CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 209

ditions under which objects can be given in hannony with them. For oth-
erwise these concepts would be without any content, and hence would be
mere logical forms rather than pure concepts of understanding.
Now this transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment will com-
prise two chapters. The first chapter deals with the sensible condition un-
der which alone pure concepts of understanding can be used, i.e., with the
schematism of pure understanding. The second chapter deals with the syn-
thetic judgments that under these conditions emanate a priori from pure con-
cepts of understanding and that lie a priori at the basis of all other cogni-
tions; i.e., it deals with the principles of pure understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE { A 137

B 176
POWER OF JUDGMENT
(or Analytic of Principles)

Chapter I
On the Schematism of the Pure
Concepts of Understanding46
Whenever an object47 is subsumed under a concept, the presentation48 of
the object must be homogeneous49 with the concept;50 i.e., the concept must

4'[Kennzeichen.]
46[See H. E. Allison, op. cit. at A 2lIB 35 br. n. 22, 173-98. See also 1. W. Ellington, essay
cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 173-86. Also 1. N. Findlay, op cit. at A 2lIB 35 br. n. 22, 158-61.
Also M. S. Gram, op. cit. at A 71B 11 br. n. 199,83-129. Also Paul Guyer, op. cit. at A 841B
116 br. n. 1, 157-81. Also Norman Kemp Smith, op. cit. at A vii br. n. 5, 334-42. Also H. 1.
Paton,op. cit. at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 17-78. Also T. D. Weldon, op. cit. at A 21/8 35 br.
n. 22, 161-71. And see R. P. WOlff, op. cit. at B 5 br. n. 159,203-23.]
47[Gegenstand, in this case. See A vii br. n. 7.]
48[WJrsteliung. My reason for translating Vorstellung as 'presentation' rather than as 'repre-
sentation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]
49[Or, i.e., 'of the same kind': gieichartig; cf. the etymology of 'homogeneous.']
sO[Literally, 'with the latter [presentation]'; i.e., with the concept.]
 210 PART II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

contain what is presented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. For
this is precisely what we mean by the expression that an object is contained
under a concept. 51 Thus the empirical concept of a plate is homogeneous 52
with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, inasmuch as the roundness
thought in the concept of the plate can be intuited [also] in the circle. 53
Pure concepts of understanding, on the other hand, are quite heteroge-
neous 54 from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions gener-
ally) and can never be encountered in any intuition. How, then, can an in-
tuition be subsumed under a category,55 and hence how can a category be
applied to appearances-since surely no one will say that a category (e.g.,
B l77} causality)56 can also be intuited through senses and is contained in appear-
A 138
ances?57 Now this question, natural and important as it is, is in fact the
cause that necessitates a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment.
The doctrine is needed, viz., in order to show how it is possible for pure
concepts of understanding to be applied to appearances as such. In all the
other sciences no such need arises. For there the concepts through which
the object is thought in a universal way58 are not so distinct and hetero-
geneous from the concepts presenting the object in concreto, as it is given.
And hence there is no need there to provide a special exposition concern-
ing the application of the first kind of concept to the second kind.
Now clearly there must be something that is third, something that must
be homogeneous 59 with the category, on the one hand, and with the ap-
pearance, on the other hand, and that thus makes possible the application
51[Cf. B 40; also the Logic, Ak. IX, 98.]

52 [Literally, 'has homogeneity.']

