the highest achievable payoff in a game.
33. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

A. there is a dominant strategy for both players.
B. there is a dominant strategy for only one player.
C. there is no dominant strategy for either player.
D. there is a dominant strategy for a player depending on what the other player does.
34. In the prisoner's dilemma:

A. a dominant strategy exists for only one player.
B. a non-cooperative outcome is predicted.
C. a cooperative win-win outcome can be predicted.

A. a stable outcome is impossible.
B. only one player has a dominant strategy.
C. a stable outcome is possible.
D. a commitment strategy is needed to reach a stable outcome.

A. a cooperative strategy can lead to a more beneficial outcome for both players.
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B. a noncooperative strategy will lead to a positive-positive outcome.
C. a stable outcome is impossible.
D. neither player has a dominant strategy.

A. neither player has a dominant strategy.
B. both players have a dominant strategy.
C. only one player will ever have a dominant strategy.
D. All of these may be true in a prisoner's dilemma game.
38. The prisoner's dilemma game can be used to describe

A. the game Rock Paper Scissors
B. why candidates in elections go negative.
C. how individuals acting in their self-interest leads to the best outcome overall.
D. a zero sum game.
39. The prisoner's dilemma game:

A. is a zero sum game.
B. is a game of chance.
C. is a game with no dominant strategies.
D. is a game with a stable equilibrium.

A. if players can communicate in advance, they will always cooperate.
B. if players can communicate in advance, they may still not cooperate.
C. will always choose to cooperate.
D. will only cooperate if they are trustworthy.
41. The players of prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. would be much better off if they could cooperate.
B. have an incentive to never cooperate.
C. have a dominant strategy to never cooperate.
42.
The figure shown portrays a game using a:
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A. decision tree.
B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
43.
The game in the figure shown is a version of:
A. the prisoner's dilemma.

B. the first-mover advantage.
C. a sequential game.
D. a repeated game.
44.
A. a sequential game.
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B. a simultaneous game.
C. a cooperative game.
D. an ultimatum.
45.
According to the figure shown, if Nike charges a high price, then Adidas should:
A. charge a high price.

B. charge a low price.
C. leave the market.
D. give an ultimatum.
46.
According to the figure shown, if Adidas charges a low price, then Nike should:

B. leave the market.
C. charge a low price.
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47.
According to the figure shown, Nike:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge a high price.

B. does not have a dominant strategy.
C. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in its own self-interest.
D. has a dominant strategy to charge a low price.
48.
According to the figure shown, Adidas:
A. should charge a low price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.

B. should charge a high price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.
C. does not have a dominant strategy.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and charge a low price.
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49.
According to the figure shown:
A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

B. both players will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both players will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both players have an incentive to charge a low price and undercut the competition.
50.
The stable outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Nike charges a high price, and Adidas charges a low price.

B. Nike charges a low price, and Adidas charges a high price.
C. Nike and Adidas both charge a low price.
D. Nike and Adidas both charge a high price.
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51.
The outcome of the game in the figure show predicts that Nike will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $4 million.
C. $10 million.
D. $15 million.
52.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Adidas will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $8 million.
C. $6 million.
D. $10 million.
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53.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can predict:
A. an outcome that is good for society and less than ideal for the companies.
B. an outcome that is less than ideal for society, but optimal for the companies.
C. that both will follow their dominant strategy and society will lose.
D. None of these is likely to happen.
54.
If Nike and Adidas are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. Nike has a dominant strategy, but Adidas does not.

B. Adidas has a dominant strategy, but Nike does not.
C. Neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. Both companies have a dominant strategy.
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55.
This figure shows the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single
grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get
pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each
would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive.
If Sarah and Joe are working on a project together and faced with the choices outlined in the figure
shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. both Joe and Sarah put forth low effort.

B. Joe will put forth high effort, and Sarah will put forth low effort.
C. Joe will put forth low effort, and Sarah will put forth high effort.
D. both Joe and Sarah put forth high effort.
56.
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D. a repeated game.
57.
A. a sequential game.
B. a simultaneous game.
C. a cooperative game.
D. an ultimatum.
58.
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According to the figure shown, if Joe puts forth high effort, then Sarah should:
A. put forth high effort.

B. put forth low effort.
C. leave school.
59.
According to the figure shown, if Sarah puts forth low effort, then Joe should:
A. put forth high effort.

B. put forth low effort.
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60.
According to the figure shown, Joe:
A. has a dominant strategy to put forth high effort.

C. has a dominant strategy to put forth low effort.
D. will reach an optimum outcome by acting in his own self-interest.
61.
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According to the figure shown, Sarah:
A. should put forth low effort, regardless of what Joe chooses to do.
B. should put forth high effort, regardless of what Joe choose to do.
D. should take the first-mover advantage and put forth low effort.
62.
According to the figure shown:
A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

B. both will act in their own self-interest and get a stable, but less than optimum, equilibrium.
C. both will act in their own self-interest and get an optimum equilibrium that is stable.
D. both have incentive to put forth high effort.
63.
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The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Joe puts forth high effort and Sarah puts forth low effort.
B. Joe puts forth low effort and Sarah puts forth high effort.
C. Joe and Sarah both put forth low effort.
D. Joe and Sarah both put forth high effort.
64.
The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Joe will earn utility of:
A. 5.
B. 7.
C. 9.
D. 13.
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65.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Sarah will earn utility of:
A. 6.
B. 10.
C. 7.
D. 15.
66.
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If Joe and Sarah are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Joe has a dominant strategy, but Sarah does not.

B. Sarah has a dominant strategy, but Joe does not.
C. neither student has a dominant strategy.
D. both students have a dominant strategy.
67.
Assume that Joe and Sarah, from the figure shown, are also dating, in addition to working together on the
joint school project. Further assume that Joe is madly in love with Sarah, who is an excellent student.
Sarah tells Joe that she will break up with him if he does not put forth high effort on this project. This
future punishment by Sarah is an example of:
A. a commitment strategy.
B. an effort optimization strategy.
C. an ultimatum.
D. a bargaining strategy.
68. Games that don't have a dominant strategy:

A. do not have stable equilibrium outcomes.
B. may have stable equilibrium outcomes.
C. always have stable equilibrium outcomes.
D. don't exist; all games have at least one dominant strategy.
69. If there is no single strategy that is best regardless of other players’ behavior:
A. there is no dominant strategy.
B. the dominant strategy will be to defect.
C. a noncooperative equilibrium is the only possible outcome.
D. the game is called a Prisoners’ dilemma.
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70.
This figure displays the choices and payoffs (company profits) of two music shops-MiiTunes and The
Rock Shop. MiiTunes is an established business in the area deciding whether to charge its usual high
prices or to charge very low prices, in the hopes that a new business will not be able to make a profit at
such low prices. The Rock Shop is trying to decide whether or not it should enter the market and compete
with MiiTunes.
If MiiTunes and The Rock Shop are both in the music business and faced with the choices outlined in the
figure shown, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop enters.
C. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
D. MiiTunes charges low prices and The Rock Shop enters.
71.
with MiiTunes.
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If MiiTunes and The Rock Shop are both in the music business and faced with the choices outlined in the
figure, we can predict the outcome will be that:
A. MiiTunes charges high prices and The Rock Shop does not enter.
B. there is more than one stable outcome to this game.
C. there is no stable outcome to this game.
D. None of these statements is true.
72.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if MiiTunes charges low prices, The Rock Shop should:
A. enter the market and earn $4 million.

B. enter the market and lose $2 million.
C. not enter the market and earn $0.
D. It cannot be determined what The Rock Shop will do.
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73.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, if The Rock Shop enters the market, MiiTunes should:

B. charge a low price.
D. give an ultimatum to The Rock Shop.
74.
with MiiTunes.
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According to the figure, MiiTunes:
A. has a dominant strategy to charge low prices.

C. has a dominant strategy to charge high prices.
D. has more than one dominant strategy.
75.
with MiiTunes.
According to the figure, The Rock Shop:
A. should enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.

B. should not enter the market, regardless of what MiiTunes chooses to do.
D. has more than one dominant strategy.
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76.
with MiiTunes.
Given the dominant strategy of MiiTunes according to the figure, we can predict that The Rock Shop:
A. will enter and enjoy profits of $4 million.

