Reading response to Elizabeth Barnes “Valuing disability, causing disability”

I focus on Elizabeth Barnes’ argument that there is no asymmetry of impermissibility betwee

n cases of Reverse Disabled Baby (RDB) (p.99) and Reverse Baby Genes (RBG). (p.101) I ar

gue that Barnes fails to account for the asymmetry of impermissibility by eliminating the disc

repancy of options constrained for disabled and “abled” people.

Asymmetry in RDB and RBG

Barnes examines the asymmetry of permissibility shown in RDB and RBG. The Opponents o

f the mere-difference view proposed that, while it seems to be impermissible to cause the able

d baby disabled (RDB), causing the disabled baby abled seems nevertheless permissible (RB

G). Barnes examines one explanation from her opponents to account for such discrepancy – t

he constraints of options (CO1) (p.105):

(a) To cause X worse off is impermissible

(b) If x is disabled, then x would be constrained from options to some goods and valuable
experience unique to those non-disabled.
(c) If x would be constrained from options to some goods and valuable experience unique
to those non-disabled, then x would be constrained from options to some goods and v
aluable experience.
(d) If x would be constrained from options to some goods and valuable experience, then x
would be worse off.
(e) To cause someone disabled constrained one from options to some goods and valuable
experience.
(f) To cause someone disabled is to cause one worse off.
(g) To cause someone to be disabled is impermissible.

Note that Barnes’ opponents cannot demonstrate the discrepancy of permissibility between R

DB and RBG merely by advocating CO1. In order to show the discrepancy, the opponents ne
ed to account for the permissibility of causing “abled” in RBG. Since Barnes does not spell o

ut the account for her opponents, I can only try to articulate such an account based on her reb

uttal to the opponents. Since causing x to be abled, x would not be constrained from options t

o some goods and valuable experience unique to those non-disabled. Given x would not be co

nstrained from options unique to non-disabled (and hence they would not be constrained from

options that lead to some goods), causing x to be abled would not follow by the claim that x

would be worse off. Given that causing x to be abled does not make x worse off, no impermis

sibility is followed after in consequent. (p.105)

However, Barnes argues that her opponents fail to establish the discrepancy of permissibility

between RDB and RBG by showing the discrepancy of options constrained for disabled and a

bled. Given being disabled and abled would have some options that are unique to one but not

the other, she alleges that both being disabled or being abled would constrain some options th

at lead to goods and valuable experience. If the opponents of the mere-difference view insist t

hat constraining options to goods and valuable experience is what makes one worse off, then,

causing disability and causing non-disability would be impermissible since both interferences

would constrain some options which lead to some goods. By demonstrating that there are opti

ons unique for both the disabled and abled, Barnes wants to eliminate the discrepancy of opti

ons constrained and show her opponents that there is no discrepancy of permissibility betwee

n RDB and RBG. (p.105)

Challenge to Barnes’response

To eliminate the discrepancy of permissibility between RDB and RBG, Barnes relies on the a

ssumption that (1) both the disabled and the abled enjoy some options unique to them and (2)
they are constrained from options of the alternative. However, I do not agree that both the dis

abled and the abled enjoy some options unique to them, given the options enjoyed by disable

d people are not truly unique.

Barnes makes her assumption (1) based on testimonies from the disabled, for instance, blind

people. She referred to Kim Kilpatrick’s unique experiences like not judging people by the w

ay they look, no temptation to check the mirror, having a deep relationship with her guide do

g, etc. (p.105) However, are these options in any sense unique to disabled people and the able

d would be constrained from that? An able person can have a deep relationship with a guide d

og. An able person can have no temptation to check the mirror. From my personal experience,

my father never seem to be hooked by the mirror. Options which Barnes suggests to be uniqu

e for disabled people do not appear to be unique after examination and abled people are not re

ally constrained from options like these.

What about the options which are unique to abled people in comparison to blind people? Abl

ed people can have an option to check the way they look in the mirror. They have access to so

me great sensory experiences, like looking at paintings and nature. These are the options uniq

ue to abled people but constrained from blind people. That being said, there seems to be a cle

ar asymmetry between options unique to abled people and disabled people. While abled peopl

e are not really constrained from options “unique” to the disabled, disabled people are constra

ined from options unique to the abled. Barnes tries to eliminate the asymmetry of permissibili

ty between RDB and RBG by pointing out the symmetry of options constrained for the disab

led and abled. However, as I have shown, the options constrained for the disabled and abled a

re not symmetrical. Hence Barnes cannot proceed to eliminate the discrepancy between RDB

and RBG.
Barnes can rebut my claim that the options constraints for the disabled and abled are not sym

metrical. She can argue that I have ignored some unique options, for instance, those “unique s

ensory experiences” for blind people. However, I do not think the discrepancy can be elimina

ted even if it is true that there are some unique options for disabled people. Suppose there are

5 options that are unique to abled people and 2 options that are actually unique to blind peopl

e. The discrepancy of options constrained is still here. Barnes cannot fully eliminate the asym

metry of options constrained between the disabled and the abled.

(993 words)

Reference:

1. Barnes, E. (2014). Valuing Disability, Causing Disability. Ethics, 125(1), 88–113. htt

ps://doi.org/10.1086/677021

Comments: This is a very interesting and thoughtful paper, and it is very well-organized. See
my marginal comments above for some issues with the exposition.In addition, I think there ar
e ways for proponents of the mere difference view to resist your argument at the end (see the
above marginal comment, for instance). However, I recognize that you are restricted by the w
ord limit. (And you do a good job of considering some ways Barnes might respond, given the
limited space you have available.)