53 [Reading dem ersteren as referring to the concept of the plate rather than to the plate itself,

but taking im letzteren to refer not to the concept of the circle but to the circle itself. Vaihinger
inverts the sequence, reading in dem letzteren ... im ersteren for in dem ersteren ... im letz-
teren, which moreover leaves indeterminate whether the reference is to the plate and the circle
or to the concepts of these.]
54[ungleichartig, i.e., more literally, 'not of the same kind.' A emphasizes the word; B does
not, except as edited (unnecessarily, I think) by Erdmann in the Akademie edition.]
55[die erste (which should have been die ersten) was meant to refer to Verstandesbegriffe but
instead anticipates the terminological switch to die Kategorie.]
56 [Parentheses added.]
57[l.e., in objects of perception (see B 207, 225), which is indeterminate empirical intuition
(see B 422 n. 288, cf. B 207).]
58[a/lgemein.]
59 [Literally, 'stand in homogeneity.']
 CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 211

of the category to the appearance. This mediating presentation must be pure

(i.e., without anything empirical), and yet must be both intellectual, on the
one hand, and sensible, on the other hand. Such a presentation is the tran-
scendental schema.
A concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the mani-
fold as such. Time, as the formal condition for the manifold of inner sense
and hence for the connection of all presentations, contains an a priori mani-
fold in pure intuition. Now, a transcendental time determination60 is ho-
mogeneous with the category (in which its unity consists) insofar as the
time determination is universal and rests on an a priori rule. But it is ho- B 178
mogeneous with appearance, on the other hand, insofar as every empiri- A 139
cal presentation of the manifold contains time. Hence it will be possible
for the category to be applied to appearances by means or l the transcen-
dental time determination, which, as the schema of the concepts of under-
standing, mediates62 the sUbsumption of appearances under the category.
In view of what has been shown in the deduction of the categories, I
hope that no one will have doubts in deciding this question: whether these
pure concepts of understanding have a merely empirical use [only] or also
a transcendental one; i.e., whether, as conditions of a possible experience,
they refer a priori solely to appearances; or whether they can be extended,
as conditions for the possibility of things as such,63 to objects in them-
selves64 (without any restriction to our sensibility). For we saw in the de-
duction that concepts are quite impossible,65 and cannot have any signifi-
cation,66 unless an object is given for the concepts themselves or at least

6O[l.e., a schema.]
61 [vermittelst.]

62[ vermitteln.]

63[Dinge iiberhaupt.]
64[Gegenstiinde an sich selbst.]
65[Corrected by Kant to 'that concepts are for us without meaning [Sinn]' in his working copy
of edition A. See Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries (cited at A 191B 33 br. n.
13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]
66[Bedeutung. Although this tenn (similarly for the verb) is often translated best by 'mean-
ing,' that translation will not work in the case of concepts. For a concept without Bedeutung
certainly need not be meaningless in the sense of being contradictory, in which case the con-
cept would be annulled and no object for it would be even logically possible. Still less are
such concepts meaningless in the same way as nonsense words are, since these do not even
have corresponding concepts. A concept without Bedeutung is. rather, one that refers to no
object that is either actual or really possible. (For the distinction between logical and real
 212 PART II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