B. will enter and lose $2 million.
C. will not enter and earn $0.
D. Their actions cannot be predicted because they do not have a dominant strategy.
77.
with MiiTunes.
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The game between music stores in the figure shows us that:
A. only The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
B. only MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy, and so the outcome cannot be predicted.
78.
with MiiTunes.
If the two music stores are faced with the game in the figure, we can see that:
A. The Rock Shop has a dominant strategy, but MiiTunes does not.
B. MiiTunes has a dominant strategy, but The Rock Shop does not.
C. neither store has a dominant strategy.
D. both stores have a dominant strategy.
79. A noncooperative equilibrium is one in which:

A. the participants act independently, pursuing only their individual interests.
B. always results in a negative-negative outcome.
C. a dominant strategy exists for both players.
D. each player ignores the actions of the other players.
80. Games:
A. only have one outcome possible.
B. with noncooperative equilibriums are always negative-negative outcomes.
C. may have several stable outcomes.
D. must have a dominant strategy present to reach a stable equilibrium.
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81. Games:
A. will always have a dominant strategy.
B. are always zero sum.
C. will always have several stable outcomes.
D. None of the above are true.
82. Games:
A. only have one possible stable outcome.
B. may have noncooperative equilibriums that are positive-positive outcomes.
C. must have a dominant strategy present in order to reach an equilibrium.
83. Games with a noncooperative equilibrium:

A. always result in a negative-negative outcome.
B. always result in a positive-positive outcome.
C. can result in either a positive-positive or negative-negative outcome.
D. always result in a positive-negative outcome (zero-sum).
84. Games with a negative-negative outcome:

A. must have a noncooperative equilibrium.
B. are not necessarily the best outcome for the players involved.
C. result from players acting in their own self-interest.
85. Cooperative equilibriums:

A. are impossible to reach in real life.
B. never occur unless players act in their own self-interest.
C. never result in positive-positive outcomes.
D. can arise if a game is repeated.
86. A Nash equilibrium:

A. is reached when all players choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players.
B. is a point in a game when no player has an incentive to change his or her strategy, given what the
other players are doing.
C. is a stable outcome of a game.
87. When all players in a game choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players, it
is always a:
A. Nash equilibrium.
B. positive-positive outcome.
C. cooperative equilibrium.
D. negative-negative equilibrium.
88. Reaching a Nash equilibrium means that:

A. the outcome will be positive-positive.
B. a cooperative equilibrium has been reached.
C. the players have reached a stable outcome where neither would wish to change his strategy once he
finds out what the other player is doing.
D. the players have failed to reach a stable outcome because one player will always wish to change his
strategy once he finds out what the other player is doing.
89. Reaching a Nash equilibrium means that:

A. a stable outcome has been reached.
B. there is no stable outcome to the game.
C. the players will never reach a positive-positive outcome.
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D. each player has achieved their highest payoff in the game.
90. Once a Nash equilibrium has been found in a game:

A. a stable outcome is impossible.
B. the players have no incentive to change their choice.
C. the players always have an incentive to change their choice.
D. no one in the game can be made better off.
91. A commitment strategy is an agreement in which players agree to:

A. submit to a penalty in the future if they defect from a given strategy.
B. cooperate before the game begins.
C. cooperate in repeated games until someone defects.
D. None of these is a definition of a commitment strategy.
92. A commitment strategy can:

A. be used to change people's payoffs to gain cooperation.
B. allow players to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium that would otherwise be difficult to maintain.
C. result in a positive-positive outcome.
93. For a commitment strategy to work:

A. the punishment must be so bad that it outweighs the incentive to defect in the game.
B. the punishment must occur immediately after the game is played.
C. both players must agree to a punishment.
D. no player may have a dominant strategy.
94. Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma-type games:

A. always benefits the players and the public.
B. always benefits the players, but does not always benefit the public.
C. doesn't always benefit the players, but always benefits the public.
D. doesn't always benefit the players or the public.
95. Reaching a positive-positive outcome through a commitment strategy:

A. will only benefit the players and will not serve public interest.
B. will not benefit anyone.
C. can benefit everyone.
D. will always benefit everyone.
96. When competing firms have a commitment strategy, it is called:

A. collusion.
B. competitive cooperation.
C. predatory pricing.
D. competition.
97. Collusion is a situation where businesses:

A. agree to cooperate, and the U.S. government works hard to encourage this behavior.
B. have noncooperative outcomes, because they compete outside the public eye.
C. agree to cooperate, and their behavior does not serve the public interest.
D. act in their own self-interest and ignore what the other businesses are doing.
98. Collusion:
A. occurs only when no dominant strategy is present.
B. is a cooperative outcome between competitors.
C. is observed, but economists cannot theoretically model it.
D. is a theoretical concept that is rarely observed.
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99. When businesses cooperate and agree to hold prices high, it is called ____________, and when they
reach a noncooperative equilibrium it is called _______________.
A. collusion; competition
B. competition; collusion
C. commitment strategy; collusion
D. collusion; commitment strategy
100. Collusion:
A. rarely occurs in reality.
B. never occurs in reality.
C. has not occurred in the last hundred years or so, due to government policy outlawing it.
D. is a common problem in reality.
101. Economists call a game that is played more than once:

A. a repeated game.
B. collusion.
C. a commitment strategy.
D. cooperative price play.
102. Strategies and incentives:

A. work the same whether games are played once or repeated.
B. often work quite differently when games are repeated.
C. do not change when the game is repeated.
103. In repeated games:

A. players no longer need commitment strategies to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
B. players will never reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
C. there are no dominant strategies.
D. negative-negative outcomes are the only outcomes possible.
104. In repeated games:

A. a noncooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
B. cooperation never happens.
C. a cooperative outcome is more likely than in a single-round game.
D. players always cooperate and enjoy a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
105. Commitment strategies:

A. are not necessary to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in repeated games.
B. are always needed to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium in single-round games.
C. usually fail to work.
D. are not observed in reality.
106. The tit-for-tat strategy is:

A. one in which a player in a repeated game takes the same action that his or her opponent did in the
preceding round.
B. one in which both players explicitly agree to compete in the first round of a repeated game, and if one
of them cooperates, the other will defect.
C. not effective in prisoner's dilemma type games.
107. The tit-for-tat strategy:

A. is not effective in repeated games.
B. is not possible in single-round games.
C. makes cooperation unlikely.
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108. If each player responds by imitating the action of his opponent in the previous round of a repeating
game, the players are following a:
A. repeated cooperation agreement.
B. collusion plan.
C. commitment strategy.
D. tit-for-tat strategy.
109. If one player defects in a repeated game, and his opponent is following a tit-for-tat strategy, we can
predict the opponent will:
A. defect in the next round.
B. renegotiate.
C. cooperate and try to get his opponent to follow.
D. collude.
110. If you are following a tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated game, and your opponent makes a cooperative
move, you will:
A. collude.
B. make a cooperative move in the next round.
C. price compete.
D. defect.
111. Two players who are both playing tit-for-tat can quickly find their way toward:
A. lasting cooperation.
B. noncooperative outcomes for the remaining rounds.
C. a cycle of cooperation and noncooperation, similar to a business cycle.
112. For players in a repeated-play game to achieve cooperation:

A. the players must reach an explicit agreement to cooperate.
B. the players need not explicitly state an agreement to cooperate, but must publicly display a
commitment strategy.
C. there is no need to enter into public commitment strategies or explicit agreements.
D. there is no need for players to collude.
113. Explicit agreements between businesses to keep prices high:

A. are illegal.
B. are called collusion.
C. are not in the public's best interests.
114. Which of the following is a subtle way for a company to reassure their competitors that it is
committed to a tit-for-tat strategy?
A. Setting prices below cost
B. Price-matching guarantees
C. Collusion
D. Offering a commitment strategy
115. A key to gaining cooperative behavior in a repeated game is:

A. that the game must be repeated indefinitely.
B. there must be a definitive end to the game.
C. the players must commit to always acting in their own self-interest.
D. at least one player must have a dominant strategy.
116. When one player has to make a decision before the other player, the situation is called a:
A. commitment game.
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B. simultaneous game.
C. sequential game.
D. prisoner's dilemma.
117. In sequential games, an especially important part of strategic behavior is to:

A. "think backward, work forward."
B. "think forward, work backward."
C. "think forward, act backward."
D. "think backward, act forward."
118. The process of analyzing a problem in reverse-starting with the last choice, then the second-to-last
choice, and so on, to determine the optimal strategy-is called:
A. backward induction.
B. backward thinking.
C. forward thinking.
D. backward working.
119. Backward induction involves:

A. a process of analyzing a problem in reverse.
B. thinking forward and working backward.
C. starting with the last choice and working backward to determine an optimal strategy.
120. Backward induction is a useful tool for:

A. finding an optimal strategy in a sequential game.
B. analyzing the decisions in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. finding an optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
D. Backward induction is useful in any of these games.
121. A way to summarize the actions and payoffs of a sequential game is to use a:
A. decision matrix.
B. decision tree.
C. payoff tree.
D. flowchart.
122. Using a decision tree:

A. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a simultaneous game.
B. can help identify the dominant strategies in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
C. allows a player to see his optimal strategy in a sequential game.
D. can help define a binding commitment strategy.
123.
9-30
This figure displays the choices being made by two coffee shops: Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts. Both
companies are trying to decide whether or not to expand in an area. The area can handle only one of
them expanding, and whoever expands will cause the other to lose some business. If they both expand,
the market will be saturated, and neither company will do well. The payoffs are the additional profits (or
losses) they will earn.
The game in the figure is shown using a:
A. decision tree.
B. decision matrix.
C. flowchart.
D. graph.
124.
9-31

D. a repeated game.
125.
According to the figure shown, if Starbucks expands in the market, then Dunkin Donuts should:
A. also expand their business.

