History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following The Cold War - 1988 To 1996

History of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations Following

the Cold War: 1988 to 1996
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Peacekeeping Operations Following
the Cold War: 1988 to 1996
Cover photo: UN Photo #131445 by Jihad El

Hassan. A United Nations armed personnel carrier
“digs in” at Medak Pocket in Sector South of
Croatia. 1 September 1993.
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
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First edition: 1998 by F. T. Liu

Second edition: 2006 by Sunil Ram
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Peacekeeping Operations During the
Cold War: 1988 to 1996
Table of Contents
Method of Study xii
Lesson 1 The End of the Cold War and the Resurgence of UN

PKOs 13
Section 1.1 The Concept of

Peacekeeping 14
Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War 15
Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the Cold War 15
Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War 15
Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations 16
Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and

Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 17
Section 1.7 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

(UNIIMOG) 20
Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) 27
Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America

(ONUCA) 31
PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE
v
History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1988 to 1996
Lesson 2 The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 41
Section 2.1 Background on UNTAG 42
Section 2.2 Negotiations Leading to the Establishment of UNTAG 43
Section 2.3 The Agreement for the UNTAG Operation 45
Section 2.4 The Mandate of UNTAG 45
Section 2.5 The Organization of UNTAG 46
Section 2.6 The Civilian Component of UNTAG 47
Section 2.7 Deployment of UNTAG 49
Section 2.8 Ceasefire Violation Dispute 49
Section 2.9 The Dismantling of the South African Military Presence in

Namibia 51
Section 2.10 South African Allegations 53
Section 2.11 Monitoring the South West Africa Police 53
Section 2.12 Return of Refugees 54
Section 2.13 Missing Persons 55
Section 2.14 The Namibian Elections 55
Section 2.15 Importance of UNTAG 56
Lesson 3 The Gulf Crisis and the Use of Force 59
Section 3.1 Background on UNIKOM 60
Section 3.2 Establishment and Mandate of UNIKOM 61
Section 3.3 The Deployment of UNIKOM 62
Section 3.4 The Expansion of UNIKOM’s Mandate 63
Section 3.5 Situation in the DMZ 64
Section 3.6 Suspension of UNIKOM and the Termination of the

Mandate 64
Section 3.7 The Influence of the 1991 Gulf War on Peace Operations 65
Section 3.8 The Debate Over Sanctions (1991 Gulf War) 66
vi
Section 3.9 The Korean Precedent 66
Section 3.10 Invocation of Chapter VII 67
Section 3.11 Limits on the Use of Force 68
Lesson 4 Further Expansion of UN Peacekeeping Operations

in 1991-1994 and New Challenges 71
Section 4.1 The Changing International Atmosphere and

Rising Expectations 72
Section 4.2 New Challenges 73
Section 4.3 New Peacekeeping Operations 73
Section 4.4 The Problems with Expansion 78
Lesson 5 Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Established in 1991-1994: The Successful
Operations 81
Section 5.1 International Conflicts 82
Section 5.2 United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) 83
Section 5.3 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 86
Section 5.4 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 93
Section 5.5 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 99
Section 5.6 United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) 109
Lesson 6 Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Established in 1991-1994: The Unsuccessful
Operations 115
Section 6.1 Background to

Problematic Missions 116
Section 6.2 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO) 118
Section 6.3 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 121
Section 6.4 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 124
vii
Section 6.5 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 127
Section 6.6 United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

(UNMOT) 133
Section 6.7 United Nations Angola Verification Mission

(UNAVEM II) 137
Section 6.8 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) 140
Section 6.9 Background to UNPROFOR

(UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia) 142
Section 6.10 The Dilemma of Non-cooperation 144
Section 6.11 Peace Enforcement 144
Lesson 7 The Second UN Operation in Somalia 147
Section 7.1 Background to UNOSOM II 148
Section 7.2 UNOSOM II Established 149
Section 7.3 The Humanitarian Conference 150
Section 7.4 National Reconciliation Conference 151
Section 7.5 Attack of 5 June 1993 152
Section 7.6 The Failure of the 3 October 1993 Assaults by UN/US

Forces 152
Section 7.7 The Situation in the Last Quarter of 1993 153
Section 7.8 UNOSOM II’s Mandate Changes 154
Section 7.9 Coordinating Aid 154
Section 7.10 The Nairobi Declaration and On 154
Section 7.11 The Situation Deteriorates 155
Section 7.12 The Withdrawal of UNOSOM II 156
viii
Section 7.13 Impact of UNOSOM II 156
The UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia 159

UNPROFOR-B 160
Section 8.2 Resolution 816 (1993) 161
Section 8.3 The Establishment of Safe Areas 162
Section 8.4 The Protection of Safe Areas 162
Section 8.5 Ultimatums on Sarajevo and Gorazde 163
Section 8.6 Deadlock in the Peace Process 163
Section 8.7 Renewed Fighting 164
Section 8.8 NATO Air Strikes 164
Section 8.9 The Failure of the Ceasefire 164
Section 8.10 The Vulnerability of UNPROFOR 165
Section 8.11 Restructuring of UNPROFOR 165
Section 8.12 The Establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force 166
Section 8.13 The Bosnian Serb Offensive and the Government and Croat
Counter-Offensive 166
Section 8.14 The Dayton Peace Agreement and the Termination of

UNPROFOR 167
Lesson 9 Lessons from the UN Operations in Somalia and

Bosnia 171
Section 9.1 Introduction 172
Section 9.2 UNOSOM II Issues 173
Section 9.3 UNPROFOR Issues 173
Section 9.4 Dangers of Combining Peacekeeping with Enforcement

Action 174
ix
Section 9.5 Problems with Mobilization 174
Section 9.6 Problems with Command and Control 175
Section 9.7 Problems with Cooperation 175
Section 9.8 Distinction between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 176
Section 9.9 Application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter 177
Section 9.10 New Approaches and Lessons Learned 178
Lesson 10 Retrenchment of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Since 1994 181
Section 10.1 Decreasing Number of Operations 182
Section 10.2 Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement 183
Section 10.3 United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

(UNOMUR) 184
Section 10.4 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 187
Section 10.5 United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters

(UNPF-HQ) 192
Section 10.6 United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia

(UNCRO) 193
Section 10.7 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) 195
Section 10.8 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(UNMIBH) 197
Section 10.9 United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern

Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) 201
Section 10.10 United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) 206
Section 10.11 United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) 208
Section 10.12 United Nations Angola Verification Mission III

(UNAVEM III) 210
Section 10.13 Credibility Issues 213
Section 10.14 The Positive 1990s Missions 214
x
Lesson 11 The Situation of UN Peacekeeping Operations and

Future Prospects 217
Section 11.1 Reasons for the Retrenchment of Operations

in the Mid-1990s 218
Section 11.2 The Approach After Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia 220
Section 11.3 Limitations of the New Approach 220
Section 11.4 Prospects for the Future 221
Appendices
Appendix A: List of Acronyms 227
Appendix B: An Agenda for Peace 231
Appendix C: Past Peacekeeping Missions 232
Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions 233
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination 236
xi
Method of Study
This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The
following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies
and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:
• Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and
section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
• The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details,
strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
• Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson,
orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum
understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
• At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by
rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
• After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking
time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student
classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.
» Access your online classroom at

<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.
• Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher
on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent,
you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
• A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the
Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.
Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

• Access to all of your courses;
• A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
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supplements;
• The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed

course; and
• Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
xii
HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE COLD WAR: 1988 TO 1996
LESSON
The End of the Cold War and
1 the Resurgence of UN PKOs
The United Nations developed

the concept of peacekeeping
at the beginning of the Cold
War because the increasing
mistrust among the major
powers made the original
UN collective security and
peace enforcement system
unworkable.
UN Photo #405017 by Eskinder Debebe.
In this lesson » Lesson Objectives »
Section 1.1 The Concept of Peacekeeping • State the concept, purposes, and
principles of UN peacekeeping.
Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War
• Discuss the role and performance of
Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the
peacekeeping during the Cold War.
Cold War
• Describe the changes in peacekeeping
Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War
operations after the Cold War.
Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations

• Discuss five examples of post-Cold War
Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in peacekeeping operations.
Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
(UNIIMOG)
(UNAVEM)
Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central
America (ONUCA)
13
LESSON 1 | The End of the Cold War and the Resurgence of UN PKOs
A wide view of the Security Council meeting on peacekeeping operations. 6 April 2017. UN Photo #719497 by Eskinder Debebe.
Section 1.1 The Concept of

Peacekeeping
The United Nations developed the concept of
peacekeeping at the beginning of the Cold War because
the increasing mistrust among the major powers made
the original UN collective security and peace enforcement
system unworkable. The United Nations used peacekeeping
operations as a practical mechanism to contain potential or
actual armed conflicts, and to facilitate the settlement of
these conflicts by negotiation and other peaceful means,
despite the political constraints resulting from the Cold War.
Unlike the enforcement actions envisioned in Chapter VII
14
of the UN Charter, these operations are based on the principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.
The establishment of these operations requires the consent of the parties directly concerned: UN peacekeepers
must maintain complete impartiality and are not authorized to use force except in self-defence. While peacekeeping
operations must be authorized by the Security Council or, exceptionally, by the General Assembly, the Secretary-
General always directs their daily operations.
Section 1.2 The Role of Peacekeeping During the Cold War

Most of the Cold War years were characterized by intense rivalry between the two superpowers tempered by
the balance of nuclear terror. These two factors led to a sort of negative stability. Between the East and West blocs
in Europe, there was constant tension along the Iron Curtain, but no war. The rivalry between the two superpowers
was played out mainly in the Third World, where those superpowers often fuelled regional conflicts in their desire
to preserve or expand their spheres of influence. Here too, however, the two superpowers were careful to avoid a
direct military confrontation if their vital opposing interests were not involved. When a regional conflict threatened
to escalate and draw them into such a confrontation, they sought to contain it. Since 1948, they used the UN
peacekeeping mechanism for that purpose in the form of small-scale military observer missions, or, since 1956, in
that of larger peacekeeping forces. Though limited in scope, peacekeeping operations had a crucial impact on the
maintenance of international peace and security, and they provided an important stabilizing instrument in areas
where a power vacuum might have led to explosive confrontations between the superpowers. Ralph J. Bunche, Dag
Hammarskjöld, and Lester Pearson developed the concept of using military personnel on missions of conflict control
under the UN flag.
Section 1.3 The Performance of Peacekeeping During the Cold War

The performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations varied with the ebb and flow of the Cold War.
During the first 40 years of their history, from 1948 to 1988, only 13 such operations were formed. No peacekeeping
operations were established during the last ten years of that period, which was a time of intensification of the Cold
War marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration’s espousal of unilateralism in foreign
policy, and the military build-up of both superpowers. This period was also a time of increasing conflict in the Third
World.
This included the Iran-Iraq war, conflicts in Cambodia and in Central America, invasion and civil war in Lebanon,
the crisis in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, the impasse in Cyprus,
Cuban and South African interventions in Angola, and failure to move Namibia towards independence. With the
Security Council deadlocked most of the time, there was little opportunity for an effective United Nations role in
bringing those problems under control.
Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War

As the Soviet Union fought an increasingly debilitating war in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the Soviet economy
also faced the escalating costs of the arms race with the United States. Under this huge economic burden, the
stagnant economy faltered, and dissent began to grow within the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, the tension between
Washington and Moscow began to wane largely because of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika (restructuring)
and glasnost (openness), as well as his “new thinking in foreign affairs.” The relations between the two superpowers
gradually shifted from competition to cooperation, and the Cold War thawed and finally ended.
15
An outpost in the Gulf of Aqaba area, manned by members of the Yugoslav contingent of UNEF. 1 May 1959. UN
Photo #147104 by JG.
Reform attempts at home led to a weakening of control over Eastern Europe, which soon led to a breakup of
the Soviet Bloc, starting with Poland. During 1989 and 1990, the Berlin Wall came down, borders opened, and free
elections ousted Communist regimes everywhere in eastern Europe. In late 1991, the Soviet Union itself dissolved
into its component republics. The Cold War had ended abruptly after some 45 years.

These changes led to a resurgence of UN peacekeeping activities. Within the next two years, in 1988 and 1989,
five new peacekeeping operations were formed:
• United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
• United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
• United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)
• United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
• United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
Because UNTAG was one of the major peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN, it will be dealt with in
greater detail in Lesson 2. The other four operations are discussed in this lesson.
These five peacekeeping operations were all international. They were set up in pursuance of international
agreements involving mainly governments and with the strong support of the two superpowers, and they were all
successful.
16
Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and

Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
Background to UNGOMAP
Following a coup in Afghanistan, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. This troop deployment
was in response to a reported request from the Afghan Government for assistance against insurgent movements.
Initially, some 30,000 Soviet troops were engaged, but this very rapidly grew to more than 100,000 troops. The
Soviets soon became entangled in a guerrilla war with the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen). The mujahideen were
eventually backed by the US and its proxy, Pakistan. After a pointless, protracted and bloody war, the Soviet Union
was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.
The war left more than 1 million Afghani dead and some 5 million refugees in neighbouring countries. Some
15,000 Soviets were killed and another 37,000 wounded. Most of the country had been laid waste, and approximately
5 million landmines were covering some two per cent of the country.
The Security Council failed to produce a resolution in early 1980, just after the invasion. To end the deadlock,
the matter was referred to an emergency session of the General Assembly, which, by resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January
1980, strongly deplored the armed intervention and called for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of
the foreign troops from Afghanistan. Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative on
the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, visited the region in April and August 1981. His negotiations at the time led to
the Geneva Accords.
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, former Secretary-

General of the United Nations, was
appointed by the General Assembly to
a second five-year term, beginning on
January 1, 1987. 10 October 1986. UN
Photo #394990 by Yutaka Nagata.
The Geneva Accords
In January 1982, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar took up the post of Secretary-General, and he designated Mr. Diego
Cordovez as his Personal Representative. Beginning in June 1982 and over the next six years, Mr. Cordovez acted as
an intermediary in a series of indirect negotiations between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva.
The conclusion of the Geneva Accords came about once the Soviet Government decided to withdraw its forces
from Afghanistan. In February 1988, the Soviet Union announced that it would start repatriating its troops in May.
The last round of talks ended on 8 April 1988 when Under-Secretary-General Cordovez announced that all the
instruments comprising the settlement had been finalized and were open for signature.
17
The Accords, known formally as the “Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan,”
consisted of four instruments:1A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, particularly on non-interference and non-intervention.
1. Declaration on international guarantees, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America.
2. A bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees.
3. An agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by
Afghanistan and Pakistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Accords were signed by the four countries in Geneva on 14 April 1988. The Geneva Accords were also the
basis for the establishment of a UN mission to Afghanistan. Organized as the United Nations Good Offices Mission in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the Mission would monitor:
• Non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other’s affairs.
• The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
• The voluntary return of refugees.
UNGOMAP’s operations in the field would be directed by a senior military officer designated as Deputy to
the Representative.2 UNGOMAP would be organised into two small headquarters units in Kabul and the other in
Islamabad, which would each consist of five military officers and a small civilian component. There was also provision
for the deployment of up to 40 additional UN Military Observer (UNMO) officers organized into inspection teams,
which would all be temporarily redeployed from existing United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Establishment of UNGOMAP
On 31 October 1988, in resolution 622, the
Security Council called for the setup of UNGOMAP.3
Mr. Cordovez remained the Representative and
Finnish Major-General Rauli Helminen was appointed
as Deputy to the Representative. Finnish Colonel
Heikki Happonen later succeeded him in May 1989.
Fifty UNMOs were temporarily assigned from the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO), the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF), and the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On 25 April
1988, the first part of an advance party arrived in A Venezuelan soldier stands guard at the camp where the
Nicaraguan resistance surrenders their weapons to the United
the Mission area. The two headquarters (HQ) units
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) as part of
in Kabul and Islamabad were operational well in the overall peace process in Central America. 18 April 1990. UN
advance of 15 May, when the instruments entered Photo #181004 by Steen Johansen.
into force.
1) United Nations, UNMOGAP Background, 2002. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/ungomap/background.html>

2) United Nations, UNMOGAP Background, 2002.
3) UN Security Council, “Resolution 622 (1988)”, S/RES/622 (1988), 31 October 1988. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=S/RES/622(1988)>.
18
Soviet Withdrawal
Phase Time Frame Details
First By 15 August 1988 50 per cent of Soviets troops (50,183) withdrawn by land
and air. Most were mobile formations, spetsnaz (special
forces) troops and an airborne brigade. Also some fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters were withdrawn.
Second To begin on 15 After the August withdrawal an agreed to three-month

November 1988 pause occurred to facilitate the 2nd phase. This phase
was suspended in early November due to the rapidly
deteriorating security situation.
Third 1-15 February 1989 Final Soviet withdrawal UNGOMAP confirms withdrawal
on 15 Feb 1989.
Monitoring the Soviet Withdrawal
UNGOMAP established three permanent outposts (each manned by two UNMOs) to monitor the Soviet withdrawal.
Two posts were on the Afghan side of the Soviet-Afghan border at Hairatan and Torghundi, while the third was
located at the Shindand airbase, which was used for withdrawal by air. UNGOMAP personnel also checked Soviet
garrisons in Afghanistan during or immediately after the departure of Soviet forces. Where security was an issue for
the UNMOs, head counts of departing Soviet troops were done at airheads at Kabul, Kunduz, and Shindand or the
border-crossing points. The Soviet withdrawal occurred in three phases:
After the completion of the withdrawal, UNGOMAP closed its three outposts at Hairatan and Torghundi and the
Shindand airbase.
UNGOMAP’s Monitoring Role
During the Soviet withdrawal, UNGOMAP received numerous complaints from both Afghanistan and Pakistan of
alleged first-instrument violations, on non-interference and non-intervention.
UNGOMAP made every effort to investigate the complaints. However, some difficulties hampered the effectiveness
of UNGOMAP’s inspection teams. These included the rough nature of the terrain, the time which lapsed before many
of the alleged incidents were reported, and the security conditions prevailing in the area of operation.4
Afghani Complaints:
• Allegations of political activities and propaganda hostile to the Government of Afghanistan taking place in
Pakistan;
• Border crossings of men and materiel from Pakistan to Afghanistan;
• Cross-border firings, acts of sabotage;
• Rocket attacks on major urban centres;
• Violations of Afghan airspace by Pakistan aircraft;
4) United Nations, UNMOGAP Background, 2002.
19
• Continued presence in Pakistan of training camps and arms depots for Afghan opposition groups;
• Direct involvement by Pakistan military personnel inside Afghanistan; and
• Restrictions placed on refugees who wished to return to Afghanistan.
Pakistan Complaints:
• Allegations of political activities and propaganda hostile to the Government of Pakistan;
• Bombings and violations of its airspace by Afghan aircraft; and
• Acts of sabotage and cross-border firings, including the use of SCUD missiles against Pakistan territory.
To investigate the violation claims, UNGOMAP established two outposts (one in Peshawar and one in Quetta)
on the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistani border in November 1988. UNGOMAP set up permanent presences
at Torkham, Teri Mangal, and Chaman in April 1989, to further strengthen its presence on the Pakistan side of the
border.
Termination of UNGOMAP
On January 11 1990, after consultations with the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution
647, which extended the UNGOMAP mandate for two months.5 However, in March the Secretary-General was unable
to obtain consensus for a further extension of UNGOMAP. Thus, the mission formally ended on 15 March 1990.
However, due to the continued problems in Afghanistan, the Secretary-General redeployed 10 UNMOs as military
advisers to his Personal Representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist in the further implementation of his
responsibilities under the Assembly’s resolution.

(UNIIMOG)
Background to UNIIMOG
During the Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980-20 August 1988), the UN tried to seek an end to the war. These
efforts were of limited effect, but in 1984 the first resident United Nations presence in the area was established with
the deployment of inspection teams to investigate alleged attacks on civilian areas. This became known as the truce
in the “war of the cities” and lasted nine months.6
By the end of June 1984, two teams were installed in Baghdad and Tehran. The teams consisted of three UNMOs
seconded from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and one senior
official of the United Nations Secretariat. Their presence in the capitals four years later helped to expedite the
establishment of UNIIMOG.
In January 1987, the Secretary-General undertook a new diplomatic initiative to settle the conflict. The readiness
by the five Permanent Members to work together to seek an end to this long-standing conflict was a major factor in
coming to a resolution. On 20 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 598 (1987), which included the basis for
the ceasefire that came into effect one year later.7
5) UN Security Council, “Resolution 647 (1990), S/RES/647 (1990), 11 January 1990. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
6) United Nations, “Iraq-Iran UNIIMOG Background”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/uniimogbackgr.html>.
7) UN Security Council, “Resolution 598 (1987)”, R/RES598 (1987), 20 July 1987. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
20
The sheer brutality of the war included the
use of chemical weapons by Iraq, missile attacks
on cities, and mass assaults against prepared
position-tactics that harkened the trench warfare
of the First World War. After the war, the UN
condemned Iraq for using chemical weapons. By
1987, it had become obvious that both sides had
fought to a stalemate, and both Governments were
willing to negotiate peace. In September 1987, the
Secretary-General began an intensive round of
negotiations, which continued into the spring of
1988. The war continued unabated until 17 July
1988, when Iran accepted resolution 598 (1987);
Iraq then followed suit the next day. Resolution 598
(1987) not only addressed the need for ceasefire
verification and supervision, but it also addressed
the need for mediation between Iraq and Iran.

The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Jan
Eliasson (Sweden) as his Personal Representative
on Issues Pertaining to the Implementation of

Key conflict area of the Iraq-Iran war. Credit: Chumwa, distributed
Security Council resolution 598 (1987) to meet the
under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license. 17 November 2015.
mediation objectives.
Once it was clear a ceasefire was to be implemented, the Secretary-General sent a technical mission to Iran
and Iraq from 25 July to 2 August to work out the modalities for the dispatch of the United Nations observer
group. Lieutenant-General Martin Vadset (Norway), Chief of Staff of UNTSO, led the mission, which included a senior
political adviser, a civilian logistics expert, and four UNMOs from UNTSO. It was assisted by the small teams that had
been stationed in Baghdad and Tehran since 1984.
Casualty figures are, at best, speculative, and estimates indicate at least half a million war and war-related
casualties; it is possible that this number is as high as two million people. Many more were wounded, and millions
were made refugees.
The Iraqi casualties (killed and wounded) are estimated at 375,000, plus some 60,000 taken as prisoners of war
(POWs). Iranian casualties (killed and wounded) are at least 300,000 with another 500,000 or more wounded. Both
economies were in ruins, and many cities had been destroyed.
Mandate and Terms of Reference of UNIIMOG
As outlined on the UN UNIIMOG database, “UNIIMOG’s mandate, in accordance with resolution 598, was “to
verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal.” Its terms of reference were set out in the Secretary-
General’s report of 7 August, as follows:
• To establish with the parties agreed on ceasefire lines based on the localities occupied by the two sides
on D-Day, but adjusting these, as may be agreed, when the positions of the two sides were judged to be
dangerously close to each other.
21
• To monitor compliance with the ceasefire.
• To investigate any alleged violations of the ceasefire and restore the situation if a violation took place.
• To prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending withdrawal of all forces to the
internationally recognized boundaries.
• To supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.
• To monitor the ceasefire on the internationally recognized boundaries, investigate alleged violations and
prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending negotiation of a comprehensive
settlement.
• To obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, pending negotiation of a comprehensive
settlement, could help to reduce tension and build confidence between them, such as: the establishment
of areas of separation of forces on either side of the international border; limitations on the number and
calibre of weapons to be deployed in areas close to the international border; and patrolling by United
Nations naval personnel of certain sensitive areas in or near the Shatt al-Arab.”8
Four essential conditions were necessary for UNIIMOG to be effective:
1. The full confidence and backing of the Security Council.
2. The full cooperation of Iraq and Iran.
3. The ability to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.
4. Sufficient financial arrangements to cover its costs.
Number and Country Details

Role
350 UNMOs Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zambia
Air unit New Zealand One Andover, two flying crews, and maintenance
detachment of 17 personnel based in Tehran
personnel
177 Military Police Ireland
Medical orderlies Austria
581 Signals Canada the composite 88 Signals Regt was sent pending the
establishment of a civilian-operated communications
system; operated in both Iran and Iraq
Establishment of UNIIMOG
On 9 August 1988, the Security Council established UNIIMOG for six months with resolution 619 (1988). Major-
General Slavko Jovic (Yugoslavia) served as Chief Military Observer until November 1990, when Brigadier-General
S. Anam Khan (Bangladesh) took command of UNIIMOG. The peak strength of UNIIMOG was 400 all ranks and a
civilian staff.
The first part of the Observer Group arrived in Iran and Iraq on 10 August 1988, consisting of 12 UNMOs,
team leaders, and a civilian component. These teams liaised with Iranian and Iraqi authorities while conducting
reconnaissance of the areas that UNIIMOG was to be deployed.
8) United Nations, “Iraq-Iran UNIIMOG Background”.
22
Brig. General Patil (left, India), Officer-in-Command of UNIIMOG operations in Iraq, being briefed
by UNIIMOG officers at their Sector Headquarters in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. 20 August 1988. UN
Photo #84998.
Deployment of UNIIMOG
By 20 August 1988, the day the ceasefire came into effect, 307 UNMOs and most of the signals squadron from
Canada were already in Iran and Iraq. On the first day, 51 patrols deployed to establish forward positions and resolve
issues that came from breaches of the ceasefire. The two UNIIMOG headquarters were located in Baghdad and
Tehran.
On the Iranian side, UNMOs were deployed in four sectors (sector headquarters at Saqqez, Bakhtaran,
Dezful, and Ahwaz); on the Iraqi side, UNMOs were deployed in three sector headquarters (sector headquarters
at Sulaymaniyah, Ba’qubah, and Basra). Team sites under sector control were located close to the ceasefire line to
minimize additional travel time. The length of the ceasefire line monitered by UNMOs at a team site varied from 70
kilometres to 250 kilometres.
UNIIMOG used three fixed-wing aircraft for communications, observation, and transportation. UNIIMOG was
anticipated to pilot a unit of United Nations helicopters for observation of the ceasefire lines and no-mans land, but
as one of the countries would not agree to that plan, observers could only fly helicopters provided to the mission by
the countries, and could not fly over the ceasefire line.
UNIIMOG Operations
As the 1,400 kilometre ceasefire lines covered a vast and diverse landscape, UNIIMOG had to adapt its patrolling
methods. From boat patrols in the southern marshes to riding mule-back through the northern mountains, UNIIMOG
adapted its observation methods to meet the challenges presented by the terrain. Patrols operated 24/7, with a daily
average of 64 patrols.
The main objective of UNIIMOG patrols was to verify compliance with the ceasefire by observing areas near
the lines and verifying complaints received by the other side. Complaints were transmitted to UNMOs on the other
side of the line to negotiate an immediate settlement. UNMOs also worked in humanitarian efforts and trust-building
measures between the two nations, such as the exchange of war dead found on the battlefield.
23
UNIIMOG Organization
Source: Ram Military Consulting
The principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations guided the agreements surrounding UNIIMOG, as did the precedent set by previous peace operations.
To coordinate cooperation with the mission, both Iraq and Iran established inter-departmental groups, provided
liaison officers, and offered logistic facilities.
While there were many violations at the outset of the ceasefire, the number of complaints steadily decreased
as the situation stabilized. Some of the more serious complaints included exchange of fire, troop movements,
reinforcement of positions by mining, wiring, or improvement of bunkers, and the establishment of new forward
positions. Despite these serious complaints, most violations recorded were minor.
Strength Reductions and Changes in UNIIMOG’s Mandate
In August 1990, Iraq invaded and subsequently occupied Kuwait, worsening the situation in the region and
complicating the tasks of UNIIMOG. Despite the upheaval, the Iran-Iraq border remained relatively calm and
UNIIMOG was able to continue its mandated work. Although some forces remained on the wrong side of the borders,
by the end of September 1990 the withdrawal of of all forces across internationally recognized boundaries was
almost complete.
24
To reach a complete withdrawal, the Secretary-General recommeneded that the Security Council extend
UNIIMOG’s mandate for two months instead of six, as it had done three times previously. This smaller extension
would allow UNIIMOG to verify complete troop withdrawal and evaluate the situation to determine if there was a
further need for ceasefire verification and enforcement. During that period, UNIIMOG would concentrate on the
following tasks:
• Verify, confirm, and supervise the remaining stages of the withdrawal;
• Help the parties resolve any local tensions that might arise because of differences about the exact line of the
border, forward moves, accidental firings, etc.; and
• Assist the parties in establishing an area of separation - an area on either side of the border into which each
party would agree not to deploy military forces. It was judged that only 60 per cent of UNIIMOG’s existing
strength would be required to perform these tasks.
In agreement with the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the Security Council adopted resolution 671 (1990)
on 27 September 1990. This resolution extended UNOMIIG’s mandate while reducing its personnel strength to 230,
including 184 UNMOs. Observers redeployed in three sectors in Iran, with headquarters at Saqqez, Bakhtaran, and
Dezful, and three sectors in Iraq, with headquarters at at Sulaymaniyah, Mansuriyah, and Basra.
Violations of the ceasefire and difficulties with withdrawal continued to occur throughout October and November.
Withdrawal efforts were further complicated by the presence of unmarked minefields, especially on the Iranian side
of the border. The mandate was extended for two months by Security Council resolution 676 (1990) to meet the
challenges posed by resistance from Iran.
UNIIMOG continued its mandated tasks of addressing issues with the border, arranging exchanges of unmarked
minefield information, assisting in the negotiation and implementation of an area of separation, and arranging
limitations on armaments. Further UNIIMOG force reductions resulted in further reorganization and redeployment.
Separation Agreements
In January 1991, the two parties agreed to convene a technical meeting of military experts to discuss and resolve
the questions relating to UNIIMOG’s mandate that were still outstanding. The agreement was reached bilaterally,
and the meeting itself was organized outside the framework of the Mixed Military Working Group that UNIIMOG had
previously been trying to establish. The Acting Chief Military Observer of UNIIMOG attended the meeting. The two
sides also reached agreements on the question of disputed positions along the internationally recognized boundaries,
an area of separation along those boundaries, and the exchange of information on minefields. These agreements
were fully consistent with UNIIMOG’s mandate, and they provided for UNIIMOG to monitor their implementation
within a specified time frame.
The disputed positions were all to be removed by 22 January 1991, and UNIIMOG was then to verify and
confirm the completion of the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized border described in the 1975
Treaty concerning the state frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq. The agreements on an area of
separation provided for a one- kilometre withdrawal on both sides along the entire length of the recognized borders.
Its establishment was to take place between 10 and 27 January, with UNIIMOG helping in the implementation.
Due to the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf region in mid-January, however, the implementation of the
agreements did not proceed fully according to the schedule. By the end of January, Iran had withdrawn 13 out of 17
disputed positions, and Iraq had withdrawn 23 out of 29 such positions. There was little progress made regarding
mine clearance and an area of separation.
25
The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was set up by the Security Council on
9 August to "verify, confirm and supervise" the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to the
internationally recognized boundaries. Iraqi soldier in Kirkük, Iraq. 20 August 1988. UN Photo #181115
by John Isaac.
Security in Iraq Worsens
UNIIMOG’s capacity to fulfil the role assigned to it was seriously affected after the adoption of Security Council
resolution 678 (1990) on 29 November, authorizing the use of all necessary means by a multinational coalition if
Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. UNIIMOG undertook detailed planning to ensure the security
of its personnel without compromising operational efficiency. With the deterioration of the situation in the second
week of January 1991, it was decided to thin out both military and civilian staff in Baghdad. Following the Secretary-
General’s visit to Baghdad on 12-13 January, a decision was taken to relocate UNIIMOG personnel temporarily from
Baghdad to the sectors closer to the border. The command group moved to Tehran on 14 January. After the outbreak
of hostilities on 16 January 1991, all remaining UNIIMOG staff in Iraq were also moved either to Cyprus or Iran.
Despite the security issues, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that the mandate of
UNIIMOG, set to expire at the end of January 1991, be extended for another month so that the Group “may fulfil
completely its important responsibilities.” On 31 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 685
(1991), extending the mandate to 28 February.
Completion of UNIIMOG’s Mandate
In the following month, because of the continuing hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, UNIIMOG continued to
operate only in the Iranian part of its area but maintained regular contact with the Iraqi authorities through meeting
on the border. At the beginning of February, some 20 military observers from the Iraqi side whose tours of duty were
due to expire returned home. The rest of the observers from Iraq temporarily relocated to Cyprus to await a possible
return to Iraq when circumstances permitted.
On 20 February 1991, the Group reported that the last of the disputed positions along the internationally
recognized boundaries had been withdrawn. UNIIMOG, thus, completed verification and confirmation of the
withdrawal of all forces in accordance with resolution 598 (1987).
26
The Secretary-General recommended replacing UNIIMOG with small civilian offices in Baghdad and Tehran.
Accordingly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council take no action to extend the mandate of UNIIMOG.
After the Council had informed the Secretary-General of its concurrence with the proposed arrangements, UNIIMOG
completed its mandate on 28 February 1991. At the time of withdrawal, UNIIMOG was comprised of 96 military
observers. The Group also included 16 military police and a small medical unit.
Civilian Offices
The civilian offices were established in February 1991. A few military officers attached to them allowed the UN
to continue to respond promptly to requests by either Government to investigate and help resolve matters for which
military expertise was required. The offices were also important in the Secretary-General’s efforts to complete the
implementation of resolution 598 (1987).
In December 1991, the Secretary-General commented on the responsibility for the conflict, which was referred
to in resolution 598 (1987). He added, however, that no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matter
further. Rather, in the interest of peace, he suggested it would be imperative to move on with the settlement process.
By the end of 1992, the offices in Baghdad and Tehran were phased out, and the Permanent Missions of Iran and
Iraq became the channels of communication between those countries and the United Nations for matters related to
resolution 598 (1987).
Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)
Background to UNAVEM I
At the time Angola emerged in 1975 from its status as a Portuguese colony, the guerrilla war for independence
had gone on for almost 15 years. In January 1975, the Portuguese Government sought to establish a programme
for transition to independence in talks at Alvor, Portugal, with three separate Angolan liberation movements: the
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).
The agreement forged at Alvor soon fell apart, and the three groups fought one another with support from a
variety of international sources, including Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. South Africa
sent troops to Angola to oppose the MPLA, which was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The MPLA emerged as
the strongest of the three groups and, on 11 November 1975, established the People’s Republic of Angola. FNLA’s
military importance subsequently dwindled, but UNITA continued to field troops, particularly in the countryside.
The Soviet Union and Cuba maintained their support for MPLA, while UNITA received backing from South Africa
and the United States.
The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), later known as UNAVEM I, came about in a
climate of declining Cold War rivalries as one aspect of intricate international negotiations on political arrangements
throughout the region. With the potential withdrawal of foreign forces, the international community saw a chance to
end the long-standing conflict that had been tearing Angola apart since independence. Both the UN and the US had
been trying to resolve the Angolan conflict since 1987, which included a UN technical mission composed of civilian
officials and three UNMOs from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
27
Establishment of UNAVEM
The establishment of UNAVEM I in December 1988 resulted from a complex international diplomatic process
that culminated in agreements on both the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978, leading to the
independence of Namibia) and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (see Lesson 2).
On 17 December, before, but contingent upon, the signature of the agreements for the independence of Namibia
and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, Cuba and Angola requested that the Secretary-General recommend
to the Security Council the establishment of a UN military observer group. Its task would be to verify compliance
with the bilateral agreement, in accordance with the arrangements which had already been made between the two
countries and the Secretariat. On 20 December, the Security Council approved resolution 626 (1988) to establish
UNAVEM for 31 months, one month after the planned completion of Cuban troop withdrawal on 1 July 1991. The
necessary arrangements came into effect on 22 December when the tripartite and bilateral agreements between
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa were signed. Shortly after, the Security Council established the UNTAG in Namibia.
On 22 December 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an agreement aimed at bringing peace to south-
western Africa. The agreement provided for the implementation of a United Nations plan, which included:
• The independence of Namibia;
• The withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola; and
• The agreement that the territories would not be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence of any State
of south-west Africa.
Discharge of mines in Huambo, Angola. 7 May 1996. UN Photo #31508 by John Charles Monua.
28
On 22 June 1989, in the presence of 18 African heads of state, the President of the MPLA, Jose Edwardo
Dos Santos, and the President of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, agreed to negotiate a peaceful solution to the 14-year
Angolan civil war. The President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, mediated the agreement, known as the “Gbadolite
Declaration.” The agreement called for a general ceasefire effective 24 June 1989, as well as the establishment of
a commission comprised of UNITA and the MPLA, under the mediation of Zaire, for the negotiation of peace and
national reconciliation in Angola. The accord failed, and the civil war continued as the Cubans began to pull out.
Composition of UNAVEM I
UNAVEM I became operational on 3 January 1989, when an advance party of 18 UNMOs arrived in Luanda to
verify the departure on 10 January of the first 450 Cuban soldiers. After that, the strength of UNAVEM I rose to 70
UNMOs. The UNMOs came from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and
Yugoslavia. The Chief Military Observer (CMO), Brazilian Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, commanded the
UN Military Observers.
Role of UNAVEM I
UNAVEM I was mandated by the Security Council to monitor the phased withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
UNMO teams verified and recorded all movements of Cuban military personnel and equipment into and out of Angola,
in particular in the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda and Namibe, and Luanda airport. A Joint Commission composed
of the CMO as chairman and two senior officers from Angola and Cuba was made responsible for the coordination of
UN verification process and was to address any issues that arose. UNAVEM I’s mobile teams also confirmed Cuban
redeployment, in accordance with the agreed plan, northwards from all locations south of the adjusted 13th parallel.
After the completion of this redeployment from the southern part of Angola, the observer strength was reduced to
60.
There was a short suspension of the withdrawal between 24 January to 25 February 1990 after two UNITA
attacks killed 10 Cuban soldiers. In general, the provisions of the Angolan-Cuban agreement were scrupulously
complied with, and the withdrawal proceeded at a rate slightly ahead of the projected figures. On 22 May 1991,
the Secretary-General was notified of the decision taken by the Governments of Angola and Cuba to complete the
withdrawal more than one month before the scheduled date. On 25 May, UNAVEM I witnessed the ceremony to mark
the completion of the withdrawal from Angola of all Cuban troops and military equipment.
The Rio Dange Bridge Inauguration

in Huambo, Angola. The bridge was
constructed by a UNAVEM engineering
corps from the Republic of Korea. It was
one of eight such bridges renovated after
civil conflict damaged them. This bridge
separates roads to Uige and Luanda. 7
December 1996. UN Photo #73485 by
John Charles.
29
Withdrawal of UNAVEM I
UNAVEM I withdrew on 31 May. On 6 June 1991, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that
UNAVEM had carried out its mandate fully and effectively. He thanked the Governments of Angola and Cuba for
their decision to complete the withdrawal ahead of schedule, thus allowing UNAVEM to concentrate its resources on
the new tasks assigned by the Security Council in resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991. The Secretary-General
observed that the “success of UNAVEM again demonstrates what can be achieved by a United Nations peacekeeping
operation when it receives the full co-operation of the parties concerned.”
UNAVEM I Organization
Source: Ram Military Consulting
30
UNAVEM was not created to enforce the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accord, but its creation allowed for
the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, thus allowing for the execution of the settlement that led to Namibia’s
independence.
Cuban Withdrawal Plan
Date No. of Troops Notes
1 Apr 1989 3,000 Over the next 27 months, the balance of troops would be
moved north-ward first to the “adjusted” 15th parallel*
and then to the “adjusted” 13th parallel*
1 Nov 1989 22,000 50 per cent withdrawal

1 Apr 1990 8,000 66 per cent withdrawal
1 Oct 1990 5,000 76 per cent withdrawal
1 Nov 1990 - 12,000 100 per cent withdrawal
1 Jul 1991
*points measured from the actual parallel
Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America

(ONUCA)
Background to ONUCA
In one of its most complex and successful interventions, the UN became directly involved in peacekeeping and
peace-making efforts in Central America in 1989. The Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua requested its assistance in the implementation of their collective agreement, the “Procedure for the
Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America,” known both as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the
Guatemala Procedure. The Esquipulas II Agreement dealt with issues of:
• National reconciliation;
• An end to hostilities;
• Democratization;
• Free elections;
• Termination of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements;
• Non-use of the territory of one State to attack other States;
• Negotiations on security, verification, and the control and limitation of weapons;
• Refugees and displaced persons;
• Cooperation, democracy, and freedom for peace and development;
• International verification and follow-up; and
• A timetable for the fulfilment of commitments.
31
A complex and difficult process of negotiations, beginning in 1983, reversed the disrupting cycle of turmoil which
had engulfed Central America for many years. At its various stages, the process involved countries from inside and
outside the region, as well as the opposing parties within several of the Central American countries. These initiatives
were actively supported and facilitated by the UN. As a result of the negotiations and the agreements reached, the
UN was requested to establish mechanisms for observing and verifying commitments. These included: the United
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA, a Spanish acronym for Observadores de las Naciones Unidas
en Centroamerica); the United Nations Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN);
the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV); the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
(ONUSAL); the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL); and the United Nations Mission for the Verification
of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
Establishment of ONUCA
In a report to the Security Council dated 11 October 1989, the Secretary-General set out the guidelines for the
mandate of ONUCA. With Security Council resolution 644 (1989), ONUCA was officially established on 7 November
1989 to verify compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement by the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.9 The main goals were to halt aid to insurrectionist movments and irregular
forces and to prevent the use of territories to launch attacks on other States; the latter goal included preventing the
establishment or use of radio and television broadcasting stations for the purposes of advising or aiding the irregular
forces or insurrectionist movements.
As the terrain in the region was not conducive to stationary outposts, ONUCA observers were organized into
mobile teams of seven to ten. They would patrol using cross-country road vehicles, helicopters, patrol boats, and
light speedboats. A small aircraft would transport the Chief Milirtary Observer (CMO) and his senior staff between
the countries and would also rotate the UNMOs between duty stations. The CMO would excerise field command, and
Member States would provide 260 UNMOs.
Operations
On 3 December 1989, an advance party established
ONUCA headquarters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The team

went on to establish liaison offices in the capitals of each
of the five nations and make preparations for verification
centres;however, because of the security conditions in the
area, the El Salvador liaison office in San Salvador could
not be established until 17 January 1990. By 5 June 1990,
ONUCA reached its full strength with five liason offices,
14 verification centres, and three operational posts. Four
additional patrol boats joined the mission in June 1990
operating from a naval verification centre in San Lorenzo,
Honduras.
United Nations Observer Group in Central America
(ONUCA) Military Observers (in blue berets) briefing the
ONUCA’s operational area was mostly rugged terrain
resistance forces during a demobilization ceremony. 16
with dense forests and had limited road access. To overcome April 1990. UN Photo #160267 by Steen Johansen.
the obstacles presented by the landscape, UNMOs patrolled
9) UN Security Council, “Resolution 644 (1989)”, S/RES/644/1989), 7 November 1989. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
32
ONUCA helicopters carrying the UN Commander and his officers arrive in Yamales to oversee the demobilization
ceremony of the Nicaraguan resistance forces as part of the overall peace process in Central America. 18 April 1990.
UN Photo #180604 by Steen Johansen.
the area from verification centres and smaller forward observational posts. They conducted daily patrols by land,
air, and river; helicopters were crucial not only in patrolling and observation efforts, but also in the transportation
of observers and supplies. Observation by ONUCA teams focused on areas with reports of irregular forces and
insurrection movements that violated the Esquipulas II Agreement, especially near the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border,
the Honduras-Nicaragua border, the Honduras-El Salvador border, the Guatemala-El Salvador border, the north-
eastern region of Nicaragua, and the south-western region of Honduras. Complaints registered with ONUCA were
communicated to the government complained against, and an investigation looked into the complaint and reported
its findings to both governents involved.
First Expansion of the Mandate
On 12 December 1989, the five Central American presidents requested the expanision of ONUCA’s mandate in
their “Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado,” expressing a desire for verification and demobilization of irregular
forces.
In March 1990, shortly after the elections in Nicaragua, the Secretary-General reported that the Nicaraguan
government, the government-elect, and the United Nations had agreed on the demobilization of the Nicaraguan
Resistance. Members of the resistance in Honduras were to be demobilized at their current camps and repatriated,
while those still in Nicaragua would demobilize at temporary ONUCA assembly points. ONUCA would be responsible
for the weapons, military equipment, and uniforms of the former resistance. As armed personnel would be required
for security, the Secretary-General requested that the Security Council expand ONUCA’s mandate to include these
tasks and deploy armed personnel to the mission on a contingency basis. The Security Council approved the report
with Security Council resolution 650 (1990) on 27 March 1990.10
10) UN Security Council, “Resolution 650 (1990)”, S/RES/650 (1990), 27 March 1990. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
33
On 23 April 1990, all five Central American presidents agreed with the Secretary-General that the weapons and
military equipment collected during demobilization should be destroyed by ONUCA.
Second Expansion of the Mandate
Before the transfer of political power in Nicaragua on 25 April 1990, intensive negotiations took place between
the Nicaraguan Government, representatives of the President-elect, and representatives of the Northern, Central,
and Atlantic Fronts of the Nicaraguan Resistance (with the participation of the Archbishop of Managua, Cardinal
Obando y Bravo). The CMO of ONUCA and Mr. Iqbal Riza, the Secretary-General’s Alternate Personal Representative
for the Central American peace process, also took part.
On the night of 18-19 April, the Nicaraguan parties signed a complex of agreements relating to the voluntary
demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Nicaragua during the period from 25 April to 10
June 1990. A ceasefire would come into effect at noon (local time) on 19 April, and a separation of forces would
take place because of the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government’s forces from certain “security zones,” which
were to be established in Nicaragua and in which the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance would concentrate for
demobilization. ONUCA was asked to monitor both the ceasefire and the separation of forces.
Based on these agreements, the Secretary-General sought the Security Council’s approval of a further expansion
of ONUCA’s mandate to cover these functions. That approval was granted by resolution 653 (1990) of 20 April 1990.
By resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of ONUCA, as defined
in resolutions 644 (1989), 650 (1990), and 653 (1990), for a further period of six months, on the understanding
that the additional tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces and demobilizing the members of the
Nicaraguan Resistance would lapse no later than 10 June 1990.
ONUCA Organization
Source: Ram Military Consulting 2005
34
Progress of Demobilization
Five “security zones” were established on 22 April following the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government’s
forces from the areas in question during the preceding three days. Within each zone, ONUCA personnel—both
UNMOs and armed members of the Venezuelan battalion—were deployed in a “demobilization and logistics support
area” where the hand-over of weapons and other activities connected with the demobilization of the members of
the Nicaraguan Resistance took place. Each zone was 500-600 square kilometres in area and was surrounded by
a demilitarized zone of some 20 kilometres in width. Two additional zones were subsequently established on the
Atlantic Coast for the demobilization of the members of the “Yatama” front. These zones covered a total of 2,550
square kilometres.
ONUCA had made all necessary arrangements in coordination with leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance.
However, for demobilization to begin on 25 April at El Amparo in Zone 1, the members of the Resistance who had
assembled there declined to lay down their weapons (after their commander told them that the minimum conditions
for demobilization had not been met). In the ensuing days, only a few members of the Resistance demobilized.
In the province of El Paraiso, a display of

weapons surrendered to the soldiers of the
United Nations Observer Group in Central
America (ONUCA) by the Nicaraguan
resistance forces as part of the overall peace
process in Central America. 16 April 1990.
UN Photo #163435 by Steen Johansen.
On 4 May 1990, after further consultations, the Nicaraguan Government and the leadership of the Nicaraguan
Resistance issued the “Managua Declaration,” in which, the Nicaraguan Resistance declared that it would continue
its voluntary demobilization and that the process would be completed in all of the “security zones” by 10 June at
the latest. Demobilization began on 8 May. However, during the next two weeks, only small numbers came forward
for demobilization, and it soon became clear that the pace was insufficient to ensure completion by 10 June. The
leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance complained of breaches by the Nicaraguan Army of the agreements relating to
the ceasefire and separation of forces. On 22-23 May 1990, the Security Council met to discuss this grave situation,
and on 23 May the President of the Security Council made a statement expressing the Security Council’s concern at
the slow pace of demobilization.
ONUCA, meanwhile, investigated complaints from both sides relating, on the one hand, to the presence of
armed civilians and militia personnel in the “security zones” and demilitarized zones, and, on the other, to the
presence outside the “security zones” of armed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (some of whom had allegedly
committed various criminal acts). However, it remained the Secretary-General’s assessment that there had been no
serious violations of the ceasefire. This serious situation was resolved on 30 May when a meeting between President
Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua, the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance, and the Archbishop of Managua resulted
in an agreement entitled the “Managua Protocol.” Under its terms, the Nicaraguan Government responded to several
of the Resistance’s publicly-stated concerns, notably through the establishment of “development areas” in which
35
A view of the camp at Yamales where ONUCA (the United Nations Observer Group
in Central America ) soldiers demobilized the Nicaraguan resistance forces. 18
April 1990. UN Photo #160268 by Steen Johansen.
demobilized members of the Resistance would be resettled. The Resistance reaffirmed its commitment to demobilize
by 10 June 1990 at the latest and, to this end, undertook that at least 100 combatants would be demobilized each
day in each of the “security zones.”
Completion of Demobilization
After 30 May, demobilization generally proceeded rapidly. On 8 June, the Secretary-General reported to the
Security Council that there had been a marked increase in the rate at which the members of the “Northern Front”
and “Central Front” were demobilizing. However, demobilization of the “Atlantic Front,” which had begun on 21 May,
was proceeding at a less satisfactory pace than that of the main group, largely because of logistic difficulties in
concentrating the members at demobilization areas in the large security zones concerned.
Considering the progress of the demobilization, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council
extend the relevant part of ONUCA’s mandate for a brief and clearly defined period. By resolution 656 (1990) of 8
June 1990, the Council accordingly decided that ONUCA’s tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces
in Nicaragua and demobilizing the Resistance should be extended, on the understanding, as recommended by the
Secretary-General, that these tasks would lapse with the completion of the demobilization process not later than 29
June 1990. During the following three weeks, demobilization proceeded in all zones. The process reached a peak
on 10 June, when 1,886 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized. On 18 June, an eighth “security zone”
became operational to facilitate the demobilization of members of the “Southern Front.”
On 29 June 1990, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that at 1900 hours (local time) on 28
June 1990, demobilization of all armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been completed
at all locations, except for one in Nicaragua where a handful of members remained to be demobilized. This was
soon accomplished, and the final zone was closed on 5 July 1990. By the time the process was completed, a total of
19,614 armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been demobilized in Nicaragua and 2,759 in
Honduras. Weapons handed over to ONUCA by members of the Nicaraguan Resistance included 15,144 small arms
(including AK-47s, other assault rifles, and light machine-guns), as well as heavy machine-guns, mortars, grenade
launchers, grenades, mines, and missiles.
36
Completing the Original Mandate
The early part of the mandate period, which was dominated by ONUCA’s role in the demobilization of the
members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, was ending. The Secretary-General reported that ONUCA UNMOs in the five
countries had then reverted to their original mandate, which required the patrolling of areas where violations of the
Esquipulas II security undertakings seemed most likely to occur. ONUCA maintained a regular and visible presence in
those areas. ONUCA’s role was verification; it did not have the authority or the capacity to prevent by physical means
either the movement of armed persons or war-like material across borders or other violations of the undertakings
nor was it staffed or equipped for the detection of clandestine activities.
Responding to a request from the five Central American Governments, the Secretary-General recommended
to the Security Council on 26 October 1990 that ONUCA should continue its operations for a further period of six
months, until 7 May 1991. He also recommended a reduction of ONUCA’s strength, which as of October was 254
UNMOs. Liaison offices and verification centres in each of the five capitals would be merged to form in each case an
Observer Group HQ, and the number of verification centres would also be reduced. The Security Council approved
the Secretary-General’s report in its resolution 675 (1990) of 5 November 1990. Security Council resolution 691
(1991) of 6 May 1991 extended ONUCA’s mandate to 7 November 1991. ONUCA’s strength in April 1991 stood at
158 UNMOs.
On 28 October 1991, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the situation in the region
had continued to improve and that the five governments were making efforts to arrive at new collective security
arrangements for the region. The five countries also continued their efforts to honour their commitments under the
Esquipulas II Agreement. Although violations continued to occur, they were increasingly linked to criminal activity for
monetary rather than political motives. At the same time, there was no evidence to indicate that the irregular armed
groups that had re-emerged in Nicaragua were being helped from abroad. Regarding the conflict in El Salvador,
ONUCA had confirmed that neighbouring countries had adopted measures, with varying degrees of vigour, to prevent
activities from their territories that would violate the agreement. However, considering the large quantities of
weapons in private hands or hidden away, considerable potential for breaches of the Agreement continued.
United Nations soldiers are cutting up guns using an oxy-acetylene torch. The guns are being surrendered
to the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) by the resistance forces as part of the
overall peace process in Central America. 16 April 1990. UN Photo #85970 by Steen Johansen
37
Due to the “fluid and dynamic situation,” the Security Council extended ONUCA’s mandate to 30 April 1992
on the recommendation of the Secretary-General in resolution 719 (1991) of 6 November 1991. At that time, the
number of military observers stood at 132.
In the meantime, there were major developments relating to the settlement of the armed conflict in El Salvador,
including additional verification tasks assigned to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The
new Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, informed the Council of these tasks on 10 January 1992. He then
stated his intention to meet as many of the personnel requirements as possible by transferring ONUCA officers to
ONUSAL’s Military Division. Aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment were similarly transferred. He had informed the
Governments of the five countries where ONUCA was deployed of his intention to recommend the termination of
ONUCA.
The Secretary-General proposed that the Security Council decide to terminate ONUCA’s operational mandate
with effect from 17 January 1992. The Security Council, by its resolution 730 (1992) of 16 January, approved the
Secretary-General’s report and decided to terminate ONUCA’s mandate.
On 24 January 1992, 131 military observers serving with ONUCA were transferred to ONUSAL. To supervise the
closing of the Mission, international and local staff serving with ONUCA were retained and subsequently phased out
over a period of three and a half months.
Impact of ONUCA
ONUCA vividly illustrated the complex demands made
of the Organization’s peacemaking and peacekeeping skills
and the varied role it played in advancing the peace process
in Central America. Although initially established with the
limited mandate of verifying only one aspect of that process,
the tasks entrusted to it evolved, and it assisted the
parties concerned to control and resolve the conflicts in the
region. Its role in the demobilization of the members of the
Nicaraguan Resistance marked an important step forward
in the process of national reconciliation in Nicaragua. In his
report recommending the termination of the Mission, the

General Augustin Quesada Gomez (Spain), Commander
Secretary-General paid tribute to the military and civilian
of the United Nations Observer Group in Central
personnel who served in ONUCA for their great success in
America (ONUCA) (wearing a blue beret), inspects
establishing the first large-scale peacekeeping operation of a weapon surrendered by the Nicaraguan resistance
forces as part of the overall peace process in Central
the United Nations in the Americas and for the contribution
America. 18 April 1990. UN Photo #171898 by Steen
that they made to the restoration of peace and stability in
Johansen.
Central America.
38
End-of-Lesson Quiz »
1. The purpose of peacekeeping operations 5. During the Cold War, superpower rivalry
is to ______. was expressed in ______.
A. Supplement the peace enforcement system A. Direct military conflict
B. Contain armed conflicts and facilitate their B. Involvement in regional conflicts in the Third
settlement World
C. Militarily support the principle of collective C. The mediation and negotiation process of the
security UN
D. Keep the peace between the superpowers D. All of the above
during the Cold War
6. Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations
2. Traditional peacekeeping operations are ______.
based on ______. A. Decreased in number
A. Consent and impartiality B. Began to include more conflicts within “failed
B. Impartiality only states”
C. Non-use of force and consent C. Met increasing resistance within the Security
D. Consent, impartiality, and non-use of force Council
D. Were ineffective
3. Besides the Charter, which document
outlines the United Nations’ roles for 7. What was the purpose of UNGOMAP?
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping,
A. To monitor the withdrawal of Arab
and peacemaking?
mujahideen.
A. General guidelines for peacekeeping
B. To monitor the disarmament of Soviet forces.
operations
C. To provide assistance to returning refugees.
B. Presidential Statements
D. To monitor the Soviet withdrawal from
C. An Agenda for Peace
Afghanistan.
D. The Brahimi Report
8. UNIIMOG verified and supervised the

4. On a day-to-day basis, peacekeeping ceasefire between which countries?
operations are directed by ______.
A. Iran and Iraq
A. The Secretary-General
B. Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq
B. The Under-Secretary-General
C. Iran and Pakistan
C. The Security Council
D. Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran
D. The General Assembly
Answer Key provided on the next page.
39
9. What did UNAVEM I UNMO teams verify 10. On 20 April 1990, the Security Council
and record? decided to expand ONUCA’s mandate to
include what additional tasks?
A. All movements of Cuban military personnel
and equipment into and out of Angola A. Separating the forces and the demobilisation
B. All movements of UNITA forces process
C. Disarmament of Cuban troops B. Monitoring the ceasefire and separation of

forces
D. Refugee movements
C. Monitoring the ceasefire, separation of
forces, and the demobilisation process
D. Monitoring the ceasefire, refugee
repatriation, and separation of forces
Answer Key »
1. B
2. D
3. C
4. A
5. B
6. B
7. D
8. A
9. A
10. C
40
LESSON
The UN Transition Assistance
2 Group (UNTAG)
Namibia, formerly South West Africa

(SWA), has an area of 825,418
square kilometres and has borders
with Angola (1,376 km), Botswana
(1,360 km), South Africa (967 km),
and Zambia (233 km).
UN Photo #104506 by John Isaac.
In this lesson »
Section 2.1 Background on UNTAG Section 2.12 Return of Refugees
Section 2.2 Negotiations Leading to the Establishment Section 2.13 Missing Persons
of UNTAG
Section 2.14 The Namibian Elections
Section 2.3 The Agreement for the UNTAG Operation

Section 2.15 Importance of UNTAG
Section 2.4 The Mandate of UNTAG

Lesson Objectives »
Section 2.5 The Organisation of UNTAG
Section 2.6 The Civilian Component of UNTAG

• Describe the background in Namibia prior
to the UNTAG mission.

Section 2.7 Deployment of UNTAG
• Trace the events and negotiations leading
Section 2.8 Ceasefire Violation Dispute to the establishment of UNTAG.
Section 2.9 The Dismantling of the South African • List the tasks and describe the structure
Military Presence in Namibia of UNTAG.
Section 2.10 South African Allegations • Trace the progress of the UNTAG mission.
Section 2.11 Monitoring the South West Africa Police • Evaluate the success of UNTAG.
41
LESSON 2 | The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
On 21 March 1990 Namibia was born as a free, sovereign and independent nation. The electoral process was monitored by the United
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). A mural in Windhoek. 12 March 1990. UN Photo #103770 by John Isaac.
Section 2.1 Background on UNTAG

Namibia, formerly South West Africa (SWA), has an area
of 825,418 square kilometres and has borders with Angola
(1,376 km), Botswana (1,360 km), South Africa (967 km),
and Zambia (233 km). Namibia is a mainly arid country
which is mostly high plateau with the Namib Desert along
its western coast and the Kalahari Desert to the east. The
small population, estimated at 2.03 million in 2005, is widely
dispersed and is linguistically diverse, but dominated by one
ethnic group: the Ovambo tribe, which represents some 50
per cent of the population. About half of the inhabitants live
in the relatively densely populated north-western border area
adjacent to Angola.
42
In 1884, Germany annexed the Territory of South West Africa and retained control of it until the First World
War, when an invasion by South Africa resulted in the defeat of German forces in July 1915. In December 1920, the
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations conferred Mandate over SWA upon Great Britain for and
on behalf of the Government of South Africa (the Mandatory). Problems began almost immediately regarding how
South Africa was administering the Mandate.
Shortly after the creation of the UN, South Africa informed the General Assembly of its intention to incorporate
SWA into the Union following the holding of a referendum in the territory. The UN opposed South
Africa’s intentions and instead asked South Africa to place the mandated territory under UN trusteeship. South
Africa refused. In an advisory opinion rendered in 1950 at the request of the General Assembly, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the mandate for SWA remained in force and that South Africa was obliged to place
the administration of the territory of SWA under UN supervision. However, the ICJ added that South Africa had no
obligation to place the territory under the UN trusteeship regime.
In 1960, the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) was formed to gain independence through
political means or by armed struggle. In 1966, the General Assembly revoked South Africa’s mandate over SWA and
decided that the territory would be the direct responsibility of the UN. In 1971, the General Assembly recognized
SWAPO as the “sole authentic and legitimate representative of the Namibian people.” South Africa continued to
oppose the UN and thus made the UN decisions largely symbolic. In 1970, by resolution 276, the Security Council
confirmed the illegality of South Africa’s presence in SWA, which was now referred to as Namibia.
In 1973, the General Assembly created the post of United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, to which Mr.
Sean MacBride (Ireland) was appointed. He was succeeded by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari (Finland, 1977-1982), Mr. Brajesh
Mishra (India, 1982-1987) and Mr. Bernt Carlsson (Sweden, 1987-1988).
Section 2.2 Negotiations Leading to the Establishment of UNTAG

Security Council resolution 385 (1976) of 13 January 1976 called upon South Africa to transfer power to the
People of Namibia and allow free elections under UN supervision and control. In 1977, the five Western members
of the Security Council (Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States), known as the
Western Contact Group, launched a mediation effort to work out an internationally accepted solution to the Namibian
problem. This effort was in close cooperation with South Africa and SWAPO, the FrontLine States (Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and later Zimbabwe), and the UN Secretary-General.
In 1978, the Contact Group presented a settlement proposal to the Security Council that outlined a ceasefire
proposal between the South Africa Defence Forces (SADF) and SWAPO and the holding of free and fair elections
under UN supervision and control, which in turn would lead to Namibia’s independence. At the request of the Security
Council, the Secretary-General developed a plan for the implementation of the settlement proposal and appointed
Ambassador Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as his Special Representative to ensure the early independence of Namibia
under UN supervision and control. In resolution 435 (1978) of 27 September 1978, the Security Council approved
the Secretary-General’s settlement plan and authorized the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance
Group (UNTAG).
43
Children of Khomasdahl, a Windhoek township, hold up UNTAG bumper stickers which read ""Free
and Fair elections"" in Afrikaans. A voter registration drive for November's scheduled elections to a
Namibian constituent assembly began last month. 1 April 1989. UN Photo #61379 by Milton Grant.
The Proposal included a timetable of actions required from the various parties involved. A complex series of
steps were developed that would take approximately seven months to complete, with the process culminating in
the holding of elections. Implementation was to begin on a so-called “D-Day,” with a ceasefire in the war between
South Africa and SWAPO, accompanied by the confinement to the base of all combatants. Within six weeks of D-Day,
the level of SADF personnel was to be reduced to 12,000 and by 12 weeks after D-Day, to 1,500, which were to be
confined to two bases in northern Namibia. Furthermore, South African-backed local military and para-military forces
were to have their command structures dismantled and the units disarmed and demobilized. Their arms were to be
placed under guard. The election campaign was to begin at the beginning of the thirteenth week, at which time:
• All political prisoners and detainees, wherever they were held, were to be released;
• All discriminatory or restrictive laws which might abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections
were to be repealed;
• All Namibian refugees were to be allowed to return so that they could freely participate in the electoral
process; and
• A provision was to be made for the peaceful return of former SWAPO forces under United Nations supervision
through designated entry points.
While primary responsibility for maintaining law and order during the transition period was to remain with
the existing police forces, the South African Administrator-General was to ensure their good conduct and to take
the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment. The Special Representative was to
make appropriate arrangements for UN personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties.
One week after the date on which the Special Representative had certified the election, SADF was to withdraw its
remaining personnel, SWAPO bases were to be closed, and the Constituent Assembly was to convene to draw up and
adopt the Constitution. Whatever additional steps were necessary would be taken before the installation of the new
Government and independence. The Contact Group anticipated that this would occur, at the latest, by 31 December
1978.
44
The negotiations for the implementation of the settlement plan experienced substantial delays. Part of this was
due to South Africa’s demand that Walvis Bay not be included in the Settlement Plan; however, in November 1977,
the General Assembly declared Walvis Bay to be an integral part of Namibia. In early 1981, when an agreement
was nearly reached, South Africa, with the support of the United States, refused to accept the agreement unless all
Cuban troops had left Angola, but SWAPO rejected such a “linkage”, and the deadlock continued until 1988.
Section 2.3 The Agreement for the UNTAG Operation

Following negotiations between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, with the acquiescence of SWAPO and the
support of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Geneva Protocol of 8 August 1988 provided, among other
things, for a cessation of hostile acts with effect from 10 August 1988. This ultimately led to two agreements that
were signed at UN headquarters on 22 December 1988.
1) A bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba was signed on

the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which resulted in
Security Council resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988,
to establish the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM I).
2) A tripartite agreement was signed involving Angola, Cuba, and

South Africa on the implementation of the UN settlement plan
for Namibia. This agreement endorsed the Brazzaville Protocol,
signed earlier by the three governments, which recommended
1 April 1989 as the opening date for UNTAG’s operation and
established a Tripartite Joint Commission to assist in the
implementation of the UN settlement plan. The Security Council
endorsed the proposed opening date, and UNTAG began
operation on that date, accordingly.
Section 2.4 The Mandate of UNTAG

UNTAG was essentially a political operation. UNTAG’s basic mandate was to ensure that free and fair elections
could be held in Namibia. Creating the conditions for such elections required UNTAG to carry out a wide variety of
tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by more traditional peacekeeping operations.
UNTAG’s main tasks were:
• To supervise the ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO;
• To monitor the dismantling of the South Africa military presence in Namibia and the confinement of the
SWAPO armed elements to the base;
• To monitor the activities of the South West Africa police force during the transitional period;
• To facilitate the return of refugees to Namibia; and
• To ensure that the measures taken by South Africa for the organization and conduct of the elections were
adequate and to verify whether the elections were free and fair.
45
Section 2.5 The Organization of UNTAG

Due to the competing budgetary and
political considerations, the Secretary-
General compromised on the strength of the
military component of UNTAG. The latter
remained at 7,500, but initially, only 4,650
troops were authorised for deployment. The
original plan called for a deployment of six
battalions of three line companies each, with
one battalion in reserve; UNTAG now was
to deploy three infantry battalions of five
line companies each, with four battalions
in reserve in their home countries. Finland,

Kenya, and Malaysia provided the three
enlarged infantry battalions approved for
initial deployment. Four additional battalions Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Namibia, inspects a contingent of United Nations Transition Assistance
were held in reserve, on seven days’ notice
Group (UNTAG) police monitors from India at their base east of
to move to Namibia, by Bangladesh, Togo, Rundu in the Caprivi Strip. India has contributed 40 police monitors to
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. UNTAG. 1 April 1989. UN Photo #106723 by Milton Grant.
To carry out these varied and complex tasks, UNTAG eventually deployed approximately 7,000 military and
civilian personnel. This included the military component of 4,498 all ranks (which was essentially a traditional
peacekeeping force) and a civilian component comprised of a civilian police (CIVPOL) corps of about 1,500, as well
as various units in charge of the supervision of the elections and the return of refugees. The military component of
UNTAG concentrated on specific tasks, including:
• Monitoring the disbandment of the citizen forces, commando units, and ethnic forces, including the South
West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF);
• Monitoring SADF personnel in Namibia, as well as SWAPO forces in neighbouring countries; and
• Securing installations in the northern border area.
The Finnish battalion was deployed in the north-eastern part of the Territory by 17 April; the Malaysian battalion
in the north-west and the Kenyan battalion in the centre and south were deployed by 1 May. All three battalions
remained in Namibia until after independence, with the Finnish and Malaysian battalions leaving in early April
1990. The incoming government asked Kenya to retain its battalion in Namibia after independence under bilateral
arrangements for an initial period of three months to fulfil various tasks, including helping with the training of a
Namibian army.
The other military units consisted of: a British signals unit; an Australian engineer squadron; a Danish
administrative company, including movement control and postal elements; a Polish and Canadian supply transport
and maintenance units, which included civilian personnel provided by the Federal Republic of Germany; an Italian
helicopter squadron; and a Spanish squadron of light transport aircraft. The military component also included a
civilian medical unit contributed by Switzerland. The Soviet Union and the United States provided air transport for
the initial deployment of UNTAG.
46
Due to the reduced number of UNTAG troops, other tasks were
assigned to military monitors or UNMOs (whose numbers were to be
increased from 200 to 300), including:
• Monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties; and
• Keeping the borders under surveillance and preventing
infiltration.
The number of UNTAG CIVPOL officers was also raised from the
360 stipulated in 1978 to 500 officers. Overall, these changes resulted
in a reduction in the overall budget from an estimated $700 million to
$416 million, not including the cost of the repatriation and resettlement
operation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), which came from a separate appeal for funding.

Despite various setbacks, more than 90
Under the overall leadership of the Special Representative and his percent of the 701,483 registered voters
participated in electing the 72 delegates
Deputy, Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana), UNTAG consisted of
to draw up Namibia's new constitution.
a civilian component, which included a large CIVPOL, and a military United Nations Transition Assistance
component, which was commanded by the Force Commander, Indian Group (UNTAG) worker at Windhoek
showgrounds checks the validity of a
Lieutenant-General Dewan Prem Chand. It was deployed at almost 200
tendered ballot. 1 November 1989. UN
locations throughout the Territory. Photo #76042 by Milton Grant.
Section 2.6 The Civilian Component of UNTAG

The civilian component consisted of six elements:
The Special Representative’s Office
The Special Representative’s Office was responsible for the overall coordination and liaison with other UNTAG
elements; the Administrator-General’s Office and his administration; the political parties and local interest and
community groups; and the many governmental, multitudinous non-governmental, and observer missions that
came to Namibia for the implementation process. Its line functions were mainly in the political and information
areas. They involved responsibility for negotiations with the local administration on each of the political processes
that had to unfold during the implementation of the Settlement Plan and for an extensive information programme
which was under the direct supervision of the Special Representative. Its HQ was in Windhoek, and its staffing,
including liaison, legal, and information personnel, was largely complete by early May 1989.
Forty-two political officers were established throughout Namibia to support the Special Representative’s
coordination, liaison, information, and political activities and to provide him with a steady flow of information about
developments throughout the Territory. For this purpose, the Territory was divided into ten regions: Oshakati, Rundu,
Tsumeb, Otjiwarongo, Outjo, Swakopmund, Windhoek, Gobabis, Mariental, and Keetmanshoop, with a regional
director in charge of each one. Within the regions, 32 district centres were established, the largest number being
in the relatively heavily populated Oshakati region. Almost all of the 42 offices were functioning by mid-May 1989,
though one or two additional district centres were opened in the northern part of the Territory in early July 1989.
47
The Independent Jurist
The Independent Jurist of international standing was to advise on any disputes that might arise regarding the
release of political prisoners and detainees. Professor Carl Nörgaard (Denmark) was appointed to the position in
1978. His office was not subject to the direction of the Special Representative but had a somewhat autonomous
status, despite being part of UNTAG and financed from its budget.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
The Office of the UNHCR was responsible for the return of Namibian exiles, their reception, and their resettlement.
All were to be back in Namibia in time to vote unless they indicated that they did not wish to return. The UNHCR
operation was part of the Settlement Plan but was administered by UNHCR and was not financed from the UNTAG
budget. However, it came under the overall political structure of UNTAG, and UNTAG facilitated its work. UNHCR’s key
personnel arrived in Namibia on or around 1 April. The peak of their activity was during the repatriation operation,
from June to September, but they maintained a presence in the Territory beyond independence in March 1990.
The Electoral Division
The Electoral Division was responsible for advising the Special Representative on all specialist and technical
aspects of the election and for the supervision of the registration and electoral processes. It was also responsible for
assisting the Special Representative in his and his deputy’s negotiations with the South African Administrator-General
concerning the electoral legislation and the way the South African authorities would implement it. The Division was
based at UNTAG headquarters in Windhoek. Its relatively small core staff was augmented by large numbers of
additional staff from the United Nations system and Governments, during registration and the election itself.
Under the supervision of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a team of more than 6,000 military and
civilian personnel, a Constituent Assembly was elected. Namibians line up outside the voter registration centre in Katutura,
a black township of Windhoek. UNTAG staff are supervising the voter registration. 1 July 1989. UN Photo #106724 by Milton
Grant.
48
For registration and the elections, the Territory was divided into 23 electoral areas, in each of which an UNTAG
official (usually from one of the regional or district political offices) was appointed as district supervisor.
The Division of Administration
The Division of Administration was responsible for all aspects of the administration and logistics support for all
elements of UNTAG, except for some of the military component, the police element, and UNHCR (to the extent that
they were self-administered or self-supported).
The CIVPOL Element
The UNTAG CIVPOL were commanded by a Police Commissioner, who, as Police Adviser, also provided advice
to the Special Representative and his Deputy on all police-related matters. Commissioner Steven Fanning (Ireland)
was appointed to this post on 23 March 1989, having previously advised the Special Representative during the long
preparations for the UNTAG mission. As Police Commissioner, he was responsible for the organization, deployment,
and operations of CIVPOL and shared responsibility with the Director of Administration for their administration and
support. Their task was to ensure that the South West Africa Police fulfilled their duty of maintaining law and order
in an efficient, professional, and non-partisan way.
For police purposes, the Territory was divided in two, with a northern and a southern regional coordinator (later
commander) providing coordination at the regional level. The country was further divided into six (later seven)
UNTAG police districts. After the first group of 500 police officers had been deployed by May 1989, CIVPOL had 39
police stations; by September, the number had increased to 49.
Section 2.7 Deployment of UNTAG

The UNTAG operation started badly. On 1 April 1989, the opening date of the operation, few military personnel
of the peacekeeping force had arrived in Namibia, and none were deployed along the sensitive northern border with
Angola. The deployment of the logistics units was not completed before D-Day. Indeed, most of them had little more
than advance parties in Namibia at that time, and most became fully operational only in late April or early May.
This came about due to UNTAG’s budget not being adopted until 1 March. This had delayed the Secretary-General’s
ability to make official requests to Governments for the resources UNTAG required and to conclude commercial
arrangements with other suppliers. Moreover, no financial reserves existed because of the severe financial crisis that
the UN had been subjected to for several years.
Section 2.8 Ceasefire Violation Dispute

On 1 April 1989, the Special Representative was informed by the South African authorities that heavily armed
SWAPO forces based in Angola had crossed the border into Namibia in large numbers and that there were violent
clashes between them and the South West Africa police on a broad front line. Later on the same day, the South African
Foreign Minister told the Secretary-General in New York that SWAPO had blatantly violated the ceasefire agreement.
He stated that if UNTAG could not control the situation, his government would have to deploy once again its armed
forces that had already been confined to base in accordance with the settlement plan. On the advice of the Special
Representative, the Secretary-General accepted a strictly limited and temporary suspension of the confinement of
South Africa forces to the base. The South African military units released from the base were immediately dispatched
by the South African Administration to the northern border area to support the South West Africa police.
49
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) troops in Angola use brush to camouflage a lorry carrying weapons and ammunition
near the Namibian border. Detachments like these penetrate Namibian territory to engage South African forces. 1 January 1981. UN
Photo #122410 by Tadeusz Zagozdzinski.
On 2 April 1989, SWAPO denied that it had violated the ceasefire agreement and maintained that its forces
had entered Namibia peacefully to hand over their weapons to UNTAG and to be confined to base in Namibia under
UN supervision. However, they had met the South West Africa police instead and were brutally attacked by them.
During the following days, more SWAPO personnel entered Namibia and fighting intensified. Between 300 and 400
combatants were killed, most of them from the SWAPO side.
On 8 April 1989, Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, announced that he had ordered the SWAPO forces within
Namibia to stop fighting, to re-group, and to report to Angola under UNTAG escort. That same day, the Tripartite
Joint Commission established by the Brazzaville Protocol and composed of representatives of Angola, Cuba, and
South Africa met at Mount Edjo in Namibia with officials from the United States and the Soviet Union attending as
observers. On 9 April 1989, the Commission adopted a “Declaration of Recommitment to the Peace Process.” That
Declaration, which was accepted by both parties, called for the rapid deployment of UNTAG, the restoration of the
ceasefire agreement, the return of SWAPO forces to locations in Angola, and the return of the South African forces
to the confinement camps in Namibia, all under UN supervision. By 13 May 1989, those measures had been carried
out, and the peace process was back on schedule.
50
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar inspects the Kenyan battalion honour guard at the UN Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG) Military Headquarters in Suiderhof Base, Windhoek, Namibia. He is accompanied
by Lt. General Prem Chand, Force Commander of UNTAG. 1 July 1989. UN Photo #75912 by Milton Grant.
Section 2.9 The Dismantling of the South African Military

Presence in Namibia
As already described, the ceasefire and confinement of forces to the base, which were supposed to come
into effect on 1 April, were not fully restored until 13 May. The next step was the dismantling of the South African
military presence in Namibia, through the withdrawal of almost all SADF personnel and their equipment and the
demobilization of the local military forces established by South Africa, namely the South West Africa Territorial Force
(SWATF), otherwise known as the “ethnic forces,” the “citizen forces,” and the “commandos.”
Under the Plan, SADF strength was to be reduced to 1,500 all ranks, confined to bases at Grootfontein and
Oshivelo, by D-Day plus 12 weeks (the end of June). Despite the hostilities of early April, which interrupted the
planned SADF withdrawal, the reduction to 1,500 was achieved by 24 June, as required. Throughout the process,
UNTAG officers monitored the bases and the withdrawal. The remaining 1,500, known as “the Merlyn Force,” were
withdrawn one week after the certification of the elections, on 21 November.
Other SADF personnel remained in Namibia fulfilling civilian functions. They too were monitored by UNTAG
military officers. In early October, they totalled 796, of whom about two-thirds were engaged in running airfields,
with many of the remainder providing medical services to the population in the north. These arrangements, while
in accordance with the Settlement Plan, caused some concern in the Security Council and other quarters because of
the numbers of SADF personnel involved. Substantial and successful efforts were accordingly made by the Special
Representative to find appropriate civilian replacements for personnel inside Namibia and from other sources in the
United Nations system, for example, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the World Health Organization.
51
Of greater concern to the Security Council was the “civilianization” of other SADF personnel, some of them very
senior, who were assigned to the Administrator-General’s office as a “Department of Defence Administration.” Their
functions included making bimonthly payments to former members of SWATF, who remained on the South African
payroll until independence. Here, too, UNTAG pressed for, and gradually achieved, a substantial reduction in the
numbers involved.
Regarding the local forces established by South Africa, the “citizen forces” and “commandos,” which were
essentially part-time forces numbering 11,578 all ranks, had been demobilized before D-Day, and their arms, military
equipment, and ammunition had been deposited in drill halls which were guarded by personnel from the UNTAG
infantry battalions as soon as they arrived in the Territory. Some of the “citizen forces” and “commandos” were
reactivated because of the events of early April, but by the end of May, they had again been demobilised.
The most important element in the local forces, however, was SWATF, which numbered 21,661 all ranks on
D-Day, most of the officers being on secondment from SADF. Their demobilization was completed by 1 June 1989,
by which time all their arms, ammunition, and military equipment had been deposited in drill halls where they
were guarded by UNTAG infantry elements, the whole process having been closely monitored by UNTAG military
monitors. However, the majority of the demobilized personnel retained their uniforms and, until after the elections,
reported twice monthly to their erstwhile headquarters to receive their pay, in most cases from officers who had
previously commanded them. This arrangement caused considerable concern to the Secretary-General and the
Security Council as being inconsistent with the requirement in the Settlement Plan that the command structures of
SWATF be dismantled. This remained a contentious issue between the Special Representative and the Administrator-
General until after the elections.
Concerns were also expressed over the arrangements for the personnel of the two bushman battalions of SWATF.
Unlike the other ex-members of SWATF, who could return to their places of origin after demobilization, the bushmen
would have had no means of livelihood if sent away from their existing camps in the northern part of the Territory,
where they had lived with their families for many years. All concerned sought a viable and humanitarian solution
to this problem, but it was not possible to find a solution before UNTAG’s mandate ended with the achievement of
Namibia’s independence.
Under the Settlement Plan, the military component of UNTAG was also required to monitor the cessation of
hostile acts by all parties and to keep Namibia’s borders under surveillance and prevent infiltration. Namibia’s border
with South Africa was entrusted to UNTAG’s military observers, who established permanently manned checkpoints at
all crossing-points from South Africa and regularly patrolled along the border. Similar arrangements were established
around the enclave of Walvis Bay, where South Africa maintained an appreciable military presence after the reduction
and eventual withdrawal of SADF from Namibia. The northern border presented a more difficult problem due to its
extent, the presence of dense and closely related populations on both sides of the border, and, as described below,
repeated allegations of impending infiltration. The Finnish and Malaysian battalions mounted daily patrols along the
border, a task in which they were assisted from time to time by the military monitors and by CIVPOL, who routinely
accompanied SWAPOL on their border patrols. The two infantry battalions, as well as the Kenyan battalion in the
centre and the south, also undertook regular patrols in populated areas to advertise UNTAG’s presence and give
people the opportunity to raise their security concerns with UNTAG. This task also was, of course, shared with the
military monitors and with CIVPOL who, as will be described, had the most important part to play in this context.
52
Section 2.10 South African Allegations

Throughout the period leading up to the elections, UNTAG had to address repeated allegations, mostly deriving
from South African security sources, of the imminent invasion of northern Namibia by SWAPO forces. Angola and
SWAPO rejected these allegations.
The persistence of these allegations caused the Joint Commission, which continued to meet throughout the
transition period, to establish a Joint Intelligence Committee to investigate all allegations of potential breaches of
the basic agreements relating to the Angolan-Namibian border. This Committee, in turn, established a Verification
Mechanism, which was empowered to investigate reports on the ground. UNTAG participated in these processes, its
contribution being of importance because of its presence on the ground and the communications and other logistics
support which it could provide.
Nevertheless, the allegations continued and culminated, a few days before the elections, in a claim by South
Africa by supposedly intercepted messages between UNTAG units that UNTAG military personnel had verified an
imminent incursion into Namibia by SWAPO forces. An investigation by the Special Representative of the transcripts
of the alleged messages showed, rapidly and conclusively, that they were fraudulent and did not come from any
UNTAG source. The South African Foreign Minister publicly withdrew the charges 48 hours later. This was the final
episode in what had appeared to be a campaign by certain quarters to disrupt the independence process through
disinformation and other, more direct means, including a political assassination and an attack on UNTAG’s regional
office in Outjo in which a local employee was killed.
Section 2.11 Monitoring the South West Africa Police

Following the confinement to the base of the South African military forces and their subsequent return to South
Africa or demobilization, the only South African-controlled security forces remaining in the Territory was the South
West Africa Police (SWAPOL). The Settlement Plan had recognized that if conditions were to be created for the
conduct of free and fair elections, without fear of intimidation from any quarter, it was essential that SWAPOL fulfil its
duty of maintaining law and order in an efficient, professional, and non-partisan way.
The CIVPOL element of UNTAG could only carry out its monitoring function with the co-operation of the SWAPOL.
However, UNTAG’s CIVPOL encountered major problems over the activities of the Koevoet (“crowbar” in Afrikaans)
counter-insurgency unit of SWAPOL and the Security Branch of SWAPOL. This problem of limited co-operation was
the principal reason for the need to increase the strength of CIVPOL.
In fulfilment of its primary function of monitoring SWAPOL, CIVPOL accompanied SWAPOL on its patrols and
monitored its conduct investigations, its attendance at political rallies, and its presence during the registration and
electoral processes. CIVPOL’s ability to do so, however, depended on the necessary co-operation from SWAPOL,
which was not always forthcoming, and, in the north, on the availability to UNTAG of mine-resistant vehicles (which
was a problem at the beginning of the mission for both CIVPOL and the military component).
Furthermore, CIVPOL had no powers of arrest and could influence the standard of policing only indirectly. As
the mission progressed, however, UNTAG’s CIVPOL role became more and more influential. CIVPOL was frequently
present, and SWAPOL absent, from political gatherings, and CIVPOL often patrolled on its own, meeting the people
and reassuring them by its presence.
53
The problem of monitoring the security police was never fully resolved, nor was the Special Representative ever
fully satisfied with CIVPOL’s ability to investigate the many complaints made by the public about SWAPOL, though
this did greatly improve during the mission. Moreover, about 2,000 of Koevoet’s members had been absorbed into
SWAPOL before 1 April 1989 where they reverted to their former role against SWAPO in the events of early April and
continued to operate as if they were a counter-insurgency unit, travelling around the north in armoured and heavily
armed convoys and habitually behaving in a violent, disruptive, and intimidating manner. Once Koevoet’s role had
become clear, the Secretary-General took the position that it was a paramilitary unit and should be disbanded.
There ensued a difficult process of negotiation with the South African Government, which continued for two
months. After continuing pressure by the UN on the South African authorities, the South African Foreign Minister
announced on 28 September 1989 that some 1,200 ex-Koevoet members of SWAPOL would be demobilised
immediately, and a further 400 members were demobilized on 30 October. UNTAG military monitors supervised these
demobilizations.
Section 2.12 Return of Refugees

The Settlement Plan required that all exiled Namibians have the opportunity to return to their country in time
to participate fully in the political and electoral process. Implementation was entrusted to UNHCR. Several other UN
agencies and programmes contributed to the repatriation programme: the World Food Programme; the World Health
Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the United Nations Children’s Fund; and
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. In Namibia, the Council of Churches in Namibia
was UNHCR’s implementing partner.
The great majority of returning Namibians came back from Angola, with smaller but significant numbers from
Zambia. Altogether, returnees came from 46 countries, requiring a coordinated effort by UNHCR offices worldwide.
A massive airlift began in June, following the proclamation of the general amnesty. Three air and three land entry
points, as well as five reception centres, were established in northern and central Namibia to receive and register
returnees and provide them with material assistance.
The military component of UNTAG provided security at the reception centres. A series of secondary reception
centres were also established. By the end of the process, 42,736 Namibians had returned from exile.
A child at Dobra Reception Centre in Namibia.

The Centre, run by the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), is helping to
smooth the resettlement of Namibia returning to
their country after years of exile. This is the first
stage of a voluntary repatriation of 40,000 exiles.
1 July 1989. UN Photo #76128 by Milton Grant.
54
Section 2.13 Missing Persons

Because of the information it obtained by UNTAG, the mission was able to reduce an initial list of persons
unaccounted for from 1,100 to 315. UNTAG continued to seek and obtain information on this question for the rest
of its mandate. Many revisions of detail were made, and the data were subsequently refined, but the overall picture
remained the same. The question of missing persons turned out to be one of the most divisive and emotionally
charged issues that confronted UNTAG during its time in Namibia.
Section 2.14 The Namibian Elections

By 13 May 1989, most of the UN military and civilian personnel had arrived in the territory, and UNTAG
quickly began the tasks assigned to it. There were frequent disagreements between UNTAG and the South African
Administrator-General, mainly regarding certain electoral arrangements made by South Africa and the conduct of the
SWAPOL. However, those disagreements were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.
On 26 June 1989, the Administrator General published, with the Special Representative’s consent, a proclamation
for general information and comments on the elections. Registration of voters took place from 3 July 1989 until 23
September 1989. The polling began on 7 November 1989 and was concluded on the 11 November. More than 97
per cent of the registered voters voted in conditions of great tranquillity and with memorable determination. Ballot
counting began on 13 November 1989, and the final results were declared that evening. SWAPO obtained 41 of
the Constituent Assembly’s 72 seats, and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance obtained 21 seats, while five of the
remaining eight political parties also obtained representation. SWAPO clearly won, but it failed to obtain the two-
thirds majority that was required to adopt a new constitution.
All stages of the elections were closely supervised by UNTAG, involving 1,758 UN supervisory personnel.
Additionally, 1,023 UNTAG police monitors were assigned to electoral duties. On 14 November 1989, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General declared that the electoral process in Namibia had, at every stage, been
free and fair and that it had been conducted to his satisfaction.
A voter casts her ballot at the polling station at Odangwa in Ovamboland. 1 November 1989. UN Photo
#50804 by Milton Grant.
55
Aside from the military and police aspects of the mission, all of UNTAG’s other functions were focused specifically
upon the need to ensure that the whole electoral process, including registration, was transparently free and fair.
Though the electoral process was to be conducted by the South African Administrator-General, every element was
to take place under the active supervision and control of the Special Representative and UNTAG. The UN’s role in
Namibia was unique regarding the degree of the Organization’s involvement in the process of political change in the
Territory and the central part played by UNTAG in that process.
UNTAG’s role in the registration process included the important provision that no application for registration
could be rejected without the concurrence of an UNTAG official. This ensured UNTAG’s supervision and control of
the election, in accordance with the Settlement Plan. Seventy registration centres were established, together with
110 mobile registration teams which covered 2,200 points throughout the country. UNTAG officials supervised each
registration point, and CIVPOL was present at each location. UNTAG computer experts also supervised the central
register.
A total of 358 polling stations were established. The total number of UN personnel directly involved in the
supervisory process was 1,758, including 885 specialist personnel made available by the Governments of 27 States.
Three hundred and fifty-eight of the UNTAG personnel, acting as ballot-box supervisors, were drawn from the military
component. The remaining electoral supervisors came from UNTAG’s civilian component and the rest of the UN
system. Additionally, 1,023 UNTAG police monitors were assigned to electoral duties.
Developments After the Elections
The Constituent Assembly convened on 21 November 1989. By consensus, it adopted a constitution for an
independent Namibia on 9 February 1990 and unanimously elected Sam Nujoma as President of Namibia in mid-
February. Namibia acceded to independence on 21 March 1990 and was admitted to UN membership one month later.
The military component of UNTAG was gradually wound down in the early months of 1990 after the completion of
the elections, with certain logistics elements and many monitors and observers leaving during January and February.
UNTAG was terminated on Independence Day. Its last task was to assist in the training of an integrated nucleus of
the Namibian National Army.
Section 2.15 Importance of UNTAG

Of the first five post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations, UNTAG was a milestone operation that had a major
impact on the subsequent evolution of peacekeeping operations in United Nations history. UNTAG was not, as has
been suggested, the first multi-functional peacekeeping operation that had an important civilian component involving
political, economic, and humanitarian problems. However, it was the first UN multi-functional operation combining
traditional peacekeeping tasks of a military nature (such as the monitoring of the ceasefire) with the supervision of
democratic elections and related political and humanitarian activities, resulting in a new type of operations sometimes
referred to as second-generation peacekeeping.
Despite a major crisis at the very beginning of its operation, UNTAG was a resounding success. It played a
key role in the implementation of the Namibian peace process and the settlement of a long-standing and complex
conflict with a destabilizing effect on all of Southern Africa. UNTAG created an important area of new activity for UN
peacekeeping. It has served as a model for a new series of UN peacekeeping operations. The basic objective of such
operations is to bring about the necessary conditions for the settlement of complex internal conflicts through the
conduct of free and fair elections or other processes of self-determination after long periods of sterile armed struggle.
56
1. UNTAG was unique among peacekeeping 5. The beginning of the UNTAG operation
missions because ______. ______.
A. It remained within the confines of traditional A. Went smoothly with ample military personnel
peacekeeping missions B. Went badly due to insufficient troop
B. It was the first operation that combined resources
traditional peacekeeping with political and C. Included the deployment of military
humanitarian goals personnel along the Angolan border
C. It was the first multi-functional peacekeeping D. Was marked by co-operation between
operation in UN history SWAPO and South Africa
D. UNTAG was not unique among peacekeeping
operations 6. What initial crisis erupted at UNTAG’s
deployment on 1 April 1989?
2. The roots of the crisis leading to the A. SWAPO and the South West African police
establishment of UNTAG lay in ______. violently clashed along the Angolan border,
A. South Africa’s refusal to place Namibia under each blaming the other
the UN trusteeship regime B. Floods of returning refugees overwhelmed
B. Namibia’s desire to be incorporated into relief workers, creating political instability
South Africa C. Disagreement between the United States
C. The 1950 International Court of Justice and the Soviet Union in the Security Council
advisory opinion defining South Africa as the endangered UNTAG’s continued operation
mandatory power for Namibia D. SWAPO and South Africa permanently
D. Widespread political and economic instability rejected the peace process and returned to
from a series of crippling droughts in civil war, and UNTAG was withdrawn
Namibia
7. The 8 April 1989 “Declaration of
3. The Settlement Proposal began with Recommitment to the Peace Process”
______. was negotiated ______.
A. The withdrawal of existing police forces and A. By SWAPO and South Africa only
their replacement with South African troops B. By the Tripartite Joint Commission with the
B. South African occupation of Namibia to U.S. and the Soviet Union as advisors
ensure secure elections C. By the UN Special Representative to the

C. A ceasefire between SWAPO and South Secretary-General
Africa and the confinement of combatants to D. In the Security Council
camp
8. The question of missing persons turned
D. The withdrawal of UNTAG
out to be ______.
4. What was UNTAG’s primary objective? A. Not an issue for UNTAG
A. To ensure the early independence of Namibia B. A component of UNTAG but proved to be
through free and fair elections easily manageable
B. To ensure the withdrawal of Cuban forces C. A matter for South Africa that proved to be
divisive and emotionally charged
C. To disarm all warring factions
D. One of the most divisive and emotionally
D. To handle the problem of internally displaced
charged issues that confronted UNTAG
persons (IDPs)
57
9. Aside from the military and police 10. UNTAG served as a model for a new
aspects of the mission, all of UNTAG’s generation of peacekeeping missions by
other functions were focused specifically ______.
upon ______.
A. Reinforcing traditional peacekeeping roles
A. The monitoring of the ceasefire B. Rising above the superpower rivalry between
B. The coordination between the governments, the United States and the Soviet Union
parties, and SWAPO C. Circumventing the traditional peacekeeping
C. The need to ensure that the whole electoral requirement to maintain the co-operation of
process, including registration, was all parties involved
transparently free and fair D. Bringing about the conditions for the
D. The return of refugees resolution of complex internal conflicts
through elections
Answer Key »
1. B
2. A
3. C
4. A
5. B
6. A
7. B
8. D
9. C
10. D
58
LESSON
The Gulf Crisis and the Use of
3 Force
The invasion of Kuwait

by Iraq on 2 August
1990 ended the months
of military brinkmanship
and sabre-rattling by
Saddam Hussein.
UN Photo #72346.

Section 3.1 Background on UNIKOM • Discuss the impact of the Gulf Crisis on UN
peacekeeping.
Section 3.2 Establishment and Mandate of UNIKOM
• Describe the international response to the
Section 3.3 The Deployment of UNIKOM
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait from the imposition of
Section 3.4 The Expansion of UNIKOM’s Mandate sanctions through the use of force.
Section 3.5 Situation in the DMZ • Trace the development of the Gulf War through
Iraqi compliance with ceasefire provisions.

