Labor Law - Leonen Case Digests

LEONEN CASES
LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS

SAN BEDA COLLEGE – ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2020
ACADEMICS TEAM
Jose Rio E. Sanchez

Chairperson for Academics
Heddrik C. Gonzales Chelsi Maine T. Laxamana

Deputy Deputy
John Leymar C. Magalang
Deputy
Lady Joyce A. Bernardez

Chairperson for Electronic Data Processing
#ParaKayCarlo
SUBJECT HEADS
Carlo Diamond S. Antipuesto Ma. Isabella A. Soriano

Political Law Labor Law
Ezekiel Japhet C. Esguerra Joanna Marie L. Barrozo

Civil Law Taxation Law
Christian Miguel C. Candelaria Natasha Felicia M. Francia

Commercial Law Criminal Law
Ma. Rosalia Emmanuel S. Ladignon Antonio Luis C. Duran

Remedial Law Legal Ethics
ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III

Dean
Atty. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad

Vice Dean
Atty. Carlo D. Busmente

Prefect
Atty. Roben B. Cadugo Jr.

Administrative Officer
LABOR LAW TEAM
Ma. Isabella Soriano

Subject Head
Rasper John Antonio

Assistant Subject Head
Cathy Sta. Romana

Kaye Boncayao
Debbie Perez
David Padre
Carla Cariaga
Jona Gomez
Mike Castillo
Shai Deveras
Joie Nato
Raph Martinez
Alex Sabio
Leymar Magalang
Patricia Ilano
Celine Purificacion
Genesis Natividad
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ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW and SAN BEDA COLLEGE
ALABANG CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2020-2021.
It is intended solely for the use of the individuals to which it is

addressed – the Bedan community. If you are not the
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SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED
BAR OPERATIONS ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2020-2021, as
enumerated below, is strictly prohibited.
The following may give consent:

a. Vice Chairperson for Academics and his deputies – all materials
produced by San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Centralized Bar Operations 2020-2021; or
b. Subject heads and assistant subject heads – limited to their
respective subjects only. Prior notice to the Vice Chairperson for
Academics is needed.
Copyright © 2020
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2020-2021
All Rights Reserved by the Authors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCTRINES
LABOR STANDARDS 1
POST-EMPLOYMENT 1
LABOR RELATIONS 5
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 5
JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES 8
LABOR STANDARDS
REPUBLIC V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 10
POST-EMPLOYMENT
ABUDA V. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS 11

ACOSTA V. MATIERE SAS 12
STANLEY FINE FURNITURE V. GALLANO 13
ARRIOLA V. PILIPINO STAR NGAYON, INC. 14
FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. V. ESPIRITU 15
CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY V. SINDAY 16
MALCABA V. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHIL. 17
AM-PHIL FOOD CONCEPTS, INC. V. PADILLA 18
MONTINOLA V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES 19
REMOTICADO V. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING CORP. 20
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. V. CABILES 21
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. DAWAL 22
HUBILA V. HSYY MARKETING LTD., CO. 23
ALDOVINO V. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC. 24
RIVERA V. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. 26
G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP V. AMBOS 27
BRAVO V. URIOS COLLEGE 28
MALCABA V. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHIL. 29
PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC. V. FUENTES 31
DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. V. LERON 32
PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES V. UNOCAL PHILIPPINES, INC. 33
PASCUA V. BANK WISE, INC. 34
MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V. PLDT 35
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. REBESENCIO 36
PASCUA V. BANK WISE, INC. 37
MANALO V. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, 38
RODRIGUEZ V. PARK N RIDE, INC. 39
PADILLA V. AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC. 40
PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION V. PELAYA 41
UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER V. BERNADAS 42
PAZ V. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC. 43
MILAN V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 44
LABOR RELATIONS
GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES V. VILLANUEVA 45

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION V. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. 46
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. V. BAUTISTA 47
SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS
RE: MEDICAL CONDITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CORNEJO 48

IN RE: GRUBA 49
TOQUERO V. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICE, INC. 50
MONANA V. MEC GLOBAL SHIP MANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION 51
MADRIDEJOS V. NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC. 52
NONAY V. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. 53
PEREA V. ELBUURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. 54
EBUENGA V. SOUTHFIEL AGENCIES, INC., 55
SHARPE SEA PERSONNEL, INC. V. MABUNAY, 56
ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. V. JARA, 57
PARINIGIT V. FLOBAL GATEWAY CREWING SERVICES, INC. 58
ESTEVA V. WILHELMSEN SMITH BELL MANNING, INC. 59
MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE, INC. V. ATRAJE 60
MANANSALA V. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC. 61
GRIEG PHILIPPINES, INC. V. PHILIPPINES 62
DAYO V. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION 63
BARSOLO V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 64
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. ET. AL. V. DE JESUS 65
AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. SPOUSES DELA CRUZ 66
CRISOSTOMO V. VICTORIA 67
HEIRS OF SALAS V. CABUNGCAL 68
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FRANCO 69
POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE V. INSON 70
JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. HEIRS OF ABUCAY 71

LIMLINGAN V. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INC. 72
PASCUAL V. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE 73
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. CHUA 74
CEPRADO V. NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. 75
METRO BOTTLED WATER CORPORATION V. ANDRADA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT 76
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. MORALDE 77
YANGSON V. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 78
KILUSANG MAYO UNO V. AQUINO 79
BUENA V. BENITO 80
CRISTOBAL V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES 81
I. LABOR STANDARDS
1. No employer-employee relationship is created by acquisition of government assets for privatization hence

it is not obliged to pay for any money claim arising from employer-employee relationship unless when it
voluntarily accepts the obligation. (Republic v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 174747,
March 9, 2016)
II. POST-EMPLOYMENT
1. The necessity or desirability of the work performed by an employee can be inferred from the length of time
that an employee has been performing this work. If an employee has been employed for at least one (1) year,
he or she is considered a regular employee by operation of law. (Abuda v. L. Natividad Poultry Farms, G.R.
No. 200712, July 4, 2018)
2. In redundancy, an employer must show that it applied fair and reasonable criteria in determining what
positions must be declared redundant. Otherwise, it will be held liable for illegally dismissing the employee
affected by the redundancy. (Acosta v. Matiere SAS, G.R. No. 232870, June 3, 2019)
3. Termination of an employee because he/she asserted their legal rights by filing a complaint is illegal
dismissal. (Stanley Fine Furniture v. Gallano, G.R. No. 190486, November 26, 2014)
4. The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause of
action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not the three-year period for filing money claims under
Article 291 of the Labor Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to illegal dismissal. (Arriola
v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc., G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014)
5. It is the burden of the employer to prove that a person whose services it pays for is an independent contractor
rather than a regular employee with or without a fixed term. That a person has a disease does not per se entitle
the employer to terminate his or her services. Termination is the last resort. At the very least, a competent
public health authority must certify that the disease cannot be cured within six (6) months, even with
appropriate treatment. (Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014)
6. Fixed-term employment is not illegal per se or against public policy. The decisive determinant in fixed-term
employments is “the day certain agreed upon by parties for the commencement and termination of their
employment relationship” which cannot be ascertained absent a contract evidencing the same as the validity
of such employment cannot be based on mere allegations and speculations. (Claret School of Quezon city v.
Sinday, G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019)
7. First, in appeals of illegal dismissal cases, employers are strictly mandated to file an appeal bond to perfect
their appeals. Substantial compliance, however, may merit liberality in its application. Second, the LA and
NLRC only exercise jurisdiction over termination disputes between an employer and an employee. They do
not exercise jurisdiction over termination disputes between a corporation and a corporate officer. Third, while
this Court recognizes the inherent right of employers to discipline their employees, the penalties imposed must
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be commensurate to the infractions committed. Dismissal of employees for minor and negligible offenses may
be considered as illegal dismissal. (Malcaba v. Prohealth Pharma Phil., G.R. No, 209085, June 6, 2018)
8. The requirements of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given
the opportunity to submit their position papers. (Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. v. Padilla, G.R. No. 188753,
October 1, 2014)
9. Illegally suspended employees, similar to illegally dismissed employees, are entitled to moral damages
when their suspension was attended by bad faith or fraud, oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy. (Montinola v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 198656, September 8,
2014)
10. There can be no case for illegal termination of employment when there was no termination by the
employer. While, in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show just cause for
termination of employment, such a burden arises only if the complaining employee has shown, by substantial
evidence, the fact of termination by the employer. (Remoticado v. Typical Construction Trading Corp., G.R.
No. 2016529, April 23, 2018)
11. The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. Failure to show that there
was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. (Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014)
12. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of its employees is with a valid and authorized
cause. The employer's failure to discharge this burden makes the dismissal illegal. Mere showing of incurred
or expected losses does not automatically justify retrenchment. The business losses must be "substantial,
serious, actual, and real," not merely de minimis. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Dawal, G.R. Nos. 173921 &
173952, February 24, 2016)
13. When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise (evenly balanced), doubt is resolved in favor of the
employee. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor. (Hubila v. HSYY
Marketing LTD., Co., G.R. No. 2017354, January 10, 2018)
14. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they are
legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in compensation less than what is mandated
by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits to which they are
legally entitled.
In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were validly dismissed rests on the employers.
Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is illegal. A valid dismissal must comply with
substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer
must comply with the two (2)-notice requirements, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be
heard. (Aldovino v. Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. G.R. No.
200811, June 19, 2019)
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15. It is not enough for an employee to be found to have engaged in improper or wrongful conduct. To justify
termination of employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it evident that no other penalty but the
termination of the employee's livelihood is viable. (Rivera v. Genesis Transport Service, Inc., G.R. No. 215568,
August 3, 2015)
16. Employers closing their businesses due to serious business losses must pay the affected workers separation
pay equivalent to one-month pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. (G.J.T. Rebuilders Machine Shop v. Ambos, G.R. No. 174184, January 28, 2015)
17. While the employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged misconduct for loss of trust
and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-file employees, the mere existence of a basis for
believing that the employee has breached the trust and confidence of the employer is sufficient for the valid
dismissal of managerial employees. (Bravo v. Urios College, G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017)
18. For an act to be considered a loss of trust and confidence, it must be: 1) work-related and 2) founded on
clearly established facts. It must likewise be willful. While an employer is free to regulate all aspects of
employment, the exercise of said prerogative must be in good faith and must not defeat or circumvent the
rights of its employees.
For disobedience to be considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional; and 2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge. Willful disobedience is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the
employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. The conduct complained of must also constitute
harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer. (Malcaba v. Prohealth Pharma Phil.,
G.R. No. 209085, June 6, 2018)
19. The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. First, petitioner must provide
evidence that the respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable reason. Second, petitioner must prove
respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever his ties with petitioner as his employer. (Protective
Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015)
20. To justify the dismissal of an employee based on abandonment of work, there must be a showing of overt
acts clearly evidencing the employee's intention to sever the employer employee relationship. (Demex
Rattancraft, Inc. v. Leron, G.R. No. 204288, November 8, 2017)
21. The merger of a corporation with another does not operate to dismiss the employees of the corporation
absorbed by the surviving corporation. This is in keeping with the nature and effects of a merger as provided
under law and the constitutional policy protecting the rights of labor. (Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees
v. Unocal Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 190187, September 28, 2016)
22. There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is placed in
a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical letter of
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resignation cannot be considered indicative of constructive dismissal if it is submitted by an employee fully
aware of its effects and implications. (Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. No. 191460, January 31, 2018)
23. Redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such business
judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals or even this Court, as long as the law was
followed and malicious or arbitrary action was not shown. (Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v.
PLDT, G.R. No. 190389, April 19, 2017)
24. Constructive dismissal is the cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits.
(Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 15, 2015)
25. There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is placed in
a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical letter of
aware of its effects and implications. (Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. No. 191464, January 31, 2018)
26. Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a
finding of constructive dismissal. When professionals and educators violate the ethical standards of the
profession to which they belong and for which they train students, educational institutions employing them
are justified in relieving them of their teaching posts and in taking other appropriate precautionary or punitive
measures. (Manalo v. Ateneo de Naga University, G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015)
27. Spontaneous or natural expressions of an employer do not automatically make for a hostile work
atmosphere. The unreasonably harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an employee must be
way beyond the occasional discomforts brought about by the misunderstandings between the employer and
employee. (Rodriguez v. Park N Ride, Inc., G.R. No. 222890, March 20, 2017)
28. The period of temporary off-detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond this, a floating status shall be
tantamount to constructive dismissal. (Padilla v. Airborne Security Service, Inc., G.R. No. 210080, November
22, 2017)
29. The employer’s right to investigate the wronfuly acts committed by its employees does not ipso facto mean
that the employers are out to get them. Employees involved in investigations will naturally entail some
inconvenience, stress, and difficulty. However, even if they might be burdened and, in some cases, rather
heavily so, it does not necessarily mean that an employer has embarked on their constructive dismissal.
(Philippine Span Asia Carriers Corporation v. Pelaya, G.R. No. 212003, February 28, 2018)
30. An employee who has already qualified for optional retirement but dies before the option to retire could
be exercised is entitled to his or her optional retirement benefits, which may be claimed by the qualified
employee's beneficiaries on his or her behalf. (United Doctors Medical Center v. Bernadas, G.R, No. 209468,
December 13, 2017)
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31. An employee must have rendered at least six months in a year for the said year to be considered in the
computation of retirement pay. (Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., G.R. No. 199554, February 18,
2015)
32. An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employee’s return of its
properties. (Milan v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015)
III. LABOR RELATIONS
1. Officers and employees of non-chartered GOCCs are covered by the Labor Code, and not the Civil Service
Law. However, such corporations are limited by law in negotiating economic terms with their employees
because the law has provided the Compensation and Position Classification System, which applies to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether chartered or non-chartered. (GSIS Family Bank
Employees v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773, January 1, 2019)
2. Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement is not demandable.
However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its unfair labor practice against the union members,
this benefit should be granted. (SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union v. Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No.
220383, October 5, 2016)
3. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. (Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015)
IV. SOCIAL LEGISLATION
1. Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her employment
for involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind retirement benefits also
applies to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities beyond their control. (Re: Medical
condition of Associate Justice Cornejo, A.M. No. 16-10-05-SB, March 14, 2017)
2. Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was
eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all
the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not
died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse’s death
or remarriage. (In Re: Gruba, A.M. No. 14155, November 19, 2013)
3. Disability ratings should be adequately established in a conclusive medical assessment by a company-

designated physician. To be conclusive, a medical assessment must be complete and definite to reflect the
seafarer's true condition and give the correct corresponding disability benefits. (Toquero v. Crossworld Marine
Service, Inc. G.R. No. 213482, June 26, 2019)
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4. In cases of entitle to permanent disability benefits, and there are two opposing medical opinions, the findings
of the company-designated doctor shall be given more credence. (Monana v. MEC Global Ship Management
and Manning Corporation, G.R. No. 196122, November 12, 2014)
5. Illnesses not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels are disputably presumed to be work-related. However, seafarers
must prove through substantial evidence the correlation between their illness and the nature of their work for
their claim for disability benefits to prosper. (Madridejos v. Nyk-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204262,
June 7, 2017)
6. For a disputably presumed work-related disease to be compensable, the seafarer or the claimant must still
show a reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the vessel and the illness contracted or
aggravated. Such relation must be proven by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the claim for disability benefits
cannot be granted. (Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016)
7. For an illness to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and acquired
during the term of the seafarer’s contract in accordance with Section 32-A of the POEA. The physician who
has personal knowledge of a seafarer’s actual medical condition after closely monitoring and regularly treating
that seafarer is more credible than another physician who only saw such seafarer once. (Perea v. Elbuurg
Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206178, August 9, 2017)
8. Section 20 (B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract

(POEA-SEC) established the procedures for assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates seafarers to see
a company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination, which must be done within 3
working days from their arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to claim disability
benefits. (Ebuenga v. Southfiel Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018)
9. The company-designated physicians' failure to arrive at a final and definite assessment of a seafarer's fitness
to work or level of disability within the prescribed periods means that the seafarer shall be deemed to be totally
and permanently disabled. (Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. v. Mabunay, G.R. No. 206113, November 6, 2017)
10. Failure of the company-designated physician to render a final and definitive assessment of a seafarer's
condition within the 240-day extended period transforms the seafarer's temporary and total disability to
permanent and total disability. (Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. v. Jara, G.R. No. 204307, June 6, 2018)
11. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered
by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee
and his work. It is the shipowners and their representatives who have better resources to ensure that their crew
members are properly nourished, kept adequately fit, and are placed in a situation where they are not put at
any risk greater than what is inherent in their jobs. (Parinigit v. Flobal Gateway Crewing Services, Inc., G.R.
No. 217123, February 6, 2019)
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12. Absent a final, definite disability assessment from a company-designated physician, the mandatory rule
on a third doctor referral will not apply. (Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., G.R. No. 225899,
July 10, 2019)
13. The third doctor rule does not apply when there is no final and definitive assessment by the company-
designated physicians. (Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje, G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 2018)
14. Honest mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from pre-existing illness shown to be
aggravated by their working conditions. However, when a proper knowledge of pre-existing conditions and
intent to deceive an employer are established, compensability is negated. (Manansala v. Marlow Navigation
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 208314, August 23, 2017)
15. For a disability claim to prosper, a seaman only needs to show that his work and contracted illness have
a reasonable linkage that must lead a rational mind to conclude that the seaman's occupation may have
contributed or aggravated the disease. (Grieg Philippines, Inc. v. Philippines, G.R. No. 228296, July 26, 2017)
16. For an Illness to be compensable, there must be a reasonable linkage between the desease suffered by the
employee and his work. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for
the illness suffered by the seafarer. (Dayo v. Status Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 210660, January 21, 2015)
17. For a claim for myocardial infarction as a compensable occupational disease to prosper, there must be
substantial evidence to prove any of the following conditions:
• If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
• The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship;
and
• If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and
signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. (Barsolo v. Social Security System, G.R.
No. 187950, January 11, 2017)
18. A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a compromise agreement and a judgment
on the merits of the case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties. The “conditional” settlement
of the judgment award may operate as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and academic.
(Magsaysay Maritime Corp. et. al. v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 2017)
19. The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following: "(1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee." There must be substantial evidence on
the presence of all these requisites; otherwise, there is no de jure tenant. (Automat Realty and Development
Corporation v. Spouses Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 192026, October 1, 2014)
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20. The core element in the existence of tenancy relationship is consent. All the requisites to determine the
existence of tenancy relationship must be demonstrated by substantial evidence; otherwise, the person
claiming to be a tenant is not entitled to security of tenure. (Crisostomo v. Victoria, G.R. No. 175098, August
26, 2015)
21. HLURB’s Rules and Regulations Implementing Farmlot Subdivision Plan categorizes a farmlot subdivision
as different from agricultural land as it is without the intended qualities of an agricultural land and is never
intended to be exclusively used for cultivation, livestock production and agro-forestry. (Heirs of Salas v.
Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017)
22. Any deviation to the basic formula made in the exercise of judicial discretion must be “supported by a
reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. A computation by a court made in “utter and
blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by the implementing rule amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019)
23. Identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Hence, when seeking to contest the selection of beneficiaries, a party should avail of the
administrative remedies under the Department of Agrarian Reform, not under the Adjudication Board. (Polo
Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson, G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019)
V. JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES
1. The jurisdiction over the administrative implementation of agrarian laws exclusively belongs to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. This is true even if the dispute involves the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents and certificates of title, which, before Republic Act No. 9700 amended Republic Act
No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. (Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay, G.R. No. 186432,, March 12, 2019)
2. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction shall apply. (Limlingan v. Asian Institute
of Management, Inc., G.R. No. 220481, February 17, 2016)
3. An intra-cooperative dispute between two officers on one hand and the Board of Directors on the other falls
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not of the Labor Arbiter. (Pascual v. Caniogan Credit and
Development Cooperative, G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015)
4. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The
principle of estoppel applies with equal force to quasi-judicial agencies as it does to courts. (Far East Bank
and Trust Company v. Chua, G.R. No. 187491, July 8, 2015)
5. Appeal is a purely statutory privilege that "may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law." If an appellate court or tribunal takes cognizance of an appeal that does not comply with
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the rules, the appellate court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction. The decision on the appeal is null and void.
(Ceprado v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015)
6. The Arbitral awards by CIAC may only be appealed on pure questions of law, though not all will justify an
appeal. Consistent with the strict standards for judicial review of arbitral awards, only those appeals which
involve egregious errors of law may be entertained. Given its technical expertise, the CIAC is given a wide
latitude of discretion so that it may resolve all issues before it in a fair and expeditious manner. Included within
the bounds of its discretion are situations where it resolves, on the basis of equity, to order a party to
compensate a contractor for any unpaid work done. (Metro Bottled Water Corporation v. Andrada
Construction & Development, G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019)
7. Public officers and employees who actively petition for retirement or separation benefits willfully affirm
their separation from service. They are bound by their own voluntary departure. Absent any indication that
their choice was vitiated by confounding predicaments, like desperate financial need, they cannot renege on
their self-imposed state, and later importune the government to reinstate them to the position they readily
relinquished and to pay them backwages in the intervening period. (Civil Service Commission v. Moralde,
G.R. Nos. 211077 & 211318, August 15, 2018)
8. Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-specific
may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service. Constructive dismissal occurs whether
or not there is diminution in rank, status, or salary if the employee's environment has rendered it impossible
for him or her to stay in his or her work. It may be due to the agency head's unreasonable, humiliating, or
demeaning actuations, hardship because geographic location, financial dislocation, or performance of other
duties and responsibilities inconsistent with those attached to the position. Demotion and constructive
dismissal are never presumed and must be sufficiently proven. (Yangson v. Department of Education, G.R.
No. 200170, June 3, 2019)
9. There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claim susceptible
of judicial resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must establish that there is a legally
demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial controversy,
with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and admitting of specific relief
that courts can grant. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)
10. If there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of appointment, the
appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibility required for the position in the national government to be
appointed in a permanent capacity. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the
Career Executive Service. The appointee to the position must be career executive service eligible. (Buena v.
Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014)
11. Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a matter, a motion for reconsideration
seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first time, is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
(Cristobal v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017)
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REPUBLIC v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 174747 | March 9, 2016
Employer-employee relationship; Payment of separation benefits
DOCTRINE
No employer-employee relationship is created by acquisition of government assets for privatization
hence it is not obliged to pay for any money claim arising from employer-employee relationship unless when
it voluntarily accepts the obligation.
FACTS
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and
Philippine National Bank, secured by its assets and properties. Philippine National Bank later on ceded its
rights and interests to the government through Asset Privatization Trust which was also succeeded by
Privatization and Management Office. Asset Privatization Trust filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure and
sent notice of termination to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's employees, advising them that their
services would be terminated within 30 days. Aggrieved by the termination, NACUSIP/BISUDECO filed a
complaint charging the private respondent with unfair labor practice, union busting, and claims for labor
standard benefits. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, it found that the petitioner’s
refusal to receive their checks was premised on their complaint that asset privatization trust's sale of Bicolandia
Sugar Development Corporation violated their collective bargaining agreement and was a method of union
busting. On appeal, NLRC issued the resolution dismissing the partial appeal for failure to perfect the appeal
within the statutory period of appeal. Privatization and Management Office filed before the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari34 arguing that its appeal should have been decided on the merits in the interest of
substantial justice but was denied.
ISSUE
Had private respondents' claim for labor standard benefits already prescribed under Article 291 of the
Labor Code?
HELD
Under Proclamation No. 50, Series of 1986, no employer-employee relationship is created by the
acquisition of Asset Privatization Trust (now Privatization and Management Office) of government assets for
privatization. It is not obliged to pay for any money claims arising from employer-employee relations except
when it voluntarily holds itself liable to pay. These money claims, however, must be filed within the three-
year period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a
determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers' right to the
benefits being claimed was committed." Once liability is determined, a separate money claim must be brought
before the Commission on Audit, unless the funds to be used have already been previously appropriated.
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ABUDA v. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS
G.R. No. 200712 | July 4, 2018
Regular Employment; Illegal Dismissal
DOCTRINE
The necessity or desirability of the work performed by an employee can be inferred from the length
of time that an employee has been performing this work. If an employee has been employed for at least one
(1) year, he or she is considered a regular employee by operation of law.
FACTS
The workers of L. Natividad Poultry Farms (L. Natividad) filed complaints for "illegal dismissal, unfair
labor practice, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay,
thirteenth month pay, and moral and exemplary damages" against it and its owner, Juliana Natividad, and
manager, Merlinda Natividad. The workers claimed that L. Natividad employed and terminated their
employment after several years of employment. The workers worked from 1989 to 2007. Labor Arbiter Jerez
dismissed the complaint due to lack of employer-employee relationship between the workers and L. Natividad.
He ruled that San Mateo General Services, Wilfredo Bronola, and Rodolfo Del Remedios were the real
employers as they were the ones who employed the workers, not L. Natividad. On appeal, the NLRC found
that the workers were hired as maintenance personnel by San Mateo and Del Remedios on pakyaw basis to
perform specific services for L. Natividad. Furthermore, it ruled that Jose Gonzales and Roger Martinez could
not be considered as regular employees because their jobs as poultry livestock mixers were not necessary in
L. Natividad's line of business. However, it found Bronola, Jeremias Capellan, Arnel Capellan, Temmie Nawal,
and Eduardo Capillan to be regular employees and ordered L. Natividad to reinstate them and pay their
thirteenth month pay and service incentive leave pay. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the workers
which was later on denied.
ISSUE
Can the maintenance personnel in L. Natividad Poultry Farms be considered as its regular employees?
HELD
YES. De Leon v. NLRC states that "the primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the employer." The connection is determined by considering the
nature of the work performed with the entirety of the business or trade. Likewise, if an employee has been on
the job for at least 1 year, even if the performance of the job is intermittent, the repeated and continuous need
for the employee's services is sufficient evidence of the indispensability of his or her services to the employer's
business. Respondents did not refute petitioners' claims that they continuously worked for respondents for a
period of 3 years to 17 years. Thus, petitioners' service of more than one (1) year to respondents has made
them regular employees for so long as the activities they were required to do subsist. The Court is convinced
that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to respondents' business of poultry and
livestock production.
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ACOSTA v. Matiere SAS
G.R. No. 232870 | June 3, 2019
Illegal Dismissal; Failure to comply with the requirements to justify redundancy
DOCTRINE
In redundancy, an employer must show that it applied fair and reasonable criteria in determining what
positions must be declared redundant. Otherwise, it will be held liable for illegally dismissing the employee
affected by the redundancy.
FACTS
Matiere SAS is a French company engaged in the fabrication, supply, and delivery of uni bridges and
flyovers. Respondent Matiere SAS executed a consulting agreement with petitioner Manuel Acosta wherein
the latter was engaged as a technical consultant for 12 months with a monthly salary of Php 70,000. Upon the
expiration of their agreement, respondent engaged Acosta as its technical assistant with the same monthly
salary under an employment agreement dated Nov, 1, 2010. On June 27, 2013, respondent sent Acosta a
letter informing him that his employment contract will end on July 31, 2013. The decision was due to the
cessation of delivery operations and diminution of activities. In respondent’s report to the Department of Labor
and Employment, it stated that its last shipment had been delivered and Acosta, who was dismissed together
with four other workers, was primarily in charge of the monitoring of shipments. It cited redundancy as a
ground for their dismissal. Acosta filed before the NLRC for illegal dismissal
ISSUE
Was the petitioner validly dismissed from employment on the ground of redundancy?
HELD
NO. The Court declares petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. In order to establish good faith,
the company must provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required
of the company, and that fair and reasonable criteria were used to determine the redundant positions. There
was no mention of monitoring shipments as part of petitioner’s tasks. If his work pertains mainly to the delivery
of supplies, it should have been specifically stated in his job description. Respondents did not even present
any evidence to support their claim or to contradict petitioner’s documentary evidence. There was, hence, no
basis for respondents to consider his position irrelevant when the shipments had been completed. Likewise,
respondents failed to show that they used fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions should be
declared redundant.
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STANLEY FINE FURNITURE v. GALLANO
G.R. No. 190486 | November 26, 2014
Illegal Dismissal; Right to security of tenure
DOCTRINE
Termination of an employee because he/she asserted their legal rights by filing a complaint is illegal
dismissal.
FACTS
Petitioner hired respondents as painters/carpenters. Respondents each received 215.00 basic salary
per day. While still working with petitioner company, respondents filed a labor complaint for
underpayment/non-payment of salaries, wages, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance, and 13th month pay.
Thereafter, they filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal and claimed that they were dismissed on the
day they filed their initial complaint and were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for money claims. They
were not allowed to work after. Petitioner contends that respondents were required to explain their absences
for the month of May 2005, the same month the respondents filed their complaint, but they refused.
ISSUE
Were the respondents illegally dismissed?
HELD
YES, the respondents were illegally dismissed. In cases of termination of employment, Art. 277(b) of
the Labor Code provides that “subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right
to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause […] the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice […] and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself…” Moreover, Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides the standards of due process which shall be observed by the employer
in matters concerning termination of employment. Petitioner claimed that they presented photocopies of the
memoranda to prove that notices to explain were sent to respondents. The photocopies were not considered
by the Labor Arbiter, on the ground that they had no probative value and petitioner even admitted that no
notices of dismissal were issued. The Court determined that there was malice when, as a retaliatory measure,
petitioners dismissed respondents because they filed a labor complaint. Further, petitioners violated
respondents’ rights to substantive and procedural due process when they failed to issue notices to explain and
notices of termination. Therefore, the respondents were illegally dismissed.
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ARRIOLA v. PILIPINO STAR NGAYON, INC.
G.R. No. 175689 | August 13, 2014
Illegal Dismissal Complaint; Period of filing
DOCTRINE
The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause
of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not the three-year period for filing money claims under
Article 291 of the Labor Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to illegal dismissal.
FACTS
In July 1986, respondent employed Arriola as correspondent assigned in Olongapo City and
Zambales. Arriola wrote "Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" until his column was removed from publication on
November 15, 1999. Since then, Arriola never returned for work. On November 15, 2002, Arriola filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries/wages, moral and exemplary damages, actual
damages, attorney's fees, and full backwages with the NLRC. He alleged that respondent "arbitrarily dismissed"
him on November 15, 1999 arguing that he was a regular employee. Respondents denied his allegations and
alleged that he absented himself from work and never returned despite several calls. After a few months, they
learned that Arriola transferred to a rival newspaper publisher to write "Boses ng Pamilyang OFWs." LA
dismissed the complaint holding that Arriola’s money claims had already prescribed having been filed out of
time according to Article 291 of LC, which should have been filed within three years from the time the cause
of action accrued. Both NLRC and CA ruled against Arriola.
FIRST ISSUE
Was Arriola illegally dismissed? and the complaint for money claims have prescribed?
HELD
NO. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the court ruled in favor of Pilipino Star as the removal of Arriola’s
column is not tantamount to a termination of his employment. A newspaper publisher has the management
prerogative to determine what columns to print in its newspaper.
SECOND ISSUE
Did the complaint for money claims alreadt prescribed?
HELD
YES. On the issue of prescription, the court held that Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, bonuses, salary differentials, and illegal deductions by an employer.
It also covers money claims arising from seafarer contracts. The provision, however, does not cover "money
claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for damages due
to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides that: “The following actions must be instituted within 4 years: (1) Upon injury to the rights of the
plaintiff.” When one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted
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to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon
an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. Thus, Arriola filed the complaint well within the 4-year prescriptive
period. However, his claims for unpaid salaries have prescribed as he filed his complaint three years and one
day from the time he was allegedly dismissed and deprived of his salaries. Since a claim for unpaid salaries
arises from employer-employee relations, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies.
FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC v. ESPIRITU

G.R. Nos. 204944-45 | December 3, 2014
Illegal Dismissal; Fixed Term Contract
DOCTRINE
It is the burden of the employer to prove that a person whose services it pays for is an independent
contractor rather than a regular employee with or without a fixed term. That a person has a disease does not
per se entitle the employer to terminate his or her services. Termination is the last resort. At the very least, a
competent public health authority must certify that the disease cannot be cured within six (6) months, even
with appropriate treatment.
FACTS
In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") as a news
correspondent/producer" tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field office."
Arlene’s employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was successively renewed on a
yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal. Sometime in January 2009, Arlene was diagnosed
with lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, Yoshiki Aoki informed her that the company
will have a problem renewing her contract since it would be difficult for her to perform her job. She insisted
that she was still fit to work as certified by her attending physician. After several verbal and written
communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract on May 5, 2009 where it was stipulated that
her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration on May 31, 2009. The contract also provided
that the parties release each other from liabilities and responsibilities under the employment contract. In
consideration of the non-renewal contract, Arlene "acknowledged receipt of the total amount of US$18,050.00
representing her monthly salary from March 2009 to May 2009, year-end bonus, mid-year bonus, and
separation pay." However, Arlene affixed her signature on the nonrenewal contract with the initials "U.P." for
"under protest." On May 6, 2009, the day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and attorney’s fees with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
ISSUE
Is Arlene considered as an independent contractor?
HELD
NO, Arlene was a regular employee with a fixed term contract. The successive renewals of her
contract indicated the necessity and desirability of her work in the usual course of Fuji’s business. Because of
this, Arlene had become a regular employee that has the right to enjoy the security of tenure. Arlene’s contract
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indicating a fixed term did not automatically mean that she could never be a regular employee. For as long as
it was the employee who requested, or bargained, that the contract has a “definite date of termination,” or
that the fixed-term contract be freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then the validity of a
fixed-term contract will be upheld.
CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY v. SINDAY

G.R. No. 226358 | October 9, 2019
Illegal Dismissal; Fixed term employment
DOCTRINE
Fixed-term employment is not illegal per se or against public policy. The decisive determinant in
fixed-term employments is “the day certain agreed upon by parties for the commencement and termination of
their employment relationship” which cannot be ascertained absent a contract evidencing the same as the
validity of such employment cannot be based on mere allegations and speculations.
FACTS
For different periods, Claret engaged the services of Sinday as a releasing clerk in its book sale, a filing
clerk at the Human Resources Department, and then back as a releasing clerk. Before her job expired, she
applied at one of Claret's departments, and later became a secretary. Sinday claims that although the institution
director signed the approval for her classification as a regular employee, she was later asked by the school to
sign a Probationary Employment Contract. When the same expired, she was informed that her tenure was
expiring due to change in administration. Being desperate, she worked as a substitute teacher. As her pleas for
reinstatement at least as a checker were only denied by Claret, she filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
claiming she had been a regular employee as her jobs were usually necessary and desirable in the usual
business of Claret. The school denied this averring she was well-aware of being a mere part-time fixed-term
contractual employee as confirmed by her application letters and biodata and that even if she were deemed
regular, the dismissal was still for just cause as she allegedly stole relief goods from the school, which it had
supposedly let slide.
ISSUE
Was Sinday a regular employee illegally dismissed by the petitioner?
HELD:
YES. In addition to the categories under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., regular, project, seasonal,
and casual, the Brent case recognized another classification, i.e., the fixed-term employment. For fixed-term
employment to be held valid, the periods must not have been imposed to prevent acquisition of security of
tenure. Under the criteria laid in Brent, such is satisfied when: (1) the parties have knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon a fixed period of employment absent any circumstances vitiating the consent of the employee,
or (2) when it satisfactorily appears that the parties dealt with each other on more or less equal terms, with the
employer not having exercised any moral dominance over the employee. Neither of these was satisfied here
as Sinday was not in a position to bargain the terms of her employment. Moreover, the absence of a contract
evidencing the fixed-term employment militates against petitioner's claims. The acid test in determining
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regularity is “whether there is a reasonable connection between the employee’s activities and the usual
business of the employer”. Here, the different services rendered by Sinday were necessary and desirable to
the petitioner’s business as an educational institution. Lastly, the claim of valid dismissal on the basis of alleged
stealing has no merit, the same not having been substantiated when it is the employer who has the burden to
prove such issue.
MALCABA v. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHIL.