B. not expand.
C. give an ultimatum.
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126.
According to the figure shown, if Dunkin Donuts expands, then Starbucks should:
A. also expand their business.

B. not expand.
C. give an ultimatum.
127.
9-33
According to the figure shown, Starbucks:
A. has a dominant strategy to expand.

B. has a dominant strategy not to expand.
C. has first-mover advantage.
D. should wait to see what Dunkin Donuts is going to do.
128.
According to the figure shown, Dunkin Donuts:
A. should expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.

B. should not expand, regardless of what Starbucks chooses to do.
C. has first-mover advantage.
D. does not have a dominant strategy.
9-34
129.
The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:
A. Starbucks will expand and Dunkin Donuts will not.

B. Starbucks will not expand and Dunkin Donuts will.
C. Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts will both expand.
D. neither Starbucks nor Dunkin Donuts will expand.
130.
9-35
The outcome of the game in the figure shown predicts that Starbucks will earn profits of:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $0 million.
D. $2 million.
131.
If the players in the figure shown act in their own self-interest, then we know that Dunkin Donuts will earn:
A. $2 million.
B. $1 million.
C. $2 million.
D. $0 million.
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132.
If Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts are faced with the game in the figure shown, we can see that:
A. Starbucks has a dominant strategy, but Dunkin Donuts does not.

B. Dunkin Donuts has a dominant strategy, but Starbucks does not.
C. neither company has a dominant strategy.
D. both companies have a dominant strategy.
133. A game with a first-mover advantage is one in which:

A. the player who chooses first gets a higher payoff than those who follow.
B. the player who chooses first gets to decide if a repeated game will start with cooperation from the
beginning.
C. the first player to move determines the payoffs for the rest of the game.
134. First-mover advantage is:

A. most advantageous in a prisoner's dilemma-type game.
B. very important in one-round sequential games.
C. likely to lead to a positive-positive outcome.
135. An ultimatum game is:

A. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the simple choice of whether to
accept or reject.
B. one in which one player makes an offer and the other player has the choice of whether to accept or
offer a counteroffer.
C. a repeated sequential game.
D. the only game played by unions in reality.
9-37
136. An ultimatum game:
A. is a repeated game.
B. is a simultaneous move game.
C. is when one player makes an offer and the other has to accept or reject.
D. is a realistic way of modeling union negotiations.
137. First-mover advantage is:

A. more important in a repeated game than in a sequential game.
B. more important in a repeated sequential game than in a one-round sequential game.
C. more important to those who have less to bargain with.
D. more important in an ultimatum game than in a repeated game.
138. Repeated play can change the outcome in sequential games by:
A. reducing the first-mover advantage.
B. removing the incentive to cooperate.
C. making collusion more probable.
D. increasing the incentive to defect.
139. The ability to make counteroffers transforms bargaining from a game in which ___________ trumps
everything to a game in which ____________ is the winning strategy.
A. patience; first-mover advantage
B. commitment strategy; self-interested behavior
C. first-mover advantage; patience
D. first-mover advantage; cooperation
140. ___________ is a winning strategy in a game of bargaining.

A. First-mover advantage
B. Patience
C. Cooperation
D. Self-interested behavior
141. In a game of bargaining, those who _______________ will likely get the highest payoff.
A. are patient
B. are cooperative
C. have a commitment strategy
D. collude
142. In a game of bargaining, the player who is willing to:

A. be cooperative has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
B. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a worse payoff.
C. hold out longer has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
D. make the first move has more bargaining power and so receives a better payoff.
143. In the real world, it is likely that wage negotiations:

A. drag on for years to see which side is more patient.
B. often end with the company enjoying a larger payoff, since they can afford to be more patient.
C. often end with the worker's enjoying a larger payoff, since they are not losing as much in profit as the
company.
D. do not drag on for years.
144. In the real world, wage negotiations typically do not drag on for years:
A. because the company can simply offer the split that would eventually occur if the two sides played all
the rounds.
B. because neither a company nor employees can afford to not work for that long.
C. unless the employees play an ultimatum game using a union to negotiate.
9-38
145. Using a commitment strategy in:
A. a simultaneous game can alter payoffs, but has no effect in sequential games.
B. a simultaneous game has no effect, but can alter the payoffs and outcome of sequential games.
C. either a simultaneous or sequential game has little impact on payoffs or outcome.
D. either a simultaneous or sequential game can greatly alter the payoffs and outcome of the game.
146. By committing to reduce one's options during a sequential game, a player can force a change in his
opponents' strategy, and that commitment strategy results in a:
A. payoff that he likely would have gotten anyway.
B. cooperative equilibrium.
C. payoff that would otherwise be out of reach.
D. negative-negative outcome.
147. The famous historical example of the commitment strategy used by Cortes against the Aztecs is
sometimes referred to as:
A. "burning your boats."
B. "burning your bridges."
C. "friendly fire."
D. "putting all your eggs in one basket."
Chapter 09 Test Bank KEY

1. While everyone wants a clean environment, it can be very hard to achieve. An approach governments
could take to promote that outcome is to:
A. create social norms.
B. create and enforce strict laws and heavy fines.
C. influence individual's incentives.
D. All of these are ways governments can get the "green" behavior they want.
AACSB: Reflective Thinking
Accessibility: Keyboard Navigation
Blooms: Understand
Difficulty: 02 Medium
Learning Objective: 09-01 Understand strategic behavior and describe the components of a strategic game.
Topic: Game Theory
2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

A. in which people make rational choices that lead to a less-than-ideal result for all.
B. in which people make rational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
C. that leads everyone to be as well off as possible without making another worse off.
D. that leads people to make irrational choices that lead to the ideal result for all.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
Topic: Prisoners Dilemma
3. To economists, games are:

A. just recreational pursuits like chess, Monopoly, or poker.
B. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
C. situations in which individuals act against their own interest for fun.
D. None of these statements are true.
9-39
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
4. To economists, a game is:

A. any situation in which players pursue strategies designed to achieve their goals.
B. a trivial pursuit that should not be used to analyze the economy or its actors.
C. a way to simplify and minimize the true importance of situations like war.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
5. Economic games can be used to analyze decisions around which of the following situations?
A. War
B. Business
C. Environmental protection
D. All of these situations.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
6. The study of how people behave strategically under different circumstances is called:
A. game theory.
B. game strategy.
C. strategy optimization.
D. strategy theory.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
7. Game theory is:

B. used by economists to evaluate behavior in a variety of settings.
C. a useful tool in predicting strategic behavior.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
8. Game theory is:

B. used to predict the winners of only certain types of strategic games.
C. used to evaluate the microeconomic choices that involve probabilities of different outcomes.
D. the study of games of chance like solitaire or betting on horse races.
9-40
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
9. When the trade-offs you face are determined by the choices someone else will make, behaving
rationally involves:
A. behaving strategically.
B. ignoring the behavior of other actors.
C. acting in a way to help others.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
10. Behaving strategically:

A. means recognizing that the actions of others will affect the trade-offs you face, and acting accordingly.
B. is an essential part of game theory.
C. involves rational decision making.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
11. Behaving strategically means:

A. evaluating decisions in which players act in their own self-interest, but the interplay of those decisions
does not exist.
B. acting to achieve a goal by withholding key information from the person with whom an exchange is
being made.
C. acting to achieve a goal by anticipating the interplay between your own and others' decisions.
D. evaluating the impact of your choices on an uninvolved third party.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
12. When your outcomes depend on another's choices, asking __________________ is the key to good
decision making.
A. how will others respond
B. what the wants and constraints are of those involved
C. what the trade-offs are
D. why everyone isn't already doing it
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Multiple players
B. Strategies
C. Payoffs
9-41
D. All games involve all of these things.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Rules
B. Chance events
C. Dice
D. Cards
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. Strategies
B. Someone to enforce the rules
C. Cards or dice
D. Full information
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory

A. A predictable outcome
B. Payoffs
C. Full information
D. A game master
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
17. In games, rules:

A. define the actions that are allowed in a game.
B. need to be loosely adhered to in order to predict an outcome.
C. define the winners of a game.
D. outline the wrong choices that could be made in a game.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

A. laws of nature.
B. legislated rules of society.
C. costs of various actions.
D. All of these are rules that constrain people's behavior.
9-42
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
19. An example of a real-life rule that might constrain people's behavior is:
A. minimum wage legislation.
B. having 24 hours in a day.
C. the earth's limited supply of oil.
D. All of these are examples of real-life rules.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
20. In games, strategies are:

A. the outcomes players want to achieve.
B. the same for everyone to achieve the same goal.
C. the plans of action that players follow to achieve their goals.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

A. is the same for everyone.
B. can be different for different players and still achieve the same goal.
C. should be similar to what others have chosen to reach the same goal.
D. has begun to be documented by economists.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
22. In games:
A. there is only one strategy associated with each outcome.
B. there are several strategies that can achieve a single goal.
C. all strategies followed in one particular game should all be similar in order to be successful.
D. if one person's strategy is wildly different from those of others, he will typically come in first or last.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
23. Payoffs are:

A. the rewards that come from particular actions.
B. always monetary.
C. things that are only enjoyed by the winner.
D. bribes made to gain some advantage unfairly during a game.
9-43
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

A. a salary.
B. winning an election.
C. having clean drinking water.
D. All of these are examples of payoffs.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

A. being the first mover in a game.
B. sharing information with a select few that others aren't privy to.
C. monetary gains made by a player.
D. giving an advantage to only one player.
Blooms: Understand
Topic: Game Theory
26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

A. only two players.
B. more than two players.
C. multiple organizations.
Blooms: Understand
Learning Objective: 09-02 Explain why noncooperation is a dominant strategy in the prisoners' dilemma.
27. The prisoner's dilemma:

A. can be summarized in a payoff matrix.
B. can involve two players.
C. leads to a less-than-ideal outcome for all players.
Blooms: Understand
28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

A. a strategy matrix.
B. a strategy tree.
C. a decision matrix.
D. a flowchart.
Blooms: Understand
9-44
29. A decision matrix:

A. summarizes the players, strategies, and payoffs associated with a game.
B. outlines the clear outcome of any strategy-based game.
C. shows only the decisions of one player.
D. is not useful in evaluating the strategic choices.
Blooms: Understand
30. When a strategy is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose, it is called a:
A. golden decision.
B. dominated strategy.
C. dominant strategy.
D. zero-sum strategy.
Blooms: Understand
31. A dominant strategy is one:

A. that is the best one to follow, no matter what strategy other players choose.
B. in which a player is forced to choose given the rules of the game.
C. in which a player must choose, even though it does not optimize his outcome.
D. provides a player with the highest payoff in the game.
Blooms: Understand
32. A dominant strategy:

A. exists in every game.
B. is the best one to follow no matter what strategy other players choose.
C. is always the same for all players of a game.
D. awards the highest achievable payoff in a game.
Blooms: Understand

A. there is a dominant strategy for both players.
B. there is a dominant strategy for only one player.
C. there is no dominant strategy for either player.
D. there is a dominant strategy for a player depending on what the other player does.
Blooms: Understand
9-45
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
the sea. From a multitude of such letters one may comprehend why the
librarian insists on proceeding slowly in order to counteract deficiencies.
The newsboy, without his five-cent weekly, still must have his penny-
dreadful classic; the girl, too old for the juvenile book, must be furnished
with a transitional book on the way to the grown-up shelves; our foreign
children must be encouraged to read, according to the librarian’s idea,
something different from themselves, something not of their own
environment.[57]
We were warned by the writer in the Quarterly Review not to regard the
extremes of genius or of dulness, in estimating children. And yet, biography
is filled with that appealing detail of juvenile taste, which the grown person
delights in recording. Lamb’s remembrance of the Stackhouse Bible,
Coleridge’s dreamy dread of the Arabian Nights, Scott’s lusty shouting of
the ballad of Hardy Knute, Tennyson’s spreading his arms to the sky and
chanting, “I hear a voice that’s speaking in the wind,” Stevenson’s crooning
to himself in the dark his “songstries”[58]—these touches do not betoken the
genius of men, but the genius of childhood. Whenever we find such young
people brought in contact with children’s literature, they do not relish the
experience; they recognise as of value only that which they can but partially
comprehend, yet which is told out of the depths of a writer’s heart and
understanding. They respond to the spirit of great literature from their
earliest moments; for its sake, they overcome the sensitiveness of
temperament which nowadays must be in so far reckoned with that all
causes for fear are rejected from a story. To them, there is a certain
educative value in fear. Coleridge, timourous as he was when not more than
six, devoured the gilt-covered books of Jack-the-Giant-Killer and of Tom
Hickathrift, whom Thackeray delighted in, not because he was so tall, but
because he was so thick; and though it is said that his father burnt many of
these nerve-exacting tales, we hear Coleridge exclaiming during the course
of a lecture delivered in 1811:
“Give me the works which delighted my youth! Give me the History of
St. George and the Seven Champions of Christendom, which at every
leisure moment I used to hide myself in a corner to read! Give me the
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, which I used to watch, till the sun shining
on the book-case approached, and, glowing full upon it, gave me the
courage to take it from the shelf.”[59]
We interpret these remarks in terms of genius, without giving the average
mind credit for such opinions, just because they are left unrecorded. Every
child has his night fears and his day dreams, however regulated they may be
by his social environment. These vary in degree according to the intellectual
energy and spiritual refinement fostered in each one of us. The librarian’s
problem is based upon an acknowledgment of this potential energy and
refinement; she reckons with the child’s voluntary interest. For all
childhood is seeking to find expression in numberless ways; its eye for the
first time sees the outline of life, its voice expresses for the first time the
rhythm of its nature in song. Its compass in all things is small, but its timbre
is pure.
FOOTNOTES
[47] The general complaint among librarians is that these picture-books
of the best type are too rare and too expensive to purchase in large
quantities for general circulation.
[48] Read Stevenson’s “A Penny Plain” in Memories and Portraits; also
“The Dime Novel in American Life,” by Charles M. Harvey, Atlantic,
100:37 (July, 1907).
[49] By Archdeacon Wilberforce, Hannah More’s friend.
[50] Vide “Reading for Boys and Girls,” by Everett T. Tomlinson.
Atlantic, 86:693 (Nov., 1900).
[51] Article on Children’s Books. Reprinted in Living Age, Aug. 10,
1844, 2:1.
[52] There was the Elliptical Questioning—a form of “drawing out” and
“injecting” knowledge and information.
[53] In a letter to the author, Mr. C. G. Leland, Superintendent of the
Bureau of Libraries, New York Board of Education, plainly states the
province and the mission of the school library. He writes: “Nearly all of
our educational institutions nowadays are very busily engaged in
supplying useful information. The practical is crowding everything else
out of their courses of study. The kind of knowledge that will help in the
future struggle for existence and material betterment is being demanded
more and more and is being taught to the exclusion of much that is only
ethical or cultural.
“As a continual protest against this materialistic tendency the school
library takes its position and marshals its books. Its first purpose is to
create a love for good literature and beautiful pictures as soon as the
child has mastered the mechanics of reading; its ultimate aim is culture.
“In the elementary school the library should reach to every class-room
and offer there a few very attractive and very carefully selected books,
so attractive and so well graded that the most indifferent boy or girl will
be led by easy stages into the green fields of literature.
“The class-room is still the strategic point, for even homes of
refinement are wont to delegate the work of directing the children’s
reading to the school, and the teacher with her case of well-known books
has every day opportunities denied to public librarian and to the majority
of parents.
“The school library naturally points the way to the public library; its
relation to that institution is that of the preparatory school to the
university.
“In supplying reference-books, and in correlating a certain amount of
recreative reading with the school course, the library has another
important field, but one which should be subordinated to the larger and
broader function.”
[54] This involves a careful consideration of a juvenile reference library.
[55] Heinrich Wolgast, the German authority, has written: “Vom
Kinderbuch,” Leipzig, Teubner, 1906.
[56] Vide London Library Association Record, Feb. 15, 1907.
[57] This last statement, however, may be refuted by the répertoire of a
Yiddish theatre. I have witnessed the theme of “King Lear” applied to
Jewish life, and followed with bated breath by the boy in the gallery.
[58] Stevenson’s father once stood outside the door and recorded one of
these impromptu poems. The Rev. Charles Kingsley, when a boy, is said
to have done the same thing.
[59] Vide W. M. Rossetti’s Memoirs of Dante Gabriel Rossetti. Chap.
VI, Childish Book Reading and Scribbling.
VI. APPENDIX
I. Book-lists Published by Libraries.

