My Upgrade To Airline Captain FF

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 1
MY UPGRADE TO AIRLINE CAPTAIN
CHRISTOPHER LONGANI RICCI

Copyright © 2020
All rights reserved
Edition 2

THANKS
To my wife and my son.
They have been very patient.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Thanks .................................................................................................................................4
Table of Contents................................................................................................................5
Premise for rookies ............................................................................................................8
Another premise .................................................................................................................9
…. and one more ...............................................................................................................11
Disclaimer .........................................................................................................................13
Notes, examples and lists ................................................................................................14
1 Where should I start from ? ..........................................................................................15
Part 1: I need knowledge ….. ...........................................................................................16
2 Missing expertise ? .......................................................................................................17
3 Aircraft reliability ...........................................................................................................18
4 Artificially increase experience: memory. ...................................................................20
5 When I need help ...........................................................................................................22
6 Artificially increase experience: the “memento” (event-catcher) .............................23
Intra-chapter 6: About learning paths.............................................................................25
7 About notes, drawings and schemes ..........................................................................26
8 Artificially increase experience: sharing. ....................................................................28
9 Artificially increase experience: accidents analysis. .................................................30
10 The training gym is ready ...........................................................................................31
11 Self mentoring ..............................................................................................................32
12 Time to move on ..........................................................................................................34
Part 2: ….. and I need attitude .........................................................................................35
13 The power of attitude ..................................................................................................36
14 Who is my crew ? ........................................................................................................38
15 Attitude and empathy ..................................................................................................39
16 Don’t be quirky (maturity) ...........................................................................................42
Intra-chapter 16: Welcome any input ..............................................................................45
Part 3: Sit on the LHS now …. .........................................................................................46
17 Unhappy FOs ...............................................................................................................47
18 I know FO .....................................................................................................................49
19 Eager FO .......................................................................................................................51
20 Apples, trees …. and clues .........................................................................................52
21 Can leopards change their spots ? ............................................................................53

22 Maintain the heading ...................................................................................................54
23 Invisible Pilots .............................................................................................................55
24 Ask or order .................................................................................................................57
25 Prevention ....................................................................................................................58
26 Leadership (vs authority) ............................................................................................62
27 About briefings ............................................................................................................64
28 Errors ............................................................................................................................68
29 The pace .......................................................................................................................72
30 Mind reset .....................................................................................................................74
31 Communication, intentions (and options) ................................................................75
32 Opinions .......................................................................................................................76
33 Information management ............................................................................................77
34 Commander style and energy ....................................................................................78
35 The boss and the leader .............................................................................................81
Part 4: ….. and build my command skills .......................................................................83
36 The filter .......................................................................................................................84
37 Decision making (home) training ...............................................................................86
38 My own “modus operandi” .........................................................................................88
Part 5: Ready for interview and more …. .......................................................................92
39 Command interview ....................................................................................................93
40 My back against the wall .............................................................................................95
41 How to fail command ..................................................................................................97
42 Grey decisions: MEL training ...................................................................................100
43 Knowledge was there ….. .........................................................................................103
44 The big men/women ..................................................................................................105
Part 6: Company operations manual ............................................................................107
45 The importance of knowing where the stuff is (written) ........................................109
46 Company operations manual captain’s responsibilities........................................110
47 Where the manuals fail to reach ...............................................................................111
Part 7: My own gym ........................................................................................................113
48 Regulatory documents ..............................................................................................114
49 Training on the company operations manual .........................................................116
50 Performance brainstorming. ....................................................................................124
51 Interview questions (non-technical) ........................................................................126
Part 8: Conclusion from the LHS ..................................................................................130

52 Involuntarily instructor .............................................................................................131
53 End of the story .........................................................................................................132
Glossary & abbreviations ..............................................................................................133
About the author .............................................................................................................135

PREMISE FOR ROOKIES
When pilots start their career in the airlines, they join airlines as a first
officer (FO) or second officer (SO).
They climb the career steps for years until their airline gives them the
unique opportunity to “UPGRADE” and become a “CAPTAIN”: the 4 bars
on the shirt and jacket, and the left-hand seat (LHS) in the cockpit.
It is a company appointment: when they join as a first or second officer,
there is no guarantee they will ever get it.
Responsibilities are tremendous, but it is the final and most rewarding
step of a pilot’s career.
Airlines select captains inside and outside the company.
Screenings are tough: preparation takes months of full dedication and
continuous work and study.
If the pilot makes it through the screening, he/she will face a long and
exhausting period of training: simulators plus line training, mixed with ini-
tial, intermediate and final exams/checks.
Depending on the airline, “pass” rate can be very low.

ANOTHER PREMISE
I was on the right-hand seat (RHS) for a long time …..
I was feeling ready for the “big” jump.

My friends were expecting it. My family was expecting it.
At some stage the bus came ….. and I was ready.
I did my upgrade quite a long time ago, but I kept my notes all this time
thinking - at some stage - I’d have time to gather them in some kind of
essay. It was a tough period of my life but I wanted to remember it and,
later on, tell my story.
So “Who are you ?” you’d probably ask me.
I’m just an average pilot who flew a lot.

Compared to other pilots I have a bad memory, but I always listened
very carefully.
I talked to anyone: listened to all kinds of pilots (from the students to the
test pilots). I witnessed a lot of cockpit talks, exams, instruction, sug-
gestions; I read many books, case studies, accident reports, etc… And I
kept notes, a LOT of notes.
I have seen pilots’ promotions, failures, upgrades, demotions, success-
es, trainings, dismissals, many many kind of pilots’ performance, man-
agement and training positions, etc…. I have flown in many airlines and
I have seen many operational standards, manuals, training departments,
instructors, etc…..
Finally, a few months ago, I gathered all my notes.
Many of them are “copy - paste” in this ebook. Its only purpose is telling
my story and what were my doubts and my thoughts.

Don’t get excited: there is no “super” secret here: this ebook is mostly
“common-sense” topics, plus a few real-life examples from both seats in
the cockpit.
Most of the stuff needed for upgrade is written in the manuals. But I
don’t know “how much I don’t know” UNTIL I put my nose in those
pages. I cannot underestimate its importance.
Plus, as a young FO, I soon realised I really needed the correct attitude
for both: upgrade and life on the LHS.
Today’s world is becoming more and more competitive.
Whatever position I’m aiming for, there’s probably hundreds of guys and
gals ready to grab my chance if I fail.
Airlines can pick candidates from a huge basket and - obviously - they’ll
take the best of the best.
That’s why I decided I needed to play my cards wisely, start preparing
from the very first moment and “make the difference”.

…. AND ONE MORE
The questions I kept asking myself at the time were:
- How can I maximize my chances of success for my command ?
- Am I ready ?
- What mistakes am I most prone to ?
- What are my weak points ? The topics I need to work on ?
- Is my technical knowledge acceptable ?
- How can I improve my attitude ? (and my non-technical skills ?)
As a starting point, I pulled out the last proficiency check reports and
searched if the examiner pointed out any weakness: I dug in there. It
was a starting point.
Then ?
For example, I asked myself questions like:
How do I perform under stress ?
Stress and fatigue bring out the worst part of anyone:
- Am I impulsive ? Scared ? Rushing ? “Macho” ?
What and when was my worst performance ?.
What was missing:

- on the worst flight I did lately ?
- in my last simulator session ?
- the day the captain (or a colleague) criticized me ?
I had to be judgemental and critical: I realized I was in no contest here.
My command was at stake.
No airline hires “First Officers”. Airlines hire future captains BUT don’t
expect any nurturing !

I needed to build my commander skills during my FO career.
I wanted to build my attitude by being open and receptive.
My everyday missions were (and are):
- have a safe flight
and
- be BETTER than yesterday.
It doesn’t matter who’s sitting left or right in the cockpit.
Never stop learning, keep your mind open like a child.
Be humble: pilots learn every single day and every single flight: even
when paired with the newer and younger company pilot.
Use all the information contained herein at your own responsibility: I de-
scribe what is my story and my experience, and it’s a mere description
of what I did and how I did it.
Read the disclaimer carefully before reading this ebook.

DISCLAIMER
The opinions, information and views set out in this book are those of the
author.
The author cannot, in any way whatsoever, be responsible for the use of
the information contained in this book.
The author assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors or omis-
sions in the content of this book. The information contained in this book
is provided on an “as is” basis without warranty of any kind. The author
does not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content,
completeness, accuracy, usefulness or timeliness.
All information in this book is provided with no guarantee of the results
obtained from the use of this information.
The author is not responsible for any errors or omissions, or for the re-
sults obtained from the use of this information.
The information contained in the book is in no way superseding any
document, manual or regulation.
There are no representations or warranties, express or implied, about
the completeness, accuracy, reliability, suitability or availability with re-
spect to the information, products, services, or related graphics con-
tained in this book for any purpose. Any use of this information is at your
own risk.
If you wish to apply ideas contained in this book, you are taking full re-
sponsibility for your actions. The author does not assume and hereby
disclaims any liability to any party for any loss, damage, or disruption
caused by errors or omissions, whether such errors or omissions result
from accident, negligence, or any other cause.
Any resemblance to real events, and/or to real persons, living or de-
ceased, is purely coincidental.

NOTES, EXAMPLES AND LISTS
- Please bear with my conversational English and grammatical mis-
takes ……
- Intra-chapter notes are (sometimes) inserted in square brackets
“[ ….]”
- When items lists are not exhaustive “etc…….” or “….” or “list not
exhaustive” will be inserted.
- For those who are not familiar with the abbreviations, terms and
acronyms used herein, please refer to the “Abbreviations Glossary”
at the end of the ebook.

1 WHERE SHOULD I START FROM ?
In many years of FO RHS flying in the airline, I realized captains were
essentially made of three NECESSARY features:
- their knowledge,
- their behaviours,
- their flying skills.
I was flying from a long time and hopefully my flying skills were not an
issue.
So left on the table were BOTH knowledge and behaviours.
While knowledge and flying skills are tangible and can be tested, it
wasn’t so easy to describe and learn the non-technical skills (attitudes
and behaviours). I did my best researching and trying to extract the
ingredients I needed.
Let’s start from the beginning.

PART 1: I NEED KNOWLEDGE …..
Topic: I know this part about “Go home and study” is boring, but I real-
ized I couldn’t proceed until my knowledge had reached a higher level. I
needed KNOWLEDGE to pass the interview, the sim, the unlimited
questioning during training, etc…..
Example: a friend (experienced FO) is approaching command interview.

He spends most of the afternoon on the books. He’ll be studying the
manuals in one single shot: from page 1 to page Xthousand .… And
then he will consider himself ready for the interview.
That would not work for me: my memory was not good enough.
The risk I would face is that, approaching the last aircraft’s systems
chapters, my knowledge regarding the first topics would be already de-
graded.
This happened every time I needed to store a lot of information in my
memory in a short period of time. My mind is an inflatable container: I
can CERTAINLY increase the capacity, but it takes TIME. If I try to stack
a lot of information in a small amount of time, I lose some items initially
stored.
This is why “increasing my knowledge" strategy has always been:
- spend 2/3 of my studying time storing new stuff in my memory,
- spend 1/3 of my studying time consolidating my previous knowledge
(brush-up and review).
If I couldn’t recurrently review the topics, this knowledge would go below
a “threshold” where I needed to use the entire initial studying effort
AGAIN !
The brush-up strategy and schedule, instead, allowed me to keep the
topic in my memory with little – but continuous – studying effort.
But remember: each one of us has a different knowledge retention and
needs to find his/her own best memorization strategy.

2 MISSING EXPERTISE ?
Topics: Methods for acquiring, organizing and increasing my expertise.
After a few years of airline flying, I realized knowledge was not enough. I
needed experience too. My definition of “expertise”: is an “ensemble” of:
- knowledge,
- experience.
As a young FO I was facing thousand of pages of information: well
enough to be disoriented.
So “information organization” was FUNDAMENTAL. It needed great at-

tention, and it was NOT an easy task. So I decided I would establish it
ASAP.
[In this instance, “information” includes knowledge and experience].
My SOP for normal operations were consolidated, but I was lost if some-
thing out of the ordinary was happening. The quick decision making the
captain was displaying seemed unreachable.

3 AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY
Topic: Does aircraft’s reliability flatten pilots learning path and maturity ?
Modern aircrafts are “way” more reliable compared to the 70s and 80s.
This is a tremendous advantage for safety and operations regularity.
Engine failure ratio on modern jet engines is an infinitesimal fraction of
what it was 40 years ago. Aircraft systems are tough and aircraft manu-
facturers have done a fantastic job making pilots’ life much easier.
40 years ago pilots could experience:
- manual pressurisations,
- autopilot or automation malfunctions,
- electrical and air conditioning faults,
- severe engine defects and failures,
- …….
much more often than today.
The “stabilized approach” standards and criteria used today were not in
place.
Flight data recorders technology was very primitive compared to today.
Manual approaches (with no automation) were THE STANDARD.
But what does this mean for the pilots ?

In simple terms: LOWER EXPOSURE.
When aircrafts were less reliable, pilots had many chances to experi-
ence big and small failures. They could learn more from everyday expe-
rience.

Pilots were ready for any inconvenience (all range: from dramatic to
meaningless).
Now it’s different.
“Training” should cope with this issue, nevertheless the time spent in
training is (on the average) 1/50th of the total flying time, so is pilot expo-
sure to significant failures during his/her life.
And even if the logbook displays thousands of hours, pilots’ experience

can be limited or concentrated in specific areas as it depends on:
- operations area: international, domestic, good or bad weather ar-
eas, cold/hot weather areas, …..
- aircraft’s range: long range vs medium vs short
- aircraft type: jet, prop, turbo-prop …..
- crew composition: augmented, relief pilot, …..
- Airline/Company procedures: i.e. most Airlines have limitations on
FO operations as PF: e.g. manual flying, crosswind, contaminated
runways, low visibility operations, etc…..
- Captains (and company) usual practice. i.e. How much room is left
for the FO decision making depends on company usual practice
and captains attitudes.
So my question was: “As a FO how could I fill this experience gap ?”.