G.R. No. 209085 | June 6, 2018
Illegal Dismissal; Jurisdiction of Labor Tribunals
DOCTRINES
First, in appeals of illegal dismissal cases, employers are strictly mandated to file an appeal bond to
perfect their appeals. Substantial compliance, however, may merit liberality in its application. Second, the LA
and NLRC only exercise jurisdiction over termination disputes between an employer and an employee. They
do not exercise jurisdiction over termination disputes between a corporation and a corporate officer. Third,
while this Court recognizes the inherent right of employers to discipline their employees, the penalties
imposed must be commensurate to the infractions committed. Dismissal of employees for minor and negligible
offenses may be considered as illegal dismissal.
FACTS
ProHealth is a corporation engaged in the sale of pharmaceutical products and health food on a
wholesale and retail basis. Malcaba, Nepomuceno, and Palit-Ang were employed as its President, Business
Manager, and Finance Officer, respectively. Petitioners separately filed complaints before the LA for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salaries and 13th month pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The LA ruled in favor
of petitioners. NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of NLRC holding that:
1) there was no employer-employee relationship between Malcaba and ProHealth since he was a corporate
officer hence, he should have filed his complaint with the RTC; 2) ProHealth was justified in dismissing
Nepomuceno and Palit-Ang since both were given opportunities to fully explain their sides. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Does the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over Malcaba’s termination considering the latter is a
corporate officer?
HELD
NONE. Under the Labor Code, the LA exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes between an employer and an employee while the NLRC exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over these cases. The presumption under this provision is that the parties have an employer-employee
relationship. At the time of his alleged dismissal, Malcaba was the President of respondent corporation. Under
Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the President of a corporation is considered a corporate officer whose
dismissal is considered an intra-corporate dispute, not a labor dispute.
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AM-PHIL FOOD CONCEPTS, INC. v. PADILLA
G.R. NO. 188753 | October 1, 2014
Illegal Dismissal; Due process in Labor Cases
DOCTRINE
The requirements of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are
given the opportunity to submit their position papers.
FACTS
Padilla was hired as a Marketing Associate by Am-Phil, a corporation engaged in the restaurant
business. Sometime in the first week of March 2004, three (3) of Am-Phil's officers informed Padilla that Am-
Phil would be implementing a retrenchment program that would be affecting three (3) of its employees, Padilla
being one of them. The retrenchment program was allegedly on account of serious and adverse business
conditions. Padilla questioned Am-Phil's choice to retrench him. He noted that Am-Phil had six (6) contractual
employees, while he was a regular employee who had a good evaluation record. He pointed out that Am-Phil
was actually then still hiring new employees. He also noted that Am-Phil's sales have not been lower relative
to the previous year. Am-Phil then sent Padilla a memorandum notifying him of his retrenchment. Padilla was
paid separation pay in the amount of PhP26,245.38. On April 20, 2004, Padilla executed a quitclaim and
release in favor of Am-Phil. On July 28, 2004, Padilla filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. For its defense,
Am-Phil claimed that Padilla was not illegally terminated and that it validly exercised a management
prerogative. It asserted that Padilla was hired merely as part of an experimental marketing program. It added
that in 2003, it did suffer serious and adverse business losses and that, in the first quarter of 2004, it was
compelled to retrench employees so as to avoid further losses. Am-Phil also underscored that Padilla executed
a quitclaim and release in its favor. With respect to its impleaded officers, Am-Phil claimed that the complaint
should be dismissed as they have a personality distinct and separate from Am-Phil.
ISSUE
Was Am-Phil’s right to due process violated?
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that In Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. C.A., the requirements of due
process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit
their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary
evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the event that the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal
hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not necessary. Am-Phil filed three (3) pleadings with
Labor Arbiter Chuanico. It was more than six (6) months after it had filed its rejoinder that it filed its motion
for leave to admit supplemental rejoinder on May 31, 2005. Its three (3) pleadings having been allowed, Am-
Phil had no shortage of opportunities to plead its claims and to adduce its evidence. It has no basis for claiming
that it was not "afforded [a] fair and reasonable opportunity to explain [its side] of the controversy." The filing
of its motion for leave to admit supplemental rejoinder represents nothing more than a belated and
procedurally inutile attempt at resuscitating its case.
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MONTINOLA v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
G.R. NO. 198656 | September 8, 2014
Illegal Dismissal; Moral Damages
DOCTRINE
Illegally suspended employees, similar to illegally dismissed employees, are entitled to moral damages
when their suspension was attended by bad faith or fraud, oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy.
FACTS
Montinola was employed as a flight attendant of Philippine Airlines. On January 29, 2008, Montinola
and other flight crew members were subjected to custom searches in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. The US Customs
and Border Protection Supervisor sent an email to PAL regarding the search. The email contained a list of PAL
flight crew members involved in the search. Another email enumerated the list of items taken from the crew
members. PAL then conducted an investigation where Montinola was required to comment on the incident.
PAL's International Cabin Crew Division Manager furnished a notice of administrative charge to Montinola.
On April 12, 2008, there was a clarificatory hearing. Montinola alleged that her counsel objected during the
clarificatory hearing regarding PAL's failure to specify her participation in the alleged pilferage. Atty. Pascual
threatened Montinola that a request for clarification would result in a waiver of the clarificatory hearing. This
matter was not reflected in the transcript of the hearing. Despite her counsel's objections, Montinola allowed
the clarificatory hearings to proceed because she wanted to extend her full cooperation in the investigations.
PAL, through Senior Assistant Vice President for Cabin Services Sub-Department Sylvia C. Hermosisima, found
Montinola guilty of 11 violations of the company's Code of Discipline and Government Regulation. She was
meted with suspension for one (1) year without pay. Montinola asked for a reconsideration. Hermosisima,
however, denied her motion for reconsideration a month after.
ISSUE
Does Montinola's illegal suspension entitle her to an award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees?
HELD
YES. The Supreme Court held that an employee is entitled to moral damages when the employer acted
a) in bad faith or fraud; b) in a manner oppressive to labor; or c) in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy. Bad faith "implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity." Cathay Pacific Airways v. Spouses Vazquez established that bad faith must be
proven through clear and convincing evidence. PAL's actions in implicating Montinola and penalizing her for
no clear reason show bad faith. PAL's denial of her request to clarify the charges against her shows its intent
to do a wrongful act for moral obliquity. If it were acting in good faith, it would have gathered more evidence
from its contact in Honolulu or from other employees before it started pointing fingers. PAL should not have
haphazardly implicated Montinola and denied her livelihood even for a moment. This act of PAL is contrary
to morals, good customs, and public policy.
19 of 81
REMOTICADO v. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING CORP.
G.R No. 206529 | April 23, 2018
Illegal Dismissal; Burden of proof
DOCTRINE
There can be no case for illegal termination of employment when there was no termination by the
employer. While, in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show just cause for
termination of employment, such a burden arises only if the complaining employee has shown, by substantial
evidence, the fact of termination by the employer.
FACTS
Petitioner works for Respondent as a helper/laborer in its construction projects. However, Petitioner
suddenly stopped showing at work for 15 days, and when he did, he voluntarily resigned, stating his sickness
for his reason. He received his fair wage up until the last day he worked. However, he was not satisfied and
demanded that he be paid his severance fee. Respondent argues that he was not entitled to a severance fee as
Petitioner voluntarily resigned. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner questions the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and CA, claiming their error for failing to see that Respondent failed
to prove the validity of Petitioner’s dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA, erred in deciding that Respondent failed to prove
that Petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
HELD
NO. In illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to prove that termination of
employment was for a just cause. However, the complaining employee must first prove by substantial
evidence the fact of termination by the employer. In the case of Doctor v. NII Enterprises, G.R. No.194001,
the Court held that “before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no
dismissal, there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof”. In the case at bar, Petitioner was
not able to prove by substantial evidence that he was illegally dismissed. He only banks on his statement that
he was told not to report to work because of his outstanding debt to the canteen, which upon checking, was
not in any way connected to the Respondents, and that said canteen’s connection is that it is located in a place
near the project. Hence, as there was no substantial evidence given by Petitioner, the burden to prove of such
illegal dismissal did not rise.
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SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. CABILES
G.R. No. 170139 | August 5, 2014
DOCTRINE
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. Failure to show that
there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
FACTS
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency which
employed the respondent, Joy Cabiles. Joy was later on deployed to work for Wacoal. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control but in Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport." She was further asked to "prepare for
immediate repatriation." As a result, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against Sameer
and Wacoal. As a defense, Sameer claimed that Joy was terminated due to her inefficiency, negligence in her
duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign employer. The LA dismissed Joy’s
complaint and ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations. When Joy appealed to the NLRC, it
declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. The case was further elevated to the CA which affirmed the decision
of the NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal
ISSUE
Was Joy illegally dismissed despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination?
HELD
YES. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law. Employees are not stripped of
their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction because we follow the principle of
lex loci contractus. By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or
authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements. To show that dismissal
resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct
and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship
must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time
prior to the employee’s performance assessment. The employer is required to give the charged employee at
least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "inform the employee of the
employer’s decision." Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to
be heard."
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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. DAWAL
G.R. Nos. 173921 & 173952 | February 24, 2016
DOCTRINE
The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of its employees is with a valid and
authorized cause. The employer's failure to discharge this burden makes the dismissal illegal. Mere showing
of incurred or expected losses does not automatically justify retrenchment. The business losses must be
"substantial, serious, actual, and real," not merely de minimis.
FACTS
PAL severed the employment of Dawal, Concepcion, and Sinobago who were regular rank-and-file
employees of PAL and "bona fide members" of the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA), until
their dismissal. PAL implemented a massive retrenchment program and then filed for corporate rehabilitation
before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Lufthansa expressed its desire to purchase PAL's Maintenance
and Engineering Department which the SEC approved. No consultation was held with the PALEA as mandated
by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between PAL and PALEA. Under the spin-off program, PAL employees
were to be retrenched whose work would be absorbed by Lufthansa and offered them generous separation
packages but PAL also offered work for the employees not absorbed. PALEA and Dawal, et al. filed before the
Labor Arbiter a Complaint for unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and was found guilty. National Labor
Relations Commission reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision stating that PAL validly exercised
its management prerogative. Dawal, et al. filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE
Was the termination of the employment of the respondents due to an authorized cause, and could be
justified as redundancy or retrenchment?
HELD
NO. The employer has the burden of showing by clear and satisfactory evidence that there are existing
or imminent substantial losses, and that legitimate business reasons justify retrenchment. Mere showing of
incurred or expected losses does not automatically justify retrenchment. For there to be a valid retrenchment,
the employer must exercise its management prerogative in good faith for the advancement of its interest and
not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure. Indeed, if retrenchment were really
necessary to forestall serious business losses, PAL should not have offered to rehire the dismissed employees,
especially after it had already given them generous separation benefits. Considering that PAL acted in bad
faith and that the grounds for termination were "not sufficiently and convincingly established," its dismissal of
Dawal, et al.'s services is therefore unjustified, illegal, and of no effect.
22 of 81
HUBILA v. HSY MARKETING LTD., CO.
G.R. No. 207354 | January 10, 2018
Equipoise Rule in Labor Cases; Illegal Dismissal
DOCTRINE
When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise (evenly balanced), doubt is resolved in favor of the
employee. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor.
FACTS
Petitioners allege that they were illegally dismissed form service when they were prevented from
entering their work premises a day after airing their grievance in Raffy Tulfo’s radio program. The respondents
denied this allegation and stated that petitioners were never dismissed from employment. Respondents allege
that there was no dismissal since they sent petitioners a First Notice of Termination of Employment, asking
them to show cause why they should not be dismissed for their continued absence from work. However,
petitioners argue that this evidence should not be given weight since there is no proof that they received this
Notice.
ISSUE
Where the employees illegally dismissed?
HELD
YES. No evidence has been presented proving that each petitioner received a copy of the First Notice
of Termination of Employment. What respondents presented were “Sample Letters of Respondents” and not
the actual Notices that were allegedly sent out. While petitioners admitted the Notices have been sent, they
have never actually admitted to receiving any of them. The lack of evidence of petitioners’ receipts suggests
that the Notices were an afterthought, designed to free respondents from any liability without having to validly
dismiss petitioners. Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to prove their
allegations, the evidence is in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are tilted in favor of labor.
Petitioners were not dismissed under any of the causes mentioned in Article 297 (formerly 282) of the Labor
Code. They were not validly informed of the causes of their dismissal. Thus, petitioners are hereby considered
to have been illegally dismissed.
23 of 81
ALDOVINO v. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 200811 | June 19, 2019
Illegal Dismissal; Payment of salaries
DOCTRINES
Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they
are legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in compensation less than what is
mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits to which
they are legally entitled.
In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were validly dismissed rests on the
employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is illegal. A valid dismissal must comply
with substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer
must comply with the two (2)-notice requirements, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be
heard.
FACTS
Petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto,
Revilla S. De Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower Management and
Development Services, Inc., a local manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International
Development Company, Ltd. Eventually, they were hired as sewers for Dipper Semi-Conductor Company, Ltd.
(Dipper Semi-Conductor), a Taiwan-based company. Their respective employment contracts provided an eight
(8)-hour working day, a fixed monthly salary, and entitlement to overtime pay, among others. Once Aldovino
and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan, Gold and Green Manpower took all their travel documents, including
their passports. They were then made to sign another contract that provides that they would be paid on a
piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary. Because they were paid on a piece-rate basis, they received
less than the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract. When Aldovino and her co-workers
inquired, Dipper Semi-Conductor refused to disclose the schedule of payment on a piece-rate basis. Aldovino
and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local court in Taiwan a Complaint against their employers,
Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage International. The parties met before the Bureau of Labor Affairs for a
dialogue. Dipper Semi-Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to the Philippines as it was
no longer interested in their services. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement. Based on the
Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim
and Release. All of them returned to the Philippines. They eventually filed before the Labor Arbiter a case for
illegal termination, underpayment of salaries and other money claims. Respondents question the legality of
the monetary damages awarded to petitioners. They assert that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the
parties' Compromise Agreement, pointing out that the labor tribunals had already rendered it valid.
24 of 81
FIRST ISSUE
Did the Compromise Agreement bar all other claims against respondents Gold and Green Manpower
Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and
Alvina?
HELD
NO. It is erroneous for the respondents to claim that the Compromise Agreement barred petitioners
from holding them liable for claims. Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned
upon for being contrary to public policy. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in
compensation less than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from
subsequently claiming benefits to which they are legally entitled. The object and foundation of the
Compromise Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries and overtime premiums to which petitioners
were legally entitled. Hence, it should not be construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute other
legitimate claims they may have against respondents.
SECOND ISSUE
Were the petitioners illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the reimbursement of their
placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees?
HELD
YES. The petitioners are illegally dismissed and are entitled to the reimbursement of their placement
fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Under the Labor Code, employers
may only terminate employment for a just or authorized cause and after complying with procedural due
process requirements. Articles 297 and 300 of the Labor Code enumerate the causes of employment
termination either by employers or employees. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees
were validly dismissed rests on the employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is
illegal. The termination of petitioners' employment was effected merely because respondents no longer
wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code. Employment
contracts cannot be terminated on a whim. Petitioners did not voluntarily sever their employment when they
signed the Compromise Agreement, which, again, cannot be used to justify a dismissal. Also, petitioners were
not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with substantive and procedural due process: there
must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply with the two (2)-notice requirement,
while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard. Here, petitioners were only verbally dismissed,
without any notice given or having been informed of any just cause for their dismissal. As a consequence of
the illegal dismissal, petitioners are also entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
25 of 81
RIVERA v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC.
G.R. No. 215568 | August 3, 2015
Termination of Employment; improper or wrongful conduct
DOCTRINE
It is not enough for an employee to be found to have engaged in improper or wrongful conduct. To
justify termination of employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it evident that no other penalty
but the termination of the employee's livelihood is viable.
FACTS
Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) beginning June 2002
as a bus conductor, assigned to the Cubao-Baler, Aurora route. In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter,
Rivera acknowledged that he was dismissed by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared
on bus ticket receipts. The discrepancy between the reported and remitted amount as against the correct
amount was detailed in the "Irregularity Report" prepared by Genesis' Inspector, Arnel Villaseran. According
to Villaseran, he conducted a "man to man" inspection on the tickets held by the passengers on board Bus No.
8286 who had transferred from Bus No. 1820 in San Fernando, Pampanga. (Bus No. 1820 broke down.) In
the course of his inspection, he noticed that Ticket No. 723374 VA had a written corrected amount of P394.00.
However, the amount marked by perforations made on the ticket, which was the amount originally indicated
by the bus conductor, was only P198.00. Upon inquiring with the passenger holding the ticket, Villaseran
found out that the passenger paid P500.00 to Rivera, who gave her change in the amount of P106.00. On July
20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his case was set on July
23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated through a written notice dated July 30,
2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating employment,
he filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Rivera’s complaint, which the NLRC
affirmed and was thereafter affirmed also by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Was Rivera’s termination valid?
HELD
No. The social justice suppositions underlying labor laws require that the statutory grounds justifying
termination of employment should not be read to justify the view that bus conductors should, in all cases, be
free from any kind of error. Not every improper act should be taken to justify the termination of employment.
Bus conductors handle money. To this extent, their work may be analogous to that of tellers, cashiers, and
other similarly situated rank-and-file employees who occupy positions of trust and confidence. However, even
granting that the first requisite for termination of employment on account of willful breach of trust has been
satisfied, we find it improper to sustain the validity of the termination of petitioner's employment. To infer
from a single error that petitioner committed serious misconduct or besmirched his employer's trust is grave
abuse of discretion.
26 of 81
G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP v. AMBOS
G.R. No. 174184 | January 28, 2015
Separation Pay; Termination of Employment; Serious Business Loss; Authorized Cause
DOCTRINE
Employers closing their businesses due to serious business losses must pay the affected workers
separation pay equivalent to one-month pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
FACTS
G.J.T. Rebuilders is a single proprietorship owned by the Trillana spouses. It was engaged in steel
works and metal fabrication, employing Ricardo Ambos (Ricardo), Russell Ambos (Russell), and Benjamin
Putian (Benjamin) as machinists. G.J.T. Rebuilders rented space in the Far East Asia (FEA) Building in Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, which served as the site of its machine shop. On September 8, 1996, a fire
partially destroyed the FEA Building. Due to the damage sustained by the building, its owner notified its tenants
to vacate their rented units by the end of September 1996 “to avoid any unforeseen accidents which may arise
due to the damage. Despite the building owner’s notice to vacate, G.J.T. Rebuilders continued its business in
the condemned building. When the building owner finally refused to accommodate it, G.J.T. Rebuilders left
its rented space and closed the machine shop on December 15, 1997. It then filed an Affidavit of Closure
before the Department of Labor and Employment on February 16, 1998 and a sworn application to retire its
business operations before the Mandaluyong City Treasurer’s Office. Having lost their employment without
receiving separation pay, Ricardo, Russell, and Benjamin filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE
Did G.J.T. Rebuilders sufficiently prove that it suffered serious business losses allowing them not to
give separation pay?
HELD
NO. Article 283 of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss an employee due to the cessation
of operation or closure of its establishment or undertaking. The decision to close one’s business is a
management prerogative that courts cannot interfere with. However, despite this management prerogative,
employers closing their businesses must pay the affected workers separation pay equivalent to one-month pay
or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The reason is that an employee
dismissed, even for an authorized cause, loses his or her means of livelihood. The only time employers are
not compelled to pay separation pay is when they closed their establishments or undertaking due to serious
business losses or financial reverses. Nevertheless, G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to sufficiently prove its alleged
serious business losses. In one of the two fiscal years covered by the financial statement presented in evidence,
G.J.T. Rebuilders earned a net income. The court agrees with the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals that
G.J.T. Rebuilders closed its machine shop to prevent losses, not because of serious business losses.
27 of 81
BRAVO v. URIOS COLLEGE
G.R. No. 198066 | June 7, 2017
Termination of Employment; Breach of trust and confidence; Just Cause
DOCTRINE
While the employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged misconduct for loss of
trust and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-file employees, the mere existence of a
basis for believing that the employee has breached the trust and confidence of the employer is sufficient for
the valid dismissal of managerial employees.
FACTS
Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher by respondent and was, in addition to his duties,
designated as the school’s Comptroller. Upon presentation of the proposed new ranking system to Bravo, he
recommended that the position of Comptroller be classified as middle management and that his salary scale
be upgraded considering said position was informally merged with that of a Vice President for Finance, which
he likewise holds. A review committee later found the following: the said system caused salary distortions,
there were discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and 2 other employees, and that the Comptroller's
Office solely prepared and implemented the salary adjustment without approval from the Human Resources
Department. Consequently, it was recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively charged for
serious misconduct or willful breach of trust for alleged misclassification of several positions and
miscomputation of his and other employees' salaries. Bravo was ordered to return the salary overpaid and was
terminated for being found guilty of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Hence this complaint
for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE
Was petitioner, who occupied a position of trust and confidence, terminated for a just cause?
HELD
YES. The dismissal of petitioner was valid based on Article 297(c) of the Labor Code. A dismissal
based thereon entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions: first, the employee to be terminated must occupy
a position of trust and confidence, i.e., being a managerial or fiduciary rank-and-file employee, and second,
there must be some basis for the loss of trust and confidence, i.e., "the employer must establish the existence
of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence". While the ground for their valid dismissal is less stringent
than that of a rank-and-file employee, the said ground may not be invoked arbitrarily. In this case, the
petitioner’s position of responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from
respondent as the entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made by the
Comptroller. His act of assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Moreover, his position made him accountable in ensuring that the
Comptroller's Office observed the company's established procedures. Hence, it was reasonable that he should
be held liable by the respondent on the basis of command responsibility.
28 of 81
MALCABA v. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHIL.
G.R. No. 209085 | June 6, 2018
Termination of Employment; Breach of trust and confidence; Just Cause
DOCTRINES
For an act to be considered a loss of trust and confidence, it must be: 1) work-related and 2) founded
on clearly established facts. It must likewise be willful. While an employer is free to regulate all aspects of
employment, the exercise of said prerogative must be in good faith and must not defeat or circumvent the
rights of its employees.
For disobedience to be considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional; and 2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge. Willful disobedience is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the
employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. The conduct complained of must also constitute
harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer.
FACTS
ProHealth is a corporation engaged in the sale of pharmaceutical products and health food on a
wholesale and retail basis. Malcaba, Nepomuceno, and Palit-Ang were employed as its President, Business
Manager, and Finance Officer, respectively. Petitioners separately filed complaints before the LA for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salaries and 13th month pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The LA ruled in favor
of petitioners. NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of NLRC holding that:
1) there was no employer-employee relationship between Malcaba and ProHealth since he was a corporate
officer hence, he should have filed his complaint with the RTC; 2) ProHealth was justified in dismissing
Nepomuceno and Palit-Ang since both were given opportunities to fully explain their sides. Hence, this
petition.
FIRST ISSUE
Was Nepomuceno validly dismissed for willful breach of trust?
HELD
NO. Article 294 [279] of the Labor Code provides that an employee may be terminated from service
only upon just or authorized causes. Under Article 297 [282] one of the just causes is fraud or willful breach
of the trust reposed in him. For an act to be considered a loss of trust and confidence, it must be: 1) work-
related and 2) founded on clearly established facts. It must likewise be willful. On respondents’ defense of
management prerogative, the court held that while an employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment,
the exercise of said prerogative must be in good faith and must not defeat or circumvent the rights of its
employees. Moreover, the manner of petitioner Nepomuceno's dismissal was likewise suspicious. In all cases
of employment termination, the employee must be granted due process which was stated in Book V, Rule
XXIII, Section 2 of the Rules Implementing the LC. Respondents should have been more circumspect in
complying with the due process requirements under the law.
29 of 81
SECOND ISSUE
Was Palit-Ang validly dismissed for willful disobedience?
HELD
NO. Under Article 297 [282] of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an
employee who commits willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer. For disobedience to be
considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the employee's assailed conduct
must have been willful or intentional; and 2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Willful
disobedience is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act
inconsistent with proper subordination. The conduct complained of must also constitute harmful behavior
against the business interest or person of his employer. Thus, it is implied in every case of willful disobedience
that the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer. The
same was absent in this case. Palit-Ang is considered to have been illegally dismissed, her penalty not having
been proportionate to the infraction committed.
30 of 81
PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC. v. FUENTES
G.R. No. 169303 | February 11, 2015
Termination of Employment; Abandonment
DOCTRINE
The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer. Thus,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. First, petitioner must provide
evidence that the respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable reason. Second, petitioner must prove
respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever his ties with petitioner as his employer.
FACTS
Celso E. Fuentes, a security guard hired by Protective, was designated at Post 33 in Agusan Del Sur.
On July 20, 2000, NPA ransacked Post 33 and took some firearms, Agency-issued uniforms and personal
items. On the same day, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the PNP. However, a
complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes was filed after the initial investigation of the
PNP. During the detention of Fuentes, he alleged that he was "mauled and tied up by the security officers of
[Protective]." To preserve proof of these claims, Fuentes had pictures taken of his injuries while in custody and
acquired a medical certificate detailing his injuries. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint due to lack of probable cause. On March 14, 2002, Fuentes then filed the Complaint "for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave and damages against Protective before the NLRC RAB XIII in Butuan City. In his Position
Paper, Fuentes claimed that right after the criminal complaint for robbery against him was dismissed he
demanded to return to work but he was refused entry by a certain Mr. Espinosa on the ground that Fuentes
was a member of the NPA and that his position had already been filled up by another security guard. On their
part, petitioner alleged that Fuentes abandoned his work and that he only filed for illegal dismissal after 6
months. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Protective but this was reversed by the NLRC stating
that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE
Was the respondent justifiably dismissed due to abandonment?
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that the burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her
work rests on the employer. Thus, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of
abandonment. First, the petitioner must provide evidence that the respondent failed to report to work for an
unjustifiable reason. Second, petitioner must prove respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever
his ties with petitioner as his employer. The act of reporting to work after the Complaint had been dropped
showed that respondent had no intention to sever his employer-employee relationship with the petitioner.
Respondent did not commit any overt act which would show his intention to sever this relationship. He clearly
intended to resume employment. Thus, respondents' dismissal was not justified.
31 of 81
DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. v. LERON
G.R. No. 204288 | November 08, 2017
Termination of employment; Abandonment of work
DOCTRINE