What principle of selection shall one adopt in making a book-list? No
hard and fast rules can be framed, for what I may consider best may be
rejected as second best by you. There is not a book-list issued that does not
differ from the others in many essentials; in classification, in titles, and in
purpose. Most of these lists are marked by a sincere effort on the part of
librarians to direct a child’s reading along the best lines. But even though
they may be suggestive and helpful, at the most they are passive and need to
be supplemented by a personal knowledge of the books recommended. For,
in the lists of history and biography, a compiler finds it necessary to adopt
many volumes that are far from literary in the style of writing or in the
manner of treatment. To-morrow these books may give place to others far
superior and far more permanent in value.
The agreement between the lists, however, does show that there are
numberless stories, legends, and the like, which are generally acceded to be
desirable, as much because of their inherent freshness as because of the fact
that they have stood the test of time. Rarely do the lists fail to mention
them.
Notwithstanding, the recommendations issued by the libraries usually are
sent forth, hedged around by exceptions and by indirect warnings. This is a
healthful sign; it indicates that, however intent the maker of book-lists may
be to offer the best, human nature is not all of the same calibre, and
excellence is of an illusive character.
It is with some peculiar pleasure that I offer the list of books in this
Appendix, protecting myself, and the committee that aided me, with
excuses, and forestalling criticism by claiming that while the
recommendations have been made to the best of several abilities, and in
accord with no mean standards of selection—at the same time much has
been included of necessity which will pass away in the years to come. This
is not an exclusive list; the attempt has been made to have it a practical,
workable list, for parents and teachers and librarians to consult, bringing to
it their own personal judgment as to individual taste and development of the
child under consideration. Such a term as “the child” has been used
reluctantly, since there is no other term, more human, less mechanical, to
take its place. Because of this dislike for a stereotyped grading of
childhood, the reader will here find no indication as to age demands. The
books have been mentioned with a generous range of from six to fifteen
years.
Other lists will be found to include a fuller division of subjects. Notably
in the historical sections, they will contain many more references than are
here given. Our histories smack largely of the school-room; they do not
differ so very much from each other as to excellence; they are very apt to
agree in the zealousness with which they follow fact. If we decide to seek
for general literary merit, we should avoid, as far as possible, the inclusion
of what we know is not the case; of what we know is intended for the class-
room.
And so, in order to supplement our method, which may be considered too
narrow or too broad, the following table of available lists, which have been
brought to my notice, is included:
BOOK-LISTS
A. L. A. Annotated Lists—Books for Boys and Girls. A Selected List
Compiled by Caroline M. Hewins, Librarian of the Hartford Public
Library. 1904. $0.15. A most judicious and literary standard.
A List of Books Recommended for a Children’s Library—Compiled
for the Iowa Library Commission by Annie Carroll Moore, Supervisor of
Children’s Rooms in the New York City Public Library. Another
excellent and practical guide.
Books for Boys—Special Bulletin No. 6. January, 1906. The Chicago
Public Library. A generous selection for boys from twelve to eighteen; an
inclusive list, marked more by vigour than by refinement of a fastidious
nature.
Fingerposts to Children’s Reading—Walter Taylor Field. McClurg,
$1.00. The book contains some practical suggestions about children and
their reading. The lists in the Appendix are open to criticism.
The Right Reading for Children—Compiled by Charles Welsh. Heath.
Referring chiefly to Heath’s Home and School Classics.
Story telling to Children from Norse Mythology and the
Nibelungenlied—References to Material on Selected Stories, Together
with an Annotated Reading List. Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. $0.20.
Excellent.
Story Hour Courses for Children from Greek Myths, the Iliad, and
the Odyssey, as Conducted by the Children’s Department of the
Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh. $0.05. An excellent guide.
A List of Good Stories to Tell to Children under Twelve Years of
Age, with a Brief Account of the Story Hour Conducted by the
Children’s Department, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. $0.05. The same
Library has issued:
Annotated Catalogue of Books Used in the Home Libraries and
Reading Clubs, conducted by the Children’s Department. $0.25.
Books for Children—A List Compiled by Gertrude Wild Arnold. The
Marion Press, New York. 1905.
Reading for the Young—Sargent. Houghton.
A Children’s Library—Selected by May H. Prentice and Effie L. Power,
in behalf of the Cleveland Normal School.
Catalogue of Books for Public School Libraries in New York—
Compiled by Claude G. Leland. Marked by educational requirements,
and graded.
A List of Books on Birds for the General Reader and Students. Audubon
Society of the State of New York. Recommended by Mr. Frank M.
Chapman, of the New York Museum of Natural History. Vide “Bird-
Lore,” a magazine which Mr. Chapman edits.
Children’s Reference Lists—Cleveland Public Library. English History
for the Sixth Grade. The system here adopted is excellent, and might be
followed with advantage in other lines.
Children, Schools, and Libraries—A list, with abstracts, of some of the
more important contributions to the subject. Compiled by Marion
Dickinson in 1897; revised by Mary Medlicott in 1899. Springfield
Public Library. Springfield, Massachusetts. A very serviceable pamphlet.
Five Hundred Books for the Young—George E. Hardy. Scribner.
Some English Catalogues recommended by Miss Isabel Chadburn:
a. Catalogue of Books for Secondary Schools.
b. Prize List, Education Committee, London County Council. Graded.
c. Buckingham Palace Road Library. Mr. Pacy.
d. Cable Street, Stepney, E., Library. Mr. Roebuck.
e. Descriptive Handbook to Juvenile Literature. Finsbury Public
Libraries, Mr. Cannons.
f. Group of Books for Schools. Librarian of the Cardiff Library. Mr.
Ballinger.
As far as nature books are concerned, it will be found that local

differences have to be observed; yet, though the British and American
writers are bound to these limitations, they are none the less alike in their
scope—to furnish the juvenile readers with a ready reference guide to
objects around them. In the present instance, the list which has been
compiled, voted upon, and arranged, may suit the English child as well as
the American child, although certain local inclusions need to be balanced
by the substitution of English counterparts. The American school story, per
se, will never supplant its English predecessor in “Tom Brown at Rugby,”
or even “The Crofton Boys.” The American library shelves are stacked with
the English make of book. And it must be acknowledged that, in point of
scholarship, the English classics, given a library and literary format, surpass
the school-book shape in every way. In this connection, it is well to heed
the warning of Miss Moore:
“The choice of editions is not based upon extended comparative work.
[What is said of her list applies as well to the present one.] It represents
merely the editions which have come to my notice, some of them being
quite unsatisfactory. This is an era of educational publications and, while
many of these are admirably adapted to their purpose, we have need to be
constantly on our guard not to overstock children’s libraries with books
which have no artistic merit as to cover or general make-up, and which
therefore fail to make a definite individual impression on the mind of the
child and give to a children’s library the general appearance of book-shelves
devoted to supplementary reading.”
Were this intended to be an exclusive list, many very rigourous omissions
would have been the result; but it is better to err upon the generous side
than to appeal to an exceptional taste. “A man’s reach should exceed his
grasp” is the Browning philosophy, but in the climb upward the
intermediate tendrils are necessary for holding on; nor must they be
removed until something is assured to take their place. The removal of
inferior books from the shelves will not remedy the matter, unless existing
circumstances are such as to meet the case.
Where it is possible, the least expensive edition has been adopted;
although it is often a fact that no choice has been given. A good edition for
a library is the most desirable, and those committees are unwise which
sacrifice quality for quantity. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that a
more suitable arrangement cannot exist, whereby the artistic books, which,
by reason of their decorative character, are perforce expensive, could be
offered at less exorbitant rates to an institution of such social importance as
a library.
II. A List of Selected Books for Children.
PICTURE-BOOKS AND PICTURES