for the elements of which they consist;67 and that hence they cannot at all
concern things in themselves (i.e., [things considered] without regard to
whether and how they may be given to US).68 We saw, moreover, that the
only way in which objects can be given to us is by modification of our
B 179 sensibility;69 and, finally, that pure a priori concepts, besides containing the
A 140 function of understanding implicit in the category, must also a priori con-
tain70 formal conditions of sensibility (of inner sense, specifically), viz.,
conditions comprising71 the universal condition under which alone the cat-
egory can be applied to any object. 72 Let us call this formal and pure con-
dition of sensibility, to which the concept of understanding is restricted in
its use, the schema of this concept of understanding; and let us call the un-
derstanding's procedure with these schemata the schematism of pure un-
derstanding.
A schema is, in itself, always only a product of the imagination. 73 Yet,
because here the imagination's synthesis aims not at an individual intuition
but at unity in the determination of sensibility, a schema must be distin-
possibility, see B xxvi n. 103, A 241-441B 300-302 incl. n. 144b, A 5961B 624 n. 148, and
cf. A 1441B 184, A 218-241B 265-72, A 230-341B 282-87 incl. n. 96, B 308, A 581 = B
609, A 610 = B 638, A 770 = B 798, A 787-88 = B 815-16.) Such a concept is thus not
meaningless (except perhaps "meaningless for us," loosely speaking-see the preceding note)
but is merely empty, i.e., without content. (See A 155-56/B 194-95, A 252, A 292IB 348-49,
and cf. A 511B 75. A 90/B 123.) Yet Bedeutung is also not translatable as 'denotation.' (For
the single exception, see A 111B 96 br. n. 144.) For not only is Kant's use of Bedeutung (which
does sometimes stand for 'meaning') rather less specific, but 'denotation' is normally taken
to include only actual things, not also possible ones (in whatever sense of 'possible.') By us-
ing 'signification' we get around both these problems. Above all, however, we make good
sense when we say that if a concept is meaningful but refers to no (actual or really possible)
objects then it signifies nothing. ('Significance,' the other possible noun for 'signify,' tends to
suggest merely 'importance' and hence is too broad and vague.) Now, logical signification in
a concept (A 1471B 186) is indeed meaning; but to translate it as 'meaning' would make the
addition of 'logical' redundant, and would also conceal the contrast of it with signification in
Kant's ordinary sense of the term.]
67[A 95-96, cf. A 117 n. 138, 129; B 146, 148-49, 158, cf. B 105, 157, 165.]
68[A 108-9, 128-30; cf. A 96, 101, 104-5, 114, B 145, 147-49, 151, 164, 166 inel. n. 324.]
69[A 98-99. 129. cf. A 97,107-9,111,115. 127-28; B 146, 148-51. 164-65, cf. B 135-36.
139, 144-45. 147.]
7°[enthalten.]
71 [enthalten.]
72[A 98-99, 115, cf. 95-96, 111-14. 119. 123-24. 127; B 153-55, 162-63, cf. 144, 147-48,
150-52, 159-61. 164-65, 167-69.]
73 [Einbildungskraft.]
 CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 213

guished from an image. 74 Thus if I put five dots after one another, like this,
...•. , then this result is an image of the number five. Suppose, on the other
hand, that I only think a number as such, which might then be five or a
hundred. Then my thought is more the presentation of a method for pre-
senting-in accordance with a certain concept-a multitude (e.g., a thou-
sand) in an image, than this image itself. Indeed, in the case of a thousand
I could hardly survey7S that image and compare it with the concept. Now,
this presentation of a universal procedure of the imagination for providing B 180
a concept with its image I call the schema for that concept.
In fact, it is schemata, not images of objects, that lie at the basis of our
pure sensible76 concepts. No image whatever of a triangle would ever be A 141
adequate to the concept of a triangle as such. For it would never reach the
concept's universality that makes the concept hold for all triangles (whether
right-angled or oblique-angled, etc.),77 but would always be limited to only
a part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere
but in thoughts, and is 78 a rule for the synthesis of imagination regarding
pure shapes in space. Even less79 is an object of experience or an image
thereof ever adequate to the empirical concept; rather, that concept always
refers directly80 to the schema of imagination, this schema being a rule for
determining our intuition in accordance with such and such a general8l con-
cept. The concept dol 2 signifies83 a rule whereby my imagination can
trace 84 the shape of such8s a four-footed animal in a general way,86 i.e.,
without being limited to any single and particular shape offered to me by

74[Bild.]

75[iibersehen.]
76[l.e., mathematical.]
77[Parentheses added.]
78[Literally, 'signifies' or 'means': bedeutet.]
79[Than in the case of pure sensible (mathematical) concepts.]
8o[unmittelbar. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]
81 [allgemein.]

82[Emphasis added.]
83[bedeutet.]
84[ verzeichnen.]

8s['such' inserted, as suggested by Erdmann.]

86[allgemein.]
 214 PART II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

experience, or even to all possible images that I can exhibit8? in concreto.

This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding ap-
pearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the
B 181 human soul, an art whose true stratagems88 we shall hardly ever divine from
nature and lay bare before ourselves. Only this much can we say: The im-
age is [here]89 a product of the productive imagination's empirical abil-
A 142 ity.90 A schema of sensible concepts (such as the concepts91 of figures in
space) is a product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure a priori imagi-
nation through which, and according to which, images become possible in
the first place. But the images must always be connected with the concept
only by means of the schema that they designate; in themselves the images
are never completely congruent with the concept. A schema of a pure con-
cept of understanding,92 on the other hand, is something that one cannot
bring t0 93 any image whatsoever. Such a schema is, rather, only the pure
synthesis conforming to a rule, expressed by the category,94 of unity ac-
cording to concepts as such. It is a transcendental product of the imagina-
tion which concerns the determination of inner sense as such, according to
conditions of that sense's form (viz., time), in regard to all presentations
insofar as these are t0 95 cohere a priori, in conformity with the unity of
apperception, in one concept.
Now, instead of letting ourselves be detained by a dry and tedious dis-
section of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure concepts

'7[darstellen, which traditionally has been translated most often by 'to present.' See B xvii
br. n. 73.]
""[ Handgrijfe.]
'9[Kant must mean here only empirical images, such as that of dog.]
90[I.e., the productive imagination (the imagination insofar as it is spontaneity: B 152) also
has an empirical use (and hence ability). See the reference just below to the pure a priori
imagination in connection with sensible concepts generally (i.e., a priori sensible or empiri-
cal ones), and cf. A 94-95, 115, 120 n. 150, and B 151-52. Vaihinger here substitutes 're-
productive' for 'productive.' But the reproductive imagination is merely the imagination in-
sofar as it is subject solely to empirical laws (B 152). Cf. also Erdmann's note, Ak. III, 588.]
9'[l.e., the mathematical concepts.]
92[l.e., of a category.]
93[Literally, 'into.']
94[Grammatically. 'expressed by the category' could, instead, modify 'synthesis' or even
·unity.']
9'[Reading, with Adickes, sollen for sollten.]
 CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 215

of understanding as such, let us exhibit them, rather, according to the or-

der of the categories and in connection with them.
The pure image of all magnitudes (quanta) for outer sense is space, B 182
whereas the pure image of the magnitudes of all sense objects as such is
time. But the pure schema of magnitude96 (quantitas) taken as a [pure] con-
cept of understanding is number, which is a presentation encompassing con-
jointly the successive addition of one item to another (homogenous item).97
Therefore number is nothing other than the unity in the synthesis of the A 143
manifold of a homogeneous intuition as such, a unity that arises because I
myself produce98 time in apprehending the intuition.
Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is what corresponds to a
sensation as such. Therefore reality is that whose very concept99 indicates
a being [of something] (in time); and negation is that whose concept pre-
sents a not-being 1OO (in time). Hence the contrast 10 1 of reality and nega-
tion is made by distinguishing the same time as either a filled or an empty
time. Now, time is only the form of intuition, and hence only the form 102
of objects as appearances; therefore what in these objects corresponds to
sensation is the transcendental matter 103 of all objects as things 104 in their
own right 105 (i.e., their thinghood,106 reality107). Now every sensation has
a degree or magnitude whereby it can, in regard to the same presentation
of an object, fill the same time-i.e., [form of] inner sense-more or fill

96[On magnitude and related concepts, cf. the Critique of Judgment, Ak. V, 248-60.]
97 [Literally, 'of one to one (homogeneous).']
98[l.e., synthesize. Cf. A l45/B 184.]
99[Literally, 'whose concept in itself.']
lOO[Or 'nonexistence': Nichtsein]
100[Or 'opposition': Entgegensetzung.]
I02[I.e., without the matter.]
I03[I.e., matter in the transcendental sense; cf. B 322.]
104[Dinge.]

105 [an sich; i.e., here, as substances. Although Kant ordinarily uses an sich to mean 'in it-
self' or 'in themselves,' he often uses it loosely. (Cf. br. n. 99, just above.) He must be doing
so here, in view of what he has just said in this paragraph. See also A 359-60, 370-73, 385-87,
390-91, B 427-28. Wille, instead, does read 'things in themselves' and inserts 'not' before
'the transcendental matter.']
I06[Sachheit.]
I07[The root meaning of 'reality' is thinghood.]
 216 PART II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

it less, down to where 108 the sensation ceases in nothingness!09 (= 0 = ne-

B 183 gatio). Hence there is a relation and coherence, llO or rather a transition from
reality to negation, which is responsible for every reality's being pre-
sented 111 as a quantum. And the schema of a reality taken as the quantity
of something insofar as it fills time is precisely this continuous and uni-
form production of that reality in time, where 112 from a sensation having
a certain degree we descend, in time, until l13 the sensation vanishes, or as-
cend gradually from the sensation's negation to its [actual] magnitude.
A 144 The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time; i.e., it is the
presentation of the real as a substratum of empirical time determination as
such, a substratum which therefore endures while 114 all else varies. llS (Time
is not in transition; 116 rather, the existence of what is mutable is in tran-
sition in time. Hence to time, which itself is immutable and enduring, there
corresponds in [the realm of] appearance what is immutable in existence,
i.e., substance; and only by reference to substance can succession 117 and
simultaneity118 of appearances be determined in terms of time.)
The schema of the cause 119 and of the causality 120 of a thing as such is
the real upon which, whenever l21 it is posited, something else always fol-
lows. ln Hence this schema consists in the manifold's succession l23 inso-
far as this is subject to a rule.

108[bis.]
I09[in Nichts.]
llO[Between reality and negation.]
111 Uede RealWit ... vorstellig macht.]
112 [indem.]

113[bis.]
114[indem.]
115[wechseln. See B 224 hr. n. 45, and cr. A 1871B 230.]
116[sich verlaufen.]
117[Folge.]
118[Zugleichsein. See B 257 hr. n. 209.]
119[Ursache.]
120[ Kausalitiit.]
121 [wenn ... nach Belieben.]
122[folgt.]
123[Sukzession]
 CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 217

The schema of community (interaction),124 or [i.e.] of the reciprocal 125

causality of substances in regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity, ac-
cording to a universal rule, of the determinations of the one substance with B 184
those of the other.
The schema of possibility is the harmony of the synthesis of different
presentations with the conditions of time as such. (Thus, e.g., what is op-
posite cannot be in a thing simultaneously, but can be in it only sequen-
tially.) Hence this schema is the determination, at some time, of the pre-
sentation of a thing.
The schema of actuality is existence within a determinate time. A 145
The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all time.
Now from all of this we see that the schema of each category contains,
and is responsible for the presentation Of,126 the following: the schema of
magnitude, the production (synthesis) of time itself in the successive ap-
prehension of an object; the schema of quality,127 the synthesis of sensa-
tion (perception) with the presentation of time--or, i.e., the filling of time;
the schema of relation,128 the relation of perceptions among one another
at all time (i.e., according to a rule of time determination); finally, the
schema of modality and of its categories, time itself as the correlate of the
determination of an object as to whether and how it belongs to time. Hence
the schemata are nothing but a priori time determinations according to rules;
and these rules, according to the order of the categories, deal with the time
series, the time content, the time order, and finally the time sum totaZ 129 in B 185
regard to all possible objects. 130
Now, this shows that the schematism of understanding provided by the
transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than
the unity in inner sense of all the manifold of intuition, and thus comes
down indirectly to the unity of apperception as a function corresponding
to inner sense (a receptivity). The schemata of the pure concepts of under- A 146
standing are, therefore, the true and sole conditions for providing these con-
124[Wechselwirkung.]
125[wechselseitig.]
126[vorstellig mache.]

127[The tenn was actually not used at A 143/B 182-83. But see A 175-76/B 217-18, and cf.
A 80/B 106, along with A 70/B 95.]
128[Relation here, Verhiiltnis just below.]
129[Zeitinbegriff.]
130[Gegenstiinde here, Objekte in the next paragraph.]
 218 PART II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

cepts with a reference to objects and hence with signification. 131 And hence
the categories have, in the end, no other use than a possible empirical one.
For, by [being] bases 132 of a unity that is a priori necessary (because of the
necessary union of all consciousness in an original apperception), they serve
merely to subject appearances to universal rules of synthesis, and thus to
make them fit for thoroughgoing connection in one experience.
In the whole of all possible experience, however, lie all our cognitions;
and the transcendental truth that precedes all empirical truth and makes it
possible consists in the universal reference to this possible experience.
Yet it is obvious also that although the schemata of sensibility are what
B 186 first realize the categories, they do nonetheless also restrict them, i.e., they
limit them to conditions lying outside understanding (viz., in sensibility).
Hence a schema is, properly speaking, only the phenomenon of an object,
or the sensible concept of an object, in harmony with the category. (Nu-
merus est quantitas phaenomenon, sensatio realitas phaenomenon, con-
stans et perdurabile rerum 133 substantia phaenomenon, aetemitas necessi-
tas phaenomenon,134 etc.)135 Now, it seems that if we omit a restricting
A 147 condition from a previously limited concept, then we amplify136 that con-
cept. Thus it was supposedl 37 that the categories in their pure sig-
nification-i.e., apart from all conditions of sensibility-hold for things
as such, as they are, instead of the categories' having schemata that present
these things only as they appear; and hence it was supposed that the cat-
egories have a signification that is independent of all schemata and that ex-
tends much farther than they do. The concepts of understanding do in fact
retain a signification, even after their separation from all sensible condi-

l31[Bedeutung. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

132[Grunde. See B xix br. n. 79.]
133[Extending the emphasis (indicated by my not using italics for the Latin) on constans ('con-
stant') to include et perdurabile rerum ('and permanent of things').]
134[Corrected by Erdmann (with deletion of commas after aeternitas and necessitas) from
phaenomena. For the adjectival use of phaenomenon. see A 433 = B 461, where Kant con-
trasts mundus phaenomenon (phenomenal world)--called mundus sensibilis ('sensible world')
at A 249 (B 305 n. 169}--with mundus intelligibilis (intelligible world)]
135[Number is phenomenal quantity; sensation, phenomenal reality; the constant and penna-
nent of things, phenomenal substance; eternity, phenomenal necessity; etc ]
136[In the sense of 'expand': ampIiJizieren.]
137[Viz., by those who omitted the restricting condition(s).]
 CHAPTER I SCHEMATISM 219

tions. But this is only a logical signification,138 [where the concepts of un-
derstanding signify] the mere unity of presentations. But these concepts 139
are then given no object, and hence also no signification that could yield a
concept of the object. 140 Thus, e.g., [the concept of] substance, if one omit-
ted from it the sensible determination 141 of permanence, would signify noth-
ing more than something that can be thought as a subject (Le., thought with-
out being thought as a predicate of something else).142 Now, this is a
presentation that I cannot tum into anything, 143 because it does not at all B 187
indicate to me what determinations l44 are possessed by the thing that is to
count 145 as such a primary subject. Without schemata, therefore, the cat-
egories are only functions of the understanding for producing concepts, but
they present no object. This latter signification they get from sensibility,
which realizes the understanding while at the same time restricting it.

138[l.e., a meaning; see A 1391B 178 br. n. 66, end of the note.]
139[Reading denen. in line more with the wider context than with the grammar, as referring
back to Verstandesbegriffen rather than to Vorstellungen (presentations).]
'40[Corrected by Kant to 'a cognition of the object' ('object' translates Objekt here, Gegen-
stand just above) in his working copy of edition A. See Preliminary Studies and Supplemen-
tary Entries (cited at A 191B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]
141 [Bestimmung. See A 231B 37 br. n. 30.]
142[Cf. B 149,288-89; A 242-431B 300-301; A 401.]
'43[Such as a cognition, i.e.: nichts machen ... aus.]
144[See br. n. 141, just above]
14S[gelten.]