To justify the dismissal of an employee based on abandonment of work, there must be a showing of
overt acts clearly evidencing the employee's intention to sever the employer employee relationship.
FACTS
Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. (Demex), a domestic corporation engaged in
manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export. Narciso T. Dela Merced was Demex's
president. Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis and his services were contracted through job orders. He
worked from Monday to Saturday. However, there were times when he was required to work on Sundays.
Leron was dismissed by Demex's foreman, accusing him of instigating a campaign to remove Viray as the
company's foreman. Before Leron was dismissed from service, he was given a memorandum stating that the
dining chair he had previously weaved for export to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex expressed
that it would no longer avail of his services.
ISSUE
Was Leron validly dismissed from employment due to abandonment of work?
HELD
NO. The determination of whether or not an employee is guilty of abandonment is a factual matter.
It involves a review on the probative value of the evidence presented by each party and the correctness of the
lower courts' assessments. The Court of Appeals' finding that respondent did not abandon his work would
generally be binding upon the parties and this Court. However, an exception should be made in this case
considering that there is a variance in the findings of the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations
Commission. Although abandonment of work is not expressly enumerated as a just cause under Article 297
of the Labor Code, jurisprudence has recognized it as a form of or akin to neglect of duty. Abandonment of
work has been construed as "a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any
intention of returning back." To justify the dismissal of an employee on this ground, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: "(a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship." Mere failure to report to work is insufficient to
support a charge of abandonment. The employer must adduce clear evidence of the employee's "deliberate,
unjustified refusal to resume his [or her] employment," which is manifested through the employee's overt acts.
32 of 81
PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES v. UNOCAL PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 190187 | September 28, 2016
Termination of Employment; Merger
DOCTRINE
The merger of a corporation with another does not operate to dismiss the employees of the corporation
absorbed by the surviving corporation. This is in keeping with the nature and effects of a merger as provided
under law and the constitutional policy protecting the rights of labor.
FACTS
Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees Union is a legitimate labor union that stands as the bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of Unocal Philippines. Unocal Corporation executed an Agreement and
Plan of Merger (Merger Agreement) with Chevron Texaco Corporation (Chevron) and Blue Merger Sub, Inc.
(Blue Merger). Blue Merger is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron. Under the Merger Agreement, Unocal
Corporation merged with Blue Merger, and Blue Merger became the surviving corporation. Chevron then
became the parent corporation of the merged corporations: After the merger, Blue Merger, as the surviving
corporation, changed its name to Unocal Corporation. Unocal Philippines executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Union. However, the Union wrote Unocal Philippines asking for the separation benefits
provided for under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. According to the Union, the Merger Agreement of
Unocal Corporation, Blue Merger, and Chevron resulted in the closure and cessation of operations of Unocal
Philippines and the implied dismissal of its employees.
ISSUE
Was the merger resulted in the cessation of employees?
HELD
NO. A merger is a consolidation of two or more corporations, which results in one or more
corporations being absorbed into one surviving corporation. The separate existence of the absorbed
corporation ceases, and the surviving corporation “retains its identity and takes over the rights, privileges,
franchises, properties, claims, liabilities and obligations of the absorbed corporation(s).” If respondent is a
subsidiary of Unocal California, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Unocal Corporation, then the merger of
Unocal Corporation with Blue Merger and Chevron does not affect respondent or any of its employees.
Respondent has a separate and distinct personality from its parent corporation. Nonetheless, if respondent is
indeed a party to the merger, the merger still does not result in the dismissal of its employees.
33 of 81
PASCUA v. BANK WISE, INC.
G.R. No. 191460 & 191464 | January 31, 2018
Constructive Dismissal; When it exists
DOCTRINE
There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is placed
in a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical letter of
aware of its effects and implications.
FACTS
Petitioner was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing. Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB) and Bankwise entered into a MOA for the purchase of Bankwise’s entire outstanding
capital stock. PVB then allegedly assumed full control and management of Bankwise and elected new
members of the Board of Directors and appointed a new set of officers, including the President and Chief
Operating Officer. Petitioner was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit but his duties, functions, and
responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. Thereafter, petitioner was informed by the President of
Bankwise that as part of the merger or trade-off agreement with PVB, he should tender resignation. Petitioner
wrote 3 letters to Bankwise. The first letter being a plea to remain in service until the end of the year (which
was denied), the second was reluctant acceptance of his resignation, and the third being a proposal for a
payment plan to cover his severance pay. When petitioner wrote a letter to claim for his severance pay, it was
unheeded by both Bankwise and PVB. Petitioner then filed for a complaint for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of benefits.
ISSUE
Was petitioner constructively dismissed?
HELD
NO. In situations where special qualifications are required for employment (Master’s degree, etc.),
prospective employees are at a better position to bargain or make demands from the employer. Employees
with special qualifications would be on equal footing with their employers. Petitioner, being the Head of
Marketing, is one of those employees. Petitioner would have been completely aware of the implications of
signing a categorically worded resignation letter. If he did not intend to resign, he would not have submitted
a resignation letter and instead, continued to write letters to Bankwise signifying his continued refusal to resign.
Petitioner’s resignation letter, however, was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was premised
on his subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his
employers. There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is
placed in a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical
letter of resignation cannot be considered indicative of constructive dismissal if it is submitted by an employee
fully aware of its effects and implications. Thus, Pascua is not considered to have been constructively
dismissed.
34 of 81
MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS v. PLDT
G.R. No. 190389 | April 19, 2017
Termination of Employment; Redundancy; Valid Cause
DOCTRINE
Redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such business
judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals or even this Court, as long as the law was
followed and malicious or arbitrary action was not shown.
FACTS
Petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the telecommunications business while private respondent Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP)
is a labor union of rank and file employees in PLDT. The latter filed a notice of strike with the NCMB, charging
the former with unfair labor practice “for transferring several employees of its Provisioning Support Division
to Bicutan, Taguig” and “PLDT's alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services
December 31, 2002 and its closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, Lucena,
Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December 31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly
imperil the job security of 503 of MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit.”
On December 31, 2002, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company declared only 323 employees as
redundant as it was able to redeploy 180 of the 503 affected employees to other positions. Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas maintains that Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company failed to submit
evidence in support of its declaration of redundancy of the 35 rank-and-file employees in the Provisioning
Support Division.
ISSUE
Was PLDT’s declaration of redundancy attended by unfair labor practice?
HELD
NO. Redundancy is one of the authorized causes for the termination of employment provided for in
Article 298[76] of the Labor Code, as amended. Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission listed down the elements for the valid implementation of a redundancy program. For the
implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites:
(1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one
month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing
the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly abolished. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's declaration of
redundancy was backed by substantial evidence showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for
both local and international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth
of wireless communication.
35 of 81
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. REBESENCIO
G.R No. 198587 | January 15, 2015
Constructive Dismissal; definition
DOCTRINE
Constructive dismissal is the cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and
other benefits.
FACTS
Respondents are Flights Attendants working for the Petitioner. As they became pregnant, they applied
for maternity leave. At first their maternity leave was granted. However, only days after granting, Respondents
receive phone calls from Petitioner informing them that their maternity leave was rejected. Further, they are
now expected to submit their resignation letter as their contracts provide that being pregnant would avoid
their contracts. Failure to submit their resignation letter would lead to Respondents being terminated from
work which entails the loss of benefits such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. Respondents
filed for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE
Were the respondents illegally dismissed?
HELD
YES, Respondents were illegally dismissed. In the case of Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, the Court
defined voluntary resignation as “the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes
that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice
but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with
the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment”. In the same case, the
court held that acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment. On the other hand, constructive dismissal
is defined as the cessation of work because of continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or diminution in pay and other benefits. Constructive
demotion is tantamount to involuntary resignation. In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing
Corporation, the Court noted that the test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances. In
the case at bar, it is clear the Respondents wished to remain at their employment since they only applied for
Maternity Leave. The only reason for filing their resignation is the impending termination of their contract
which would entail the loss of benefits. Since in illegal termination cases, the burden of proving that such
termination was not illegal lies with the employer, petitioner must prove that such termination was not illegal.
Their main argument is that the respondents complied with the standard procedure of resignation. However,
concluding that such entails voluntary resignation is non sequitur (it does not follow). Mere compliance does
not indicate voluntariness. Hence, respondents were illegally dismissed.
36 of 81
PASCUA v. BANK WISE, INC.
GR No. 191460 & 191464 | January 31, 2018
Constructive Dismissal; When it exists
DOCTRINE
There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is placed
in a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical letter of
aware of its effects and implications.
FACTS
Petitioner was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing. Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB) and Bankwise entered into a MOA for the purchase of Bankwise’s entire outstanding
capital stock. PVB then allegedly assumed full control and management of Bankwise and elected new
members of the Board of Directors and appointed a new set of officers, including the President and Chief
Operating Officer. Petitioner was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit but his duties, functions, and
responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. Thereafter, petitioner was informed by the President of
Bankwise that as part of the merger or trade-off agreement with PVB, he should tender resignation. Petitioner
wrote 3 letters to Bankwise. The first letter being a plea to remain in service until the end of the year (which
was denied), the second was reluctant acceptance of his resignation, and the third being a proposal for a
payment plan to cover his severance pay. When petitioner wrote a letter to claim for his severance pay, it was
unheeded by both Bankwise and PVB. Petitioner then filed for a complaint for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of benefits.
ISSUE
Was the petitioner constructively dismissed?
HELD
NO. In situations where special qualifications are required for employment (Master’s degree, etc.),
prospective employees are at a better position to bargain or make demands from the employer. Employees
with special qualifications would be on equal footing with their employers. Petitioner, being the Head of
Marketing, is one of those employees. Petitioner would have been completely aware of the implications of
signing a categorically worded resignation letter. If he did not intend to resign, he would not have submitted
a resignation letter and instead, continued to write letters to Bankwise signifying his continued refusal to resign.
Petitioner’s resignation letter, however, was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was premised
on his subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his
employers. There is constructive dismissal when an employee is compelled by the employer to resign or is
placed in a situation where there would be no other choice but to resign. An unconditional and categorical
letter of resignation cannot be considered indicative of constructive dismissal if it is submitted by an employee
fully aware of its effects and implications. Thus, Pascua is not considered to have been constructively
dismissed.
37 of 81
MANALO v. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015
Constructive Dismissal
DOCTRINE
Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure
sustains a finding of constructive dismissal. When professionals and educators violate the ethical standards of
the profession to which they belong and for which they train students, educational institutions employing them
are justified in relieving them of their teaching posts and in taking other appropriate precautionary or punitive
measures.
FACTS
Jovita S. Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the Accountancy
Department of respondent Ateneo de Naga University. She taught subjects such as Auditing Theory, Auditing
Practice, Financial Accounting, and Elementary Accounting. She was also a part-time manager of the Ateneo
De Naga Multi-purpose Cooperative. Acting on the charges against Manalo, Respondent Fr. Tabora constituted
a grievance committee which found her guilty of fraud in issuance of official receipts, collection of cash
without documented remittance to the cooperative, use of inappropriate forms of documents cash receipts,
instances of bouncing checks issued by the cooperative, fraud in the issuance of official receipt, and
unauthorized cash advances. Instead of dismissing her from service, Fr. Tabora opted to transfer Manalo to
teach economics in the Department of Social Sciences of the Ateneo De Naga University College of Arts and
Science. Alleging that her transfer constituted constructive dismissal, Manalo filed a complaint against
respondents.
ISSUE
Was Manalo’s transfer within the scope of respondent’s prerogatives as an employer and as an
educational institution?
HELD
YES. Values and ethics are paramount pedagogical concerns. It is for this reason that training in various
fields is considered a "discipline." Were it all a matter of operational deftness, mere "how-to" instructional
would perhaps suffice. This, however, is not the way of genuine education. Educational institutions are
founded on the fundamental notion of how students grow as apprentices following the lived example of their
mentors. Petitioner should be grateful to her employer that she was only transferred and her employment was
not completely terminated. At the heart of the issue of constructive dismissal is the matter of whether the
employer's actions are warranted. Here, the court finds ample basis not only for the precautionary measures
actually taken on the petitioner, but even for other heavier penalties that could have been imposed on her. It
is true that petitioner may have been inconvenienced by the mandated transfer, but to reiterate, not every
inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of
constructive dismissal. With the backdrop of petitioner's professional indiscretions, respondent Ateneo de
Naga University, through its President, respondent Fr. Tabora, validly exercised a management prerogative.
38 of 81
RODRIGUEZ v. PARK N RIDE, INC.
G.R. No. 222980 | March 20, 2017
DOCTRINE
Spontaneous or natural expressions of an employer do not automatically make for a hostile work
atmosphere. The unreasonably harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an employee must be
way beyond the occasional discomforts brought about by the misunderstandings between the employer and
employee.
FACTS
Petitioner was an employee of Javier Spouses who owned several companies including Park N Ride,
Inc. She held different positions during the course of her employment which include the handling of the
personnel and administrative matters of the companies, without additional compensation, as well as the
household concerns of the Javier Spouses. Petitioner alleged that the treatment from the Javier Spouses became
unbearable, hence the filing of her first resignation letter which the Spouses allegedly did not accept. She
claimed that toward the end of her employment, Estelita Javier was always unreasonable and hot-headed,
repeatedly belittling and embarrassing her in the presence of co-workers. In one incident, for opening the
office late, Estelita berated her over the phone and told her that if she did not want to continue with her work,
the company could manage without her. Rodriguez did not report for work thereafter and subsequently sent
another resignation letter, which the Spouses accepted. She intimated therein that the Javier Spouses were
always finding fault with her to allegedly push her to resign. On the other hand, the Spouses stated that
Rodriguez was emotionally sensitive, prone to occasional "tampo" when reprimanded for unaccomplished
tasks, and would be absent after such reprimands, only to return a few days after.
ISSUE
Was Rodriguez constructively dismissed based on her claim of unbearable working conditions and
strong words uttered by her employer?
HELD
NO, Rodriguez was neither terminated nor constructively dismissed. There is constructive dismissal
when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of
the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. The standard
is "whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his
employment under the circumstances. Petitioner's unequivocal intent to relinquish her position was manifest
when she submitted her letters of resignation which contained words of gratitude that could hardly come from
an employee forced to resign. These letters were reinforced by petitioner's very own act of not reporting for
work despite respondents' directive. Moreover, the words uttered by her employer, i.e., "Kung ayaw mo na
ng ginagawa mo, we can manage!, which triggered her resignation, are not sufficient to make the continued
employment of petitioner impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely. Such utterance was more a consequence of
the employer’s spontaneous outburst of feelings resulting from the petitioner's failure to perform a task that
was long overdue, rather than an act to force the petitioner to resign from work.
39 of 81
PADILLA, v. AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC.
G.R. No. 210080 | November 22, 2017
DOCTRINE
The period of temporary off-detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond this, a floating status shall
be tantamount to constructive dismissal.
FACTS
Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc. as a security guard. Padilla allegedly
rendered continuous service until June 15, 2009, when he was relieved from his post at City Advertising
Ventures Corporation and was advised to wait for his re-assignment order. He allegedly received a letter from
Airborne directing him to report for assignment and deployment. He called Airborne's office but was told that
he had no assignment yet. He received another letter from Airborne asking him to report to its office. He sent
his reply letter and personally reported to the office to inquire on the status of his deployment with a person
identified as Mr. Dagang, Airborne's Director for Operations. He was told that Airborne was having a hard
time finding an assignment for him since he was already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised
by Airborne's personnel to resign, but he refused. When he reported to the office to collect his 13th month
pay, he was again persuaded to hand in his resignation letter. Still not having been deployed or re-assigned,
Padilla filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal, impleading Airborne and its president, respondent Catalina
Solis.
ISSUE
Was Padilla constructively dismissed from his employment?
HELD
YES, Macado Padilla was constructively dismissed from his employment. The practice of placing
security guards on "floating status" or "temporary off-detail" is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Jurisprudence has settled that the period of temporary off-detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond this,
a security guard's floating status shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal. To prove that petitioner was
offered a new assignment, respondents presented a series of letters requiring petitioner to report to respondent
Airborne's head office. These letters merely required petitioner to report to work and to explain why he had
failed to report to the office. These letters did not identify any specific client to which petitioner was to be
reassigned. Jurisprudence is consistent in its disapproval of general return-to-work orders as a justification for
failure to timely render assignments to security guards. As a further defense, respondents add that it was the
petitioner who abandoned his work, however, petitioner's conduct belies any intent to abandon his work. To
the contrary, it demonstrates how he took every effort to retain his employment. Taking the totality of
circumstances into consideration, this Court is unable to conclude that petitioner abandoned his work. Rather,
this Court finds that he was placed on floating status for more than six (6) months. Thus, he was constructively
dismissed.
40 of 81
PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION v. PELAYO
G.R. No. 212003 | February 28, 2018
Constructive Dismissal; Employer’s right to investigate
DOCTRINE
The employer’s right to investigate the wronfuly acts committed by its employees does not ipso facto
mean that the employers are out to get them. Employees involved in investigations will naturally entail some
inconvenience, stress, and difficulty. However, even if they might be burdened and, in some cases, rather
heavily so, it does not necessarily mean that an employer has embarked on their constructive dismissal.
FACTS
Pelayo was employed by Sulpicio Lines as an accounting clerk at its Davao City branch office.
Sulpicio Lines uncovered several anomalous transactions as there was apparent double disbursement in its
Davao City branch office. Sulpicio Lines' Cebu-based management team went to Davao to investigate. Pelayo
was interviewed by members of the management team as "she was the one who personally prepared the cash
vouchers and checks for approval by Tan and Sobiaco. Pelayo was asked to come to Sulpicio Lines' Cebu
main office for another interview. During the panel interview, Pelayo walked out. She later claimed that she
was being coerced to admit complicity with Tan and Sobiaco.Pelayo then returned to Davao City. She
eventually filed for leave of absence and ultimately stopped reporting for work. Sulpicio Lines served Pelayo
a memorandum dated requiring her to submit a written explanation concerning "double disbursements,
payments of ghost purchases and issuances of checks with amounts bigger than what [were] stated in the
vouchers. Sulpicio Lines also placed Pelayo on preventive suspension for 30 days. Sulpicio Lines also sought
the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, which asked Pelayo to appear, instead of responding to
Sulpicio Lines memorandum or appearing before the National Bureau of Investigation, Pelayo filed a
Complaint against Sulpicio Lines charging it with constructive dismissal.
ISSUE
Was there constructive dismissal?
HELD
NO. An employer who conducts investigations following the discovery of misdeeds by its employees
is not being abusive when it seeks information from an employee involved in the workflow which occasioned
the misdeed. Basic diligence impels an employer to cover all bases and inquire from employees who, by their
inclusion in that workflow, may have participated in the misdeed or may have information that can lead to
the perpetrator's identification and the employer's adoption of appropriate responsive measures. An
employee's involvement in such an investigation will naturally entail difficulty. This difficulty does not mean
that the employer is creating an inhospitable employment atmosphere so as to ease out the employee involved
in the investigation.
41 of 81
UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER v. BERNADAS
G.R. No. 209468 | December 13, 2017
Claim for Optional Retirement Benefits
DOCTRINE
An employee who has already qualified for optional retirement but dies before the option to retire
could be exercised is entitled to his or her optional retirement benefits, which may be claimed by the qualified
employee's beneficiaries on his or her behalf.
FACTS
Cesario is a rank-and-file employee of the United Doctor Medical Center (UDMC), as a housekeeper
and eventually promoted to be a utility man. UDMC and its rank-and-file employees had a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), under which rank-and-file employees were entitled to optional retirement
benefits. Under the optional retirement policy, an employee who has rendered at least 20 years of service is
entitled to optionally retire. The optional retirement pay is equal to a retiree’s salary for 11 days per year of
service. On October 2009, Cesario, aged 53, died from a “freak accident” while working in a doctor’s
residence. Leonila Bernadas, representing her deceased husband, Cesario filed a complaint for payment of
retirement benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. Leonila and her son also claimed and were
able to receive insurance proceeds of 180,000 PHP under the CBA. Petitioner argues that respondent Cesario’s
beneficiaries do not have legal capacity to apply for Cesario’s optional retirement to apply for Cesario’s
optional retirement benefits since respondent himself never applied for it in his lifetime. It asserts that even
assuming respondent Cesario was already qualified to apply for optional retirement 3 years prior to his death.
On the other hand, Leonila counters that had her husband died “under normal circumstances,” he would have
applied for optional retirement benefits. That Cesario was unable to apply before his death is a procedural
technicality that should be set aside so that “full protection to labor” is afforded and “the ends of social and
compassionate justice are met.
ISSUE
Is Bernadas entitled to receive his optional retirement benefits despite his untimely death?
HELD
YES, Cesario is entitled to receive his retirement benefits. Petitioner’s optional retirement plan is
premised on length of service, not upon reaching a certain age. It rewards loyalty and continued service by
granting an employee an earlier age to claim his or her retirement benefits even if the employee has not
reached his or her twilight years. It would be the height of inequity to withhold respondent Cesario’s retirement
benefits despite being qualified to receive it, simply because he died before he could apply for it. In any case,
the CBA does not mandate that an application must first be filed by the employee before the right to the
optional retirement benefits may vest. Thus, this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the retiree.
42 of 81
PAZ v. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC.
G.R. No. 199554 | February 18, 2015
Computation of Retirement Pay
DOCTRINE:
An employee must have rendered at least six months in a year for the said year to be considered in
the computation of retirement pay.
FACTS
Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc. hired Zenaida Paz as a seasonal sorter, paid ₱185.00 daily.
NTRCI regularly re-hired her every tobacco season since then. She signed a seasonal job contract at the start
of her employment and a pro-forma application letter prepared by NTRCI in order to qualify for the next
season. Paz was 63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was considered retired under company
policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive ₱12,000.00 as retirement pay. Paz, with two other
complainants, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against NTRCI, she amended her Complaint into a
Complaint for payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees as ₱12,000.00 seemed inadequate
for her 29 years of service. NTRCI countered that no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between
NTRCI and its workers. Thus, it computed the retirement pay of its seasonal workers based on Article 287 of
the Labor Code. NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year for that year to be
considered in the retirement pay computation. It claimed that Paz only worked for at least six months in 1995,
1999, and 2000 out of the 29 years she rendered service.
ISSUE
Must Retirement pay be computed pursuant to Art. 287 of the Labor Code?
HELD
YES, the retirement pay must be computed according to Art. 287 of the Labor Code. NTRCI failed to
present a copy of a CBA on the alleged retirement policy, the court will apply Article 287 of the Labor Code
for the proper computation of retirement benefits in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement. While the
present case involves retirement pay and not separation pay, Article 287 of the Labor Code on retirement pay
similarly provides that "a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year." Thus, the
court’s reading of this proviso in the Labor Code in Philippine Tobacco applies in this case. An employee must
have rendered at least six months in a year for said year to be considered in the computation. It is established
from the records that Paz rendered at least six months of service for 1995, 1999, and 2000 only. Based on
these factual findings, retirement pay pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code was correctly computed at
12,487.50 and was awarded to petitioner Paz.
43 of 81
MILAN v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 202961 | February 04, 2015
Claim for Terminal Benefits and Separation Pay
DOCTRINE
An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employee’s return of its
properties.
FACTS
Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc.’s (Solid Mills) employees. They are represented by the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective bargaining agent. As Solid Mills’ employees,
petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by Solid Mills. According
to Solid Mills, this was “out of liberality and for the convenience of its employees and on the condition that
the employees would vacate the premises anytime the Company deems fit.” Petitioners were informed that
Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses. NAFLU recognized Solid Mills’ closure
due to serious business losses in a memorandum of agreement which also provided Solid Mills’ grant of
separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay
to the employees. Later, Solid Mills sent petitioners individual notices to vacate SMI Village. Petitioners were
no longer allowed to report for work. They were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release
and quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay would be
released. Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation
pay. Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation pay,
accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay. They argued that their accrued benefits and separation
pay should not be withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice. Their possession
of Solid Mills property is not an accountability that is subject to clearance procedures. They had already turned
over to Solid Mills their uniforms and equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations. On the other hand, Solid
Mills argued that petitioners’ complaint was premature because they had not vacated its property.
ISSUE
May wages bee withheld pending the settlement of employee's accountabilities.?
HELD
YES. As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. However,
our law supports the employers’ institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages. As an
exception to the general rule that wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished. More
importantly, respondent Solid Mills and NAFLU, the union representing petitioners, agreed that the release of
petitioners’ benefits shall be “less accountabilities.” “Accountability,” in its ordinary sense, means obligation
or debt. The ordinary meaning of the term “accountability” does not limit the definition of accountability to
those incurred in the worksite. As long as the debt or obligation was incurred by virtue of the employer-
employee relationship, generally, it shall be included in the employee’s accountabilities that are subject to
clearance procedures.
44 of 81
GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES V. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210773 | January 1, 2019
Collective Bargaining Agreement between GOCC’s and its employees
DOCTRINE
Officers and employees of non-chartered GOCCs are covered by the Labor Code, and not the Civil
Service Law. However, such corporations are limited by law in negotiating economic terms with their
employees because the law has provided the Compensation and Position Classification System, which applies
to all government-owned or controlled corporations, whether chartered or non-chartered.
FACTS
Private corporation Royal Savings Bank was offered by the Central Bank Governor to reopen and
rehabilitate if it would transfer all its shares of stock to Commercial Bank of Manila, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and if it would drop all its complaints against the Central
Bank for supposed grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting it to do business. After its agreement with
Commercial Bank of Manila on rehabilitation and capital infusion, Royal Savings Bank was renamed
Comsavings Banks. The GSIS transferred its holdings from Commercial Bank of Manila to Boston Bank,
excluding Comsavings Bank. Due to Boston Bank's acquisition of Commercial Bank of Manila, the GSIS took
over the control and management of Comsavings Bank. Upon agreement, GSIS infused additional capital into
Comsavings Bank resulting in GSIS effectively owning 99.55% of Comsavings Bank's outstanding shares of
stocks. Comsavings Bank was then changed to GSIS Family Bank. Subsequently, GOCC Governance Act of
2011 (RA 10149) was signed into law creating the Government Commission for GOCCs and revoking the
authority of GOCCs to enter into negotiations on the economic terms of a CBA with its employees. Later, the
GSIS Union demanded payment of Christmas bonus as provided under their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) and accused the Bank of evading its contractual obligation when it is supposedly not covered by RA
10149 for being a private bank created under the Corporation Code. For the Bank's refusal to negotiate a new
CBA, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari asserting that GSIS Family Bank is a private bank not covered by
RA 10149.
ISSUE
Can GSIS Family Bank, a non-chartered GOCC, negotiate the economic terms of a CBA with its
employees?
HELD
NO, non-chartered GOCCs like GSIS Family Bank lack the authority to enter into any negotiations for
the economic terms of CBAs, as specifically provided under RA 10149 which applies to both chartered and
non-chartered GOCCs as it does not differentiate between such. A GOCC is one (1) established by original
charter or through the general corporation law; (2) being vested with functions relating to public need whether
governmental or proprietary in nature; and (3) directly owned by the government or by its instrumentality, or
where the government owns a majority of the outstanding capital stock. Contrary to petitioner’s contention,
GSIS Family Bank is a GOCC since 99.55% of its outstanding capital stock is owned and controlled by GSIS.
45 of 81
SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.
G.R No. 220383 | October 5, 2016
Unfair Labor Practice; Collective Bargaining Agreement
DOCTRINE
Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement is not demandable.
However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its unfair labor practice against the union members,
this benefit should be granted.
FACTS
The case arose from an unfair labor practice complaint filed by SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union
against its employer, Universal Robina Corporation, Sugar-Division-Southern Negros Development
Corporation. In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO offered,
among other benefits, a l6.00/day wage increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had
to sign a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective Bargaining Agreement] is negotiated
between Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective on
January 1, 2008." Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some members of SONEDCO Workers
Free Labor Union refused to sign. A similar arrangement was done in 2008 wherein it extended an additional
16.00 per day. Several members however, refused again to waive their rights. Consequently, they did not
receive the wage increase which already amounted to 32.00 per day. In October 2016, the SC founded URC
to be guilty of unfair labor practice. The employer restricted the union’s bargaining power when it asked rank-
and-file employees to sign a waiver foregoing the CBA in exchange of wage increases. Nonetheless the SC
denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and ruled that if the Union wished to receive the additional wage
of 2008, the proper recourse is to include it in the 2009 CBA.
ISSUE
Should the P32.00/day wage increase beginning January 1, 2009 be awarded to petitioners?
HELD
YES, the requested wage should be granted. Generally, the CBA controls the relationship between the
parties. However, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the wage increase that was awarded to
employees who signed the waiver. To rule otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All
the consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed.
46 of 81
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. v. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 168406 | January 14, 2015
Illegal Strike; Right to Collective Bargaining
DOCTRINE
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
FACTS
The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired on May 31,
2000. Prior to the expiration of the CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for
negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be
held. Sometime in 2000, the union submitted its formal CBA proposal to the company’s negotiating panel and
repeatedly asked for the start of negotiations. No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons
proffered by the company. In order to compel the company to negotiate, respondents filed a request for
preventive mediation with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Their strategy, however,
failed to bring the management to the negotiating table. The union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on
the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain. On April 22, 2001, the company formally
responded to the demands of the union when it submitted the first part of its economic counterproposal.
Meanwhile, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the Department of Labor and
Employment. In response to the company’s counterproposal, the union sent the company its improved
proposal, but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May
26, 2001 on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock. The company filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers
who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.
ISSUE
Was the strike staged by respondents legal?
HELD
YES. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was filed by the union without attaching the
counterproposal of the company. This, according to petitioners and the labor arbiter, made the ensuing strike
of respondents illegal because the notice of strike of the union was defective. In the instant case, the union
cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counterproposal of the company in
the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counterproposal. To recall, the union filed
a notice of strike after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only after two weeks, when
the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counterproposal. Worse, it took
the company another three weeks to complete the second part of its counterproposal. This was almost a year
after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.
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RE: MEDICAL CONDITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CORNEJO
A.M.NO.16-10-05-SB | March 14, 2017
Permanent Disability Benefits under R.A. No. 910
DOCTRINE:
Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her
employment for involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind retirement
benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities beyond their control.
FACTS
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang sent a letter to the court stating that
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo has been on sick leave since June 13, 2016.
According to the attached clinical abstract from Dr. Santos/Tubig, Justice Cornejo was diagnosed with acute
cerebrovascular disease; controlled hypertension; systemic lupus erythematosus; pancytopenia; colon cancer;
and acute kidney injury secondary to poor oral intake. Based on the reports submitted by the Supreme Court
medical officers and his own physical evaluation of Justice Cornejo, Dr. Prudencio P. Banzon, Jr., Supreme
Court Senior Chief Staff Officer, Medical and Dental Services, opined that as of November 25, 2016, Justice
Cornejo was "physically and medically incapacitated to perform her duties, and responsibilities as
Sandiganbayan Justice. Justice Cornejo wrote Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno to request the approval
of her optional retirement, effective March 1, 2017, due to serious health concerns. She stated that she had
been in government service since August 1977 and has been in the judiciary from January 1987 to the present.
Justice Cornejo will be 66 years, two (2) months, and 16 days old on March 1, 2017. She has been in
government service for more than 39 years, the last 30 years of which she had continuously rendered in the
judiciary
ISSUE
May a retirement for disability of a judge/justice be granted with the benefits covered by R.A. No.
910?
HELD
YES. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended, provides that if the reason for the retirement of
a Sandiganbayan Justice be any permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency in office and prior
to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances
aforementioned: Provided further, that should the retirement under Section 1 (a) hereof be with the attendance
of any partial permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of the
retirement, he/she shall receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she is
entitled to under this Act. WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DECLARE Associate Justice Ma. Cristina J.
Cornejo to have suffered permanent total disability effective March 1, 2017 as requested; and GRANT her the
lump sum permanent disability benefits provided for in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended. The
Fiscal Management and Budget Office is DIRECTED to compute the benefits due to Justice Cornejo under
Republic Act No. 910, to be made available to her or her duly constituted guardian.
48 of 81
IN RE: GRUBA
A.M. No. 14155 | November 19, 2013
Death Gratuity Benefits and Survivorship Pension Benefits under RA 9946
DOCTRINE
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired,
or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to
receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or
Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving
spouse’s death or remarriage.
FACTS
Manuel K. Gruba, a judge of the Court of Tax Appeals, died at the age of 55 while in service. The
cause of his death was natural and was reported as brain stem/midbrain stroke. He died prior to the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9946, which substantially amended the benefits provided in Republic Act No. 910. The
surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for retirement/gratuity benefits
under Republic Act No. 910. The court approved the application filed by Mrs. Gruba. A total of
₱1,486,500.00, representing the five-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba, was paid to his heirs. On
January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946. Republic Act
No. 9946 provided for more benefits. The Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. In a Resolution dated
November 27, 2012, the Court revoked the Resolution dated January 17, 2012 and directed the Court of Tax
Appeals to discontinue the payment of the survivorship pension benefits to Mrs. Gruba. However, the Court
stated that Mrs. Gruba was not required to refund the survivorship pension benefits received pursuant to the
Resolution dated January 17, 2012.
FIRST ISSUE
Are the heirs of Judge Gruba entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under Republic Act
No. 9946?
HELD
YES. The death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 entitle the heirs of a deceased justice or judge to
a five-year lump sum of the salary the justice or judge was receiving during the period of death. The five-year
lump sum is conditioned on the compliance with the service requirement of 20 years. Noncompliance with
the service requirement entitles the heirs only to a two-year lump sum.
SECOND ISSUE
Is Mrs. Gruba entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the same law?
HELD
YES. Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9946. Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship pension benefits if her late husband were eligible
49 of 81
to optionally retire at the time of his death. His late husband would have qualified for the government service
requirements. However, his age at the time of his death did not make him qualified for optional retirement.
TOQUERO v. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 213482 | June 26, 2019
Claim for Disability Benefit of Filipino Seafarers
DOCTRINE
Disability ratings should be adequately established in a conclusive medical assessment by a company-
designated physician. To be conclusive, a medical assessment must be complete and definite to reflect the
seafarer's true condition and give the correct corresponding disability benefits.
FACTS
Toquero was employed by Crossworld Marine Services, Inc. (Crossworld) on behalf of its principal,
Kapal Cyprus, Ltd., as a fitter for vessel MV AS Victoria. While on board the vessel, Toquero was assaulted by
his fellow seafarer, Jamesy Fong. Toquero was later hospitalized in Lome, Togo, Africa, where he was
evaluated by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Tchamba Bambou. The Medical Certificate "noted a large lacerated wound
with a large depression on the left parietal area." Toquero underwent urgent craniectomy, debridement, and
evacuation of hematoma, which left a hole in his skull. Toquero was repatriated to the Philippines. He was
then referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Bacungan, who concluded that his frequent headaches
and dizziness were due to the jarring of the brain. Alarmed by his physical condition, Toquero consulted his
chosen physicians, Dr. Pascual and Dr. Runas. Dr. Pascual assessed that Toquero's physical discomfort was
due to trauma and skull defect. Dr. Runas declared Toquero ``permanently unfit to return to work as a seaman
in any capacity" and diagnosed him with a total and permanent disability. Toquero then asked Crossworld for
his sickness allowance, but this was rejected. Instead, Toquero was declared by the company-designated
physician as fit to go back to work. However, he only learned about this much later, after he had filed a
Complaint against Crossworld for sickness allowance, money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
ISSUE
May the petitioner's injury be compensable and may the company-designated physician's findings be
upheld?
HELD
For a disability to be compensable, it is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease
or injury suffered by the seafarer and his or her work to conclude that the work may have contributed to
establishment or, at least, aggravate any preexisting condition the seafarer might have had. Here, the two (2)
elements of a work-related injury are present. Not only was the petitioner's injury work-related, it was
sustained during the term of his employment contract. His injury, therefore, is compensable. The Court cannot
consider the company-designated physician's finding of petitioner's fitness to work because it is deficient.
Between the company-designated physician's assessment and the findings of the petitioner's chosen physician,
we give more weight to the latter's assessment of permanent and total disability. Disability ratings should be
50 of 81
adequately established in a conclusive medical assessment by a company-designated physician. Tardy,
doubtful, and incomplete medical assessments, even if issued by a company-designated physician, have been
repeatedly set aside by this Court.
MONANA v. MEC GLOBAL SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 196122 | November 12, 2014
Claim for Disability Benefits of Filipino Seafarers
DOCTRINE
In cases of entitle to permanent disability benefits, and there are two opposing medical opinions, the
findings of the company-designated doctor shall be given more credence.
FACTS
Respondent employed Monana as an ordinary seafarer for a six-month duration. Four months after
boarding the ship, he felt dizzy with blurring of vision and body weakness with slurred speech and numbness
of the face. The ship doctor prescribed oral anti-hypertensive medication. He was treated and diagnosed for
stroke. He was repatriated to the Philippines and referred to Dr. Ong-Salvador, the company-designated
physician who informed respondents that his condition is non-work related. Respondents still continued
providing him with medical assistance. He sought a second opinion with Dr. Vicaldo of Phil. Heart Center
where the latter declared that the illness was work-related/-aggravated, and that Monana was unfit to resume
work as a seafarer. He claimed disability and illness allowance. Respondents refused; hence, he filed a
complaint. LA ruled in favor of Monana ordering respondent to pay him his disability benefits. NLRC vacated
the LA’s decision and ordered respondents to grant only financial assistance. CA affirmed the decision of
NLRC.
ISSUE
Is Monana entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?
HELD
NO. The POEA contract governs petitioner's claims for disability benefits. It states that for an illness
to be compensable: (1) it must be work-related and (2) it must have existed during the term of the seafarer's
employment contract. The POEA contract defines "work-related illness" as any sickness resulting to disability
or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the contract with the conditions
set therein satisfied. Petitioner failed to show a causal connection between his illness and his work as Dr. Ong-
Salvador's initial medical report mentioned that Monana had a family history of hypertension and smoked a
pack a day for 30 years. The question of weighing the credibility of two opposing medical opinions involves
a factual review beyond the scope of a petition under Rule 45. As correctly discussed by the CA, "as between
the company-designated doctor who has all the medical records of the petitioner for the duration of his
treatment and as against the latter's private doctor who merely examined him for a day as an outpatient, the
former's finding must prevail." Since the petitioner's illness is not work-related, there is no need to decide
whether it is total or permanent.
51 of 81
MADRIDEJOS v. NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204262 | June 7, 2017
Claim for Disability Benefits of Filipino Seafarers
DOCTRINE
Illnesses not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels are disputably presumed to be work-related. However, seafarers
must prove through substantial evidence the correlation between their illness and the nature of their work for
their claim for disability benefits to prosper.
FACTS
Petitioner Madridejos was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc.
(NYK-FIL), a registered local manning agency operating by virtue of Philippine laws for its foreign principal,
International Cruise Services, Limited. Madridejos signed an employment contract with NYK-FIL as a Demi
Chef for the vessel "Crystal Symphony/Serenity." The employment contract was effective for a period of 10
months with a basic monthly salary of US$1,055.00, an overtime rate of US$4.00 per hour beyond 70 hours,
and vacation leave with pay amounting to 10% of his total income. On April 10, 2010, Madridejos
commenced to work aboard the vessel. Two (2) weeks after, he claimed that he suddenly slipped on a metal
stairway and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal pipe. He was brought to the ship doctor and
was diagnosed to have a "sebaceous cyst to the right of the umbilicus. The next day, Madridejos was treated
at Spire Southampton Hospital in Hampshire, England. Under a local anesthesia, his cyst was removed, and
the lesion was closed with three (3) stitches. After two (2) months, NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos' services
through its foreign principal. Madridejos insisted that he did not finish his employment contract with NYK-FIL
due to his unwanted health condition. Not being at fault for the pre-termination of his employment contract,
he made demands upon NYK-FIL to pay his disability benefits.
ISSUE
May work-related illness be automatically presumed?
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court did not find merit in the petition. For an illness to be compensable, it is not
necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer.
It is enough that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to
lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment, or at the very least,
aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had. Madridejos cannot solely rely on the disputable
presumption for his failure to substantiate his claim that his cyst was either work-related or work-aggravated,
the court cannot grant him relief.
52 of 81
NONAY v. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 206758 | February 17, 2016
Payment of total and permanent disability; proven by substantial evidence
DOCTRINE
For a disputably presumed work-related disease to be compensable, the seafarer or the claimant must
still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the vessel and the illness contracted
or aggravated. Such relation must be proven by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the claim for disability
benefits cannot be granted.
FACTS
Nonay was hired by Bahia Shipping on behalf of Fred Olsen Cruise as a Casino Attendant. In February
2010, Nonay experienced profuse and consistent bleeding and had difficulty in breathing. She went to the
clinic for medication. The next day she experienced a severe headache and again went to the clinic for
medication and was given medication which apparently worsened the headache so she stopped taking the
medicine. Her bleeding intensified and was advised by the ship’s physician to rest but her condition did not
improve. In a clinic in Barbados, it was found out that she had two ovarian cysts so upon her return to the
ship she was tasked to do only light duties. She was repatriated in March 2010 and Bahia referred her to the
company physician. She was placed under the care of an Ob-Gyne who is also a company physician. The
Ob-Gyne diagnosed her with "Abnormal Uterine Bleeding Secondary to an Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma."
so she underwent treatment. Nonay was not declared fit to work by the end of the 120-day period from March
20, 2010, the date of her repatriation,16but she was declared "fit to resume sea duties' ' within the 240-day
period. Thus, she claimed for disability benefits.
ISSUE
Is Nonay entitled to disability benefits even if Adenomyoma is not included in the list of occupational
diseases under the POEA Standard Employment Contract?
HELD
NO. To grant petitioner's claim for disability benefits, the following requisites must be present: (1) he
suffered an illness; (2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with
the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease[s]
or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated
under Section 3 2-A for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be
compensable. Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the
employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a
reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to
conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-
existing condition he might have had. Here, Nonay was unable to present substantial evidence to show the
relation between her work and the illness she contracted. The records are bereft of information whether her
Adenomyoma is pre-existing as a result the court could not determine whether it was aggravated by the nature
of her employment.
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PEREA v. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 206178 | August 9, 2017
Payment of Disability Benefits; POEA Standard Employment Contract
DOCTRINE
For an illness to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and
acquired during the term of the seafarer’s contract in accordance with Section 32-A of the POEA. The physician
who has personal knowledge of a seafarer’s actual medical condition after closely monitoring and regularly
treating that seafarer is more credible than another physician who only saw such seafarer once.
FACTS
Petitioner worked as a seafarer for respondent company. Petitioner complained of chest pains with
palpitations and was required to rest for 3 days, however, he did not feel any better and asked to be repatriated.
A few days later, petitioner was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding exploded,
resulting in injury to his left shoulder and twisted fingers. He was sent to a medical facility in Turkey because
of continued chest paints and was found to be suffering from Cubital Tunnel Syndrome and was required to
rest for 10 days, he was thereafter repatriated to the Philippines. After extensive laboratory examinations, the
company-designated physicians stated that the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined that
petitioner’s estimated length of treatment would be 3 to 4 months. Petitioner consulted a private physician
who diagnosed him with “Uncontrolled Hypertension and Coronary Artery Disease” and found petitioner to
be medically unfit to work as a seafarer. Petitioner filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, among
other things. Thereafter, after a series of examinations, the company-designated physicians certified that
petitioner was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation.
ISSUE
Is the petitioner entitled to disability benefits?
HELD
NO. For an illness to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and
acquired during the term of the seafarer’s contract. This is stated under Section 32-A of the POEA. It is not
disputed that petitioner was treated for injuries and hypertension during the term of his contract. Soon after
his repatriation, petitioner was seen by the company-designated physicians, who monitored petitioner and
subjected him to laboratory exams. There is no reason to distrust the assessment of the company-designated
physicians of petitioner’s condition considering that they were able to monitor petitioner’s condition over a
prolonged period compared to the private physician’s findings who only saw petitioner once and did not even
order any medical tests to be done to support his declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer. The
physician who has personal knowledge of a seafarer’s actual medical condition after closely monitoring and
regularly treating that seafarer is more credible than another physician who only saw such seafarer once. Thus,
petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits.
54 of 81
EBUENGA v. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC.
GR No. 208396 | March 14, 2018
Payment of Disability Benefits; POEA Standard Employment Contract
DOCTRINE
Section 20 (B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) established the procedures for assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates seafarers to see
a company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination, which must be done within 3
working days from their arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to claim disability
benefits.
FACTS
Petitioner worked as a chief cook on board respondent’s vessel. Petitioner asked to be repatriated as
soon as possible to attend to a family problem to which respondents acted favorably on this request. Without
consulting respondent’s designated physician, petitioner had himself checked at St. Luke’s Medical Center
where he underwent an MRI and revealed that he was afflicted with Multilevel Disk Desiccation and was
advised to undergo physical therapy. Petitioner went back to his hometown and underwent physical therapy.
Thereafter, he consulted Dr. Ticman who issued him a Disability Report, finding him to be permanently
disabled and no longer fit to work as a seafarer. Petitioner filed for a complaint for permanent disability
benefits.
ISSUE
Is the petitioner entitled to permanent disability benefits?
HELD
NO. Section 20 (B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) established the procedures for assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates
seafarers to see a company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination, which must be
done within 3 working days from their arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to
claim disability benefits. The conduct of post-employment medical examination is not a unilateral burden on
the part of the seafarer. Rather, it is a reciprocal obligation where the seafarer is obliged to submit an
examination within 3 working days from his or her arrival, and the employer is correspondingly obliged to
conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer. Petitioner’s cause is grossly deficient as he failed
to undergo the requisite examination, thereby creating a situation resulting in the forfeiture of his claims. Thus,
petitioner is not entitled to permanent disability benefits.
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SHARPE SEA PERSONNEL, INC. v. MABUNAY
G.R. No. 206113 | November 06, 2017
Payment of Total and Permanent Disability Benefits
DOCTRINE
The company-designated physicians' failure to arrive at a final and definite assessment of a seafarer's
fitness to work or level of disability within the prescribed periods means that the seafarer shall be deemed to
be totally and permanently disabled.
FACTS
Macario G. Mabunay, Jr. entered into a contract of employment with Sharpe Sea. While working
Mabunay slipped and hit his back. He lost consciousness and when he awoke, his back was numb, and he
had difficulty getting up. That night, Mabunay informed Castro of his accident. However, Castro directed him
to continue with his assigned duties. Despite the persistent pain in his back and numbness in his legs, Mabunay
continued working, until Chief Engineer Manuel De Leon allowed him to have a medical checkup when the
ship docked. Mabunay was brought to a hospital for a medical checkup and he was diagnosed with chest and
spinal column bone damage. He was declared unfit to work. Mabunay was medically repatriated to Manila
and reported to Sharpe Sea's office and was told to report to Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, a company-designated
physician. Mabunay was confined. After it was noted that Mabunay was not responding to physical therapy,
Dr. Cruz recommended that Mabunay undergo a discectomy. Mabunay underwent surgery. Mabunay was
discharged from the hospital and he filed a complaint against Sharpe Sea, Monte Carlo, and Florem for the
payment of his medical expenses, total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. Mabunay sought the
opinion of Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo and Dr. Rommel F. Fernando who diagnosed him with "herniated
disc, C4-C5" and opined that he was unfit to work as a seaman in his present condition.
ISSUE
Should the Grade 8 disability rating of the company designated physician be upheld over the contrary
findings of respondent's private physicians?
HELD
NO. Dr. Cruz only issued an interim disability rating. The court stated that an interim disability grading
is merely an initial prognosis and does not provide sufficient basis for an award of disability benefits. After Dr.
Cruz issued the interim disability, respondent underwent a discectomy where Dr. Cruz's only feedback was
that respondent "tolerated the procedure well." This is not the "definite and conclusive assessment of the
seafarer’s disability or fitness to return to work" required by law from the company-designated physician that
would have the effect of binding the parties. Clearly, Dr. Cruz, Dr. Castillo, or any other company-designated
physician failed to issue respondent either a fit-to-work certification or a final disability rating after his
operation and before the lapse of 240 days from his repatriation. The Court explained that the company-
designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
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ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. v. JARA
G.R. No. 204307 | June 6, 2018
Payment of total and permanent disability benefits
DOCTRINE
Failure of the company-designated physician to render a final and definitive assessment of a seafarer's
condition within the 240-day extended period transforms the seafarer's temporary and total disability to
permanent and total disability.
FACTS
Michael Jara was hired through Orient Hope Agencies and worked as an engine cadet for M/V
Ordchid Sun. On its way to Oman, M/V Orchid Sun sank off Muscat during which Jara sustained leg injuries.
He was treated at Khoula Hospital in Oman and thereafter repatriated and admitted at the Metropolitan
Hospital in Manila. He did not return to the company-designated doctor after his check up on March 17,
2008. The company doctor categorically marked him as “disabled” in the initial medical report with a
suggested disability grading is Grade 11 – stretching leg or ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the
joint. However, the company physician was unable to examine Jara’s fitness to get back to work. Jara filed a
complaint with the Labor Arbiter, insisting that he was entitled to total permanent disability benefits amounting
to US$60,000.00. The Labor Arbiter ordered the company to pay Jara US$7,465.00 for his disability benefits.
The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Insisting that he is entitled to permanent disability benefits
based on the company-designated physician’s grade 11 assessment, Jara elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals which ruled in his favor. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that Jara was "entitled to permanent
disability benefits because the assessment of the company-designated physician that he was suffering from a
grade '11' disability was issued after nine (9) months or more than 120 days from the time he was medically
repatriated."
ISSUE
Is the respondent Jara entitled to permanent and total disability compensation considering that there
was a Grade 11 disability grading given by the company-designated physician?
HELD
YES, Jara is entitled to his permanent disability benefits. The company-designated physician only
made one assessment of Jara's condition - an initial medical assessment stating that his condition is in disability
grade 11. Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1
may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading
from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties
for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is,
under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. That while the seafarer is partially injured or
disabled, he is not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that
he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful
employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.
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PARINGIT, v. GLOBAL GATEWAY CREWING SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 217123 | February 06, 2019
Payment of total and permanent disability benefits
DOCTRINE
It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered
by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee
and his work. It is the shipowners and their representatives who have better resources to ensure that their crew
members are properly nourished, kept adequately fit, and are placed in a situation where they are not put at
any risk greater than what is inherent in their jobs.
FACTS
On June 1, 2010, Paringit entered into a six (6)-month employment contract with Mid-South Ship and
Crew Management, Inc., representing Seaworld Marine Services, S.A. He was employed as Chief Mate of the
Panaman vessel Tsavliris Hellas. Prior to his deployment, Paringit underwent a pre-employment medical
examination, where he disclosed that he had high blood pressure. Still, he was declared fit for duty. When the
vessel docked at Spain, Paringit was rushed to the intensive care unit of Clinica Perpetuo Socorro, where he
underwent blood transfusion. Paringit was discharged from the intensive care unit with a diagnosis of:
"Decompensated cardiac insufficiency. Severe anemia. Renal dysfunction." He was soon medically repatriated
and arrived in Manila. Dr. Quetulio noted that Paringit was a candidate for open heart surgery. The attending
cardiologist opined that he still had to undergo open heart surgery for valve replacement or repair. Dr. Donate-
Tan concluded that with his heart condition, he would need regular medication, further laboratory procedures,
and periodic check-ups with a cardiologist to prevent any aggravation of his illness. She declared him to be
permanently disabled and unfit for duty as a seaman.
ISSUE
Was the Petitioner entitled to disability benefits due to his permanent and total disability?
HELD
YES. Respondent Global Gateway's silence meant that she could neither issue the required disability
assessment within the 120-day period nor extend the period to 240 days to further evaluate and treat the
petitioner. Physical examinations and laboratory examination, the patient suffers from mitral valve prolapse
with severe mitral regurgitation and severe tricuspid regurgitation. Medications will need to be adjusted and
further laboratories be done to prevent progression of signs and symptoms. Lifestyle medication is also advised.
A consultation with his cardiologist is warranted to control further recurrence of symptoms as well as further
deterioration caused by his present condition. He is therefore given permanent disability and declared unfit
for duty in whatever capacity as a seaman. Shipowners who avail of Filipino hands on their decks take on the
obligations of their contracts. Their crew members risk their lives and spend inordinate amounts of time
attending to their businesses. Here, it would have been a measure of good business practice and a show of
justice for respondents to have promptly attended to the people that make their businesses possible.
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ESTEVA v. WILHELMSEN SMITH BELL MANNING, INC.
G.R. No. 225899 | July 10, 2019
Payment of Total and Permanent Disability Benefits; Third doctor referral rule
DOCTRINE
Absent a final, definite disability assessment from a company-designated physician, the mandatory
rule on a third doctor referral will not apply.
FACTS
While Esteva was onboard the vessel, Esteva began to suffer severe back pains. Esteva was diagnosed
by Dr. W. Watson with lumbar disc prolapse and declared Esteva to have a temporary total disability and unfit
for work. Esteva returned to the Philippines and reported to his employer. He was then referred to a hospital,
where his x-ray results revealed that he had osteodegenerative changes in his lumbar spine. The company-
designated physician, Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon issued a Medical Certificate indicating that Esteva was given
medications for Pott's disease. In the Medical Certificate, Esteva's suggested disability grading was Grade 8,
with 2/3 loss of lifting power. In his complaint, Esteva also stated that he consulted with two other doctors
namely, Dr. Maricar P. Reyes-Paguia and Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo, who issued Medical Reports
showing that his condition will no longer allow him to return to his previous occupation as an able-bodied
seaman. Thus, Esteva filed a Complaint for total permanent disability benefits.
FIRST ISSUE
Is the petitioner entitled to total disability benefits?
HELD
YES, Esteva is entitled to total disability benefits. Petitioner failed to signify his intention to resolve the
conflicting assessments of the company-designated physician and his chosen physicians. Clearly, petitioner
failed to comply with the mandatory rule on referral to a third doctor. However, respondents did not furnish
copies of the disability assessment. Absent a final, definite disability assessment from a company-designated
physician, the mandatory rule on a third doctor referral will not apply. Since It was not contested that petitioner
is still incapacitated to perform his usual duties and that his health has not regained normalcy. The petitioner's
failure to refer the assessment to a third doctor is not fatal to his disability claim. Hence, petitioner is entitled
to total and permanent disability benefits.
SECOND ISSUE
Is referral to a third doctor mandatory?
HELD
YES, the court held that despite the wording of the provision in Section 20 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract, the referral of a disputed medical assessment to a third doctor is mandatory as a
consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In
other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor,
unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his
or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. Noncompliance with this
procedure militates against the seafarer's claim, particularly in cases where the company-designated physician
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concluded that there is no permanent total disability. Without the referral to a third doctor, there is no valid
challenge to the company-designated physician's findings. Ultimately, the company-designated physician's
assessment must be upheld.
MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE, INC. v. ATRAJE

G.R. No. 229192 | July 23, 2018
Payment of total and permanent disability benefits; POEA Standard employment Contract; Third Doctor
Rule
DOCTRINE
The third doctor rule does not apply when there is no final and definitive assessment by the company-
designated physicians.
FACTS
On February 11, 2014, Atraje entered into a Contract of Employment with Mol Ship, through its local
manning agent, Magsaysay Mol, to work on board the vessel Carnation Ace as Second Cook. The employment
contract was for nine (9) months with a basic monthly salary of US$599.00. It was his seventh (7th) contract
with the company. Atraje slipped and fell while holding a casserole containing water and sliced vegetables.
His head hit the stainless disposer and the floor. He had a seizure and lost his consciousness for about five (5)
hours. The incident was witnessed by the messman who was with him at that time. When the vessel reached
Singapore on March 8, 2014, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital, where he underwent MRI, EEG,
and CT scan. He was diagnosed to have suffered Epileptic Seizure with post-fit neurological deficit. He was
declared unfit to work and recommended to be repatriated. Atraje completed his 12 sessions of physical
therapy. However, persistence of gait instability and weakness on his left side were still noted. Additionally,
he reported intermittent recurrences of lower back pain. Shiphealth opined that "the current symptoms of
weakness and spasticity of the left upper and lower extremities could be secondary to the [Ossified Posterior
Longitudinal Ligament]." Surgery was contemplated or, as an alternative, physical therapy for an indefinite
period of time.
ISSUE
Should the third doctor rule apply in this case?
HELD
NO. The third doctor-referral provision does not apply because there is no definite disability
assessment from the company-designated physicians. Petitioners were adamant in their position that
respondent's disabling medical conditions are not work-related. The third doctor rule covers only conflicting
medical findings on the fitness to work or degree of disability. It does not cover the determination of whether
the disability is work-related or not. As this Court held in Leonis Navigation Co. v. Obrero: Under the
circumstances of this case, non-referral to a third doctor will not prejudice respondent's claim. The rigorous
process for disability claims prescribed in the POEA SEC seeks a balance between a seafarer's right to receive
a just compensation for his or her injuries116 and an employer's interest to determine the veracity of disability
claims against it. In line with this policy, the third doctor rule was added to enable the parties to expeditiously
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settle disability claims in case of conflict between the findings of the company-designated physicians and the
seafarer's doctor. It was not to be construed to mean that "it is only the company-designated physician who
could assess the condition and declare the disability of seamen." Certainly, it cannot be used by employers to
limit or defeat the legitimate claims of seafarers.
MANANSALA v. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 208314 | August 23, 2017
Payment of Disability Benefits
DOCTRINE
Honest mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from pre-existing illness shown to
be aggravated by their working conditions. However, when a proper knowledge of pre-existing conditions
and intent to deceive an employer are established, compensability is negated.
FACTS
Petitioner served as a “fitter” on board M/V Seaboxer. Before such, Petitioner underwent a Pre-
Employment Medical Examination. Petitioner specifically denied having hypertension and diabetes by
answering “NO” when asked about hypertension and diabetes. He was then declared fit for sea duty. While
on board the vessel, Petitioner suffered a stroke. Petitioner was repatriated and was at a local hospital under
the care of a company designated physician. While under the care of the doctor, Petitioner repeatedly denied
that he had any past history of diabetes and hypertension. Petitioner then filed for total and permanent
disability benefits. Dr. San Luis, Petitioner’s own doctor issued a medical opinion stating that ‘the patient
should be permanently disabled because of the inherent risk of his work as a seaman that will predispose of
him to repeated stroke and other cardiovascular, hyperlipidemia and stroke, he is considered a high risk of
developing another stroke”. The same opinion indicated that Petitioner admitted to having had a long history
of hypertension and diabetes, and he was regularly taking ‘Enalapril’ and ‘Metformin’, which are medicines
to treat these illnesses.
ISSUE
Should the Petitioner be awarded with the total and permanent disability benefits?
HELD
NO. The POEA-SEC, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration – Standard Employment
Contract, bars the compensability of disability arising from pre-existing illness when attended by an
employee’s fraudulent misrepresentation. Sec. 20 (E) of the POEA-SEC provides that a seafarer who knowingly
conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the pre-employment medical
examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and
benefits. Fraudulent misrepresentation means that such falsity must be coupled with the intent to deceive and
to profit from that deception. In the case at bar, Petitioner was recorded to have answered ‘No’ when asked
whether he has ever suffered from or has been told to have hypertension and diabetes, and again denied
having history of hypertension and diabetes while under the care of Dr. Barrairo, the company-designated
physician. However, in the medical opinion issued by Dr. San Luis, Petitioner’s doctor, Petitioner was
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indicated to not only having admitted that he had past history of hypertension and diabetes, but also that he
was regularly taking Enalapril and Metforming which are used to treat hypertension and diabetes. Hence,
Petitioner is not entitled to the total and permanent disability benefits.
GRIEG PHILIPPINES, INC. v. GONZALES

G.R. No. 228296 | July 26, 2017
Payment of Disability Benefits
DOCTRINE
For a disability claim to prosper, a seaman only needs to show that his work and contracted illness
have a reasonable linkage that must lead a rational mind to conclude that the seaman's occupation may have
contributed or aggravated the disease.
FACTS
Gonzales was first hired by Grieg, a shipping agent. On his third contract with Grieg, while aboard
Star Florida, Gonzales was advised to take paracetamol and to rest after he experienced shortness of breath,
pain in his left leg, fatigue, fever and headaches. The following month, his past symptoms returned with the
added symptom of black tarry stools. Gonzales was confined in a hospital where he was initially diagnosed
with "pancytopenia suspect aplastic anemia." Gonzales was declared unfit for sea duty and was repatriated.
Gonzales was admitted at the Metropolitan Medical Center after his medical repatriation. The company
physicians diagnosed him with acute promyelocytic leukemia. Grieg had discontinued his treatment.
Gonzales sought a second opinion from an independent physician, who certified that his leukemia was work-
related. After his disability claims were refused, Gonzales filed a complaint against Grieg before the Labor
Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found that Gonzales' leukemia was work-related and that it had permanently
incapacitated him to work as a seafarer and Grieg to pay the permanent total disability compensation under
the CBA. Grieg appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission. The
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's ruling.
ISSUE
Did the Public Respondent Commission commit grave abuse of discretion when it relied upon the
mere allegations of the private respondent that his condition is work-related?
HELD
NO. Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the
employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a
reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to
conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-
existing condition he might have had. Gonzales was able to satisfy the conditions under Section 32-A and
establish a reasonable linkage between his job as an Ordinary Seaman and his leukemia. The labor tribunals
found sufficient evidence to support Gonzales' claim of work-related illness. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that Grieg failed to dispute this claim.
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DAYO v. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION
G.R. No. 210660 | January 21, 2015
Claim for Death Benefits
DOCTRINE
For an Illness to be compensable, there must be a reasonable linkage between the desease suffered
by the employee and his work. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only
reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer.
FACTS
Eduardo P. Dayo (Eduardo) was hired by Status Maritime Corporation for and on behalf of Nafto Trade
Shipping Commercial S.A. He was hired as a bosun on board the “MV Naftocement 1” for a period of 10
months, with a monthly salary of US$500.00. Prior to embarkation, he underwent a pre-employment medical
examination and was declared fit to work. Eduardo embarked on June 8, 2008. On September 5, 2008, he
“experienced severe pain on his hips and both knees, and total body weakness.” He was given medical
attention in Bridgetown, Barbados, where he was diagnosed with hypertension. He was repatriated on
September 7, 2008. Eduardo repeatedly requested for medical assistance, but it was only in November 2008
when he was referred to a company-designated physician. Dr. Bolanos of the Metropolitan Hospital
diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus. Status Maritime Corporation stopped giving Eduardo medical assistance
in February 2009. He died on June 11, 2009 due to cardiopulmonary arrest. Flor G. Dayo (Flor), Eduardo’s
wife, requested for death benefits to no avail. Thus, she filed a complaint.
ISSUE
Did Eduardo Dayo die from a work-related illness?
HELD
NO. The Court of Appeals cited GSIS v. Valenciano where the court held that “diabetes mellitus is
not an occupational disease. The Court of Appeals also cited Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Amended Standard Terms and Conditions that does not list diabetes mellitus as
an occupational disease. Eduardo died after the term of his contract with Status Maritime Corporation. It was
clear then that his beneficiaries were not entitled to death benefits. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that
Flor failed to substantiate her allegation that Eduardo’s illness and cause of death were work-related.
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BARSOLO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 187950 | January 11, 2017
Claim for Death Benefits
DOCTRINE
For a claim for myocardial infarction as a compensable occupational disease to prosper, there must
be substantial evidence to prove any of the following conditions:
• If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
• The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship;
and
• If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and
signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
FACTS
Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was employed as a
seaman by various companies from 1988 to 2002." From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel served
as a Riding Gang/Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was
his last employer before he died in 2006. After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was
diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was
examined and treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to October 22, 2004.
When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death.
Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security System.
ISSUE
Is Cristina entitled to compensation for the death of her husband Manuel?
HELD
NO. Petitioner's claim for death benefits was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
offered no proof that her husband suffered any of the symptoms during his employment. The Medical
Certificate did not help petitioner's cause, as this only shows that Manuel was already suffering from
hypertension even before his pre-employment examination, and that he did not contract it during his
employment with Vela. Petitioner failed to adduce any proof that her husband experienced any symptom of
a heart ailment while employed with Vela, much less any sign that his heart condition was aggravated by his
job. Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during the
performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's employment caused the
disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment.
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MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. ET AL. v. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 203943 | August 30, 2017
Death Benefits; Compromise agreement
DOCTRINE
A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a compromise agreement and a
judgment on the merits of the case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties. The “conditional”
settlement of the judgment award may operate as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and
academic.
FACTS
Petitioner Cynthia De Jesus is the wife of Bernandine De Jesus, a seafarer who worked as an
Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess. After 10 months onboard, Bernandine’s contract
ended. However, only after two months thereafter, he died of a cardiac arrest. Bernardine's widow, filed a
complaint against Magsaysay Maritime, her husband’s local manning agency, for "payment of death benefits,
medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney's fees." The two parties were unable to amicably
settle the case. The Labor Arbiter granted Cynthia's complaint and directed Magsaysay to pay her claims for
death benefits, additional benefits, burial expenses, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled that it was
highly improbable that Bernardine developed a cardio-vascular disease which would lead to his death merely
two (2) months after his repatriation. The Labor Arbiter held that Cynthia sufficiently established that her
husband suffered chest pains while he was still aboard the Regal Princess and despite reporting the same, no
medical attention was given by the employer. Magsaysay filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. On June 30, 2011, Magsaysay paid Cynthia P3,370,514.40 as conditional satisfaction of the
judgment award against it and without prejudice to its Petition for Certiorari pending before the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, the petition for certiorari was dismissed for being moot and academic.
ISSUE
Has the payment of money judgment rendered the petition for certorari moot and academic?
HELD
YES. In the instant case, the parties entered into a compromise agreement when they executed a
Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award. As decided by the Court in Career Philippines v. Madju, a
"Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment," the Court is valid, hence, the "conditional" settlement of the judgment
award insofar as it operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and academic. While the
general rule is that a valid compromise agreement has the power to render a pending case moot and academic,
being a contract, the parties may opt to modify the legal effects of their compromise agreement to prevent the
pending case from becoming moot. Likewise, respondent was prohibited from seeking further redress against
petitioners, making the compromise agreement ultimately prejudicial to respondent. This prohibition on the
part of respondent to pursue any of the available legal remedies should the Court of Appeals or this Court
reverse the judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action in another country puts
the seafarer's beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage.
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AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPOUSES DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 192026 | October 1, 2014
Agrarian Relations; Agricultural Tenancy Relationship
DOCTRINE
The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following: "(1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee." There must be substantial evidence on
the presence of all these requisites; otherwise, there is no de jure tenant.
FACTS
Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna which was
unoccupied when it was purchased by Automat in 1990. Ofelia volunteered her services as caretaker which
Automat agreed on the condition that the caretaker would voluntarily vacate the premises upon its demand.
Respondents’ stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants who cultivated the land and shared the produce
with Automat. In 2000, Automat asked respondents to vacate the premises. Respondents refused unless they
were paid compensation as they claimed they were agricultural tenants who enjoyed security of tenure under
the law. Automat recovered possession of the property. Hence, in October 2000, respondents filed a petition
for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for PMI and or TRO against Automat before PARAD
Laguna. PARAD dismissed it as no agricultural tenancy was established. DARAB reversed PARAD and
declared respondents as de jure tenants protected by security of tenure. CA affirmed the DARAB. Meanwhile,
DAR issued two orders, exempting the property from coverage of the CARP.
ISSUE
Does agricultural tenancy relationship exist between Automat and respondent spouses?
HELD
NO. The first two elements of the tenancy relationship are absent in this case. A MARO certification
is limited to factual determinations, hence, cannot bind the judiciary. The land in dispute is not an agricultural
land. The exemption orders clearly provide that the lands were reclassified to non-agricultural prior to the
effectivity of CARL. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. It must be proven by evidence. Automat is
considered to have consented to a civil lease under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. Petitioners' acceptance of
rental payments may be considered as ratification of an unwritten lease agreement whose period depends on
their agreed frequency of rental payments. DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the CARP and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. The DAR exemption orders have determined
with certainty that the lands were re-classified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, hence, DARAB has
no jurisdiction.
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CRISOSTOMO v. VICTORIA
G.R. No. 175098 | August 26, 2015
Agrarian Relations; Agricultural Tenancy Relations
DOCTRINE
The core element in the existence of tenancy relationship is consent. All the requisites to determine
the existence of tenancy relationship must be demonstrated by substantial evidence; otherwise, the person
claiming to be a tenant is not entitled to security of tenure.
FACTS
In a Complaint for Ejectment filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Bulacan, Crisostomo alleged that he, along with his deceased brother Jose Crisostomo, were the registered
owners of a parcel of iceland which was was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. He and his brother
allegedly entered into a lease contract with Hipolito over a portion of the iceland. The contract was supposedly
in effect until Hipolito’s death. As Hipolito died without any known heirs, Crisostomo was set to reclaim
possession and to take over cultivation of the disputed portion. However, Victoria entered the disputed portion
and began cultivating it without the knowledge and consent of Crisostomo. Crisostomo confronted Victoria,
who insisted that he had tenancy rights over the disputed portion. In his Answer, Victoria claimed that Hipolito
was his uncle. He alleged that even during the lifetime of Hipolito, it was he who was doing farmwork on the
disputed portion and that he did so with Crisostomo’s knowledge. He added that from the time Hipolito
became bedridden, it was he who performed all duties pertaining to tenancy. He asserted that Crisostomo’s
act of receiving lease rentals from him amounted to implied consent, which gave rise to a tenancy relationship
between them.
ISSUE
Is Victoria a bona fide tenant of the disputed portion?
HELD
NO, Martin P. Victoria is not a bona fide tenant of the disputed portion. There is nothing in this case
to indicate that Hipolito exercised rights and prerogatives that accrue to the landowner. Hipolito, as lessee,
was entitled to possession of the disputed portion, and legally so. He was, in this sense, a "legal possessor."
However, his capacities ended here. There was nothing that authorized him to enter into a tenancy relation
with another. Even if Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code were to be interpreted loosely, petitioner
as the landowner never consented to making respondent a tenant. The court has settled the requisites for
tenancy, the core of which is the element of consent. All these requisites must be demonstrated by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the person claiming to be a tenant is not entitled to security of tenure. To hold that
respondent is the bona fide tenant of the disputed portion would be to extend the petitioner's dispossession
for a period much longer that he had originally contemplated. It puts him at the mercy of a person whom he
recognized as a tenant.
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HEIRS OF SALAS v. CABUNGCAL
G.R. No. 191545 | March 29, 2017
Land Coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
DOCTRINE
HLURB’s Rules and Regulations Implementing Farmlot Subdivision Plan categorizes a farmlot
subdivision as different from agricultural land as it is without the intended qualities of an agricultural land and
is never intended to be exclusively used for cultivation, livestock production and agro-forestry.
FACTS
Augusto Salas, Jr. is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land consisting of 148.4354
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2807. The properties are located in Barangays
Pusil, Inosluban, Marawoy and Balintawak, Lipa City, Batangas. In May 1987, Salas entered into an Owner-
Contractor Agreement with Laperal Realty Corporation for the development, subdivision and sale of the
property. On November 17, 1987, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued Development
Permit No. 7-0370 allowing Salas and Laperal Realty to develop the property and subdivide it into a farm lot
subdivision consisting of 80 saleable lots. The property was further subdivided into smaller lots for which new
TCTs were issued in the name of Salas. Petitioners filed a motion for issuance of temporary restraining order
(TRO) claiming that "the majority, if not all of the respondents, have clandestinely entered or are about to enter
into transactions for the conveyance of the 17 parcels of land.
ISSUE
Whether or not the grant of temporary restraining order is proper
HELD
The Court therefore finds that it is to the public interest to maintain the conditions prevailing before
the filing of this case. Posting of a bond by petitioners shall answer for any damages which may be sustained
by respondents as a consequence of the issuance of a TRO if the Court finally decides that petitioners are not
entitled to it.
The motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order is GRANTED upon posting by the petitioners
of a bond in the amount of ₱2 Million. Respondents are enjoined from entering into transactions resulting in
the conveyance of any part of the properties subject of this case. The parties in this case are directed to
maintain the status quo and to refrain from all actions which may affect the ownership or present possession
of the contested properties until further orders of the Court.
68 of 81
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCO
G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019
Determination of Just Compensation for Agricultural Land
DOCTRINE
Any deviation to the basic formula made in the exercise of judicial discretion must be “supported by
a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. A computation by a court made in “utter and
blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by the implementing rule amounts to grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS
Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco (the Francos) were the registered owners of parcels of
agricultural land in Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles. The Francos
offered the parcels of land for sale to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the Voluntary Offer to Sell of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in 1995. During the summary proceedings, the Francos did not
agree with the initial valuation. Still dissatisfied with the amount, the Francos filed before the Regional Trial
Court, sitting as the Special Agrarian Court, a Complaint for the determination of just compensation.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Special Agrarian Court's valuation of just compensation
using a variation of the basic general formula provided for in Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 5?
HELD
YES. The special agrarian court sitting in a condemnation action may adopt the value computed using
the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In its exercise of original jurisdiction, the
special agrarian court may deviate from the formulas if it can show that the value is not equivalent to the fair
market value at the time of the taking. However, an allegation is not enough. The landowner must allege and
prove why the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform does not suffice.
Here, the Special Agrarian Court found that a slight deviation was in order. It held that there were
other factors present that must also be taken into account, deeming petitioner's valuation to be "unrealistically
low'' and therefore is not the just compensation of the subject lot. On the other hand, the valuation of the
petitioners is likewise cumbersomely high for the government and the farmer-beneficiaries considering that
the valuation of P300,000.00 per hectare they initially asked in 1998 were based only on assumptions of facts
unsupported by credible evidence. Thus, the Court in the exercise of its judicial prerogatives, must consider
the needs of both parties and should be guided by several factors in order to arrive at a just compensation
which is fair, reasonable and acceptable to the parties.
The Special Agrarian Court's computation of just compensation resulted in a "double take up" of the
market value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already been considered in
Palmares as a departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative guidelines.
69 of 81
POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. INSON
G.R. No. 189162 | January 30, 2019
Administrative Disputes under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
DOCTRINE
Identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Hence, when seeking to contest the selection of beneficiaries, a party should avail of the
administrative remedies under the Department of Agrarian Reform, not under the Adjudication Board.
FACTS
Sometime in 2003, a portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo
Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. A Notice of Coverage was sent on May 23, 2003 to Polo Coconut President Rene Espina.
After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the Department of Agrarian
Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation. Regional
Adjudicator Atty. Arnold C. Arrieta affirmed the valuation offered by Land Bank of the Philippines and Polo
Coconut's title was cancelled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Polo Coconut filed before the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its property to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. It contended that the City of Tanjay had already reclassified the area into a mixed
residential, commercial, and industrial land. It also assailed the eligibility of the identified agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
ISSUE
WON respondent Regional Director Rodolfo T. Inson's cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of
farmer beneficiaries constitute defiance of the court’s decision.
HELD
NO. Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law authorizes the Department of Agrarian
Reform, in coordination with the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, to plan and program the acquisition
and distribution of all agricultural lands in accordance with the order of priority under the law. Inherent in this
function is the Department of Agrarian Reform's power to identify the landholdings within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and to identify, screen, and select agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The Department of Agrarian Reform is further tasked to make support and coordinative services available to
farmer-beneficiaries and affected landowners.
70 of 81
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. HEIRS OF ABUCAY
G.R. No. 186432 & 186964 | March 12, 2019
Implementation of Agrarian law; Jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform
DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction over the administrative implementation of agrarian laws exclusively belongs to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. This is true even if the dispute involves the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents and certificates of title, which, before Republic Act No. 9700 amended Republic Act
No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board.
FACTS
Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay owned a 182-hectare parcel of land located in Leyte and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9814. The Deed of Absolute Sale provided that the property
"consists of various classifications, and is untenanted except for 39.459 hectares, and per certification of the
Agrarian Reform Team No. 08-28-231 appears to be within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer as to the
tenanted area of over 39 hectares.” Sometime in 1986, 22.8409 hectares of the lot were declared covered
under the Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Emancipation patents
were then issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. Later, the Register of Deeds issued original certificates of title in
their names. However, in 2002, the Heirs of Abucay filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator a
Complaint for the proper determination of just compensation. The Regional Adjudicator ruled in their favor
and canceled the original certificates of title. Emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries were
also voided. Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board reversed the Regional
Adjudicator’s decision and declared itself wanting of jurisdiction over the appeal. It found that the nature of
the action filed by the Heirs of Spouses Abucay was an Operation Land Transfer protest, an agrarian law
implementation case under the primary jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform and the consequent appeal, to the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.
ISSUE
Does Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board have jurisdiction over the complaint for cancellation of original certificates of title and emancipation
patents?
HELD
NO. The jurisdiction over cancellation of registered emancipation patents no longer belongs to the
DARAB. In 2009, Congress amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law through Republic Act No.
9700. Under the new Section 24, all cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents,
certificates of land ownership awards, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. He or she takes
jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of titles issued under any agrarian reform program, whether
registered with the Land Registration Authority or not.
71 of 81
LIMLINGAN v. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 220481 | February 17, 2016
Payment of Health Insurance Premiums; Attorney’s Fees
DOCTRINE
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction shall apply.
FACTS
A complaint for illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, deprivation of medical benefits, life
insurance and other benefits was filed by Victor S. Limlingan and Emmanuel A. Leyca against Asian Institute
of Management. The LA declared that Limlingan and Leyco's suspension was illegal and ordered AIM to pay
the salaries and benefits. Such decision was later on modified by the NLRC finding Limlingan and Leyco’s
suspension is valid for six (6) months only. Both parties appealed the NLRC's Resolution to the CA through
certiorari. The CA further modified the NLRC’s resolution finding that the penalty of suspension is deleted and
instead, the penalty of formal reprimand is imposed on petitioners. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court
resolved to deny the petition for review on certiorari for failure to show that a reversible error because
petitioners failed to convince the court that no valid and compelling reasons existed which excused the belated
filing of respondents' appeal. Limlingan and Leyco filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and a
Motion for Re-computation of Monetary Award before the NLRC. The NLRC allowed in Limlingan and Leyco's
computation their (a) salaries during the period of suspension; and (b) book/medical allowance.32 However,
the Commission reduced the amounts awarded by the Labor Arbiter. For the second time, the parties come
before the Supreme Court, asking that we resolve the remaining issues in this case.
ISSUE
Whether they are entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of the
Court of Appeals' May 4, 2010 Decision (or on July 25, 2011) up to June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the award.
HELD
The legal interest imposed is but a consequence of AIM's participation in prolonging the proceedings
between the parties. The amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased as a consequence that it
cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter's decision.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become
final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying
the rate of interest fixed therein.
72 of 81
PASCUAL v. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE
G.R. No. 172980 | July 22, 2015
Intra-cooperative Dispute; Jurisdiction of Regular Courts
DOCTRINE
An intra-cooperative dispute between two officers on one hand and the Board of Directors on the
other falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not of the Labor Arbiter.
FACTS
Petitioners Pascual and Terencio were appointed by the former Board of Directors of Caniogan Credit
and Development Cooperative (CCDC) to act as the cooperative's General Manager and Collection Manager,
respectively, from start of operations until they reach the compulsory age of retirement of 65. Despite their
retirement on January 9, 1997 and on March 2003, Pascual continued to serve as General Manager and
Terencio as Collection Manager of CCDC. The Board of Directors of CCDC passed a Resolution terminating
Pascual's and Terencio's services and declaring that they should serve only until September 30, 2005 and
October 15, 2005, respectively. Despite the lapse of these periods, Pascual and Terencio refused to vacate
their positions. CCDC and Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr., the newly appointed General Manager, filed a Complaint
for Injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Finding that the case involves a dispute between the
Board of Directors and officers of CCDC, the Regional Trial Court referred the case and all its records to the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for re-raffle to branches specifically assigned to hear and
decide intra-corporate disputes. Allegedly without notice to Pascual and Terencio, the case was re-raffled to
Branch 79, and an order was issued in open court during the hearing to the effect that pending incidents were
deemed submitted for resolution. However, Branch 79 issued another Order returning the case to Branch 12.
It reasoned that the case is not an intra-corporate dispute but an intra-cooperative one.
ISSUE
Which has jurisdiction over the ccase?
HELD
RTC, the case is not one of illegal dismissal which is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC
or the Labor Arbiter. The case involves an intra-cooperative dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. There is evidently no employment relationship between the parties. In Tabang v. NLRC the
court held that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors
or stockholders. Here, petitioners were officers of respondent CCDC. They were appointed directly by the
former Board of Directors according to the by-laws of respondent CCDC, and their salaries were likewise set
by the same Board. Petitioners do not refute this fact. Their termination or removal is clearly an intra-
cooperative matter. It involves a dispute within the cooperative between two officers on one hand and the
Board of Directors on the other.
73 of 81
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CHUA
G.R. No. 187491 | July 8, 2015
Estoppel; Appeal in Labor Cases
DOCTRINE
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The principle of estoppel applies with equal force to quasi-judicial agencies as it does to courts.
FACTS
Respondent Lilia S. Chua was dismissed by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co. due to a finding that
she engaged in multiple kiting transactions which was a serious violation of Far East Bank's Code of Conduct.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. This was reversed by the National Labor Relations
Commission. Chua participated in the appeal proceedings before the NLRC. The Court of Appeals reversed
the NLRC’s ruling, stating that Far East Bank’s appeal before the NLRC was not perfected. Specifically, Chua
claimed that the NLRC should not have entertained Far East Bank’s appeal because it "directly filed its appeal
with NLRC contrary to the requirements of Rule VI, Section 3 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC."
Petitioner argues that in accepting the appeal memorandum which petitioner directly filed with it, the NLRC
was guided by its own policy that, in line with the jurisprudence set by the Supreme Court, technicalities in
labor cases must yield to substantial justice. Lastly, petitioner faults respondent on the ground of estoppel
arguing that it could not belatedly repudiate the adverse decision by only then invoking the issue of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Did the NLRC act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the directly filed unperfected appeal of respondents?
HELD
NO. Not only did the NLRC acquiesce to the direct filing of an appeal before it, so did respondents.
The matter of the propriety of the NLRC’s assumption of jurisdiction was never raised by respondent before
the Commission. In a long line of cases, the court has held that although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be
barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court
over a particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape liability. The rationale that animates the rule on estoppel vis-à-vis jurisdiction applies
with equal force to quasi-judicial agencies as it does to courts.
74 of 81
CEPRADO v. NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 175198 | September 23, 2015
Appeal; Motion for Reconsideration
DOCTRINE
Appeal is a purely statutory privilege that "may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law." If an appellate court or tribunal takes cognizance of an appeal that does not
comply with the rules, the appellate court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction. The decision on the appeal is
null and void.
FACTS
Nationwide Security is a security agency with Romeo T. Nolasco as its president and general manager.
It provided security guard services to Uniden Philippines. On November 16, 2000, the Office of the Regional
Director of the DOLE – Region IV (Regional Office) conducted a regular inspection of Uniden’s Cabuyao plant.
In the Notice of Inspection Results, the following violations of labor standards laws allegedly committed
against the security personnel stationed at Uniden were noted: 1) Record keeping – employment records such
as payrolls and daily time records of guards were kept and maintained at their main office; 2) Underpayment
of wages and salary[-]related benefits; 3) No [Department of Labor and Employment] registration per
[Department Order] No. 10; 4) No organized safety committee/no safety committee reports; 5) No annual
medical report; 6) No annual work accident/illness exposure data report; and 7) Non-submission of list of
labor component. Regional Director Martinez directed Nationwide Security and Uniden to solidarity pay 40
security personnel the aggregate amount of P1,600,134.40 representing wage differentials and other salary-
related benefits, with each security personnel receiving P40,003.36.
ISSUE
Are the Department of Labor and Employment’s Orders in this case void?
HELD
YES. The Rules of Court is suppletory in labor standards cases, requiring a written notice of every
motion for reconsideration to be served on the adverse party as compliance with the requirement of due
process. Petitioners violated the requirements of due process and never denied that they failed to furnish
respondents a copy of their Letter-Appeal to the Secretary of Labor. Their appeal did not strictly comply with
the rules on appeal as provided in the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional
Offices. Appeal is a purely statutory privilege that "may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law." If an appellate court or tribunal takes cognizance of an appeal that does not
comply with the rules, the appellate court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction. The decision on the appeal is
null and void. In this case, the law consists of rules issued under the quasi-legislative power delegated by the
legislative branch to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
75 of 81
METRO BOTTLED WATER CORPORATION v. ANDRADA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, INC.
G.R. No. 202430 | March 6, 2019
Appeal; Arbitral Awards by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
DOCTRINE
The Arbitral awards by CIAC may only be appealed on pure questions of law, though not all will
justify an appeal. Consistent with the strict standards for judicial review of arbitral awards, only those appeals
which involve egregious errors of law may be entertained. Given its technical expertise, the CIAC is given a
wide latitude of discretion so that it may resolve all issues before it in a fair and expeditious manner. Included
within the bounds of its discretion are situations where it resolves, on the basis of equity, to order a party to
compensate a contractor for any unpaid work done.
FACTS
Metro Bottled Water and Andrada Construction entered into a Construction Agreement for the
construction of a reinforced concrete manufacturing plant. The Construction Agreement covered all materials,
labor, equipment, and tools, including any other works required. The project was to be completed within 150
calendar days or by October 10, 1995, to be reckoned from Andrada Construction’s posting of a Performance
Bond to answer for liquidated damages, costs to complete the project, and third-party claims. On May 10,
1995, Metro Bottled Water extended the period of completion to November 30, 1995 upon Andrada
Construction’s request, due to the movement of one bay of the plant building, weather conditions, and change
orders. On November 14, 1995, Metro Bottled Water filed a claim against the Performance Bond. Andrada
Construction sent letters to Metro Bottled Water requesting for payment of unpaid work accomplishments.
Metro Bottled Water refused to pay. Andrada Construction filed a Request for Arbitration before the CIAC,
alleging that Metro Bottled Water refused to pay its unpaid work accomplishment. In its Answer, Metro Bottled
Water denied the allegations and counterclaimed for cost to complete and correct the project. Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission found that Andrada Construction was entitled to unpaid work
accomplishment with legal interest. It, however, denied Metro Bottled Water’s counterclaims Metro Bottled
Water filed before the CA a Petition for Review assailing the Arbitral Award. The CA dismissed the Petition for
lack of merit and upheld the factual findings of the CIAC.
ISSUE
Did the CIAC and the CA err in finding that Metro Bottled Water Corporation was liable to Andrada
Corporation, Inc. for unpaid work accomplishment?
HELD
NO. The CIAC cannot be faulted for applying the equitable principle of unjust enrichment in
determining petitioner's liability to respondent. CIAC's primary function which is to adjudicate claims and/or
determine rights in accordance with procedures set forth in and the general rule is that appeals of arbitral
awards by the CIAC may only be allowed on pure questions of law.
76 of 81
CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION v. MORALDE
G.R. Nos. 211077 & 211318 | August 15, 2018
Reinstatement of Position
DOCTRINE
Public officers and employees who actively petition for retirement or separation benefits willfully
affirm their separation from service. They are bound by their own voluntary departure. Absent any indication
that their choice was vitiated by confounding predicaments, like desperate financial need, they cannot renege
on their self-imposed state, and later importune the government to reinstate them to the position they readily
relinquished and to pay them backwages in the intervening period.
FACTS
Moralde, as a Dental Aide in the Province’s Provincial Health Office, was charged with falsifying
his Daily Time Records for March and April 1998, as alleged by the Province. During the pendency of
administrative complaint filed against Moralde, the latter proceeded to GSIS and filed his application for
retirement which was latter on approved. Moralde was the dismissed after the provincial governor found him
guilty of Falsification of Public Documents and dismissing him from service. Moralde then filed an appeal to
the Civil Service Commission on the ground of violation of due process, which was granted issuing a resolution
for his reinstatement. Years after, the Province discovered that Moralde did not disclose the fact of his
successful retirement prompting the province to file a Motion New trial and/or Modification of Judgment. The
Civil Service Commission denied the motion; however, it issued a resolution finding the reinstatement of
Moralda to be moot and academic.
ISSUE
Can Moralde be reinstated?
HELD
NO. Moralde was estopped from demanding reinstatement when he went to GSIS and successfully
applied for retirement benefits under RA 8291. Any such reinstatement strains the bounds of logic and tramples
on common sense. Moralde was not forced out, he left of his own accord and did so in order to escape an
impending liability. With his prior willful departure, there was not even a dismissal, let alone an illegal one,
to speak of. With his own cessation of employment, there was no longer an issue for the Civil Service
Commission to resolve on appeal. It has been almost 20 years since Moralde filed his appeal on November
24, 1998. All these years, Moralde has taken the Civil Service Commission on a ride to nowhere, asking that
he be restored to what he himself abandoned. Public officers and employees cannot forestall a finding of
liability by opting out of employment. It is doubly worse when they reap financial benefits through severance
packages upon opting out of employment. Public service is a public trust, and to hold a government position,
no matter the rank, is a privilege, not a right.
77 of 81
YANGSON v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. 200170 | June 3, 2019
Reassignment of position; Reassignment vs Transfer
DOCTRINES
Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-
specific may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service. Constructive dismissal occurs
whether or not there is diminution in rank, status, or salary if the employee's environment has rendered it
impossible for him or her to stay in his or her work. It may be due to the agency head's unreasonable,
humiliating, or demeaning actuations, hardship because geographic location, financial dislocation, or
performance of other duties and responsibilities inconsistent with those attached to the position. Demotion
and constructive dismissal are never presumed and must be sufficiently proven.
FACTS
Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson) was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School (Surigao
National). Yangson was reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School
(Toledo Memorial). Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum without first consulting her counsel. Two (2)
days prior to the effectivity of her reassignment, Yangson filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against Rosas and Dulcesima Corvera
(Corvera), who was supposed to replace Yangson as the new principal of Surigao National. Yangson alleged
that the Memorandum violated Department of Education Circular No. 02, series of 2005, because it failed to
specify the duration of her reassignment and because it was issued without her prior consultation. The Regional
Trial Court denied Yangson's prayer for preliminary injunction. It held that Yangson did not have a vested
right over her position at Surigao National because her appointment as Principal III was not station-specific. It
also held that the reassignments were in good faith and within Rosas' authority.
ISSUE
Is the reassignment was valid?
HELD
YES. Petitioner’s reassignment is valid. Petitioner’s appointment is not station-specific. An
appointment is station-specific if the employee's appointment paper specifically indicates on its face the
particular office or station the position is located. Petitioner's reassignment did not violate her right to security
of tenure. It has been established that petitioner's appointment is not station-specific. While she is entitled to
her right to security of tenure, she cannot assert her right to stay at Surigao National. Demotion and
constructive dismissal are never presumed and must be sufficiently proven. Again, petitioner failed to rebut
this reasonable presumption. She retains the same rank, status, and salary, and is expected to exercise the
same duties and responsibilities. There is no movement from a higher position to a lower position.
78 of 81
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. AQUINO
G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
Validity of SSS Hike; Judicial Review
DOCTRINE
There is an actual case or controversy if there is a “conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claim
susceptible of judicial resolution.” A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must establish that there is a
legally demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial
controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties and admitting of
specific relief that courts can grant.
FACTS
The Social Security System, through President and Chief Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr.,
issued Circular No. 2013-010, which provided the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect
in January 2014. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in
contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63%
(from 3.33%). On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the assailed issuances. Petitioners then argue that the increase in contributions is
an invalid exercise of police power for not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose
sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive on the labor sector. According to them, the Social Security
System can extend actuarial life and decrease its unfunded liability without increasing the premiums they pay.
Petitioners further insist that the revised ratio of contributions between employers and employees, per the
assailed issuances, is grossly unjust to the working class and is beyond respondents' powers. They claim that
for the purposes of justice and consistency, respondents should have maintained the 70%-30% ratio in the
premium increase. Changing it, they add, is grossly unfair and detrimental to employees. Petitioners further
emphasize that the State is required to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare under the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Is there an actual case or controversy?
HELD
NO. The Court notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated workers'
constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on
the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and
proportion of Social Security System contributions. In arguing that the increase in contributions is unduly
oppressive upon the labor sector, petitioners are again asking this Court to inquire into the wisdom of the
policy behind the issuances made by the executive branch which the court cannot do.
79 of 81
BUENA v. BENITO
G.R. No. 181760 | October 14, 2014
Civil Service Law; Career service eligibility
DOCTRINE
If there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of appointment,
the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibility required for the position in the national government to
be appointed in a permanent capacity. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to
the Career Executive Service. The appointee to the position must be career executive service eligible.
FACTS
Regional Governor Dr. Parouk S. Hussin of the ARMM appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito as Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education Division of Lanao del Sur in a temporary
capacity. In 2005, Dr. Hussin then requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office of the ARMM to
attest to Dr. Benito’s appointment. However, Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena declined on the ground
that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the said position. Thereafter,
Dr. Benito filed a petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional Office to
attest to his permanent appointment arguing that the position does not belong to the Career Executive Service
under the Administrative Code of 1987 and that it is only the ministerial duty of the Regional Office to attest
to his appointment, thus, the position does not require Career Executive Service eligibility. He further claimed
that under RA 9054, Regional Governor of the ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in the civil
service in the region and since Dr. Hussin has already exercised his discretion, the Regional Office has no
choice but to attest to his appointment.
ISSUE
Is the permanent appointment valid?
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs
to the Career Executive Service. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a career position.
Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the appointee an opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions, such as Schools Division Superintendent. If permanently appointed,
the appointee is guaranteed security of tenure. Permanent appointment to positions in the Career Executive
Service presupposes that the appointee has passed the Career Executive Service examinations. In this case,
respondent Dr. Benito does not possess the required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot
be appointed to the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil
Service Commission cannot be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito.
80 of 81
CRISTOBAL v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
G.R. No. 201622 | October 4, 2017
Second Motion for Reconsideration
DOCTRINE
Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a matter, a motion for
reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first time, is not a prohibited second motion
for reconsideration.
FACTS
Angelito Cristobal was employed as a pilot for respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) in 1971. In
May 1998, in line with a downsizing program of PAL, Cristobal applied for leave without pay from PAL to
enter into a four (4)-year contract with EVA Air. PAL approved the application and advised him that he would
continue to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire from PAL during this period. In a
letter dated March 10, 1999, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire. In response, PAL advised him that
he was deemed to have lost his employment status on June 9, 1998.Thus, on May 12, 1999, Cristobal filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Cristobal has been
illegally dismissed and ordered PAL to pay him his retirement pay together with attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages. PAL appealed the decision and argued that the retirement benefits should not be based
on Article 287 of the Labor Code since Cristobal was not yet 60 years old at the time. The appeal was well
taken by the appellate court which dismissed the petition for reconsideration filed by Cristobal. Petitioner
points out that his November 12, 2010 Partial Motion for Reconsideration only assailed the National Labor
Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision, which reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, his June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration assailed the reduction of his retirement
benefits.
ISSUE
Whether or not the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Cristobal assailing
the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision was a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration
HELD
NO. What the National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from
questioning a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same party from
assailing the same judgment. However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision
is a discrete decision from the earlier one. Here, the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011
Decision substantially modified its September 30, 2010 Decision. Thus, petitioner was not precluded from
seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, and it was clearly
an error for the Court of Appeals to find that petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed out of time on that
ground. Hence, the petitioner is correct in pointing out that the motions for reconsideration were on different
subject matter.
81 of 81

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LEONEN CASES

LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS

Jose Rio E. Sanchez

Heddrik C. Gonzales Chelsi Maine T. Laxamana

Lady Joyce A. Bernardez

Carlo Diamond S. Antipuesto Ma. Isabella A. Soriano

Ezekiel Japhet C. Esguerra Joanna Marie L. Barrozo

Christian Miguel C. Candelaria Natasha Felicia M. Francia

Ma. Rosalia Emmanuel S. Ladignon Antonio Luis C. Duran

Dr. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III

Atty. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad

Atty. Carlo D. Busmente

Atty. Roben B. Cadugo Jr.

Ma. Isabella Soriano

Rasper John Antonio

Cathy Sta. Romana

This work is the intellectual property of SAN BEDA COLLEGE

It is intended solely for the use of the individuals to which it is

The following may give consent:

REPUBLIC V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 10

ABUDA V. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS 11

GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES V. VILLANUEVA 45

RE: MEDICAL CONDITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CORNEJO 48

JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES

SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. HEIRS OF ABUCAY 71

1. No employer-employee relationship is created by acquisition of government assets for privatization hence

III. LABOR RELATIONS

IV. SOCIAL LEGISLATION

3. Disability ratings should be adequately established in a conclusive medical assessment by a company-

8. Section 20 (B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract

V. JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES

FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC v. ESPIRITU

CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY v. SINDAY

MALCABA v. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHIL.

TOQUERO v. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC.

MONANA v. MEC GLOBAL SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION

MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE, INC. v. ATRAJE

MANANSALA v. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC.

GRIEG PHILIPPINES, INC. v. GONZALES

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