(The Nister Picture-Books are sold in this country by Dutton.)
Bedford, Frances D.—Book of Shops. (Verses by E. V. Lucas.) Dutton,
$2.50.
Bradley, Will—Peter Poodle, Toy Maker to the King. Dodd, $1.50 net.
Caldecott, Randolph—Toy Books. Warne, (4 vols.) $1.25 each. The
separate stories are sold at $0.25 each, and comprise, among a large
number, the following: The Farmer’s Boy; A Frog He Would A-Wooing
Go; Hey Diddle Diddle and Baby Bunting; The House That Jack Built;
The Milk Maid; The Queen of Hearts; Ride a Cock Horse; Sing a Song
of Sixpence; John Gilpin.
Cox, Palmer—The Brownie Books. Century, $1.50 each.
Crane, Walter—Mother Hubbard’s Picture Book. Lane, $1.25.
This Little Pig’s Picture Book. Lane, $1.25. [There are other volumes.
Crane also ill. Lamb’s fanciful essay, “The Masque of Days.” Cassell,
$2.50.]
Mother Hubbard; This Little Pig; Aladdin; Beauty and the Beast;
Bluebeard; The Forty Thieves; The Frog Prince; Goody Two Shoes;
Sleeping Beauty; The Fairy Ship; Baby’s A B C. Lane, $0.25 each.
De Monvel, Boutet—Filles et Garçons. (Stories by Anatole France.)
Hachette; Brentano, $2.35.
Chansons de France pour les petits Français. Hachette; Plon, $2.50.
La Civilité puérile et honnête. Plon; Brentano, $2.35.
Nos Enfants. (Text by Anatole France.) Hachette; Brentano, $1.25.
Fables de La Fontaine, choisies pour les enfants. S. P. C. K.; Brentano,
$2.35.
Gerson, Virginia—Happy Heart Family. Duffield, $1.00. (There is a
second volume.)
Greenaway, Kate—A Day in a Child’s Life. (Music, verse, pictures.)
Warne, $1.50.
Marigold Garden. Routledge (Warne, $1.50), $2.00.
Under the Window. (Pictures and Rhymes.) Warne, $1.50.
A Apple Pie, etc. Warne, $0.75.
Mother Goose. Warne, $0.75.
Mavor’s Spelling Book. Warne, $0.40.
Guigou, P. et Vimar, A.—L’illustre Dompteur. (The French Circus Book.)
Plon; Brentano, $2.35.
Hoffmann, Heinrich—Slovenly Peter. Coates, $1.50. [German editions
are preferable.]
Perkins, Lucy Fitch—Adventures of Robin Hood. Stokes, $1.50.
Whitcomb, Ida P.—Young People’s Story of Art. Dodd, $2.00. [Sarah
Tytler is the author of “The Old Masters and their Pictures”; “Modern
Painters and Their Paintings.” Little, Brown, $1.50 each. Vide Poetry;
also German section, Richter, etc. The French are here included since
they are so familiar to English readers.]
MYTHS, FOLK-LORE, LEGENDS, FAIRY TALES, AND HERO

TALES
Æsop—Fables. (Tr., Joseph Jacobs.) Macmillan, $1.50.
A Hundred Fables of Æsop. (Tr., Sir Roger L’Estrange; intro., Kenneth
Grahame.) Lane, $1.50 net.
The Babies’ Own. (Ill., Walter Crane.) Warne, $1.50.
Andersen, H. C.—Fairy Tales. (Tr., H. L. Braekstad; ill., Tegner; 2 vols.)
Century, $5.00. Fairy Tales. (Tr., Mrs. Edgar Lucas.) Macmillan, $0.50;
Dent, $2.50. [Ill., the Robinsons. Vide also Contes Choisis, Bibliothèque
Rose.]
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments—(Ed., Andrew Lang.) Longmans,
$2.00.
Fairy Tales From. (Ed., E. Dixon.) Dent, 2 vols., 7s. 6d. net each.
Asbjörnsen, P. C.—Fairy Tales From the Far North. Armstrong, $2.00;
Burt, $1.00. [Folk and Fairy Tales. Tr., H. L. Braekstad; intro., E. W.
Gosse.]
Baldwin, James—The Story of Siegfried. (Ill., Pyle.) Scribner, $1.50.
The Story of Roland. (Ill., Birch.) Scribner, $1.50.
Brown, Abbie Farwell—The Book of Saints and Friendly Beasts.
Houghton, $1.25.
In the Days of Giants. Houghton, $1.10 net.
Bulfinch, Thomas—The Age of Fable. Lothrop, Lee, $1.50. [Cheaper
editions, Altemus, Crowell, etc.]
Cantor, William—True Annals of Fairyland. Reign of King Herla. (Ill.,
Charles Robinson.) Dent, 4s. 6d. net.
Carroll, Lewis—Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. (Ill., Sir John
Tenniel.) Macmillan, $1.00. [There is also an edition, Harper, ill., by
Peter Newell, $3.00 net. The reader is advised to consult Mr. Dodgson’s
Life and Letters.]
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There. (Ill., Sir
John Tenniel. Sequel to the above.) Macmillan, $1.00.
Chapin, A. A.—Story of the Rhinegold. Harper, $1.25. [Vide also “Wonder
Tales from Wagner.” She is the author of “Masters of Music.” Dodd,
$1.50.]
Church, A. J.—Charlemagne and the Twelve Peers of France. Macmillan,
$1.75.
Cruikshank, George—The Cruikshank Fairy Book. Putnam, $1.25; $2.00.
Francillon, R. E.—Gods and Heroes. Ginn, $0.40.
Gibbon, J. M. (Ed.)—True Annals of Fairyland. Reign of King Cole. (Ill.,
Charles Robinson.) Macmillan, $2.00.
Grimm, J. L. and W. K.—Fairy Tales of the Brothers. (Tr., Mrs. Edgar
Lucas; ill., Arthur Rackham.) Lippincott, $2.50; $1.50. [Editions also ill.,
Cruikshank; intro., Ruskin,—Chatto and Windus, 6s.; Macmillan, ill.,
Walter Crane, $1.50; Contes Choisis; Bibliothèque Rose; vide German
section.]
Harris, Joel Chandler—Uncle Remus and His Friends. (Ill., Frost.)
Houghton, $1.50.
Nights with Uncle Remus. (Ill., Church.) Houghton, $1.50.
Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings. (Ill., Frost.) Appleton,
$2.00.
Hawthorne, Nathaniel—A Wonderbook for Girls and Boys. (Ill., Walter
Crane.) Houghton, $3.00.
Tanglewood Tales. (Ill., G. W. Edwards.) Houghton, $1.00; $2.50.
Horne, Richard Hengist—The Good-Natured Bear. [Out of print, but re-
publication is strongly recommended by librarians.]
Ingelow, Jean—Mopsa, the Fairy. Little, Brown, $1.25.
Irving, Washington—Rip Van Winkle and The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.
Macmillan, $1.50. [Expensive illustrated editions issued by Putnam and
Doubleday.]
Jacobs, Joseph—English Fairy Tales. Putnam, $1.25.
The Most Delectable History of Reynard the Fox. Macmillan, $1.50.
Book of Wonder Voyages. Macmillan, $1.50.
Celtic Fairy Tales. Putnam, $1.25.
Kingsley, Charles—The Heroes; or, Greek Fairy Tales for My Children.
(Ill., T. H. Robinson.) Dutton, $2.50. [Vide also editions Crowell; Harper,
$2.50.]
The Water Babies. Macmillan, $1.25. [Cheaper Editions.]
Kipling, Rudyard—Just-So Stories. Doubleday, $1.20 net. [There is also a
“Just-So Song Book,” $1.20 net.]
Jungle Book. (First and second series.) Century, $1.50 each.
Puck of Pook’s Hill. (Ill., Arthur Rackham.) Doubleday, $1.50.
Laboulaye, E. R. L. de—Fairy Tales. Routledge, $1.25; Harper, $2.00.
The Last Fairy Tales. Harper, $2.00.
La Fontaine—Selected Fables. (Ill., Boutet de Monvel.) Young, $2.50.
Lang, Andrew (Ed.)—The Red Fairy Book. Longmans, $2.00.
The Blue Fairy Book. Longmans, $2.00.
The Book of Romance. Longmans, $1.60 net.
Lanier, Sidney—The Boy’s King Arthur. Scribner, $2.00. [Lanier bases his
narrative on Mallory. Vide Howard Pyle’s “Story of King Arthur and His
Knights.” Scribner, $2.50.]
The Boy’s Froissart. Scribner, $2.00.
Knightly Tales of Wales; or, The Boy’s Mabinogion. Scribner, $2.00.
The Boy’s Percy. [Full introduction and the ballads based on original.]
Scribner, $2.00.
Mabie, H. W.—Norse Stories. Dodd, $1.80 net.
MacDonald, George—At the Back of the North Wind. Routledge, $1.25;
Burt, $1.00.
Mulock-Craik, Dinah M.—The Fairy Book. Macmillan, $1.00.
The Adventures of a Brownie. Harper, $0.60; Page, $0.50.
The Little Lame Prince. Harper, $0.60.
Musset, Paul de—Mr. Wind and Madam Rain. Putnam, $2.00. [Vide Petite
Bibliothèque Blanche.]
Perrault, Charles—Fairy Tales. Macmillan, $0.40 net. [Vide p. 36.]
Pyle, Howard—Merry Adventures of Robin Hood. Scribner, $3.00. [An
excellent version of the ballad has been issued by Stokes, ill., Lucy Fitch
Perkins.]
Ruskin, John—King of the Golden River. Ginn, $0.25; Page, $0.50.
Scudder, Horace E. (Compiler.)—Book of Legends. Houghton, $0.50.
Stockton, Frank R.—The Queen’s Museum and Other Fanciful Tales.
Scribner, $2.50. [Vide former edition, “Clocks of Rondaine and other
stories.” Scribner, $1.50.]
Thackeray, W. M.—The Rose and the Ring. Putnam, $0.50, $1.00. [Vide
other editions.]
POETRY AND VERSE

