Safeguarding Sovereignty: An In-Depth Analysis into the Philippine

Stance on the West Philippine Sea Dispute with China

A Final Paper Submitted to

The Faculty of the Political Science Department
Institute of Public Policy and Governance
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Course

PS130- Introduction to International Relations

By

Eunice Pauline Ordonio

Kervin Roy Atanacio
April Grace Dela Trinidad
Chinie Siscar
Julia Dela Concepcion
Jonabelle Quijano
Maria Diana Agustin
Rhena Danielle Balmas
Sheina Mae Maambong
Kristine Joy Alaska
Jully Bee Bertulfo
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

This section presents biographical sketches profiling the distinguished members of Group 1, a
cohort of accomplished 3rd-year Political Science students at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa.
Within this compilation, we illuminate the academic journeys, accomplishments, and aspirations that
delineate the distinctive contributions of each member to the field of Political Science. Delving into the
nuanced narratives of Group 1, where a fervent dedication to political inquiry converges with a commitment
to academic excellence.

Eunice Pauline Ordonio, born on April 27, 2003, is a dedicated leader and
student at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa. Her educational journey
at JBT Caing Sr. Integrated School was marked by consistent leadership
awards, culminating in her role as the School President, representing her
institution in the Supreme Student Government Federation and Ang
Paglalakbay News Paper in Sarangani Province as a columnist and editorial
writer representing Region 12. In her second year of college, Eunice served
as the Year Representative for Political Science, showcasing her commitment to leadership. Currently, she
actively participates in research extensions at the IIDE Department and holds the position of Public
Relations Officer at IPPG Student Government. Eunice also serves as the University Coordinator of the G17
University Ambassadors Consortium - Philippines, further extending her impact within the university
community.
April Grace T. Dela Trinidad is a dedicated college student who has a passion for reaching her goals and
dreams through determination and hard work. She was born on April 17, 2002, and grew up in Muntinlupa.
She does not consider herself smart, but she stands out for being committed to giving her best to all of her
academic endeavors. She did not like political science at first, but she gradually developed a profound
interest in the field, recognizing its potential to broaden her political perspective. April is characterized by
adaptability and resilience. She is hopeful that her relentless efforts will lead to a meaningful outcome in the
future.

Chinie Siscar, born on June 25, 2003 is a diligent student at Pamantasan ng

Lungsod ng Muntinlupa. From elementary until junior high school, she was a
mediocre student that didn't engage in any academic related activities and
organizations. In her Senior High School, Chinie graduated with Honors.
And in her first year of college, she took a Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science and slowly learned how to get out of her comfort zone, and explore
for new experiences.
 Julia Dela Concepcion, a driven and passionate college student with
resilience and determination that have kept her on track to achieve her goals.
She understands the value of education and the impact it can have on her
future career. Born on August 12, 2003, she resides in Laguna. In her free
time, Julia enjoys watching movies, playing video games, and reading books.
She is a dedicated student committed to her academic and professional
growth, willing to put in the effort needed to reach her goals.

Sheina Mae T. Maambong, born on December 04, 2000, is an optimistic

student at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa. During her high school at
Northern Antique Vocational School, she was a consistent linguistic participant
in contests representing her school in various school competitions. As a
political science student, she is consistently supporting the advocacies and
program of the IPPG department in the movement for the development of civil
society.

Jonabelle Quijano, born on January 7, 2002, graduated senior high school

in the general academic strand, which has a wide range of subjects that
helped her explore different fields of study. Currently, she is a student of
political science at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa. Despite her
heavy workloads, she has maintained a high GWA and has been recognized
for her academic achievements. Jonabelle’s future goals include pursuing a
career in public service. She hopes to use her education and experience to
make a positive impact on society.

Rhena Danielle Balmas is a passionate and ambitious student. She is

committed to pursuing a career in education and political science. She was
born on November 24, 2002. She graduated with her secondary education at
Tropical Village National High School and finished her senior high school in
International Leadership Academy with honors. Two of her greatest
achievements in high school are the Academic Excellence Award and the
Campus Journalism Award. She’s currently enrolled in Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Muntinlupa, where she is pursuing a degree in Political Science.
Rhena served as a tutor in Bukid Kabataan Center, providing lower-grade
students with individualized assistance to help them learn new and review
concepts and complete their assignments. She participated in broadcasting at her previous school as a news
anchor and also participated in intramural sports at ICLA, where she was once a member of the volleyball
team.
 Jully Bee Bertulfo was born on July 10, 1995, in Zamboanga Del
Sur. She is the youngest daughter of Lot N. Bertulfo and Marilyn B. Bertulfo.
She finished her Elementary Education in 2008 at Talaptap Elementary
School, her Secondary Education at Kabatan National High School in 2012,
she took up Associates in Office Administration at College of Saint Adeline
Paranaque City in the school year 2013-2015. After graduating the two (2)
years course in March 2015 she decided to apply as Administrative Aide VI at
the City Government of Muntinlupa, Muntinlupa City luckily she got hired. Five (5) years later she took
the opportunity to enroll in Pamantasan Lungsod ng Muntinlupa taking up the Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science where she is now in her third year college as working student.

Kristine Joy Alaska, born on April 28, 2002, is a highly accomplished

individual with a academic background. Her consistent academic achievements
and dedication to excellence have been evident throughout her educational
journey. Kristine Joy Alaska demonstrated consistent academic excellence
throughout her high school years, establishing a strong foundation for her future
endeavors. She graduated with honors, reflecting her commitment to scholastic
distinction and her exceptional performance in senior high school. In college,
Kristine was awarded the Academic Excellence Award, a testament to her
outstanding accomplishments and her dedication to academic pursuits.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
HISTORY
 INTRODUCTION

The protracted and contentious dispute over the West Philippine Sea, also recognized as the South China
Sea, stands as a geopolitical quagmire, primarily contested between the Philippines and China. The
Philippines, resolute in its opposition to China's expansive territorial claims and assertive maneuvers in the
region, witnessed a significant legal victory in 2016. The South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal found
clearly in favor of the Philippines, invalidating China's contentious "nine-dash line" claim and preserving
the Philippines' rights within its exclusive economic zone (Medina, 2017). Despite this victory, China has
pursued control through militarily coercive means such as the controversial possession of disputed islands
and harassment of Filipino fishermen (Misalucha-Willoughby, 2023).

Central to the Philippines' stance on the West Philippine Sea dispute is a steadfast adherence to the
principles of international law, with particular emphasis on the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) (Bongapat, 2021). The nation consistently advocates for a rules-based approach and the
peaceful resolution of conflicts, underscoring the significance of safeguarding freedom of navigation and the
rights of coastal states in the region (Reganit, 2023). Concurrently, the Philippines endeavors to garner
international support for its position, employing a combination of diplomatic initiatives and legal strategies
aimed at countering China's expansionist agenda (Manhit, 2023).

Scrutinizing China's actions within the West Philippine Sea is imperative to underscore the deleterious
consequences of its behavior on regional stability and security. The deployment of military vessels and the
construction of artificial islands through coercive tactics have sparked apprehension among neighboring
countries and the broader international community. Moreover, according to the report by A global news
organization, The Guardian (2016), and the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission (2023), China's flagrant disrespect for the rights of other claimant states and its noncompliance
with the arbitral ruling have sharply increased tensions in the area.
Criticism of China's actions in the West Philippine Sea is not merely a national concern for the Philippines;
it is a matter that reverberates across international borders. By examining the dispute through the lens of the
Philippines and scrutinizing China's behavior, it becomes palpable that the ongoing conflict poses a
formidable challenge to the foundational tenets of international law and the preservation of peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper aims to undertake a comprehensive analysis, delving into the
legal, political, and security dimensions of the West Philippine Sea dispute, with a specific focus on the
ramifications of China's conduct for the Philippines and the broader international community. As the
intricacies of this geopolitical conundrum unfold, an exploration of these dimensions will provide valuable
insights into the complexities of contemporary global governance and the imperatives of maintaining
equilibrium in the face of burgeoning regional discord.
 HISTORY

The West Philippine Sea is a crucial region in the South China Sea that is of vital interest to the Philippines.
It encompasses the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and extended continental shelf (ECS) of
the Philippines, and is part of the larger South China Sea. Throughout the years, the Philippines has asserted
its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea, engaging in various disputes and legal
proceedings to protect its territorial integrity. In February 1992, China enacted the Law on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, asserting its claim over the entire South China Sea by citing historical rights
dating back to the Western Han dynasty (200 BCE to 9 CE).

Moreover, the passage of this law adds complexity to the South China Sea dispute, raising concerns about
adherence to international maritime norms, and employs expansive territorial determination methods that
deviate from UNCLOS, signed a decade earlier. It also includes China's active role at UNCLOS, where it
opposed the United States and Soviet Union's initiatives to secure freedom of navigation for warships.
However, some interpret this move as China's strategy to enhance its maritime security. According to Hyun-
Soo (1994), despite China's signing of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, discrepancies
between the 1992 Territorial Sea Law and the UN Convention exist, posing potential sources of
international disputes. This situation necessitates a thorough analysis and evaluation of the legal issues
within the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, examining customary international law and State practices in alignment
with the provisions of the UN Convention.

January 1996 marked another historic event: a ninety-minute battle occurred between three Chinese naval
vessels and a Philippine navy gunboat near Capones Island in Mischief Reef, part of the disputed Spratly
group of islands that the Philippines claims. This engagement represented China's first combat encounter
with an ASEAN member country other than Vietnam. In addition to igniting a crisis in Sino-Philippine
relations, the conflict reestablished military ties between the US and the Philippines.

De Castro's article (2009) delves into China's efforts to weaken the US-Philippine alliance through soft
power diplomacy. The United States and the Philippines have strengthened their security relations through
the provision of economic and military support, regular discussions, defense policy reviews, joint military
exercises, and the introduction of new defense projects.

Following the incident, Philippine President Fidel Ramos denied a direct link between the standoff with
Beijing and the joint training conducted by the Navy SEALs and their Philippine counterparts on Palawan
Island. Tensions resulting from the occupation were mitigated by the mid-year negotiation of a non-binding
code of conduct between China and the Philippines. The two nations aimed to bolster trust and amicably
resolve their territorial dispute with the assistance of this code.
De Castro (2009) concludes with two key points: firstly, the alliance serves as a strategic buffer against
China's expanding influence in East Asia, and secondly, the United States is likely to remain the Philippines'
primary strategic ally.

With at least five encounters involving Chinese ships between the Spratly Islands and the Amy Douglas
Bank in the previous year, the Philippines raised concerns over naval incursions in its claimed territory in
March 2011. After a Philippine vessel doing surveys in the Reed Bank is compelled to depart by Chinese
surveillance ships, tensions rise. The 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea is allegedly violated in these occurrences, according to both nations. However, the Chinese
Embassy denied the incursion of Chinese surveillance ships.

According to the GMA News (2011), the Chinese Embassy claims that the ship in question is China's
marine research vessel conducting routine maritime research operations in the South China Sea. But
Voltaire Gazmin, the secretary of defense, worries about the growing number of incursions and calls the
situation frightening. He points out that China is making territorial claims in places where the Philippines is
not present and implies that China intends to fly its flag there. The Philippine government began using the
name "West Philippine Sea" in all official communications pertaining to the region usually referred to as the
South China Sea in October 2011, in response to persistent confrontations with Chinese warships.

An administrative decree from October 2012 that upholds the Philippines' inherent authority and right to
declare its maritime zones goes hand in hand with this change. The secretary of states of the U.S, Hillary
Clinton, uses language that emphasizes the strength of the connection between the US and the Philippines.
She emphasizes the significance of this partnership, particularly at a time when the Philippines is facing
threats to its territorial integrity in the seas.

In January 2013, the Philippines initiated an international arbitration lawsuit under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in response to China's territorial claims in the Scarborough
Shoal and Spratly Islands. President Obama emphasized the enduring partnership with the United States'
longstanding regional ally during his visit to the Philippines in April 2014. Simultaneously, he endorsed
Manila's pursuit of international arbitration over the South China Sea islands, making it clear that the
primary goal of the agreement was not to impose restrictions on China.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) took center stage, serving as the administration's
centerpiece for the Asia "pivot." Furthermore, President Obama, reiterating his support, outlined how the
EDCA, positioned as a focal point in the geopolitical landscape of the region, provides the U.S. military
with increased powers, including broader access to numerous locations around the Philippine archipelago,
such as ports and airfields. This arrangement facilitates increased cooperative training initiatives and the
rotational deployment of U.S. forces.
In a joint news conference in Manila, President Obama elucidated the specifics of the agreement,
emphasizing the commitment of the U.S. to upholding international laws and conventions, particularly in the
resolution of international conflicts, rather than opposing or countering China. This stance underscored the
diplomatic approach taken by the United States in addressing the complex territorial issues in the South
China Sea.
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines in a 2013
lawsuit against the People's Republic of China. The tribunal determined that there is no legal foundation for
China to assert its so-called "nine-dash line" and claim historical rights to resources in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, the court found that none of the land features, many of which resulted from significant Chinese
land reclamation efforts, meet the criteria outlined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
for creating a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone for China.

The court ruling highlighted China's violation of its obligations as a member of UNCLOS due to the
environmental impact caused by its island-building activities and the unsafe practices of its vessels, which
heightened navigational risks. Despite the ruling, China's Foreign Ministry stated that it "neither accepts nor
recognizes" the court's decision. According to Erickson (2016), the Tribunal concluded that China had
breached its duties during dispute settlement procedures by building artificial islands and engaging in
massive land reclamation. This included constructing a sizable artificial island inside the Philippines'
exclusive economic zone, destroying evidence related to the original state of South China Sea features
central to the dispute, and causing irreversible harm to the marine environment.

Beijing's actions were deemed a violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and international law, further intensifying and prolonging disputes in the region.

On November 20, 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte orchestrated a crucial maneuver in the West
Philippine Sea dispute, unveiling the establishment of a no-fishing zone and marine sanctuary at a lagoon in
the Scarborough Shoal. This strategic move, within the backdrop of longstanding tensions between the
Philippines and China over the shoal, marked a distinct departure from the confrontational stance adopted by
his predecessor, Benigno S. Aquino III.

Duterte's decision to institute the no-fishing zone and marine sanctuary served as a tangible manifestation of
his inclination towards a more conciliatory approach, signaling a recalibration of relations between Manila
and Beijing. Unlike Aquino's adversarial approach, Duterte prioritized the enhancement of economic ties
and the resumption of bilateral dialogue with China concerning disputed territories. This marked shift was
particularly noteworthy given the previous administration's initiation of an arbitration case against China at
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

As underscored by Medina (2013), Duterte's decision had an immediate impact on the region, prompting the
resumption of bilateral talks between China and the Philippines. These discussions, focused on formulating
a "code of conduct" to govern interactions in the South China Sea, aimed at mitigating tensions and
fostering a more peaceful resolution to the disputes.

Duterte's approach to the West Philippine Sea dispute reverberated internationally. With China steadfastly
asserting its claims in the South China Sea, concerns among neighboring countries, including Brunei,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, heightened regarding the potential for regional escalation. The Philippines'
pursuit of a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague underscored the imperative of adhering
to international law and illuminated the potential ramifications of China's actions on regional stability.

In February 2020, the South China Sea witnessed a surge in tensions as China aggressively advanced its
territorial claims, a move that coincided with the global battle against the corona-virus pandemic. As
reported by the Council on Foreign Relations (2023), a series of provocative actions by China, including
military confrontations and the establishment of new research stations equipped with defense silos and
military-grade runways, significantly escalated the already contentious situation in the region. One
particularly alarming incident involved a Chinese naval ship reportedly aiming its weapons control system at
a Philippine naval ship in the Spratly Islands. This audacious maneuver, occurring amidst the burgeoning
public health crisis, served as a stark reminder of China's unwavering commitment to asserting its
dominance in the South China Sea, irrespective of the broader global challenges posed by the pandemic.

Furthermore, China's strategic decision to establish new research stations, complete with defense silos and
military-grade runways, on the Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs, sparked concerns among neighboring countries
regarding the militarization of the disputed territories. The subsequent sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat
by a Chinese vessel near the Paracels, coupled with Beijing's establishment of two administrative districts
covering the Paracel and Spratly Islands, further heightened tensions in the region. The Philippines and
Vietnam, both claimants in the South China Sea dispute, vehemently denounced China's actions as a direct
challenge to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected countries.

These developments drew close scrutiny from the international community, as they not only posed a threat
to regional stability but also raised profound questions about China's adherence to international law and the
principles of peaceful dispute resolution. The events of February 2020 underscored the urgent need for a
comprehensive and judicious international response to address the complex dynamics in the South China
Sea and safeguard regional stability.

In March 2021, China executed a strategic move by deploying approximately two hundred ships to Whitsun
Reef, a region firmly within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While China asserted that
these vessels constituted a mere "fishing fleet," the Philippines, with discerning skepticism, argued that they
bore the hallmarks of military operation, thus igniting concerns over the blatant militarization of the area.
The tensions reached a tipping point in November 2022 when the Philippines formally accused China's coast
guard of confiscating debris from a suspected Chinese rocket that had descended in Philippine waters. As
elucidated by Hayton (2018), this incident unfolded against the backdrop of heightened geopolitical
tensions, exemplified by the visit of U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris to the Philippines, thereby
amplifying the international ramifications of the dispute.

Over this nearly two-year period, these unfolding events stand as testament to China's progressively
assertive and confrontational demeanor in the West Philippine Sea. The massive deployment of ships to
Whitsun Reef and the unilateral establishment of administrative districts covering the Paracel and Spratly
Islands serve as unequivocal indicators of China's unwavering determination to assert its claims in the
region, brushing aside the protests of the Philippines and other concerned stakeholders. This assertive
maneuvering not only underscores China's quest for dominance but also poses a significant challenge to
regional stability, emphasizing the imperative of a comprehensive and judicious international response.

The West Philippine Sea issue saw a turning point on February 4, 2023, when the Philippines accepted an
increased US military presence on its territory. According to Pemmaraju (2016), after less than a year in
office, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. approved the construction of four more military bases in
the country's north, thereby more than doubling the number already in place and greatly expanding US
influence in the South China Sea. China strongly objected to this decision, seeing the increased US military
presence as a direct threat to its strategic interests in the area.

At the same time, there were heated exchanges between Philippine and Chinese diplomats over allegations
that China's military had harassed Philippine and Australian sailors with lasers. Tensions between the two
countries increased as a result of these accusations. Beijing, citing "escalating" threats, announced a 7.2
percent increase in military spending in reaction to these developments. Many saw this revelation as a direct
response to the growing assertiveness of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea issue and the expansion
of the U.S. military presence. The complicated interaction of regional geopolitical variables highlighted how
complicated the situation is and how much more escalation in the South China Sea is possible.

On August 18, 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and South Korean
President Yoon Suk Yeol convened for a historic trilateral summit at the Camp David presidential retreat
outside of Washington, DC. As noted by Crisis Group (2021), the summit aimed to reaffirm the mutual
cooperation of the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region, serving as a demonstration of their
commitment to upholding international law and countering China's aggressive actions in the South China
Sea.

The leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea unequivocally condemned China's aggressive
behavior, explicitly expressing their support for The Hague's 2016 ruling against China's contentious nine-
dash line. Notably, this stance received additional endorsement from France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. The collective reaffirmation of The Hague's decision further validated the Philippines' position in
the West Philippine Sea dispute and emphasized the pressing need for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution
to the longstanding disagreements over the South China Sea.
The summit occurred two months after President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi jointly
committed to upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) decision and
other international laws in the South China Sea. Some experts argue that this joint commitment reflects New
Delhi's increasing discomfort with Beijing's maritime expansionism, highlighting the imperative of a unified
international response to address the escalating tensions in the region. The developments underscore the
growing global concern over China's actions and the necessity for a collaborative approach to maintain
stability and uphold the principles of international law in the South China Sea.
 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This section will delve into relevant literature consisting of reliable and factual data from articles, journals,
columns, history books, and other sources regarding the West Philippine Sea Dispute. It aims to provide
comprehensive discussions on the status of the dispute between the Philippines and China, focusing on data
spanning from 1990 to 2023. The primary objective of this section is to underscore the validity of arguments
supporting the substantial benefits of studying this issue.

The West Philippine Sea dispute is a complicated issue involving territorial and maritime jurisdictional
disagreements between the Philippines and China. At least 23 difficult territorial disputes have occurred
between the Philippines and China (Banlaoi, 2023). The fisheries issue exemplifies why the Philippines
requires an overarching strategic policy framework on maritime security; it calls for a maritime security
perspective that integrates geopolitics, fisheries, and the environment to inform policy recommendations for
small powers like the Philippines in navigating great power politics (Misalucha- Willoughby, 2023).

The issues are laid out from a Filipino point of view, with a focus on information that is considered most
significant and pertinent to the people of the Philippines, as opposed to information that is emphasized by
foreign organizations, writers, or governments (Baviera & Batongbacal, 2013). China's maritime claims to
the West Philippine Sea were contested by the Philippines through the application of both domestic and
international law. In the South China Sea, which the Philippines refer to as the West Philippine Sea, China
and the Philippines are at odds over maritime and territorial claims.

A legal analysis by Rosen (2014) on Philippine claims in

the South China Sea, published as a CNA Occasional
Paper, provides a comprehensive examination of historical,
legal, and territorial aspects surrounding the disputes in the
region. This review critically assesses Rosen's arguments,
identifying strengths, weaknesses, and the overall
contribution of the paper to the understanding of the
complex South China Sea disputes. Rosen begins by
elucidating the legal origins of the Philippine archipelago,
emphasizing the transition from the outdated concept of a
territorial "box" to adherence with the 1982 UN Law of the
Sea Convention (UNCLOS). The argument supporting the
Philippines' claims to Scarborough Shoal, based on
historical visits, charting, and law enforcement jurisdiction,
is logically presented. The geographical proximity of Scarborough Shoal to the Philippines is also
underscored, enhancing the legal justification for Philippine sovereignty.

Rosen contrasts the Philippine claim methodology with China's nine-dashed-line and Vietnam's legal
annexation approach. He contends that Vietnam's legal annexation, recognized by France in 1933,
establishes a stronger foundation for its claims than China's vague historical assertions. The analysis
regarding the ROC's occupation of territories listed in the French annexation is a notable contribution,
shedding light on the complexities of territorial claims in the post-World War II era. Rosen argues that the
Philippines was justified in classifying certain features within the Kalayaan island group as terra nullius,
citing Vietnam's apparent lack of active dispute.

The discussion on West York Island, Nanshan Island, Flat Island, and Lankiam Cay provides a nuanced
examination of historical claims, though the assertion that the Philippines legally occupies islands belonging
to Vietnam requires further evidentiary support. The paper convincingly asserts the Philippines' entitlement
to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf based on UNCLOS. Rosen
contends that China's interference with the Philippines' continental shelf resources is illegal, contributing to
a strong legal stance against such actions. The identification of specific features, including Reed Bank and
Mischief Reef, reinforces the argument regarding sovereignty over low-tide elevations.

The analysis of the pending arbitration between the Philippines and China is a noteworthy addition,
emphasizing the potential role of the arbitral panel in codifying legal principles. Rosen correctly
acknowledges the complexities of enforceability but underscores the political costs of an adverse judgment
for China. The proposal for a joint development scheme aligns with UNCLOS and reflects a pragmatic
approach to address resource implications.

Rosen's legal analysis strongly supports the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea by providing a
thorough examination of historical, legal, and territorial aspects. The paper convincingly underscores the
Philippines' adherence to UNCLOS, logically presents justifications for sovereignty over Scarborough
Shoal, and contrasts favorably with China's and Vietnam's approaches. The analysis of specific features, the
discussion on the arbitration with China, and the proposal for a joint development scheme further contribute
to the robustness of the Philippines' legal stance in the complex regional disputes.

The South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of
China, convened under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
constitutes a seminal instance wherein the principles and provisions enshrined in UNCLOS are rigorously
examined and applied to address profound legal intricacies surrounding the West Philippine Sea (Permanent
Court of Arbitration, 2016) . This analysis seeks to underscore the substantive significance of the Philippine
argumentation within the framework of UNCLOS, affirming the merits of the Philippines' position vis-à-vis
China's non-acceptance and non-participation.
Commenced on 22 January 2013, the arbitral proceedings initiated by the Republic of the Philippines
manifest a commitment to the principles of international law as articulated within UNCLOS. The
multifaceted nature of the arbitration encompasses a nuanced exploration of historical rights, the
foundational underpinnings of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, and the legal status of specific
maritime features. Moreover, the Philippines posits allegations against China, asserting breaches of
UNCLOS in its actions within the South China Sea, thereby elevating the dispute to the realm of
international legal scrutiny.

China's steadfast adoption of a stance characterized by non-acceptance and non-participation in the

arbitration proceedings raises critical scholarly inquiries into the efficacy of the arbitral process in instances
of uncooperative parties. This non-engagement by China, while indicative of broader geopolitical
complexities, challenges the tribunal's ability to fully adjudicate the matter in accordance with UNCLOS,
thereby highlighting inherent limitations in the current landscape of international dispute resolution.

Crucially, the arbitral proceedings being conducted under the aegis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
accentuate the importance of a neutral and esteemed institutional framework in facilitating the resolution of
intricate geopolitical disputes. The discourse recognizes the institutional role played by the Permanent Court
of Arbitration as pivotal in ensuring the procedural fairness and legitimacy of the arbitration process,
thereby contributing to the overarching objective of promoting the rule of law within the international arena.

The South China Sea Arbitration stands as a testament to the application of UNCLOS principles in
addressing complex legal questions pertaining to the West Philippine Sea. The Philippines' articulation
within the legal confines of UNCLOS merits consideration and scholarly examination, especially in light of
the challenges posed by China's non-participation, emphasizing the ongoing imperative for refinements in
international dispute resolution mechanisms to effectively address multifaceted geopolitical dynamics.

In Pemmaraju's (2016) comprehensive analysis of the South China Sea arbitration (The Philippines v.
China), published in the Chinese Journal of International Law, the focus centers on evaluating the tribunal's
award concerning jurisdiction and admissibility. The study critically examines the tribunal's decision,
particularly emphasizing the assessment of the dispute and the overarching objective of the Philippines in
Paragraph 78. Pemmaraju contends that the tribunal's determination is questionable due to its alleged failure
to adequately assess the actual nature of the dispute. It posits that the Philippines' primary goal was to seek
legal direction against China's perceived "unlawful claims and activities," a perspective that, according to
the study, the tribunal did not fully recognize.

The study identifies a crucial concern in the tribunal's approach to dividing the dispute into maritime
entitlements and historic titles. Pemmaraju argues that this artificial division is flawed, asserting that issues
of interpretation and application of the Convention are intricately linked to matters of sovereignty and
maritime delimitation. The potential repercussions of the tribunal's findings on sovereignty and maritime
delimitation raise apprehension about the tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction.

Pemmaraju criticizes the tribunal's summary dismissal of the "negotiation" requirement as a condition
precedent for jurisdiction. This decision, according to the study, weakens the overall persuasiveness of the
judgment. The practical aspect is underscored, suggesting that, ultimately, the Philippines would need to
return to negotiations with China for a mutually acceptable solution, despite the tribunal's stance.

The study acknowledges the tribunal's delicate task and objectives, recognizing the substantial burden it
bears to ensure that legitimate claims of China and third parties are not prejudiced. The hope expressed is
that the tribunal's decisions would bring the parties closer together rather than exacerbate tensions. The
paramount importance of the tribunal's objectives in forming the core of its mandate is emphasized.

Summarily, the study interrogates the tribunal's decision on multiple grounds, including its assessment of
the dispute, artificial division of issues, dismissal of the negotiation requirement, and potential impact on
sovereignty and maritime delimitation. It underscores the importance of the tribunal's objectives in
reconciling the claims of the parties involved. The study expresses skepticism about the tribunal's approach
and decision-making, hinting at challenges for the Philippines in achieving its objectives through legal
avenues. The possibility of the tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction, especially concerning sovereignty and
maritime delimitation, is questioned. Despite these concerns, the study reinforces the practical necessity of
returning to negotiations for a mutually acceptable solution, casting reservations on the effectiveness of the
tribunal's decisions in safeguarding the Philippines' interests in the West Philippine Sea.

The concerning tensions that are rising in the South China Sea are discussed in detail in Morales' Reuters
Article in 2023, which also highlights China's recent aggressive actions against the Philippines. The
Philippines strongly denounces what it considers to be "illegal and aggressive actions" by China through its
South China Sea task force. One such instance is the recent event in which the Chinese coast guard fired
water cannons at a Philippine Fisheries Bureau vessel that was on a routine resupply mission.

One of the main justifications for the Philippines' position is China's flagrant disregard for international law.
MaryKay Carlson, the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, has emphasized with great emphasis that China's
actions not only violate international law but also endanger lives and livelihoods. The United States has
unambiguously condemned China's actions, and it is committed to supporting the Philippines in its advocacy
for a free and open Indo-Pacific. These factors significantly strengthen the case against China's belligerent
actions.

The Philippines task force's assertion that China deliberately targeted a fisheries vessel engaged in a
humanitarian supply mission accentuates the inhumane nature of China's actions. Interfering with the
distribution of humanitarian support is not only illegal but also morally reprehensible, as the task force
rightfully contends.
The argument is further complicated by the strategic significance of the Scarborough Shoal within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. China's illegal annexation of the shoal in 2012 and its
subsequent policies, such as forcing Filipino fishermen to fish farther away for smaller catches, demonstrate
a flagrant disrespect for international maritime borders and an infringement on the sovereignty of the
Philippines.

Additionally, Morales (2023) draws attention to the larger picture surrounding China's sweeping claims in
the South China Sea, which is a vital route for international trade. The Philippines' stance is well-supported
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 decision, which ruled that China's claims are without legal
standing

Subsequently, Morales (2023) articulates a compelling argument in favor of the Philippines' stance against
China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. The overt violations of international law, the morally
reprehensible interference with humanitarian missions, and the broader ramifications for regional stability
and global commerce collectively provide a formidable basis for condemning China's actions in the
contested waters. To guarantee long-term peace and stability in the South China Sea, the international
community must band together in support of the Philippines and the values of a rules-based order.

The study conducted by Gunawan et al. (2022), titled "Dispute Resolution between the Philippines and
China: Fisheries Activities in the South China Sea," focuses on the ongoing conflicts related to fishing
activities in the South China Sea. It explores the efforts made by both countries in resolving these disputes,
considering fishing as a significant economic activity for both China and the Philippines. Fishing disputes
often lead to diplomatic tensions and potential conflict escalation.

Gunawan et al. (2022) concentrated on three key issues: overfishing, illegal fishing, and fishing vessel
detention. Both China and the Philippines have accused each other of these practices, resulting in diplomatic
protests and regional tension. The study assesses the different approaches taken by the Philippines and
China with regards to dispute resolution, placing a significant emphasis on the role of international law,
specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

One of the key recommendations made is the adoption of alternative conflict resolution processes.
According to Gunawan et al. (2022), these mechanisms offer a more peaceful, cost-effective, and efficient
approach to resolving disputes compared to resorting to armed conflict. Direct negotiations between the two
countries have not always been successful, emphasizing the need for exploring other modes of dispute
resolution, such as mediation or arbitration.

The study suggests that arbitration is a viable way to settle disagreements between the Philippines and
China. It examines the landmark arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China in 2013, seeking to
clarify the legal status of disputed features in the South China Sea.
Additionally, this research proposes specific recommendations for addressing overfishing and illegal
fishing, including increasing patrols and strengthening international cooperation. Gunawan et al. (2022)
argue that both the Philippines and China, as parties to the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, should
uphold their obligations to conserve and manage the region's marine resources.

The thorough analysis of fishing conflicts in the South China Sea provided by Gunawan et al. (2022) makes
it clear that the Philippines' commitment to resolving these disputes through international legal mechanisms
—most notably UNCLOS—is a morally right and prudent course of action.
It is essential to acknowledge the country's dedication to global collaboration and conservation initiatives as
delineated in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. The Philippines is a prime example of a
responsible approach to the sustainable management of marine resources in the South China Sea by
honoring its commitments.

The Philippine position as a reasonable and legal reaction to fishing disputes is supported by this research.
The Philippines exhibits a commitment to stability, legality, and the long-term health of the maritime
environment in the South China Sea by adhering to UNCLOS, seeking alternative dispute settlement, and
upholding international agreements.

The Philippines-China Joint Development Agreement within the context of the South China Sea Rabena's
(2020) research critically examines with a specific focus on its implications during the Duterte
administration. The West Philippines Sea disputes, as highlighted by Rabena (2020), have deep-rooted
origins in conflicting territorial claims involving China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.
This study delves into the multifaceted dynamics of these territorial disputes, especially in light of the
bilateral approach adopted by the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte.

The Philippines conducted bilateral talks and collaboration with China under Duterte's presidency in an
effort to find a peaceful settlement to the conflicting claims in the West Philippines Sea. The Philippines-
China Joint Development Agreement in the South China Sea, which surfaced as a viable instrument for
promoting collaboration and controlling tensions between the two countries, was key to this diplomatic
approach. The goal of the agreement was to make it easier to explore and develop resources for the mutual
benefit of all parties involved without making the already complex situation worse.

However, the research acknowledges the concerns raised by critics of the Philippines-China Joint
Development Agreement. Detractors argue that the agreement may compromise the Philippines' sovereignty
and undermine its claims in the West Philippines Sea. Notably, there are apprehensions that bilateral
agreements with China might contradict the 2016 international arbitration ruling, which invalidated China's
expansive territorial claims under the nine-dash line. Additionally, skeptics contend that such collaboration
might inadvertently legitimize China's occupation and assertive actions in the disputed waters.
Conversely, proponents of the agreement advocate for its pragmatic approach in resolving disputes through
mutually beneficial cooperation. By temporarily setting aside the sovereignty issue, they argue that joint
development projects could lead to economic gains while contributing to peace, stability, and trust-building
measures between the Philippines and China.

Rabena's (2020) research offers a nuanced exploration of the complexities surrounding the Philippines-
China Joint Development Agreement and its implications for the West Philippines Sea disputes. Considering
the divergent perspectives on the agreement, it becomes crucial to evaluate its overall impact on the
Philippines' stance. The ensuing analysis aims to support the Philippine stance by recognizing the potential
for economic gains and fostering diplomatic relations while ensuring vigilance to safeguard national
sovereignty and adhere to international legal rulings.

The study "The Limits of Intergovernmentalism: The Philippines' Changing Strategy in the South
China Sea Dispute and Its Impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)" by De
Castro (2020) examines the Philippines' evolving foreign policy strategies in the context of the South China
Sea dispute, focusing on the contrasting approaches of former President Benigno Aquino III and current
President Rodrigo Duterte. The main argument is that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
intergovernmental approach, which the Philippines has traditionally used, has limitations in effectively
addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
In response to China's maritime expansion in the South China Sea, the Philippines pursued a balancing
strategy during the Aquino Administration (2011-2016). President Aquino sought to protect the Philippines'
strategic leverage in the region in response to Chinese incursions into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The encroachments not only threatened the Philippines' territorial integrity, but also depleted the country's
vital fishery and mineral resources.
In contrast to this, President Duterte, who took office in 2016, adopted an appeasement policy toward China.
His recognition of China's emergence as a major economic powerhouse, as well as its ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), influenced this shift. Duterte believed that continuing the balancing strategy would
make it more difficult for the Philippines to access Chinese investments and aid through the BRI. As a
result, he saw appeasement as a way to position the Philippines as a recipient of China's economic largesse.

De Castro (2020) emphasizes the importance of ASEAN in both administrations' foreign policy agendas. It
investigates how Aquino and Duterte used ASEAN's intergovernmental approach to advance their respective
goals in the South China Sea issue and bilateral relations with China. De Castro's central inquiry from 2011
to 2019 revolves around how the Philippines used ASEAN to pursue its shifting foreign policy objectives. In
answering this question, the article delves into specifics such as the challenges posed by the Aquino
Administration to China's maritime expansion and the rationale behind Duterte's appeasement policy.

De Castro (2020) scrutinizes the implications of the Philippines' evolving foreign policy on ASEAN's role as
a regional security association. The shifting dynamics prompt a critical examination of the traditional
intergovernmental approach and call for a reconsideration of how ASEAN navigates the security challenges
arising from the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. De Castro (2020), illuminates the
pragmatism in adjusting foreign policy strategies to align with evolving geopolitical realities. While
Aquino's balancing strategy emphasized safeguarding territorial integrity, Duterte's appeasement policy
underscores the importance of economic cooperation. The study of De Castro (2020) advocates for a
nuanced understanding of the Philippines' approach, acknowledging the complex interplay of security and
economic considerations. In this view, leveraging the ASEAN as a diplomatic tool demonstrates strategic
acumen in pursuing national interests amidst regional challenges.

The security and stability of the region are seriously threatened by the ongoing disputes in the South China
Sea, particularly in the West Philippines Sea. In order to overcome these obstacles, ASEAN, a significant
regional organization in Southeast Asia, is essential in promoting collaboration and fostering discussions
among the claimant nations.

Le Hu's (2023) research "Examining ASEAN's Framework in Managing South China Sea Disputes"
explores the complex dynamics of ASEAN's engagement in conflict resolution and tension management
related to the complex territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The study argues that the fundamental
principles of ASEAN—consensus, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence—have a major impact on the
organization's strategy. Although the organization has made progress in resolving conflicts, a number of
issues limit its efficacy.

One significant obstacle to the efficacy of ASEAN is the disparity in interests among its constituent nations,
especially those asserting territorial claims in the South China Sea. The organization's capacity to put up a
united front and resolve the conflicts has been hampered by the differences over the scope and meaning of
these claims. Further complicating ASEAN's efforts to forge a united front on the South China Sea conflicts
are outside pressures and influences from powerful nations, most notably China and the US.
The effectiveness of ASEAN-led mechanisms and initiatives, like the Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea (COC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in managing conflicts and promoting peaceful
resolutions is evaluated by Le Hu (2023), who closely examines ASEAN's role as a forum for dialogue and
negotiation. The paper emphasizes the difficulties in converting these talks into concrete actions and legally
binding agreements, even while these procedures provide forums for candid discussion and steps toward
fostering confidence.

The study prompts a critical evaluation of ASEAN's effectiveness in managing South China Sea disputes.
The divergent interests among member states and external influences have posed substantial challenges to
achieving a unified and impactful resolution. However, recognizing the pragmatic role ASEAN plays as a
platform for dialogue and negotiation, it becomes imperative to acknowledge its importance in fostering
regional stability. Supporting the Philippine stance involves acknowledging these challenges while
emphasizing the need for continued diplomatic efforts within ASEAN to address the complex South China
Sea disputes and preserve regional security.
Rather than relying solely on international law to counter China's claims, President Rodrigo Duterte has
adopted a pragmatic approach, prioritizing economic benefits and avoiding direct confrontation with China.
However, after five years, it becomes evident that this strategy may not have fully paid off, as the ongoing
maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing is increasingly intertwined with the geopolitical competition
between China on one side and the United States and its allies on the other.

According to the International Crisis Group (2021) report, Manila should push for a comprehensive and
successful code of conduct between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
order to reduce the likelihood of escalating confrontations at sea. It proposes that Manila concentrate on
promoting regional collaboration, particularly on matters like fisheries management, and highlights the
significance of keeping diplomatic channels open with Beijing in order to minimize miscommunications.

President Duterte's efforts to lessen relations with the United States and diversify the strategic alternatives
available to the Philippines have been noteworthy, according to the International Crisis Group (2021).
Throughout his presidency, Duterte has downplayed the issue of territorial sovereignty and instead
prioritized economic benefits from China. This flexible approach aimed to strengthen ties with Beijing while
preventing damage to the bilateral relationship with the region's dominant economic and military power.
However, irritants persist even after five years, with Chinese ships frequently patrolling the Philippine
exclusive economic zone, hindering Filipino fishermen's access to traditional fishing grounds. Furthermore,
the promised economic benefits from engagement with China, including infrastructure projects, have not
met expectations, leading to growing skepticism among Filipinos regarding reconciliation with China if it
entails giving up claims to disputed maritime features.

Since late 2019, Manila has shown a reduced willingness to overlook China's assertiveness. It has lodged
diplomatic protests against perceived territorial violations, reversed the cancellation of the Visiting Forces
Agreement with the United States, allowing for joint military exercises and the stationing of U.S. personnel
in the Philippines. The United States, in turn, has reaffirmed its alliance with the Philippines, labeled China's
claims in the South China Sea as "unlawful," and clarified that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two
countries encompasses defense against attacks on Philippine forces or vessels in the Sea. However,
balancing the South China Sea issue, treaty alliances, and intermittent tensions with neighboring countries,
including China, poses significant challenges for the Philippines, given its alliance with Washington,
economic considerations, and geographical imperatives to find common ground with Beijing. Additionally,
maintaining constructive relations with other Southeast Asian claimants is crucial, given internal conflicts of
interest within the bureaucracy and military, as well as the interplay of elite positioning and public opinion
that often result in policy contradictions.

To address the deadlock in the dispute, the International Crisis Group (2021) suggests that Manila should
foster cooperation by engaging in formal and informal discussions with neighboring countries on common
interests such as fisheries management, law enforcement challenges, and scientific research on
environmental issues. Building partnerships with other littoral states for joint resource management could
pave the way for broader cooperation. The Philippines should also intensify efforts to advance Code of
Conduct negotiations and maintain bilateral dialogue with China to address misunderstandings and manage
disagreements. Specific measures, like negotiating access rules to Scarborough Shoal, need to be pursued to
reduce friction with China. Additionally, risk management mechanisms should be strengthened to mitigate
potential tensions between claimant states or between the United States and China. While these steps may
not solve the maritime dispute entirely, they can help reduce the risk of escalating incidents at sea and
contribute to peace and stability in the South China Sea.

Supporting the Philippine stance involves recognizing the pragmatic elements of President Duterte's
approach, which prioritizes economic benefits and diplomatic engagement over direct confrontation. The
recommendations by the International Crisis Group align with the need for Manila to advocate for a
substantive Code of Conduct, maintain diplomatic channels, and foster regional cooperation to address the
complexities of the South China Sea disputes. Balancing multiple interests, including the alliance with the
United States and economic considerations with China, requires a nuanced and strategic approach. The
suggested measures can contribute to reducing the risk of tensions and enhancing peace and stability in the
region, supporting the overall objective of safeguarding the Philippines' national interests.
 ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENTS

In the International arena, China and Philippines’ ongoing territorial dispute over the expansive
body of water, now legally claimed by the Philippines and recognized as the West Philippine Sea
(WPS) remains an issue, since, according to Davidson (2023), the South China Sea (SCS) is
considered as one of the world’s most strategically and commercially vital trade routes or shipping
lanes. This section of the paper seeks to analyze the complexities of the conflict, offering a
perspective that leans toward supporting the Philippines. By consistently employing the term “West
Philippine Sea” to delineate its claimed territory, the Philippines goes beyond more than just a
matter of semantics; it is a strategic declaration of the nation’s sovereignty rights in the waters.
This paper argues in support of the Philippines, asserting that the usage of the term “West
Philippine Sea” is vital in expressing the country’s maritime rights, as well as its adherence to
international law. To further discuss this, Gerona (2021) stated in his analysis of the South China
Sea dispute that for the Philippine government, the term “West Philippine Sea” is not synonymous
with the “South China Sea” and emphasizes that both terms should not be used interchangeably.
The Philippines uses the term "West Philippine Sea" to emphasize its maritime rights over the
waters inside its exclusive economic zone. However, China calls it the "South China Sea" and
unlawfully occupies a large portion of it. According to a timeline of China’s Maritime Disputes
published by Xu on Council on Foreign Relations (2020), in 2011, as a response to spate clashes
with China’s vessels, the government of the Philippines began referring to the South China Sea as
“West Philippine Sea.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, also began using the
term “West Philippine Sea” in the same year, affirming the alliance with the Philippines during the
time the country was facing difficulties in territorial integrity.

Legal Foundations: UNCLOS and Philippine domestic laws assert sovereignty rights in the
waters

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states are granted
specific maritime rights and boundaries measured in nautical miles (NM) from their baselines.
These are first, the Territorial Sea (12 NM); this is the area where a coastal state can exercise its
sovereignty rights. The state has full control over this water, including the airspace above it.
Foreign vessels can enter these waters as they have the right of innocent passage in any territorial
waters. However, they shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace if they engage in any
activities stated in Article 19, Section 2, of UNCLOS. Next is the Exclusive Economic Zone or
EEZ (200 NM). In this zone, a state has the right to manage, conserve, and exploit resources, as
well as to conduct economic activities such as fishing and the building of artificial islands, but the
state cannot order other foreign states passing through this area to leave as they have the freedom
of navigation and right to overflight. The last is the High Sea (150 NM), which has similar rules
and conditions to the EEZ. All in all, the maximum a state can claim under UNCLOS is 350
nautical miles, but it is subject to specific criteria. Yano (2022) stated in The Maritime Review that
the Bajo De Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the Kalayaan Islands or Kalayaan Island Group
only have 12 NM territorial seas and are not capable of generating EEZs but both are within the
Philippine’ EEZ, while Ayungin (Second Thomas) shoal and Panganiban (mischief) reef do not
have 12 NM territorial seas, both are still inside the EEZ of the Philippine archipelago.

The late former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. signed the Presidential Decree No. 1599,
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spanning two hundred nautical miles from
baselines and asserts that the ability of the Republic of the Philippines to exist and thrive
economically is dependent on its territorial sea. Furthermore, the zone is recognized under
international law. As per the Presidential Decree's Section 2, the Philippines is granted the: (a)
authority to explore, exploit, manage, and conserve marine resources, encompassing both living
and nonliving, renewable and nonrenewable resources found in the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent
waters; (b) exclusive authority and rights that cover the creation and use of artificial islands,
offshore structures, marine preservation, pollution control, and scientific research; and (c)
additional rights recognized by international law or national custom. Unless otherwise provided in
any agreement with the Republic of the Philippines or license granted under the authority of the
Republic of the Philippines, the country reserves the right, as stated in Section 3, to prohibit any
person from: (a) exploiting or exploring resources; (b) carrying out operations such as research,
drilling, or excavating; (c) conducting research; (d) building and operating artificial islands, off-
shore terminals, and installing sand; and (e) conducting or engaging in activities that are contrary or
derogatory to the sovereignty rights and jurisdiction issued on this Presidential Decree (Official
Gazette, 1978). This legislation was submitted by the Philippines to the United Nations and can be
seen on the official website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Office of Legal
Affairs, United Nations.

The ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed in
2002 by China and ten ASEAN nations, including the Philippines. The agreement, which was
negotiated in Phnom Penh, attempts to lower tensions in the South China Sea by providing guiding
principles for the nations involved (The National Bureau of Asian Research, n.d.). In order to
promote stability and prevent disputes in the South China Sea from getting worse, the DoC offers
guidelines for collaboration, risk mitigation, and conflict resolution in the disputed zone by
peaceful means. This agreement shows the commitment of the Philippines to promote cooperation
and stability in the waters among the involved countries.

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed the baselines bill into law in 2009, which
became Republic Act 9522, in which the Philippine archipelago's baselines are explicitly defined
and detailed, assisting in the establishment of the Philippines' marine boundaries. Scarborough
Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) are also classified as "regimes of islands under the
Republic of the Philippines" by this Baselines Law (The Lawphil Project, n.d.). This is submitted to
the United Nations as a part of compliance with the deposit obligations pursuant to UNCLOS. This
simply means that the Philippines continues to assert its claims to the West Philippine Sea by legal
means. Additionally, Republic Act 9522 aligns with UNCLOS and can also be seen on the official
website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United
Nations.

Debunking China’s Claims: The 1734 Murillo-Velarde Map

China has been adamant in asserting its claims over the West Philippine Sea. Providing a series of
narratives that reveals a growing skepticism about these claims, raising doubts about the
transparency and accuracy of China’s declarations regarding the contested maritime region. As
provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China (2016), Chinese
former ambassador to Lesotho Sun Xianghua published an article stating that China found, named,
and managed islands in the SCS date back 2000 years ago, adding that China has been shipping and
fishing in the waters during that time, and even named islands like “Rising Seas” and “Rugged
Peaks.” Xianghua added that the Chinese have governed the region from the eighth century through
naval patrol, administration, and resource exploitation.

According to an article published by Jadloc (2020) on the official website of Mel V. Velarde, The
1734 map was printed in Manila by Jesuit priest Padre Murillo Velarde; it served as the official
map of the Spanish government detailing both terrestrial and aquatic areas in the Philippines. The
Murillo-Velarde map is widely recognized as the “Pinnacle of Philippine cartography,”
representing the important marital routes that connect Manila to Spain, Mexico and other Spanish
holdings in the New World. Francisco Suarez, along with Nicolas Dela Cruz Bagay are the two
Filipinos who drew and engraved the map. The Murillo-Velarde map which was crucial to the
Galleon Trade, also holds significance in today's Philippine and China’s Maritime conflict, as it
debunks the historical narrative of China claims in the West Philippine Sea. Retired SC Justice
Antonio Carpio said in the conference of the Philippine-Spanish Day that the map invalidates
China’s ownership claims of SSC for over 2000 years as well as the Nine-dashed line. During the
hearings on the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the Murillo-Velarde map was one of
ancient maps presented to the PCA to challenge China’s claims. Additionally, none of all the
ancient maps of China showed that it owned the disputed waters, while the 1734 Murillo-Velarde
map, which was provided in the PCA by the Philippines team of experts, showed that it included
the Scarborough Shoal which was named in the map as “Panacot Shoal” and the Spratlys as “Los
Bajos De Paragua.” This implies the Philippines is the first to name the shoal and islands and
China, historically, had no exclusive control over these waters.

The Ruling of Arbitral Tribunal

Based on the timeline of China’s maritime disputes provided by Xu (2020), after recording at least
five incursions by Chinese ships near the Spratly Islands and the Amy Douglas Bank located off
the coast of the Island of Palawan in 2010, the Philippines summoned a Chinese envoy to express
the government’s growing concerns regarding China's naval incursions in the Philippines’ claimed
territory. Chinese surveillance ships forced Philippine vessels to leave the Recto Bank, located in
the northwest of Palawan and within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. What China’s
surveillance ships did is obviously a violation of the 2002 ASEAN-China DoC. As specifically
stated in Section 5 of the DoC, the parties agree to refrain from engaging in actions that would
jeopardize the peace, complicate or aggravate disagreements, and harm peace and stability,
including, among other things, abstaining from colonizing currently uninhabited islands, reefs,
shoals, cays, and other characteristics and resolving their differences constructively (ASEAN
Secretariat, 2020), but what Chinese surveillance ships did is not aligned with this agreement.
Following the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, the Philippines and China’s diplomatic ties
deteriorated further. Bilateral discussions have repeatedly broken down after the Philippines sent a
warship to meet the fishing vessels of China at the Scarborough Shoal. This resulted in Chinese
surveillance ships being dispatched to safeguard their fishermen, which also led to a two-month
standoff between the two countries (Xu, 2020). As the Philippine government explores different
possibilities, including ASEAN participation and legal options under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Beijing still conducts regular patrols within the
EEZ of the Philippines and prevents Filipino fishermen from accessing the waters.

As maritime tensions between the two aforementioned countries persist, the Philippines raised the
issue under UNCLOS to contest China’s illegal occupation in the areas within the EEZ of the
Philippines and its interference with the country’s maritime rights. In 2013, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China stated that the Philippines
requested that the Arbitral Tribunal declare that first, the maritime rights of China must align with
the provisions of UNCLOS; second, assert that China’s claims on the historical “nine-dash line”
are invalid under UNCLOS; and third, request that China cease its unlawful activities violating the
Philippine maritime rights in the WPS (Official Gazette, 2013). The Philippines argued that the
Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the
convention according to Article 288(1)(2) of UNCLOS (Oceans and Law of the Sea, n.d.).
Philippines’ claims regarding this matter are asserted to be well-founded by fact and law, as
supported by the submitted documents. The Philippines also gave emphasis to its reliance on
international law, including UNCLOS, as a fair resolution mechanism for the West Philippine Sea
dispute.

Three years after filing the case against China in the WPS, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, stating that China's nine-dash line claim
lacks legal foundation and that its land reclamation and other activities in the Philippines' EEZ are
illegal (Williams, 2016). In contrast, China proclaimed the ruling unlawful, null, and void.
Countries including the United States, Australia, Vietnam, and Japan backed the Philippines and
asked China to respect the tribunal's decision. ASEAN countries emphasized the need for peaceful
dispute resolution in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Because the
tribunal has no jurisdiction over sovereignty claims, the Philippines focused on the legal status of
the marine features, resulting in a resounding victory for the country, with the panel unanimously
favoring its case. China's Mischief Reef occupancy and artificial islands construction are illegal
because the reef is located within the Philippines' EEZ. Despite being under Chinese de facto
authority since 2012, Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) also lies inside the Philippines' EEZ.
The Philippines claims the Spratly Islands' northeastern part (Kalayaan Island Group) under
UNCLOS, yet China continues to use coercive measures in these waters.

China’s Continued Aggressive Actions

In previous months, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and marine militia have used risky tactics to
target Filipino fishing vessels in the WPS. On December 9, 2023, the CCG obstructed the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Armed Forces' resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre by
firing water cannons to resupply ships in full strength. Following the 2016 arbitral ruling in favor
of the Philippines, China continued its Gray-Zone tactics, including building and developing
artificial islands in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, using militias to chase away Filipino
fishermen, and using military-grade lasers and water cannons to disrupt missions and assert control
over disputed areas. According to Misalucha-Willoughby (2023), China does not use the term
“Gray-Zone” to conceal its military development in the WPS. Instead, it disguises its expansionary
campaigns by using terms like “peacetime use of military forces” or “maritime rights protection.”

The December 9, 2023, incident of obstruction of PCG and Armed Forces’ resupply mission to
BRP Sierra Madre by the Chinese Coast Guard was followed by another incident on December 10,
2023, when PCG planned to convoy Philippine vessels for its Christmas mission for the Filipino
troops garrisoned in the Ayungin Shoal and residents of Pag-asa Island, one of the islands that
comprise the KIG and is the largest and the only inhabited among the islands of KIG in the WPS.
The Christmas convoy, which is the TS Kapitan Felix Oca (TS KFO), failed to reach Ayungin
Shoal as the captain decided to turn around and go back to El Nido as they were observed and
surrounded by the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese Navy. “We are erring on the side of
caution, and kasi nga medyo marami yung nakita natin at pinalibutan tayo, in coordination with our
Coast Guard and the decision of our boat captain, we are going back,” said Akbayan Party member
of the Atin Ito movement, Rafaela David, to the participants of the convoy. Capt. Jorge Dela Cruz
said that he did not want to compromise the safety of the group, which is why he decided to abort
(Ticke, 2023).

The above-mentioned encounters and collisions between the Philippines and China within
Philippine waters are just a few of the many series of China's harassment and aggression against the
Philippines since China began pushing their maritime claims in the WPS. Even with the existence
of UNCLOS and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Ruling, China continues its unlawful
activities in the Philippines’ EEZ by increasing its Chinese maritime control and surveillance as
well as unlawfully expanding its artificial islands. This not only violates the maritime rights of the
Philippines, but it also violates international law, including the provisions under UNCLOS. Apart
from this, China continues to bully the Philippine Coast Guards' fishermen in the WPS by directly
firing their water cannons in full strength at the PCG and fishermen's vessels. Jay Tarriela, a coast
guard officer who studies coast guard organizations, posted on X also known as twitter on
December 9, 2023, condemning China’s actions and stating that the Bajo de Masinloc recent
incident has had a tremendous impact on the livelihood of regular Filipino fishermen who rely on
this area. The illegal and aggressive activities of the People's Republic of China have had a
significant impact on these fishermen while they waited for their fuel subsidies and food packets. It
is critical that all Filipinos and the entire nation strongly denounce such conduct. He added that the
2016 Arbitral Award clearly stated that Bajo de Masinloc is a high-tide feature inside the
Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Furthermore, it confirmed that Filipinos have
customary fishing rights in the waters of Bajo de Masinloc, which are protected by international
law. “Whatever China is fighting to illegally occupy these waters, the Filipinos need to fight for
these waters because our lives depend on it!" (Tarriela, 2023). Additionally, China’s illegal
occupancy in the WPS is a threat to the Philippine economy, specifically in the maritime sector, as
China continues its reclamation in Philippine waters as well as increasing their control and
surveillance, which might have an impact on the access to waterways for trade negotiations
between the Philippines and other foreign countries in the future if the tension severely escalates.

Despite the continuous aggression of China in the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines continues to
solve maritime disputes with China by peaceful means, initiating bilateral agreements with China,
including trade negotiations, as well as participating in multilateral agreements such as ASEAN.
Philippines continue its diplomatic and legal approach in solving this matter; however, China is just
ignoring the Philippines efforts in mitigating maritime tensions; instead, China even accused the
Philippines of dangerous maneuvers in the WPS and saying that their actions, such as firing water
cannons and intimidating Philippine vessels, are just part of their security measures. China seems to
be twisting the narrative, blaming the Philippines for the incidents in the WPS when in fact it was
China that took such aggressive actions. The China ambassador to the Philippines, whose job is to
promote a “line of diplomacy” between the countries, was not even doing anything to address
China’s aggression in the West Philippine Sea; instead, the ambassador even aggressively pointed
at Philippine Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner Jr., saying, “don't provoke us!" as if it is not China
who is provoking and adding to the escalating maritime tensions in the WPS (Ballecer, J.R., 2023).
Whatever China is doing in the West Philippine Sea as well as in other Southeast Asian countries’
waters is not in line with diplomacy. Instead, it creates regional instability.
China being the big bully and the Philippines being the weak shows what the Athenians told the
Melians in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must” China does everything they can to the expense of harassing the Philippines and
violating the country’s maritime rights in order to stay and expand their power, while the
Philippines suffer from all the aggressions done by China, who blatantly show the world their
geopolitical interests.