4 ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE EXPERIENCE: MEMORY.
Topic: My memory was my biggest asset: the storage of all the good in-
formation I’d need soon. I wanted to learn its quality and features.
My opinion: “learning” is restructuring my future behaviour and I want to

change it through a memory “overwrite/override”.
So I needed methods to artificially increase my experience and “leave a

mark” or “scar” (possibly long-lasting or unforgettable) in my memory.
But first I needed to investigate how often did I need to review technical
and procedural topics? What was my memory decay period? Differenti-
ating:
• numbers: how often did I need to review the aircraft limitations to
remember the numbers ? How often should I review these
figures ? (i.e. Max EGT for start or takeoff, maximum tailwind for
engine start ……),
• concepts: how often did I need to review company operations
manual procedures to remember them ? How often should I re-
view them ? (i.e. deportees, inadmissible passengers procedures
and documents, refuelling with passengers on board procedure,
alternate aerodrome planning weather minima …..)
• systems schemes: e.g. air conditioning system: how often should I
review all the system components to remember how they work ?
I needed to understand what was my “decaying time” = how much time

the topics would remain usable in my memory after review.
From this information, I arranged my topics reviewing periods and fre-
quencies.
Then I chose the method for memorizing my lessons/topics:
• printing the manual’s pages for studying,
• underlining those the main concepts,

• tablet reading,
• tablet taking side-notes,
• laptop with or without notes,
• summarizations,
• writing handbooks,
• other …..
I started writing notes that I stored on my computer.

Later, I “clouded” these documents to facilitate reviewing on my tablet.
Then I planned my periodic review and brush up, integrating when nec-
essary with new updated information.
The method needed to be efficient: information storage and retrieval
was the key.

5 WHEN I NEED HELP
Topics: There were times when I needed the most out of myself.
When faced with “high risk” or “time pressure” decision making, I usually
search, find and refer to a similar “scene” I already faced in life.
It is no secret that in this job I could encounter “sticky” situations, fraught

with limited time, limited resources, multiple uncertainties, high stakes,
teamwork, organisational constraints, unstable conditions, …....
I realized this equation:
The more I had EXPERIENCED aircrafts, operational, environmental is-

sues
+
the more I KNEW about aircraft, operational and environmental issues
=
the EASIER to build my own mental MODEL of the problem, and to deal
with it.
I could picture the EVENT passing and “flying” through my Experience

and Knowledge.
Experience and Knowledge would enrich it, “dressing it” with my per-
sonal “past” and becoming keys to get me out of troubles.

6 ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE EXPERIENCE: THE
“MEMENTO” (EVENT-CATCHER)
Topics: What methods were available to increase my experience ? I built
a “ready-to-use” episodes collection to pick from. With time I realized the
single best experience source was “investing-time” in everyday small or
big event: an “event-catcher”.
Example: today my aircraft reports a system XXX component defect al-

lowable by the MEL: we checked the MEL and see no problem for to-
day’s flight.
So during cruise or in my living room after the flight, I should briefly re-
view:
- this failure and its indications,
- the related system scheme and failed component,
- the possible reason(s) for the failure,
- the consequences of this failure plus others “sister/nearby” re-
lated (e.g.: XYZ system 1 failed: what if XYZ system 2 fails
too ?).
This research action is momentarily memorized in my experience. It
means a little part of my memory keeps this tiny piece of information
about:
- the aircraft system,
- its components
and
- the decision making process I followed today.
I extended this procedure from the aircraft systems issues to ALL on
board events or procedures. Examples: medical emergency, unruly pas-
senger, crew member incapacitation, bad weather, cold weather proce-

dures, contaminated environments (volcanic ash, sand, ice, snow),
etc….
This memorized information was going to be used if a similar event
would pop up in the future.
But ONLY if I would
- make a physical NOTE (on notebook or calendar or else),
- REVIEW IT once in a while to refresh the event back in the
memory.
My notes were categorized by AIRCRAFT SYSTEM or type of events.

Just a few words to remember what happened that day.
Example: “If system component XXX fails during flight, remember to

check valve YYY before descent otherwise ZZZ happens…..”.
Only a few words were necessary: the (so called) “MEMENTO” would
trigger and polish-up the experience.
Next step was to understand how often I’d need to review this note to
maintain the expertise.
In my case: approximately
• after 2 or 3 days
• then after a week,
• then after a month,
• then after 3/4 months onward.
This was my ONLY WAY to “never forget” these system issues and op-
erational specificities.
I know: it was going to take time and effort.
But my command was at stake !

INTRA-CHAPTER 6: ABOUT LEARNING PATHS
My opinion: it was not acceptable to reach command with the same
knowledge I had as a new FO. I didn’t want a learning path shaped like
this.
My most critical proficiency check had been approximately 1 year after

the Final Line check.
I got the job, successfully finish training at final line check and …… re-
lax. Money in my pockets, enjoy life for a while …… fair enough….. and
suddenly the first simulator check comes up. And I need to review the
abnormals and emergencies !!
Day to day normal operations were very different from disastrous (emer-
gencies, fire, smoke, multiple failures, etc) simulator training and check-
ing sessions !!! Without a periodical emergency/abnormal procedures
review, I couldn’t make it.
It was ok to relax for a while and enjoy life after a heavy training…… but
a few months later I realized I needed to pick up the books again and
thoroughly review all the training topics with a different and mature
mind-set.

7 ABOUT NOTES, DRAWINGS AND SCHEMES
Topics: knowledge organization was crucial.
My aim was to be able to review knowledge:

- readily,
- efficiently
o and
- with very little effort.
Notes needed to be EASY to find: tablet, laptop, paper, notes, phone,
whatever was convenient and handy.
The notes review and enrichment had to be “easy to do” at any time of
the day:
- handy when I was on the bus going home,
- handy when I was bored while deadheading to a remote airport,
- handy when I was in cockpit.
Structure of my personal notes:

1st : the main part of my notes was the AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
SCHEMES.
A common item among aircrafts manufacturers is that engineers draw
systems schemes trying to make pilots’ life easier.
[The system scheme is actually a very big help. If I can remember it in
details, I have a full understanding of how the system works. This in turn
can significantly improve my problem solving and decision making
skills.]
I picked a complex aircraft system (air conditioning, fuel or landing gear
for example) and I tried to draw the system scheme.

I practiced for a couple of days, then again in a week time.
Picturing the flows, valves, pumps, accumulators - and ESPECIALLY the
pushbuttons I used every day in the SOP - helped my system knowl-
edge.
It didn’t have to be fancy or perfect.

So my aircraft’s systems schemes collection started to grow.
2nd: the second part of my notes: the ADD-ON.

Months after months I took my SYSTEMS SCHEMES and added signifi-
cant notes/drawing, limitations, resets, then some small reminders of
events experienced.
Example: when overheat is off then…., the procedure says …… but be
careful as …….. try to rescue the system by …., descend to regain
pressure…., system locked if pushbutton reset….., configure early…..,
ask ATC to ….. etc ….…
Reviewing the aircraft system, my mind would start asking questions:
- “what if that valve XXX doesn’t open ?
- What if that pushbutton/valve/switch/light doesn’t work ? What
would happen and why ?”
- etc…..
This process has been successfully in place SINCE THEN, and consis-
tently fed my knowledge foundations and hardware.

8 ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE EXPERIENCE: SHARING.
Topics: Back to the methods to increase expertise.
The second best experience source was SHARING.
It took more energy, but still it was a very good analysis “trampoline”.
I still remember interesting flying events friends or colleagues told me at
the coffee bar, in hotel receptions, or via internet, phone, etc ….
My opinion: this job is not suitable for those who want to be isolated. I
think being social was one of the tricks that helped me the most during
training and LHS flying.
I tried to stay in touch with training batch mates, colleagues, etc ….. and
KEPT SHARING any significant event happening.
I encouraged my friends to do the same.
It doesn’t matter which method was available and appropriate: internet,

blog, mail, email, text, telephone, …..
I felt it was IMPERATIVE to KNOW other pilots’ technical and opera-

tional experiences. Then go home and think: “What if that (issue) hap-
pened to me ?”.
Irrevocable requirement for this procedure was complete honesty. I
needed to:
- look for my mistakes,
- admit them,
- find ways to correct them.
There was nothing wrong with admitting what I could have done better.
It was my insurance policy for the future: a continuous search for im-
provement.
“Sharing” had to be used wisely:

- respect other pilots experiences without judging and/or criticiz-
ing,
- listen to (and respect) others’ opinions,
then build my own.
(Everyone is a “super pilot” sitting in his/her living room….. but being
up there …. is different….).

9 ARTIFICIALLY INCREASE EXPERIENCE: ACCIDENTS
ANALYSIS.
The third best experience source was world accidents analysis.
This method would have limited efficiency as it would depend on many
factors:
- how deep I’d study the case (the deeper the study, the less
would remain in my memory),
- how similar the case was, compared to my normal operation
(aircraft, environment, weather pattern, etc….),
- the type of accident: technical failure, human factor, operational
matters, etc…..
- …….
So I started surfing through accidents investigation websites and tried
the accidents search queries. They were very useful and handy: could
be done by model, make, date, etc…. .
This was an extensive training gym where I could practice my decision
making skills just wondering: “What if this happened to me ?”

10 THE TRAINING GYM IS READY
All the steps described in the last chapters were completed and I was
ready for total independence in my “technical decision making” training.
I was ready to sit at my desk and imagine any kind of scenario to train
myself.
In my opinion this was the best technical training for my command inter-
view; it required self-discipline but has guaranteed me a good long-term
knowledge retention ever since.

11 SELF MENTORING
My command interview study schedule included 3 phases.
1st phase: aircraft systems:
- aircraft’s systems schemes,
- aircraft’s systems limitations,
- aircraft’s systems resets, advisories, special/conditional/supple-
mentary procedures,
- aircraft’s systems normal and abnormal use.
2nd phase: company procedures:
- company operations manual,
- international and local regulations.
3rd phase: “applying” the acquired knowledge.

I created a database of scenarios and my study sessions were up and
running.
When in doubt, I would discuss with friends and colleagues.
Later, during my career, I shared this study guide with friends and the
airline management. It was well received, and they implemented it for a
few years: chosen captains would volunteer for a monthly meeting with
FOs getting ready for command assessment.
I soon realized this method’s biggest flaw was starting command prepa-
ration from the aircraft systems knowledge.
This is - and was - quite painful and honestly boring ..… it’s true.
But why did I start all this process from technical knowledge ?
My opinion: because it gave me “confidence”.

It made me feel comfortable, knowledgeable and calm when facing:

o technical issues and
o consequential decisions making.

12 TIME TO MOVE ON
I started my preparation for command about 24 months before my inter-
view.
12 months later my technical schedule and brush-up strategy were well
established, my expertise was in the luggage and it was time to move on
and start discussing ATTITUDE.

PART 2: ….. AND I NEED ATTITUDE
Topic: Are knowledge and attitude equally important for command ?
In my opinion, the answer is “YES BUT” ….. I have something to add:
- first, I needed to bring up my knowledge to a minimum level
(we discussed this topic in the first chapters),
- but after that: attitude is as important as knowledge !
With a special feature. Attitude has what I call the corkscrew
effect.

13 THE POWER OF ATTITUDE
Topic: It doesn’t matter how I feel inside or how I think I behaved, what
matters is how other people “sense me”.
My opinion: I think attitude is my personality facing the world: how I act
and how the world perceives me. After many years flying, I came to the
conclusion that with the correct attitude, I could bring out the best in
everyone: this is the corkscrew effect. This means all the crew would
perform 110% if stimulated correctly.
With the right attitude I could have all the crew’s extreme cooperation,
reaction and proaction: the crew would race to give solutions and go the
extra mile to fulfil their duties efficiently.
In the aircraft (and especially in the cockpit) I GET WHAT I GIVE. If I
show a good attitude, I will most likely receive a good attitude. During
training on LHS I knew the crew COULD give me this “extra” perfor-
mance: they had the ability to
- recover,
- complement,
- complete
missing expertise and knowledge (if necessary)
or simply
- confirm
expertise and knowledge.
Most of the times it was just a matter of motivation and enthusi-
asm: there you go: attitude could do this.
The opposite was not true. I.e. my superb KNOWLEDGE of the aircraft
systems COULD NOT fix my grumpy attitude.
Airlines tested me in complex environments: aircraft’s systems malfunc-
tions, bad weather, terrain, specifically heavy interaction and coordina-
tion between ATC/crew members, etc…...

So why was my attitude so important ?
Because in these situations the workload was unmanageable for a sin-
gle person. My attitude was the key to “fly through” unfriendly skies safe-
ly, getting help from everyone around me.

14 WHO IS MY CREW ?
To start discussing this topic, let me momentarily review the “crew” defi-
nition. Just for a few moments (through this chapter) allow me to broad-
en the concept of CREW.
For a few minutes let my CREW include everybody involved in the oper-
ations/mission, NOT just the CMs on the aircraft during flight. So mo-
mentarily include ATC, company management, handlers, employees in-
volved with my aircraft operation, dispatchers, and, yes, believe it or not,
passengers too….
Why ? Because all this people, starting from the airline CEO to the last
baggage loaders, could have precious information allowing me to take
better decisions.
The main key-point was: I needed to keep OPEN all communication
“channels” with all these people, holding them ready to provide informa-
tion - directly and/or indirectly - and help my decision making.
But communication was the top of the (attitude) iceberg. It needed to be
supported by a much bigger force from beneath: my CREW was not go-
ing to support me (and effectively communicate with me) unless:
- they trusted me (they thought I was qualified and had no doubt
about my technical skills and my knowledge),
- they knew they could communicate with me,
- they felt their job was important to me (and the company) as
they were necessary for the safe completion of the mission.
That’s why I needed to be easily receptive to any request/need to:
• communicate with my CREW and vice versa,
and/or
• increase my information and expertise (in whatever forms).
Since the very beginning of my FO career, I needed to learn to apply
these concepts. Kicking-off with the right attitude was the key for my fu-
ture on the LHS.

15 ATTITUDE AND EMPATHY
Topic: personality is the core of myself, but attitude and behaviour are
the actions I show outside: the way my personality faces and deals with
people and issues around me.
At my age personality could not change anymore, but behaviours and
attitude could !
Starting from home when I was called for a duty; all the way until the
end of the flight when I debriefed and walked to the parking lot, I was
dealing with a lot of people.
I could be polite, rude, resigned, impulsive, precise, decisive, silent, re-
laxed, caring, etc …..
Depending on:
my core personality
+
thousands of factors (motivators)
= my behaviour dealing with the issue.
Today could be different compared to yesterday or 1 hour ago.
While on the RHS for many years, I experienced many captains’ styles
and attitudes. I could remember many of the captains I flew with.
Those who made me comfortable ……. those who didn’t want any re-
sponsibility ….. those who would never give away any decision ……
those who wanted full control of the situation …… etc
I wondered for a while if I should be like the “best” I had seen. It was a
good start, but it was not enough. It would be subjective.
So I sat back, relaxed and tried to categorise the captains I flew with.
Yes, I know: there are good ones and bad ones.
Some guys/ladies were like “heroes” to me.
Others made my life miserable.