Allingham, William—The Ballad Book. Macmillan, $1.00.
Blake, William—Songs of Innocence. (Ill., Geraldine Morris.) Lane,
$0.50 net.
Browning, Robert—The Pied Piper of Hamelin. (Ill., Kate Greenaway.)
Warne, $1.50.
Burgess, Gelett—Goops and How to be Them. (Several volumes.)
Stokes, $1.50.
Cary, Alice and Phœbe—Ballads for Little Folks. Houghton, $1.50.
Child, Lydia Maria—Flowers for Children; New Flowers for Children.
[Out of print, but re-publication is strongly recommended by librarians.]
Dodge, Mary Mapes (Ed.)—Baby Days. Century, $1.50.
English and Scottish Popular Ballads. (Ed., Sargent-Kittredge, from
Francis James Child’s collection, Cambridge edition.) Houghton, $3.00.
Field, Eugene—Poems of Childhood. (Ill., Maxfield Parrish.) Scribner,
$2.50.
Goldsmith, Oliver—The Deserted Village. (Ill., E. A. Abbey.) Harper,
$3.00. [Abbey also illustrated “She Stoops to Conquer,” $5.00.]
Henley, W. E. (Compiler)—Lyra Heroica: A Book of Verses for Boys.
Scribner, $1.25.
Holmes, Oliver W.—Poems. (Complete ed., Cambridge.) Houghton,
$2.00, $1.50. [Vide “The One Hoss Shay,” ill., Howard Pyle, $1.50.]
Jerrold, Walter (Ed.)—The Big Book of Nursery Rhymes. Dutton,
$3.00.
Lamb, Charles and Mary—Poetry for Children. (Ill., Winifred Green;
pref., I. Gollancz.) Dent, 2s. 6d. net. [Vide in same edition “Mrs.
Leicester’s School,” 5s. net.]
Lang, Andrew (Ed.)—The Blue Poetry Book. Longmans, $2.00.
Lear, Edward—Nonsense Books. Little, Brown, $2.00. [Vide also Warne
edition.]
Longfellow, Henry W.—Poems. (Complete ed., Cambridge.) Houghton,
$2.00. [Vide also “Hiawatha,” ill., Remington, $4.00.]
Lowell, James R.—The Vision of Sir Launfal. Houghton, $1.50.
Lucas, E. V. (Ed.)—A Book of Verses for Children. Holt, $2.00. [There is a
school edition.]
Macaulay, T. B.—Lays of Ancient Rome. Longmans, $1.25. [Vide editions
Houghton, Putnam.]
Matthews, Brander—Poems of American Patriotism. Scribner, $1.50.
[Vide “English History Told by English Poets.” Ed., Bates and Coman.
Macmillan, $0.60 net.]
Mother Goose Nursery Rhymes (Ill., Tenniel, Crane, etc.)—Dutton,
$1.50. [Vide Nister ed., Routledge, etc.]
Mother Goose’s Melodies—Houghton, $1.50.
Norton, C. E. (Ed.)—Heart of Oak Books. Heath, 7 vols., from $0.25 to
$0.60. [Collection of Rhymes, Poems, Stories, etc.]
Palgrave, F. T.—The Children’s Treasury of English Song. Macmillan,
$1.00.
Patmore, Coventry (Ed.)—Children’s Garland from the Best Poets.
Macmillan, $1.00.
Repplier, Agnes (Ed.)—Book of Famous Verse. Houghton, $0.75 and
$1.25.
Riley, James Whitcomb—Rhymes of Childhood. Bobbs-Merrill, $1.25.
Rossetti, Christina G.—Sing-Song. Macmillan, $1.50.
Scott, Sir Walter—Marmion; The Lay of the Last Minstrel. (Ed., W. J.
Rolfe.) Houghton, $0.75 each.
Shute, Katharine H. and Dunton, Larkin (Compilers)—The Land of
Song. Silver, 3 vols., $0.36 to $0.54.
Stevenson, Robert L.—A Child’s Garden of Verses. Scribner. (Ill.,
Robinson, $1.50; ill., Jessie W. Smith, $2.50.) [An excellent, inexpensive
edition, Rand, McNally, $0.75.]
Taylor, Jane and Ann—Little Ann and Other Poems. (Ill., Kate
Greenaway). Warne, $1.00. [Vide also edition, ed., E. V. Lucas. Stokes,
$1.50. Including verses of Adelaide O’Keeffe; ill., F. D. Bedford. Vide
“Greedy Dick and Other Stories in Verse,” by the Taylors, $0.50.]
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord—Selected Poems for Young People. (Ed., W. J.
Rolfe.) Houghton, $0.75. [Children should be made acquainted with parts
of the “Idylls of the King.”]
Watts, Isaac—Childhood Songs of Long Ago. Wessels, $0.75. [Vide
English editions.]
Welsh, Charles—Book of Nursery Rhymes. (Edited and graded.) Heath,
$0.30. [In Home and School Classics.]
Wiggin, K. D., and Smith, N. A. (Eds.)—Golden Numbers: A Book of
Verse for Youth. McClure, $2.00 net.
Posy Ring: A Book of Verse for Children. McClure, $1.25 net. [The
same editors have gathered together a book of nursery rhymes.]
CLASSICS
Cervantes, Miguel de—Don Quixote of the Mancha. (Retold by Judge E.
A. Parry; ill., Walter Crane.) Lane, $1.50.
Chaucer, Geoffrey—Canterbury Tales. (Retold by Percy MacKaye; ill.,
W. Appleton Clark.) Duffield, $2.50.
Canterbury Chimes; or, Chaucer Tales Retold to Children. Storr,
Frances and Turner, Hawes. Kegan, Paul, 3s. 6d.
Chaucer for Children. Mrs. H. R. Haweis. Scribner, $1.25.
Church, A. H.—Lords of the World. (Pictures from Roman Life and
Story). Appleton, $1.50.
Herodotus—Wonder Stories from. Told by Boden, G. H., and D’Almeida,
W. B. Harper, $2.50.
Homer—Iliad. (Tr., W. C. Bryant.) Houghton, $1.00 to $9.00. [Vide also tr.,
Lang, Leaf, Myers.]
Lamb, Charles—The Adventures of Ulysses. Harper, $2.50. [Vide also ed.,
E. V. Lucas, Putnam.]
Odysseus, Adventures of—(Retold by Marvin, F. S., and others; ill.,
Charles Robinson.) Dutton, $1.50. [Vide also ed., G. H. Palmer and W. C.
Perry.]
Plutarch—Lives. [Full ed.; also J. S. White’s “Boys’ and Girls’ Plutarch.”
Putnam, $1.75.]
Shakespeare—Girlhood of Shakespeare’s Heroines. Mary Cowden Clarke.
(Ill., Sir John Gilbert.) Scribner, $3.00.
Tales from. Charles and Mary Lamb. Macmillan, $1.00. (Ed., Ainger.)
[Vide also ed., E. V. Lucas, Putnam; ed. ill., Norman M. Price, Scribner;
ed. Nister. Quiller Couch has treated the historical tales in the same
manner. Scribner.]
Swift, Jonathan—Gulliver’s Travels. Macmillan, $1.25 net.
Towry, M. H.—Spenser for Children. Scribner, $1.25.
“HOW TO DO THINGS”—AMUSEMENTS
Alcott, L. M.—Little Women Play. (Adapted from the story by E. L.
Gould.) Little, Brown, $0.50.
Beard, Dan—The Field and Forest Handy Book. Scribner, $2.00.
The Jack of All Trades. Scribner, $2.00.
The American Boy’s Handy Book. Scribner, $2.00.
Beard, L. and A.—Things Worth Doing and How to Do Them. Scribner,
$2.00.
Handicraft and Recreation for Girls. Scribner. $2.00.
Black, Alexander—Photography Indoors and Out. Houghton, $1.25.
Boys, C. V.—Soap Bubbles and the Forces Which Made Them. Gorham,
$0.75.
Cutter, Mrs. S. J. (Compiler.)—Conundrums, Riddles, Puzzles, and
Games. Hansauer.
Games Book for Boys and Girls. Dutton, $2.50. (Vide Nister.)
Kelley, L. E.—Three Hundred Things a Bright Girl Can Do. Estes, $1.75.
King, G. G.—Comedies and Legends for Marionettes. Macmillan, $1.50.
Lewis, A. J. (Prof. Hoffman.)—Magic at Home. Cassell, $1.25. [Vide also
“Modern Magic.” Routledge, $1.50.]
Lucas, E. V. and Elizabeth—What Shall We Do Now? Stokes, $2.00.
Newell, Peter—Topsys and Turvys. Century, $1.00 net.
Seton, Ernest Thompson—The Wild Animal Play. Doubleday, $0.50.
Syrett, Netta—Six Fairy Plays for Children. Lane, $1.00 net.
White, Mary—How to Make Baskets. Doubleday, $1.00 net. [The same
author has written a second volume. Many workers prefer “Cane Basket
Work.” Annie Firth. London: Gill; New York: Milton Bradley.]
MUSIC
In the preparation of this music bibliography, it is a rare privilege to be
able to include a list which was compiled by the late Miss Mary L. Avery,
of the music department of the Lenox Library, New York; and which was
used in a lecture delivered by her before the Pratt Institute Library School
on January 12, 1900. To this, the following supplementary list, based upon
recommendation, may be added. Prices vary.
Brainard, H. L. (music), and Sage, Betty (words)—Four Childhood
Rhymes. Schirmer; The Boston Music Co.
Coolidge, Elizabeth—Fifteen Mother Goose Melodies. Schirmer. (Music
somewhat difficult.)
Fisher, William Armes—Posies from A Child’s Garden of Verses. Ditson.
Gaynor, Jessie L. (music), and Riley, C. (words)—Songs of the Child
World. Nos. 1, 2. The John Church Co.
Jenks, Harriet S., and Rust, Mabel—Song Echoes from Child Land.
Ditson.
Jordan, Jules—A Life Lesson. (Words by Riley.) Schmidt.
McLaughlin, James M., and Gilchrist, W. W.—Educational Music
Course. Teachers’ Edition for Elementary Grades. Ginn.
Mother Goose Set to Music. (Elliott, J. W.) Novello. [An edition is
published by Houghton, $1.50.]
Riley, Gaynor, Beale—Songs for Children. John Church Co.
Taubert, Wilhelm—Klänge aus der Kinderwelt. Schirmer.
In addition, such names as Eleanor Smith and Harvey Worthington