Section 3.6 Suspension of UNIKOM and the
Termination of the Mandate • Discuss the application of the UN Charter
provisions on the use of force, including past

Section 3.7 The Influence of the 1991 Gulf War on
action and potential for the future.
Peace Operations
Section 3.8 The Debate Over Sanctions (1991 Gulf
War)
Section 3.9 The Korean Precedent
Section 3.10 Invocation of Chapter VII
Section 3.11 Limits on the Use of Force
59
LESSON 3 | The Gulf Crisis and the Use of Force
Aerial view of the UNIKOM Headquarters in the Central Sector of the demilitarized zone. The DMZ extends 10 kilometres into Iraq and
five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundaries as agreed to in 1963. 1 May 1991. UN Photo #181007 by John Isaac.
Section 3.1 Background on

UNIKOM
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 ended
the months of military brinkmanship and sabre-rattling by
Saddam Hussein. Within a day, Iraqi forces had occupied
Kuwait. On the day of the invasion, the Security Council
adopted resolution 660 (1990), which condemned the invasion
and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal
of Iraq’s forces to the positions they had occupied the
previous day. Iraq was already under UN-initiated arms and
economic sanctions, and the Security Council had adopted 12
resolutions between 2 August and 29 November 1990 against
Iraq to stop the escalation to all-out war. Security Council
resolution 678 (1990) specified that if Iraq had not fully
implemented by 15 January 1991 all of the Security Council’s
60
resolutions relating to the occupation of Kuwait, Member States cooperating with Kuwait’s legitimate government
were authorised to use “all necessary means” to compel Iraq to do so and restore international peace and security
in the area.
Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States began deploying American troops in Saudi Arabia and
other Arab States in the region on the basis of bilateral agreements to deter possible attacks by Iraq in operation
“Desert Shield.” After the adoption of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, the deployment
of US troops intensified and was supplemented by smaller units from other governments cooperating with Kuwait. By
the beginning of January 1991, the coalition force—made up for the most part by US troops and operating under US
command and control—had reached a total strength of well over half a million all-ranks.
With the passing of the 15 January 1991 deadline, coalition forces led by the United States began air attacks
against Iraq on 16 January 1991. Operation “Desert Shield” was replaced by “Desert Storm.” For about three weeks,
the United States and its allies launched massive air attacks against Iraqi targets, including those in Baghdad. On 24
February 1991, the allied ground troops crossed the border into Kuwait on several fronts and within a few days, not
only drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait but also occupied sizable portions of south-eastern Iraq. On 27 February
1991, Iraq informed the Security Council that all its armed forces had withdrawn from Kuwait and that it had decided
to comply fully with the Council’s resolutions. The next day, President George H.W. Bush announced that offensive
operations against Iraq were suspended as of midnight the same day. On 3 April 1991, Security Council resolution
687 (1991) set the conditions for a formal ceasefire to end the conflict and establish the machinery for ensuring the
implementation of those conditions. Following Iraq’s acceptance of the resolution’s provisions, the ceasefire became
a formal one.
Section 3.2 Establishment and Mandate of UNIKOM

Security Council resolution 687 (1991) included the establishment of a demilitarised zone (DMZ) between Iraq
and Kuwait that was to be monitored by a UN observer force. On 9 April, the Security Council (1991) adopted
resolution 689, whereby the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, established the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) with the strength of 300 UNMOs. It decided further that the
modalities for the Mission should be reviewed every six months, but without requiring a formal decision for its
extension in each case.
Only the Security Council’s decision would be required to terminate UNIKOM, allowing UNIKOM to have an
indefinite duration if required.
The Council gave UNIKOM a mandate to:
• Monitor the DMZ and the Khawr ‘Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait;
• Deter violations of the boundary; and
• Observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other.
According to the original mandate, UNIKOM did not have the authority or the capacity to take physical action
to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the DMZ, and the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait
conducted responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the DMZ. Thus, both countries maintained police
posts in their respective parts of the zone. Police in these posts were only allowed to carry side-arms.
61
Resolution 687 (1991) also established the UN Special Commission to oversee the destruction of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission established the
international boundary between the two states (completed in May 1993), and the UN Compensation Commission
administered a fund for compensation for direct losses, damage, or injury to various parties due to the illegal
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.
Section 3.3 The Deployment of UNIKOM

UNIKOM’s advance party arrived in the area on 13 April 1991, and by 6 May the Mission was fully deployed.
UNIKOM monitored the final withdrawal of the armed forces still deployed in its assigned zone. When completed,
this allowed for the establishment of the mandated DMZ, which came into effect on 9 May. At that time, UNIKOM
assumed its full observation responsibilities. During this initial phase of the mission, UNIKOM had five infantry
companies attached to it. These units were drawn from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The UNFICYP and UNIFIL troops withdrew by the end of
June 1991. UNIKOM had full freedom of movement throughout its Area of Operation (AO).
UNIKOM deployed into the Khawr ‘Abd Allah waterway region, which was approximately 40 kilometres (25 miles)
long. The DMZ was approximately 200 kilometres (125 miles) long and extended 10 kilometres (6 miles) into Iraq
and 5 kilometres (3 miles) into Kuwait. Except for the oilfields and two towns—Safwan and Umm Qasr, which became
Iraq’s only outlet to the sea—the DMZ was barren and almost uninhabited. To fulfil its mandate, UNIKOM used a
combination of:
• Patrol and observation bases;
• Observation points;
• Ground and air patrols; and
• Investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.
The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to establish the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in a demilitarized zone between the two countries. A general view of the
Security Council chamber vote in favour of the resolution. 9 April 1991. UN Photo #184376 by John Isaac.
62
A UNIKOM soldier from the USSR greets a shepherd in the Southern Sector of the demilitarized
zone, which extends 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait from the borders as
agreed to in 1963. 1 May 1991. UN Photo #180245 by John Isaac.
Section 3.4 The Expansion of UNIKOM’s Mandate

Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and unauthorised retrieval of Iraqi property from Kuwaiti
territory led to the expansion of UNIKOM’s mandate on 5 February 1993. Security Council resolution 806 (1993)
expanded UNIKOM’s tasks to include the capacity to take physical action to prevent or redress:
• Small-scale violations of the DMZ;
• Violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, e.g., by civilians or police; and
• Problems that might arise from the presence of Iraqi installations and Iraqi citizens and their assets in the
DMZ on the Kuwaiti side of the newly demarcated boundary.
UNIKOM’s size also increased to 3,645 personnel (three mechanised infantry battalions including support
elements). The addition of one mechanised infantry battalion from Bangladesh reinforced the UNMOs; Kuwait
provided its equipment. An advance team arrived in the mission area in mid- November 1993, and the balance of the
battalion arrived between December 1993 and early January 1994. The battalion became operational on 5 February
1994 after a training period to familiarise personnel with the Kuwaiti equipment.
The mechanised infantry battalion modified UNIKOM’s concept of operations, which now was based on:
• A combination of patrol and observation bases;
• Observation points, ground and air patrols;
• Vehicle checkpoints;
• Roadblocks;
• A force mobile reserve; and
• Investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.
63
The Mission was further modified in February 2000 when the Khawr ‘Abd Allah Waterway Monitoring project
began. The command of the project was directly under the UNIKOM Force Commander. Its role was to patrol its AO,
the waterways, and the land area patrolled by UNIKOM from an observation base on the Al Faw peninsula.
Section 3.5 Situation in the DMZ

The overall situation in the DMZ remained generally calm, though there was tension in November 1993 due to the
demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary and in October 1994 regarding reports involving the deployment of Iraqi
troops north of the DMZ. Overall, there were few incidents and violations of the DMZ. These mainly involved over-
flights by military aircraft and the carrying or firing of weapons other than side-arms. These were all investigated by
UNIKOM, which received cooperation from authorities on both sides.
UNIKOM also liaised with and provided support to the other UN missions operating in Iraq and Kuwait and closely
cooperated with UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Mines laid by the Iraqi occupation forces en route to

Al-Wafra in southern Kuwait. 29 March 1991. UN Photo
#1412 by John Isaac.
Section 3.6 Suspension of UNIKOM and the Termination of the

Mandate
Due to the rising tensions with Iraq, on 17 March 2003, before the planned coalition military operations against
Iraq, the Secretary-General decided to suspend UNIKOM’s operations. The Mission was withdrawn due to security
considerations and the fact that it could no longer operate in the DMZ. A small HQ, consisting of 12 military officers,
20 essential civilian staff, and some local staff, was left at the Kheitan support base in Kuwait City, while all other
Mission personnel returned to their countries of origin or previous assignments. The UNIKOM HQ continued to
provide liaison duties and support to other UN activities.
The HQ also maintained a nuclear, biological, and chemical detection capability. The air and ground war against
Iraq began on the night of 19-20 March. On 14 April, the 26th day of the war, coalition forces declared victory.
On 31 March, the Secretary-General made it clear the UNIKOM had only been temporarily dispersed and, when
feasible, would be reconstituted to fulfil its mission. The UNIKOM HQ presence was maintained until 6 July 2003.
Given the occupation of Iraq by coalition forces, UNIKOM’s mandate was extended one last time (Security Council
resolution 1490 (2003) of 3 July) until 6 October, when the mission was terminated. During this final extension, the
Mission made arrangements to hand over its humanitarian role to other entities and proceeded to liquidate Mission
assets. The Security Council also mandated the end of the DMZ at the termination of UNIKOM’s mandate.
64
Section 3.7 The Influence of the 1991 Gulf War on Peace

Operations
Shortly after the end of the Cold War, a crisis broke out in the Persian Gulf area when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
The Gulf crisis and the use of force authorised by the Security Council to redress Iraq’s aggression influenced the
evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in three important ways.
1) The exorbitant human and financial cost of a large-scale

enforcement operation, as well as the difficulties involved in
deploying such an operation, have caused the United Nations
to rely increasingly on the cheaper and more manageable
peacekeeping operations to deal with armed conflicts in the
post-Cold War era.
2) The device used by the Security Council to delegate to the

United States the responsibility for organising and leading the
anti-Iraq coalition force has been used to set up peacekeeping
operations with enforcement capability. Some examples of
these operations are the United States-led task forces in
Somalia and Haiti and the NATO-led Implementation Force and
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia.
3) The Gulf crisis has shown that the use of force, however
powerful, cannot always achieve a political settlement. Such
a settlement has to be brought about by negotiation and
agreement.
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) on the Kuwaiti side of the Kuwait-Iraq border. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
is accompanied by UNIKOM Force Commander Major General Jian Giuseppe Santillo (right) and
Mohammad A. Abulhasan, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations (left, nearest
Secretary-General). 28 December 1995. UN Photo #104045.
65
Section 3.8 The Debate Over Sanctions (1991 Gulf War)

On 6 August 1990, the Security Council decided, by resolution 661 (1990), to impose mandatory economic
sanctions against Iraq for all goods except medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs. Between
6 August and 29 November 1990, the Security Council adopted nine additional resolutions to deal with the situation
between Iraq and Kuwait and the sanctions it had imposed on Iraq. The 12 resolutions were adopted unanimously or
by an overwhelming majority and included the affirmative votes of the five Permanent Members.
In October and November, an informal but intense debate was engaged at UN Headquarters on two issues.
The first issue centred on the economic sanctions. Some governments felt that the sanctions against Iraq were not
working. They noted that those sanctions hurt innocent people in Iraq and friendly governments in neighbouring
countries, but had little effect on Saddam Hussein and his clique. Consequently, they believed that the Security Council
should use force under Chapter VII of the Charter to compel Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Other governments,
however, held the view that force should be used only as a very last resort and that more time should be allowed for
the economic sanctions to work. The second issue was a spin-off of the first and concerned the authority required for
the use of force. A few governments, including the United States and the United Kingdom, asserted that given the
continued aggression of Iraq, Kuwait and its allies could resort to force to end that aggression as an act of collective
self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The general feeling, however, was that the use of force against Iraq
would require a special resolution of the Security Council.
Five men of the Army of the Republic of Korea, pose

for the photographer with the UN flag and Korean
Regimental banners. 01 June 1952. UN Photo
#188470 by JG.
Section 3.9 The Korean Precedent

Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, was the first resolution ever adopted by the Security Council in
which it invoked the authority conferred upon it under Chapter VII of the Charter and authorised the use of force on
a large scale (implied in the phrase “all necessary measures”) to deter aggression and restore peace. The Security
Council had authorised such use of force once before, at the outset of the Korean Crisis in June-July 1950, but only
indirectly and without invoking Chapter VII. The Security Council was able to act in that case only because the Soviet
Union was then boycotting the Security Council and other UN organs to protest a recent decision of the General
Assembly to reject communist China’s claim to China’s seat at the United Nations. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union
failed to return to the Security Council immediately after the outbreak of the Korean crisis. It stayed away from the
Council and relinquished its veto at a crucial time. In the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States proposed
and got the Security Council to adopt three resolutions that enabled it to organise and lead a powerful international
force to support South Korea. Chapter VII was not mentioned at all in the enabling resolutions for obvious political
reasons.
66
Members of the Security Council vote to use "all necessary means" to uphold its resolutions if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait by
15 January 1991. 29 November 1990. UN Photo #31700 by Milton Grant.
Section 3.10 Invocation of Chapter VII

When the Gulf crisis broke out, the Cold War had ended. The relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union had shifted from competition to cooperation, and the five Permanent Members had begun to work
closely together to assume an increasing role in the maintenance of international peace and security. In addressing
the aggression of Iraq, the Security Council could invoke Chapter VII of the Charter to take enforcement measures
against Iraq—first mandatory economic sanctions and later the use of collective force.
However, the large-scale military enforcement operation undertaken against Iraq was not carried out in strict
accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII. It did not involve a United Nations force under UN command and
control, vested in the Security Council and the UN Military Staff Committee, but a coalition force organised and led
by the United States with the authorisation of the Security Council. Like the international force in Korea, the coalition
force in the Gulf crisis was based on a pragmatic application of Chapter VII. And as in Korea, the operation against
Iraq was extremely expensive, both in human and financial terms. The Gulf War involved more than half a million
troops, at the staggering cost of over $70 billion, for the coalition side only.
67
Section 3.11 Limits on the Use of Force

In both the Korean and Iraqi cases, the United States initiated the enforcement action and shouldered most of
the burden because what it perceived as its vital national interest was at stake—the expansion of communism in
Korea in 1950 and the supply of oil in the Gulf crisis in 1990. There are reasons to believe that the United States or
any other major power able to organise and lead a large-scale enforcement operation on behalf of the United Nations
would not want to assume such heavy and costly responsibilities in the future unless their vital national interests are
clearly involved. This is a serious limitation of the use of force as an effective means to control and resolve conflicts.
This latter point came to be in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where the US, against major international opposition,
argued that its national interests were at stake, and it effectively went to war on a unilateral basis.
Soldiers from Ghana (on radio) and China at work in the Central Sector of the demilitarized zone. The DMZ extends
10 kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundaries as agreed to in 1963. 1 May 1991. UN
Photo #61585 by John Isaac.
68
1. The trend in the post-Cold War era has 5. Military action against Iraq ______.
been ______.
A. Included simultaneous air and ground attack
A. The use of large-scale enforcement operations on 16 January 1991
B. The continued difficulty in obtaining B. Stopped at the Kuwait-Iraq border
superpower approval for the establishment of C. Was directed entirely by the United States
operations D. Did not succeed in forcing Iraq to comply with
C. The use of cheaper and more manageable the Security Council resolutions
peacekeeping operations
D. The use of large-scale but cheaper operations 6. Which of the following is not a term
established by Security Council
2. The device used by the Security Council resolution 687 (1991) for a formal
to delegate responsibility to the United ceasefire with Iraq?
States during the Gulf Conflict ______. A. The re-development of the destroyed oil fields
A. Has not been used since B. The establishment of a demilitarised zone
B. Set a precedent for peacekeeping missions C. The destruction of Iraq’s biological and
with enforcement capability chemical weapons and long-range ballistic
C. Has been unambiguously the best way to missiles
achieve a political settlement D. The payment of war reparations
D. Is in direct conflict with the UN Charter
7. Why was the action taken against
3. Which of the following was part of Iraq not in strict accordance with the
UNIKOM’s mandate? provisions of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter?
A. Deter violations of the boundary
A. It did not receive a unanimous vote in the
B. Handle refugees
General Assembly
C. Disarm Iraqi forces
B. It was not in line with Article 39
D. Demine Iraqi minefields
C. No provisional measures were taken under
4. The mandatory economic sanctions Article 40
imposed by Security Council resolution D. It did not involve a UN force under UN
661 (1990) ______. command and control, vested in the Security
A. Were not supported by all five Permanent Council and UN Military Staff Committee
Members of the Security Council
B. Did not include medical supplies and food- 8. SC resolution 806 (1993) expanded
UNIKOM’s tasks to include the capacity
stuffs in humanitarian situations
to take physical action to prevent or
C. Were adopted with a great deal of contention redress ______.
among the members of the Security Council
A. Iraqi concerns about landmines
D. Did include humanitarian supplies
B. American concerns about arms smuggling
C. Large-scale violations of the DMZ and Kuwaiti
territory
D. Small-scale violations of the DMZ
69
9. On 17 March 2003, UNIKOM was 10. The UN was influenced by the 1991
withdrawn due to ______. Gulf War in regards to peacekeeping
operations in a number of ways. One of
A. The UN running out of money to run the
these ways was ______.
mission
A. To rely increasingly on the cheaper and more
B. Security considerations and the fact that
manageable peacekeeping operations to deal
UNIKOM could no longer operate in the DMZ
with armed conflicts
C. Kuwait requesting the withdrawal of the
B. To not become involved militarily
mission
C. To only use peacekeeping forces from Western
D. The expiration of the mission’s mandate
European countries
D. To stop becoming involved in peacekeeping
completely
Answer Key »
1. C
2. B
3. A
4. B
5. C
6. A
7. D
8. D
9. B
10. A
70
LESSON Further Expansion of UN
4 Peacekeeping Operations in
1991-1994 and New Challenges
The success of the five first UN peacekeeping

operations in the post-Cold War era, highlighted
by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to UN
peacekeeping forces in December 1988, and
later the decisive enforcement action of the
Security Council on Iraq’s aggression against
Kuwait gave rise to a burst of euphoria in the
international community.
Section 4.1 The Changing International • Describe the increasing expectations and new
Atmosphere and Rising challenges to peacekeeping in the changing
Expectations international atmosphere.
Section 4.2 New Challenges • Discuss the new peacekeeping missions established
between 1991 and 1994.

• Discuss the difficulties presented by rapid expansion
Section 4.4 The Problems with Expansion
and the changing nature of international conflict.
71
LESSON 4 | Further Expansion of UN Peacekeeping Operations in 1991-1994 and New Challenges
Members of the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) celebrating as they are moved to cease-fire zones. An
ONUSAL vehicle (right) is accompanying the convoy. 1 February 1992. UN Photo #160270 by J Bleibtreu.
Section 4.1 The Changing

International
Atmosphere and
Rising Expectations
The success of the five first UN peacekeeping operations
in the post-Cold War era, highlighted by the award of the
Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeeping forces in December
1988, and later the decisive enforcement action of the
Security Council on Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait gave rise
to a burst of euphoria in the international community. There
72
was a general feeling that the United Nations could henceforth effectively ensure the maintenance of international
peace and security in the way envisaged by the founding fathers. President George H.W. Bush of the United States
proudly extolled the New World order after the victory over Iraq.
But the euphoria was short-lived. True, the end of the Cold War brought about important and positive changes.
The danger of a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers, which could have led to a third world war
and a nuclear holocaust, had receded. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted from
competition to cooperation, and after the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the United States has become the
only superpower in the world. Freed from Cold War constraints, the Security Council was revitalised and could not
only set up peacekeeping operations quickly but also take enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter to
restore peace and deter aggression, if necessary.
Section 4.2 New Challenges

However, along with those positive developments, there is a downside. The negative stability of the Cold War,
resulting from the stalemate between the two superpowers and what came to be known as the balance of nuclear
terror, disappeared. Ambitious and troublesome local leaders are no longer tightly controlled by the superpowers
in their respective spheres of influence, and many ancient ethnic conflicts, long contained during the Cold War, re-
emerged in East Europe and Central Asia, often with brutal violence. Moreover, the end of East-West confrontation
and the new unrest in a strategic part of Europe caused the industrial nations of the West to shift their attention
and financial assistance from the South to the North. This further worsened the plight of some African countries
devastated by bad governance, civil war, natural disaster, and famine.
The experience gained from the Gulf crisis indicates that large-scale military enforcement operations are not an
easily available option. They are extremely complex and costly and can be undertaken only if a major power such
as the United States is willing to assume the responsibility of organising and leading such operations. For those
reasons, the United Nations has come to rely increasingly on the cheaper and more manageable peacekeeping
operations to deal with the various conflicts brought before it. This development, combined with the revitalisation of
the Security Council and the proliferation of internal conflicts and major humanitarian crises in failed or collapsing
states, produced a dramatic expansion of peacekeeping operations after the Gulf crisis.

From 1991 until 1994, 17 new operations were established. They are briefly summarised below:
1. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).

This operation was set up in April 1991, after the Gulf War, to
monitor a demilitarised zone established by the Security Council
between Iraq and Kuwait and to deter violations of the ceasefire
ordered by the Council.
73
A team from the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) pass dromedaries as they conduct a ceasefire patrol
and monitor for illegal movements near the border with Mauritania. 18 June 2010. UN Photo #440155 by Martine Perret.
2. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in West Sahara

(MINURSO). This operation was established in April 1991, in
accordance with the “settlement proposals” agreed by Morocco
and the Polisario Liberation Front (Frente Popular para la
Liberacion de Saguira el Hamra y de Rio de Oro). Its purpose
was to monitor a ceasefire between them and to organise
and conduct a referendum to determine the wishes of the
population on the future status of West Sahara (independence
or continued union with Morocco).
3. The second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM

II). This operation was set up in May 1991 in pursuance of the
Peace Accords signed by the Government of Angola and the
insurgent political movement UNITA (União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola). Its purpose was to monitor
the ceasefire between them and to observe and verify the
presidential and legislative elections provided by those accords.
4. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

This operation was established in July 1991 to verify the
implementation of the agreements between the Government
of El Salvador and the “Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Movement” (FMLN) aimed at ending a decade-long civil war.
5. The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).

This operation was established in October 1991 to assist the
four Cambodian parties in maintaining the ceasefire provided by
the Paris Agreements, pending the arrival of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
74
6. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

This operation was established in February 1992 to ensure the
implementation of the Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement in Cambodia, which included the supervision
of the ceasefire and the organisation and conduct of free and
fair elections.
7. The United Nations Protection

Force (UNPROFOR). This operation
was established in February 1992,
initially to supervise the ceasefire
and to ensure the demilitarisation
and protection of the “UN protected
areas” in Croatia. Its mandate
was later enlarged to cover Bosnia
(humanitarian assistance and
ceasefire) and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (preventive
deployment).
8. The first United Nations Operation in

Somalia (UNOSOM I). This operation
was established in April 1992 to
Somali women, including elders of the community,
promote and protect humanitarian
assembled for a meeting with Admiral Jonathan T.
relief assistance to starving civilian Howe, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
populations during the civil war in for Somalia. 1 April 1993. UN Photo #78590 by Milton
Grant.
Somalia.
9. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This

operation was established in December 1992 to help implement
the General Peace Agreement that was concluded in Rome by
the Government of Mozambique and the insurgent political
movement RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicna),
including supervising of the ceasefire and monitoring the
elections.
10. The second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM

II). This operation was set up in March 1993 to take over
the responsibilities of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, which
had been set up in December 1992 to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In
addition to its humanitarian task, UNOSOM II was mandated to
promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, and the disarmament of
Somali militias, by force if necessary.
75
11. The United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

(UNOMUR). This operation was established in June 1993 to
monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and to verify
that no military assistance was provided to Rwanda across it.
12. The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). This

operation was established in July 1993 to verify compliance
with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the
Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authority in Georgia.
13. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

This operation was established in September 1993 to monitor,
in co-operation with the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Cotonou Peace Agreement signed by the Liberian parties to
the civil war on 25 July 1993. This agreement provided for a
ceasefire, the disarmament and demobilisation of military units,
and the holding of national elections, all under the supervision
of ECOMOG.
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) military observers’ winter survival exercise in the Caucasus mountains. 1
March 2004. UN Photo #49200 by Justyna Melnikiewicz.
76
14. The United Nations Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). This

operation was established in September 1993, initially to help
implement the Governors Island Agreement signed by Jean-
Baptiste Aristide, the exiled President of Haiti, and General
Cedric Cedras, the leader of the military coup that had ousted
Aristide, on 3 July 1993. This Agreement, concluded under the
auspices of Mr. Dante Caputo, Special Envoy of both the UN and
OAS Secretaries General, contained arrangements designed to
pave the way for national reconciliation and the restoration of
democracy in Haiti.
15. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

This operation was established in October 1993 to help
implement the Arusha Agreement signed by the Rwandan
parties (Hutus and Tutsis) in August 1993, including monitoring
the ceasefire and the security situation during the transitional
government’s mandate prior to the elections and assisting in
the coordination of humanitarian activities.
16. The United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG).

This operation was established in May 1994 to monitor and
verify the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces
from the Aouzou Strip in accordance with the agreement of
4 April 1994 between Libya and the Republic of Chad. This
agreement was based on a judgment of the International Court
of Justice.
17. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT).

This operation was established in December 1994 to assist the
Joint Commission of representatives of the Tajik Government
and the Tajik opposition and to monitor their agreement on a
temporary ceasefire and the cessation of other hostile acts.
A mother and child in a camp in the French-protected

area in Gikongoro. 27 July 1994. UN Photo #76133 by
John Isaac.
77
Section 4.4 The Problems with Expansion

This rapid expansion created new problems. It outpaced the organisational capacity of the United Nations, and
the UN found it increasingly difficult to obtain the military personnel and equipment required for the new operations.
The rising cost of peacekeeping is further compounded by the failure of some Member States, including the United
States, to pay their assessed contributions. Even more serious in the long run, the traditional principles of consent,
impartiality, and non-use of force—laid down during the Cold War when peacekeeping operations were intended
to contain international conflicts involving governments—are no longer adequate in internal conflict and civil war
situations. In such situations, when confronted with unruly and heavily armed internal factions and irregular forces,
the UN peacekeepers, with their light defensive weapons and operating under the constraining principles of consent
and non-use of force, can no longer fulfil their peace missions. The performance of the peacekeeping operations
established from 1991 to 1994 was mixed. Some were successful, but others suffered severe setbacks.
The immediate post-Cold War era saw the advent of large-scale “peace-building” operations; these soon became
the UN’s largest costs and, by default, caused the largest controversies. Some missions (Cambodia, Mozambique,
Namibia) still generally followed the traditional model of consent and neutrality, while others led to direct intervention
by the UN (Somalia) or withdrawal of UN forces (Rwanda) when a fragile peace broke down. Ultimately, intervention
in the absence of any agreement by local actors, which in many cases were not a recognised state government, led
to large-scale operations (e.g., the former Yugoslavia) that stretched the capacity of UN peacekeeping to its breaking
point.
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were examples of peacekeeping missions that morphed into “nation-building”
operations in a failed state scenario. These missions, aside from the traditional military components of peacekeeping,
involved humanitarian relief deliveries, civilian administrators, a litany of NGOs, human rights watchdogs, election
observers, and police and judicial monitors. In short, this was no longer peacekeeping in the Pearsonian sense
of the late 1950s. As the Secretary-General observed in An Agenda for Peace, the UN had moved into a world of
peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Some have argued that these were just euphemisms for war, while most
western militaries now call these types of mission—in the context of the Spectrum of War—Operations Other Than
War (OOTW). The problems that led to mission complications and failures came about due to this transition from
peacekeeping to peace-making. The key factors were:
• Frequent mismatches between the mission mandate and mission capacity and funding;
• Dependence on voluntary funding to pay for mission-essential functions;
• The premature withdrawal of missions;
• The sluggish process of voluntary military commitments and the slow arrival of committed units into the
mission area;
• The variation in quantity, training, equipment, and quality of military components;
• The limited time frames for unit rotations and national commitments;
• The even slower deployment of CIVPOL and civil administrators; and
• The even greater unevenness of CIVPOL and civil administrators.
78
1. While the end of the Cold War brought 4. The rapid expansion of peacekeeping
the superpower rivalry to an end, it also operations ______.
brought about negative changes, such as
A. Made it easy for the UN to get military
_______.
personnel and equipment for operations
A. A continuance of the balance of nuclear terror
B. Reinforced and adhered to the traditional
B. An increase in the number of local leaders principles of consent, impartiality, and the
exploiting intra-state divisions without non-use of force
superpower control
C. Exceeded the organisational capacity of the
C. An increase in aid to the Third World at the UN
expense of the new unstable areas of Eastern
D. Was facilitated by the willingness of Member
Europe
States to pay their full assessed financial
D. More state-to-state conflicts contributions
2. Why are large-scale military operations 5. Were the peacekeeping operations

not an easily available option? between 1991 and 1994 all considered
A. They are complex and costly and only successful?
work when a major power is willing to take A. No, the results were mixed
responsibility for leadership and organisation B. Yes, they were all highly successful
B. They are too costly for the UN C. Yes, except for UNPROFOR
C. They are logistically too hard to organise D. Only UNTAC was considered successful
D. The UN does not have the capability to plan
such missions 6. The rising cost of peacekeeping was
further compounded by ______.
3. The number of peacekeeping operations A. The unwillingness of states to provide troops
has dramatically increased since the Gulf
for UN missions
Crisis because ______.
B. The lack of will in the Security Council to
A. They are more expensive and less manageable
commit to missions
than small-scale military enforcement
C. The lack of mission planning capacity in
operations
UNDPKO
B. The Security Council was revitalised after the
D. The failure of some Member States to pay
end of the Cold War
their assessed contributions
C. There were more state-to-state conflicts that
posed threats to international stability
D. There was more money to spend on missions
79
7. The traditional Cold War peacekeeping 9. Somalia (UNOSOM) and the former
principles of consent, impartiality, and Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) were examples
the non-use of force were ______. of peacekeeping missions that morphed
into ______.
A. Still fully viable for all situations in the post-
Cold War era A. “Nation-building” operations in a failed state
B. Functionally obsolete for any new mission scenario
C. No longer adequate in internal conflict and B. Solely CIVPOL operations
civil war situations C. Full-scale conventional wars
D. Adequate only for internal conflicts D. Small-scale humanitarian aid mission
8. Intervention in the absence of any 10. In the context of the Spectrum of War,
agreement by local actors, which in what do most western militaries now call
many cases were not a recognised state missions like Somalia and the Former
government, led to ______. Yugoslavia?
A. Confusion over UN mission mandates A. Peacekeeping
B. Successful missions B. Peace Support Operations (PSOs)
C. Small-scale operations that bankrupted the C. Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
UN D. Conventional Warfare
D. Large-scale operations that stretched the

capacity of UN peacekeeping to its breaking
point
Answer Key »
1. B
2. A
3. B
4. C
5. A
6. D
7. C
8. D
9. A
10. C
80
Performance of UN Peacekeeping
LESSON
5 Operations Established in 1991-

1994: The Successful Operations
Of the 17 peacekeeping
operations set up by the United
Nations from 1991 until the end
of 1994, only two dealt with
conflicts of an international
nature; the other 15 were
all involved with intra-state
conflicts.
UN Photo #31503 by P Sacaud.
Section 5.1 International Conflicts • Distinguish between international and intra-state
operations.
Section 5.2 United Nations Aouzou Strip
Observer Group (UNASOG) • Describe the two successful inter-state operations set
up between 1991 and 1994.

Section 5.3 United Nations Observer Mission
in El Salvador (ONUSAL) • Describe the three successful intra-state operations set
up between 1991 and 1994.

Section 5.4 United Nations Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) • Identify the characteristics of successful operations.
Section 5.5 United Nations Transitional • Identify problematic elements of intra-state operations.
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Section 5.6 United Nations Advance Mission
in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
81
LESSON 5 | Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations Established in 1991-1994: The Successful Operations
Standing in a crowd of Cambodians, an UNTAC soldier from Ghana (centre, with cap) helps provide security for a multi-party political
rally. Twenty political parties are recognized by UNTAC, which is supervising Cambodia's upcoming election for a constituent assembly.
19 May 1993. UN Photo #105382 by John Isaac.
Section 5.1 International

Conflicts
Of the 17 peacekeeping operations set up by the United
Nations from 1991 until the end of 1994, only two dealt with
conflicts of an international nature; the other 15 were all
involved with intra-state conflicts.
The two operations in the first category were the United
Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) and the
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM),
which were both covered in the previous lesson and were
generally successful.
82
Canadian soldiers building accommodations for

UNIKOM staff at the NORMED hospital, which is part
of Norway's contribution to UNIKOM. Preparations
are underway to move UNIKOM Headquarters to the
NORMED site. 01 May 1991. UN Photo #180244 by
John Isaac.
UNIKOM was set up by the Security Council in April 1994 at the end of the Gulf War. With a maximum strength
of 3,645 military personnel, including 600 military observers, it was mandated to monitor a demilitarized zone (DMZ)
along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the Khawr’ Abd Allah waterway, as well as to prevent violations of
the DMZ and the boundary between the two countries. Its presence was an important stabilizing element in the area.
UNASOG was a small observer group established by the Security Council on 4 May 1994 for a limited period of 40
days. Its purpose was to monitor and verify the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces from the Aouzou
Strip in accordance with the agreement of 4 April 1994 between Libya and the Republic of Chad. The Agreement was
based on a judgment of the International Court of Justice. UNASOG carried out its mission within the ascribed period
with the full cooperation of the two governments concerned.
Section 5.2 United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group

(UNASOG)
Background on UNASOG
The ongoing civil war in Republic of Chad (Chad) (1965-1979) had weakened the central government’s control of
the country’s northern border. In 1974, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) took advantage of this
weakness and seized the 114,000 square-kilometre (44,000-square-mile) strip of land in northern Chad called the
Aouzou Strip. Libya had claimed this region based on a 1935 border dispute and settlement between France (which
then controlled Chad) and Italy (which then controlled Libya). France never ratified the settlement, but when Chad
gained its independence, both France and Chad recognized the boundary.
The Libyans became involved in the Chadian civil war, which led to northern Chad falling under Libyan influence.
After the civil war ended, Libya began a war (in 1980) in Chad that lasted until mid-1988. The Libyan military was
equipped with advanced Soviet weapons, which far out-classed any military hardware Chad possessed. Chad, in
turn, mounted howitzers and recoilless rifles onto Toyota 4x4 trucks, in what quickly was dubbed the “Toyota Wars.”
Libyan forces included the Islamic Pan-African Legion, a mercenary group, and military advisors from the Warsaw
Pact. France soon came to the aid of Chad, and with the support of the French Foreign Legion and US military aid,
Chad stopped the Libyan advance. There was a de facto division of the country, with Libya controlling all the territory
north of the sixteenth parallel.
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France and Libya agreed to mutual withdrawal from Chad, but as French troops began their withdrawal in the
autumn of 1984, the Libyans instead dispersed and hid their forces. France stayed on, but only to maintain the
existing status quo; the real fighting was left to the Chadian forces in their Toyotas. In a stunning series of battles,
Chadian forces defeated the heavily armed Libyan forces. On 3 October 1988, Libya moved to a diplomatic solution
to resolve the Aouzou Strip dispute. A Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute
was signed in Algiers on 31 August 1989. The talks settled nothing, and in September 1990, both governments
agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The ICJ, on 3 February 1994, found that the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness had made it clear
that the Aouzou Strip was part of Chad. Subsequent talks provided the modalities for the withdrawal of the Libyan
administration and military forces and the demilitarization of the Aouzou Strip.
Establishment of UNASOG
The withdrawal operation of the Libyans was to begin on 15 April 1994 and was to be completed by 30 May
1994. The withdrawal was to be supervised by a mixed team composed of UNMOs and 25 Libyan and 25 Chadian
military officers.
On agreement of both Governments and with
Security Council resolution 910 (1994) of 14 April
1994, a UN reconnaissance team composed of civilian
and military personnel was sent to the area to conduct
a brief survey of conditions on the ground. The team
arrived in Tripoli on 15 April and proceeded to the
Aouzou Strip on 17 April. The team reported that
it would be possible to deploy UNMOs to fulfil the
requirements of the 4 April 1994 agreement.
On the recommendation of the Secretary-General,
the Security Council, by its resolution 915 (1994),
established the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer
Group (UNASOG) on 4 May 1994. The mission was
to last approximately 40 days. With the adoption
of resolution 915, the reconnaissance team of five
UNMOs became the advance party of UNASOG. Four
other UNMOs joined the mission on 12 May 1994.
The authorized strength of UNASOG was nine military
observers and six international civilian staff. The
UNMOs and most of the civilian staff were drawn from
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO). Credit: Hohum, distributed under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license
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UNASOG Operations
In consultation with the UNASOG reconnaissance team, the mixed Chadian/Libyan team determined the schedule
and the locations of where Libyan forces would withdraw from the Aouzou Strip. Both sides certified each withdrawal,
witnessed by UNASOG UNMOs.
On 30 May 1994, the Governments of Chad and Libya signed the Joint Declaration, whereby both parties agreed
that the withdrawal of Libya from the Aouzou Strip met the satisfaction of both parties. The Chief Military Observer
of UNASOG witnessed the Declaration.
The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 6 June 1994 that UNASOG had completed its mission
and was terminated. In his view, the accomplishment of UNASOG’s mandate demonstrated the useful role that the
United Nations could play in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The personnel of UNASOG returned to their previous
assignments, most returning to MINURSO.
Intra-State Conflicts
The performance of the 15 UN peacekeeping operations involved in intra-state conflicts is mixed; some were
successful in varying degrees, but others suffered setbacks. Among the successful operations, the three most
important ones were the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Operation
in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which are outlined
below.
Sarah Owusu-Ansah, a Ghanaian officer with UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), watches
the sunrise during an early morning patrol in Smara, Western Sahara. 20 June 2010. UN Photo #440160 by Martine
Perret.
85
Section 5.3 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

(ONUSAL)
The San Jose Agreement on Human Rights
In the wake of the Esquipulas II Agreement signed by the presidents of five Central American Republics in August
1987 and the UN action to verify its implementation (see Lesson 1), negotiations were initiated by the Government of
El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement (FMLN). These negotiations took place under the auspices
of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in early 1990 to end the 12-year-old civil war. It is estimated
that approximately 75,000 people died during the Salvadoran civil war.
In April 1990, the parties reached a framework agreement to promote democratization, guarantee respect for
human rights, and reunify Salvadoran society. The following July, they signed the San José Agreement on Human
Rights, which set out a series of rights that both sides had to respect and provided for a mechanism to verify its
implementation after they agreed upon a ceasefire.
Establishment and Mandate of ONUSAL
Shortly after the conclusion of the San José Agreement, however, both parties requested the Secretary-General
to set up a verification mission on human rights before a ceasefire agreement was reached. Pérez de Cuéllar agreed
to follow up on their request in the belief and hope that the verification action by the UN on the human rights issue
could be a useful measure of confidence-building and facilitate further negotiations towards a formal ceasefire and
other peace arrangements. Based on his proposal, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) by resolution 698 (1991) of 20 May 1991. In accordance with the San José
Agreement, ONUSAL was originally tasked to monitor human rights violations; promote human rights in the country;
make recommendations for the elimination of violations; and report on these matters to the Secretary-General and,
through him, to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. ONUSAL was to operate with a limited number of
military observers and civilian staff.
A small preparatory office had been established in San Salvador in January 1991. When ONUSAL began its
operations on 26 July 1991, it was amalgamated into the larger mission. ONUSAL initially took a two-phase approach
to its mission mandate:
Phase Time Frame Objectives
Preparatory phase July-Sept 1991 Set up regional offices and lay the operational and
conceptual bases for future work
Second phase 1 Oct 1991-Jan 1992 investigate cases and situations involving allegations
of human rights violations and to follow them up
systematically with the competent State organs and with
FMLN
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The New York Agreement
Meanwhile, negotiations on other political agreements aimed
at ending the civil war continued. On 27 April 1991, an agreement
was reached in Mexico on reforms to be presented to the Legislative
Assembly and on the creation of a three-member Commission on the
Truth, which would contribute to national reconciliation by investigating
serious acts of violence committed since 1980. In September 1991,
the parties signed the New York Agreement in which they decided to
create a National Commission for Consolidation of Peace, to reduce and
“purify” the armed forces and to organize a new national civilian police
Secretary-General Javier Perez de
force.
Cuellar (left) meets with President
Alfredo Cristiani-Burkard of El Salvador.
Following two weeks of intense negotiations at UN Headquarters
President Cristiani-Burkard arrived here
in order to help the UN-sponsored peace
in New York under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, the
process that is underway between the representatives of the Salvadorean Government and the FMLN reached
parties to the El Salvador conflict. 29
an agreement (The Act of New York) on all outstanding issues at midnight
December 1991. UN Photo #70257 by
John Isaac.
on 31 December 1991, just before the expiration of Pérez de Cuéllar’s
term of office. The Act of New York, combined with the agreements
previously signed at San José (26 July 1990), Mexico City (27 April 1991), and New York (25 September 1991),
finalized the peace process. The final peace agreement was formally signed in Chapultepec, Mexico, on 16 January
1992. The Agreement provided for a ceasefire between the warring parties; reform and reduction of the armed
forces; the conversion of the FMLN insurgent movement into a political party; the creation of a new national police
force and substantial reform of the administration of justice; the holding of new elections; and a programme to
transfer land to ex-combatants and others affected by the war.
Following the signing of the final peace agreement, ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded to include the supervision
of the ceasefire and the monitoring and verification of the other provisions of the agreement, including the National
Civil Police. In the latter case, ONUSAL would monitor the maintenance of public order during the transition period
while the new National Civil Police was being set up. ONUSAL’s strength was increased to 368 military observers and
315 civilian police.
Structure of ONUSAL
During the preparatory phase of ONUSAL, the Human Rights Division was established. Once the mission was
enlarged, the Military and Police Divisions were established. All divisions were under the overall direction of the Chief
of Mission, whose office, composed of a team of political affairs officers, was directly responsible for monitoring and
promoting the implementation of all political aspects of the Peace Agreement.
Human Rights Division
The Human Rights Division was responsible for verifying the implementation of the Human Rights Agreement,
as well as dealing with the human rights aspects of the Mission mandate. The Division had approximately 30 human
rights observers and legal advisers.
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Military Division
During the preparatory phase of ONUSAL, 15 military officers from Canada, Brazil, Ecuador, Spain, and Venezuela
maintained liaison with the military chiefs of the two parties to the conflict. With ONUCA, they carried out joint
operations, whereby they acted as escorts for FMLN commanders travelling to peace negotiations in Mexico and New
York.
Upon the signing of the Peace Agreement, ONUSAL’s Military Division was established on 20 January 1992. Its
authorized strength was 380 UNMOs. Its tasks were:
• The verification of the cessation of the armed conflict;
• Dealing with the re-deployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in
normal peacetime;
• The concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed “designated locations” in the areas of conflict;
• The monitoring of troops of both parties in these “designated locations”;
• The verification of inventories of weapons and personnel;
• The authorisation and accompanying of the movements of both forces;
• The receiving and investigation of complaints of violations; and
• The coordination and control of mine clearing through the Plan for the Prevention of Accidents from Mines
(involving some 425 minefields).
Police Division
During the preparatory phase, 16 police officials from Spain, France, and Italy were involved in the Mission’s
tasks.
Once the second phase began, the authorized strength of the Police Division was set at 631, although this
strength was never achieved. The deployment of CIVPOL personnel began on 7 February 1992. The Police Division
was composed mostly of specialists in the organisation and operation of civilian police forces. Their key tasks were
to:
• Create the new Salvadorian police force, the National Civil Police (PNC);
• Monitor National Police activities during the transition from armed conflict to national reconciliation;
• Assist in efforts to locate illegal arms caches;
• Support the Human Rights Division;
• Conduct special inquiries and ensure that appropriate security measures were provided for FMLN leaders;
• Provide support to the Electoral Division; and
• Supervise and instruct the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT).
The PAT operated between October 1992 and July 1993. It provided public order and security in the former
zones of conflict until the new National Civil Police replaced its personnel. It was made up of recruits from the
National Public Security Academy, which began its activities on 1 September 1992.
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In March 1993, the Police Division assumed additional functions as the territorial deployment of the PNC began.
Furthermore, between 1 April and 30 September 1993, the Division evaluated the performance of the PNC in the
field and provided it with technical advice and logistical support. On 27 July 1994, the PNC signed memorandums of
understanding on technical co-operation with the Police Division and Human Rights Division of ONUSAL, respectively.
Electoral Division
The Electoral Division of ONUSAL was established in September 1993. It was composed of 36 professional staff
deployed throughout the Mission’s six regional offices and 900 electoral observers at its peak strength. Its mandate
was to observe the electoral process before, during, and after the elections under the following terms of reference:
a. To observe that measures and decisions made by all electoral

authorities were impartial and consistent with the holding of
free and fair elections;
b. To observe that appropriate steps were taken to ensure that

eligible voters were included in the electoral rolls, thus enabling
them to exercise their right to vote;
c. To observe that mechanisms were in place effectively to prevent

multiple voting, given that a complete screening of the electoral
rolls before the elections was not feasible;
d. To observe that freedoms of expression, organization,

movement, and assembly were respected without restrictions;
e. To observe that potential voters had sufficient knowledge of the

mechanisms for participating in the election;
f. To examine, analyse, and assess criticisms made, objections

raised, and attempts undertaken to de-legitimize the electoral
process and, if required, to convey such information to the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal;
g. To inform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of complaints received

regarding irregularities in electoral advertising or possible
interference with the electoral process; when appropriate,
to request information on corrective measures taken by the
Tribunal; and
h. To place observers at all polling sites on election day to verify

that the right to vote was fully respected.
89
A voter casts his ballot in San Miguel. 20 March 1994. UN Photo #173082 by Milton Grant.
Delay in the Peace Process
The peace agreement was to have been fully implemented by 31 October 1992. However, major delays occurred
due to the complex nature of the process and the tight timetable imposed on the parties, and the dismantling of
the FMLN military structure had proved hard to complete. On 23 October, the Secretary-General proposed to the
parties that 15 December 1992 become the new target date. ONUSAL’s role was that of an observer in the National
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), which was mandated to oversee the implementation of all
political agreements reached by the parties. On 23 December 1992, the Secretary-General formally declared that the
armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN had ended.
Second Enlargement of ONUSAL’s Mandate
On 8 January 1993, the Government of El Salvador requested UN observation of the March 1994 elections for
the presidency, the Legislative Assembly, mayors, and municipal councils. In response to the request, the UN sent
a technical mission to El Salvador during the latter half of April 1993. It defined the terms of reference, the concept
of operations, and financial implications of expanding the ONUSAL mandate. The Security Council approved the
Secretary- General’s report by its resolution 832 (1993) of 27 May 1993 and decided to enlarge ONUSAL’s mandate
to include observation of the electoral process.
The Secretary-General further recommended that ONUSAL continue its activities for a further mandate period
through 31 May 1994. After that time, it would probably be necessary to keep the Mission in existence at reduced
strength for a few months to verify the implementation of major points in the Peace Accords. On 30 November 1993,
the Security Council extended the mandate of ONUSAL through 31 May 1994.
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FMLN Arms Caches
The discovery in Nicaragua on 23 May 1993 of an illegal arms cache belonging to FMLN and its subsequent
admission that it had maintained large quantities of weapons both within and outside El Salvador marked a serious
violation of the Peace Accords; this could have led to a collapse of the peace process.
On 12 July, the Security Council took note of the Secretary-General’s report and noted FMLN’s promise to disclose
all its holdings of arms and munitions and subsequently to destroy them by 4 August 1993. Under the supervision
of ONUSAL, the overall process of verification and destruction of FMLN weapons and equipment mandated by the
Peace Agreements had been completed on 18 August 1993. The Secretary-General also confirmed that the military
structure of FMLN had been dismantled and that full demobilization had occurred.
Commission on the Truth
In his report of 21 May 1993, the Secretary-General reported on the Commission on the Truth. The Commission
had been established in accordance with the Mexico Agreements of 27 April 1991 to “investigate serious acts
of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society was deemed to require an urgent public
knowledge of the truth.”
The Commission received over 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence that had occurred between January
1980 and July 1991. The Commission classified these violations as:
• Violence by agents of the State
• Massacres of peasants by the Armed Forces
• Assassinations by death squads
• Violence by FMLN
• Assassinations of judges
Regarding the implementation of recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, the Ministry of Justice
submitted to the Legislative Assembly several draft laws aimed at perfecting the guarantees for due process.
The Elections
After the armed conflict had been brought to an end, general elections for the presidency, part of the Legislative
Assembly, and many municipalities took place in March 1994. Six political parties participated in the elections,
including the ruling party (the National Republican Alliance, or ARENA) and the FMLN, which had transformed from
an armed insurgency movement into a legitimate, unarmed political party. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which
was in charge of the electoral process, was overseen by a “Board of Vigilance” composed of representatives of all the
participating political parties, including the FMLN.
During the campaign period, ONUSAL teams made an average of nine observation visits to each of the country’s
262 towns (more than 2,350 visits) and dispatched a total of 3,700 patrols. ONUSAL teams attended more than 800
events, mainly political meetings and demonstrations, and monitored political advertising through the mass media.
ONUSAL transmitted complaints of irregularities to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the terms of
reference of the Electoral Division.
In the elections for the Legislative Assembly, ARENA won 39 out of 84 contested seats against 21 seats for the
FMLN. ARENA was also ahead in the municipal elections with 206 out of 262 mayoralties against 16 for the FMLN.
91
ONUSAL police from Mexico (second from left) and

Spain (second from right) observing a Salvadoran
police officer (far right) making a traffic stop. UN
observers are providing training for El Salvador's
national police force. 1 February 1992. UN Photo
#73477 by J Bleibtreu.
With the presidential election, as no candidate obtained the required absolute majority, a second round was held in
April. On voting day, 24 April, ONUSAL deployed 900 observers in all the voting centres in the country. Calderón Sol
of ARENA was elected with 68 per cent of the votes against 32 per cent for Rubin Zamora, who was supported by
the FMLN.
On 25 April, ONUSAL reported that despite some irregularities in voters’ registration and the voting procedure,
the elections had proceeded without serious incidents affecting public order or ballot tampering. For the first time in
the country’s history, all political parties were able to participate on relatively fair terms. On 1 May 1994, the new
Legislative Assembly took office with the participation of the FMLN as the second political force of the country. The
Government and the FMLN signed a joint declaration on 4 October 1994 reaffirming their commitment to complete
the implementation of the peace accords.
The Reduction and Withdrawal of ONUSAL
Following the 1994 elections, the Security Council decided, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General,
to extend the mandate of ONUSAL until 30 April 1995. During the last phases of its activity, ONUSAL emphasized
institution-building and strengthening of civil society in El Salvador. After mid-1994, ONUSAL began a phased
reduction of its military and police components. By 30 November 1994, ONUSAL had a strength of three military
observers and 31 police observers. It was finally withdrawn on 30 April 1995, and a small team of civilian personnel
was left to deal with outstanding claims and to handle the final disposal of property and equipment. A small follow-
on mission called the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) was established to conduct the remaining
verification and good offices responsibilities of the UN.
MINUSAL and ONUV
In his report of 24 March 1995, the Secretary-General noted that some commitments under the Peace Accords
remained unfulfilled. Therefore, even though there was a solid case to keep ONUSAL operational after 30 April
1995, it was decided that a small team would be created to conduct the remaining verification and good offices
responsibilities of the UN. In this vein, the United Nations Mission for El Salvador (Mision de las Naciones Unidas del
Salvador) was established. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Mr. Enrique ter Horst, led the mission. To
support the Mission’s activities, the Secretary-General established the Trust Fund for MINUSAL.
In late September 1995, at the request of President Armando Calderón Sol, MINUSAL presented the government
with a detailed critique of the PNC. The report urged the government to remove more former police members
from the new force. It also found that the internal disciplinary unit, while sanctioning police misconduct such as
drunkenness and violation of internal police regulations, rarely penalized PNC abuses committed against civilians.
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MINUSAL operated from 1 May 1995 to 30 April 1996, when it was replaced with a smaller organization, called
the United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV). The ONUV operated until 31 December 1996 and consisted of only
eight staff members plus three civilian police consultants. ONUV’s mandate was “to follow up implementation of
pending aspects of the peace accords in El Salvador.” At the end of 1996, a smaller support unit continued to verify
the implementation of outstanding elements of the peace agreements until 30 June 1997. The ONUV office was
closed in July 1997, with verification duties transferred to the UN offices in Geneva.
The Secretary-General’s October 1997 report on El Salvador noted that despite large-scale international aid and
the participation of over 130 Salvadoran NGOs in various aspects of the peace process, many projects had suffered
from insufficient resources, lack of continuity, the late arrival of funds, slow decision-making, and uncoordinated
efforts.
In 2005, after more than a decade of peace, El Salvador had a distinct economic disparity between its urban and
rural populations. It remains one of the most crime-ridden countries in the Americas, and its economy has become
very dependent on the money sent home by the Salvadorian diaspora.
Section 5.4 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
Background to ONUMOZ
Barely two years after Mozambique had obtained independence from Portugal, civil war broke out in 1980
between the Government led by FRELIMO (the Frente de Libertaçao de Mozambique) and the insurgent movement
RENAMO (Resistencia National Moçambicana). At the end of 1988, 4.6 million Mozambicans had been severely
affected by the war, and about 1.5 million people had fled to neighbouring countries. By that time, both sides were
weary from continued fighting and became more receptive to suggestions for seeking a settlement of their conflict
by negotiation rather than by force.
Refugees arrive on United Nations helicopters in Sofala. 1 July 1994. UN Photo #31426 by S Santimano.
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The General Peace Agreement
The Mozambican government and RENAMO agreed to hold peace negotiations in Rome at the headquarters of
Sant’Egidio in July 1990. The Sant’Egidio community and the Italian government provided hospitality and logistic
support. Four personalities acted as mediators: Mario Raffaelli, a Socialist member of the Italian Parliament; Don
Jaime Goncalves, Archbishop of Beira and Head of Mozambique’s Episcopal Conference; and Andrea Riccardi and
Don Mateo Zuppi, both leaders of the Sant’Egidio community. Ten governments, including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Italy,
and the United States, sent observers to the negotiations, which were also strongly supported by the UN Secretary-
General.
After ten rounds of intense negotiations and two summit meetings, the two parties reached a general peace
agreement, which was signed by the President of Mozambique and the Head of RENAMO in Rome on 4 October 1992.
The agreement provided for a ceasefire to come into effect no later than 15 October 1992. The ceasefire was rapidly
followed by the separation of the opposing armed forces, their concentration in designated assembly areas, the
integration of parts of the armed forces of both sides into a new Mozambican Defence Force, and the demobilization
of the remaining troops (70,000 out of the estimated 100,000 troops). Following the demobilization process, which
was scheduled to be completed six months after the ceasefire, national elections would be held no later than 15
October 1993. The United Nations was requested to play a major role in the implementation of the agreement, in
particular regarding the ceasefire, the demobilization process, the elections, and humanitarian assistance.
In December 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali submitted his report to the Security Council on the
measures to be taken by the UN for the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. The Secretary-General
expressed his firm view that the proposed national elections should take place only after all of the military provisions
of the agreement had been carried out.
The Establishment of ONUMOZ
Based on the Secretary-General’s report of 9 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992)
on 13 October, by which it approved the appointment of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to
Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers.
On 15 October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement went into force, the interim Special Representative
and a team of 21 UNMOs, drawn from existing UN peacekeeping missions, arrived in Mozambique. On 20 October,
two UNMO teams were deployed to the provincial capitals of Nampula and Beira. Later, two additional outposts were
established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique.
During this period, there were numerous major violations of the ceasefire. These were reported to the interim
Special Representative. However, the parties resented the official complaints, and there was a high probability of the
violence escalating. To mitigate the situation, and after an informal meeting between the Government and RENAMO,
on 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
(CSC).
The CSC was chaired by the UN and was initially composed of Government and RENAMO delegations, with
representatives of Italy (the mediator State), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer
States at the Rome talks), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In December 1992, Germany also became a
member of CSC. Its first meeting was held on 4 November 1992, whereby it created its main subsidiary commissions:
the Ceasefire Commission (CCF); the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE);
and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).
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The CSC was to:
• Guarantee the implementation of the Agreement;
• Assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it;
• Settle any disputes that might arise between the parties; and
• Guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions.
Upon the further recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council authorized the establishment
of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) by resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992.
The Mandate of ONUMOZ
In his 3 December 1992 report, the Secretary-General stressed that the operational concept of ONUMOZ was
based on the strong inter-relationship between four components (political, military, electoral, and humanitarian)
that required a fully integrated approach and coordination by the interim Special Representative. The main tasks of
ONUMOZ were to:
• Monitor and verify the ceasefire between the forces of the Mozambican Government and RENAMO;
• Monitor and verify the separation and concentration of those forces;
• Monitor and verify the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons;
• Monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces;
• Provide security in the four transport corridors for the withdrawal; Monitor and verify the disbanding of
private and irregular armed groups;
• Authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures;
• Provide security for UN and other international activities in support of the peace process;
• Provide humanitarian assistance and assist in the return of refugees displaced by war and hunger; and
• Supervise the electoral process in all its phases.
Political Aspects
The Office of the Special Representative provided overall direction of UN activities in Mozambique and was
responsible for the political guidance of the peace process, including facilitating the implementation of the General
Peace Agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its joint subsidiary
commissions.
Military Aspects
ONUMOZ’s verification of the arrangements for the ceasefire and other military aspects of the peace process in
Mozambique was carried out mainly by teams of UNMOs at the 49 assembly areas in the three military regions and
elsewhere in the field. Teams were also to be deployed at airports, ports, and other critical areas, including RENAMO
headquarters.
The military aspects of ONUMOZ were closely linked with the humanitarian effort. An ONUMOZ technical unit,
staffed by civilian personnel, assisted in implementing the demobilization programme and worked closely with the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the programme’s humanitarian
aspects.
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Refugees on a train in Boane. 1 April 1994. UN Photo #180608 by S Santimano.
Electoral Aspects
ONUMOZ’s Electoral Division monitored and verified all aspects and stages of the electoral process that were
organized by the National Elections Commission. It also provided overall direction and maintained contacts with the
Government of Mozambique, RENAMO, the National Elections Commission, and the main political parties. Through the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other channels, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative
coordinated technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique.
Humanitarian Aspects
ONUMOZ’s integral component for humanitarian operations, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination (UNOHAC), was set up in Maputo. It had sub-offices at the regional and provincial levels. It replaced
the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations, which had been responsible
for humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid
community were asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC. UNOHAC also provided food and other
relief for distribution by a technical unit of ONUMOZ to the soldiers in the assembly areas.
Organization of ONUMOZ
ONUMOZ began operation in February 1993. To carry out its tasks, ONUMOZ had 6,625 troops, 354 UNMOs,
and some 850 civilian staff at its maximum strength. The operation was placed under the overall direction of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Aldo Ajello of Italy. On 23 February 1994, the Security Council,
by its resolution 898 (1994), authorized the establishment of a 1,144 CIVPOL component, as recommended by the
Secretary-General.
ONUMOZ carried out extensive operational activities throughout Mozambique. The security of corridors and main
roads was ensured by regular road and aerial patrol, as well as by vehicle and train escorts provided by United Nations
forces. They also provided security to oil- pumping stations, airports, UN warehouses, ONUMOZ HQ, and temporary
and permanent arms depots that housed the arms collected from both sides. ONUMOZ’s military component also
contributed to humanitarian activities in the country by providing engineering and medical assistance.
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The UNMOs conducted inspections into allegations of ceasefire violations and assisted in the establishment and
preparation of assembly areas. The UNMOs also supervised the process of cantonment of troops from both sides.
CIVPOL Component
In his 28 January 1994 report, the Secretary-General noted that, due to the changed circumstances in
Mozambique, there was now a greater need for a CIVPOL component to the mission.
On 23 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 898 (1994), authorized the establishment of a
1,114-strong CIVPOL component. But, to keep mission costs down, the military component of ONUMOZ was to be
drawn down.
CIVPOL would be a separate component of ONUMOZ under the command of a Chief Police Observer, who would
report directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The ONUMOZ CIVPOL mandate was to:
• Monitor all police activities in the country and verify that their actions were consistent with the General
Peace Agreement;
• Monitor respect for citizens’ rights and civil liberties;
• Provide technical support to the National Police Commission;
• Verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies did not violate the General Peace
Agreement;
• Verify the strength and location of the government police forces and their materiel;
• Monitor and verify the process of re-organization and re-training of the quick reaction police, including its
activities, weapons, and equipment; and
• Monitor the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that political rights of individuals, groups,
and political organizations were respected.
The CIVPOL component was deployed in three phases:
Phase Time Frame Objectives
1 Completed by mid- Establishment of the central headquarters and regional

March 1994 and provincial capitals teams
2 April-June 1994 Coincide with the voter registration process; up to 70

per cent of CIVPOL posts and stations throughout the
countryside would become operational
3 Deployed 1 month Monitor the elections
before the election
( 1 September 1994)
CIVPOL units were established at all strategic locations throughout Mozambique, and they had unrestricted access
to the general public. They were able to conduct investigations and, when necessary, recommend corrective action.
The CIVPOL component also worked closely with the existing electoral, military, humanitarian, and administrative
components of ONUMOZ. Liaison arrangements were set up with the national police at all levels.
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The Humanitarian Programme
The humanitarian assistance programme was a key aspect of the ONUMOZ mission. Projections indicated that
some 6 million Mozambicans would resettle over the following two years, including about 4.0 to 4.5 million internally
displaced persons, 1.5 million refugees, and 370,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependents. Thus, ONUMOZ’s
humanitarian programme had to shift its emphasis from emergency humanitarian relief towards reintegration and
rehabilitation.
At the end of 1993, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that
more than half of Mozambique’s 1.5 million refugees had returned to the country. A further 350,000 returned at the
end of 1994, with a further 375,000 returning in 1995. By October 1994, the international humanitarian assistance
programme had also aided the resettlement and reintegration of some 3 million internally displaced persons and
200,000 former combatants and their dependents.
Another key aspect of the humanitarian programme was demining.
Initially implementation was slow, but eventually, the National Mine
Clearance Plan began coordinating efforts to clear 4,000 km of roads in
the initial phase, to develop mine awareness programmes, and to train
Mozambican nationals in mine clearance and related technologies. In
May 1994, UNOHAC assumed responsibility for mine clearance.
The Elections
Despite minor incidents in the initial step, the ceasefire held quite
well. However, due to delays in the demobilization of the armed forces
of both sides and the formation of the new Mozambican Defence Force,
the proposed elections had to be postponed from October 1993 until
October 1994. On 21 October 1994, the Secretary-General reported
to the Security Council that the necessary conditions were established The United Nations Operation in
for the holding of free and fair elections. There were no violations of Mozambique (ONUMOZ) assists local
population with elections. Voters wait on
the ceasefire in recent months. Voter registration was completed in
line outside a polling station in a suburb
an orderly manner. About 10,000 soldiers were included in the new of Maputo. 28 October 1994. UN Photo
Mozambican Defence Force, and more than 75,000 combatants were #99294 by Pernaca Sudhakaran.
demobilized. The political situation was relatively calm.
The presidential and legislative elections were held from 27 to 29 October 1994. About 2,300 international
observers, including 900 from the United Nations, monitored these elections. A large number of registered voters
participated in the elections, and there were no major irregularities or incidents. The incumbent President, Mr.
Chissano, won the presidential election by 53.3 per cent of the vote against 33.7 per cent for Mr. Dhlakama, the head
of RENAMO. In the legislative election, the government party, FRELIMO, received 44.3 per cent of the vote as against
37.8 for RENAMO. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified the elections as free and fair.
Termination of ONUMOZ
The new Parliament was installed in Maputo on 8 December 1994 with the participation of the elected members
of RENAMO. Mr. Chissano was inaugurated as President of Mozambique the next day. The mandate of ONUMOZ
was formally ended at midnight on 9 December 1994, and the Special Representative left Maputo four days later.
ONUMOZ continued to carry out residual functions until the Mission was fully liquidated at the end of January 1995.
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Section 5.5 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

(UNTAC)
Background to UNTAC
Until 1970, Cambodia enjoyed relative peace and stability under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk. However,
in 1970, in events closely linked with the Vietnam War, Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup d’état led by one of his
subordinates, Lon Nol, who was supported by the United States.
Sihanouk’s fall ushered in a period of increasing turbulence. Under Lon Nol, Cambodia became involved in the
Vietnam War on the side of the Americans, and the US carried out intense air attacks against North Vietnamese
troops within Cambodian territory. In 1975, Lon Nol was in turn overthrown by the Communist guerrillas of the
Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge regime (the People’s Government of Democratic Kampuchea) imposed a brutal
re-organization of the Cambodian society, which caused the death of more than a million Cambodians in what some
describe as “auto-genocide.”
Following a series of incidents between the two countries, the Vietnamese armed forces invaded Cambodia in
December 1978. After occupying most of the country, the armed forces installed a new government in Phnom Penh
(the People’s Republic of Kampuchea) under the leadership of two Cambodian Communist allies, first Hang Samrin
and later Hun Sen. However, the new government could not extend its control to the entire country, despite the strong
support of the Vietnamese army. The armed forces of the Khmer Rouge and, to a lesser extent, troops of Sihanouk’s
party and those loyal to Son Sann, a former Prime Minister of Cambodia, held about 15 per cent of Cambodia and
waged a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese army and the armed forces of the Phnom Penh government. During
the Khmer Rouge regime and the civil war, some 370,000 Cambodians fled to Thailand and lived in refugee camps.
Cambodian society had been devastated, and the economy had become dependent on drug trafficking.
In 1982, with the support of China and the United States, the three Cambodian rebel factions formed a coalition
government-in-exile with Sihanouk as the president. The coalition government occupied Cambodia’s seat at the
United Nations from 1982 until the signing of the Paris Agreements. In this twist of realpolitik, the US began
providing support to the Khmer Rouge to destabilize the Vietnamese.
A UN patrol boat on the Mekong River. 28 February 1993. UN Photo #181110 by John
Isaac.
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The UN Response
The conflict in Cambodia was brought before the Security Council in early 1979, shortly after Vietnam invaded
Cambodia. However, the Security Council could not decide on this issue because of the disagreement among the five
Permanent Members. The matter was then referred to the General Assembly, which decided in November 1979 to call
for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and for self-determination by its people. The Assembly also
welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General to coordinate relief assistance to the Cambodian people. In July 1981,
the General Assembly convened an international conference on Cambodia (Kampuchea). Although Vietnam did not
attend the conference, it accepted the offer of good offices by the Secretary-General, which was carried out by his
Special Representative, Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed.
An Attempt at Peace Negotiations
Between 1982 and 1985, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the
four Cambodian parties and the regional states, developed the outlines of a settlement plan. This plan called for the
following: a ceasefire and the demobilization of parts of the armed forces of the Cambodian factions; the withdrawal
of all foreign troops; guarantees for Cambodia’s independence and neutrality; and the holding of free and fair
elections to a Constituent Assembly. The Cambodian parties accepted those proposals but could not agree on an
international control mechanism to supervise the transition to peace.
In early 1989, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its forces from Cambodia. In September of that year,
following the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and as the deadlock in the peace negotiations persisted, civil war
flared up again. Despite some minor losses, the forces of the Phnom Penh government of Hun Sen held on to most
of the territory it controlled.
Young soldiers of the Khmer People National

Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), one of the forces
of the four Cambodian factions, being cantoned.
16 June 1992. UN Photo #181008 by Pernaca
Sudhakaran.
New Initiatives
In January 1990, in the new mood of cooperation that had prevailed among them after the end of the Cold War,
the five Permanent Members of the Security Council took the lead to break the stalemate in the peace negotiations.
Working from the papers prepared by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, they reached a consensus
on the framework of a comprehensive peace plan. The framework provided for the establishment of a Supreme
National Council of Cambodia (SNC) composed of representatives from all four Cambodian parties, as the unique
legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia during the transitional period.
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In September 1990, the four Cambodian parties accepted the framework and set up a Supreme National Council
of 12 members, which later elected Prince Sihanouk as Chairman. The Agreements on Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (or the Paris Agreements) were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 by the
four Cambodian parties, the UN Secretary-General, and 18 governments, including the five Permanent Members of
the Security Council, the six Member States of the Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other
interested regional powers, such as Australia and Japan.
UNTAC’s Mandate and the Implementation Plan
The Paris Agreements provided for a ceasefire among the Cambodian parties and the containment, disarmament
and demobilization of 75 per cent of their respective military forces. These actions were to be followed by the
holding of free and fair elections to a Constituent Assembly that would approve a new constitution and create a new
government for Cambodia. During the transitional period, the Supreme National Council would act as “the unique
legitimate body and source of authority” of Cambodia and would delegate to a United Nations Transitional Authority
for Cambodia (UNTAC) all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the Agreements. The mandate of
UNTAC included:
• Aspects relating to human rights;
• The organization and conduct of free and fair general elections;
• Military arrangements;
• Civil administration;
• The maintenance of law and order;
• The repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; and
• The rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period.
Upon the signing of the Paris Agreements on 23 October 1991, UNTAC was established by Security Council
resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February 1992, to ensure the implementation of the Agreements on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. The Security Council also authorized the establishment and dispatch of
an Advance Mission (UNAMIC) to assist the parties in maintaining the ceasefire and making preliminary arrangements
for the arrival and deployment of UNTAC. The Secretary-General appointed Yasushi Akashi of Japan as his Special
Representative in charge of the entire operation.
Components of UNTAC
UNTAC, which began operation in March 1992, consisted of seven components: military, electoral, civil
administration, civil police, human rights, repatriation, and rehabilitation. Due to the massive size of UNTAC’s
operations, its components were computerized to allow for integration and greater efficiency and control. An
information office at UNTAC HQ was established and operated as the sole production point and conduit for information
being disseminated in Cambodia. The various UNTAC components used approximately 7,000 locally recruited support
personnel, including some 2,500 interpreters.
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Military Component
The military component was to be fully deployed by the end of May 1992. The regrouping and cantonment
process, as well as demobilization of the cantoned forces, was to be progressing by the end of September 1992. The
military component had four main functions:
• To verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment;
• To supervise the ceasefire and related measures, including regrouping, cantonment, disarming, and
demobilization;
• To control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and
• To assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programmes.
The number of regrouping areas for regular forces was set at 95, while the number of cantonment areas was
set at 52.
No. of No. of
Designated Force Regrouping Cantonment
Areas Sites*
Government of the State of Cambodia (SOC), 48 33
Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF)**

Government of the State of Cambodia (SOC), 30 10
Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF)**

Khmer People’s Liberation Front (KPNLF), 8 6
Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF)

United National Front for an Independent, 9 3
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC),
National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI)
* The number of cantonment centres was later revised upward to 55 (14 for NADK and 5 for KPNLAF)
** CPAF naval forces, totalling some 4,000 and equipped with 18 naval and 38 river vessels were to be dealt with in the same manner as the land forces. A small number
were retained to patrol coastal and river areas under the close supervision and control of UNTAC. Engineer and logistic units of the regular forces would also be subject to
special arrangements in view of their role in the demining programme, as well as in supplying and supporting the cantoned forces.
Civil Administration Component
The civil administration functions gave UNTAC the ability to exercise control over existing administrative
structures that had an impact on the outcome of the elections. Structures under direct UNTAC control were:
• Foreign affairs
• National defence
• Finance
• Public security
• Information
UNTAC also dealt with administrative structures that were under less direct control, and other offices would deal
with training, complaints, and investigation. Twenty-one provincial offices were established to parallel the existing
administrative structure in Cambodia. The civil administration component and the human rights component was
comprised of some 224 specialists assisted by an international support staff of 84.
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Electoral Component
Before UNTAC’s establishment, the Advance Election Planning
Unit undertook the initial compilation of socio-demographic and
cartographic data. That unit subsequently integrated into the electoral
component. Other electoral staff progressively deployed throughout
the country. Staff at HQ during the registration period included about
280 Cambodian data entry clerks, working in three 8-hour shifts. Some
465 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) served as district electoral
supervisors. They were vital in establishing the programme of civic
education about the election, as well as in convincing the electorate
that their vote was secret.
Following the elections, a skeleton staff remained in Phnom Penh
to advise the Special Representative’s Electoral Advisory Committee

Buddhist monks rally outside the
on CPP complaints and, subsequently, to assist with the establishment
Constituent Assembly Building as newly
of the Constituent Assembly and with its work on the constitution, as
elected members hold their first meeting
requested. following the elections. 14 June 1993.
UN Photo #888 by Pernaca Sudhakaran.
CIVPOL Component
Though the management of the Cambodian civilian police force remained the responsibility of the Cambodians,
UNTAC supervised and controlled their operations. The objective was to have one UNTAC CIVPOL officer for every
15 local police. This required some 3,600 CIVPOL officers, but it was never fully achieved as the mission reached a
maximum of some 3,300 CIVPOL officers.
The CIVPOL component had a policy and management unit at its HQ, with 21 units at the provincial level and
200 district-level units. The main function of the CIVPOL officers was to:
• Supervise or control the local civil police to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and
impartially;
• Ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected;
• Assume other responsibilities relating to the elections; and
• Assume security requirements within UNTAC itself.
Human Rights Component
UNTAC’s human rights officers were progressively deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including the zones
controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the component had no access to the zones controlled by PDK. The
UNTAC human rights component was active in three broad areas:
• It encouraged SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and undertook a review of
the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions.
• It conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the
Information/Education Division of UNTAC.
• It investigated human rights-related complaints and took corrective measures where necessary.
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Repatriation Component
The Paris Agreements gave the right to all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to voluntary return to
Cambodia. UNHCR was to lead the effort to repatriate the estimated 360,000 returnees within a nine-month time
frame. Voluntary contributions funded the operation. UNHCR:
• Identified and provided agricultural and settlement land for returnees;
• Provided them with instalment assistance;
• Provided them with reintegration assistance and food supplies for an average of one year; and
• Provided food and installation assistance for up to 30,000 spontaneous returnees.
Rehabilitation Component
The rehabilitation phase was funded from voluntary donor contributions. It required concentrated efforts in
various areas of humanitarian needs, including:
• Food, health, housing, and other essential needs, particularly of the disadvantaged, the disabled, and
women and children;
• Re-settlement and re-integration needs, including those of returnees, displaced persons, and demobilised
military forces; and
• Essential restoration, maintenance, and support of basic infrastructure.
Organization of UNTAC
The Secretary-General recommended that UNTAC have a military component of 15,900 all ranks to be headed by
a Force Commander. Personnel would include headquarters staff (204); a military observer group (485); an infantry
element (10,200); an engineer element (2,230); an air support group (326) to operate and maintain 10 fixed-wing
aircraft and 26 helicopters; a signals unit (582); a medical unit (541); a composite military police company (160);
a logistics battalion (872); and a naval element (376) to operate 6 sea patrol boats, nine river patrol boats, three
landing craft, and 12 other boats. Force headquarters would be in Phnom Penh. For operational reasons, Cambodia
would be divided into nine sectors, two of them with separate sector HQs.
Troops from Uruguay march in their camp in

Mondolkiri. 1 June 1992. UN Photo #186500 by
Pernaca Sudhakaran.
The military component represented a traditional Cold War peacekeeping force. It had a maximum strength
of about 16,000 all ranks, including nearly 900 UNMOs. The CIVPOL component had a maximum strength of about
3,300. The international civilian staff of UNTAC, which numbered about 3,000, was supplemented by more than
50,000 Cambodian temporary recruits and some 900 international polling officers seconded by various governments
during the electoral period. The total budget of UNTAC amounted to approximately $2 billion.
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Mine Clearance
UNTAC took over the landmine programmes begun by UNAMIC and expanded them. On 20 April 1992, the
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established under the Presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the
Vice Presidency of the Special Representative. CMAC began long-term programmes in mine-awareness, marking,
and clearance.
UNTAC’s Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) was comprised of some 183 officers and troops. It was organized
into mine clearance training teams and mine clearance supervisory teams. Towards the end of its mandate, MCTU
worked to equip CMAC to function after UNTAC’s withdrawal. Its main objectives were to train Cambodians to:
• Identify, locate, and destroy landmines;
• Mark minefields; and
• Promote mine awareness among the public.
By August 1993, more than 4 million square metres of Cambodian territory had been cleared of mines. About
37,000 mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) had been destroyed, and some 2,300 Cambodians had been
trained in mine-clearance techniques.
In 2000, the Cambodian government decided to form the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) to take
over the tasks of national planning, coordinating, and monitoring from CMAC. CMAA is also responsible for licensing
mine action operators, backing the elimination of stockpiles, monitoring usage, and reporting landmines, as well as
collecting and organizing a national mine action database. As of 2005, CMAC continues its work.
UNTAC soldier from Ghana guarding bombs at a military airfield at Pochentong. 1 June 1992. UN Photo #171900 by
Pernaca Sudhakaran.
105
UNTAC’s Operation
UNTAC’s operation proved to be unusually difficult. To fulfil the complex responsibilities entrusted to it, UNTAC
required full co-operation from all four Cambodian parties, but that condition was not met. Some of the tasks
assigned to UNTAC were carried out satisfactorily despite the difficulties involved. Most refugees were repatriated
and resettled in the localities they chose. The many arrangements required for the conduct of the elections were
completed effectively and without undue delay. Adequate electoral laws and regulations were drawn up and issued in
consultation with the SNC. Most eligible voters were registered and provided with voting cards. UNTAC undertook an
imaginative and highly efficient programme of public information to explain to the population the importance of the
elections, the procedure to be followed, and their right to vote freely and in secrecy.
In two important areas, however, UNTAC was less successful. The control that it had to exercise over the
Cambodian civil administration and the police force was less than adequate. The Phnom Penh Government continued
to run the day-to-day administration in most of the country and undoubtedly used its authority to favour its political
supporters in the electoral process.
On 9 May 1992, UNTAC announced that Phase I of the ceasefire, in effect since the signing of the Paris
Agreements, would be followed on 13 June by Phase II, the cantonment, disarming, and demobilization phase. In
May 1992, when UNTAC began action to contain and reduce the forces of the four Cambodian parties, the Khmer
Rouge refused to comply and would not let UNTAC personnel into the area it controlled. The cantonment process
was suspended in late 1992 due to the non-compliance of the Khmer Rouge and the deteriorating military situation.
As a UN peacekeeper from Ghana (right) looks on,

members of an UNTAC electoral team board a boat which
will transport them to villages along the river. The team
helps convey information about the upcoming elections,
scheduled for 23-28 May. 4 March 1993. UN Photo
At that point, UNTAC was faced with a wrenching dilemma. It could either use coercion to compel the Khmer
Rouge to comply with the Paris Agreements or it could proceed with the electoral process without the cooperation
and participation of the recalcitrant party. On the advice of the Special Representative and the Force Commander, the
Secretary-General adopted the latter option, which the Security Council also endorsed.
December 1992 saw several incidents where NADK units temporarily detained UNTAC personnel. In January and
February 1993, ceasefire violations continued, including exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between CPAF and
NADK and movement of troops. UNTAC protested the moves as exceeding the bounds of self-defence. From January
to March six UNTAC military and civilian personnel were injured, and two were killed by hostile action against UNTAC,
including a Bangladeshi soldier killed by a mortar believed to be fired by NADK. Nonetheless, the electoral process
went ahead.
106
A Cambodian voter and her child at a polling station in Phnom Penh on

the first day of voting. The election, for a national constituent assembly, is
being carried out under the supervision of UNTAC. 23 May 1993. UN Photo
Elections
The electoral process continued in far more difficult conditions. Because of its failure with the Khmer Rouge,
UNTAC had to abandon its plan to contain and disarm the military forces of the other Cambodian parties as well.
This development inevitably caused tension to increase, and the ceasefire, never fully observed, became even
more fragile. The Khmer Rouge attacked UN personnel to disrupt the electoral process. Officials of the Phnom Penh
Government resorted to intimidation tactics against supporters of Prince Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC, its main rival in
the elections. Prince Sihanouk threatened to boycott the elections but eventually changed his mind and resumed his
support of the UN operation.
Despite all the difficulties, electoral arrangements proceeded. The elections took place from 23-28 May 1993.
The UN peacekeeping troops and civilian police were fully deployed to ensure protection and security. There were
no major incidents. A total of 4,267,192 voters, representing approximately 90 per cent of the registered voters,
participated in the elections. Prince Sihanouk’s party won 58 seats (45.5 per cent of the vote). The Phnom Penh
government’s party came second with 51 seats (38 per cent of the vote), and Son Sann’s party obtained ten seats.
One seat went to a smaller party, MOLINAKA. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General declared that the
elections as a whole had been free and fair.
End of UNTAC’s Mandate
The Constituent Assembly began work on 14 June 1993. It adopted a new Constitution on 21 September and
elected Prince Sihanouk as Head of State (later King). In accordance with the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly
was transformed into a Legislative Assembly on 21 September 1993 and approved a new government with Prince
Ranariddh as first Prime Minister and Hun Sen as second Prime Minister.
UNTAC’s mandate ended on 24 September 1993 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk formally promulgated the new
Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, making the country a constitutional monarchy, independent, sovereign,
peaceful, neutral, and non-aligned. The Special Representative left Cambodia on 26 September 1993.
United Nations Liaison Team
On 26 September 1993, both of Cambodia’s Prime Ministers jointly requested the Secretary-General to consider
the possibility of sending some 20 or 30 UNMOs to Cambodia for a period of six months following the end of UNTAC’s
mandate in an effort to strengthen the confidence among the people, thus enhancing the stability of Cambodia and
its new Government.
107
As recommended by the Secretary-General, the Security Council by resolution 880 (1993) of 4 November
established a military liaison team for a single period of six months. The team’s task was to maintain close liaison
with the Government and report to the Secretary-General on matters affecting security. The team also helped the
Government in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreements. The team was comprised
of 20 UNMOs and was headed by a Chief Military Liaison Officer (CMLO). The team, based in Phnom Penh, was
distinct from the integrated UN office the Secretary-General intended to establish, although, in practice, the CMLO
maintained regular contact with the UN representative.
The CMLO liaised at the ministerial, executive, and ambassadorial levels, while his UNMOs handled the day-to-
day operations and reported daily to UNHQ on security conditions and developments. UNMOs were sent in mobile
teams to observe areas outside Phnom Penh when requested by the Government and when the CMLO deemed the
issue was related to the mandate.
On 29 March 1994, the Secretary-General appointed his representative in Cambodia. On 2 May, the Government
requested an extension of the Team’s mandate, but the Security Council decided that three military advisers
would be attached to the office of the representative to assist him in fulfilling his mandate. Three military advisers
were retained in Cambodia after the Team’s departure. After April 1995, one military adviser was attached to the
representative’s office.
The Impact of UNTAC
Despite the many difficulties with which it was confronted, UNTAC was considered to be a success. The election
of the Constituent Assembly, the centrepiece of the operation, was held without major incidents and could be
considered as free and fair. Most voters were able to cast their ballot freely and in secrecy, and the results of the
election reflected the collective wishes of the population and the political realities of Cambodia. After so many years
marked by auto-genocide, foreign occupation, and destructive civil war, the country, or at least most of it, could
finally enjoy a reasonable measure of peace and stability. Much credit of this remarkable achievement must go to
UNTAC.
Despite its accomplishments, however, UNTAC’s success was not complete. It was unable to ensure the
maintenance of the ceasefire and the reduction of the military forces of the contending parties. When it withdrew
from Cambodia in September 1993, the Khmer Rouge still controlled a part of the country, albeit a very small one,
and the civil war had not entirely ended. The constitution of a government of national union based on the cohabitation
of two prime ministers from rival political parties was unstable. The inability of a traditional peacekeeping operation
to fulfil its original mission because one of the parties reneges on the agreement was a serious problem which the
UN never resolved. Moreover, the immediate post-UNTAC period created an economic crisis, as the presence of such
extensive numbers of UN personnel had created massive inflation in the Cambodian economy. The withdrawal of
UNTAC caused serious economic problems, but eventually, the economy stabilized.
UNTAC was a landmark peacekeeping operation of the United Nations and was one of its largest and costliest
missions. UNTAC also set the groundwork for the development of more cohesive CIMIC policies and doctrines in
future peacekeeping missions. It was entrusted with extraordinary responsibilities, including the task of organizing
and conducting large-scale national elections for the first time.
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Section 5.6 United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

(UNAMIC)
Background to UNAMIC
To prepare the ground for a peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, the UN sent multiple fact-finding missions to
Cambodia to review the conditions of its administrative, economic, and social infrastructure and the requirements for
the repatriation of refugees. These missions became part of an August 1990 proposal that outlined a comprehensive
settlement in Cambodia. Security Council resolution 668 (1990) of 20 September 1990 endorsed the proposal. This
ultimately led to the Paris peace talks and a temporary ceasefire by all sides.
Meeting in July 1991, SNC decided to elect Prince Sihanouk as its chairman. A letter signed by Prince Sihanouk
was sent to the UN asking for a survey mission to Cambodia. In response, on 8 August, the Secretary-General
informed the Security Council of his intention to proceed with the necessary arrangements.
Establishment and Organization of UNAMIC
On the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Advance
Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreements were signed. UNAMIC would
be absorbed into UNTAC once the Security Council established UNTAC.
UNAMIC operated under the authority of the Security Council and UN command. The mission was led in the field
by a civilian Chief Liaison Officer, who, in addition to duties to UNAMIC, was responsible for maintaining contact with
SNC on preparations for the deployment of UNTAC. A Senior Military Liaison Officer would report to the Secretary-
General through the Chief Liaison Officer. The Secretary-General would, in turn, report regularly to the Security
Council on the operations of UNAMIC.
The Security Council decided to establish a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist in
maintaining the present cease-fire, in preparation for a proposed United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC). It took this action by unanimously adopting resolution 717 (1991), which calls for the Mission to become
operational with the signing of the agreements for a comprehensive political settlement. Members of the Security
Council vote in favour of the resolution. 16 October 1991. UN Photo #279391 by Milton Grant.
109
Troops from Ghana on parade at Pochentong airport near Phnom Penh. 1 September 1993. UN Photo
#181123 by Pernaca Sudhakaran.
Security Council resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991 authorized UNAMIC. UNAMIC became operational on 9
November 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his functions as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC
in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the
military elements of UNAMIC on 12 November.
Operationally, UNAMIC HQ was in Phnom Penh, and it had military liaison units at the general military
headquarters (GHQ) of each of the Cambodian parties. Teams were established at Battambang and Siem Reap,
which were also the primary bases for the mine- awareness programme.
UNAMIC had eight civilian liaison staff, 50 military liaison officers, 20 other military personnel that formed the
mine awareness unit, and approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff. Additionally, there was a
military communications unit of some 40 persons, provided by Australia as a voluntary contribution. An air operations
unit of four utility helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft from France arrived in Phnom Penh on 12 November.
UNAMIC deployed small teams of military personnel with experience in landmine awareness training. Initially,
the teams gave priority to populations living in or close to recent fighting. This programme would eventually, under
UNTAC, become part of the larger effort in conjunction with UNHCR for the resettlement of refugees.
The deployment to the parties’ headquarters of the UNAMIC liaison teams was completed on 22 December,
and per the Paris Conference, the first meeting of the mixed military working group (MMWG) was held with the
participation of all four parties on 28 December. Due to ongoing violence in late November and into December 1991,
the meeting appealed to the Secretary-General for the early deployment of UNTAC and the appointment of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
Expansion of the UNAMIC Mandate
There was a requirement to prepare the ground for the safe and orderly repatriation of Cambodian refugees
and displaced persons before the establishment of UNTAC. Therefore, at the end of December 1991, the Secretary-
General noted that there was a need to expand the mandate of UNAMIC to undertake the demining effort in Cambodia.
110
In response to the Secretary-General’s recommendations, on 8 January 1992, the Security Council by its
resolution 728 (1992) expanded the mandate of UNAMIC to include an additional 1,090 military personnel. Forty
of these personnel would be assigned to a planning and liaison unit to liaise with the National Mine Clearance
Commission. Its role was to:
• Gather information on all known minefields in the country;
• Develop a training programme for Cambodians on mine-detection and clearance;
• Establish priorities for action; and
• Allocate work among different units.
Additionally, an engineering battalion from Thailand was deployed in the Sisophon/Battambang area on 21-22
February. UNAMIC now included a field engineer battalion of 700 personnel to begin clearing repatriation routes,
reception centres, and resettlement areas, and to carry out emergency repair and rehabilitation work on roads and
bridges already cleared. Also, 200 personnel and 150 logistic support personnel were used in expert teams to train
local military personnel made available by the four Cambodian parties.
Ceasefire Violations
Until January 1992, the ceasefire was generally maintained. However, in Kompong Thom, where forces of all
four Cambodian parties were present, there were armed clashes in January between forces of SOC and forces of
PDK. UNAMIC deployed a military liaison team to the area on 29 January. Although UNAMIC’s presence contributed
to calming the situation, the atmosphere remained tense.
On 26 February, a United Nations helicopter on a reconnaissance mission in the Kompong Thom area came
under fire, and a member of the Australian contingent was wounded. This was the first attack against United Nations
peacekeepers in Cambodia. UNAMIC immediately undertook an investigation.
Two UN peacekeepers walking towards their armoured personnel carrier. 1 January 1992. UN Photo #180246 by J
Bleibtreu.
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Officers of the Self Defence Forces of Japan, as they arrive in Cambodia to participate in
their first peacekeeping mission on behalf of the United Nations. 1 September 1992. UN
Photo #126927 by Pernaca Sudhakaran.
Absorption of UNAMIC by UNTAC
The second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia met from 1 to 23 October 1991. The peace plan became
known as the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. The Agreements
consisted of a Final Act and three instruments:
1) The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the

Cambodia Conflict;
2) The Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence,

Territorial Integrity, and Inviolability, Neutrality, and National
Unity of Cambodia; and
3) The Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of

Cambodia.
By resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, the Security Council established UNTAC. UNAMIC continued to function
until UNTAC became operational, at which time UNAMIC was absorbed into UNTAC. The initial phase of UNTAC’s
deployment began on 15 March 1992.
112
1. The San Jose Agreement for El Salvador 5. Due to the huge refugee and IDP
______. problems, ONUMOZ’s humanitarian
programme had to shift its emphasis
A. Set out a number of human rights to be
from _____ towards reintegration and
respected
rehabilitation.
B. Provided for a ceasefire in the 12-year civil
A. Disarmament
war
B. Emergency humanitarian relief
C. Established the National Commission for the
C. Infrastructure reconstruction
Consolidation of Peace
D. Agricultural development
D. Established a new national civilian police
6. Which part of ONUMOZ’s mission proved

2. The final peace agreement for El
to be the most difficult?
Salvador included ______.
A. Emergency humanitarian relief
A. A ceasefire only
B. Infrastructure reconstruction
B. A ceasefire and Justice reform
C. Separation of forces
C. Justice and Armed service reform
D. Demobilisation
D. A ceasefire, Justice reform, and Armed
service reform 7. What distinguishes UNTAC from other
peacekeeping operations?
3. The electoral division of ONUSAL
______. A. It was the smallest UN mission ever
B. It did not have the support of the Secretary-
A. Could not bring complaints of irregularities to
General and his staff
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
C. At the time, it organised and conducted large-
B. Physically ran the elections in place of the
scale national elections for the first and only
government
time in UN history
C. Supervised and observed all phases of the
D. It was a large and inefficient operation,
elections
especially in regards to running the elections
D. Selected the parties that could run in the
election 8. The 1982-1985 attempt at a peace
agreement for Cambodia failed because
4. The General Peace Agreement for ______.
Mozambique included ______.
A. The parties could not agree on an international
A. Ceasefire and demobilisation
control mechanism to supervise the transition
B. The establishment of a new governing
B. The Phnom Penh government refused to sign
coalition
the agreement
C. A mechanism for the investigation of human
C. Vietnam refused to withdraw from Cambodia
rights abuses
D. The rebel factions violated the ceasefire
D. Re-armament of the military
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9. UNTAC’s success was not complete 10. The withdrawal of Libyan forces from the
because ______. Aouzou Strip was ______.
A. Upon UNTAC’s withdrawal, the civil war had A. Only witnessed by UNASOG UNMOs
not entirely ended B. Only certified by both sides with no UN
B. Elections were not free and fair involvement
C. Refugees could not be effectively repatriated C. Certified by UNASOG UNMOs and only
D. The Legislative Assembly was not involved Chadian military observers
representative of the political realities in D. Certified by both sides and witnessed by
Cambodia UNASOG UNMOs
Answer Key »
1. A
2. D
3. C
4. A
5. B
6. D
7. C
8. A
9. A
10. D
114
Performance of UN Peacekeeping
LESSON
6 Operations Established in 1991-1994:
The Unsuccessful Operations
While the UN peacekeeping
operations set up in 1991-1994 to
contain conflicts of an international
nature were generally successful,
the performance of those operations
involved in intra-state conflicts was
mixed.
UN Photo #440158 by Martine Perret.

Section 6.1 Background to Problematic Missions • Identify the unsuccessful, intra-
state operations.
(MINURSO) • Analyse three of the most
problematic missions in Angola,

Section 6.3 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
Somalia, and Bosnia.
Section 6.4 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
• Discuss the dilemmas faced by
Section 6.5 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) the UN as illustrated by these
three missions.
(UNMOT)
Section 6.7 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)
Section 6.8 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
Section 6.9 Background to UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in
Yugoslavia)
Section 6.10 The Dilemma of Non-cooperation
Section 6.11 Peace Enforcement

115
LESSON 6 | Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations Established in 1991-1994: The Unsuccessful Operations
At the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)’s Mijek team site, Military Liaison Officers mark stones
as part of practical training. 29 June 2010. UN Photo #440793 by Martine Perret.

Problematic Missions
While the UN peacekeeping operations set up in 1991-
1994 to contain international conflicts were generally
successful, the performance of those operations involved in
intra-state conflicts was mixed. As mentioned in Lesson 5,
four such operations—ONUSAL in El Salvador, ONUMOZ in
Mozambique, and UNTAC with its advance mission UNAMIC
in Cambodia—were able to fulfil their mandates within agreed
timeframes. However, the other 11 operations were less
successful.
116
Western Sahara
In Western Sahara, the ceasefire between the Moroccan troops and POLISARIO armed elements held reasonably
well, largely due to the presence of MINURSO. However, the referendum that the UN operation was mandated to
organize had to be repeatedly postponed because of a basic disagreement between the parties over the list of voters.
Rwanda
The United Nations established two peacekeeping operations regarding the ethnic conflict in Rwanda. First, the
UN established UNOMUR, a small military observer mission whose main task was to monitor the border between
Rwanda and Uganda and to deter infiltration into Rwanda of Tutsi armed elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
based in Uganda. Second, UNAMIR, a larger peacekeeping force, was established to supervise the ceasefire between
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and to assist the transitional government of national reconciliation before the holding
of general elections in accordance with the Arusha Agreement of August 1993. The Hutu and Tutsi leadership on
the transitional measures could reach no firm agreements, however, and the situation in Rwanda remained highly
unstable at the end of 1993. (These missions are covered in greater detail in Lesson 10).
Haiti
In Haiti, confronted with the uncooperative attitude of the Haitian military leadership, the United Nations decided
to postpone the deployment of UNMIH pending further negotiation.
Liberia
In Liberia, the main peacekeeping and peacemaking role was assumed by the Economic Community of West
Africa States (ECOWAS) and its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). There, the main task of UNOMIL, a small UN military
observer mission, was to monitor the activities of ECOMOG and to assist it in its efforts to maintain the ceasefire
among the Liberian warring parties and to promote a negotiated political settlement of the conflict. A peace
agreement was signed by the Liberian factions under the auspices of ECOWAS at Cotonou, Benin, in July 1993, but
new disagreements delayed its implementation.
Georgia and Tajikistan
Like UNOMIL, the UN military observer missions in Georgia (UNOMIG) and Tajikistan (UNMOT) had a secondary
peacekeeping and peace-making role. Their main task was to monitor the activities of the peacekeeping forces set up
in the two countries by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) under Russian leadership and to assist them
in the search for a peaceful settlement. In both cases, however, the peace efforts of the CIS proved to be elusive,
though in 2000 UNMOT did eventually fulfil its mandate.
In all the above cases, the Security Council decided to maintain the status quo by repeatedly extending the
mandates of the UN operations in the belief that they constituted an important deterrent factor that could consolidate
the ceasefire and promote the search for peaceful settlements (these above missions are covered in limited detail
below). However, in three other cases—those of Angola, Somalia and Bosnia—the United Nations was confronted
with dilemmas as the uncooperative attitude of one of the parties concerned led to renewed violence and wide-
spread suffering.
117
Peacekeepers with the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) consult a
map as they drive through vast desert areas in Smara, Western Sahara. 20 June 2010. UN Photo
#440161 by Martine Perret.

(MINURSO)
Background to MINURSO
Spain administered the territory of Western Sahara until 1976. Both Morocco and Mauritania affirmed their claim
to the territory, a claim opposed by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente
POLISARIO), which is composed of the indigenous Sahrawi people. The UN has been seeking a settlement in Western
Sahara since the withdrawal of Spain in 1976 and the ensuing fighting between Morocco (which had “reintegrated”
the Territory) and the Frente POLISARIO (supported by Algeria). Mauritania renounced all claims to Western Sahara
in 1979. In 1979, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also became active in seeking a peaceful solution to the
conflict.
Establishment and Organization of MINURSO
In 1985, the UN, working with the OAU, initiated a mission of good offices leading to “the settlement proposals,”
which were accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. Based on the Secretary-General’s
report (S/21360) on 29 April 1991, the Security Council, by its resolution 690 (1991), established the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
The Plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
would have sole and exclusive responsibility for all matters relating to a referendum in which the people of Western
Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) would carry out a repatriation programme for eligible Western Saharan voters living outside
the Territory. The transitional period began with the coming into effect of the ceasefire and end with the proclamation
of the results of the referendum.
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Originally, MINURSO’s civilian component was to have some 800 to 1,000 personnel, and the military component
would have had approximately 1,700 personnel. Additionally, the Mission was to have had a security unit of about
300 police officers. The original settlement plan called for the referendum in Western Sahara to have taken place in
January 1992. However, this never happened due to both sides being unable to resolve their political differences.
The Tindouf liaison office in Algeria provides a communication channel between MINURSO and the POLISARIO
leadership, whose offices are in Rabouni, some 20 km outside of Tindouf. It is also the entry point for visits to the
refugee camps located in the Tindouf region.
The Mandate of MINURSO
MINURSO is mandated to:
• Monitor the ceasefire;
• Verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory;
• Monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations;
• Take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees;
• Oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross);
• Implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees);
• Identify and register qualified voters; and
• Organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.
The Ceasefire
Due to the inability to maintain the informal ceasefire, which had been in effect for over two years, the Secretary-
General decided that the formal ceasefire should come into effect on 6 September 1991 as initially agreed. The
transition period would then begin. One hundred UNMOs were deployed to the Territory to verify the ceasefire and
the cessation of hostilities in certain areas. The number of UNMOs subsequently increased to 228, and additional
logistics and administrative support staff joined them in the field.
The primary function of MINURSO at that time was limited to verifying the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.
MINURSO’s HQ was established in Laayoune, with regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the
territory. A liaison office was also established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the
Frente POLISARIO.
Since the deployment of MINURSO in September 1991, the ceasefire has generally held. As of December 2005,
the transitional period had not begun, as the parties had not been able to agree on a plan. MINURSO had continued
to carry out its functions in so far as conditions have allowed.
The Berm and Mission Team-sites
The Berm is a 2,720-kilometre long system of defensive walls, built in six stages between 1980 and 1987. It
was built to defend Moroccan troops from POLISARIO Front attacks. Effectively, the POLISARIO Front now controls
all areas to the east of the barrier. The Berm is made of earth, rock, and sand, reinforced with regularly spaced
Moroccan garrisons, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, barbed wire, trenches, bunkers, and radar detectors.
119
The military component of MINURSO has observers based in team-sites located on both sides of the Berm. From
these team-sites, regular patrols are conducted by land and air to ensure that the parties abide by the ceasefire
agreement.
The Identification Commission
MINURSO’s Identification Commission was
established in May 1993 and began its work of
identifying potential voters in August 1994. Due to
procedural and operational difficulties and the inability
of the parties to resolve their differences, in May 1996,
the Secretary-General suspended the identification
process. At that time, most MINURSO civilian
staff were withdrawn, including the civilian police
component, which provided security and assistance to
the Identification Commission.
After a series of talks in 1997 led by the Secretary-
General, the identification process restarted in
December 1997. Identification of all applicants from
tribes other than three contested groupings was finished
by 3 September 1998. However, the parties remained
unable to arrive at a consensus on how to deal with

Records of registered voters kept by the Identification
applicants from the three groups. After intervening in
Committee of the United Nations Mission for the
October 1998, the Secretary-General was able to get
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). 19 June 2003.
the process going again. Identification of the remaining UN Photo #22001 by Evan Schneider.
individuals from the three tribal groups resumed on
15 June 1999. Even with the identification process
completed, the parties were still unable to come to a
consensus regarding the referendum.
The Restructuring of MINURSO
The restructuring of MINURSO began in September 2005 and included the closure of the two sector HQs and
restructuring of the force HQ, including the establishment of a civilian-military joint mission analysis cell and a joint
operations centre to enhance data collection and information management. The two sector HQ closures allowed
MINURSO to increase the number of UNMOs deployed to the nine military observer team-sites. The use of night
patrols and temporary observation posts came into effect on 1 October.
A phased reconfiguring of the civilian structure was designed to better support mandated activities, ensure
greater integration between the military and civilian components, and enhance the management of MINURSO.
As of late 2005, the Secretary-General had instructed his Special Representative to continue consultations with
the parties to seek a reconciliation of these views; and to explore ways and means to achieve an early, durable, and
agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara.
120
Section 6.3 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
Background to UNOMIL
The Liberian Civil War began in late 1989 when Charles Taylor, a former key government official who had gone
into exile, returned with a small group of soldiers under the name of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).
After Taylor’s troops killed President Doe in September 1990, what remained of governmental control broke down
completely. The civil war caused some 150,000 civilian casualties and led to a complete collapse of law and order.
Massive numbers of Liberians were displaced both internally and externally, resulting in some 850,000 refugees in
the neighbouring countries.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 16-country sub-regional organization, made efforts
to end the civil war. These efforts included establishing an ECOWAS’s observer force, the Military Observer Group
(ECOMOG) in 1990. The UN supported the various ECOWAS efforts to end the conflict, including the appointment of
a special representative to assist in talks between ECOWAS and the warring parties.
Establishment of UNOMIL
Security Council resolution 856 (1993) of 10 August 1994 authorized an advance team of 30 UNMOs to be
sent to Liberia. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established on 22 September 1993
by resolution 866 (1993) for an initial period of seven months, to work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the
Cotonou Peace Agreement (ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993). UNOMIL was the first
UN peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by another
organization.
UNOMIL Components
The Secretary-General estimated that the military component of UNOMIL required 303 UNMOs, organised
into 41 teams composed of six observers per team (for investigation, airports, seaports, border crossings, and
cantonment sites), 25 UNMOs stationed at UNOMIL headquarters, and eight UNMOs at each of four regional HQs. A
military medical unit of some 20 staff and a communications unit of about 25 civilian staff would also be required.
The military component of UNOMIL was to monitor and verify:
• Compliance with the ceasefire;
• The embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment; and
• The cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of combatants.
The civilian component was to include political, humanitarian, and electoral personnel. The electoral assistance
element would observe and verify the entire election process, from the registration of voters until the voting itself.
The work would be carried out by 13 international staff, 40 UN Volunteers, and necessary support staff. Organizing
and holding elections would be the responsibility of the transitional government, through the Liberian Elections
Commission consisting of representatives of the three Liberian parties. The elections were originally scheduled for
February-March 1994.
121
Presidential and parliamentary elections in Liberia were observed and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL). Liberians forming a queue to place their vote, Nimba County. 1 July 1997. UN Photo #71326 by John Charles Monua.
The Mission
UNOMIL attained its total authorized strength in early January 1994 and began deployment of its military
observers throughout Liberia. ECOMOG was also expanded with the arrival of battalions from Tanzania and Uganda
on 8 January and 28 January 1994, respectively.
These units deployed to the northern and eastern regions of the country. By April 1994, the Mission had deployed
its military observers in 27 team-sites out of a total of 39 projected sites. Four regional headquarters were established
at Monrovia (central region), Tubmanburg (western region), Gbarnga (northern region), and Tapeta (eastern region).
The military observers were engaged in the patrolling of border crossings and other entry points; observation and
verification of disarmament and demobilization; and the investigation of ceasefire violations.
Delays in the implementation of the peace agreement and resumed fighting among Liberian factions made it
impossible to hold the scheduled elections for February-March 1994. By September and October 1994, the military
situation had become confused, with alignment and realignment of groups depending on their short-term interests,
as well as the breakdown of command and control within factions. Warlords, without any particular political agenda
but with control of a certain number of soldiers, sought territory for the sake of adding to their claim to power. There
were no substantive military results, but in the process, entire villages were destroyed, and there was a complete
breakdown of law and order; most of the casualties were innocent civilians.
The factional fighting resulted in the internal displacement of some 200,000 persons. The lack of security
resulted in the inability of international and local relief organizations in Liberia to deal with the growing crisis.
Movement of relief supplies became impossible, including across the border from Côte d’Ivoire, which resulted in
almost all international humanitarian assistance operations ceasing, the exception being at Buchanan and Monrovia.
The continued fighting significantly limited the ability of UNOMIL to perform its functions. By 12 November 1994, the
UN Resident Coordinator in Liberia was reporting that the crisis had affected more than 700,000 innocent civilians in
rural Liberia and 1.2 million residents and displaced persons in Monrovia, its environs, and the rest of Montserrado
country.
122
A New UNOMIL Mandate and Concept of Operations
In October 1995, UNOMIL’s mandated changed. It now was tasked to:
• Exercise its good offices to support ECOWAS and the transitional government;
• Monitor compliance with the ceasefire and other military provisions;
• Verify disarmament and demobilization;
• Support humanitarian assistance activities as appropriate;
• Investigate and report to the Secretary-General on violations of human rights;
• Assist local human rights groups in raising voluntary assistance for training and logistic support; and
• Observe and verify the election process in consultation with OAU and ECOWAS, including the legislative and
presidential elections scheduled to take place on 20 August 1996.
For operational purposes, ECOMOG divided the country into three sectors, each under the control of a brigade.
ECOMOG’s brigade HQs were established at Gbarnga, Greenville, and Tubmanburg. ECOMOG’s force HQ would remain
in Monrovia. In turn, the tasks of ECOMOG were to:
• Monitor the borders of Liberia and man the main entry points by land, sea, or air to ensure that no arms or
ammunition were brought into the country;
• Assemble and disarm combatants of all factions;
• Establish checkpoints to verify the movement of arms and assist in the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons; and
• Carry out intensive patrols throughout the country to build confidence and create an atmosphere conducive
to the holding of free and fair elections.
In the following years, several supplementary and new peace agreements were negotiated, amending and
clarifying the Cotonou agreement. After years of conflict that resulted in massive devastation to the country and its
population, a ceasefire was eventually put in place. With the ceasefire in force, the UN with the aid of ECOMOG was
able to complete the disarmament and demobilization process, which was concluded in early February 1997. The UN
then successfully observed the conduct of the elections in July 1997. These elections led to the establishment of a
democratically elected Government, and the effective end of a war in which some 150,000 people were killed and
more than 850,000 became refugees. With this, UNOMIL achieved its principal objective.
UNOMIL Terminated
By mid-September, the Mission had withdrawn all personnel and assets to Monrovia, and most of the UNMOs
had been repatriated. However, it was decided to retain nine UNMOs until 30 September, in connection with the joint
ECOMOG/UNOMIL custody of the approximately 10,000 weapons and 1.24 million pieces of ammunition surrendered
during the disarmament and demobilization exercise.
In November 1997, following the completion of UNOMIL’s mandate on 30 September, the United Nations
established a post-conflict peace-building support office. Headed by a Representative of the Secretary-General, the
United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was intended to strengthen and harmonize United
Nations peace-building efforts, to help promote reconciliation and respect for human rights, and to help mobilize
international support for reconstruction and recovery.
123
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

(right), together with President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (centre) and
President Bill Clinton (left) of the United
States, preside over a ceremony marking
the transfer of command from the
Multinational Force to the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). 31 March 1995.
UN Photo #181022 by Evan Schneider.
Section 6.4 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
Background to UNMIH
After the departure of “Life President” Jean-Claude “Baby-Doc” Duvalier in 1986, Haiti had a series of short-
lived governments. In 1990, the country’s provisional Government requested the UN to observe the December 1990
elections. In response to this request, the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti
(ONUVEH) observed the preparation and holding of the elections, which were termed as “highly successful” by the
head of ONUVEH. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, of the National Front for Change and Democracy, was elected President.
However, the 1991 coup headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras overthrew the government of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, who was forced to flee into exile. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN condemned the
coup and began diplomatic efforts for the return to democratic rule. The Secretary-General, at the request of the
General Assembly, appointed a special envoy for Haiti, Mr. Dante Caputo, who was also appointed separately as a
special envoy by the OAS.
MICIVIH
In response to the worsening situation, and on the request of Mr. Aristide, a joint UN/OAS mission, the
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH, the French acronym for Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti), was
sent to Haiti in 1993. MICIVIH was mandated to:
• Pay attention to respect for the rights to life, to the physical integrity and security of the person, to individual
liberty, to freedom of expression, and to freedom of association.
• Inform itself about the human rights situation in Haiti and to take any initiative which it judged useful to
promote and respect human rights.
Under its terms of reference, MICIVIH’s powers included:
• Receiving communications regarding human rights violations from any person, group of persons, or entity
in Haiti;
• Presenting itself freely at any place or in any establishment, without being accompanied and without giving
notice;
124
• Meeting freely and in confidence with any person, group, or member of any entity or institution;
• Collecting, by the means it judges appropriate, all information which it regards as pertinent; and
• Assisting the judicial system in reinforcing the legal means guaranteeing the exercise of human rights and
the respect of legal procedures.
The special envoy appointed by the Secretary-General, Mr. Dante Caputo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Argentina, sought to reach an agreement on the appointment of a Prime Minister at the head of a Government of
national unity, an amnesty for the coup leaders, and the return of the President. However, his proposals were not
accepted.
To restore constitutional rule, the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993.
General Cédras then agreed to hold talks. Such talks, conducted in New York by the special envoy, led in July to an
agreement: Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October and appoint a new head of the armed forces.
Establishment and Mandate of UNMIH
As provided for by the agreements, the Security Council suspended the embargo following the approval by
Parliament of a new cabinet, and in September 1993, it established the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).
UNMIH’s mandate was to help implement provisions of the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993. The mandate
was later revised to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government to:
• Sustain a stable environment;
• Professionalize the armed forces and to create a separate police force; and
• Establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections.
However, UNMIH’s mandate was undermined due to the unwillingness of the Cédras military regime to comply
with the agreement. On 30 October 1993, the deadline for the return of President Aristide to Haiti passed. Moreover,
there was continued obstruction by the military authorities to allow UNMIH to deploy. Nonetheless, UNMIH’s mandate
was extended into 1994. Due to the growing violence and the inability of MICIVIH to complete its work, the bulk of
its personnel were evacuated in October 1993. A small group of MICIVIH administrative personnel remained in Port-
au-Prince. The Security Council also resumed the embargo against Haiti.
Soldiers of the Multinational Force (foreground) and United Nations troops (background)
on parade during the transfer ceremony. 31 March 1995. UN Photo #390394 by Evan
Schneider.
125
After further negotiations, MICIVIH returned to Haiti in 1994. The mission denounced the human rights violations
taking place and was met with harassment and obstruction. The Security Council added to the sanctions a trade
embargo, except for medical products and food-stuffs. The de facto Government declared MICIVIH’s international
staff undesirable and gave them 48 hours to leave. The Secretary-General, concerned about their security, decided
to evacuate them, in agreement with the OAS Secretary-General.
The Multinational Force
In July 1994, the Security Council authorized Member States to form a multinational force and use “all necessary
means” to facilitate the departure of the military leaders and the return to democratic rule. It also decided that
a strengthened UNMIH would take over from the multinational force once a secure and stable environment was
established.
The Secretary-General dispatched an envoy to seek arrangements for the President’s return, but the military
leaders declined to meet the envoy. Preparations for an operation to enforce the Security Council’s decision began.
The United States and Haiti’s military leaders reached an agreement in September 1994 aimed at avoiding further
violence. The agreement, mediated by a delegation headed by former United States President Jimmy Carter, provided
for the early retirement of various military leaders, the end of the embargo, and free parliamentary elections.
The 20,000-strong, 28-nation multinational force, led by the United States, began deploying in Haiti, followed
shortly after by an advance team from UNMIH. General Cédras resigned and left Haiti, along with the Chief of Staff.
On 15 October 1994, President Aristide returned to Haiti, and the following day the embargo was lifted. MICIVIH also
returned, resuming its monitoring and promotion of human rights and providing assistance to institution- building.
Transition to UNMIH and the End of the Mission
As decided by the Security Council, UNMIH took over on 31 March 1995 from the multinational force to assist the
Government in maintaining the secure and stable environment. UNMIH established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince
and sub-headquarters in six operational sectors.
UNMIH deployed five infantry battalions (including the Quick Reaction Force), support units, a military police
battalion, an engineering unit, aviation and logistic elements, a military information support team, and a civil affairs
unit in 10 locations. Additionally, Special Forces elements were deployed throughout the country in 25 locations. By
10 April 1995, the strength of the UNMIH military component was 6,017 troops, and its CIVPOL component stood
at 791 personnel. Approximately two-thirds of the military and one-third of the civilian police components of UNMIH
came from the multinational force. To maintain a secure and stable environment in Haiti, UNMIH:
• Carried out patrols;
• Escorted humanitarian relief convoys;
• Provided back-up to the Haitian authorities in law and order situations; and
• Ensured the security of UNMIH personnel and property.
As the Mission evolved, UNMIH military personnel had to take on tasks not foreseen in the Mission’s mandate.
Some of these tasks included taking on prison guard duties, conducting harbour patrols once the U.S. Coast Guard
left, and maintaining a presence in some police stations.
126
With the assistance of UNMIH and for the first time in the country’s history, a national civil police force was
created. Through MICIVIH, the UN and the OAS oversaw the two rounds of local and parliamentary elections held in
June and September of 1995. A coalition associated with President Aristide won the majority of seats at the local and
national levels. The Presidential elections were held in December. Mr. René Préval, President Aristide’s Prime Minister
in 1991, won. He took power on 7 February 1996. Overall, the election process was deemed free and fair.
On 30 June 1996, the mandate of UNMIH came to an end. With its mission concluded, UNMIH was replaced by
the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which was followed by the United Nations Transition Mission
in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).
Portrait of Capt. Pavel Bojda (Czech Republic), member of the United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) military team. 17 January 2005. UN Photo #64464 Michal
Novotny.
Section 6.5 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

(UNOMIG)
Background UNOMIG
As the Soviet Union began to collapse, disorder broke out in Abkhazia, an autonomous region of the Republic of
Georgia, in 1989. After Georgian independence in 1991, attempts by the local Abkhaz authorities to separate from
Georgia combined with social unrest escalated into a series of armed confrontations in the summer of 1992, when
the Government of Georgia deployed 2,000 Georgian troops in the region. After heavy fighting, which left some 200
dead and hundreds wounded, the Abkhaz leadership abandoned the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi and retreated to the
town of Gudauta.
A ceasefire agreement was reached on 3 September 1992 between the government, the leadership of Abkhazia,
and the Russian Federation, which was supporting the Abkhazis. The agreement also established that the ceasefire
began on 5 September 1992. However, the agreement was never fully implemented, and by 1 October 1992, the
ceasefire collapsed. Abkhaz forces, supported by fighters from the North Caucasus region, quickly gained control of
most of Abkhazia. In November 1992, the more widespread outbreak of inter-ethnic fighting in the North Caucasus
region of the Russian Federation further exacerbated the situation.
127
Establishment of UNOMIG
In consultation with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) [re-designated the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)], the UN sought to revive the peace process by diplomatic means. In
November 1992, a UN office opened in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
Through the good offices of the Secretary- General’s Special Envoy for Georgia, on 28 July 1993, the ceasefire
was re-established. International observers were deployed within 15 days of the date of the ceasefire. On 24 August
1993, the Security Council, by resolution 858 (1993), established the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG). It was composed of 88 UNMOs, plus minimal civilian support staff, to verify compliance with the ceasefire
agreement.
The ceasefire, however, broke down again on 16 September 1993. In the next few days, the military situation
developed rapidly as Abkhaz forces forced out the Georgian military. As a result of the fighting, hundreds of thousands
of civilians, mostly Georgians, were displaced.
Due to the fighting, further deployment of UNOMIG was suspended. The strength of the Mission was limited to
four UNMOs and four civilians in Sukhumi; one observer in Tbilisi; and seven observers in Sochi, a city within the
territory of the Russian Federation.
UNOMIG’s Mandate Expanded
After UNOMIG’s initial mission suspension in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate by
Security Council resolution 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993. UNOMIG was now to:
• Maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with the Russian military contingent.
• Monitor and report on the situation concerning developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote
a comprehensive political settlement.
On 14 May 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces.
The parties agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
to monitor compliance with the Agreement, with UNOMIG monitoring the implementation of the agreement and
observing the operation of the CIS forces.
The Security Council unanimously adopted

resolution 1494 (2003) and extended the
mandate of the United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31
January 2004. A wide view of the Security
Council at the meeting. 30 July 2003.UN
Photo #26468 by Mark Garten.
128
On 27 July 1994, following the recommendation by the Secretary-General, the Security Council expanded the
mandate of UNOMIG and increased its strength to up to 136 military observers. The Mission was entrusted with the
following tasks:
• Monitoring and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of
Forces;
• Observing the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force
within the framework of the implementation of the
Agreement; to verify, through observation and patrolling,
that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the
security zone and that heavy military equipment does not
remain or is not re-introduced in the security zone or the
restricted weapons zone;
• Monitoring the storage areas for heavy military equipment
withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted

Ryszard Wroblewski (Poland, left) and Ma Roedy
weapons zone in cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping (Indonesia, right), patrol officers for United
force as appropriate; Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),

stop by various houses to interview locals in the
• Monitoring the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Gagida village in Abkhazia region. 1 March 2004.
Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places beyond the UN Photo #49198 by Justyna Melnikiewicz.
boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;
• Regularly patrolling the Kodori Valley;
• Investigating reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and resolving or contributing to the resolution
of such incidents;
• Reporting regularly to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and
their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments; and
• Maintaining close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperating with the CIS peacekeeping
force and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return
of refugees and displaced persons.
The Human Rights Office
The Human Rights Office of UNOMIG was established in December 1996 and was jointly staffed by OSCE and
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The Office forms part of UNOMIG and reports to
the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Head of Mission of UNOMIG. Over the years, the Secretary-
General and his successive Special Representatives have continued efforts to promote regional stabilisation and a
settlement regarding the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia.
UNOMIG Activities
With the impasse in the peace process, the situation on the ground also remained unsettled to the end of
2000. Criminality and lawlessness continued to be major destabilizing factors, putting the overall security situation
in jeopardy. Repeated violations of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces of 14 May 1994 and
restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNOMIG continued.
129
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Military and Civilian Police jointly patrol in the Gali sector of Abkhazia region,
Georgia. 28 January 2005. UN Photo #64466 by Justyna Melnikiewicz.
However, UNOMIG continued to carry out its mandate using daily ground patrols from its headquarters in
Sukhumi and the two sector headquarters at Gali and Zugdidi, as well as through regular helicopter patrols. By these
means, UNOMIG was able to cover its entire area of responsibility, except the upper Kodori Valley, where patrolling
was suspended for security reasons.
The high level of criminality in the area and the inability of local law enforcement agencies to deal with the
problem effectively was the main threat to the security and safety of UNOMIG personnel. Additionally, the threat of
mines continued to be a serious problem. UNOMIG relied on the assistance of the HALO Trust to dispose of the mines.
Both sides also regularly restricted the freedom of movement of UNOMIG. The humanitarian situation in Abkhazia
remained serious. Though international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations continued their
efforts, there were no indications of improvement in the field of human rights.
From August to October 2001, there was a serious deterioration of the situation as fighting resumed between
Abkhaz forces and armed irregulars. During that period, UNOMIG continued its patrols throughout the mission area,
except for the Georgian-controlled upper part of the Kodori Valley. The situation took a change for the worse on 8
October, when a UNOMIG helicopter patrol to the Kodori Valley was shot down, killing all on board. This was the most
serious security incident in the history of UNOMIG.
Due to the serious security conditions, operational patrolling from UNOMIG’s Sukhumi headquarters and Gali
sectors was suspended. Patrolling resumed on 18 October 2001, after the fighting died down. However, tensions
remained high due to the presence of Georgian troops, militant rhetoric, and uncertainty about the mandate of the
CIS peacekeeping force.
130
On 15 and 17 January 2002, the Special Representative brought the two sides together for direct talks on
the situation in the Kodori Valley. They agreed on a protocol providing that UNOMIG would resume patrolling on
1 February 2002. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General’s Report of 14 October 2002 noted that the situation in the
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone had not improved.
UNOMIG Fact Finding Team
The UNOMIG Fact Finding Team (FFT) consisted of three UNMOs and a Language/Administrative Assistant. One
of the UNMOs was a trained military lawyer appointed directly to the team as the legal officer, while the other two
UNMOs were selected after gaining patrol experience in the sectors. One of the main responsibilities of the FFT is
to chair, on the Chief Military Observer’s (CMO) behalf, the Joint Fact-Finding Group, known commonly as the JFFG.
Signed in Tbilisi on 19 January 2000, the Joint Fact-Finding Group Protocol created the JFFG, which is composed
of representatives of law enforcement agencies from Abkhazia and Georgia, and the Commonwealth of Independent
States Peacekeepers (CIS-PKF) and UNOMIG FFT members. The JFFG’s role is to:
• Investigate violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement throughout the AOR;
• Investigate suspected acts of terrorism, sabotage, or politically motivated illegal acts directed against the
civilian population; and
• Provide an opportunity for law enforcement agencies on both sides of the CFL to meet and discuss recent
incidents, exchange information, and cooperate in their investigations.
CIVPOL and CIMIC Component Added to UNOMIG
Based on the report of the security assessment mission of late 2002, and by Security Council resolution 1494
(2003) of 30 July 2003, a twenty-officer-strong CIVPOL component was added to UNOMIG. The CIVPOL role was to
improve the security situation in the Gali district and strengthen the Mission’s capacity to carry out its mandate and
contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and
refugees. However, in 2005, the Secretary-General noted that the deployment of the remaining officers in the Gali
sector was still outstanding.
The UNOMIG Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) office was set up in January 2003 to coordinate and share
information between UNOMIG, other UN organizations, and the civilian community. The CIMIC office has three
UNMOs, each one located in the UNOMIG Sukhumi Headquarters and Gali and Zugdidi sectors. The role of UNOMIG’s
CIMIC office is to:
• Promote the forwarding of the peace process;
• Increase goodwill among those affected by the current conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia;
• Coordinate with external organizations such as UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, UNV, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF),
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and various international NGOs; and
• Be the initial focal point for local authorities and NGOs for the initiation and implementation of Quick Impact
Projects funded by the UN Trust Fund.
131
A United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) commander briefs his teams on the newest security developments before
their patrol rounds. 28 January 2005. UN Photo #64465 by Justyna Melnikiewicz.
UNOMIG 2003 and On
In 2003, new proposals and bilateral agreements re-invigorated the peace process. However, there still was
no resolution to the core political issue of the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia. This situation
continued to create an environment that was prone to destabilization. Therefore, UNOMIG’s role was to continue to
focus its efforts on the three issues identified as priority areas for advancing the peace process:
• Political and security matters;
• The return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and
• Economic cooperation.
Given the absence of a political settlement, the Secretary-General stated that the role played by UNOMIG
in preventing the resumption of hostilities and pursuing a lasting solution of the conflict remained relevant and
important.
By October 2004, the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process had come almost to a stand-still. However, the Secretary-
General felt that UNOMIG’s presence played a key role in preventing instability on the ground and in promoting a
political settlement of the conflict. Accordingly, the Mission’s mandate has been extended several times. There was
a resumption of talks between the sides in 2005; thus, as of December 2005, the Mission’s mandate was extended
into 2006. Because of a lack of consensus among the members of the Security Council, they were unable to extend
the mandate of UNOMIG, and the Mission came to an end in June 2009.
132

(UNMOT)
Background to UNMOT
After Tajikistan’s independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991, the new country quickly slid into a
dire social and economic crisis. Growing national instability was further exacerbated by clan, regional, and political
tensions, which were compounded by differences between secularists and pro-Islamic traditionalists.
In May 1992, the Tajik opposition tried to seize power, and the country soon slipped into a civil war. Government
forces, whose remaining forces crossed into Afghanistan, defeated the opposition in December 1992. Although the
civil war as such ended at the start of 1993, the armed insurgency of the opposition forces continued, in particular
from across the Tajik-Afghan border. To protect the border, the Governments of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation
agreed that the Russian border forces would continue to be deployed along the Pyanj river, which forms the Tajik-
Afghan border.
By mid-1993, an estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, had been killed, while another 600,000 had been
displaced internally and an additional 60,000 had crossed the border into northern Afghanistan. Many others had
fled to neighbouring Central Asian republics and other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
As part of the efforts to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan, the Governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan decided, at a meeting held in Moscow on 24 September 1993, to
establish the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan. These forces had the following mandate:
• To assist in the normalization of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border to stabilize the overall situation
in Tajikistan and create conditions conducive to progress in the dialogue between all interested parties on
ways of achieving a political settlement of the conflict; and
• To assist in the delivery, protection, and distribution of emergency and other humanitarian aid, create
conditions for the safe return of refugees to their places of permanent residence, and guard the infrastructure
and other vitally important facilities.
UNMOT staff with a member of the

government militia. 1 September 1995.
UN Photo #31550 by UNHCR/A Hollmann.
133
Initial United Nations Involvement
Several international and regional diplomatic efforts tried to find a lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict
in Tajikistan. Responding to a letter from the President of Uzbekistan, the UN became involved in September 1992,
with a fact-finding mission sent to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from 13-23 September. Subsequently, a UN good offices
mission was sent to the region in November 1992. On 21 January 1993, a small United Nations unit of political,
military, and humanitarian officers were sent to monitor the situation on the ground and to help coordinate the
international community’s response to the humanitarian situation in Tajikistan.
The UN mission reported in April 1993 that there could be an escalation of the conflict without diplomatic
intervention. Accordingly, on 26 April the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for Tajikistan with the
mandate to:
• Obtain agreement on a ceasefire and make recommendations on appropriate international monitoring
mechanisms;
• Ascertain the positions of all the concerned parties and make good offices available to assist in the
establishment of a process of negotiations for a political solution; and
• Enlist the help of neighbouring countries and others concerned in achieving those objectives.
Agreement on a Temporary Ceasefire
Efforts by successive Special Envoys of the Secretary-General resulted in the signing of the Tehran Agreement in
September 1994, which led to a temporary ceasefire. A Joint Commission was formed, composed of the Government
and the opposition. It was agreed that the Tehran Agreement would enter into force as soon as UN observers were
deployed. In light of the Tehran Agreement, on 27 September, the Security Council extended the mandates of the
Special Envoy and the small group of UN officials in Tajikistan. As a provisional measure, the group was strengthened
temporarily with 15 UNMOs drawn from existing peacekeeping operations.
Following a public announcement by the Head of the UN office in Dushanbe, the ceasefire came into effect on 20
October 1994. A further round of inter-Tajik talks took place from 20 October to 1 November 1994, at which time the
parties decided to extend the Tehran Agreement for another three months.
Establishment of UNMOT
On 16 December 1994, Security Council resolution 968 (1994) established the United Nations Mission of
Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). By the end of January 1995, UNMOT’s total personnel numbered 55, of which 22
were UNMOs, 11 were international civilian staff, and 22 were local staff.
The UNMOT concept of operations allowed the mission to act on its initiative or at the request of the Joint
Commission. In case of a complaint about a ceasefire violation, the mission investigated the complaint, established
the facts, and reported its findings to the Joint Commission and UNHQ. It would also provide good offices as stipulated
in the Tehran Agreement. The mission would maintain a close liaison with the Russian border forces and the CIS
Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan.
134
The General Agreement and the Expansion of UNMOT
In early 1996, the opposition launched an offensive in the Tavildara region and, by July 1996, the ceasefire
had effectively collapsed. After negotiations, the Khusdeh Agreement of December 1996 between the Government
and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) restored the ceasefire agreement. This paved the way for a succession of
agreements that resulted in the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan
on 27 June 1997.
In turn, based on the Secretary-General’s recommendations, the Security Council adopted resolution 1138
(1997) of 14 November, which expanded the mandate of UNMOT and increased the size of the mission. The civil
affairs component size was increased and additional expertise added in the areas of public law (including human
rights), police, electoral affairs, and coordination of international assistance. The military component was also
increased to 120 UNMOs.
During the following months, growing violence disrupted the peace process, which resulted in the elections of
1998 not being held. Nonetheless, the Security Council by resolution 1206 (1998) of 12 November 1998 extended
UNMOT’s mandate to 15 May 1999.
However, by the end of 1999, the peace process was again moving forward with the inclusion of a constitutional
referendum and the lifting of the ban on UTO political parties. Parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held
at the end of February 2000. The UN, in cooperation with the OCSE, supported the preparation for international
monitoring of the electoral process. The Security Council again extended UNMOT’s mandate to 15 May 2000.
By unanimously adopting resolution 1138 (1997), the Security Council expanded the size and the mandate of the United Nations
Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to enhance the Mission’s ability to assist in the implementation of the General Agreement
on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, which was signed on 27 June 1997. A general view of the Security
Council as they unanimously adopt resolution 1138 (1997). 14 November 1997. UN Photo #301083 by Evan Schneider.
135
Mrs. Nane Annan (left) talking with young Tajik girls in their national costumes, on the street in
Dashanbe, Tajikistan. 22 October 2002. UN Photo #24060 by Sergey Bermeniev.
The Elections and the End of the UNMOT Mandate
The UN and the OSCE deployed the Joint Electoral Observation Mission (JEOM), which arrived in Tajikistan in
January and February 2000. It was comprised of 10 core staff and 13 observers from OCSE, as well as five electoral
experts from the UN. On polling day, the JEOM deployed 86 short-term international observers, who visited some
300 of the 2,761 polling stations and also observed the counting of the votes and tabulation of the results. UNMOT
provided logistic support to the work of the JEOM throughout the process. The election for the lower house of a new
two-chamber parliament of Tajikistan was held on 27 February 2000 and went without serious incident.
Reporting to the Security Council on 14 March, the Secretary-General observed that, with the holding of the
first multi-party parliamentary election in Tajikistan, the transition period envisaged in the General Agreement was
coming to a close and, thus, so was the process that UNMOT had been set up to support. He further noted that the
UN had played an important part in this success. The election for the National Assembly (upper house) was held, as
scheduled, on 23 March.
The Secretary-General noted that several characteristics of United Nations involvement in the peace process
contributed to its overall positive outcome:
• The early engagement of the United Nations in the conflict;
• Sustained political support of the Security Council and interested Member States in the region;
• Cooperation with other organizations, notably the OSCE;
• Effective crisis management; and
• The clear will of the Tajik people to end the war and pursue a political solution.
He further observed that, from the beginning, the mandated activities of UNMOT had been channelled towards
a long-term objective, namely, to promote peace and national reconciliation. UNMOT withdrew when its mandate
expired on 15 May 2000.
136

(UNAVEM II)
Background to UNAVEM II
Following the conclusion of the agreement of 22 December 1988 on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola,
the Angolan Government of President José Eduardo dos Santos and the insurgent political movement of Mr. Jonas
Savimbi (UNITA) initiated negotiations towards resolving their 19-year civil war with the participation of Portugal
as mediator and of the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. These negotiations led to the signing in
May 1991, at Lisbon, of the Peace Accords for Angola (also known as the Bicesse Accords or “Acordos de Paz para
Angola”). This agreement provided for: a ceasefire between the Angolan warring parties; the creation of a unified
Angolan Armed Force (FAA) to be composed of parts of the two opposing armed forces; the demobilization of the
remaining parts of these warring forces and the storage of their weapons; and, finally, the conduct of presidential
and legislative elections.
The Establishment of UNAVEM II
At the request of the Angolan Government, the Security Council, by its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991,
established the second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) to assist in the implementation of
the Peace Accords. The main task of UNAVEM II was to verify that the Joint Monitoring Groups, composed of equal
numbers of representatives of the Angola Government and UNITA, would carry out their responsibilities under the
Accords and to use its good offices to help resolve any problems that might arise within the monitoring groups. The
UN Mission was also mandated to monitor the activities of the Angola police during the transitional period. Later, the
mandate of UNAVEM II was expanded to observe the elections and to verify that they were free and fair.
Verification of the Ceasefire
The verification operation began 2 June 1991. Advance parties of UNMOs were deployed to five of UNAVEM
II’s six regional HQs. UNAVEM II UNMO teams were deployed at some 46 locations (“assembly areas,” where the
troops of the two sides were assembled during the ceasefire), as well as at several “critical points” (certain seaports,
airports, and border posts). UNAVEM II police observers had been deployed in all 18 Angolan provinces by October
1991.
UNAVEM’s tasks were to:
• Verify that joint monitoring groups, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan
Government and UNITA, carried out their responsibilities;
• Monitor on the spot the observance of the ceasefire;
• Provide support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the ceasefire; and
• Examine activities of the police and, if necessary, investigate alleged violations of political rights.
As of 25 October 1991, the Mission included 350 military observers, 89 police monitors, 14 military medical
personnel, 54 international civilian staff, and 41 local civilian staff. UNAVEM II was also equipped with a civilian air
unit, made up of one fixed-wing cargo aircraft and 12 utility helicopters, supplemented when necessary by hiring a
heavy cargo aircraft and a small passenger aircraft.
137
The Elections
The ceasefire held reasonably well during the transitional
period. The UN’s role was to observe and verify the elections, not
to organize them. The elections were organized by the National
Electoral Council (NEC), in which all legalized political parties,
including the Government party (Movimento Popular Para a
Liberaçao de Angola, or MPLA) and UNITA, were represented. The
electoral process took place without major incidents. However,
there were reports of intimidation by some political parties,
especially by MPLA and UNITA, and complaints about the slow
progress in the demobilization process and the establishment of
the new Angolan Armed Force. The presidential and legislative
elections were held on 29-30 September 1992. More than 90
per cent of the registered voters participated in the elections.
The MPLA won the Legislative election with 53.74 per cent of the
votes, against UNITA’s 34.1 per cent. In the presidential election,

A woman casting her ballot, participating in
President dos Santos received 49.37 per cent of the votes and Mr.
Angola’s first national, multi-party elections. 29
Savimbi of UNITA 40.07 per cent. The Special Representative of
September 1992. UN Photo #84112 by Milton
the Secretary-General declared that with all deficiencies taken into Grant.
account, the elections could be considered as free and fair.
Problems with Cooperation
However, Mr. Savimbi rejected the results of the elections. He re-grouped his armed forces and launched a
nationwide operation against the government. Civil war flared up again with brutal violence, and by November 1992
the situation had deteriorated even further with outbreaks of heavy fighting in at least ten provincial capitals and
other population centres. In a report dated 25 November 1992 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated
that the failure of the peace process was due to the incomplete fulfilment of the key provisions of the Peace Accords.
This included the less-than-effective demobilization and storage of weapons, the delay in creating the new Angolan
Armed Forces, the setting up of a neutral police force, and the failure to re-establish central administrations in many
parts of the country.
Reporting to the Council on 21 January 1993, the Secretary-General stated that “to all intents and purposes,
Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace
Accords were signed in May 1991.” UNAVEM’s UNMOs faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45
of UNAVEM II’s 67 locations had to be evacuated, resulting in the temporary decrease of UNAVEM II’s strength. In
the following months, the mandate of UNAVEM II was extended by the Security Council on several occasions to allow
the Mission to help the two sides reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process and, at the same
time, to broker and help implement ceasefires at the national or local level.
The End of UNAVEM II’s Mandate
The UN continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan
parties and interested countries. The question of national reconciliation proved to be very difficult, but after long and
hard negotiations, an agreement was reached in October 1994.
138
A Soviet-made Ilyushin helicopter being unloaded at Luanda Airport. The helicopter is one of many being used by the UN to transport
people in remote areas to polling stations, so that they may participate in the country’s first national elections. 30 September 1992. UN
Photo #181010 by M Grant.
A comprehensive peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, was signed on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka, Zambia.
Consequently, UNAVEM II’s mandate was extended to monitor the new ceasefire, and its strength was steadily
increased. As of 31 January, the number of UNMOs had increased from 50 to 171, and civilian police observers had
increased from 18 to 122. On 8 February 1995, Security Council resolution 976 (1995) authorized the establishment
of UNAVEM III to assist the parties to restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace
Accords, the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant Security Council resolutions, thus ending UNAVEM II.
Outcome of UNAVEM II
It was estimated that during 1993, close to 1,000 persons died every day from the direct or indirect effects of
the war. The UN made major efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need, but it was often impossible
to reach those in the interior of the country. By October 1993, after intensive negotiations and due to the decrease in
the level of fighting, many people were found to be starving to death in previously inaccessible communities. Despite
major logistical difficulties, UN relief programmes did manage to provide relief to accessible populations in need. In
early 1995, some 3.5 million Angolans living in accessible areas were receiving humanitarian aid.
The problems experienced by UNAVEM II showed the risks faced by the UN when its mandate and resources
are inadequate for the complexities of the task. The situation is made worse where the parties involved are not fully
committed to the peace process. In the case of UNAVEM II, the short time-frame allotted for the cantonment and
the demobilization of troops and national reconciliation, and the narrow scope of UN activities in assuring compliance
with major provisions of the Peace Accords, had a negative impact on the overall situation.
139
Section 6.8 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
Background to UNOSOM I
In 1991, the outbreak of civil war and the total collapse of government structures, combined with drought
and famine, created a major humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The United Nations relief agencies, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and many non- governmental organizations set up humanitarian operations to feed
starving populations, but relief convoys often failed to reach the victims because of obstructions and attacks by
warlords and their unruly militias. The extent of the physical destruction to the country’s infrastructure further
exacerbated the situation.
Almost 4.5 million people, over half of the estimated population of Somalia, were threatened by severe
malnutrition and related diseases. Nearly one million Somalis fled to neighbouring countries and elsewhere, and it
has been estimated that maybe as many as half a million Somalis had died from hunger by the end of 1991. On a
larger canvas, the conflict threatened the stability of all states in the Horn of Africa.
The United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the League
of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), became actively involved in finding a
peaceful solution to the conflict. In early 1992, the newly elected UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
obtained the agreement to a ceasefire plan from the two Somali faction leaders of Mogadishu (the Interim President
of Somalia, Ali Mahdi, who controlled the Northern part of the capital; and General Mohammed Farad Aidid, warlord
of South-Mogadishu). This involved the deployment of UN military observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu
and the dispatch of a UN security component to protect humanitarian relief convoys.
Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (second

from right), Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for Somalia,
visiting a UN-supported feeding centre
run by CONCERN, a non-governmental
organization. With him are Colonel
Evren (far right) of Turkey, Military
Liaison Officer with UNOSOM, and two
Baidoa residents. 1 April 1993. UN Photo
#186487 by Milton Grant.
Establishment of UNOSOM I
On 24 April 1992, in response to the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the Security Council adopted
resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to
implement the ceasefire plan. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for
the Secretary-General’s 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. The Council
also asked the Secretary-General to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards a conference on national
reconciliation and unity.
140
The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imtíaz Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM
UNMOs arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. After major problems and delays, the 500-man UN security unit from
Pakistan began arriving in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.
Because of the ongoing security problems for UN agencies and other NGOs, on 28 August, Security Council
resolution 775 (1992) authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. On 8 September, the Security Council
approved the Secretary-General’s plan to deploy three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the
enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the
unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units.
Despite all efforts, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate during October and November 1992.
Because of the uncooperative attitude of General Aidid and his heavily armed militias, the Pakistani troops—with only
light defensive weapons and operating under the traditional principles of consent and non-use of force except in self-
defence—were confined to the Mogadishu airport area and could not carry out their mission.
Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of more UN troops. UNOSOM
troops in Mogadishu were fired upon, and their vehicles and arms were taken. Relief ships were prevented from
docking, and the delivery of international humanitarian relief supplies (at least what made it into Mogadishu),
was hampered by widespread looting, robberies, and extortion by various militias and armed bandits. It has been
estimated that some 3,000 people a day were starving to death in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked.
In response to the situation in Somalia, on 3 December, Security Council resolution 794 (1992) was adopted,
which authorized the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council authorized
the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for “the unified command and
control” of the military forces that would be involved.
UNITAF Deployed
Led by the United States, the first units of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) entered Mogadishu on 9 December
1992. UNITAF was a UN-sanctioned joint multinational operation also known as Operation Restore Hope. In the
following weeks, UNITAF forces expanded their operations to major relief centres in Somalia. UNITAF’s principal goal
was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished,
the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully
responsible for the political aspects and humanitarian assistance to Somalia.
UNITAF was composed of some 38,000 troops of military forces from the United States (which formed the
bulk of the force), Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait,
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.
From February to May 1993, UNITAF rapidly and successfully secured major population centres and ensured that
there was no restriction on the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid. Once Somalia was secure, the plan was
to transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. However, ongoing clan rivalry among the Somali factions in and around
Mogadishu and southern Somalia and the reluctance of the US to engage in long-term “nation-building” operations
led to unforeseen problems during UNOSOM II.
141
Peace Agreements and Transition to UNOSOM II
While UNITAF secured southern Somalia, the Secretary-General led peace talks in Addis Ababa from 4-15
January 1993. Three agreements were signed:
• General Agreement of 8 January 1993;
• Agreement on implementing the ceasefire and on modalities of disarmament; and
• Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at,
and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation, as well as any other issues pending from the
informal meeting.
The transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was set to happen 1 May 1993.
It was subsequently decided that the transfer of the military command would take place on 4 May. On 26 March, the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 814 (1993), by which it
decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM. Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey was appointed as Force
Commander of UNOSOM II. As UNOSOM II assumed control of the mission, he took command of forces in Somalia on
4 May 1993. Retired US Admiral Jonathan T. Howe was appointed the new UN envoy to Somalia.
Section 6.9 Background to UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in

Yugoslavia)
The United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) was initially deployed in Croatia in February
1992, following that country’s secession from the former Yugoslavia. The Force was deployed after the outbreak of
civil war between the armed forces of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serb armed elements supported
by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Its mandate was to supervise a plan worked out by the
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, and was accepted by the warring parties. This plan provided
for a ceasefire between the warring parties, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army from Croatia, and the
demilitarization and protection of the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs), in which large numbers of Serbs resided.
A United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) observation post in Sector West of Croatia. 1
January 1994. UN Photo #100483 by Jihad El Hassan.
142
UNPROFOR’s Mandate
In June 1992, when civil war spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) in a three-sided struggle
involving the Muslim-led Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Croats, the Security Council
authorized the dispatch to Bosnia of a detachment of military observers and peacekeeping troops from UNPROFOR.
The mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was initially to ensure the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport and
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Sarajevo area. In September, as fighting in Bosnia intensified, the
mandate was enlarged to support the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief
assistance throughout Bosnia and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee
of the Red Cross so requested. In October 1992, the Security Council banned all military flights in the airspace of
Bosnia except those in support of the UN operation. NATO was authorized to use its air power to enforce the ban, and
UNPROFOR was asked to monitor compliance with it.
The lack of cooperation from the warring parties, especially from the Bosnian Serbs, often prevented the UN
peacekeepers from carrying out their mission. Fighting continued with brutal violence. All three parties committed
atrocities, but the Bosnian Serbs, militarily the strongest party, were most to blame, while the Muslims (the weakest
party) suffered the most. The Serbian armed elements, which occupied about 70 per cent of the territory by the end
of 1992, continuously attacked the Muslim enclaves, victimizing the civilian population. The ban on non- UN military
flights was frequently violated. Although UNPROFOR initially was not directly responsible for containing the fighting
or preventing atrocities, its failure to do so and the frequent criticisms directed at it by the Bosnian Government
placed it in an awkward position. (UNPROFOR is covered in detail in Lesson 8)
A Canadian Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officer (third from right) talking to Croatian police officers in Daruvar. 1 July 1992. UN Photo
#46560 by Steve Whitehouse.
143
Section 6.10 The Dilemma of Non-cooperation

By mid-1992, it became increasingly evident that the traditional principles of consent, impartiality, and the
non-use of force except in self-defence were all too often inadequate when the UN peacekeeping operations were
involved in complex internal conflicts. These traditional principles were laid down when the first UN peacekeeping
force was created during the Suez crisis in November 1956. They are intended for UN peacekeeping operations
involved in international conflicts between governments and are based on the premise that when those governments
had accepted a UN operation, they would cooperate with it. However, when the United Nations is involved in
internal conflicts and must deal with internal factions, which are often destructive, organized, and undisciplined,
the guarantee of cooperation no longer holds. Therefore, when confronted with unruly and heavily armed internal
factions, the United Nations has only three options: abandon the peace mission as impossible, however important it
may be; try again to negotiate and persuade the recalcitrant parties to cooperate, however difficult and frustrating it
may be; or use coercion. The United Nations chose the second option for the crisis in Angola and the third for those
in Somalia and Bosnia.
A United Nations peacekeeping soldier, part of the UN Protection Force

in The former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), stands guard at a checkpoint. 1
January 1994. UN Photo #186496 by Staton Winter.
Section 6.11 Peace Enforcement

In his Agenda for Peace of June 1992, then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, recommended that “the
Security Council consider the utilization of peace enforcement units” in clearly defined circumstances and with their
terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist
of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would be more heavily armed than regular peacekeeping forces
and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation
of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peacekeeping
forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General.
In dealing with the deepening crises in Somalia and Bosnia, in late 1992 and early 1993, the Security Council
considered the recommendation of the Secretary-General. It decided to invoke the authority conferred upon it under
Chapter VII of the Charter to endow the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the two countries with varying
degrees of enforcement powers. However, both operations found it difficult to reconcile the conflicting requirements
of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and both suffered severe setbacks in different ways. The United Nations
was accused of being too aggressive in Somalia and too passive in Bosnia. The setbacks of the two operations are
outlined in Lessons 7 and 8.
144
1. MINURSO has not completed its mandate 4. On 27 July 1994 the Security Council did
because ______. what to UNOMIG upon recommendation
by the Secretary-General?
A. The transitional period has not begun, as
the parties’ have not been able to agree on A. Ended the Mission
a plan B. Reduced the Mission’s strength
B. There are violations of the ceasefire C. Expanded its mandate and increased its
C. The Mission does not have the capacity to strength
monitor the situation D. Temporarily withdrew the mission due to a
D. Both sides have continued human rights breakdown in the ceasefire
abuses
5. UNAVEM II’s main task was to ______.
2. UNOMIL was the first UN peacekeeping A. Conduct national elections
mission undertaken in cooperation with B. Monitor the observance of the ceasefire on
______.
the spot
A. A peacekeeping operation already C. Enforce the ceasefire
established by another organization
D. Oversee reconstruction efforts
B. Another UN peacekeeping mission
C. A group of NGOs 6. The United Nations Secretary-General
D. All of the Permanent Members of the
co-operated with what organisations in
the early 1990s to resolve the conflict in
Security Council
Somalia?
3. UNMIH’s mandate was later revised A. LAS, OAU, and OIC

to enable the Mission to assist the B. ECOWAS, LAS, NATO, and the OAU
democratic Government of Haiti to
C. LAS, NATO and OPEC
______.
D. He did not cooperate with any other
A. Sustain a stable environment and
organisations.
professionalize the armed forces
B. Professionalize the armed forces and create 7. Why were international relief
a separate police force only organisations unable to effectively reach
starving populations in Somalia?
C. Provide agricultural aid and help in
infrastructure rehabilitation A. Lack of transport to get aid to Somalia
D. Sustain a stable environment; B. Inability to get enough aid from donors
professionalize the armed forces and create C. Obstructions and attacks by warlords and
a separate police force; and establish an their militias
environment conducive to free and fair D. Poor planning by the NGOs
elections
145
8. Which of the following was not included peacekeeping

in UNPROFOR’s mandate?
10. What mechanism was suggested by
A. Secure delivery of humanitarian assistance
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
to the Sarajevo area
Ghali in An Agenda for Peace (1992)
B. Delivery of humanitarian assistance to address the changing nature of
throughout Bosnia peacekeeping?
C. Monitor in compliance with the ban on A. Continued reliance on the principles of
military flights consent, impartiality, and the non-use of
D. Monitor elections force
B. Diminished involvement of the UN in intra-
9. Why have the principles of consent,
state conflicts
impartiality, and the non-use of force
become problematic in intra-state C. Better armed and better trained peace
conflicts? enforcement units
A. They are no longer a legal option for the UN D. An increased number of peacekeeping troops
under international law

B. Internal factions are often unorganised
and undisciplined, making it difficult to
maintain the cooperation of all parties to an
agreement
C. Member States of the UN no longer
recognise them as valid
D. They are irrelevant in modern post-Cold War
Answer Key »
1. C
2. B
3. D
4. C
5. B
6. A
7. D
8. B
9. A
10. D
146
LESSON
The Second UN Operation in
7 Somalia
The collapse of Somalia into

civil war—and subsequently a
failed state scenario—led to
UN intervention in the form of
UNOSOM I in April 1992.
UN Photo #181112 by Milton Grant.
In this lesson »
Section 7.1 Background to UNOSOM II Section 7.7 The Situation in the Last Quarter of 1993
Section 7.2 UNOSOM II Established Section 7.8 UNOSOM II’s Mandate Changes
Section 7.3 The Humanitarian Conference Section 7.9 Co-ordinating Aid
Section 7.4 National Reconciliation Conference Section 7.10 The Nairobi Declaration and On
Section 7.5 Attack of 5 June 1993 Section 7.11 The Situation Deteriorates
Section 7.6 The Failure of the 3 October 1993 Assaults Section 7.12 The Withdrawal of UNOSOM II
by UN/US Forces
Section 7.13 Impact of UNOSOM II
• Trace the development of UN involvement in Somalia.
• Identify the difficulties faced by UNOSOM II in the fulfilment of its mandate.
147
LESSON 7 | The Second UN Operation in Somalia
Somalis welcoming Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, to Kismayo. 1 April 1993.
UN Photo #186488 by Milton Grant.

UNOSOM II
The collapse of Somalia into civil war—and subsequently
a failed state scenario—led to UN intervention in the form of
UNOSOM I in April 1992 (see Lesson 6). However, the ongoing
civil war eventually led to an inability to provide humanitarian
aid and an inability of the UN to expand UNOSOM I.
To resolve the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the UN-
sanctioned UNITAF (see Lesson 6), which was led by the US
and entered southern Somalia in December 1992.
It quickly secured all major relief centres, and by the
year’s end, humanitarian aid was again flowing. In early
1993, a UN-brokered ceasefire was negotiated between the
14 Somali political movements. This set the stage for the
transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in May 1993.
148
The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks
to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support. Additionally,
the United States Government agreed in principle to provide a tactical quick reaction force in support of the Force
Commander of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II would also include civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals.
Effective 9 March 1993, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.) of the United States was appointed as the Special
Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.
Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey was appointed as the Force Commander of UNOSOM II.
Section 7.2 UNOSOM II Established

On 26 March, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted resolution 814 (1993),
which expanded the size and mandate of UNOSOM. It authorized the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM for an
initial period through 31 October 1993. The mandate of UNOSOM II, which covered all of Somalia, was to:
• Monitor that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they
had consented;
• Prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that
violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities;
• Maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions that would have been brought under
international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;
• Seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assist in the registration and security of such
arms;
• Secure or maintain security at all ports, airports, and lines of communications required for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance;
• Protect the personnel, installations, and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, the ICRC, and
NGOs, and take such forceful action as might be required to neutralize armed elements that attacked, or
threatened to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force
which could assume this responsibility;
• Continue the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas;
• Assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia; and
• Carry out such other functions as might be authorized by the Security Council.
Security Council Authorizes Enforcement

Action by UNOSOM II to Secure
Humanitarian Relief Operations throughout
Somalia. 26 March 1993. UN Photo
#282745.
149
The Pakistan Battalion band playing during a ceremony marking the transfer of operational authority from UNITAF to
UNOSOM II. 4 May 1993. UN Photo #186490 by Milton Grant.
Section 7.3 The Humanitarian Conference

In the wake of UNITAF, the situation in Somalia improved. However, the humanitarian and political situation
in many parts of the country remained complex and tense. The UN focused on helping the Somalis to rebuild their
society and rehabilitate the decimated infrastructure.
At the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia (held from 11-13 March 1993 in Addis
Ababa), the UN, with the active participation of the Somalis, UN agencies, ICRC, and NGOs, created the Relief and
Rehabilitation Programme to achieve these objectives. The Programme covered the period from March to December
1993 and involved activities to:
• Re-establish local administrative capacity;
• Re-establish national and local police forces;
• Provide support services for women, particularly those victimized by violence and trauma;
• Aid in the return of some 300,000 refugees and over 1 million displaced persons within Somalia;
• Develop a food security system;
• Establish a basic health-care system;
• Increase the availability of potable water and sanitation;
• Expand agriculture and enhancement of livestock;
• Create work opportunities for the unemployed; and
• Re-establish primary education and vocational training.
Over $130 million was pledged by international donors towards the implementation of the Programme, which
was estimated to cost some $166.5 million. It was anticipated that further resources would be forthcoming as the
implementation of the various projects gained momentum.
150
Section 7.4 National Reconciliation Conference

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative continued to give high priority to national reconciliation
in Somalia. On 15 March 1993, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia convened in Addis Ababa. The
result was the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia, signed on 27
March 1993. The Agreement was comprised of four parts:
• Disarmament and security;
• Rehabilitation and reconstruction;
• Restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and
• Transitional mechanisms.
The agreement provided for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993.
The transitional mechanism was to consist of the following four basic organs of authority:
1. Transitional National Council (TNC), to act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime
political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. It consisted of 74 members
- three (two men and one woman) from each of the 18 regions of the country, one from each of the 15
political movements, and five from Mogadishu. The agreement provided for the appointment by the TNC of
a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional charter;
2. Central administrative departments, to be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments
of civil administration and social, economic, and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of
a formal Government;
3. Regional councils, to be established in all 18 existing regions of Somalia, comprised of three representatives
from each district council in the region; and
4. District councils, to be established in the existing districts in every region. Members were to be appointed
through election or consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.
A UNOSOM soldier from Turkey manning a lookout post near UNOSOM II military
headquarters in Mogadishu. 1 April 1993. UN Photo #180247 by Milton Grant.
151
Section 7.5 Attack of 5 June 1993

Soon after UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, it became apparent that General Aidid’s faction would not
cooperate in the Addis Ababa Agreement’s implementation. UNOSOM II’s efforts to implement disarmament led
to increasing tensions and, on 5 June, to all-out conflict. Throughout south Mogadishu, a series of armed attacks
against UNOSOM II troops were launched by Somali militias loyal to General Aidid’s faction. Militia units armed with
“technicals” (heavily armed trucks that had become a synonymous symbol of the war in Somalia) killed some 25
Pakistani soldiers, ten others were reported missing, and a further 54 were wounded. Their bodies were mutilated
and subjected to other forms of degradation.
In response, UNOSOM II initiated military action on 12 June 1993. Ground and air attacks occurred in south
Mogadishu that took Radio Mogadishu out of the hands of the USC/SNA (General Aidid’s faction), as well as disabling
or destroying militia weapons and equipment in storage sites and clandestine military facilities.
At the same time, UNOSOM II began an investigation of the 5 June incident. On 17 June, based on evidence
implicating the SNA militia in the attack, the Special Representative called on General Aidid to surrender peacefully
to UNOSOM II and to urge his followers to surrender their arms.
Section 7.6 The Failure of the 3 October 1993 Assaults by UN/US

Forces
In the wake of the June attacks and armed response by UNOSOM II, the mission command began a coercive
disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. A public information campaign tried to explain UNOSOM II’s actions
to the local population. UNOSOM II’s forces began active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations that were
directed at the militia and depots of General Aidid’s faction (USC/SNA).
The US deployed its Army Rangers, Delta Force, and Quick Reaction Force in support of the UNOSOM II actions.
However, US forces were not under UN command and control. On 3 October 1993, the Rangers launched an operation
in south Mogadishu, aimed at capturing several key aides of General Aidid implicated in attacks against the UN. The
operation succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to General Aidid. The situation, however,
quickly went wrong as two US Blackhawk helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons
and rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated
fire. Eighteen American soldiers lost their lives, and 75 were wounded. One US helicopter pilot was captured and
subsequently released on 14 October 1993.
In a highly calculated act by Aidid, the bodies of American soldiers were subjected to public acts of outrage,
and television stations around the world broadcasted the scenes. The American efforts to save their soldiers during
battle resulted in an estimated 1,000 Somali casualties. American commanders reinforced the Quick Reaction Force
with a joint task force consisting of air, naval, and ground forces equipped with heavy weapons, but the impact of
the televised images of the body of an American pilot being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu prompted the
withdrawal of US forces from Somalia at the end of March 1994.
On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces. After this
declaration, there was a general calm, but Mogadishu remained tense. The reality was that the major factions were
re-arming for further fighting.
152
A member of the Nigerian contingent of UNOSOM II surveying the city of Mogadishu from his post at Police
Headquarters. 1 May 1993. UN Photo #181113 by Milton Grant.
Section 7.7 The Situation in the Last Quarter of 1993

At the request of UNOSOM II, a draft framework for planning long-term reconstruction and recovery had been
prepared. The objectives of the framework were to:
• Establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development of
Somalia;
• Identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation; and
• Construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital
resources.
By November 1993, some 1.7 million people were displaced due to war and famine, with more than 1 million
crossing into Kenya and Ethiopia. Some 250,000 persons had moved to Mogadishu and about 60,000 persons to
Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions were supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced
persons. The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya was increasing. It was estimated that about 70,000
refugees in the Mombasa area had returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu, and Bossasso. Assistance was being
provided to approximately 800 refugees returning each week to the Gedo region and those spontaneously moving
into the Lower and Middle Juba areas.
By November 1993, efforts to expedite the formation of regional councils had led to the establishment of
regional councils in six areas. However, the progress for the rehabilitation of Somalia had been seriously affected by
the events of June and October 1993. Voluntary disarmament had succeeded to some extent during UNITAF and in
the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June 1993 that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to
coercive methods, which challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia. This created instability
in south Mogadishu and led to factional elements re-arming for a new round of fighting.
153
Section 7.8 UNOSOM II’s Mandate Changes

By Security Council resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994, UNOSOM II would no longer use coercive methods
but instead would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. UNOSOM II would:
• If inter-clan fighting resumed in different parts of the country, not become involved in the fighting, but
retain some capability to defend its personnel and protect the important ports and airports in the country,
as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia;
• Keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outlying areas;
• Pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems;
• Help with the repatriation of refugees;
• Continue its efforts to provide emergency humanitarian relief supplies to all in need throughout the country;
• Continue to coordinate rehabilitation and development activities to assist international programmes of
assistance in areas of their choice; and
• Continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people in the political processes of the country.
UNOSOM II was also gradually reduced in strength to a force level of 22,000. The Security Council felt that this
force level gave UNOSOM II the material means and military
assets it required to fulfil its new mandate.
Section 7.9 Coordinating Aid

The inaugural meeting of the Somali Aid Coordination
Body (SACB) was held in Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994.
The SACB was composed of major bilateral and multilateral
donors, UN agencies, and non-governmental groups. It was
created in response to the call by the Fourth Humanitarian
Conference on Somalia, and it was mandated to identify
the means of involving Somalis and their organizations in

its efforts.
Given the long-term nature of reconstruction and A Somali mother and two children waiting for food at
a UNICEF/Swede Relief feeding centre in Mogadishu.
development programmes, the Secretary-General approved
1 October 1992. UN Photo #78587 by Milton Grant.
the transfer of the Development Office from UNOSOM II to
a UNDP project on 15 March 1994.
Section 7.10 The Nairobi Declaration and On

On 17 March 1994, Mr. Ali Mahdi of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) and General Aidid, leader of SNA, met in
Nairobi under the auspices of the Acting Special Representative. On 24 March, after a series of intensive consultations
in Nairobi, Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed a declaration on national reconciliation. A National Reconciliation
Conference would be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a president and vice-presidents, and to appoint a prime
minister. However, the ongoing factional disputes, conflict, and disagreements concerning modalities led to repeated
postponements of the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference.
154
The outbreak of a cholera epidemic in February 1994 created an unexpected health emergency. Under the
auspices of UNOSOM II, a Cholera Task Force was quickly established to coordinate the efforts to contain the
epidemic. Though contained, the epidemic merely added to the growing instability in the region.
On 24 May 1994, the Secretary-General provided a negative assessment of the political and security situations
in Somalia. In light of this, the Security Council, by resolution 923 (1994) of 31 May 1994, renewed the mandate of
UNOSOM II until 30 September 1994, subject to review no later than 29 July 1994. In June and July, the security
situation was marred by clashes among clans and sub-clans, especially in Mogadishu, and by a further increase
in banditry. The recurring outbreaks of inter-clan fighting brought all humanitarian activities in Mogadishu and its
immediate vicinity to a near stand-still for several weeks. There were further attacks against UNOSOM II personnel
resulting in fatal casualties.
There was no progress on national reconciliation, and the National Reconciliation Conference and its preparatory
meeting were repeatedly postponed. New subgroups of factions emerged, and there was no clear reconciliation
process. In light of this political impasse, the Secretary-General sent a special mission to Somalia from 28 July to 4
August 1994 to review the situation. It concluded that the ongoing political impasse had created a vacuum of civil
authority and of governmental structure in Somalia, which had left the UN with no function to build on. The presence
of UNOSOM II troops had limited impact on the peace process and security in the face of continuing inter-clan
fighting and banditry. Both the Special Representative and the Force Commander recommended a force reduction in
UNOSOM II to the special mission. A gradual reduction of the force from 22,000 to approximately 15,000 would be
achieved by early November 1994.
A building damaged during Somalia’s civil war.

1 May 1993. UN Photo #181013 by Milton
Grant.
Section 7.11 The Situation Deteriorates

By the end of August 1994, the security situation in Southern Somalia had deteriorated further. There were
constant attacks and harassment against UNOSOM II and other international personnel. In response to this, in
September UNOSOM II began concentrating its force strength in four key areas. This was a preventive measure
aimed at deterring concentrated attacks against UNOSOM II contingents, such as one that occurred in Belet Weyne
on 29 July 1994 when a strong militia force overran a small UNOSOM contingent.
UNOSOM II withdrew from Bardera, Hoddur, Wajid, and Balad, as part of the concentration of forces and the
planned reduction process. By the end of October, UNOSOM II was concentrated mainly in three locations: the
Mogadishu area, Baidoa, and Kismayo.
155
Section 7.12 The Withdrawal of UNOSOM II

The Security Council sent a mission to Somalia from 26-27 October to convey directly to the Somali political
parties the Council’s views on the situation and the future of the UN’s involvement. The mission concluded that
UNOSOM II’s mandate should end on 31 March 1995. On 4 November 1994, the SC, by resolution 954 (1994),
decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995.
Once the end of UNOSOM II’s mandate had been set, the rival Somali factions in Mogadishu began to work
together. On 19 February 1995, Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Osman Ali Atto, a high-ranking official of SNA, had a meeting
that led to significant political developments during the last two weeks of UNOSOM II’s withdrawal. On 21 February
1995, a peace agreement was signed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi on behalf of SNA and SSA, respectively, to
promote national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement.
UNOSOM II conducted a phased withdrawal from southern Somalia between 28 December 1994 and 3 March
1995. The initial phase of withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces entailed redeploying troops to Mogadishu from Baidoa,
Baledogle, Afgoye, and Kismayo. With the major reductions starting in mid-February, it was no longer possible
for UNOSOM II troops to extend the necessary protection, even within Mogadishu. Aid agencies were advised to
evacuate their international staff by 14 February 1995.
The final phase of withdrawal was supported by a combined task force, known as “United Shield,” which was
composed of forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, under
American Lieutenant-General Anthony Zinni. Mogadishu seaport was handed over to the combined task force and
closed to commercial traffic on 28 February. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, his staff, and the
UNOSOM Force Commander left Mogadishu by air on 28 February. The withdrawal of the UNOSOM II rear-guard was
completed on 2 March, with the combined task force providing cover. The personnel of the combined task force, who
had come ashore on 28 February, also withdrew on 3 March, concluding the operation without casualties.
Section 7.13 Impact of UNOSOM II

The greatest success of UNOSOM II was in the humanitarian field. Millions of Somalis were helped, and an
estimated quarter of a million lives were saved. Even after the withdrawal of the Mission, aid agencies and programmes
of the UN system continued their work in Somalia. However, with the withdrawal of most western contingents by
March 1994, the Mission lost its best-equipped troops. Though the operation was extended for another year, it was
on a much smaller scale and without the authorization to use force, except in self-defence. Thus, UNOSOM II never
fulfilled its mandate.
The Secretary-General observed that the world had changed, and so had the nature of the conflict situations
that the UN was asked to resolve. There was a need for careful and creative rethinking about peace-making,
peacekeeping, and peace-building in the context of the Somali operation. The experiences of Somalia led Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to write An Agenda for Peace, which re-evaluated UN Peacekeeping in the post-Cold
War world.
156
1. After the failure of UNOSOM I, the 4. Soon after UNOSOM II took over from
international community changed its UNITAF, what became apparent?
approach and _______.
A. There were no major problems in Mogadishu.
A. Increased the number of peacekeeping troops B. There were not enough aid workers from
under UNOSOM I NGOs in Mogadishu.
B. Transferred responsibility for securing a stable C. There was an inadequate presence of other
environment for humanitarian assistance to international organisations in Somalia.
the United States D. General Aidid’s faction would not cooperate in
C. Withdrew from Somalia the Addis Ababa Agreement’s implementation.
D. Handed over control of the mission to local
leaders 5. What event prompted the withdrawal
of US forces from Somalia at the end of
2. What was unique about the powers March 1994?
granted to UNOSOM II? A. Lack of support from the UN
A. It was allowed under IMF oversight the right B. Lack of Congressional support
to print its own currency C. TV images of the body of an American
B. It could launch pre-emptive attacks against pilot being dragged through the streets of
any belligerent forces Mogadishu
C. It was granted enforcement powers under D. General Aidid’s continued attack against US
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to prevent any and UN forces
resumption of violence
D. The Commander of UNOSOM II could ignore 6. What was the real reason behind the
USC/SNA declaration of a unilateral
the rulings from the Security Council
cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM
II forces on 9 October 1993?
3. How did the Secretary-General respond
to continued non-cooperation by General A. General Aidid wanted to surrender
Aidid? B. The major factions were re-arming for further
A. He decided to capture Aidid with the help of fighting
the US quick reaction force C. The UN had agreed to withdraw from Somalia
B. He tried to offer bribes to General Aidid’s key D. Northern Somalia had entered the war in the
lieutenants south
C. He offered amnesty and a safe haven in
another country if Aidid left Somalia
D. He did nothing
157
7. What led to repeated postponements of 9. By the end of August 1994, the security
the preparatory meeting for the National situation in Southern Somalia was
Reconciliation Conference? deteriorating. In response, what did
UNOSOM II do in September?
A. Ongoing factional disputes and conflicts and
disagreements concerning modalities A. Withdrew from Somalia
B. The inability of the UN to bring security to B. Sent out small fighting patrols to engage
Somalia Somali fighters in Mogadishu
C. The unwillingness of General Aidid to C. Began concentrating its force strength in four
negotiate in good faith. key areas
D. The unwillingness of Mr. Ali Mahdi to negotiate D. Mounted large scale cordon and search
in good faith operations
8. In June and July 1994, the recurring 10. The greatest success of UNOSOM II was
outbreaks of inter-clan fighting _______. _______.
A. Led to the defeat of General Aidid’s faction A. Its military operations
B. Forced UNOSOM II’s forces to withdraw from B. Its humanitarian aid
Somalia C. Its diplomatic initiatives
C. Forced the UN to reinforce UNOSOM II with D. Its being able to stay in Somalia
10,000 more troops.
D. Brought all humanitarian activities in
Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity to a
near stand-still
Answer Key »
1. B
2. C
3. A
4. D
5. C
6. B
7. A
8. D
9. C
10. B
158
LESSON
The UN Protection Force in the
8 Former Yugoslavia
The UN Protection Force in Bosnia
(UNPROFOR-B) was, aside from
UNOSOM II, the only UN peacekeeping
operation endowed by the Security
Council with enforcement powers
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
In this lesson »
Section 8.1 Background to UNPROFOR-B Section 8.13 The Bosnian Serb Offensive and the
Government and Croat Counter-

Section 8.2 Resolution 816 (1993)
Offensive
Section 8.3 The Establishment of Safe Areas
Section 8.14 The Dayton Peace Agreement and the
Section 8.4 The Protection of Safe Areas Termination of UNPROFOR
Section 8.5 Ultimatums on Sarajevo and Gorazde

Section 8.6 Deadlock in the Peace Process
• Trace the development of the UN’s involvement in
Section 8.7 Renewed Fighting Bosnia.
Section 8.8 NATO Air Strikes • Describe the concepts of the no-fly zone and safe areas
and identify the difficulties with the enforcement of

Section 8.9 The Failure of the Ceasefire
these concepts.
Section 8.10 The Vulnerability of UNPROFOR
• Follow the peace process through the multiple stops
Section 8.11 Restructuring of UNPROFOR and starts of negotiation, culminating in the Dayton
Peace Agreement.
Section 8.12 The Establishment of the Rapid
Reaction Force • Describe the successor operations, IFOR and SFOR.

159
LESSON 8 | The UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia
The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, establishing the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to create conditions for a negotiated settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UN soldier
of the Kenyan Battalion playing with a Croatian child in a predominantly Serbian village near Knin. 28 August 1992. UN Photo #31362
by John Isaac.

UNPROFOR-B
The UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR-B) was,
aside from UNOSOM II, the only UN peacekeeping operation
endowed by the Security Council with enforcement powers
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. While UNOSOM II had
an extensive mandate and was given extensive enforcement
powers to carry it out (in retrospect, too extensive in both
respects), UNPROFOR started in Bosnia with a limited
humanitarian mission with no enforcement powers. As
the civil war in Bosnia intensified and the efforts of the
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia to promote a
peace settlement in Bosnia remained deadlocked, its mandate
was gradually enlarged to include elements of enforcement.
160
On 30 June 1992, Security Council resolution 762 (1992) authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring
functions in the “pink zones” – certain areas of Croatia controlled by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and then
populated largely by Serbs but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries. The second enlargement occurred
on 7 August 1992, when Security Council resolution 769 (1992) authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR’s strength
and mandate to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and
customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers. The third enlargement of UNPROFOR’s mandate
in Croatia came about on 6 October 1992, when Security Council resolution 779 (1992) authorized UNPROFOR to
assume responsibility for monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik.
As previously mentioned (see Lesson 6), the situation in Bosnia had greatly deteriorated by the end of 1992,
despite the presence and efforts of UNPROFOR. Delivery of humanitarian relief assistance to affected civilians often
had to be delayed or even cancelled because of obstructions by the warring parties, mainly the Bosnian Serb forces.
These forces had reduced the territory controlled by the Muslim-led Bosnian government troops to merely 10 per
cent of the country and were subjecting the cities still under government-control—including the capital, Sarajevo—to
continuing attacks, victimizing the civilian population. The ban imposed by the Security Council on military flights in
the Bosnian airspace was frequently violated. Between early November 1992 and March 1993, the UN reported 465
violations of the “no-fly zone.”
A United Nations Canadian soldier

stands guard amongst destruction
in Croatia. 1 September 1993. UN
Photo #114862 by Jihad El Hassan.
Section 8.2 Resolution 816 (1993)

In March 1993, after two Muslim villages had been bombed by aircraft believed to be Serbian, the Security
Council adopted resolution 816 (1993). This resolution invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and authorized Member
States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to take “all necessary measures” to ensure compliance
with the ban on non-UN military flights, under the authority of the Council and subject to close coordination with the
Secretary-General and UNPROFOR. In effect, the resolution enabled NATO to carry out air strikes against violations
of the no-fly zone, with the agreement of the UN Secretary-General in what came to be known as a “double-key”
system.
Following the adoption of the Security Council resolution, violations of the ban on military flights of the no-fly
zone were greatly reduced, but they did not entirely cease. The most serious incident occurred on 28 February 1994,
when NATO fighters (two USAF F-16s) engaged and shot down four of six Krajina-Serb Galeb jets that had entered
the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Six F-15Es and six F-16CGs took part in NATO’s first air strike on 21
November 1994, attacking Udbina Airfield in Croatia.
161
Section 8.3 The Establishment of Safe Areas

As fighting intensified in eastern Bosnia in March and April 1993, Bosnian Serb forces launched infantry and
artillery attacks against several Muslim-held cities, including Sarajevo and Srebrenica. By resolution 824 (1993) of 6
May 1993, the Security Council declared that Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and four other towns (Gorazde, Bihac, Zepa, and
Tuzla) and their surroundings should be treated as “safe areas.” According to this declaration, armed attacks against
those areas must cease, all Bosnian Serb military and para-military units must withdraw, and all parties must allow
UNPROFOR and the international humanitarian agencies free and unimpeded access.
Section 8.4 The Protection of Safe Areas

On 4 June 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 836 (1993), by which it expanded the mandate of
UNPROFOR to enable it to ensure the protection of the safe areas. It authorized UNPROFOR “acting in self-defence”
to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against safe areas, or to armed
incursions into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or
protected humanitarian convoys. In similar terms, as in its resolution on the ban on military flights, the Security
Council authorized NATO to use its air power to support UNPROFOR in and around the safe areas at the request of
the UN command.
Following the adoption of this resolution, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the
UNPROFOR Force Commander estimated that 34,000 additional troops would be required to achieve “deterrence
through strength.” However, the Secretary-General added that it was possible to start implementing the resolution
under a “light option” with a minimal troop reinforcement of 7,600. The Security Council chose the light option, but
the minimal troop reinforcement it authorized took nearly one year to arrive in Bosnia. Consequently, UNPROFOR
was always too thinly deployed on the ground, especially in and around the safe areas, to effectively carry out its
enlarged mandate.
Bosnian Muslims passing through a United Nations checkpoint. 1 May 1994. UN Photo #46656 by John
Isaac.
162
Through Security Council resolution 871 (1993) of 1 October 1993, the military structure of UNPROFOR was
reorganized under three subordinate commands: UNPROFOR Croatia, under Major General A. Tayyeb (Jordan),
headquartered in Zagreb; UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, under Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose (United
Kingdom), headquartered in Kiseljak; and UNPROFOR former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, under Brigadier-
General Tryggve Tellefsen (Norway), headquartered in Skopje. The three commanders reported to the Force
Commander who, together with the civilian, logistical, and administrative components, acted under the overall
direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
Section 8.5 Ultimatums on Sarajevo and Gorazde

The threats of NATO air strikes had initially encouraging deterrent effects. On 4 February 1994, a mortar round
fired at Sarajevo from a Bosnia Serb position killed ten civilians and injured 18. The next day, another mortar round
exploded at the central market of Sarajevo, killing at least 58 civilians and wounding 142 others in the worst single
incident since the start of the civil war. On 9 February, NATO, in close coordination with the UN command, addressed
an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb forces, enjoining them to withdraw or be placed under UN control. Within ten
days, their heavy weapons were to be in an exclusion zone within 20 kilometres from the centre of Sarajevo, or
they would face air strikes. The Bosnian Serb forces complied with the ultimatum and withdrew their heavy weapons
from the exclusion zone or placed them at collection points under UN control. At the same time, the two warring
parties accepted to observe a ceasefire in and around Sarajevo under UNPROFOR supervision. In April 1994, after
the Bosnian Serbs had launched an artillery attack against Gorazde, a similar ultimatum was addressed to them, and
they similarly complied.
Section 8.6 Deadlock in the Peace Process

In parallel developments, the United States initiated
a mediation effort after the ultimatum on Sarajevo that
resulted in the conclusion, in May 1994, of an agreement
between the Muslim-led Bosnian Government and the
Bosnian-Croat leadership to establish a Bosnian-Croat
Federation in Bosnia with confederal links with Croatia. In
April 1994, a contact group was set up by France, Germany,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the

United States to assist the two Co-Chairmen of the Steering
Committee of the International Conference on the former
Yugoslavia in their mediation efforts. In this connection, the
Contact Group crafted a new settlement plan based on the
division of Bosnia into two federated states: the Bosnia-
Croat Federation, with 51 per cent of the country; and the An UNPROFOR armoured personnel carrier, manned by
Nordic battalion troops, patrolling the border between
Bosnian Serb Republic of Srpska. The plan was accepted
Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
by the Muslim-led Bosnian Government, the Bosnian-Croat (FYROM). 1 March 1993. UN Photo #131432 by M
leadership, and by the Serbian President of the Federated Grafman.
Republic of Yugoslavia, but it was rejected by the Bosnian
Serb leadership.
163
United Nations soldiers of the British battalion on patrol in Vitez. 1 May 1994. UN Photo #76182
by John Isaac.
Section 8.7 Renewed Fighting

The situation in Bosnia deteriorated again during the later months of 1994 as a result of the continuing deadlock
in the peace process. Meanwhile, the Muslim-led Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croat leadership strengthened
their armed forces and reduced to some degree the military imbalance between them and the Bosnian Serbs.
More government troops were now stationed in Sarajevo and other safe areas, which were used as bases for their
military operations against the Serbs. In August and September, intense fighting erupted along the confrontation
line between government and Bosnian Serb forces. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb attacks against civilians increased in
frequency and deadly effects. There were numerous interferences with humanitarian relief operations. On several
occasions, the NATO Council authorized air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, but the UN command opposed them
for fear of Serbian retaliatory attacks against its thinly deployed troops and unarmed military observers.
Section 8.8 NATO Air Strikes

In November 1994, attacks undertaken by government and Bosnian Croat forces to retake lost territories in the
Bihac area were followed by a counter-offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces, assisted by Croatian Serbs. When the
Serbian forces launched intensive attacks against the safe area of Bihac, endangering the civilian population as well
as UNPROFOR personnel, the UN command called in NATO warplanes. In retaliation for NATO air strikes, the Bosnian
Serbs detained several UN personnel throughout Bosnia and stopped most humanitarian convoys in the territories
controlled by them.
Section 8.9 The Failure of the Ceasefire

The crisis was resolved only at the end of December 1994. On 31 December, a four-month cessation of hostility
agreement was concluded under UNPROFOR auspices between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb forces,
in which the Bosnian Croats later joined. In addition to a ceasefire for four months, the agreement provided for
the separation of forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and inter-positioning of UNPROFOR troops along the line of
confrontation and freedom of movement for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel.
164
The cessation of hostilities agreement could not be renewed despite strenuous efforts by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. Even before the agreement expired in May 1995, fighting broke out in
Bihac and soon extended to central Bosnia and Sarajevo. On 24 May, the Bosnian Serb forces removed heavy
weapons from UN collection points and used them to shell Sarajevo. During the next two days, as the Serbs failed to
return the heavy weapons to the collection points as demanded by UNPROFOR, NATO conducted air strikes against
Serb ammunition depots. The Bosnian Serb forces retaliated by taking over 300 UNPROFOR personnel as hostages
and used some of them as human shields to deter further NATO air strikes. The hostages were eventually released
after lengthy and difficult negotiations, but the Bosnian Serbs remained defiant.
Section 8.10 The Vulnerability of UNPROFOR

At the end of May 1995, UNPROFOR forces in the Sarajevo area found themselves in complete isolation and
were targeted by both government and Bosnian Serb forces. They lost control over the heavy weapons at collection
points, and their freedom of movement was further restricted. The UN could not use NATO air strikes as a deterrent
given the vulnerability of its thinly deployed troops on the ground. The Secretary-General informed the Security
Council that UNPROFOR’s position was untenable and had to be changed. He mentioned several options, including
maintenance of UNPROFOR with a reduced mandate, its complete withdrawal, or its replacement by a multinational
force under the command of one or more of the troop-contributing countries. Any option involving the continuing
presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the Secretary-General pointed out, would require additional troops to provide
better security for UN personnel.
Section 8.11 Restructuring of UNPROFOR

On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate
but inter-related peacekeeping operations: UNCRO (United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia)
and UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force), under the joint theatre headquarters known as
UNPF (United Nations Peace Forces) located in Zagreb. Eventually, following positive developments in the former
Yugoslavia and the establishment of two new United Nations Missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, UNPF-HQ
was phased out in January 1996.
United Nations military observers from the United States (right) converse with a UN civilian police
officer (left) from Switzerland. 1 May 1994. UN Photo #73484 by John Isaac.
165
Section 8.12 The Establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force

In June 1995, three troop-contributing countries (France, the Netherlands, and the UK) offered to provide a
rapid reaction force (RRF) of about 15,000 troops as reinforcement for UNPROFOR to reduce its vulnerability and
to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate. The offer was accepted by the Security Council, but the
deployment of the RRF was delayed by an objection from the Bosnian and Croatian Governments, which took the
position that RRF troops were not covered by the Status of Forces Agreement concluded at the time of the creation
of UNPROFOR.
UNPROFOR civilian police officers

attend a briefing at police
headquarters in Skopje, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
1 May 1994. UN Photo #46633 by
John Isaac.
Section 8.13 The Bosnian Serb Offensive and the

Government and Croat Counter-Offensive
Meanwhile, the situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate. In July 1995, in open defiance of the Security Council
resolutions, the Bosnian Serbs launched a full-scale assault against the safe area of Srebrenica and occupied it five
days later, despite the presence of a small Dutch infantry unit of UNPROFOR. During and after the offensive, grave
abuses of human rights were inflicted on the Muslim population, including mass detention and summary executions
of Muslim men and boys. Thousands of people were unaccounted for and probably murdered. After occupying
Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serbs attacked the nearby town of Zepa, a UN-protected safe area, and occupied it on July
25. The reaction of the Security Council to these two attacks was surprisingly mild. It was limited to a warning that
all those who committed violations of international humanitarian law would be held individually responsible and that
further violations of the safe areas would be met with decisive force, including the use of NATO air strikes.
Following the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the United States assumed a more active role in the Bosnian crisis.
When Bosnian Serb forces launched new attacks against Sarajevo in August 1995, US planes under NATO command
carried out intensive air strikes against them. At the same time, the US initiated a major mediation effort with the
support of the Security Council and in cooperation with the Contact Group and the Co-Chairmen of the Steering
Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. During this mediation process, the military
situation in Bosnia underwent a dramatic change. In August and September 1995, the Government and Bosnian
Croat forces launched a joint offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and recaptured some of their lost territories. As
a result, the map proposed by the Contact Group reflected more closely the ratio of the lands controlled by the
contending parties.
166
Section 8.14 The Dayton Peace Agreement and the Termination

of UNPROFOR
The peace initiative of the United States culminated in a peace conference held at Dayton, Ohio, in November
1995, during which the parties concerned agreed on a settlement plan. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which was
formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, provided for the division of Bosnia into two federated states as
proposed by the Contact Group. The federal government would be headed by a three-man presidency, with the co-
presidents elected by their respective communities. Presidential, legislative, and local elections would be organized
and conducted under OSCE auspices in both federated states, and arrangements would be made to promote and
facilitate the return and resettlement of refugees to their home localities.
The Dayton Peace Agreement also provided that NATO would set up a multinational Implementation Force
(IFOR) to ensure compliance with the military provisions of the agreement. IFOR would have a total strength of
60,000 troops, including a US contingent of 20,000. UNPROFOR would be withdrawn, but a sizable portion of its
military personnel would be transferred to IFOR, and the United Nations would set up an International Police Task
Force (IPTF) to advise Bosnian law enforcement personnel and to monitor their activities.
The Security Council quickly endorsed the Dayton Peace Agreement. By resolution 1031 (1995) of December
15, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized the Member States concerned to establish IFOR
and to take all necessary measures to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. In a separate resolution, the
Security Council decided to establish IPTF for one year from the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR.
United Nations aircraft being unloaded at Camp Pleso in Zagreb, Croatia. 1 May 1994.UN Photo #72351 by Janel
Schroeder.
167
A Muslim family on a street in Vitez. 1 May 1994. UN Photo #318926 by John Isaac.
IFOR took over from UNPROFOR on 20 December 1995 when Admiral Leighton Smith of the United States
assumed command. At that time, UNPROFOR had a total strength of about 21,000 troops, of which 18,500 were
transferred to IFOR, while the remainder were withdrawn.
IFOR was set up for a period of one year. In December 1996, the Security Council authorized the establishment
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for a period of 18 months to replace IFOR. SFOR had essentially the same mandate
as IFOR, but it had a reduced strength of 34,000 troops, including 8,000 personnel from the United States.
168
1. Aside from UNOSOM II, which of the 5. Why did UN command oppose NATO
following was the only UN peacekeeping air strikes in the face of Bosnian Serb
operation endowed with enforcement attacks against civilians and interference
powers under Chapter VII of the UN with humanitarian relief?
Charter?
A. UN command feared retaliatory attacks
A. UNAMIC against thinly deployed troops and UNMOs
B. UNTAC B. UN command felt that such attacks were
C. UNPROFOR illegal under the UN Charter
D. UNOSOM I C. The air strikes would not be under the control
and direction of UN command
2. What was UNPROFOR’s original mission
D. The fear that UN forces might accidentally
in Bosnia?
shoot down NATO aircraft
A. Electoral
B. Humanitarian 6. What was the purpose behind the idea of
C. Maintenance of the ceasefire a rapid reaction force?
D. Armed intervention on the Bosnian Muslim A. To reduce the vulnerability and enhance the
side capacity of UNPROFOR
B. To provide protection for humanitarian
3. Which of the following was one of the organisations
conditions that were expected to be met
C. To provide an alternative to NATO air strikes
in the safe areas declared by Security
Council resolution 824 (1993)? D. None of the above
A. Cessation of armed attacks

7. The Dayton Peace Agreement ______.
B. Withdrawal of all military and para-military
A. Militarily strengthened UNPROFOR with
units of all sides
additional troops
C. Limited access for UNPROFOR
B. Reduced the number of troops under
D. Unimpeded access for humanitarian aid
UNPROFOR
4. Why was UNPROFOR unable to fulfil its C. Transferred a sizeable portion of UNPROFOR
mandate of protecting the safe areas? troops to IFOR
A. It lacked heavy weapons D. Ended the UNPROFOR mission
B. It was slow to deploy its forces

C. The Security Council changed the mandate
D. The number of troops was insufficient and too
thinly deployed
169
8. The Dayton Peace Agreement created 10. In what areas of the former Yugoslavia
two political entities in Bosnia. What did UNPROFOR operate?
were they called?
A. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and
A. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia
and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) B. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
B. The Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) and Montenegro), the former Yugoslav Republic of
FYROM Macedonia, and Slovenia
C. Kosovo and the Federation of Bosnia and C. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the
Herzegovina Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
D. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav
and West Herzegovina Republic of Macedonia
D. Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
9. What happened to UNPROFOR’s mandate
(Serbia and Montenegro), and the former
as the mission progressed?
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
A. Its mandate kept getting reduced over the
first few years of the mission
B. Its mandate kept getting expanded during
the first few years of the mission
C. Parts of the mandate were transferred to
NATO in 1993 and 1994
D. Nothing happened to its mandate for the
duration of the mission
Answer Key »
1. C
2. B
3. A
4. D
5. A
6. A
7. C
8. A
9. B
10. C
170
LESSON
Lessons from the UN
9 Operations in Somalia and

Bosnia
Important lessons may

be drawn from the UN
experiences in Somalia and
Bosnia.
Section 9.1 Introduction • Identify the weaknesses in the UNOSOM II and
UNPROFOR operations.
Section 9.2 UNOSOM II Issues
• Identify the problems inherent in the combination
Section 9.3 UNPROFOR Issues
of peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions.
Section 9.4 Dangers of Combining Peacekeeping with
• Discuss the possibility of delegating responsibility
Enforcement Action
for peace-enforcement operations to individual
Section 9.5 Problems with Mobilization Member States or coalitions of Member States.
Section 9.6 Problems with Command and Control • Discuss lessons to be learned from the operations
in Somalia and Bosnia in the context of Secretary-

Section 9.7 Problems with Cooperation
General Boutros-Ghali’s new approach to
Section 9.8 Distinction between Peacekeeping and Peace peacekeeping as articulated in the Supplement to
Enforcement An Agenda for Peace.
Section 9.9 Application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
Section 9.10 New Approaches and Lessons Learned
171
LESSON 9 | Lessons from the UN Operations in Somalia and Bosnia
A woman stands above her crops on a platform, keeping a lookout for birds, near the town of Jowhar, Somalia. 15 December 2013. UN
Photo #574637 by Tobin Jones.
Section 9.1 Introduction

Important lessons may be drawn from the UN experiences
in Somalia and Bosnia. The mistakes made in both cases, both in
the policy-making process and at the operational level, provide
useful warning signals for the establishment and management
of future peacekeeping operations.
It soon became clear that the support of the local
population is essential to the success of a peacekeeping
operation. Lack of local support not only hinders the operation
in the implementation of its mandate and the conduct of daily
activities but can also pose a physical danger to the mission’s
personnel. The planning of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping
operation should cover the full range of its activities. The
planning process has to be as comprehensive as possible to be
effective in the long term.
172
Section 9.2 UNOSOM II Issues

In Somalia, UNOSOM II was given an extensive and precise mandate, but the workforce and equipment provided
to the UN force were insufficient for its assigned tasks. This discrepancy was quite evident when one compares
the mandate and resources of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) with those of UNOSOM II, its successor. To
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, UNITAF had 36,000 troops with sophisticated
weapons. UNOSOM II, whose mandate included UNITAF’s humanitarian tasks, the promotion of national reconciliation
in Somalia, its rehabilitation, and the return to normalcy, including the disarming of Somali militias (by force if
necessary), was given only 24,000 troops with much less sophisticated weapons and equipment.
While the insufficient means given to UNOSOM II lay at the root of its difficulties, the decision of the UN
command to use force to capture General Mohammed Farah Aidid was a major mistake that had disastrous results.
Unquestionably, strong action was necessary after the brutal murder of 24 UN Pakistani soldiers, and UNOSOM
II acted with the full support of the Secretary-General, the US Government, and the Security Council itself. In
retrospect, however, the decision to capture Aidid seems impractical and ill-advised, for even if the UN had succeeded
in capturing the Somali warlord, it is not clear what the organization could have done with him.
United States Marines serving with the

United Task Force (UNITAF) preparing to
leave Somalia. Operational authority was
transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on
4 May 1993. May 1993. UN Photo #264563.
Section 9.3 UNPROFOR Issues

Serious mistakes were also made during the UN operation in Bosnia. In the Bosnia situation, the discrepancy
between the tasks assigned to UNPROFOR and the means given to it to carry them out was a major cause of
weakness. Unlike UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR (Bosnia) began as a small humanitarian mission. As the civil war in
Bosnia intensified, the Security Council gradually enlarged UNPROFOR’s mandate and provided it with a measure of
enforcement powers and additional troops, but never quite enough to enable it to fulfil its increasing responsibilities.
As a result, UNPROFOR could rarely use the enforcement powers it had been given for fear of retaliation by the
Bosnian Serb forces against its thinly deployed troops.
The restraints displayed by UNPROFOR during some major incidents that plagued its operation seemed excessive
and counter-productive. UNPROFOR failed to take forceful action when the Bosnian Serbs attacked and occupied
Srebrenica and Zepa (two UN-protected safe areas) and committed blatant atrocities against the captured Muslim
civilians in the presence of UN peacekeepers and in open defiance of the Security Council resolutions. This situation
damaged UNPROFOR’s credibility and provoked justifiable criticism.
173
View of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) armoured vehicle in a reinforced position on
the edge of Sarajevo’s Butmir Airport. 3 September 1992. UN Photo #121849 by John Isaac.
Section 9.4 Dangers of Combining Peacekeeping with

Enforcement Action
The most important lesson provided by the UN experience in Somalia and Bosnia is the danger of combining
peacekeeping with peace enforcement. There is little question that when a UN peacekeeping operation is involved in
a complex civil war situation in a country where normal government structures have collapsed, it may need to use
a measure of force or a credible threat of force to carry out its mission. The operation must also effectively support
vital humanitarian relief efforts, prevent blatant violations of human rights, and protect the civilian population and
the peacekeepers themselves. However, once the United Nations uses force beyond self-defence for enforcement
purposes, it may be difficult to control the level of violence and to avoid casualties. Therefore, it is important that
any UN peacekeeping operation endowed with enforcement powers be strong enough to use force successfully on a
large scale, should this situation arise. This would require many well-trained and well-armed troops, as well as a fully
integrated and efficient command and control structure.
Under its present system, however, the United Nations is unable politically, militarily, and financially to organize
and conduct operations meeting those requirements. The present system is subject to certain limitations dictated
by important practical and political considerations. This system is still based on the criteria laid down by Dag
Hammarskjöld when UN peacekeeping forces were set up to contain international conflicts involving governments
and operated under the traditional principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence.
Section 9.5 Problems with Mobilization

Because the United Nations does not maintain a standing army, the Secretary-General must establish each new
peacekeeping force on an ad hoc basis, often hurriedly and without much time for planning, after the Security Council
has authorized its establishment. His ability to organize and deploy the new operation depends on the cooperation of
Member States, which provide the required military personnel on a voluntary basis.
174
One of the underlying problems with this approach has been the reality that there has been a lack of mutual
knowledge about contributing state’s contingents regarding organizational mandates, equipment, training, language,
objectives, and operating procedures. These factors all contribute to slowing down the mobilization process.
Section 9.6 Problems with Command and Control

A major consequence of this constraint is the difficulty of providing new operations with strong command and
control structures. The staff officers who assist the Force Commander at the international force headquarters are
usually from different countries with different military training and sometimes even different languages. These
officers cannot work together as an integrated unit, at least in the beginning phase of a new operation. More
seriously, the operational control of the Force Commander over the national contingents that make up the force is
often loose. Each national contingent function as a separate and self-contained unit.
A basic principle of UN peacekeeping is that once detailed to UN service, the national contingents must take
orders exclusively from the Force Commander. However, this principle is rarely strictly followed. Most often, the
national contingents are given certain guidelines by their governments and constantly keep in touch with them. This
double loyalty does not matter if the UN operation functions under the traditional principles of consent, impartiality,
and the non-use of force, or if its personnel are rarely in danger. However, when soldiers of a national contingent are
assigned to dangerous combat duty and are placed in a situation where they must kill or be killed in a conflict that
does not affect the vital interests of their own country, it may lead to major problems between the Force Commander
and the contingent commander, as well as between the Secretary-General and the government concerned. This is
what happened in Somalia when the Italian contingent commander, on instructions from his government, refused to
carry out the order of the Force Commander aimed at the capture of General Aidid.
Section 9.7 Problems with Cooperation

A fundamental impediment in the use of force by a UN
peacekeeping operation for enforcement purposes is that
few governments are willing to make their soldiers available
to the United Nations for dangerous combat duty in conflicts
that do not involve their vital national interests. Although
defined by inference only, the UN Security Council undertook
military peacekeeping operations on the understanding
that it bridged the gap between non-military measures for
conflict resolution described in Chapter VI and the military
enforcement actions authorized by Chapter VII.
Conceivably, the United Nations would be able to field
enforcement operations if it could maintain a powerful

Soldiers from Tunisia (left), Pakistan (centre),
standing army of its own, but that is impossible at present
and the United States (right) attending today’s
for political, financial, and other practical reasons. In the ceremony. 4 May 1993. UN Photo #26544 by Milton
present circumstances, only a major power such as the Grant.
United States, or a military organization like NATO, has the
capability to organize and lead an enforcement operation.
175
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, arriving at Butmir airport of

Sarajevo, Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon (France), Force Commander of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo, is to the left. 31 December 1992. UN Photo #855.
Section 9.8 Distinction between Peacekeeping and Peace

Enforcement
Another important lesson from the UN experience in Somalia and Bosnia is that peacekeeping and peace
enforcement have different objectives and conflicting requirements. The distinction between the two activities should
not be blurred. UN peacekeeping operations were created to contain armed conflicts and to bring about conditions
conducive to negotiation and the search for a political settlement of conflicts by peaceful means. This has remained
their main purpose. It is essential that UN peacekeepers remain completely impartial and avoid taking sides in the
conflict in which they are involved. However, when a peacekeeping operation uses force against one of the contending
parties as enforcement action, it ceases to be impartial; this may make it part of the problem rather than its solution.
Thus, the United Nations must choose between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. If the UN chooses the
latter, then it must adopt a war strategy and accept all the risks attendant to war, including grievous causalities.
Therefore, if peace enforcement becomes the model, military units should arrive in the mission area well balanced in
composition and capable of accomplishing their envisaged tasks. Member States with known capabilities in specific
areas of expertise should contribute troops for those purposes. Emphasis should be put on quality and capability
rather than quantity (boots-on-the-ground). The latter has become a way for many nations to raise foreign currency
as they get paid $1000 per soldier per month, but many nations pay their soldiers in their national currency and at
their own established pay scales.
If the UN does not have the capability or the political will to do so, it must remain within the narrow confines of
peacekeeping and adhere as closely as possible to the principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force
except in clear cases of self-defence. Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, the former force commander of the UN
operation in Cambodia, observed that a peacekeeping force is an instrument of diplomacy, not war. In the same vein,
Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, a former commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, said that he could not wage
war from the backs of vehicles painted in white.
176
Section 9.9 Application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter

It is relevant to recall that the use of force on a large scale by the United Nations is envisaged in Chapter VII
of the Charter as a last resort to deter aggression and restore peace when all peaceful means and non-military
enforcement measures have failed to do so. However, the mechanism for setting up a United Nations force for
this purpose, which is composed of troops provided by Member States (including all major powers) as a Charter
obligation and operating under UN command and control vested in the Security Council and the UN Military Staff
Committee, was never established. This is mostly, though not exclusively, because of Cold War constraints.
The Charter provisions on the collective use of force as enforcement action were applied only indirectly and
pragmatically. On two occasions, the Security Council adopted resolutions that enabled the United States to organize
powerful multinational forces under its command and control. The first situation was in Korea in 1950 (when the
Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council over the question of the representation of China and, thus, relinquished
its right of veto at a crucial time). The second situation occurred after the Cold War, during the Gulf crisis in 1990.
These forces required the use of vast numbers of combat troops and powerful weapons at enormous costs. In the
Gulf War, the US-led coalition deployed more than half a million troops at the staggering cost of over $70 billion. The
Korean War, which lasted much longer, involved even more troops and higher costs in human and financial terms. In
both cases, the United States initiated the enforcement action and shouldered most of the resulting burden because
what it perceived as its vital national interests were at stake, namely, the containment of communist expansion in
Korea and the supply of oil in the Gulf crisis. There are reasons to assume that the United States—or any other major
military powers able to do so—will not want to assume similar responsibilities in the future unless their vital national
interests are clearly and directly involved.
Two soldiers from the Danish Battalion

(DanBat) outside of their quarters. 2
September 1992. UN Photo #122037 by
John Isaac.
During the Somali crisis, however, the United States offered, in December 1992, to organize and lead a
multinational task force, on a much smaller scale and for a limited period. The purpose of this force was to establish
a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts pending the deployment of a reinforced UN peacekeeping
operation. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, accepted this offer. The United States-led
task force in Somalia (UNITAF) set a precedent, which affected later UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to
UNITAF, the Council authorized a French-led task force in Rwanda (Operation Turquoise) and a United States-led task
force in Haiti (Operation Restore Democracy) in 1994, a NATO-led task force in Bosnia (Implementation Force) in
1996, and a multinational force in Albania led by Italy in 1996. These task forces had sophisticated weapons and a
unified command structure, and they did achieve deterrence through military strength without actually using force.
They were peacekeeping operations with enforcement capability, rather than enforcement operations.
177
Section 9.10 New Approaches and Lessons Learned

Regarding the lessons learned from the UN experience in Somalia and Bosnia, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
concluded, in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995, that UN peacekeeping operations should
strictly adhere to the traditional principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in clear cases of
self-defence. He warned against the danger for such operations to blur the distinction between peacekeeping and
peace- enforcement. If an enforcement operation should be required in exceptionally complex conflict situations, the
Security Council should, in his view, delegate to a major power or to a military organization such as NATO the task
of organizing and leading such an operation for a limited period. The Security Council has applied the new approach
in recent years, and this practice is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
Since Boutros-Boutros Ghali penned his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, further re-evaluations of
peacekeeping have made it clear that the inflexible definition of what are and are not peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations had become untenable by the late 1990s. In short, the division between peacekeeping and
enforcement operations had to be re-evaluated. Ultimately, the cornerstones of traditional Cold War peacekeeping
(consent and neutrality), if they are to be used, must be used in a more precise way:
• ‘Consent’ should function at the strategic rather than the tactical level.
• ‘Impartiality’ is not the same as neutrality.
• Whether or not an obligation to protect civilians is explicit in the mandate of such a force, the UN must be
prepared to respond to expectations created by its very presence.
Moreover, the ambiguity of Security Council mandates and inconsistent rules of engagement (ROEs) between
troop-contributing nations had seriously weakened the functionality of UN peace operations as witnessed in both
Bosnia and Somalia. ROEs had to be more robust, and a clear agreement between troop-contributing nations was
required. The use of force now had to be a reality on missions.
Ultimately, in a failed state scenario or in the wake of a conflict, there has to be a robust mandate to protect
civilians and restore order, either by the use of military forces or by the deployment of CIVPOL units.
Soldier of the Kenyan Battalion stationed in Sector-South, with two Croatian children. 28 August
1992. UN Photo #73475 by John Isaac.
178
1. The main problem with UNOSOM II in 5. Given the difficulties in establishing

Somalia was _______. effective military action under Chapter
VII, the UN has _______.
A. The lack of a clear and precise mandate
B. Insufficient means to fulfil its mandate A. Not deviated from the traditional model of
peacekeeping
C. Insufficient international consensus
B. Established a more effective military
D. A passive attitude towards General
command and control structure
Mohammed Farah Aidid
C. Delegated responsibility for enforcement
2. Which incident most blatantly action to Member States willing to take on
undermined the credibility of UNPROFOR the organisation and costs of the operations
in Bosnia?
D. Re-designed the peacekeeping model
A. The lack of cooperation among the parties
during negotiations 6. Why was the US willing to initiate the
B. The lack of enforcement powers under
enforcement action and shoulder most of
the resulting burden of the Korean War
Chapter VII of the UN Charter
and the 1991 Gulf War?
C. The failure to react forcefully to the Bosnian
A. It was the morally right thing to do
Serb attacks against UN safe areas
B. The United States perceived that its vital
D. The failure to provide adequate humanitarian
national interests were at stake
assistance
C. Its NATO allies forced the US into action
3. How does the Secretary-General acquire D. In both cases, the respective UN Secretaries-
military personnel when a new operation General convinced the US Congress
is authorised?
A. From Member States voluntarily 7. UN peacekeeping missions of the first
part of the 1990s made it clear that
B. From the UN’s standing army
_______.
C. From special units in the militaries of each
A. There was a need for more NGO input on the
member state according to pre- determined
military aspects of the mission
ratios
B. Traditional peacekeeping still worked well in
D. From mercenary organisations and Private
all cases
Military Companies (PMCs)
C. Missions had to be large and complex to
4. Which original principles of work
peacekeeping change under peace D. Use of force now had to be a reality on
enforcement? missions
A. Consent only
B. Consent and impartiality
C. Non-use of force except in self-defence only
D. Consent, impartiality, and non-use of force
except in self-defence
179
8. In An Agenda for Peace, what four areas 9. What does Boutros Boutros-Ghali offer
for action are suggested that offer a in An Agenda for Peace as essential
coherent contribution towards securing to reducing the likelihood of conflict
peace in the spirit of the UN Charter? between States?
A. International media diplomacy, post-conflict A. The need for major international funding
peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, and B. Mutual confidence and good faith
peacemaking C. Large scale military presence and a
B. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, willingness to use pre-emptive force
peacekeeping, and major international D. International isolation of failed states
financing
C. Post-conflict peacebuilding, preventive 10. An Agenda for Peace suggests that
demilitarised zones (DMZs) could be
diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping
used as a form of _______.
D. An Agenda for Peace does not offer such a
A. Preventive deployment
suggestion
B. Reactive deployment
C. A post-conflict deployment buffer
D. An Agenda for Peace does not refer to DMZs
Answer Key »
1. B
2. C
3. A
4. D
5. D
6. D
7. C
8. B
9. B
10. C
180
LESSON Retrenchment of UN
10 Peacekeeping Operations
Since 1994
After six years of

expansion, UN
peacekeeping operations
entered a period of
retrenchment in 1994.
In this lesson »
10.1 Decreasing Number of 10.6 United Nations Baranja, and Western
Operations Confidence Restoration Sirmium (UNTAES)
Operation in Croatia
10.2 Peacekeeping versus (UNCRO) 10.10 United Nations Mission
Peace Enforcement of Observers in
10.7 United Nations Prevlaka (UNMOP)
10.3 United Nations Preventive
Observer Mission Deployment Force 10.11 United Nations Support
Uganda-Rwanda (UNPREDEP) Mission in Haiti
(UNOMUR) (UNSMIH)
10.8 United Nations
10.4 United Nations Mission in Bosnia 10.12 United Nations Angola
Assistance Mission for and Herzegovina Verification Mission III
Rwanda (UNAMIR) (UNMIBH) (UNAVEM III)
10.5 United Nations Peace 10.9 United Nations 10.13 Credibility Issues
Forces Headquarters Transitional
(UNPF-HQ) 10.14 The Positive 1990s
Administration for
Missions
Eastern Slavonia,
• Describe the operational atmosphere behind the retrenchment of UN peacekeeping operations
since 1994.
• Trace the termination of UNPROFOR.
• Trace the problematic development of UN missions in Rwanda and discuss how the setbacks
affected attitudes towards the UN and future operation.
• Trace the revival of the UN operation in Haiti and American involvement.
• Trace the development in Angola from UNAVEM II to UNAVEM III.
• Trace the changes in UN missions in the former Yugoslavia after UNPROFOR.
181
LESSON 10 | Retrenchment of UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1994
Two United Nations MI-24 helicopters, part of the Ukraine Helicopter Squadron, supply air support to the peacekeeping forces in
Croatia. 1 November 1996. UN Photo #31492 by Eric Kanalstein.
Section 10.1 Decreasing Number of

Operations
After six years of expansion, UN peacekeeping operations
entered a period of retrenchment in 1994. The period between
1994 and the end of 1996 saw the number of operations—
as well as the scope of their activities—gradually decrease,
although many conflicts continued to require UN action.
182
The turning point in this evolution can be traced to the setbacks of UNOSOM II, the first peacekeeping operation
endowed by the Security Council with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and especially to
the tragic death of 18 American Rangers in a raid conducted against militiamen of General Mohammed Farah Aidid
in South Mogadishu on 3 October 1993. Following that tragedy, the United States and other western powers that
participated in the UN operation decided to withdraw their troops from Somalia. The United States also decided
that it would henceforth support and participate in UN peacekeeping operations only if they had a precise mandate,
adequate resources, served US interests, and had a clear exit strategy.
After the tragedy of 3 October 1993, the UN suffered further setbacks in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. These
operations were terminated with their missions largely unfulfilled or taken over by other agencies. From 1994 to
1996, few new operations were set up by the United Nations to deal with emerging conflicts and those that were had
limited scopes. The major developments relating to UN peacekeeping activities from 1994 to the end of 1996 are
outlined below.
Section 10.2 Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement

As discussed in Lessons 7 and 8, UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the only two peacekeeping
operations endowed with enforcement powers in UN history, found it difficult to reconcile the conflicting requirements
of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and both suffered severe setbacks. Following the withdrawal of its western
contingents in March 1994, UNOSOM II continued operation for another year with greatly reduced strength, a much
less ambitious mandate, and no enforcement powers. The mission was formally terminated in early March 1995.
UNPROFOR, which had been deployed in Croatia, Bosnia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with
very different mandates, was restructured in January 1995. UNPROFOR was divided into three separate operations:
the Bosnian section retained the title of UNPROFOR; the Croatian section was renamed the United Nations
Confidence Restoration Force (UNCRO); and the Macedonian section the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
(UNPREDEP). In January 1996, UNPROFOR and UNCRO were terminated, and the Security Council authorised three
smaller follow-on missions for limited periods: the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); the
United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES); and the
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), both in Croatia. The backdrop to these mission changes
was the tragedy that unfolded in Rwanda in 1994.
A United Nations soldier of the British battalion

converses with a Muslim boy in the Muslim enclave of
Stari Vitez. 1 May 1994. UN Photo # 181119
183
Section 10.3 United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-

Rwanda (UNOMUR)
Background to UNOMUR
Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. The country was a German colony from
1884 to 1916 and was then placed by the League of Nations, and subsequently by the United Nations, under Belgian
trusteeship from 1918 to 1962. Rwanda became independent in 1962. Its population of over 7 million was divided
into three ethnic groups: the Hutu (about 85 per cent); the Tutsi (about 14 per cent); and the Twa (about 1 per
cent).
The Tutsi minority had dominated the Hutu majority for centuries, but after independence, the tables were
turned, and the Tutsis were brutally repressed. The sources of the Rwandan conflict involved issues of esteem,
identity, land, recognition, safety, security, and unhindered opportunities for human development. These factors
have created an environment where deeply rooted mutual suspicion, fear, distrust, hatred, and even contempt has
grown between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Even though both groups share a common language, culture, and the
idea of intermarriages, the rift between these two ethnic groups grew wider over time. These conditions of ethnic
and political tensions defined Rwandan society. Ethnic-driven conflicts in Rwanda have occurred in the late 1950s,
1963, 1972, and again in the genocide of 1994. The Tutsi people became the main victims of these repetitive cyclical
massacres and political killings.
Fighting between the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 along the border between Rwanda and Uganda. Several
ceasefire agreements followed, including one negotiated at Arusha, Tanzania, on 22 July 1992, which arranged for
the presence in Rwanda of an OAU 50-member Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I). Fighting flared up again
in early February 1993, disrupting the negotiations between the Government and the RPF.
In 1993, Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of UNMOs along their common border to prevent the
military use of the area by RPF. In response, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission
Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in June 1993 on the Ugandan side of the border to verify that no military assistance
reached Rwanda.
In the meantime, the Arusha talks reconvened in March 1993 and finally led to a peace agreement in August
1993. The comprehensive peace agreement called for a democratically elected government and provided for the
establishment of a broad-based transitional Government until the elections, in addition to the repatriation of refugees
and integration of the armed forces of the two sides. In October 1993, the Security Council established another
international force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to help the parties implement the
agreement, monitor its implementation, and support the transitional Government.
Establishment of UNOMUR
Security Council resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993, established UNOMUR on the Uganda side of the common
border for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. The status of mission agreement for
UNOMUR entered into force on 16 August 1993. This opened the way for the deployment of an advance party, which
arrived in the mission area on 18 August. UNOMUR established its headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, approximately 20
kilometres north of the border with Rwanda. By the end of September 1993, the Mission had reached its authorized
strength of 81 military observers and was fully operational.
184
Following the conclusion of the Arusha peace talks, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security
Council establish another peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR. In doing so, he proposed that the military observers
of UNOMUR come under the command of the new Mission while maintaining their separate monitoring tasks on the
Uganda-Rwanda border. UNAMIR was established on 5 October by Security Council resolution 872 (1993).
32˚
B a h r el J e b e l
The boundaries and names shown and the
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S peke G
Map No. 3862 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS Department of Public Information

May 2003 Cartographic Section
UN Map of Uganda. May 2003. UN Map #3862 Rev. 4 by the Department of Public Information Cartographic
Section.
185
UNOMUR’s Role
UNOMUR’s verification role was primarily focused on the transit or transport (by roads or tracks which could
accommodate vehicles) of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which
could be of military use. UNOMUR restricted its monitoring activities in Uganda along the area of the border with
Rwanda controlled by the RPF.
The Mission established observation posts at two major crossing sites and three secondary sites on the Ugandan
side of the border. The Mission monitored the area through mobile patrols enhanced by airborne coverage. It also
facilitated the transit of vehicles transporting food and medical supplies to Rwanda.
Following the expansion of UNAMIR, UNOMUR became a forward base to back up the movement of UNAMIR
personnel, equipment, and supplies into Rwanda. During the closure of Kigali airport, the Entebbe airport in Uganda
functioned as the only air base from which those personnel and supplies were routed by land to Rwanda. A team
of UNOMUR UNMOs were stationed at Entebbe to coordinate logistics activities, and UNOMUR observers escorted
convoys of logistic material and food-stuffs to the Uganda-Rwanda border for use by UNAMIR. UNOMUR also
facilitated the transport of UNAMIR and other UN personnel between Kabale and Entebbe and between Kabale and
Goma and Bukavu in Zaire. The evacuation of UNAMIR casualties was carried out with UNOMUR assistance.
The Genocide
On 6 April 1994, an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira
of Burundi was shot down at Kigali airport. All persons aboard were killed. The two presidents had been attending
a regional meeting at Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Almost immediately, a planned genocide against the Tutsi and
moderate Hutu population began.
It has been estimated that some 800,000 Tutsis and 30,000 Hutus were murdered between April and June 1994.
Many of the victims were hacked to death with machetes. The RPF immediately took up arms and rapidly defeated
the Rwandan Army, which was pre-occupied with aiding in the genocide. The civil war ended in August 1994,
resulting in some 2 million refugees, mostly Hutus, and some 1.8 million internally displaced people. This created an
immense regional humanitarian and ecological crisis.
After the RPF gained control of the entire Uganda-Rwanda border, UNOMUR extended its observation and
monitoring activities to that area. UNOMUR carried out its tasks essentially through patrolling, monitoring, and
surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observations as well as on-
site investigations of suspected cross-border traffic.
Termination of UNOMUR
On 16 June 1994, the Secretary-General reported that there appeared to be little rationale for monitoring one
of Rwanda’s borders and not the others. He recommended the reduction of UNOMUR and its termination by 21
September 1994. Security Council resolution 928 (1994) of 20 June 1994 confirmed the SG’s recommendations. The
reduction of UNOMUR was carried out in four phases (between 15 August and 21 September) with a gradual scaling
down of monitoring activities.
The Secretary-General noted that the tragic events in Rwanda in 1994 had prevented UNOMUR from fully
implementing its mandate, though the Mission had played a useful role in efforts to build confidence, defuse tensions,
and facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.
186
Section 10.4 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

(UNAMIR)
Background to UNAMIR
In the wake of the October 1990 outbreak of civil war in Rwanda, the Security Council in June 1993 established
the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border to verify that no
military assistance reached Rwanda. On 29 June 1993, Canadian Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire was appointed
as the Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOMUR (see the previous section).
The Arusha talks, brokered by Tanzania and the OAU, finally led to a peace agreement in August 1993. The UN
was asked to assist in the implementation of the agreement. In early August 1993, the Neutral Military Observer
Group (NMOG I) was replaced by an expanded NMOG II force, composed of some 130 personnel to operate as
an interim measure pending the deployment of the neutral international force. In October 1993, Security Council
resolution 872 (1993) established another international force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation, and support the transitional
Government.
Security Council established United Nations Assistance

Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor the
observance of cease-fire agreement by unanimously
adopting resolution 872. Ahmed Snoussi, Permanent
Representative of Morocco to the United Nations,
addressing the Security Council. 5 October 1993. UN
Photo #176386 by R Da Silva.
Deployment of UNAMIR
Brigadier-General Dallaire, the CMO of UNOMUR, was appointed as UNAMIR Force Commander. He arrived in Kigali
on 22 October 1993, followed by his advance party a few days later. UNAMIR’s demilitarized zone sector HQ became
operational on 1 November 1993, at which time the NMOG II elements were absorbed into UNAMIR. Additionally, the
UNMOs of UNOMUR came under the command of UNAMIR, while maintaining their separate monitoring tasks on the
Uganda-Rwanda border. Deployment of the UNAMIR battalion in Kigali, composed of contingents from Belgium and
Bangladesh, was completed in the first part of December 1993, and the Kigali weapons-secure area was established
on 24 December.
With the arrival of the UNAMIR Police Commissioner, Colonel Manfred Bliem (Austria), on 26 December 1993
and of the police units in January and February 1994, the UNAMIR CIVPOL contingent was established. Its HQ was
in Kigali, and its authorized strength was 60 civilian police monitors. Its mandate was to assist in maintaining public
security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and the Communal Police.
Initially, only Belgium (with half of a battalion of 400 troops) and Bangladesh (with a logistical element of 400
troops) offered personnel for UNAMIR. It took five months to reach the authorized strength of 2,548. However, due
to the many unresolved issues between the parties, implementation of the agreement was delayed. Consequently,
the inauguration of the transitional Government never took place.
187
The Genocide
In April 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down; this event
triggered the 1994 genocide. The killing targeted Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and it was mainly carried out by the
Rwandan military, the presidential guard, and the ruling party’s youth militia (the “Interahamwe”). Prime Minister
Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian UN peacekeepers assigned to protect her were killed. It was clear that the
genocide was well planned and orchestrated by Hutu extremists.
In response to the attacks against the Tutsi population, the RPF resumed its advance from the north and the east
of Rwanda, and government authority disintegrated. An interim Government was formed, but it failed to stop the
massacres. With the RPF’s southward push, the number of displaced persons and refugees grew.
UNAMIR was unsuccessful in arranging a ceasefire, and its personnel came increasingly under attack. Partly
in response to the murder of its ten soldiers, Belgium withdrew its battalion from UNAMIR because it felt it was
impossible to carry on with its original mandate. With the departure of the Belgian contingent and non-essential
personnel, UNAMIR’s strength stood at 1,515 military personnel, down from 2,165, and 190 military observers, down
from 321.
Security Council resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 reduced UNAMIR’s strength from 2,548 to 270. Despite
its reduced presence, UNAMIR troops managed to protect thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at sites under
UNAMIR control. By early May, UNAMIR’s strength was 444 all ranks in Rwanda and another 179 UNMOs in Nairobi,
who were waiting to be redeployed to the Mission or repatriated.
Security Council resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda and called for
urgent international action. It also increased UNAMIR’s authorized strength to 5,500 troops. However, it took nearly
six months for Member States to provide the troops. By the end of May 1994, the RPF had occupied about half of the
territory of Rwanda, including strong positions in and around Kigali.
Children who fled the fighting in Rwanda rest in Ndosha camp in Goma. 25 July 1994. UN
188
France offered to send troops under Chapter VII of the Charter. Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22
June 1994 authorized, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a multinational humanitarian operation. The
French-led multinational forces, composed of 2,500 French and Senegalese troops, carried out Operation Turquoise,
which established a humanitarian protection zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western
Rwanda, covering approximately one-fifth of Rwandese territory.
However, the zone (known as Zones Humanitaires Sures (ZHS) in French) was never demilitarized, which
resulted in extremist Hutu militias continuing to kill Tutsis and intimidate moderate Hutus who opposed them.
Additionally, the RPF perceived the refugee camps in the ZHS as havens for their enemies, and thus not neutral
areas. Operation Turquoise ended in August 1994, and UNAMIR then took over the ZHS.
In July, RPF forces took control of Rwanda, ending the civil war and establishing a broad-based Government.
The new Government declared its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement and assured UNAMIR that it would
cooperate on the return of refugees. It has been estimated that of the 7.9 million people in Rwanda, at least half
were refugees, internally displaced people, or had been killed. Final estimates indicated that at least 800,000 Tutsis
were killed during the genocide. In response to the growing humanitarian crisis, the UN raised $762 million.
UNAMIR Deployment
UNAMIR was fully deployed by October
1994, with a strength of 5,500 all ranks,
and the majority of the CIVPOL component
was deployed by 15 November. The troops
and military observers were deployed in six
sectors: north-east, south-east, south, south-
west, north-west, and Kigali City. The human
rights field operation had about 60 human
rights officers and special investigators at
seven regional offices. Another 40 human
rights observers and teams of forensic experts
arrived at the end of December 1994.
During the first half of 1995, the UNAMIR
military component maintained its authorized
strength of 5,500 troops and 320 military
observers. By February, UNAMIR’s force
structure and deployment had been adjusted
as a result of security developments in the

United Nations soldiers being briefed at their headquarters in Kigali. 26
displaced persons camps and an increase in
July 1994. UN Photo #107629 by John Isaac.
armed attacks by groups infiltrating across the
border with Zaire.
189
The Expanded Role of UNAMIR
UNAMIR troops and observers intensified their monitoring, observation, and patrol duties, but their role now
involved the:
• Assistance in the transporting of refugees and internally displaced persons;
• Protection of populations at risk;
• Aiding in landmine clearance; and
• Working with the humanitarian agencies and the Government to develop and implement a strategy to close
the displaced persons camps in Rwanda gradually by ensuring voluntary return.
UNAMIR’s CIVPOL component suffered from lack of personnel and was further limited by the limited number
of French-speaking officers (of 89 CIVPOL observers in February, only 25 were French-speaking). Once CIVPOL
functions were expanded under resolution 965 (1994), the component’s authorized strength was raised from 90 to
120 police observers. However, UNAMIR’s CIVPOL component continued to face acute personnel shortages. By April
1995, CIVPOL strength had fallen to 58 police observers.
CIVPOL had teams of three to four observers in each of the 11 prefectures in the country working in close co-
operation with local authorities, UN Nations agencies, and NGOs. UNAMIR’s CIVPOL contingent’s role included the
following:
• Training a new integrated national police force;
• Monitoring the increasingly difficult situation in Rwanda’s overcrowded prisons; and
• Providing monitoring and investigatory assistance to the human rights officers and the military and civilian
components of UNAMIR.
Rwandan refugees set up camps outside Goma because of a cholera epidemic in the city. 25 July 1994. UN
190
After the Genocide
A commission of experts established by the Security Council reported in September that “overwhelming evidence”
proved that Hutu elements had perpetrated acts of genocide against the Tutsi group in a “concerted, planned,
systematic, and methodical way.” The final report of the commission was presented to the Council in December 1994.
On 8 November 1994, the Security Council established the International Tribunal for Rwanda “for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.” Located in
Arusha, Tanzania, the Tribunal issued the first indictments in 1995 and held the first trials in 1997.
UNAMIR’s Withdrawal
By January 1996, the civilian police component of UNAMIR ceased its activities, and all remaining CIVPOL
personnel were repatriated. The Rwandan Government did not wish to keep UNAMIR active due to diminished force
levels; thus, the mission withdrew when its mandate ended at the end of March 1996. Final withdrawal occurred
on 19 April 1996. The Security Council authorized those
elements of UNAMIR remaining in Rwanda before their
final withdrawal to protect the personnel and premises
of the International Tribunal. On 24 April, the Rwandan
Government announced that it had agreed to the
establishment of the United Nations Office in Rwanda.
Though there was tacit Government support for
the presence of the Human Rights Field Operation in
Rwanda by mid-March 1996, the number of human
rights monitors had decreased to 78 of a total staff on
the ground of 95. The United Nations High Commissioner Rwandan refugees who fled the country during the
fighting are returning home. 26 July 1994. UN Photo
for Human Rights considered that 120 human rights field
officers constituted the minimum presence necessary.
However, the absence of sufficient financial resources
made it impossible to maintain that number.
The 1999 Independent Inquiry
Given the enormity of the genocide of 1994 and the questionable actions of the UN and its Member States,
the Secretary-General commissioned an independent inquiry in March 1999 into those actions. The findings of the
inquiry were made public on 15 December 1999. The inquiry concluded that the overriding failure of the international
community’s response was due to the following:
• Lack of resources;
• Lack of political will; and
• Errors of judgement as to the nature of the events in Rwanda.
191
On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to replace UNPROFOR

by three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations. Their
joint theatre headquarters, known as United Nations Peace Forces
headquarters (UNPF-HQ), was established in Zagreb, the capital
of Croatia. General Bernard Janvier was appointed Theatre Force
Commander responsible for all three operations. Portrait of Lt.
General Bernard Janvier, Theatre Force Commander. 8 March 1995.
UN Photo #295770 by Stanton Winter.
Section 10.5 United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters

(UNPF-HQ)
Background to UNPF-HQ
The Security Council adopted three resolutions on 31 March 1995 that restructured UNPROFOR into three
distinct but interlinked regional operations. Resolution 981 (1995) created the United Nations Confidence Restoration
Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), resolution 982 (1995) extended UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
30 November 1995, and resolution 983 (1995) created the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and UNPROFOR were known collectively
as the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF). UNPF had its HQ in Zagreb, Croatia. Security Council resolutions 982
(1995) of 31 March 1995 and 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995 were the basis of the UNPF mandate.
Role of UNPF-HQ
UNPF-HQ’s role consisted of the coordination, command, and control between UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and
UNPROFOR. UNPF-HQ was also responsible for the overall coordination, control, and direction of political, military,
and civil affairs activities within the mission area, including the coordination of reporting on human rights. Its
Division of Information conducted information activities, including television, radio, and print production, in support
of UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and UNPROFOR. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was in overall command,
and the Theatre Force Commander exercised overall command of the military elements of UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and
UNPROFOR from UNPF-HQ in Zagreb. UNPF-HQ also maintained a liaison office in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) to conduct political liaison, public information, and support activities for UNPF movement
through that country.
On 20 December 1995, responsibility for operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina was transferred from UNPROFOR
to IFOR. UNPF-HQ coordinated the withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina of those UN units which were not
transferred to IFOR.
Termination of UNPF-HQ
With the end of UNPROFOR and UNCRO and the transition to UNTAES, UNMIBH, and UNMOP, UNPF-HQ was
phased out by 31 January 1996. The administrative support structure of the mission was transferred temporality
to the Transition Office for United Nations Operations in the Former Yugoslavia in Zagreb. It provided all aspects of
administrative support for the remaining missions in the region.
192
Section 10.6 United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in

Croatia (UNCRO)
Background to UNCRO
With the restructuring of UNPROFOR into three separate UN missions (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, and UNPREDEP),
Security Council resolution 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995 established UNCRO to replace UNPROFOR in Croatia. UN
forces and UNMOs were deployed in Serb-controlled Western Slavonia, the Krajina region, and Eastern Slavonia.
UNMOs were also stationed in the Prevlaka peninsula. The authorized strength of the mission was 8,750 troops plus
UNMOs, CIVPOL, administrative, and logistical personnel, and it was to deploy by April 1995.
UNCRO’s Role
UNCRO was established as an interim arrangement to create the conditions that would facilitate a negotiated
settlement regarding the territorial integrity of Croatia, as well as to guarantee the security and rights of all
communities living in Croatia. UNCRO’s mandate was to:
• Perform the functions envisaged in the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994;
• Facilitate implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994;
• Facilitate implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions;
• Assist in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies,
and weapons over the international borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings;
• Facilitate the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the
territory of Croatia; and
• Monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula.
Croatian Catholic church riddled with bullet holes. 4 September 1992. UN Photo #121860 by John
Isaac.
193
Outbreak of Hostilities
On 24 April 1995, Serbo-Croat forces closed the Zagreb-Belgrade highway in Western Slavonia for 24 hours. On
1 May, the Croatian Army broke the ceasefire and attacked Serbo-Croat forces that controlled the region of Western
Slavonia. By the next day, Croatian forces had captured all key military positions in the region. In response, the
Krajina Serbs fired missiles at Zagreb and Pleso airfield and shelled Karlovac and Sisak. Fighting continued through
June and July, but on 4 August the Croatian Army launched a major offensive into the Krajina region. The next day,
the Bosnian Army attacked the Krajina Serbs and linked up with the Croatian Army. The conflict led to a mass exodus
of Serbs (90 per cent) from the region.
Some 98 UN Operational Posts (OPs) were destroyed, and peacekeeping troops were arrested, disarmed, and
used as human shields. UN military equipment was also taken. Four peacekeepers were killed and another 16
wounded by the fighting. UNCRO had severe restrictions put on the movement of its personnel, and both sides to
the conflict took aggressive stands towards UNCRO troops. The UN on 4 August gained NATO air support to deter
attacks against UN positions. However, the forced annexation of Sectors North, South, and West by Croatia made the
presence of UNCRO troops pointless in these areas. UNCRO forces began to withdraw. Sector East remained under
the control of UNCRO, and its mandate remained for same.
Withdrawal of UNCRO
The Government of Croatia and the Croatian Serb leadership agreed to resolve the issue of Eastern Slavonia
through negotiation. UN-sponsored talks concluded with the signing of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium on 12 November. The Agreement provided for the peaceful integration into
Croatia of that region and requested the Security Council to establish a transitional administration to govern the
region during the transitional period.
Sector Military UNMO CIVPOL
North 591 31 61
South 540 34 71
East 1,605 48 16
West 165 12 99
UNCRO HQs in Zagreb, Split, 294 39 49
Ploce
TOTAL 6,581* 164 296
*includes the 3,386 military support personnel
Following the establishment of the UN’s transitional administration, the United Nations Transitional Administration
for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the mandate of UNCRO was terminated on 15
January 1996.
194
Section 10.7 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

(UNPREDEP)
Background to UNPREDEP
On 11 November 1992, the President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) requested the
deployment of UNMOs to his country due to the concern that the ongoing regional conflict in the former Yugoslavia
could spill into the FYROM. Security Council resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 authorized the establishment
of UNPROFOR’s presence in the FYROM by its “UNPROFOR’s Macedonia Command.” Its mandate was to:
• Monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
• Strengthen, by its presence, the country’s security and stability; and
• Report on any developments that could threaten the country.
UNPROFOR’s Macedonia Command was comprised of a battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 UNMOs, 26 CIVPOL
monitors, ten civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff, and local interpreters. The Command’s HQ was in the FYROM’s
capital of Skopje. In June 1993, the US provided approximately 300 troops to reinforce UNPROFOR’s presence in the
FYROM.
United Nations civilian police officers monitor a border

control point between Yugoslavia and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 1 April 1994. UN
The Establishment of UNPREDEP and Its Mandate
On 31 March 1995, the Security Council replaced UNPROFOR with three separate but interlinked peacekeeping
operations. Within the FYROM, Security Council resolution 983 (1995) created the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with a mandate, responsibilities, and composition identical to those in place.
UNPREDEP’s mandate, in co-operation with the Macedonian authorities through its good offices, eventually included:
• The maintenance of a UN presence in the FYROM at its borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
• Monitoring and reporting any developments in the border areas that could undermine the confidence and
stability of the host country and threaten its territory;
• Strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among its political, social, and ethnic forces and groups;
• Assisting in the advancement of social progress and development; and
• Promoting multicultural and multiethnic cooperation.
195
At the end of 1995, UNPREDEP operated 24 permanent OPs along a 420-kilometre stretch on the Macedonian
side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania. It also operated 33 temporary observation
posts. Close to 40 border and community patrols were conducted daily. UNPREDEP was divided into two sectors:
the Nordic Battalion, primarily bordering Albania and Kosovo; and the US Battalion, primarily bordering the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia. Security Council resolution 1046 (1996) of 13 February 1996 made UNPREDEP an independent
mission. 50 additional military personnel increased the strength of the force, and the position of Force Commander
of UNPREDEP was established.
Events in Kosovo and the Termination of UNPREDEP
By 1997, the situation seemed relatively settled along the border, and UNPREDEP was reduced by 300 military
personnel by 30 April 1997. However, the growing ethnic violence during the summer and fall of 1998 in the
neighbouring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia province of Kosovo and Metohia changed the situation for UNPREDEP.
The Security Council reaffirmed the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In response to the potential threat of rising violence in Kosovo, the Security
Council adopted resolution 1186 (1998) on 21 July, which authorized an increase in the troop strength of the
UNPREDEP up to 1,050. UNPREDEP’s mandate also now included:
• Monitoring border areas;
• Reporting to the Secretary-General on illicit arms flows; and
• Reporting to the Secretary-General on other activities prohibited under resolution 1160.
As of 30 November 1998, UNPREDEP’s total uniformed personnel strength stood at 906 (comprised of 846
troops, 35 UNMOs, and 25 CIVPOL). However, due to veto by China on 25 February 1999, the Security Council voted
not to extend the mandate for UNPREDEP. This terminated UNPREDEP’s mandate on 28 February 1999. At the end of
the mission, there were 35 military observers, 1,050 troops, 26 civilian police, 76 international staff, and 127 locally
recruited staff deployed.
After the vote, the Chinese delegate said his
Government had always maintained that UN peacekeeping
operations, including preventive deployment missions,
should not be open-ended. The situation in the FYROM
had stabilized. Therefore, the UN’s resources were better
used in areas such as Africa. The mission was terminated
on 28 February 1999. On 1 March 1999, the UN renamed
UNPREDEP to UN Skopje. China’s motives for terminating
UNPREDEP were tied to the FYROM’s recognition of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, UNPREDEP, as the first preventive
diplomacy and deployment operation of the UN, contributed
to the stabilization of FYROM’s security environment through

An UNPREDEP peacekeeper with a local child at
patrolling its northern and western borders. The mission has
a United Nation Day event held at UNPREDEP
been recognized as a significant instrument for facilitating Headquarters in Skopje. 23 October 1998. UN Photo
dialogue, restraint, and practical compromise between #76134 by Igor Vasilev.
different segments of society.
196
Section 10.8 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(UNMIBH)
Background to UNMIBH
After NATO intervention, fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina came to an end on 11 October 1995. On 14 December
1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was ratified in Paris by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Peace Agreement had 11
annexes that covered a broad range of issues, including:
• Military aspects of the peace settlement;
• Regional stabilization;
• Delineation of an Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska;
• The holding of democratic elections;
• Human rights;
• Assistance to refugees;
• Civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement; and
• An International Police Task Force.
A ceasefire had been in place since October 1995, which allowed for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the
deployment of NATO’s multinational Implementation Force (IFOR).
The parties requested designation of a High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement
on Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was to mobilize and coordinate all civilian activities and act as the final authority
regarding the civilian implementation of the peace settlement. They also called for the Security Council to create a
United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) to monitor law enforcement activities and facilities, advise and
train law enforcement personnel, and respond to requests for assistance.
On 20 December 1995, IFOR took over from UNPROFOR, whose mandate was subsequently terminated. On 21
December 1995, Security Council resolution 1035 (1995) established the IPTF and a United Nations Civilian Office.
Collectively, they were known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
Soldiers of the Kenyan Battalion stationed in Sector-South, filling jerry

cans with water. 28 August 1992. UN Photo #122017 by John Isaac.
197
Mandate and Organization of UNMIBH
UNMIBH’s mandate was to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina by:
• Assisting in reforming and restructuring the local police;
• Assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system; and
• Monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and
order.
UNMIBH’s head was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Coordinator of United
Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who exercised authority over the IPTF Police Commissioner and
coordinated all other UN activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his role as coordinator, the SRSG focused on
programmes that supported the return of refugees and displaced persons; demining; the promotion of human
rights; the welfare of children; education and culture; elections; and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic
reconstruction. The Mission had a nationwide presence with regional headquarters in Banja Luka, Bihac, Doboj,
Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and a district headquarter in Brcko. The main components of the Mission were:
• The IPTF;
• The Criminal Justice Advisory Unit;
• The Civil Affairs Unit;
• The Human Rights Office;
• The Public Affairs Office;
• The Administration, including the United Nations Trust Funds; and
• The Judicial System Assessment Programme (JSAP), from 1998 to 2000. The IPTF
The IPTF supported local police through the co-location of its personnel at the Interior Ministries, Public Security
Centres, and Police Stations, and by providing expert support to investigations of special cases. Other IPTF tasks
included weapons inspections, prison inspections, and monitoring the enforcement of traffic and crime control. In
both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPTF was responsible for:
• Basic training courses in human dignity;
• Transitional training and advanced training courses for command and senior officers; and
• Specialized training in organized crime, drugs, and crowd control and major incident management.
The Criminal Justice Advisory Unit
UNMIBH established the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit to foster cooperation between the police and the criminal
justice system, as well as to retain support and advisory functions. This unit monitored key court cases, carried out
liaison between the police and the judiciary, advised IPTF on legal procedural matters, and trained local police on the
implementation of criminal procedures.
Civil Affairs Unit
The role of the Civil Affairs Unit was to provide expert advice and assistance to all UNMIBH units on policy
development, strategic analysis, and programme implementation. The Civil Affairs officers maintained liaison with
local authorities and international organizations to advance mandate implementation.
198
The Human Rights Office
Regarding its mission objectives, the Human Rights Office carried out investigations into serious incidents of
police misconduct and conducted comprehensive inspections of law enforcement agencies to address persistent or
endemic institutional deficiencies. The Human Rights Office’s primary objectives were to:
• Investigate human rights violations by law enforcement agents;
• Design remedial measures to correct such violations; and
• Monitor and ensure the implementation of the corrective measures. The Judicial System Assessment
Programme
JSAP was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 1184 (1998) of 16 July 1998. The Programme
was mandated to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of an overall programme of
legal reform under the overall coordination of the High Representative. Teams of international and national lawyers
carried out assessments of the legal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and made recommendations for action.
At the end of 2000, this responsibility was transferred to the Independent Judicial Commission within the Office of
the High Representative.
Implementation of the Mandate
By 1999, the security situation became more stable, and the first significant returns of displaced persons to
their pre-war homes began. The Mission then concentrated on implementing the substantive aspects of its mandate.
It had become obvious by 1999 that sustainable police reform and restructuring could not solely rely on training
and intensive co-location alone. A two-year plan for concrete police reform and restructuring was implemented.
It addressed three key factors: (1) the individual police officer; (2) law enforcement institutions; and (3) the
relationship between the police and the public. The plan was organized into six core programmes (see the table
below), and its end goals were:
• The certification of individual officers;
• The accreditation of police administrations; and
• The establishment of self-sustaining mechanisms for State and regional level inter-police force cooperation.
Through the core programmes, the IPTF was able to de-certify police officers who lacked adequate training or
education, as well as those who had participated in war crimes or other violations of the law. Recruitment of officers
from minority groups was improved. The reforms and restructuring resulted in the reduction of the bloated local
police forces from over 40,000 personnel in 1996 to approximately 20,000 at the end of the Mission mandate.
The Security Council authorizes an increase in the

strength of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) by 120 police personnel.
Ambassador Park Soo Gil (Republic of Korea), President
of the Security Council, addressing Members of the
Council. 16 May 1997. UN Photo #289563 by Evan
Schneider.
199
Core Programmes for Police Reform
Core Objective Methods

Programme
1 Police Reform • Register officers and administrative personnel grant full
certification
• Raise the professional skills of the police to internationally
accepted standards
2 Police Restructuring • Deployment of minority police officers
• Increase ethnic representation
• Address gender balance
3 Foster cooperation UNMIBH established the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit, which
between the police monitored key court cases, carried out liaison between police and
and the criminal the judiciary, advised IPTF on legal procedural matters and trained
justice system local police in the implementation of criminal procedures.
4 Institution building • Establish State-level institutions within a new and complex
and inter-police force structure comprising two entities, 10 cantons and a
cooperation
separate district.
• Establish a State Border Service
• Establish a National Central Bureau of the International
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) in Sarajevo
• Establish the Special Trafficking Operations Programme
(STOP) to enhance police capacity to combat human
trafficking
5 Public Awareness • Conduct of national public awareness campaigns
• Police-sponsored community open days, school visits and
demonstrations of law enforcement skills
6 Participation in UN • harmonizing police and military co-operation in the
Peacekeeping country through
• international participation of multi-ethnic CIVPOL
contingents
Termination of UNMIBH
In accordance with Security Council resolution 1423 (2002) of 12 July 2002, UNMIBH completed its mandate
on 31 December 2002, at which time the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) assumed international police
monitoring duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To ensure continuity, the IPTF Commissioner continued as the first
EUPM Commissioner, and 119 IPTF officers were retained in their positions (many of them in sensitive areas) and
were transferred to EUPM on 1 January 2003. A small liaison office operated in Sarajevo until June 2003 to ensure
completion of the transition.
Through UNMIBH, the UN demonstrated its ability to complete a complex mandate in accordance with a strategic
plan and within a realistic and finite time frame. The Mission also completed the most extensive police reform and
restructuring project ever undertaken by the UN, and a high level of security was established throughout the country.
Finally, the handover of long-term police monitoring to EUPM was an excellent example of cooperation and smooth
transition between the UN and a regional organization.
200
Section 10.9 United Nations Transitional Administration for

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
(UNTAES)
Background to UNTAES
After Croatia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991, Serb forces
seized about 30 per cent of Croatian territory, including the region of Eastern Slavonia, which came to be known
as Sector East. In a major military offensive in 1995, Croatia retook the Krajina region in August and Western
Slavonia in May. On 12 November 1995, the Republic of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern
Slavonia signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, providing
for a peaceful reintegration into Croatia of this region. However, when the Basic Agreement was signed, Sector East
remained under Serb control.
Security Council resolution 1025 (1995) of 30 November 1995 terminated UNCRO’s mandate by 15 January
1996. However, in the context of the Basic Agreement, there was a requirement to maintain an international force
that would maintain peace and security in Eastern Slavonia and that would ensure the demilitarization of the whole
area within 30 days of deployment.
The Secretary-General concluded that, given the failure of earlier attempts to demilitarize the sector under a
UN peacekeeping operation, only a substantial military force could generate the confidence necessary for the parties
to take the difficult steps to implement the agreement. The Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare a
report on all aspects of the establishment of a transitional administration and peacekeeping force to implement the
Basic Agreement. The purpose of the Transitional Administration was to achieve the peaceful reintegration of the
region into the Croatian legal and constitutional system following four years of war and hostility, which had created
deep apprehension, fear, and distrust between the local Croatian Government and the local Serbs.
Establishment of UNTAES
In January 1996, the UN established a new peacekeeping
operation in Croatia consisting of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,
and Western Sirmium. The Security Council authorized
the operation to implement the Basic Agreement on the
region signed on 12 November 1995 between the Croatian
Government and local Serb authorities. Acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, Security Council resolution
1037 (1996) established the United Nations Transitional
Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
Sirmium (UNTAES) for an initial period of 12 months with

A light tank division of the Ukrainian military
an authorized strength of 5,000 troops and headquartered component of UNTAES. 1 January 1997. UN Photo
at Vukovar. #31495 Eric Kanalstein.
201
By 20 May 1996, UNTAES was fully deployed. Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein announced that the
demilitarization process of the region would commence at 1200 hours (local time) on 21 May 1996. Member States
were authorized by the Security Council, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to take all necessary
measures, including close air support to defend or help withdraw UNTAES, and that such actions would be based on
UNTAES’s request and procedures communicated to the UN.
UNTAES Mandate
In accordance with the Basic Agreement, the Transitional Administrator oversaw and coordinated the military
and civilian activities of UNTAES, as well as the work of other UN agencies in the mission area. The Force Commander,
the Police Commissioner, and the Chief Administrative Officer reported to the Transitional Administrator, who in turn
reported directly to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. In the context of the Basic Agreement, UNTAES’s
mandate included the following tasks:
• Supervise and aid in the demilitarization of the region as provided for in the Basic Agreement, which was
carried out by the parties within 30 days after the full deployment of UNTAES;
• Oversee the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes;
• Establish and train a temporary police force to build professionalism among the police and confidence
among all ethnic communities;
• Monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system;
• Organize elections for all local government bodies;
• Maintain international monitors along the international borders of the region to facilitate the free movement
of persons across existing borders;
• Restore the normal functioning of all public services in the region without delay;
• Monitor the parties’ commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
• Co-operate with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its task of investigating and
prosecuting war crimes;
• Promote the realization of the commitments made in the Basic Agreement between Croatia and local Serb
authorities and contribute to the overall maintenance of peace and security.
Demilitarization
The process of demilitarization involved the disarmament and demobilization of all military, para-military, and
police forces, units, and personnel, as well as the breakdown of their command and control structures. During the
30-day demilitarization period, all heavy weapons were withdrawn or turned over to the UN to be destroyed or
rendered inoperable. One hundred UNMOs were assigned to oversee the demilitarization process. They identified the
units and equipment to be demilitarized, and they monitored and verified the implementation of the demilitarization
process and reported on developments relevant to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.
The demilitarization period, which had begun on 21 May 1996, was completed within the 30-day time frame
on 20 June 1996. A weapon buy-back programme, financed by the Government of Croatia, was also initiated on 2
October 1996. It collected over 15,000 weapons and 435,000 rounds of ammunition. However, it was clear from this
programme that there were still large quantities of small arms and ammunition in the region.
202
A further aspect of the demilitarization process was the removal and disposal of the estimated 650,000 landmines
within the UNTAES AOR. The UN Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) was established in the region, with a staff of eight
deminers. UNMAC was mainly responsible for collection and dissemination of information on landmine contamination
in the region and mine awareness training of UNTAES personnel. Mine-clearance was carried out by the UNTAES
Slovak Engineer Battalion and by the Croatian and Serb Army Units, whose work was monitored by the UNTAES
Belgian Battalion Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.
Demining operations began on 12 April from the Croatian side and on 15 April on the Serb side. The Secretary-
General reported on 28 October 1996 that the first four pilot project villages had been demined, and reconstruction
was at a stage where Croat displaced persons might return in November 1996. As of 2005, demining continues with
coordination from the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC).
Key Structures of UNTAES
The Transitional Administrator has established Joint Implementation Committees (JICs) in consultation with the
Croatian and local Serb parties on matters concerning:
• The police;
• Civil administration;
• The restoration of public services;
• Education and culture;
• The return of refugees and displaced persons;
• Human rights;
• Elections; and
• Records.
UNTAES, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), aided displaced
persons in Croatia that were forcibly relocated during the war. 1 January 1997. UN Photo #46661 Eric
Kanalstein.
203
Five regional UNTAES Civil Affairs offices have opened at Beli Manastir, Osijek, Erdut, Vinkovci, and Ilok. The
Transitional Administrator supported a Civil Affairs Unit responsible for all JICs and contact with officials and the
public, as well as a Legal Unit responsible for legal issues involving the reintegration of the region into Croatia and
UN contracts and claims. A Public Information Unit provided neutral and accurate information about the transition
process, and the Political Unit was responsible for policy development and liaison with UNHQ in New York.
Peace Though Economic Rehabilitation
UNTAES stressed the importance of the economic reconstruction of Eastern Croatia as the basis for creating
lasting peace and for national reconciliation. Four years of economic devastation had caused a severe drop in the
gross national product (production was down some 50 to 70 per cent) and massive unemployment. For the most
part, the economy as a whole had been destroyed. UNTAES troops provided regional and local security to prevent
the illegal removal of resources from the region, including the interdiction of the transport of illegally cut timber by
train. UNTAES organized or facilitated significant initiatives towards economic development of the region. Among
them were the:
• Reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, which cuts through the UNTAES mission area, on 7 May 1996;
• Reconnection, on the same date, of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline between Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia; and
• Turn-over, on 14 May, of the Djelatovci Oil fields to UNTAES from the “Scorpion” para-military unit.
The Elections
No later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies,
including municipalities, districts, councils, and a joint council of municipalities for the Serbian community, were to be
organized by UNTAES. International organizations such as the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) were requested to oversee the elections. During the transitional period, the Croatian Government
authorized the presence of international monitors along the international borders of the region to facilitate the free
movement of persons across existing border crossings.
The municipal and local elections in the region, conducted by UNTAES on 13-14 April 1997, were successful.
The elections were conducted simultaneously with elections throughout Croatia. The high voter turnout in Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium was beyond expectations. People voted at 193 polling stations, including
30 polling locations for absentee voting for the authorities outside the region. Within the UNTAES AOR, over 150
UNTAES observers were deployed to all polling stations as static monitors. Additionally, 30 OSCE observer teams,
observers from the Council of Europe, and diplomats visited numerous polling stations during the elections. No
intimidation, violence, or electoral improprieties were observed before, during, or after the elections.
The Transitional Administrator certified the elections on 22 April, and the results were accepted by all major
parties. The newly formed Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) won an absolute majority in 11 of the 28
municipalities. The elections led to the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
into Croatia.
204
UNTAES set up a program as part of the final civilian phase of demilitarization to allow citizens to turn
in their weapons, in any condition, for set prices. After the weapons were stockpiled, Belgian and Slovak
explosive experts supervised their disposal. Explosive experts place weapons in a dirt trench. The weapons
will be exploded and destroyed. 01 January 1997. UN Photo #31496 by Eric Kanalstein.
Humanitarian Action
One of the main objectives of the UN presence in Eastern Slavonia was to alleviate the difficult humanitarian
situation in the area to normalize civilian life. Numerous UN agencies, international, and regional organizations,
as well as NGOs, were active in the UNTAES mission area to address the difficult humanitarian and human rights
situation, including serious human rights violations.
In August 1996, in the zone of separation between Osijek and Klisa, UNTAES created an open-air meeting
area and marketplace for family reunions and commerce. By March 1997, some 140,000 people had attended and
reunited at the UNTAES market days without incident.
Withdrawal of UNTAES
The UN put in place a two-phase exit strategy for UNTAES. In the first phase, the Transitional Administrator
would devolve to Croatia executive responsibility for the major part of the civil administration of the region, while
maintaining his authority to intervene and overrule decisions should the situation deteriorate and the achievements of
UNTAES be threatened. In the second phase, subject to satisfactory Croatian performance, the remaining executive
functions would be devolved, with Croatia assuming responsibility for the continued demilitarization of the region and
gradual integration of the Transitional Police Force into the Croatian police force.
The exit strategy allowed UNTAES personnel and resources to be reduced progressively as Croatian authorities
assumed executive functions. Phase two of the military drawdown began on 15 October 1997. At this point, UNTAES
had reduced its troop level to 720 personnel. The number of UNMOs remained unchanged at 100, and the authorised
strength of 600 CIVPOL was reduced to some 450 police. A revised civil affairs structure with a strengthened focus
on returns and human rights was based around the new municipalities to monitor implementation of the Basic
Agreement and other Croatian guarantees and commitments. The strength of the civilian component was reduced
from 485 to 315 international staff and from 746 to 399 local staff, in addition to 70 United Nations volunteers.
205
As the mission came to an end, Security Council resolution 1145 (1997) of 19 December 1997 established a
support group of 180 CIVPOL monitors for a single period of up to nine months in the post-UNTAES period to continue
monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region. Having accomplished its key objective of
peacefully reintegrating Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium into Croatia, UNTAES was terminated on
15 January 1998.
Section 10.10 United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

(UNMOP)
Background to UNMOP
Regarding UN engagement, the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula was mostly overshadowed by the larger
Balkan conflict during the 1990s. The UNMOs of UNPROFOR assigned to the Prevlaka peninsula carried out their
mandate against the backdrop of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). UN efforts to bring a negotiated
peace to the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula proved to be fruitless.
During the period 1996-1998, the parties focused mainly on the situation in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia).
Despite the provision for a negotiated settlement of the Prevlaka dispute in the Agreement on Normalization of
Relations signed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 23 August 1996, no progress was made.
With the restructuring of UNPROFOR in March 1995, the UN’s observer functions were carried out by UNCRO.
With the termination of UNCRO’s mandate on 15 January 1996 and the imminent withdrawal of its UNMOs and
CIVPOL monitors, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that monitoring the demilitarization
of the Prevlaka peninsula continue.
Establishment and Mandate of UNMOP
Security Council resolution 1038 (1996) of 15 January 1996 authorized UNMOs to continue to monitor the
demilitarization of Prevlaka. This new mission was called the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
(UNMOP). It was established to be self-sufficient to more reliably patrol the areas concerned and maintain liaison
teams in Dubrovnik and Herceg Novi. Its strength was raised from 14 to 28 UNMOs.
UNMOP became an independent mission on 1 February 1996. Its UNMOs served under the command and
direction of a Chief Military Observer, who reported directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York. Although an
independent Mission, for administrative and budgetary purposes, UNMOP was treated as part of the United Nations
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). UNMOP’s mandate was the monitoring of the demilitarization of the
Prevlaka peninsula and the neighbouring areas in Croatia and the FRY.
Security Council President HASMY Agam (Malaysia)

presides over meeting at which the Council extended
the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers
in Prevlaka (UNMOP), to continue monitoring the
demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula. 15 July
1999. UN Photo #129669 by Milton Grant.
206
UNMOP’s Activities
UNMOP held regular meetings with the local authorities to strengthen liaison, reduce tensions, improve safety
and security, and promote confidence between the parties. The Chief Military Observer also maintained contact with
the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade. Cooperation between UNMOP and NATO’s multinational stabilization force
(SFOR) was maintained through regular meetings.
UNMOP maintained its 24-hour presence at the team site on the Ostra peninsula, at Herceg Novi in the FRY,
and at the HQ at Cavtat and the team site at Gruda in Croatia. Except when restrictions of movement were imposed
by either party, it conducted vehicle, foot, and standing patrols. Throughout UNMOP’s presence in the region, the
situation in its AOR remained stable and calm.
Resolution to the Dispute
The first serious rounds of negotiation occurred after the conclusion of UNTAES as the parties began a round of
direct negotiations on Prevlaka in 1998. However, this initial dialogue in 1998 was suspended with the commencement
of military action against the FRY in March 1999 by NATO. In October 1999, Security Council resolution 1252 (1999)
requested the UN Secretary-General to present a package of confidence-building measures to the parties. However,
neither of the parties at the time were willing to accept the package in its entirety.
The absence of major conflict in the region and the change in government in both Croatia and the FRY in
2000 created a more favourable environment for restarting negotiations. A process of consultation between the
two sides led to the formation in December 2001 of a joint Interstate Diplomatic Commission tasked with resolving
the outstanding border disputes between the two countries. By April 2002, both sides had reached the stage where
they were able to report in a joint letter to the president of the Security Council that they were negotiating, in good
faith and an atmosphere of confidence and respect, a comprehensive cross-border regime that “would eventually
contribute to the successful ending of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka.”
UNMOP’s Mandate Ends
Due to clear progress in resolving the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula, Security Council resolution 1437
(2002) of 11 October 2002 extended UNMOP one last time until 15 December 2002. In the meantime, Croatia and
the FRY continued bilateral negotiations to conclude an interim agreement providing for the normalization of the
situation in Prevlaka. On 10 December, the sides signed the Protocol on the Interim Regime along the Southern
Border between the two states, establishing a provisional cross-border regime on the Prevlaka peninsula.
At this point, it was clear that there was no longer a requirement for UNMOP as the situation was quiet,
demilitarization was not in question, and there was no risk of renewed hostilities. However, the presence of mines,
unexploded ordnance, and ammunition in the area of handover required careful handling. A small core staff stayed
on until 31 December 2002, to ensure that the handover was conducted in a safe and orderly fashion.
The Secretary-General said that throughout a turbulent decade in the Balkans, UNMOP had contributed to
insulating Prevlaka from the surrounding conflicts and tensions and ensured that hostilities nearby did not create
instability on the peninsula. It demonstrated that even a small UN presence, properly conceived and executed, could
make a difference.
207
Section 10.11 United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

(UNSMIH)
Background to UNSMIH
The Secretary-General made it clear that there was a continued need for a UN presence in Haiti after the
mandate for UNMIH expired. A stable and reasonably secure environment had been established by the US-led
multinational force in Haiti (September 1994 to March 1995) and extended with the assistance of the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, September 1993 to 30 June 1996). Nonetheless, there remained a clear need for a continued
presence and an ongoing need for assistance from the international community to support the new Haitian National
Police (HNP). This support from the international community would help to consolidate the progress achieved by the
Haitian people after the restoration of democracy. Thus, the UN had to adjust its operations in Haiti to reflect the new
realities on the ground.
For the first time in its history, Haiti had the foundation for a police force that was effective, professional,
committed to the rule of law, and respected human rights. However, the HNP alone could not ensure a stable and
secure environment required for the consolidation of democratic rule. The withdrawal of UN military and CIVPOL
forces would lead to a collapse of the HNP due to external forces.
Establishment and Mandate of UNSMIH
Keeping the reality of the HNP in mind, Security Council resolution 1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996 established
the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH). It was initially composed of 300 CIVPOL personnel and 600
troops. An additional 800 voluntarily funded military personnel were to be provided by Member States to serve with
UNSMIH. The Mission’s mandate was until 30 November 1996 and was limited to the following tasks:
• Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police;
• Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the
success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; and
• Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation,
and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.
In the foreground a UNSMIH peacekeeping soldier

from Pakistan patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince;
a United Nations vehicle with soldiers can be seen in
the background, approaching him. 13 May 1997. UN
Photo #56978 by Eskinder Debebe.
208
One of the objectives of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) is to
assist the Government of Haiti professionalize its police force. 12 May 1997. UN Photo
#78609 by Eskinder Debebe.
UNSMIH Activities
The UNSMIH military element was deployed exclusively in the city of Port-au-Prince, which was patrolled on
a 24-hour basis. Members of the military element worked with the staff of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)
and the technical assistance team of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to plan the logistical and
operational support for the first round of elections. UNSMIH military personnel also protected the National Palace and
the residence of former President Aristide.
Members of the UNSMIH CIVPOL element were deployed in ten detachments in the provinces and five in Port-
au-Prince, and they continued to accompany HNP officers in their day-to-day activities. The central training unit of
the Mission’s CIVPOL element oversaw instruction through its programme of continuing education, which focused on
conflict resolution, marksmanship, human rights and police work, driving, immigration, and narcotics. The CIVPOL
element also conducted refresher courses for Palace guards, and it trained HNP officers to patrol the border.
Given the continuing violence in the country, UNSMIH worked to strengthen the HNP crowd-control and rapid-
intervention capabilities. The Mission’s police element also continued to work closely with the HNP Directorate General
in redeploying the force according to population density and patterns of criminal behaviour. However, progress was
slow, and overall the HNP as a police organization was still not experienced enough and lacked the confidence to
control and defeat threats posed by subversive groups. Therefore, there was still a requirement for the presence of
UNSMIH military elements to support the Haitian authorities in their efforts to contain the danger of destabilization
by forces threatening the fragile security situation.
Extension of the Mandate
Based on the Secretary-General’s report of 31 March 1997 that UNSMIH could make a further contribution to
the consolidation of democracy in Haiti and the revitalization of the country’s system of justice, the Security Council
by resolution 1086 (1996) extended UNSMIH’s mandate until 31 May 1997 with a maximum strength of 300 civilian
police personnel and 500 troops. To ensure the continued institutional development of the police force, the mandate
of UNSMIH was extended for a final time until 31 July 1997.
209
End of the Mandate
For the first time in Haiti’s history, a peaceful hand-over of power between two democratically elected presidents
took place in February 1996. The Secretary-General noted that the former military had been weakened to a point
where their return to power appeared highly unlikely. However, Haiti continued to face major economic and political
problems. Since the transfer from UNMIH to UNSMIH, the overall situation had deteriorated, marked by flawed
elections, stagnant living standards, and rising crime. Thus, UNDP put in place the “Haiti 2012” initiative, which
provided the framework for national and international development efforts in Haiti.
The establishment of the new police force had been slow and uneven. There was also the possibility that the
HNP could still be manipulated by certain political groups. In light of this reality, the Security Council, at the end
of UNSMIH’s mandate on 31 July 1997, established a new mission, the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH) for a period of four months until 30 November 1997, the mandate of which would be to support the Haitian
authorities in the further professionalization of HNP.
Section 10.12 United Nations Angola Verification Mission III

(UNAVEM III)
Background to UNAVEM III
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the war in Angola was brought to a negotiated end. The UN assisted in
verification of the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (UNAVEM I, January 1989 to May 1991). Then, it
verified the peace arrangements agreed by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência
Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA). The restoration of peace and the
attaining of national reconciliation based on the Peace Accords for Angola was signed on 31 May 1991 to observe
and verify the elections held in September 1992 (UNAVEM II, June 1991 to February 1995). Renewed fighting broke
out between Government and UNITA forces in the aftermath of the 1992 elections, but UNAVEM II presence was
maintained in Angola, albeit at a reduced strength.
The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 began a new phase in the Angolan peace process.
The Protocol consisted of several documents, each relating to a particular issue on the agenda of the peace talks,
covering legal, military, police, and political issues, as well as the role for the United Nations. However, the Lusaka
Protocol was also signed at a point when UNITA was in a weakened military position. Thus, its leadership’s decision to
seek peace was premised on stopping further territorial losses to the government rather than a true wish for peace.
Aside from the ceasefire, the Lusaka Protocol called for the integration of both sides’ military leadership,
demobilization, and later demilitarization under UN oversight. Nonetheless, even with a UN arms embargo in place,
both sides continued to openly re-arm.
Establishment and Mandate of UNAVEM III
In 1995, the Secretary-General recommended that UNAVEM III take over from UNAVEM II to help the parties
“restore peace and achieve national reconciliation.” On 8 February, Security Council resolution 976 (1995) established
UNAVEM III. Its maximum strength was set at 7,000 troops and military support personnel, 350 UNMOs, 260
CIVPOL, and some 420 internationally recruited civilian staff, 300 locally recruited staff, and 75 UN Volunteers.
UNAVEM III’s mandate was to end in February 1997.
210
In the context of the various relevant Security Council resolutions on Angola, UNAVEM III’s mandate was to:
• Provide good offices and mediation to the Angolan parties;
• Monitor and verify the extension of State administration throughout the country and the process of national
reconciliation;
• Supervise, control, and verify the disengagement of forces and to monitor the ceasefire;
• Verify information received from the Government and UNITA regarding their forces, as well as all troop
movements;
• Assist in the establishment of quartering areas;
• Verify the withdrawal, quartering, and demobilization of UNITA forces;
• Supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments;
• Verify the movement of Government forces (FAA) to barracks and the completion of the formation of FAA;
• Verify the free circulation of persons and goods;
• Verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of
the rapid reaction police, and security arrangements for UNITA leaders;
• Coordinate, facilitate, and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process, as well as
participating in mine-clearance activities;
• Declare formally that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential elections
have been fulfilled; and
• Support, verify, and monitor the electoral process.
Peacekeepers of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) Brazilian battalion on welcome
parade during the visit of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 15 March 1997. UN Photo #160271.
211
Over 15,000 civilians are killed or maimed by anti-personnel mines every year. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM
III) was established to facilitate the restoration of peace and the process of national reconciliation in Angola. As part of UNAVEM's
mandate, demining schools were established to train and aid in the process of disarmament and arms control. A display of anti-
personnel mines used for demining training. 26 March 1996. UN Photo #31509 by John Charles Monua.
UNAVEM III’s Activities
By July 1995, 337 UNMOs, 1,970 troops, 209 CIVPOL, 208 staff officers, and military support personnel had
been deployed. Though there were positive results in the peace process, there were continued violations of human
rights by both sides, even with the growing UN presence. Additionally, the overall implementation process fell quickly
behind schedule. The key issue of quartering UNITA forces had seriously fallen behind and was impacting other
aspects of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Much of this was due to the continuing lack of mutual trust
between the Government and UNITA.
Security Council resolution 1075 of 11 October 1996 emphasized that continuing delays and unfilled promises,
in particular on the part of UNITA, in implementing the successive timetables for the completion of key military
and political issues were no longer acceptable. After UNITA submitted a list of tasks that it had to fulfil by 15
November 1996 (later extended to 20 November), UNAVEM III prepared a comprehensive implementation timetable,
encompassing all pending military, police, and political tasks to be completed by both parties, but the process
continued to fall behind schedule. A fragile peace had been established in Angola, but UNITA continued to delay the
peace process.
The presence of UNAVEM III allowed food aid to reach regions of Angola that had been inaccessible since 1992.
UNAVEM III also investigated all ceasefire violations and was able to limit violations to the point that both sides were
able to disengage their forces, and landmine clearance could begin in some areas.
212
Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan ( centre, behind the honour guards) reviews peacekeeping troops at the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission III Headquarters in Luanda. Accompanying the Secretary-General, on the left is Alioune
Blondin Beye, special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola. 25 March 1997. UN Photo #179422 by Milton
Grant.
Termination of UNAVEM III
By early 1997, pressure from the UN led the Government of Angola to install the Government of Unity and
National Reconciliation on 11 April. The events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) changed the strategic
situation in the region and led to fighting in northern Angola in June as refugees came into Angola from the DRC.
However, the process of the draw-down of UNAVEM III’s forces had already begun as four of its infantry and support
units had been withdrawn in December 1996, and the Mission was terminated on schedule on 30 June.
Since the situation in Angola had not been resolved regarding what had been outlined in the Lusaka Protocol and
due to the situation along its border with the DRC, on 30 June, the Security Council established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The new follow-on mission replaced UNAVEM III.
Section 10.13 Credibility Issues

The setbacks suffered in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia adversely affected the prestige and credibility of
United Nations peacekeeping operations. The UN was blamed for being too passive in Bosnia, simply ineffective in
Haiti, too insensitive in Rwanda, and too aggressive in Somalia.
Following a brief but stellar rise, UN peacekeeping virtually collapsed in the mid-to-late 1990s. Operations
undertaken by the “blue helmets” in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia were widely considered to have failed,
eclipsing successes in Nicaragua, Mozambique, Namibia, and Eastern Slavonia/Croatia. In an effort not to repeat
the same mistakes, the UN took concrete steps in the early 1990s that led to improvements in the cooperation and
coordination between troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the Security Council. These were enshrined in two
Security Council Presidential Statements.
213
Section 10.14 The Positive 1990s Missions

The positive results of missions from the post-Cold War era nonetheless suffered from under-manning and
under-funding. UN military force sizes were based on financial constraints rather than realistic mission requirements.
Troop quality was uneven, and CIVPOL and civil personnel were of mixed competence. All components of the mission
arrived in an ad hoc manner subject to availability from Member States. CIVPOL and civil administrators tended to
arrive more slowly than military personnel.
An unforeseen positive result of the negative aspects of the early 1990s missions occurred when Kofi Annan
was appointed as UN Secretary-General. His experience as the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping and head
of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (during the first half of the 1990s) created an environment at the UN
that had a positive impact on peacekeeping operations. Additionally, many of his key associates came with him to
UNHQ or stayed in the area of peacekeeping. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the UN had an experienced cadre of
UN civil servants running UN peacekeeping operations. From the military perspective, many recent UN peacekeeping
missions were headed and staffed by veterans of missions from the 1990s. This ultimately led to a resurgence of
peacekeeping in the late 1990s.
Nation-building needs peace. Without peace, it is impossible for real democratization or economic growth to
occur. With peace, some level of economic growth becomes almost inevitable, and democratization at least becomes
possible. The failures and credibility issues aside, regarding nation-building, five UN missions during the 1990s did
achieve positive results. They are summarized in the following table.
Successes in the 1990s
Country or Years Peak Troops Assessment Lessons Learned

Territory
Namibia 1989-1990 4,493 Successful UN helped ensure peace, democratic development, and
economic growth. Compliant neighbours, a competent
UNTAG
government, and a clear end state can contribute to
successful outcome.
El Salvador 1991-1996 4,958 Successful UN negotiated lasting peace settlement and transition
to democracy after 12-year civil war. UN participation in
ONUSAL
settlement negotiations can facilitate smooth transition.
Cambodia 1991-1993 15,991 Partially UN organized elections, verified withdrawal of foreign

Successful troops, and ended large-scale civil war. But democracy
UNAMIC
did not take hold. Democratization requires long-term
UNTAC engagement.
Mozambique 1992-1994 6,576 Mostly Transition to independence was peaceful and
Successful democratic. But negative economic growth. Cooperation
ONUMOZ
of neighbouring states is critical to success.
Incorporation of insurgent groups into political process
is key to democratic transition.
Eastern 1995-1998 8,248 Successful Well-resourced operation and clear end state
Slavonia contributed to peaceful and democratic transition. UN
UNTAES can successfully conduct small peace enforcement
missions with support from major powers.
Source: Adapted from The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, 2005.
214
1. Which operation marked the 5. One of the tasks in UNCRO’s mandate

turning point in the evolution of UN was to ______.
peacekeeping missions?
A. Assist in controlling by monitoring and
A. UNTAC reporting the crossing of civilians across
B. UNAMIR Croatian borders
C. UNOSOM II B. Control all border crossings to Kosovo
D. UNASOG C. Remove all civilians from the Prevlaka
peninsula
2. What happened to UNPROFOR after its
D. Monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka
setbacks in Bosnia?
peninsula
A. It was terminated in 1995
B. It was strengthened with additional troops 6. UNPREDEP was the UN’s first ______.
and resources A. Peace enforcement mission
C. Its mandate was reduced to a humanitarian B. Preventive diplomacy and deployment
mission only operation
D. It was restructured and divided to provide C. Peacekeeping mission
specific support to the Dayton Peace D. Preventive diplomacy mission
Agreement
7. UNMIBH established the Criminal Justice
3. UNOMUR was established in June 1993 Advisory Unit to ______.
on the Ugandan side of the Rwandan
A. Aid in prosecuting war crimes
border to ______
B. Investigate criminal activity of UN personnel
A. Verify that no military assistance reached
C. Foster co-operation between the police and
Rwanda
the criminal justice system
B. Control the problem of refugees crossing the
D. Investigate Serbian political leaders
border from Rwanda
C. Oversee the withdrawal of UNAMIR 8. The IPTF, through the core programmes,
D. Observe Uganda troop movements was able to de-certify police officers who
______.
4. What organization was put in place
A. Had participated in war crimes or other
to control the new UN missions that
violations of the law
replaced UNPROFOR?
B. Did not shown up for duty shifts
A. IFOR
C. Deserted their posts
B. UNPF-HQ
D. Owed income tax to the Government
C. OSCE
D. UNCRO
215
9. In the context of the Lusaka Protocol 10. An unforeseen positive result of the
and the UN arms embargo, what did both negative aspects of the early 1990s
sides in the Angolan conflict continue to missions was:
do?
A. The appointment of Kofi Annan as UN
A. Both sides began a systematic disarmament Secretary-General
process B. A restructuring of the Security Council
B. Both sides continued to openly re-arm vetoes
C. Both sides began a covert re-armament C. A change in the way UNDPKO worked
programme D. A restructuring of the whole UN system
D. Both sides looked to mercenary
organizations to continue the conflict
covertly
Answer Key »
1. C
2. D
3. A
4. B
5. D
6. B
7. C
8. A
9. B
10. A
216
THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE COLD WAR: 1998-1996
LESSON
The Situation of UN
11 Peacekeeping Operations and

Future Prospects
The retrenchment of
peacekeeping in the mid-1990s
was mainly due to three factors.
UN Photo #762294 by Harandane Dicko.
Section 11.1 Reasons for the Retrenchment of • List the reasons for the current retrenchment.
Operations in the Mid-1990s

• Discuss the ongoing re-evaluation of peacekeeping,
Section 11.2 The Approach After Bosnia, including Boutros-Ghali’s new approach and its
Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia limitations, functional challenges, and prospects for the
future.
Section 11.3 Limitations of the New Approach
Section 11.4 Prospects for the Future
217
LESSON 11 | The Situation of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Future Prospects
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) celebrates the 70th Anniversary of Peacekeeping with a ceremony open to the
public for the first time in South Sudan. The Government of South Sudan was represented by the Special Adviser to the President.
Rwandan peacekeepers serving with UNMISS participate in the ceremony. 29 May 2018. UN Photo #763785 by Nektarios Markogiannis
Section 11.1 Reasons for

the Retrenchment
of Operations in
the Mid-1990s
Inadequate Resources
The retrenchment of peacekeeping in the mid-1990s
was mainly due to three factors. First, the revitalization of
the Security Council brought about by the end of the Cold
War and the successes achieved during the first two years
of the post-Cold War era instilled in the United Nations a
sense of euphoria and over-confidence. This attitude led to
a remarkable expansion of UN peacekeeping operations.
218
However, this rapid expansion soon outpaced the capability of the organization. The United Nations found it
increasingly difficult to secure from its Member States the financial means, personnel, and equipment that were
required for the new peacekeeping operations. Soon after, the Security Council established new operations with over-
ambitious mandates without giving them adequate resources to fulfil their missions.
Problems with Intra-State Conflicts
Second, the main danger to world stability had shifted after the Cold War from international conflicts and
superpower confrontation to internal conflicts and major humanitarian crises in failed or collapsing states. Most of
the conflicts that claimed the attention of the Security Council during this period were of an internal nature. However,
UN peacekeeping operations were initially conceived to deal with international conflicts involving governments.
These operations, based on the traditional principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except
in self-defence, were essentially a non-violent UN presence. This presence was intended to help the governments
involved in an armed conflict to stop the fighting when they had agreed to do so and to seek a settlement of their
conflict by peaceful means. They are rooted on the premise that once the governments concerned had accepted a
UN peacekeeping operation, they would cooperate with it and that their cooperation would include a commitment
to ensure the safety of UN personnel. However, these safeguards were no longer available when the United Nations
became involved in internal conflicts and had to deal with unruly and heavily armed internal factions and irregular
forces. In such cases, UN peacekeepers needed to use force beyond self-defence to carry out their mission. The
decision of the Security Council to endow UN peacekeeping operations with enforcement powers in Somalia and
Bosnia, however, proved to be a costly mistake.
Declining Support from the United States
The third and most important factor contributing to the retrenchment was the diminishing support of the
United States. The effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations is essentially contingent upon the cooperation and
assistance of the Member States, especially of the most powerful and most wealthy of them. During the Cold War and
the first years of the post-Cold War era, the United States was a staunch supporter of UN peacekeeping. It helped the
UN to overcome several serious crises and, for many UN emergency operations, it provided crucial equipment and
logistic facilities that no other nation could provide. Despite being only one of 185 member nations of the UN, the
United States paid 31.4% of the cost of peacekeeping operations through the Special Scale of Assessments.
However, the US drastically reduced its support for UN peacekeeping operations, particularly after the tragedy
of 3 October 1993 involving the death of 18 American soldiers in Somalia. It opposed United Nations involvement
in several conflicts and often seemed to prefer to act unilaterally, bilaterally, or through channels other than the
United Nations. The United States’ failure to pay its assessed contributions promptly was the main cause of the
financial crisis that threatened to paralyze the organization and its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. By 1997,
many western countries were, like the US, starting to hesitate when committing their resources to peacekeeping
operations, especially since so much was owed to them by the UN. The top seven creditors in 1997 were all from
western industrialized states, and all had been strong supporters of peacekeeping.
219
Payments Owed by the UN to Member Countries for PKOs (December 1997)
Country Troops Contingent- Letters of Death and Total Owed

Owned Assistance Disability
Equipment
France 2,039 125,136 16,530 7,610 $151,315
United States 3,498 25,396 80,289 0 $109,183
United Kingdom 3,062 45,190 15,420 2,175 $65,847
Italy 369 29,070 29,398 3,653 $62,490
Belgium 4,646 39,869 13,473 97 $58,085
Netherlands 37 45,308 5,567 0 $50,912
Canada 2,749 29,209 13,084 5,348 $50,390
Sums rounded in the US thousands. "Debt of 15 Largest Payers to the Peacekeeping Budget," Global Policy Forum,
accessed 22 June 2018. Available from: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/the-un-
peacekeeping-operations-budget/27452.html>.
Section 11.2 The Approach After Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and

Somalia
Considering the difficulties experienced by the United Nations and the lessons learned from its operations in
Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined in January 1995 a new
approach for future peacekeeping operations (see Lesson 9). In brief, he recommended that UN peacekeeping
operations adhere strictly to the traditional principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in
self-defence, also recommending that they not blur the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Should enforcement operations be required, the Security Council should delegate the responsibility for organizing
and leading such operations to a Member State or a group of Member States.
Section 11.3 Limitations of the New Approach

The new approach recommended by the Secretary-General, which was obviously dictated by prevailing political
realities, has been followed by the United Nations up to the present. However, this tactic contained certain weaknesses
that must be addressed. The delegation to a Member State or a group of Member States of the responsibility for
organizing and leading enforcement operations (or peacekeeping operations with enforcement capability) is subject
to serious limitations. The applicability of this device depends on the goodwill of those Member
States concerned and their willingness to accept the very heavy responsibility that it entails. In any case, the
number of Member States able to assume such responsibility is limited. Aside from the major military powers, very
few countries can do so. If experience is any guide, this device can be used only in a limited number of cases and
for a limited duration.
Therefore, the responsibility for containing armed conflicts that threatened world or regional stability in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, whether international or internal, continued to rest mainly with the United
Nations. Most of the conflicts brought before the Security Council in the immediate post-Cold War era (1988-96)
were internal conflicts. The United Nations had to improve and strengthen its peacekeeping operations to enable the
220
mission to function effectively in the volatile environment of complex civil war situations while adhering strictly to the
traditional principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence.
As shown by the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia or the US-led multinational forces in Somalia and
Haiti, this objective can be achieved if the peacekeeping operation is militarily strong and can put up credible shows
of force as a deterrent without using force. United Nations peacekeeping operations should be able to do the same,
but they would have to be provided with an integrated and efficient command and control structure, precise rules of
engagement, well-armed and well-trained troops, and a rapid deployment capability. This is not an impossible task,
but it would require much time and effort and the strong support and assistance of the Member States, especially the
most powerful and richest of them. Unfortunately, the present negative position of the United States remains, as it
did in the 1990s, a serious issue that must be addressed.
Despite their limitations, peacekeeping operations remain an important practical mechanism for containing and
helping to resolve internal as well as international conflicts. These operations are a collective responsibility that
should be assumed by the United Nations, rather than by individual states whose policy may be influenced by
national interests. Admittedly, traditional UN peacekeeping operations need to be strengthened to be better able
to function effectively in the volatile environment of civil wars and major humanitarian crises in failed or collapsing
states. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who began his term in January 1998, took urgent measures to this effect in
close co-operation with some of the traditional troop-contributing countries. He also exerted his best efforts to make
the UN administration leaner and more efficient in response to criticisms from the United States.
Current UN Peacekeeping Missions

Looking for statistics or other data about peacekeeping around
the world today? Visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations’ resource page for the most up-to-date information
about current peacekeeping operations and other UN missions:
<www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/>.
Section 11.4 Prospects for the Future

There are reasons to believe that the present negative attitude of the United States may be temporary because
it is against the grain of history. The current failure of the United States to resolve its unilateral war in Iraq and
its choice to call on the international community (in the form of NATO and the UN) to support its endeavours in
Afghanistan may bode well for the future of peacekeeping.
The establishment of an international organization dedicated to saving succeeding generations from the scourge
of war and ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the principles of justice
and international law is very much an American idea. It was mainly the vision and efforts of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt that made the creation of the United Nations possible after the Second World War, and it was the staunch
support of the United States that enabled the UN to overcome several crises during the Cold War. The argument that
the United States no longer needs the United Nations following the end of the Cold War is spurious. Indeed, if the
United Nations needs the United States more than ever in the post-Cold War era, the reverse is equally true. As the
sole superpower of the world, the United States cannot ignore any major conflicts in other parts of the world, but it
cannot and should not be expected to function as the policeman of the world. It is far better to let the United Nations
assume that responsibility and to help it to do the job.
221
With the renewed support of all nations, the United Nations would be in a much better position to strengthen
its peacekeeping operations and play a more effective role in dealing with various conflicts of the post-Cold War era.
In particular, it would be able to provide a restraining international presence in brutal civil war situations to prevent
ethnic massacres and other gross violations of human rights and to protect vital humanitarian relief operations for
distressed civilian populations. This would be in the best interests of the United Nations and all peace-loving nations.
The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) holds a memorial ceremony for two fallen peacekeepers,
one killed during the attack against the Timbuktu Regional Headquarters on 14 April, and one who succumbed to illness. 20 April 2018.
UN Photo #760045 by Marco Dormino.
222
1. What impact did the rapid expansion of 5. What was the main cause of the financial
missions in the first half of the 1990s crisis that threatened to paralyze the
have on the UN? organization and its peacekeeping
operations in the 1990s?
A. It soon out-paced the capability of the
Organization A. Lack of commitment by Security Council
B. It made peacekeeping even more relevant members to spend money to resolve conflicts
C. It polarised the Member States in the General B. A global recession
Assembly C. Unwillingness of most Member States to pay
D. It had no impact their dues

D. The United States’ failure to pay its assessed
2. The decision of the Security Council to contributions in a timely manner
endow UN peacekeeping operations with
enforcement powers in Somalia and 6. In 1995, Secretary-General Boutros
Bosnia had what effect? Boutros-Ghali outlined that, should
A. It reinforced the power and prestige of the enforcement operations be required, the
Security Council should ______.
UN
B. It proved to be a costly mistake A. Take full control of the mission
C. It led to peace in other conflicts B. Avoid making any type of commitment
D. It had no effect C. Delegate the responsibility for organising and

leading such operations to a Member State or
3. What event solidified the already a group of Member States
declining support from the United States D. Look to the only remaining superpower, the
for UN peacekeeping?
U.S., to organise and run the mission
A. The Gulf Crisis
B. The death of 18 American soldiers in Somalia 7. What was one of the limitations of the
new approach recommended by the
C. The end of the Cold War
Secretary- General?
D. Global recession
A. The number of Member States able to assume
4. In 1997, the top seven creditors were all such a responsibility was limited
from ______. B. There was not enough international interest
A. Africa. in the new approach
B. The industrialised states of South Asia. C. The UN Charter had no provisions for such an
C. Western industrialised states. approach
D. South America. D. The approach was seen as ad hoc and ill-

conceived by most Member States
223
8. For UN peacekeeping operations to 10. When the United Nations became

be successful in the current global involved in internal conflicts and had
environment, Missions would require to deal with unruly and heavily armed
_____. internal factions and irregular forces, UN
peacekeepers needed to use ______.
A. Highly limiting rules of engagement
B. An integrated and efficient command and A. Naval tactics
control structure B. Force beyond self-defence
C. Lightly armed troops with limited training C. Different uniforms
D. Heavy assault Special Forces troops only D. No force whatsoever, not even in self-defence
9. Even with their limitations,

peacekeeping operations should ______.
A. Remain a collective responsibility that should
be assumed by the UN
B. Be assumed by individual states only
C. No longer be pursued by the UN
D. Become the sole responsibility of western
industrialised states with major military
capabilities
Answer Key »
1. A
2. B
3. B
4. C
5. D
6. C
7. A
8. B
9. A
10. B
224
HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: 1945 TO 1987
Appendix A: List of Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AO Area of Operation
AOR Area of Responsibility
ARENA National Republican Alliance
ASEAN Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations
CCF Ceasefire Commission
CCFADM Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces
CEP Provisional Electoral Council
CIAV International Support and Verification Commission
CIMIC Civil-Military Coordination
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVPOL Civilian Police
CMAA Cambodian Mine Action Authority
CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CMLO Chief Military Liaison Officer
CMO Chief Military Observer
COPAZ National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CORE Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel
CPAF Cambodian People’s Armed Forces
CROMAC Croatian Mine Action Centre
CSC Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States
EUPM European Union Police Mission
FAA Angolan Armed Force
FFT Fact Finding Team
FMLN Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement
225
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
FRELIMO Frente de Libertaçao de Mozambique
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and

Cooperative Cambodia
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GHQ General Military Headquarters
HNP Haitian National Police
HQ Headquarters
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFOR Implementation Force
IPTF International Police Task Force
JEOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission
JFFG Joint Fact Finding Group
JIC Joint Implementation Committees
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army
JSAP Judicial System Assessment Programme
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
LAS League of Arab States
MCTU Mine Clearance Training Unit
MICIVIH International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MINUSAL United Nations Mission in El Salvador
MMWG Mixed Military Working Group
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NADK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC National Electoral Council
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
226
NMOG Neutral Military Observer Group
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAS Organisation of American States
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
ONUV United Nations Office of Verification
ONUVEH UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OP Operational Post
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAT Auxiliary Transitory Police
PDK Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PNC National Civil Police
POLISARIO Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro RENAMO

Resistencia National Moçambicana
ROE Rules of Engagement
RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRF Rapid Reaction Force
SACB Somali Aid Coordination Body
SADF South Africa Defence Forces
SC Security Council
SDSS Independent Democratic Serb Party
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SG Secretary-General
SNC Supreme National Council of Cambodia
SOC State of Cambodia
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWA South West Africa
SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation
SWAPOL South West Africa Police
227
SWATF South West Africa Territorial Forces
TCC Troop-Contributing Country
TNC Transitional National Council
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNMAC UN Mine Action Centre
UNMO UN Military Observer
UNOHAC UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNOL UN Support Office in Liberia
UNPA UN Protected Areas
UNPF United Nations Peace Forces
UNV United Nations Volunteer
UTO United Tajik Opposition
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZHS Zones Humanitaires Sures
228
Appendix B: An Agenda for Peace
A/47/277 - S/24111
17 June 1992
An Agenda for Peace

Preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking and peace-keeping
Report of the Secretary-General

pursuant to the statement
adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992
Introduction
1. In its statement of 31 January 1992, adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held
by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, I was invited to
prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, an
"analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient
within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.1/
2. The United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on
the common ground that they create between them. The adversarial decades of the cold
war made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfil. The January 1992
Summit therefore represented an unprecedented recommitment, at the highest political
level, to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.
3. In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an
opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United
Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and
human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom". This opportunity must not be squandered. The
Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.
4. I welcome the invitation of the Security Council, early in my tenure as Secretary-

General, to prepare this report. It draws upon ideas and proposals transmitted to me by
Governments, regional agencies, non-governmental organizations, and institutions and
individuals from many countries. I am grateful for these, even as I emphasize that the
responsibility for this report is my own.
5. The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our
To read
utmostAneffortAgenda for Peace,
to enhance respect the and
for human rights report of former
fundamental freedoms, toSecretary-
promote
sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress
General Boutros
and to curtail Boutros-Ghali
the existence and use of massivelyabout the
destructive roleThe
weapons. ofUnited
the United
Nations in a post-Cold War world, visit the UN Department
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the largest summit ever held, has of
Peacekeeping Operations’ resource page:
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/an-agenda-for-peace-
preventive-diplomacy-peacemaking-and-peace-keeping-report-of-the-
secretary-general/>.
229
Appendix C: Past Peacekeeping Missions
Left to Right: UN Photo #145285 by Yutaka Nagata; UN Photo #137362 by JG; UN Photo #145152; UN Photo #64265 by Milton Grant.
For information about past peacekeeping missions, visit the

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ resource page:
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations>.
230
Appendix D: Current Peacekeeping Missions
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MINUSMA MINURSO UNAMID UNMIK UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMOGIP
Mali Western Sahara Darfur Kosovo Cyprus Lebanon India and Pakistan
MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MONUSCO UNMISS UNISFA UNTSO UNDOF

Haiti Central African Republic Dem. Rep. of the Congo South Sudan Abyei Middle East Syria
Map No. 4259 Rev. 25 (E) UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support
April 2018 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)
UN Peacekeeping Map from the UN Cartographic Section, April 2018: <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/P_K_O.pdf>.

MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara established: 1991
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the established: 2014
Central African Republic
MINUSMA» Looking for Multidimensional
United Nations statistics or otherStabilization
Integrated data about Mission in Mali established: 2013
MINUJUSTHpeacekeeping around
United Nations Mission for Justicethe world
Support in Haititoday? established: 2017
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem. Republic of the Congo established: 2010
UNAMID Visit the
African UN Department
Union-United of Peacekeeping
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur established: 2007
UNDOF Operations’ resource page
United Nations Disengagement ObserverforForcethe most up-to- established: 1974
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus established: 1964
UNIFIL date information
United about
Nations Interim Force current peacekeeping
in Lebanon established: 1978
UNISFA operations
United Nationsand
Interimother
Security UN
Forcemissions:
for Abyei established: 2011
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo established: 1999
UNMISS <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/resources>.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan established: 2011
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan established: 1949
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Orginization established: 1984
231
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» Access the exam from your Online Classroom

by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/
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Once you arrive at the course page, click the red
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Continue your POTI training experience »

• Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.
• If a particular category of study interests you, such as Human Rights,

Logistics, or Military Studies, consider the POST Certificate programme
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History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following The Cold War - 1988 To 1996

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History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following The Cold War - 1988 To 1996

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History of United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations Following

Cover photo: UN Photo #131445 by Jihad El

Peace Operations Training Institute

First edition: 1998 by F. T. Liu

Method of Study xii

Lesson 1 The End of the Cold War and the Resurgence of UN

Section 1.1 The Concept of

Section 1.4 The End of the Cold War 15

Section 1.5 New Peacekeeping Operations 16

Section 1.6 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and

Section 1.7 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

Section 1.8 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) 27

Section 1.9 United Nations Observer Group in Central America

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Lesson 2 The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 41

Section 2.1 Background on UNTAG 42

Section 2.2 Negotiations Leading to the Establishment of UNTAG 43

Section 2.3 The Agreement for the UNTAG Operation 45

Section 2.4 The Mandate of UNTAG 45

Section 2.5 The Organization of UNTAG 46

Section 2.6 The Civilian Component of UNTAG 47

Section 2.7 Deployment of UNTAG 49

Section 2.8 Ceasefire Violation Dispute 49

Section 2.9 The Dismantling of the South African Military Presence in

Section 2.10 South African Allegations 53

Section 2.11 Monitoring the South West Africa Police 53

Section 2.12 Return of Refugees 54

Section 2.13 Missing Persons 55

Section 2.14 The Namibian Elections 55

Section 2.15 Importance of UNTAG 56

Lesson 3 The Gulf Crisis and the Use of Force 59

Section 3.1 Background on UNIKOM 60

Section 3.2 Establishment and Mandate of UNIKOM 61

Section 3.3 The Deployment of UNIKOM 62

Section 3.4 The Expansion of UNIKOM’s Mandate 63

Section 3.5 Situation in the DMZ 64

Section 3.6 Suspension of UNIKOM and the Termination of the

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Section 3.9 The Korean Precedent 66

Section 3.10 Invocation of Chapter VII 67

Section 3.11 Limits on the Use of Force 68

Lesson 4 Further Expansion of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Section 4.1 The Changing International Atmosphere and

Section 4.2 New Challenges 73

Section 4.3 New Peacekeeping Operations 73

Section 4.4 The Problems with Expansion 78

Lesson 5 Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Section 5.1 International Conflicts 82

Section 5.3 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 86

Section 5.4 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 93

Section 5.5 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 99

Section 5.6 United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) 109

Lesson 6 Performance of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Section 6.1 Background to

Section 6.2 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Section 6.3 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 121

Section 6.4 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 124

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Section 6.5 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 127

Section 6.6 United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

Section 6.7 United Nations Angola Verification Mission

Section 6.8 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) 140