How could I improve and learn from my previous experience on the RHS
? Only by going back to those days, UNDERSTANDING these guys/
ladies putting myself in their shoes.
[Understanding why people do what they do is like “walking” towards
them: as a captain I needed to be able to do it !]
Example: today my FO has a personal issue affecting his day (i.e. he is
tired, or worried, or angry for family issues). I have only two choices:
sympathize and try to help him/her OR say “No, I don’t care”.
In my experience, when I walked towards people, 90% of the time they
appreciated and did whatever they could to be a good resource for the
mission.
[But remember the airline doesn’t care about ANY extra issue. What
counts is the final result (mission safety, regularity, economy, ….)]
So what attitude was needed on the LHS ?
In my opinion: a balanced and positive behaviour inside and outside the
cockpit:
- creating a good working environment,
- respecting my colleagues and their opinions,
- following procedures,
- facilitating and promoting an efficient use of all resources.
Somewhat similar to a family environment.
A good father/mother would:
- lead by example,
- be firm if needed,
- use all resources for the family well-being.
After all, a flight-crew (including cabin crew) is a “temporary family”, and

international laws clearly state the captain is always responsible for his/
her crew.

So I decided I was going to start from the briefing: clearly state I care for
my crew well-being, ask them to inform me about the issues they face
during the duty. And it worked.
Every day I needed to do what every mum or dad would do: take care of
my family: “My crew is my “family” today”.
Since then every day I build a good and open working environment from
the very first moment: it puts smiles on everyone’s face and spreads
from the top all the way down the chain of command: most of the time
the captain’s style is “contagious”.
The captain is on the top of a big structure. He has responsibility, ac-
countability, authority, etc …. but he cannot sustain unless everyone be-
low him/her works as a team.
I was a brand new captain when my DFO told me: ”… keep this attitude
Chris: all the crew will help you and, believe me, many times they will
get you out of trouble…”. It has proven to be true so far.

16 DON’T BE QUIRKY (MATURITY)
Topic: while analyzing captains’ attitudes, I wanted to understand their

origins. I was sure many of my behaviours were deriving from the expe-
rience on the RHS.
It’s not easy to be a FO.
In my life I met essentially 2 types of FO:
- those obsessed with the career,
- those obsessed with the career (but who CAN STAND the
RHS).
Obviously everybody wants to become a captain.
But some FOs suffer the RHS so badly compared to others. Why ?
Most of the time they suffer because some captains hassled them (*)
….. and they don’t want to be bothered anymore. (and maybe - secretly
- they want to become the hasslers !).
[(*): might be for right or wrong reasons]
It’s true: some captains are not easy to fly with. I have my own quirks.
And it’s normal: pilots work in a very complex environment, weather,
fuel, time pressure etc…. all leading to stress.
Each one of us cope differently, and sometimes captains become picky
on tiny issues: I believe it’s their way to cope with the responsibility, ac-
countability, etc..…
As a FO I realized I needed to “prioritize” the issues, always keeping in
mind 2 important concepts:
- the captain was ultimately responsible on how the flight was
conducted,
- if in doubt, I would check whatever the captain said in the man-
uals.

Example: descending through FL 300, The FO (PF) set the speed 270kt
(no speed constrains). The captain (PM) touches the speed to 260kt
mumbling “…too fast…..”.
Is there a reason ? If there is, just say it, otherwise let it go.
The FO might see this as an invasion of his/her right to conduct the flight
the way he/she wants….. And some might silently think: “What a
bugger ! When I will be captain, I will also do these stupid little things to
my FO…..”.
Captain: is it a safety issue ? No. So don’t be too quirky ! Do you re-
member how it felt when they did it to you ? If there is a good reason,
STATE IT clearly and explain it to your FO. Let him understand why you
want 260kt ! Otherwise your FO is PF: let him/her fly the way he/she
feels more comfortable with, don’t violate his mental picture of the de-
scent, approach, etc ..…
FO: let go ! is this stupid thing so important ? No ! So let go. And learn
how this experience made you feel.
Other example: the FO is PF and is using an Autopilot mode not rec-
ommended by the aircraft manufacturer for that phase of flight. The cap-
tain tells him/her to change the mode.
This is an entirely different situation: when dealing with something clear-
ly specified in the manuals, I need to be professional and admit I didn’t
know and thank my colleague for reminding me.
In just one word: MATURITY.

A “hard to explain” concept.
What is it ? Is knowing when to interfere, when to act = when it is appro-
priate.
A MATURE FO knows when to bring up an important safety issue and
when to let go a stupid quirk.

A MATURE captain knows how much room allow for the FO to gain ex-
perience while conducting the flight, and when and how to go back to a
prescribed procedure.
But I know it’s not easy, on both sides.
Sometimes I am tired, sometimes overstressed, sometimes there is no
time to explain ……

INTRA-CHAPTER 16: WELCOME ANY INPUT
Whatever the cockpit topic, at any stage of my airline pilot career, I have
been “exposed” to a huge amount of inputs: from instructors, captains,
FOs, colleagues etc..… These plus my education, training (books, man-
uals, etc…) and personality create the onset of my captain behaviours
and attitudes.
But I need to keep my eyes on the ball and never lose my track.
What I mean: a lot of captains/instructors/pilots told me what was right
and what was wrong: hundreds of opinions and topics. I always accept-
ed and welcomed every input and thank whoever gave it to me.
Then I went home, sat on my sofa, read the manuals/documents, talked
to my friends/colleagues/instructors (if needed) and THEN decided if I
would follow that advise or not.

PART 3: SIT ON THE LHS NOW ….
Topic: for a few chapters, let’s sit on the LHS. The vast variety of people
and situations can be disorienting.
A few examples of FOs behaviours shuffled from my memory and expe-
rience on the LHS.

17 UNHAPPY FOS
Today let’s fly with an unhappy FO.
He is typically quite mature, maybe in his 40s. His knowledge is good
but during the flight he keeps complaining about company treatment, not
upgrading, rosters, food, cabin crew,…….. He hasn’t been shortlisted for
upgrade as he doesn’t meet the minimum requirements yet. He is smart,
but he’s unhappy.
Contradicting or challenging his beliefs is difficult. He objects to show his
firm personality and knowledge, but most of the time he’s silent.
He thinks the airline doesn’t understand his value, and he sees every-
thing with “dark glasses”: the food is tasteless, the hotel is noisy, the ros-
ter is exhausting and …. his captain is not skilled….. etc ....
This FO started his career late, he doesn't have the minimum upgrade
requirements, and he is fussy.
Let’s scrutinize his performance.

Expertise:
o he has done his homework: no issue here. He knows the
manuals and the procedures.
o Flying skills are good.
Attitude:
o What about interpersonal skills ? Nowadays captains are
Managers. Human Factors studies and accidents analysis
describe how captains need “interpersonal/management”
skills for:
▪ team-building,
▪ motivating colleagues around them,
▪ resolving conflicts,
▪ easily socialising and interfacing with other people,

▪ using all available resources efficiently.
This FO’s personality skills are not visible as his demotivation and un-
happiness convey his attitude in a mostly silent mood.
This gentleman has been flying approximately 10 years and is a few
years away from command. At this age, pilots need maturity.
Furthermore, who is he complaining to ? To the Company ? No. He
doesn’t complain to the management. He complains to a normal captain
like me. Who am I ? Am I his rival now. So he’s angry with me ?
Pilots must be professionals and never let their emotions affect interper-
sonal skills.
His answer would be: “I do my job professionally, why do you care ?

Leave me alone.”.
Not enough, sorry.
What I think about my company and career must not interfere with my
duties. I need to watch and limit my mood influence on my behavioural,
interactive and social skills.
My doubt would be: once on the LHS, would he find other reasons to re-
play the same attitude AGAIN ?

18 I KNOW FO
Today let’s fly with a very experienced FO.

He is almost 50. Plenty of flying hours. He is waiting to be called for
command interview in the following weeks. He has been on the RHS
many years now. Maybe he was captain on turboprops in a previous
company. He is usually very friendly and very straight forward.
I expect a lot from such a guy.
Instead I notice some minor issues. Flight preparation is a little bit su-
perficial. He knows the environment very well so he feels very confi-
dent.
Expertise:
- Knowledge is so and so.
- Procedures: small deviations appear, usually with the excuse to
expedite operations and arrive home early. He has a strong rea-
son for every deviation from SOP. After takeoff I realize I should
correct him every few minutes as the deviations increase with
time. By now he thinks I’m too picky.
- Situation awareness is excellent and so is problem solving.
Attitude:
- He has the tendency to do things without telling me: what I de-
fine a 1-man-band.
- It’s difficult to change his mind ! It takes a lot of energy to ex-
plain, to open and show on the manuals that what he says is
wrong. Nevertheless, he doesn’t change his mind. He still thinks
he knows better than old captains and the aircraft manufacturer.
I try to give him some advice about his SOP for his interview but
soon realize he is not really listening. His firm beliefs are so hard
to eradicate.
- He feels he’s a captain already.
- He seems to be in a hurry and have the urge to arrive and de-
part early. After flight with an excuse, he leaves the airplane be-
fore everyone else. Sometimes forgets to say goodbye to cabin

crew. Not relevant in his view.
He is sometimes aggressive with:
- ATC for not giving shortcuts,
- Cabin crew for bringing food too early/late/cold….,
- Management for the roster…..
- the waiter at the hotel for …..
- …...
He is swearing frequently.
Again the same question: what will he do on the LHS ?
How will he behave ?

19 EAGER FO
Today let’s fly with a new FO.
He joined the company a few months ago and has very little experi-
ence. He’s typically in his late 20s.
He is enjoying the good job and money and is constantly trying to
show and increase his knowledge and efficiency.
Expertise:
- His knowledge is ok. His SOP are very precise,
- Situation awareness and Workload Management are low but
growing consistently.
- Same for problem solving.
- Experience is low. Whenever a bit of weather or technical issue
arises, he is clueless and looks at his captain searching for the
solution.
Attitude:
- open to additional information. He listens to the suggestions and
treats everyone with respect.
Communication:
- the constant need to look efficient makes him speed up his
speech and tasks. Sometimes ATC doesn’t understand what he
says and vice versa.
Workload management:
- rushing through the loadsheet filling, he makes mistakes.
So a lot of goodwill, but a lot of inexperience.

20 APPLES, TREES …. AND CLUES
As for fathers and sons, “the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”: very
often FOs replay behaviours seen in their captains, instructors or
their mum and dad.
Let’s say my behaviour is NOT OK and someone has an issue with it:
how can I understand it ?
Some clues:
- I get only monosyllabic answers, silence otherwise,
- other crew member/s (cockpit or cabin) are very silent, es-
pecially when I’m close by,
- other crew member/s seem annoyed (or angry) but won’t
clarify what is the issue,
- other crew member/s don’t hesitate to give criticism,
- no common topic we can talk about,
- crew don’t share any on board experience or event,
- crew keeps saying nothing is happening (but it’s not true),
- nobody smiles,
- duties are not fulfilled,
- ……
As a captain I cannot wait and expect someone else to fix the crew’s
behavioural conflicts (especially if I am involved). If something
doesn’t work, I need to fix it.
So no matter what FO or cabin chief I get, I am supposed to cope
with this crew: I have to be a manager, a psycho-therapist: I have to
be whatever it takes to “make this team work” and “make this mission
safe and successful”.

21 CAN LEOPARDS CHANGE THEIR SPOTS ?
Topic: back to my interview preparation “motif”.
I tried to focus on “behaviours”. As a FO sometimes I picked up some
“usual practice”: later I realized some of them were against the manuals
and the SOPs.
Did I fix it ? Yes. It was a behaviour.
But what about my own character/personality ? Can I change it or fix it ?
Not in my opinion.
And that’s why airlines scrutinize me thoroughly before hiring me or giv-
ing me the LHS. Companies need to be sure “unfitting” personalities are
left out of the door.
Regarding behaviours and attitudes instead, I knew I could modify my
pilot’s attitude in a short period of time (e.g. during my initial or com-
mand training) if needed.
Changes were possible because internal motivators would trigger the
need-to-change.
Would these changes be long-lasting ? (i.e. after training).
I found the answer many years later and it is “YES”: but it takes maturity,
willingness to improve and good instructors.

22 MAINTAIN THE HEADING
Topic: tempting trends towards wrong habits.
Sometimes I was tempted to take shortcuts: skip this …. or that …. or
simply wear the “dark glasses” and see my captains’ value decreasing
from a Mentor/Guide position to a low quality competitor.
Whichever seat RIGHT or LEFT, as a professional pilot I knew I
shouldn’t let this happen.
I built my opinion about “What the airline expects from me as a FO ?”:
- Whatever the time delay for the upgrade, FO’s behaviour in the
cockpit doesn’t change.
- FO’s assertiveness grows with knowledge and skills, but the pi-
lot respect for the captain/instructors/company leadership and
authority doesn’t change; he/she knows his/her position in the
crew and doesn’t take excessive confidence.
- The FO is a real asset for the crew and the captain: knowledge-
able and reliable.
After that, during and after transitioning to the LHS, I built my opinion on
what was expected from me as a captain:
- keep my mind open and be fully receptive,
- welcome any input,
- eliminate or minimize prejudice,
- be open to new ideas,
- be ready to change my mind and say “I am/was wrong”,
- even if I know the discussed topic by heart, let the other pilot ex-
plain, talk and express opinions (to keep him/her in the loop),
- not perceive other people’s “explanations” as a threat to my beliefs/
knowledge.

23 INVISIBLE PILOTS
I always thought airlines management loved “invisible” pilots ?
Who are they ?
Those who don’t “suck” management energy.

Those who rarely cause operational disruptions, those who rarely fall
sick, those who are never called to the office for troubles, those who
have no problem flying with anyone, those who have no reason to go to
the office often (e.g. leaves, off days, roster, family issues, etc) …..
I think every Chief Pilot knows that FO causing troubles, will build BIG-
GER grief, headaches and misfortunes as captains.
In my opinion if I have experienced one or more of the following:
- a thick file in the office (troubles, issues, letters, reprimand and
complains),
- blaming others for career frustrations and failures,
- frequent arguing with captains, colleagues, cabin crew or man-
agement pilots,
- frequently reporting colleagues,
- frequently be reported by flight deck or cabin crew,
- failing proficiency checks, simulator sessions, line checks,
- …….
there is something wrong, and it has to be fixed.
I need to make my attitude work, otherwise this job ain’t no good for me.
My opinion: those who complain the most, usually have the worst per-
formance.
30-40 years ago in small airlines there was no command interview. The
Chief Pilots would pick up the phone and talk to the last 2-3 captains
who flew with the candidate. Just a few questions:

- “How is this FO ?”,
- “Is he/she ready for Command ?”
- “How is flying with him/her ?”.
A quick look at his/her file:
- how many troubles did he/she cause ?
- Did he/she keep his/her nose clean ?
- Do people complain about him/her ? Do they want to fly with
him/her ? Is it nice to fly with him/her ?
Easy to find out.
Now it’s (way) different: psychological test, computer tests, math and
physics tests, technical interviews, social interviews, HR interview …
etc…..
Is it better ?
The shrinks and HR experts think so. I don’t.
A “good” captain must “FIT IN” and “LEAD” a TEAM on a machine
speeding up at 950 Km/h, with precise procedures and time schedules.
How can the company measure if I fit ?
By looking at HOW I FUNCTION inside the cockpit, inside the crew and
inside this complex and beautiful machine. Not in the office.
My opinion.

24 ASK OR ORDER
As already said, a long time ago my DFO told me “Keeping your FO

CONSTANTLY in the loop, will keep you out of troubles and will make
your life SO MUCH easier …..”: in my case this has proven to be true
many times…..
From the LHS I tried to always operate in a “low authority gradient cock-
pit”.
While decision making remained firmly in my hands, I always thought
my FO was a future captain and I needed to use his/her expertise.
By “asking” instead of “ordering” I BUILD ROOM for the other crew

member to give his/her opinion and expertise on the operation. (again: I
keep him/her in the loop).
Examples:
FO: “Captain, shall we do one engine out taxi in ?”

CAPT: “Good idea, but there’s a bit of uphill on the XXX taxiway. I’m not
sure I can manage the energy.”.
FO: “I forgot about it. Let’s leave it ON”.
As opposed to:
FO: “Shutdown engine 2”.
CAPT: “Leave it ON.”
“Engaging” the other crew member increased cooperation, awareness

and the “feeling” between the crew members.
Another example:
CAPT: ”…it looks smooth, shall we turn OFF the seatbelts sign ?”
FO: ”Captain, we are approaching an area of reported turbulence in 30
NM…”
CAPT: ”Right, thanks, I’ll leave them ON.”.

25 PREVENTION
Topic: if I could just keep a distance from tangled situations …… Another
important ingredient for my captain career: staying out of troubles.
It was clear from the beginning of my career that the BEST way to avoid
trouble was “prevention”. This would mean:
- knowing the manuals and applicable regulations,
- staying as far as I could from threats, violations and errors,
- preparing myself and my resources for the mission.
Prevention for me means AVOIDING situations which require my exper-
tise.
I have built most of my prevention through my briefings.
An excellent example of prevention was the “cruise briefing”.

I used to practice a thorough cruise briefing at least once a day.
The aim was: getting as READY as I could for those events that
THREATENED my mission THE MOST.
What were the biggest threats ?
- those that NEEDED me to act quickly,
- those that were going to give me the worst STARTLE FACTOR,
- those that could affect my aircraft flyability,
- those that could rapidly affect my aircraft’s occupants’ health,
- ………
In brief:
- engine failure,
- cabin depressurization,
- fire or smoke on board, including:

o cabin smoke and/or fire,
o cockpit smoke,
o cargo smoke,
- Medical emergency,
- Bomb on board,
- Hijacking,
- Etc……..
In the briefing, I needed to describe an action sequence for what I was
going to do (including appropriate company or aircraft procedures).
During the cruise phase, I would continuously update my “worst case”
plan by extensive use of:
- the FMC CLOSEST AIRPORTS or the ALTNT (ENROUTE) in-
formation to increase my awareness of the alternates aero-
dromes at all times,
- the ETP (EQUI-TIME POINTS), especially on long ETOPS/
EDTO sectors.
I wanted my plan ready at all times. Trying to cover as many cases as I
could.
Example:
“- Before ETP (or point AAA), we go back to XXX airport, weather is …..,
no relevant notams, etc ……,
- After ETP (or point AAA), we continue to YYY airport, weather is …..,
notams reports … affecting our operation ….,”
The cruise briefing was the perfect example of prevention method: iden-
tifying the worst threats and mitigating them by building a plan.
I realized most of my flying-lifetime should be allocated to “plan for the

worst”. I know it is not a fun job, but I felt it was a MUST.

Another example regarding PREVENTION was the use of AU-
TOMATION: I always used modes that necessitated the lowest monitor-
ing. Automation was there to help me, so:
- I would use automation modes suggested by the aircraft manu-
facturer,
- I wouldn’t intentionally increase my workload for my own rea-
son,
- I wouldn’t waste mental resources.
[Example:
Crossing the Ocean on a moonless night.
The FO is busy checking some alternate Instrument approach plates.
Looking outside in the darkness: I am more than 1 hour away from any
airport.
A fire or smoke on board in this moment could be fatal for everyone on
board.
Who has the best view on the mission’s success ?
It's me. And I must have a clear-cut plan for the worst cases.
My job is not just looking ahead. It’s to plan for what COULD come.
As stated in previous chapters: here comes experience ! and knowledge
!
If I cannot see what could come, I read about accidents and use my
imagination.
This is what I am supposed to do every day: read about accidents,
share my experience with others so that I:
- learn to see around the corner,
- improve my worst case scenario planning,

- imagine what could happen
and PLAN FOR IT.]
[Another point of view: who is a leader in a running or cycling race ? The
leader, the first one. The one who is “making the pace”.
What does this mean ?
It means he/she is the FIRST to see the THREATS in front of him/her.
The captain is the leader of his/her team: the first who sees (or envis-
ages) troubles.
Maybe “prevention” and “leadership” live in the same building ?

More food for thoughts…..]
No alternative: as an experienced FO or a captain, my attitude needed
to be proactive and concentrate on wiping out troubles before they had a
chance to appear.

26 LEADERSHIP (VS AUTHORITY)
Topics: I soon realized the primary ingredient for my career were the
leadership skills. I could not survive without them.
There is no shortcut here: being a good captain is being a good
LEADER. On internet we can find plenty of definition of “leadership” and
“leader”.
AUTHORITY
Before discussing what is “leadership” made of, let me draw a line here
between leadership and authority.
I searched the difference between these two and I came to the conclu-
sion that the use of authority is part of being a leader and there could be
times when I could need to use it.
For me AUTHORITY is: instead of CONVINCING “my way is better” I
force those around me to FOLLOW MY INSTRUCTIONS without dis-
cussing.
I once saw a heavy discussion between my captain and the cabin chief.
It ended with an angry: ”You’re the captain, you decide.” meaning the
captain was using his/her authority to define the course of action. Fair
enough (if needed).
I tried, as often as possible, to make the crew integrate and participate
to my decision making process; thus LEADING the “outcome” without
involving authority.
I decided I should use authority only when absolutely necessary as it
would limit communication and resources utilization.
LEADERSHIP
Leadership was the main ingredient of my attitude recipe and involved a
mix of different components. My recipe was:
1) I cannot make everyone happy, but my team must know I tell the
truth and talk straight. That’s why it is so important to brief prop-
erly: the crew must know:

• I will do my best to make their journey safe and comfortable,
• I am trained, knowledgeable and experienced,
• I care about them.
2) Fix anything erroneous: as a Leader I am expected to fix what-

ever doesn’t work around me: documents, procedures, attitudes,
etc…..
I cannot let go.
3) Respect everybody: never humiliate anyone. Never publicly dis-
cuss, scold, berate (especially in front of passengers, manage-
ment, other colleagues, ….).
4) Improve myself. I must do it for my career, my family and for those
around me. Remember: my crew and my FO will inexorably bend
towards my “modus operandi” (described in later chapters).
5) Be humble and listen first (unless time constrained)
It would not be easy, but I needed to lead by example. As for teachers at

school:
Students WILL NOT do what I SAY,
Students WILL do what I DO.
The same would apply to my crew.
Example:
Stepping into the aircraft I would start my flight preparation by following
SOP very precisely: the crew would immediately perceive me as a pilot
who adheres to the procedures: the captain always set the MOOD and
the STYLE while leading by example.
Finally: as a leader, did I have to take the decision ? Yes. And I would
take full responsibility for it. But did it have to be MY idea ? NO ! Abso-
lutely not ! Remember the leader ENSURES THE APPROPRIATE DE-
CISIONS ARE TAKEN.

27 ABOUT BRIEFINGS
Topics: as a FO I saw many briefings “reciting the poet”, or “rushing
through it”. I realized I needed to improve my briefings.
In a briefing my aim needed to be:
- prepare and plan my actions,
- describe and discuss what were the threats and what was dif-
ferent from usual,
- have my worst case scenario ready.
Briefing needed to turn me into a “proactive” individual.
I tried to listen to myself:

1) was I doing the same briefing, whether it was CAVOK or wet
and windy ? There was something wrong.
2) Was I briefing the NON PRECISION APPROACH just like a
Precision Approach ? There had to be something wrong !
I needed to always wonder: “what is DIFFERENT FROM USUAL ?”
And at the end of the briefing, ask myself and my colleague: “What are
the threats today ? Did I/we identify them ? What do you think ?”
Examples of questions that needed to be asked before the briefing:
o Is this the crew’s 4th sector ?
o Did the crew just cross the ocean during their circadian rhythm ?
o Am I tired ? Stressed ? Worried for any reason ?
o Is my colleague fresh enough ?
o Anyone of us is familiar with this airport ? Did I fly here in the
last 6 months ? If yes, let’s remember what were the threats.
o Do I or does my colleague have experience in this environment/
aerodrome ?

I needed to look for threats around myself:
o Am I (or are you) coming back from leaves ?
o Am I acclimatized with the time zone we're now landing in ?
o What are the threats of the aerodrome or the weather reported
(visibility, wind, rain, sun position, etc…….) ?
As a young FO I didn’t want to bore my colleague (he might tease me
later, but that was ok) but I needed to bring awareness in the discussion.
To maintain his/her attention, I used to face him/her and look in his/her
eyes.
Once training on the LHS if everything was “really normal” then I would
take the chance to review a procedure.
Example is the RTO Rejected Takeoff Procedure:
- in which cases shall I reject the takeoff below XXX knots ?
- am I familiar with these reasons ?
I must keep in mind that if something goes wrong, I’ll have A SPLIT
SECOND to take the right decision. But those who will judge my actions,
will sit in a comfortable room for weeks or months, with:
- all the manuals available at a glance,
- the best experts on the phone,
- coffee break whenever they want.
I remind my FO that his/her callouts have to be precise, sharp and time-
ly as he/she MUST help me take the right decision.
Many companies write in their operations manual BOTH crew members
must be fully familiar with the RTO decision making: I agree. The FO
(TOO !) must know the RTO reasons by heart.
Approach briefing: it was very important to ask ourselves: “What are the
threats today ?”

Almost half of my flights ended up flying an approach NOT as planned.
Examples: shortcuts, change of runway, change of IAP, change of
STAR, change of track miles, traffic not as forecasted, weather not as
expected, …… thousands variables can change our puzzle.
I needed to prepare myself for these events and be ready to establish
my time-distance-horizon. At anytime during the descent/approach if the
answer to the question: “Am I rushing in the approach ?” was yes:
then I should:
- “buy” some time ?

- Slow down ?
- Ask ATC for extra miles ?
- Hold ?
- ……
The threats can be subtle and I needed to:
- sneak them out,
- mention them during my briefing,
- tackle them = including mitigation/alleviation methods.
As a FO I always tried to bring all the threats on the table. If my captain
wasn’t sharing my point of view it wouldn’t matter: I think any threat I
perceived was REAL: safety is built in small pieces.
And when I was done I’d ask my colleague:
- “What did I/we forget ?
- Do you want to add something ?
- Anything I missed ?”
But my briefings had to be “time managed” as there was not so much

time for the briefings. Also I didn’t want to lose the other crew member
attention, so I wasn’t afraid to ask "What do you think?" just to keep him/
her in the loop.

Many airlines in the world use briefing guides.
To work proficiently with this tool I used to “think” every item wondering:
“Anything special about it today ?”
Examples:
While reading the “aircraft’s status” line: I should scroll through my air-
craft techlog mentally.
Reading the “weather” line: I should think and look where I’d be heading
the aircraft (taxi routes, taxiway conditions, SID direction, etc…). Any
weather parameter approaching the limits (wind, tailwind, crosswind, vis-
ibility/RVR or ceiling for return, etc…). Look outside: I should imagine my
SID: how is the weather on departure ? Look at the downwind: is the vis-
ibility sufficient if we need to come back in a hurry ? Is the sun position
hampering the runway sight ?
Reading the “NOTAMS” line: I should think and look where I’d be head-
ing the aircraft (taxi routes, runways facilities lights, ILS, navaids, etc)
Complacency was my hidden enemy.
Examples:
- do I fly every day to an airport with 20-30kt gusty winds ? I get
used to it.
- do I fly every day in heavily congested traffic areas ? I get used
to it.
But an unfamiliar crew would prepare early and be extra alert.
Preparing the flight: did I read airport information for my home base air-
port recently ? Or my country rules ? Did I read the approach chart’s
notes I use every day ? Did I ever check thoroughly when the chart
changes ?
Every time I realized my behaviour was “GETTING USED” to a threat, I

tried to STOP and RECOGNIZE the threat was STILL THERE and I
needed to mitigate its possible effects !

28 ERRORS
Topics: I realized in very early stages of my career, that no matter how

hard I try, I make mistakes. That’s why it is important to ACCEPT it WILL
happen and build a protection barrier for damage control.
The facts are: people (and pilots) make mistakes.

Everyone is prone to this unpleasant event. Aviation literature gives
plenty of definitions, types of errors (slips, mishaps, lapses ….. ) and
examples.
Every time I made a significant mistake, I tried to be analytic.
Why did I make this error today ? Was it distraction, inexperience, startle
factor, interruption, lack of knowledge, other ……?
As a good error prevention strategy, I needed to be self-analytic and an-
swer: “In what conditions do I make most errors ? Fatigue ? Time pres-
sured ? Relaxing situations ? Other ?….”
Example: I flew with an experienced FO well ready for command, a
good friend of mine.
I became too relaxed: he didn’t arm the approach, and we flew through
the Localizer.
Since then I tried to build my protection barrier and increase my situation
awareness when flying with good and experienced FO, especially with
friends. I needed to be proactive and anticipate the threats that would
come: relaxation, excessive trust in the other guy/lady, etc…
So: knowing the threat was NEVER enough: mitigation was just as im-
portant. I needed to be proactive and especially alert in THAT specific
condition.
To answer these questions, I needed to know myself, plus I needed to
analyze my environment: see what were the “ingredients“ that could fool
me.

I identified a few big enemies that could trick me into making mistakes.
First enemy: fatigue.
Easy. I know that. But I was the captain, and I was expected to predict
when fatigue would come, prevent it (if possible) and take care of the is-
sue.
If I wasn’t able to predict then I needed to be able to identify fatigue
symptoms and bring AWARENESS to all the crew. Finally I needed to
give alleviation, mitigation methods and opportunities to rest for every-
one in my crew.
So as a captain fatigue wasn’t only about feeling tired, it was about
managing how everyone would be affected.
Second enemy: broken work-flow.

Example: I am reading a checklist and some new event pops over-
whelmingly into my attention: in this condition it is difficult to keep track
of my original work-flow.
As most of my normal actions are brought from memory, interruptions
are real spoilers that can affect my operation.
How could I alleviate this disruption ? When interrupted, I tried to go
back exactly where I left. Putting a flag, a paper on my glareshield, leav-
ing the checklist out. Anything would work.
Third enemy: time pressure.

I was working in a constantly changing environment: fuel and weather
(i.e.) could put a lot of time-pressure on my actions. How could I mitigate
its effects ?
The first question should be: “is this time pressure appropriate ?”
Example: Was it necessary to land early and go home ? Certainly no. So
I should stop whoever was putting unnecessary time pressure on me

and my crew. Same for ATC: no traffic around, so huge shortcut ?
Great ! Did I have to get in trouble or risk my job to make it ? NO !
The opposite was also true: if I was putting undue time pressure on my
FO, I should leave him/her the right to say NO.
But, if the time pressure was duly built (fuel on reserve, closing airport,
weather coming in, etc) then I needed to plan ahead and prioritize.
Prioritization was the spearhead of my workload management strategy.
It was also a big chunk of a good leader. Not an easy tasks.
Understanding what needed to be done first was something I could learn
from experience: using prebuilt scenarios could help me exercise for this
kind of decisions.
Fourth enemy: information flow.

The rate of the received information could also trick me into making mis-
takes: if the rate was too high I was flooded, I needed to stop the flow or
severely reduce it.
Situations in cockpit could be very messy: a typical example was the
ground operation phase: ground handler, ATC, cabin crew, technical
personnel would all be asking or giving too much information.
I should not hesitate to (kindly) kick them out of the communication
channel if they had low priority.
Example: if the engineer cannot solve the technical problem, there is no
point having the ground handler or cabin crew asking for passengers
boarding.
Low information flow can also trick me: not enough information or poor
information transfer can lead to mistakes. In this case the typical “WHAT
IF” or worst case scenarios can be useful in coping with foggy and not
clear situations.
One more enemy: “UNUSUAL” situations (broken habit pattern).

In case of “out of the ordinary” events I needed to force myself and all
the crew to intentionally slow down the pace (or step back) and “build
time”
- to analyze better,
- to avoid mistakes,
- to counteract the natural human tendency to “DO SOMETHING”
(impulsivity) to solve the issue,
- to maintain concentration on the usual task like SOPs, without
being distracted.
It is natural and human: I see a risk/threat and my mind wants to solve

the issue ASAP and go back to my previous comfortable position. But
“impulsive” behaviours are unacceptable: the chance of doing some-
thing wrong is way too high.
Finally there were the frustrating training mistakes/errors. Those I al-

ready HAD the knowledge to avoid.
I have been in that awkward position when the instructor says: “I told
you already ….. (last session, or last flight).”.
In my case I could avoid recurring errors if I had just taken a small note
on my notebook and reviewed it at home…… I already had the knowl-
edge to tackle them: I needed concentration, planning, alleviation meth-
ods and a bit of luck (yes, that helps too …..).

29 THE PACE
Most decision making tools would help me prioritizing by asking me
to:
o share with my crew what issue and options we had,
o decide what was appropriate,
o assigning tasks to face the issue,
o monitoring for any change.
As the captain now, I was the “ORCHESTRA CONDUCTOR”.
I needed to SET THE PACE without losing the “Big Picture”.
The MODUS OPERANDI described in later chapters would help me
in this phase.
Monitoring task speed was a delicate captain’s duty.
If I’d see my FO (or captain) rushing during a task, I needed to slow
down my pace and wonder why he/she was pushing him/herself into
this stress. This was the time I needed to watch him/her closely as
he/she was most likely to make a mistake.
The AVERAGE crew’s TASK SPEED should not change through
normal and abnormal operations. Only PRIORITIES should change.

If my colleague was performing a task too fast, I had 2 choices:
a) Talk him/her into decreasing his/her speed,
b) Decrease my own speed to compensate: I was deliberately
expanding our time-horizon to counteract for his/her speed
increase and possible mistakes. The opposite was also true: I
would increase task speed if the other crew member was too
slow and help him/her performing it.

30 MIND RESET
After long delays, systems’ failures, long procedures, but especially
after stressing situations I learnt to take, share and/or give a (few min-
utes) “MIND RESET”.
This was markedly true when the crew had been through a tough
time: could be on ground due to technical or passengers troubles or in
the air due to technical or bad weather issues.
I needed to learn to recognize the stress built-in-the-crew and be able
to force a RESET or REST.
I never hesitated to give my FO 20 minutes sleep if I’d see him/her
exhausted. The same applied for the cabin crew: everyone deserves
rest and a decent meal when they are worn out.

31 COMMUNICATION, INTENTIONS (AND OPTIONS)
I cannot stress it enough: for captains COMMUNICATION is “EVERY-
THING”: both received and transmitted. But sometimes I saw it missing.
I knew my “communication attitude” (including tone, style…..) needed to

be very effective and would often be followed by my crew too.
I also knew a big chunk of my communication should be devoted to
transmitting my INTENTIONS. An important captain’s duty was keeping
everyone in the loop.
This would mean:
- all my crew i.e. when there were operational disruptions,
- my company i.e. when there were diversion options,
- my engineering department i.e. when encountering a technical issue
and needing help,
- my passengers i.e. when I needed them to be patient as the destina-
tion was still closed and I could not depart,
- my management i.e. when I needed any kind of clarification,
- Atc i.e. when I needed significant deviations around the weather or I
needed coordination between sectors.
All these people were working with me to allow the safe completion of
the mission and they all needed to be informed about my options and
my intentions.

32 OPINIONS
Topic: I learnt really soon that captain’s opinion is “heavier” than anyone
else on board. Captain’s opinion weighs MORE than anyone else and
influences everyone on board and on ground.
If I was facing a tough decision and I wanted IMPARTIAL and UNBI-
ASED points of view, I should not state my opinion.
Communication is physical too: so I should ensure I was not showing
emotions through my voice or body moves.
Asking my FO’s opinion had another big advantage: it would motivate

him/her and it would keep him/her in the “decision loop”. The same for
my cabin crew.
Before the final decision, I’d look at them in the eyes and ask honestly:
“Anything we missed ?”.
These actions would increase the crew self-esteem, motivate them to
show their competence and perform at their best.

33 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Topic: Information is communication next of kin. A few examples to show
how misunderstandings were waiting for me around the corner.
If COMMUNICATION was the train to move the stuff, INFORMATION

was the goldbrick on this train.
I already discussed how I should manage the threats related to informa-
tion flood and information lack in previous chapters.
Everything I’d say could be miss-interpreted so - especially during train-
ing - I needed to be very precise and state clearly what were my infor-
mation needs.
Examples:
- if I call the cabin chief talking about “the door” I need to remem-
ber for him/her the “door” is the aircraft door while for me it’s the
cockpit door: misunderstanding can lead to disastrous conse-
quences.
- if I tell the cabin crew, I have a “hydraulic problem” it can easily
be
o underestimated =no problem, all ok,
o overestimated =we are all gonna die !
The same would apply to my passengers announcements: I’d follow my
company guidelines. If I didn’t have any: I’d be short, simple and posi-
tive.

34 COMMANDER STYLE AND ENERGY
Topics: my attitude contained my own style, but experience showed me I
should be ready to be very flexible and be ready to move among the dif-
ferent commander styles and behaviours.
When on the LHS I decided which type of leader I wanted to be: there
was a full range of captains’ types from the:
o authoritarian captain: giving orders all the time (mostly without ex-
plaining)
all the way up to the
o delegating captain: non-leading and delegating all tasks.
But I COULDN’T be just ONE type. The captain should “adjust his style”
according to:
• the FO capabilities,
• the cabin crew attitude,
• the normal vs abnormal situations,
• the phase of flight,
• Etc….
Examples:
1) I report for duty and realize my FO already changed the alternate
due to bad weather, called operations office to have a new flight-
plan, corrected wrong fuel data and filled all the documents.
Result: I can sit back and relax. He/she will update me on the
progress and I’ll congratulate him/her for the efficiency. With capa-
ble FO there is no need to be authoritarian, I can delegate, monitor
and save energy.
2) I fly with a brand new FO. I report for duty and see the FO still
struggling with the NOTAMs. He didn’t realize the wrong routing,

inappropriate flight level and fuel that has to be recalculated with a
new flight-plan. So I have to act and take control of the situation:
my energy has to be used.
The amount of control, action and monitoring can be drawn on a chart.
My style would move across the black line (from top left to bottom right):
1. during my life, as my experience increased,
2. according to the crew members I’d fly with,
3. even during the same day or the same flight or manoeuvre.
I always started from a central position. The more experienced and ca-
pable my FO, the more monitoring and less action I’d need, the more
energy I could save.
But I should be always ready for sudden changes and ready to take con-
trol of the aircraft and the operation: FOs are human and DO make mis-
takes, usually in the more critical and unexpected moment.
Threats:

• the LOW energy side (left side of diagram) monitoring skills were
generally more difficult to accomplish as they’d require constant at-
tention. Note: human’s mind is not cut out for monitoring, it is meant
for action or rest. The biggest risk is being caught off guard.
Example: I trust my experienced FO too much: I get distracted and
don’t realize he did not follow the SOP to advise the cabin crew for
landing. Uncertain about it, on short final I do it myself: I was too re-
laxed, my energy level was too low.
• the HIGH energy side (right side of diagram) threats:
o I could run out of energy for a later stage.
Example: First of 4 sectors long day. A big discussion with the
ground handler for the cargo loading becomes very animated. I
need to be careful using big amounts of energy. It’s just the be-
ginning of a long duty and I might need it later.
o If I was perceived as an excessively authoritarian leader, those
around me would think very carefully before speaking up, this
behaviour would lower their assertiveness.
The other areas of the chart ? Could I use them ? (top right and bottom
left)
Of course, i.e. for training purposes. But in normal flights it would show
low adaptivity to the environment: excessive stress and/or unnecessary
will to control. As a captain I should be ready to replan my priorities very
quickly: being excessively stiff and/or having prejudice wouldn’t allow
me to keep all possible solutions in view.
Examples:
- I would be wasting energy and getting lower help and lower
crew assertiveness, (top right of the diagram)
- I’d be too relaxed and (i.e.) couldn’t realize my FO is getting in
trouble with ATC shortcuts until its’ too late …. (bottom left of
the diagram).

35 THE BOSS AND THE LEADER
Topic: there were times when I needed to act like an authoritarian
BOSS. Was I also a good leader in that moment ?
Example:
we are number 1 for takeoff. A failure pops up on the aircraft warning
system. I know it’s a very small issue, a little reset we can do later, after
takeoff. But my FO doesn’t know that. And simply explaining her where
to find this information, would make us lose our takeoff slot.
I don’t have time to explain: I need to act like a BOSS and suit my style
to that model.
I look in her eyes and tell her: “You need to trust me on this. We are go-
ing to reset during cruise phase and the system will be ok. We cannot
lose our slot in the takeoff sequence.”.
Everything worked out fine on that flight.
It was the first time I needed to use “authority” as part of my
“leadership”. I was the captain and I had the right to do it. But it needed
to be a one-off and NOT my usual practice.
This was the trick for using authority: it had to be used very rarely, only
when there was - really - no alternative.
Some more food for thoughts and examples regarding the differences
between my BOSS and LEADER attitudes:
• Should I wish to inspire fear or generate enthusiasm ? Generating en-
thusiasm should normally be preferred, but there were cases when
discipline had to be reminded.
• Should I need to do something quickly or I have time to discuss and
show how it’s done ? I was working in a constantly changing environ-
ment where sometimes tasks needed to be accomplished very quickly.
• Should I place the blame on a mishap, disruption or failure ? or fix the
issue and discuss at a later stage ?

• Should I talk plural (“We’ll do this ….”) rather than singular (“I will do
this …..”) ?
• Should I develop colleagues around me, or just use them ? Should I
delegate and monitor when possible ?
• Should I order or - when possible - ask for inputs regarding the next
move ? Should I give colleagues around me the chance to give their
feedback ?
• Should I give credit rather than taking credit ?
• Should I show compassion rather than impersonal feelings ?
• Was I always open-minded to new ideas and proactivity ?
• Should I avoid absolute and imperial statements when possible ?
• Should I leave “doors” open ?
Now, years later, I think the Boss and the Leader cohabit in the same
“Leadership” building. But I should see the Boss very very rarely.

PART 4: ….. AND BUILD MY COMMAND SKILLS
After the expertise and the attitude, I needed to blend all the ingredients
together and start building internal procedures to face any issue.
Recap: what skills did I need for command training ?
- Technical knowledge,
- decision making,
- organisational/management skills,
- interpersonal skills,
- …….
My “skills” were my “internal procedures” when responding to stimulus.
With self-discipline I could:
- manufacture,
and
- continuously improve
these procedures.

36 THE FILTER
Once my memory had the necessary knowledge and experience, I
needed to discuss and study how my mind would utilize them during
everyday encounters.
All abnormal events happening on board are analyzed by the crew:

• individually (initially)
and
• (then) together
to understand “What is going on ?”.
My own “understanding” would depend on many personal and motiva-

tional factors: e.g. my personality, my fatigue, my physiological state, my
attention in that moment of time, etc…..
In this phase there would be significant information collection from out-
side to comprehend the problem.
After gathering this information and confronting it with my experience
and knowledge, I could start drawing a “model” of what was happening.
Then I needed to make a PREDICTION to estimate how current situa-

tion could develop. Ultimately, I needed to figure out how this issue
would affect my mission.
Example.
On climb just after takeoff, the crew receives a failure message from an
on-board warning system.
The FO is flying: engages the autopilot and asks to perform the abnor-
mal checklist. The captain forces the FO to stop the checklist and (in-

stead) prioritize aircraft flying as airspeed is increasing and the maxi-
mum flap extended speed is approaching……
In this example the captain projects in time two separate issues:
- First: the “magnitude” of the failure - low in this case -. He/she
deems the flaps can be retracted and distance from departing
aerodrome can increase.
- Second: the importance of “flying the aircraft”. He/She is realising/
projecting the flaps max speed is approaching.
Expertise would play a big role: I should be able to GLIMPSE where the
problem could lead the mission VERY early and VERY quickly.
The information received would be filtered all the way through my per-
sonal and professional experiences to create my picture.
The consequential decisions would depend on this image.
It was easy for me to visualise why and how:
experience
+
knowledge
would affect my decisions.

37 DECISION MAKING (HOME) TRAINING
Topics: I wanted to challenge my knowledge through focused mental
exercises: I was approaching the final phase of my interview prepara-
tion.
It was time to build a small but effective scenarios database. Where
would it originate from ?
• internet accidents investigations databases,
• command interviews,
• real-life experiences (friends, colleagues, internet, TV, etc….),
• etc…..
Each scene/scenario would start with:

• a specific issue like:
o an aircraft system malfunction,
or
o a totally generic issue (e.g. bomb on board, medical emer-
gency, hijack, unruly passenger(s), etc.…..) affecting the
aircraft mission.
• a specific phase of flight (before start, engine start, taxi, takeoff,
climb, cruise, approach, etc….).
I could pick a place, altitude, speed and a failure (or situation) to start
the imaginary scenario.
Indexing by flight phases and by aircraft’s system allowed categorization
and search through queries.
I created my private “decision making gym”.

I could practice at home on the sofa, stuck in traffic or in bed before
sleeping at night …… There was no need for any special and expensive
location - cockpit or simulator -.

Doubts about procedures, systems, manuals, etc…. would arise and this
was extremely GOOD ! Having doubts was healthy.
It meant I was “thinking” and scanning my expertise and manuals to un-

derstand how to cope with issues.
So wondering if my decision making was correct (diverting, continuing,
returning, descending, landing as soon as possible, etc..….) would lead
to discussions with friends, captains or instructors !
The outcome was never harmful:
• more ideas would get on the table,
• very often ideas and solutions would improve over time (weeks,
months, sometimes even years later),
• system knowledge would increase,
• decision making would improve becoming an easier process.
I was specifically training my decision making, aircraft systems and/or

company procedures knowledge at the same time.

38 MY OWN “MODUS OPERANDI”
Topic: I was ready to establish my own “method of doing things”: my
MODUS OPERANDI. Using my internal procedures for a decision mak-
ing exercise.
Example of a typical study game during command interview preparation:

Day 1:
- Reviewing my notes for one aircraft system (i.e. fuel system). Ap-
prox time 1 to 2 hours.
Day 2:
- Brushing up the system. Approx time 15-20 minutes.
then
- decision making exercise on this system.
Building or using 4-5 scenarios sitting at my desk.
Example: flight from A to B (picked two in my network): abeam ZZZ (any

waypoint along the route) at 35000ft
Failure of XXX component of the aircraft system I reviewed the day be-
fore.
Analysis:
- Symptoms ? i.e. warnings, cautions or indications expected ?
- Actions ? i.e. use of autopilot, automation status, etc …
- Procedures ? i.e. automatically shown procedures, paper proce-
dures and checklists, etc…
- Techniques applicable
- ……

Option choices:
- Continue ?
- Divert ?
- Return to departure aerodrome ?
- Descent ? Climb ? Change route ?
- ….
Duties assigned:
• FO ? How should I guide him/her ?
• ATC ? What should I tell and/or ask them ?
• Cabin Attendants ? What should I tell them and how should I
guide them ?
• Passengers ? What should I tell them ?
• Company ? How could I communicate and what message should I
forward ?
• etc..…….
Any other action needed: for example:
- sub procedures following the initial one,
- evaluation of company policies applicable,
- landing distance calculations,
- information and recommendations for approach briefing,
- information and recommendations for approach
- ……..
My internal procedure was taking shape.
If any item was forgotten, I’d go back and do it again and again from the
beginning until I’d get it right.

These examples helped me build a “modus operandi”: a sequence of
actions that would allow me to TAKE CONTROL of any situation.
My “modus operandi” slowly entered my DNA so that anytime something

happened, it would kick-in and help me manage.
It would slowly but continuously change (and improve) throughout my pi-
lot life, as I constantly adjusted and revised it because of events or dis-
cussions.
In time I also built multiple acronyms to remember specific steps, sys-
tems features and procedures.
Once the scenario had burnt out, I expanded my view and asked myself:
- what if this failure/event happened on ground:
o before engine start ? what would the MEL or the operations
manual say ?
o During taxi ? what would the company want me to do ?
or
o What would be the flight phases in which this failure would af-
fect me the most ?
- What if it happened at 2000’ on final ? or at 500’ ?
o Would I go around ?
o Would I perform the checklist ?
o Would I handover controls ? Takeover ?
o Would I continue ?
o Etc….
I started with easy failures/issues then went deeper with more serious
one.
Finally I worked backwards from the options side:
- in which XXX System fault would I divert ?

- In which failure would I return to the departure airport ?
Back and forth, I kept exercising.

PART 5: READY FOR INTERVIEW AND MORE ….
At this point of my preparation
• expertise (with knowledge and experience),
• attitude (with the correct behaviours),
• modus operandi (to help me prioritize)
were covered, and I was ready to exercise my decision making and dis-
cuss some interview examples.

39 COMMAND INTERVIEW
Topics: command interview was the venue where my decision making
would show its muscles. But not only: something else needed to be pre-
pared for the interview.
Months away from my command interview, I started wondering how it

was going to be. I asked those who had been there lately and realized I
needed to do some more homework: interviewers would look for specific
behaviours surfing through my real-life events (aiming to understand
my personality and behaviours features).
Example of interview questions (from previous interviews)
• “Describe yourself: your virtues and your flaws”.
• “Describe your worst day at work ? What happened and what
did you do ?”
• “Describe an event in your life when you had a personal
conflict ? Why did it happen ? Was it your fault ? How did you
solve it ?”
• “Tell us an event when you had to use all of your diplomacy in
order to solve a communication issue ?”
• “Tell us an event when you had a communication breakdown
with your FO, or captain, or wife/husband ? Why did this happen
? How did you solve the issue ? What was the other person’s
response ?”
• “What would happen if your FO says you’re wrong ? Did it ever
happen to you ? How did you solve the issue ?”
• “Describe a very tough day you had lately.”
• “Describe a situation where you saved the day.”
The aim was understanding how I would interface with other people and
events.

The interviewer would swing between my life episodes and his/her sce-
narios, starting with: “What would you do if ……..”
I needed to bring some real-life experiences, so I had to scroll through
my own memories to find some “fitting” examples.
Other questions from previous interviews:
• “What if your FO says he/she doesn’t agree with your decision and
wants to proceed differently (divert instead of continue to destina-
tion e.g.). How would you react ? What would you do ?”
• “How would you cope with a very long duty and an extremely fa-
tigued crew ? What would you expect would be the threats in this
situation ? (Note: Introduce alleviation)”.
• “What will you do if your FO will ask you to sleep during flight ?
what will be your answer ? With no previous clearance you see
your FO sleeping on his seat during flight, what are you going to
do and say ?”
• “What methods have you used in the past for alleviating time and/
or pressure threats ?”
• “You see your FO rushing down the checklist and missing some
items: how are you going to react ?"
• “Your CTOT is expiring and your FO is too slow filling/drawing the
loadsheet. What are you going to say and do ?”
• “What alleviations methods would you use during line flights and
simulator sessions:
o if your FO had very little experience ?
o if your FO was slowing down and delaying the approach
while weather is deteriorating or fuel is on reserves ?”

40 MY BACK AGAINST THE WALL
Topics: during command (or job) interview I might have to go through
uncharted territory.
I was expecting questions about operational procedures and expertise,

knowing I could face some heavy discussions: interviewers would try to
give me a hard time, exploring my knowledge until they’d find a weak
spot.
At that point they would show disappointment and see how I’d face:
- the “silence”,
- the “I don’t know” position,
- the “there is no solution” scene,
and the stress rising from this situation.
There was no way I could learn all the manuals by heart. If they wanted
to fail me, they’d find a way. But this was not the point.
In this instance, their aim was to move me out of my “comfort zone” to

see how I’d react when flying in unfriendly skies.
My strategy was a professional approach: I was going to accept the feel-
ing, control my emotions, show a mature attitude, there was nothing
wrong.
And I would look for a way out: e.g.
- “Let me look for it in the XXXX manual ….”
- “I will evaluate with my colleague and discuss privately with him/
her….”
- “I will counteract it by doing …… and …… (mitigation methods)”
- “I will accept the aircraft only if we delay the flight until the
weather improves…., or take a better alternate, or take more
fuel, or take a different route ….”

- “I will buy coffee for the passenger to calm him down (for pas-
senger issues….)” trying to be creative.
I also needed to prepare for the command interview’s TRAPS.

In case of questions like:
- “Is there any rule you consider inapplicable or obsolete in your opera-
tions manuals ?”
- “When was the last time you bypassed any procedure or recommen-
dation ? Did you do it to expedite the operation ? For what reason did
you do it ?”
- “When was the last time your colleague didn’t follow the SOP ? What
happened ? How did you react ? What did you do ?”
- “Did you ever disregard any operational procedure ? Why ?” or
“Which operational procedure you do not apply and why ?”
no SOPs or rules violations were acceptable.
Finally, I needed to be ready for questions regarding my service history
in the company like:
- “Were you ever called to the office by your chief pilot ? If yes, what
was the reason ?”
- “Did you ever discuss or argue with your chief pilot or company man-
agement pilots ? If yes why ?”
keeping in mind the interviewers would have full access to the file re-
garding my company history and performance.

41 HOW TO FAIL COMMAND
Topics: I always thought one of my most important personality feature
NEEDED to BE “learning from mistakes” (including other pilots mis-
takes). While preparing for my interview and simulator sessions I looked
around searching for most common mistakes that previous candidates
had made. Here’s a (not exhaustive) collection.
• Automation handling when performance was downgraded. I.e.:

o engine failure on takeoff, climb, cruise or approach: ac-
tions not clear,
o upset recovery: actions not clear.
• Decision making: i.e.:
o inappropriate mission continuation while return or diver-
sion would be appropriate (e.g. engine failure, severe
electrical issues, ….),
o inappropriate diversion, overestimating a failure/issue
impact on the mission. E.g. Navigation degradation,
single air conditioning system operation, brake system
failure, ……
• Impact of a system failure: i.e.:
o impact on the mission: e.g. autopilot on RVSM, ETOPS/
EDTO flight continuation, systems affecting low visibility
operation……
• Incorrect prioritization: i.e.:
o “Fly - navigate - communicate” (or “aviate, navigate,
communicate” if you prefer) prioritization issues. E.g.:
incorrect actions sequence, no one flying the aircraft,
both pilots heads down, incorrect prioritizations, incor-
rect options evaluation, assignment of tasks out of se-
quence ….

o MAYDAY situation priorities: when would be appropriate
to declare MAYDAY ? Engine failure ? System failure ?
(which systems ?)
o PANPAN situation priorities: when would be appropriate
to declare PANPAN ?
• Incorrect operating procedure applied: i.e.:
o Paper versus electronic systems checklists,
o Abnormal procedures: e.g. similar title procedures.
o Instrument approach procedures: incorrect IAP chart, in-
correct use of automation for IAP (especially NPA) …..
• Land at all costs: i.e.:
o busting minima due to tunnel vision or feeling the need to
land as soon as possible,….. or faking or overestimating
visual contact.
o underestimating wind and shear, continuing an approach
with deteriorated weather conditions (wind, visibility, RVR,
system degradation,….).
• Attitude: i.e.:
o Not keeping FO in the decision loop, not using all re-
sources (FO and/or cabin crew), not asking opinions. Not
informing the crew or the company of the captain’s inten-
tions.
o Heavy discussions during instruction and checks. Losing
control of emotions.
o Being too kind and submissive with the FO
o Being excessively authoritarian with the FO or the crew
• Technical Knowledge: i.e.:
o Insufficient system knowledge, failure to recognise the fail-

ure’s impact on the mission.

• Procedural knowledge: i.e.:
• Company operations manual ground and flight procedures:
not known, not applied or applied incorrectly…
• In-flight fuel management procedures. E.g.: re-planning,
enroute weather causing large deviations, changing alter-
nate, cancelling alternate, concept of minimum landing
fuel, landing below MDF cases, commitment to land below
MDF (single or multiple runways): unknown or not clear.
• EDTO/ETOPS procedures, Decompression vs Engine fail-
ure cases, electrical malfunctions, fuel quantity cases
…… : unknown or not clear.
• Land at nearest suitable aerodrome interpretation: un-
known or not clear.
• Supplementary (or conditional) procedures knowledge and
application: unknown or not clear.

42 GREY DECISIONS: MEL TRAINING
Topics: decisions “complexity” and “time pressure” could give me a hard
time: MEL decisions were a good example and I used them to train my
decision making.
DECISION COMPLEXITY
Command Interview:
Chief pilot: “Captain, can you accept the aircraft with XXX item inopera-
tive ?”
I buy time and look in the MEL. Then I find it: in case of item XXX inop-
erative: “NO DISPATCH”.
I found it in a few seconds, I’m proud of myself……
Chief Pilot says: “Oh sorry sorry captain, my mistake. It has been fixed”.
A new question will come soon…..
I wish all decisions were like this: black or white !
Unfortunately, this is not true. Many times decisions are grey.

Some examples:
1) about the “MAY BE INOPERATIVE” MEL items:

- Today I fly to a brand new challenging destination. I never flew
there before and the forecast gives bad weather. I would like a per-
fect aircraft, but one of these “may be inoperative” items doesn’t
work: will I accept the aircraft ?
- Then I reverse the scenario: I pick a “may be inoperative” MEL item

and I exercise understanding in which cases (weather, destination,
routing, etc…) I would NOT accept it inoperative ?
I forced myself to play this game more and more, wondering: i.e.

• accepting the aircraft, how could I mitigate the risk ?
• what “escapes” would be available ?
2) Takeoff on a humid and hot night from a middle east airport. We are
at the holding point, ready for takeoff, when the cabin chief calls the
cockpit.
A passenger sees fuel leak from a wing.
I just flew this aircraft on the previous leg with no issue. I ask ATC to
maintain position for 1 minute, but TWR is getting nervous. I send again
the cabin chief to have a look at the wing: she sees some liquid drop-
ping from the wing. Humidity ? I check the fuel system and see no
anomaly.
Continue for takeoff or go back to the stand ?
3) From a previous interview: before departure: weather forecast at des-

tination is bad: crosswind, low clouds and ceiling just above minima.
“Captain, what do you think ? Should we delay the flight ? Until what
time ? What’s your maximum Flight Duty Period ? What should we tell
the passengers ? Do you want to board now ? Can you keep them on
board ? For how long ?”.
4) On top of descent: the arrival aerodrome closes due to thunderstorm

and wind. I have fuel to wait. Divert, refuel and come back soon ? Or
wait until MDF to see if it improves ?
Each day, each aircraft, each pilot, each weather, each MEL item could
be a different story.
DECISION TIME PRESSURE

From my point of view, MEL has always been a big issue for command
training. Why ?
First, because MEL is a complex document and it takes time to analyze
it properly.
Second, because many times I discovered an inoperative item once ar-
rived on board. The timing was terrible: MEL had to be thoroughly ana-
lyzed by both CMs BUT there was a lot of people waiting to “dump” time
pressure on the captain and the crew.
Dispatcher, fuelling personnel, engineers, ground handler, cabin crew:
all these people had "running processes" following precise time sched-
ules. It was the busiest time of the day !
MEL inoperative items examination, instead, was a delicate flight prepa-
ration "static scenario” requiring both CMs full concentration in a sterile
environment.
Since this MEL “step” could affect all other processes, if I had any doubt
the issue could affect the flight “doability”, I’d leave everyone outside the
cockpit, close the door until all items were fully understood.
Not easy when time-pressure builds up.

43 KNOWLEDGE WAS THERE …..
Approach briefing:
The captain is pilot flying and briefs: “….. approach to land in rainy
weather on a soaked runway: we’ll do a positive touch down to break
the layer of water and avoid aquaplaning…..”
Later during the day it’s the FO turn to land in rainy weather: he doesn’t
brief about aquaplaning. The captain waits for the FO to finish the brief-
ing, then adds the remarks about the positive touchdown to avoid aqua-
planing.
FO looks at him, agrees silently but makes a super-soft landing on a
soaked runway without a comment…..
Why did this happen ?
o Did the FO listen when the captain briefed about the risk of aquaplan-
ing and the need to make positive touchdown ?
o Did the FO know what is aquaplaning ? If not, maybe he didn’t want
to show his lack of knowledge ?
o Did the FO know how to make a positive touch-down ?
It doesn’t matter if it was an expertise issue or an attitude problem, the
KNOWLEDGE was there, fully available to our FO, but he/she didn’t use
it. LEARNING in adults always needs one or more reasons: aren’t your
safety, your job, your upgrade enough ?
Another example: before starting the first engine the captain discusses
the engines warm-up period as the aircraft is on ground from the day be-
fore.
The FO is totally silent and doesn’t look at the captain.
Does he know what the captain is talking about ?
Again: when KNOWLEDGE is available, I MUST use it !

During any of my flying days I needed to be able to see when KNOWL-
EDGE was around me and grab it.
So I
- asked my captain,
- looked at the numbers in the books,
- asked my friends or batch mates,
- have never been afraid to say “I don’t know”.
Once again: I needed to learn from every day events and I didn’t
need a safety reason to learn something new.
It took a lot of energy, I know, but I NEVER LET GO.
No shortcuts: in today’s aviation there is no room for incompetent in-
dividuals.

44 THE BIG MEN/WOMEN
Topic: some remarkable colleagues I flew with a long time ago gave me
a gift. The ability to say “You are right, I’m wrong”.
Pilots are “Prima Donna”: they like to be the expert, the ace, the artist,
the pro, ……
So I want to talk about exceptional personalities.
Some excellent pilots I flew with a long time ago, had an uncommon
personality trait I needed to learn from.
They had the capability to say: "You are right. I'm wrong".
They had no issues admitting - in that instance - I had better knowledge
(or skills, or whatever…..).
I will always remember them.
And the great thing was that it didn’t cost them anything to state it and
look in my eyes.
I was a young FO and it was SO COOL compared to some “machos”

around town.
Being a “big man/woman” in my opinion means NO FEAR admitting

others are better than me. What’s important is: the mission and its safe-
ty. Our ego must step back ! Once we land everyone goes back to his/
her life and nothing matters anymore……
Each one of us has a POSITION in the crew. The FO “completes” and

“complement” the captain. If the two work together as a team, the syn-
ergy is fantastic, and the outcome is well more than 1+1=2.
All it takes is understanding there is no problem admitting when we’re

caught off guard. My priorities become:
- building awareness,
- acknowledging my colleague got me off the hook.

After all, “experience” was (and always will be) =
“Things happening to me” + “I learn from them”.

I learnt that there was no problem admitting something (outside or inside
me) could be improved. It was the first step to continuous improvement.
I knew in some parts of the planet "losing face" or admitting mistakes
was (and still is) very difficult. I flew there and I think in modern aviation
we CANNOT AFFORD these attitudes.
The crew is a pyramid: the captain is at the top, but he cannot function
without the support of the team beneath him.
Information, support, recommendations (to take the right decision) can
come from any pyramid level and “credit” MUST be given. Under a
“physics” point of view, the captain’s position is more delicate as it de-
pends on everyone else.
Especially in tough situations, I needed to “catch” the right suggestion if

and when it would come from ANY position in the structure below me. To
achieve this goal I needed to keep my mind clear, free and wide open
while listening on all the communication channels.

PART 6: COMPANY OPERATIONS MANUAL
Topic: no airline was going to let me fly a multimillion dollars toy unless
I’d show thorough knowledge of the company operations manuals.
I quickly realized that if I wasn’t “seriously” acquainted with my company
operations manual rules, I was not ready for command.
Good thing: the structure of the company operations manual is very sim-
ilar in most airlines.
Many of its paragraphs should help me take decisions and - believe it or
not - make my life easier.
Experienced captains often argue that this manual should be less spe-
cific and should leave more “room” to the pilots. Old captains in the 70s
and 80s used to say the company operations manual should be just one
word manual: “AIRMANSHIP”: fair point.
Some airlines instead cook up heavy operations manuals (2/3000+
pages) leaving very little room for captain improvisation.
So: big manual or small manual ?
Is airmanship enough to take the right decisions ?
or
do I need the company operations manual guidance on every aspect of
my operation ?
In real life I had no choice: no airline was going to let me fly the aircraft
and hundreds of passengers unless I’d show:
• thorough knowledge of the company operations manual,
• consistent compliance with its rules.
Example:
Heading to a CAT 1 approach with challenging visibility and cloud base
just above minima.

What should I include in my briefing ? and what would be the opera-
tional items (from the operations manual) to be kept “ready to use” in my
mind ?
Examples:
- Could the FO fly the approach ? in which cases ?
- Should I/we prepare for a low visibility approach ?
- Should I ask if LVP are in force ?
- Is Autoland approved if LVP are not in force ?
- What RVR values are acceptable ? in which measuring point ?
- How many RVR measuring points do I need for the approach ?
- Is cloud ceiling at or above MDH necessary to start the ap-
proach ? and/or to continue the approach after OM ?
- What is the policy on commencement and continuation of ap-
proach before FAF/FDP ? Above 1000ft ? Below 1000ft , down
to DA ?
- What if the RVR or visibility falls below minima ?
- What will be the crew’s task sharing ?
just to show how I need to bring the operation to TOTAL compliance with
my operations manual.
This is being a captain: never let anything go. Preparation is crucial.

45 THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING WHERE THE STUFF IS
(WRITTEN)
Topic: Pilots face huge amounts of pages of information originating from
the airline, the aircraft manufacturer and the regulators. How to unravel
this situation…..
In my case, the best trick to store stuff in my mind was to first memorize
where the topics were located in the manuals index.
Example: for questions like:
- “Captain, can you accept deportees on this flight ?”
- “Can you accept pregnant women at the 34th week ?”
- “Can you refuel with passengers on board ? Or with one engine
running ?”
a professional approach would be: “Let me look for it in the manual.”.

Most airlines and interviewers accept this approach without topic memo-
rization. But it needs to be done quickly. So, for me, knowing where the
topic was located in the manuals was crucial.
Obviously this approach was unacceptable for information that had to be
kept in my “ready memory” for quick use: i.e.
- maximum ceiling/crosswind/tailwind for my FO to land (if any),
- company takeoff minima,
- company landing minima and categories,
- other truly operational issues and numbers,
- etc ……….

46 COMPANY OPERATIONS MANUAL CAPTAIN’S RESPON-
SIBILITIES
Topics: once again on the operations manual pages.
One of the first items in the operations manual was the captain’s re-
sponsibilities chapter. It could help my decision making for all situations
without written rules.
I made a list, map and diagram of this chapter: it listed a good bunch of
very specific responsibilities. I exploited each one of them (word by
word) to be ready to apply them when needed.
Examples: what am I responsible for ? Avoiding alcohol and drugs, do-
ing briefings, getting the correct navigation charts, giving commands if
needed, delegating the crew, .…..
Yes, yes: all true. To simplify I tried to categorize them:
• Responsibilities on technical issues: MEL, weather for the flight,
weight and balance procedures, company and aircraft manufactur-
er procedures, briefings compliance, aircraft system, ….
• Responsibilities regarding passenger’s care: how to brief passen-
gers, use of seatbelts, when to disembark an unruly passenger, ….
• Responsibilities regarding flight documents: documents to be car-
ried on board, reporting issues, signatures on documents, ..…
• Responsibilities regarding crew care: personal conduct, com-
mands given, delegation and development of subordinates, ……
I packed them together renaming all of them:
“CONDUCT OF A SAFE FLIGHT”

or
“CONDUCT of SAFE OPERATION” (including operations in and around

the aircraft on ground too, i.e. refuelling, boarding, briefing passengers
….).

47 WHERE THE MANUALS FAIL TO REACH
Sometimes, no matter how comprehensive the company operations
manual was, there were situations where:
- there was no defined rule or regulation applicable,
- there were two or more conflicting guidelines on manuals, doc-
uments, rules applicable,
- regulations or company rules were open to interpretation or bad-
ly written.
These were difficult (nightmare) decisions forcing the crew to take more
and more responsibility.
Examples for these cases (and typical for command interviews) are the
low fuel cases. I practiced low fuel scenarios with my batch mates build-
ing dozen of examples by changing criteria like:
- aircraft state, position and altitude,
- fuel on board,
- weather,
- aerodromes,
- notams,
- traffic,
- ATC behaviours and standard callouts,
- runways (number, status, ….)
- etc……
A few months before my interview, I asked guidance to my Chief Pilot
about a complex low fuel scenario. After my explanation, he smiled and
told me: “We cannot make a rule for every single case.
We expect you to take the SAFER decision.”.

End of the story.
This is what they expected from me.

PART 7: MY OWN GYM
A collection of questions I gathered and used to check my knowledge
and expertise. Most of them taken from command interviews.

48 REGULATORY DOCUMENTS
(Lists not exhaustive):
1. ATC: air traffic management. E.g.:
- flight plan form contents,
- emergencies and communication failure,
- on-board systems used for communication,
- emergency and urgency messages,
- radar services and separation minima.
2. Navigation. E.g.:
- instrument procedures design (departures PDG, STAR and ar-
rivals design, approach procedures design, ……)
- enroute criteria (gross vs net gradients),
- noise abatement procedures,
- requirements for RNAV/RNP navigation and procedures,
- altimeter setting procedures,
- simultaneous operations on parallel or near-parallel instrument
runways, segregated vs. independent operations,
- transponder setting/operating procedures.
3. Radiotelephony.
- World Standards,
- Standards for emergency and urgency.
4. Rules of the air. E.g.:
- signals (distress, urgency, visual signs, marshalling signs),
- interception of civil aircrafts,
- unlawful interference.

5. Aerodromes. E.g.:
- ground signals, visual signals, approach path indicators, ….
- aerodromes and taxiways categorization,
- aerodromes lighting,
- aerodromes obstacles limitation surfaces.
6. Dangerous goods:
- reference documents,
- types of dangerous goods,
- different types of quantity packaging,
- Emergency drill codes applicable,
- Briefing to cabin crew about DG,
- Information to ATC about DG in emergencies.

49 TRAINING ON THE COMPANY OPERATIONS MANUAL
More command interview or written test questions from Operations
manuals (lists not exhaustive).
Operational:
- who has the authority for delaying or anticipating a flight ?
- Dispatcher responsibilities ?
Crew composition:
- minimum flight crew composition and licenses ?
- Minimum cabin crew number and composition for flight and board-
ing ?
- Flight crew member incapacitations behaviours and procedures ?
- Captain incapacitated case ?
- FO incapacitated case ?
- Cabin crew member incapacitations procedures (appointment of
cabin chief if incapacitated) ?
- Possibility to move from own seat and under what circumstances
(phase of flight, physiological needs,…..) ?
- Use of seatbelts and shoulder harness (altitude, phase of flight,
turbulence) ?
- Possibility to operate on other seat (example RHS for captain) ?
Qualifications requirements:
- recency of experience requirements (captain and FO) ?
- Route competence requirements ?
- Aerodrome competence requirements ?
- Aerodromes categories and requirements to operate ?

- Low visibility competency requirements and recency of experience
(Takeoff and approach) ?
Crew health:
- limitations for alcohol drinking ?
- Rules on medication, drugs and vaccinations ?
- Rules on scuba diving and blood donation ?
- Rules on surgeries ?
- Rules on sleep and meals when off duty or before duty ?
- Rules on meals on board (eat together, meals composition) ?
Operational matters, aerodrome selection:
- what services must be available at the aerodrome I intend to use ?
- What requirements must an emergency aerodrome have ?
- What is referred as a suitable airport ?
- What is the RFF category ?
- Minimum RFF required for the aircraft ?
- What is PCN and what value does the aircraft have at MTOW ?
and average operating weight ? ACN required ?
- How many alternates do I need for the flight ? Destination alternate
if weather is below minima ? If destination operates in contaminat-
ed runways ? Or low visibility ? Enroute alternates ? Maximum dis-
tance between enroute alternate aerodromes ?
- What is the minimum visibility/RVR for Takeoff ?
- What must be the destination minima for planning purposes (preci-
sion approach and non precision approaches) ?
- What must be the alternate minima for planning purposes (preci-
sion Approach, non precision, circling) ?
- What must be the enroute minima for planning purposes ?

Fuel policy:
- What are the different parts of the fuel upload on the aircraft ?
- What is the minimum block fuel ? Minimum ramp fuel ? Minimum
takeoff fuel ?
- How much is the contingency fuel ?
- What is the reduced contingency procedure ?
- What is a FUEL ERA alternate ?
- What is MDF (minimum diverting fuel) and what other fuel quanti-
ties are inside MDF for each flight ?
Weight and balance:
- who decides the cargo positions in the holds ? who is responsible
for checking the cargo load is secured on the aircraft ?
- Passengers bags preferred position in holds, ULD usage ?
- Passenger areas in cabin and effect of movement on centre of
gravity ?
- Consequences on performance ?
- What if the flight plan has a wrong ZFW (discuss lower vs higher) ?
What is maximum last minute changes ?
Technical logbook, documents and failures:
- Technical log transit filling ? Fuelling numbers ? De-antiicing codes
?
- Who has to fill the low visibility parts and in which cases ?
- Who has to fill the de antiicing part and in which cases ?
- Can I accept an inoperative equipment outstation ?
- Discuss the possibility to defer the failed items until home base ?
- Requirement to inform the company ?

- Are aircraft systems resets allowed during boarding, or taxi, or
cruise and/or outstation ?
- What to do in case of fault/defect during boarding or taxi or
cruise ?
- What aircraft documents must be checked before flight ?
- What other operational documents must be on board for a normal
flight ?
Ground operations:
- Can aircraft be refuelled with passengers on board ? With one en-
gine running ?
- What precautions shall the crew take ?
- What are pax with reduced mobility ?
- How many can the crew allow on the flight and with what precau-
tions ?
- Do they need escorts ?
- Can the crew accept for the flight pregnant women between 29th
and 35th weeks ?
Security:
- in which cases should the captain disembark any passenger ?
- What are the levels of unruly passengers ?
- What are cabin and flight crew behaviours, prescriptions, docu-
ments and procedures in each one of the levels ?
- If a passenger is under the influence of drugs and very sleepy (to-
tally inoffensive). Should the crew accept him/her on board ? Why
yes ? Why no ?
- Beside other passengers safety, what about his/her own safety ?
- Will he/she hear evacuation orders ?

- Policy on sterile cockpit ?
- Guidelines in case of suspect hijack in the cabin ?
- In which cases would the flight crew suspect a hijack threat ?
- Can an unruly passenger become a hijack threat ?
- Is a drunk passenger unruly ? If yes in which cases ?
- Is an angry passenger unruly ? If yes in which cases ?
- Is a passenger hassling and trying to hug/touch a cabin attendant
unruly ?
- What are the steps in dealing with such an issue ?
- Can I exit the cockpit ? Can I send my FO to deal with the issue ?
- Can I ask other passengers for help dealing with a violent passen-
ger ? If yes how can I organize it ?
- How would a bomb threat start ? A telephone call to the company
or to an aerodrome or to ATC ?
- In which cases is a passenger on the aircraft a potential bomb
threat ?
- What are the company guidance in case of bomb threat received
while boarding ?
- Is evacuation needed in this case ? Are there different types of
evacuation ? if yes what type of evacuation would be recommend-
ed ?
- What if the cabin attendants find a strange bag after passenger
disembarkation ? What if it was a suspicious powdery substance ?
- What are the procedure for deportees passenger ? Escorts ?
From real-life events:
- During the flight, a cabin crew lend his nice pen to a passenger.
The passenger really likes the pen and doesn’t want to give it

back. The conflict slowly escalate to the cabin chief and then to
the flight deck crew. What can (or must) the captain do ?
- During flight three big guys start hitting each other. A brawl quickly
develops. How can the crew and captain deal with it ?
- ASM informs there is a deportee to be carried on the flight. The
Police escorts the gentleman at the aircraft door where he starts
to misbehave. What should and/or can the captain do ?
Cold weather:
- When should the crew use de-Icing ?
- And anti-Icing ?
- Is de+anti-icing always required ?
- Can the crew apply anti-icing treatment over a previous anti-icing
treatment ? Can the crew apply asymmetrically ?
- Can the crew apply on wings only ?
- Can the crew apply on wings and stabilizer only ?
- What are the different types of de-anti-icing fluid and their
features ?
- When are they used ?
- In which cases (weather, contamination, etc….) should each type
be used ?
- How long do they last in bad weather/precipitation (moderate vs
heavy) ?
Flight Operation:
- which kind of approaches am I allowed to fly ?
- Autopilot limitations for each approach type ?
- What is the company procedure for in-flight fuel management ?

- During cruise phase I realize that fuel at destination will be below
minimum diverting fuel: what are my actions ?
- What is the company directive to the crew regarding landing fuel ?
- When should I declare minimum fuel ?
- When should I compute the landing distance in flight ?
- Is the dispatcher (or the crew) supposed to check it ? When ?
- What are the depressurization escape routes and why are they
needed ?
- What is the approach ban ?
- Can I continue the approach if the visibility goes below minima ?
- Can I continue the approach if the ceiling goes below minima ? Is it
needed to fly the approach ?
- What is a low visibility takeoff ?
- What are ILS categories minima ?
- What are the callouts during each type of approach ?
- What required visual reference are needed for each kind of ap-
proach ?
- When should the crew fly a published Missed approach procedure
in one engine conditions ?
- What is an adequate aerodrome ?
- What services must be available ?
- When an adequate aerodrome becomes suitable ?
- Policy on use of checklists ?
- Policy regarding overweight landing ?
- Conditions to declare medical emergency ?
Reporting:

- which occurrences should I report through phone, email, going to
the office ? After how much time from the event ?
- Should unstabilized approach (with landing) be reported ? If yes
how ? and how much time after the flight ?
- Should unstabilized approach (with Go Around) be reported ? If
yes how and how much time after the flight ?
- Flight or cabin crew incapacitation ?
- Medical case ? Should the captain divert the flight ? If yes in which
cases ?

50 PERFORMANCE BRAINSTORMING.
Performance questions examples from command interviews (lists not
exhaustive).
TAKEOFF
Definition of V1 (vs Vmcg and Vmbe)
Definition of Vef (vs Vmcg and Vmbe)
How far from V1 ? What reaction time after V1 is included in the calcula-
tion ?
What is a Balanced field ?
Definition of Vr (vs Vmca) ?
Vmu (how does it change AEO vs OEO) ?
Definition of Vliftoff (vs Vmu and Vmts)
Definition of V2 (vs Vmca and Vs)
Net and Gross Climb gradient One Engine Out (and AEO):
Takeoff segments OEO
SID NET and GROSS Climb Gradient:
How to understand if I can make a waypoint at a pre-defined altitude:
CRUISE
Net and Gross Flight Path One Engine Out
Drift Down speeds discussion
MRC vs LRC vs Vmd vs fixed Mn speeds on OEO diversion
Standard Strategy speeds and purpose
Obstacle Strategy speeds and purpose

Fixed Speed Strategy speeds purpose and utilisation.
APPROACH
Approach Climb gradient and Aircraft configuration (Cat I & NPA versus
CAT II/III)
Landing Climb Gradient and Aircraft configuration
LANDING
Definition of Required, Operational and Actual Landing Distance
Factorization of Landing Distances

51 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (NON-TECHNICAL)
Typical examples of Interview questions (list not exhaustive).
1. Personality questions
- Tell us the good and bad of you (virtues and flaws).
- What would your colleagues say about you ? How would they describe
you ?
- What would your managers (chief pilot) say about you ?
2. Conflicts.
- Tell us an event when you had to convince someone to do something
different from usual ?
- Tell us an event when you triggered someone’s anger ? Why did this
happen ?
- Tell us an event when you had a personal conflict with a crew
member ? Why did this happen ? What were the consequences of this
conflict ?
3. Communication.
- Tell us an event when you had a communication breakdown ? Define
what is for you a communication break-down ? What effect would you
expect on the crew/team ?
- Tell us an event when someone misunderstood you ?
- Tell us an event when you miss-understood your colleague ?
4. Rules and SOP violations.

- How would you define an SOP violation ? Is an SOP deviation similar
to a violation ? What is the difference (if any) ?
- Describe an SOP deviation you do every day ?

- Tell us an event when you or your Captain deviated from SOP ?
Do you think you violated the rules ?
- Do you think this issue affected flight safety ?
- Did you take control ? If no, why ?
- Did you report the issue ? If no why ?
5. Mistakes.
- Tell us an event when you made a mistake ?
- What were the mistake consequences ?
- How did these consequences affect flight (or operations) safety ?
- What did you learn from this event ?
6. Anger.
- Tell us an event when you got really angry ? Why did this happen ?
- What did you do ?
- What were the consequences of your actions ?
- What did you learn from these events ?
7. Convincing others.
- Tell us an event when someone made you change your mind ?
- Tell us an event when your captain/first officer didn’t agree with you ?
- Tell us an event when you made a critique to someone’s actions ?

- Tell us an event when you criticize someone ?
- Tell us an event when someone made a critique to your actions ? What
was your reaction ?

8. Praising.
- Tell us an event when you praised someone else’s work ?
- Tell us an event when you gave credit to your First officer ? to your
captain ? to your Crew ?
- Tell us an event when someone praised your actions?
9. Teamwork.
- Tell us an event when you had a positive impact on a group actions ?
- Tell us an event when someone brought you inside a group exercise ?
How did you like it ?
- What are the advantages of teamwork ?
- How does teamwork help a captain during flight operations ?
- What are the challenges of dealing with the Cabin Crew in your current
Airline ?
10. Difficult situations.

- Tell us when did you have a really bad day (difficult day) ?
- Tell us an emergency situation you had in real life ?
- What is your company procedure for this kind of emergency ?
11. Leadership.
- Tell us an event when you actively took the lead of a group/crew ?
- How can you understand if you are engaging the crew with leadership
or authority ?
- What are the personality traits of a good leader ?
- Are you a good leader ? Why ? What makes you a good/bad leader ?

12. Flexibility.
- Tell us an event in life or flight when you had to show your
adaptability ?
13. Creativity and innovation.

- Tell us an event when you convinced someone of an innovative solu-
tion ? What was this solution ?
- What methods and strategies did you use ?
14. Quick Takeover.

- Tell us an event when you had to quickly takeover a situation ?
- Tell us an event when you had to quickly takeover the controls of the
aircraft ?
15. Mission and Personal Support.

- Tell us an event when you felt abandoned by your family ?
- Tell us an operational event when you felt abandoned by your crew/
captain/FO ?
- Tell us an operational event when you felt no support from your com-
pany ?
Question ZERO is always the motivational reasons.

- Why do you want to join this airline ?
- Why do you want to be a captain ?

PART 8: CONCLUSION FROM THE LHS
Each day I am increasingly convinced the captain is the orchestra con-
ductor, he/she DECIDES the rhythm and MUST set the STYLE.

52 INVOLUNTARILY INSTRUCTOR
My opinion: a captain is an “instructor” every single day.
Some airlines operations manual wisely mentions “developing subordi-

nates” as one of the captain’s responsibilities. I believe captains are the
closest existent species to the “Instructor”.
As a captain I need to remember my FO:
- always watches me and
- LEARNS (the good and the bad).
I don’t like to hear FOs complaining their captain refused to answer
questions/doubts saying: “I am no flight instructor ….”.
Very disappointing.

53 END OF THE STORY
As a FO I tried not to be touchy or sensitive.
I always thought that if the captain was recommending some changes
for my knowledge or behaviours, it was for my own benefit.
After the flight he/she would go home and forget about it, while I should
sit in my living room thinking if what he/she recommended was signifi-
cant for my career and upgrade.
Initially, it was important to settle on the RHS but, later on, for a smooth
upgrade I tried to never let my knowledge
- level off for too long
or
- decrease in time.
The recipe that worked for me was:
- STUDY (manuals, regulations, etc.),
- BEHAVE (respect people and rules, set the tone, lead by ex-
ample),
- BE SOCIAL (always have open and honest communication
with everyone),
- SMILE (yes it helps a lot …..)
and be ready when the “bus” comes.

GLOSSARY & ABBREVIATIONS
AEO: All Engine Operative
ATC: Air Traffic Control
ASAP: as soon as possible
ASM: Airport Station Manager
CM: Crew Member (normally indicated as CM1 sitting on the LHS and
CM2 sitting on the RHS)
CTOT: Calculated Take Off Time
DFO: Director of Flight Operations
ERA: En-Route Alternate
FO: First Officer
IAP: Instrument Approach Procedure
LHS: left hand seat
LRC: Long Range Cruise
LVO: Low Visibility Operations
LVP: Low Visibility Procedures
MEL: Minimum Equipment List
MDF: Minimum Diverting Fuel
NPA: Non Precision Approach
OEO: One Engine Out
PF: Pilot Flying
PM: Pilot Monitoring
RHS: right hand seat
RTO: Rejected Takeoff

RVR: Runway Visual Range
SO or SFO: Second Officer
SOP or SOPs: Standard Operating Procedures
Vmd: Minimum Drag speed

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Christopher Longani
Flying enthusiast since he was a baby.
Started his career 16 years old, flying little propeller aircrafts.
Master in electronic engineering.
Flight Instructor on SEP.
Multiple experience in airlines training departments as:
- Ground training instructor,
- Ground training online courses designer,
- CRM trainer,
- Project manager on OM A (Operations Manual part A) design,
- Flight instructor.
During his career he has operated in multiple world airlines.
Currently employed in a prestigious legacy airline.
He is almost 60 years old and flew approximately 16000 flight hours.
He is very passionate about flying.
He still enjoys his job (a lot).

My Upgrade To Airline Captain FF

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Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 1

MY UPGRADE TO AIRLINE CAPTAIN

CHRISTOPHER LONGANI RICCI

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 2

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 3

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 4

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 5

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 6

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 7

Depending on the airline, “pass” rate can be very low.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 8

I was feeling ready for the “big” jump.

I’m just an average pilot who flew a lot.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 9

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 10

What was missing:

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 11

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 12

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 13

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 14

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 15

Example: a friend (experienced FO) is approaching command interview.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 16

So “information organization” was FUNDAMENTAL. It needed great at-

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 17

But what does this mean for the pilots ?

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 18

And even if the logbook displays thousands of hours, pilots’ experience

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 19

My opinion: “learning” is restructuring my future behaviour and I want to

So I needed methods to artificially increase my experience and “leave a

I needed to understand what was my “decaying time” = how much time

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 20

I started writing notes that I stored on my computer.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 21

It is no secret that in this job I could encounter “sticky” situations, fraught

The more I had EXPERIENCED aircrafts, operational, environmental is-

I could picture the EVENT passing and “flying” through my Experience

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 22

Example: today my aircraft reports a system XXX component defect al-

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 23

My notes were categorized by AIRCRAFT SYSTEM or type of events.

Example: “If system component XXX fails during flight, remember to

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 24

My most critical proficiency check had been approximately 1 year after

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 25

My aim was to be able to review knowledge:

Structure of my personal notes:

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 26

It didn’t have to be fancy or perfect.

2nd: the second part of my notes: the ADD-ON.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 27

The second best experience source was SHARING.

It doesn’t matter which method was available and appropriate: internet,

I felt it was IMPERATIVE to KNOW other pilots’ technical and opera-

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 28

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 29

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 30

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3rd phase: “applying” the acquired knowledge.

My opinion: because it gave me “confidence”.

Christopher Longani Ricci - My Upgrade to Airline Captain - 32