Loomis should not be omitted, as composers who recognise successfully the
requirements of children’s voices. These requirements cannot be too often
reiterated. In a letter to the author, the following was underscored: “A
child’s song must be written almost entirely in the middle register of the
voice—neither too high nor too low. Then there must be a distinct melody
for the child’s ear to catch readily. And the words must interest the child’s
mind.” In this last respect music-teachers are most emphatic. They appeal
for verses that stimulate the imagination, they wish words carefully chosen;
in the teaching, they seek for purity of diction, for proper valuation of
vowels, consonants, and word-endings.
Miss Avery’s Music List. Music in Children’s Libraries

Breitkopf Edition Catalogue—Breitkopf and Hartel. New York.
Musical, The, Interests [tastes] of Children—Fanny B. Gates. West.
Springfield, Mass., 1898. [Reprinted from the Journal of Pedagogy,
October, 1898.]
Novello’s School Music Catalogue (Operettas, etc.)—[Descriptive.]
London.
Scribner’s Musical Literature List—New York.
Literature of Music
Letters from Great Musicians to Young People—Alathea E. Crawford
and Alice Chapin. New York, 1897.
Musicians in Rhyme for Childhood’s Time—Crawford and Sill. New
York, Schirmer.
Story of Major C and his Relatives: Lessons in Harmony—Grace S.
Duff. New York, 1894.
Story of Music and Musicians—Lucy C. Lillie. New York.
Story of the Rhinegold—Chapin.
Wagner Story-Book—William Henry Frost. New York.
Vocal Music
Baby’s Bouquet—(Old songs.) Ill., Walter Crane. Routledge.
Baby’s Opera—(Old songs.) Ill., Walter Crane. Routledge; Warne.
Book of Rhymes and Tunes—Compiled by Margaret P. Osgood [from
German and English]. Boston, 1880.
Book of Old Rhymes Set to Music—Walter Crane. Warne, $1.20.
Child’s Garden of Song—Arranged by Wm. L. Tomlins. Chicago, 1895.
Child’s Garden of Verses—12 Songs by Stevenson. Music by Mary
Carmichael. London.
Child’s Garland of Songs [From a Child’s Garden of Verses.]—R. L.
Stevenson. Music by C. Villiers Stanford. London, 1892.
Children’s Singing Games—Eleanor Withey Willard. Grand Rapids,
1895.
Children’s Souvenir Song Book—Arranged by Wm. L. Tomlins. New
York, 1893.
Christmas (A) Dream—School Operetta—Moffat. London, Novello.
Christmas Carols Ancient and Modern—Wm. L. Tomlins. New York,
1897.
Christmas Carols New and Old—Bramley and Sir John Stainer.
Novello; Routledge.
Garland of Country Song—(English folk songs.) Arranged by S. Baring
Gould and H. F. Sheppard. London, 1895.
Kindergarten Chimes—Kate Douglas Wiggin. Boston (cop.), 1887.
Kinderlieder—Von Carl Reinecke. Leipzig; New York, Schirmer.
Kinder- und Jugend-lieder (50)—Von Hoffman, V. Stuttgart.
Kinderlieder (24)—Gustav Fischer. New York.
Kinderlieder-Album—Amalie Felsenthal. Leipzig.
May-day Revels (Operetta, Old English style.)—Hawkins and West.
London.
Musik-Beilage zu Kinderfest—J. Fischer. Berlin, Bloch.
National, Patriotic, and Typical Airs of All Lands, with Copious
Notes—John Philip Sousa. Philadelphia, 1890.
Old May Day (Operetta.)—Shapcott Wensley and F. C. Wood. London.
Olde Englyshe Pastimes—F. W. Galpin. (Dances and sports, old music.)
London.

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Microeconomics 2nd Edition Karlan

2. The prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategy:

3. To economists, games are:

4. To economists, a game is:

7. Game theory is:

8. Game theory is:

10. Behaving strategically:

11. Behaving strategically means:

13. All games involve which of the following?

14. All games involve which of the following?

15. All games involve which of the following?

16. All games involve which of the following?

17. In games, rules:

18. In real life, people's behavior is constrained by:

20. In games, strategies are:

21. In games, the strategy to reach a particular goal:

23. Payoffs are:

24. An example of a payoff in a game would be:

25. In game theory, an example of a payoff could be:

26. The prisoner's dilemma game can involve:

28. The prisoner's dilemma can be summarized in:

29. A decision matrix:

31. A dominant strategy is one:

32. A dominant strategy:

33. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

34. In the prisoner's dilemma:

35. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

36. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

37. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

38. The prisoner's dilemma game can be used to describe

39. The prisoner's dilemma game:

40. In the prisoner's dilemma game:

41. The players of prisoner's dilemma-type games:

The figure shown portrays a game using a:

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. the prisoner's dilemma.

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. charge a high price.

A. charge a high price.

According to the figure shown, Nike:

A. has a dominant strategy to charge a high price.

According to the figure shown, Adidas:

A. should charge a low price, regardless of what Nike chooses to do.

According to the figure shown:

A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

A. Nike charges a high price, and Adidas charges a low price.

A. Nike has a dominant strategy, but Adidas does not.

A. both Joe and Sarah put forth low effort.

A. the prisoner's dilemma.

The game in the figure shown is a version of:

A. put forth high effort.

A. put forth high effort.

According to the figure shown, Joe:

A. has a dominant strategy to put forth high effort.

According to the figure shown:

A. there is no stable equilibrium to the game.

The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be:

A. Joe has a dominant strategy, but Sarah does not.

68. Games that don't have a dominant strategy:

A. enter the market and earn $4 million.

A. charge a high price.

A. has a dominant strategy to charge low prices.

According to the figure, The Rock Shop: