FABIG TM83 2 MActonMJohnson

IGNITION OF PIPELINE RELEASES
Mike Acton
DNV GL
E: mike.acton@dnvgl.com
Mike Johnson
DNV GL
E: mike.johnson@dnvgl.com
TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 13

Ignition Probability for High Pressure
Gas Transmission Pipelines
Mike Acton & Mike Johnson
(previously presented at IPC2008)
FABIG 24TH JUNE 2015
DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
Overview
 Introduction
 Review of incident data
 Derivation of ignition probabilities
 Physical causes of ignition
 Conclusions
DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Introduction
 Natural gas transmission pipelines have a good safety record

 But, worldwide experience shows that serious incidents have occurred and the
consequences can be severe
 Unignited releases are disruptive and costly but unlikely to present a significant
risk to people
 Potential for harm arises from fires and thermal effects
Belgium 2004, Rupture of 40” Natural Gas Pipeline @ 70 bar
 Majority of fatalities – emergency

services and construction personnel
 Majority of injuries – people stranded
in vehicles on nearby road
 Mechanical damage caused by

construction machinery (multiple
gouges)
 24 fatalities, >200 injuries

Introduction
 Risk generally dominated by rupture failures

 Potential for ignition is a key element in assessing risks for natural gas
transmission pipelines
 Wide variations in values assumed for ignition probability in risk assessments,
due to limited data
Elements of Pipeline Risk Assessment
 Failure cause
 Failure mode
 Gas outflow
 Dispersion
 Ignition
 Thermal radiation
 Effects on people
 Risk calculations
 Risk reduction measures

PIPESAFE Package
 Fully quantified hazard and risk assessment

package for onshore natural gas transmission
pipelines
 Supports consistent and informed decisions on
risk issues
– Infringements to pipeline codes
– Uprating of pipelines
– Pipeline routeing
– Land use planning
 Developed and maintained as international JIP
since 1994
– Participants from Europe, North America & Asia
– Main development phases completed by 2004
PIPESAFE Package
 Mathematical models validated by large and

full scale experiments and incidents
 Risk dominated by ruptures
– Ground crater formed by pipeline rupture
– Lighter than air and momentum-driven
 Immediate ignition
– Transient “fireball” phase
– Followed by quasi-steady crater fire
 Delayed ignition
– Quasi-steady crater (or jet) fire only
 Publications include “A model for the initial
stages following the rupture of a natural
gas transmission pipeline” Process Safety
and Environmental Protection May 2015

Validation – Full Scale Testing
 76 km length
 914 mm pipeline (36”)
 60 bar (880 psi)
 200 instruments deployed
– Weather
– Gas outflow
– Size and shape of resulting fire
– Thermal radiation levels
 Maximum flame heights 500 m
 Presented at IPC 2000
A Full Scale Experimental Study of Fires Following the Rupture of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines
M. Acton, G Hankinson (Advantica), J Colton, M Sanai (SRI Int), B Ashworth (TransCanada PipeLines)
PIPESAFE Methodology
Input
Parameters
External Ground
Failure cause? Corrosion
interference Fatigue movement
Causes
Risk Transect
Individual
Calculation of
Risk Calculations
Failure Frequency
Societal
FN curve (PLL, EV)
Essential
Failure mode? input to
risk
Thermal Radiation
Outflow Dispersion Ignition
Rupture or Puncture? radiation effects
Consequence calculations

Ignition Models
 Heavier-than-air gases and vapours
(e.g. LPG) can form flammable clouds
at ground level
– Risk analyses often estimate density
of ignition sources to derive ignition
probabilities
 But, natural gas is lighter-than-air, and

unignited high pressure releases
generally form flammable clouds well
above ground level
– Risk analyses usually rely on
historical data for ignition probability
PIPESAFE Ignition Correlation
 Observed trend for rupture ignition probability to increase linearly with pd2, where
p = pressure
d = diameter
 Maximum ignition probability of 0.8
 Punctures of diameter d treated in the same manner (pd2 halved to reflect single
release)
 Trend previously reported at IPC2002 but not in detail

Review of Data Sources
Original PIPESAFE Analysis
 Based on Group data 1970 – 1996

– Criteria for incident reporting, scope and quality of data well understood
 Other data sources considered but rejected:
– CONCAWE (Europe) – liquid lines only
– EGIG (Europe) – significant overlap with Group data
– OPS (US) – information insufficient for this purpose at the time (now PHMSA)

Recent Review of Data Sources
 Group data extended to 2004

 PHMSA data format revised from 2002
– Now includes required detail
 PHMSA data from 2002 – 2007 sorted by:
– Gas transmission pipelines
– Onshore pipelines
– Below-ground pipelines
– Pipeline rupture failures
Summary of Incident Data Used
European US PHMSA
Group Data Group Data
Data Data
1970 - 1996 1970 - 2004
1970 - 2004 2002 - 2007
Total
1461 1683 1208 -
Incidents
Total
190 228 166 97
Ruptures
Ignited
43 53 19 12
Ruptures

Observations
 Group data
– 38 additional rupture incidents in 8 years (+20%)
– Small increase in average ignition probability for ruptures from 22.6% to 23.2%
– European ignition average 11.4%
 PHMSA data
– Increases data available by almost 50%
– Average ignition probability of 12.4%
Derivation of Ignition Probabilities

Stages in Analysis
 First, analysed new Group data using original method to check for changes
– Dividing data into four pd2 ranges (“bins”)
 Second, analysed expanded dataset including PHMSA
 Third, analysis method refined using additional data now available
– Investigated options for sub-division of data
– Now able to divide data into five pd2 “bins”
Additional Group Data

4
100
-2 00
-2 00
6
90
-1 99
6
19 70
19 70
-1 99
80
19 70
19 70
70
No of incidents
4
-2 00
6
-1 99
60
Ignited
19 70
4
-2 00
50
19 70
6
-1 99
Unignited
40
19 70
19 70
30
20
10
0
10
1
0
-3
0-
0
1-
-1
10
30
2 2
pd (barm )

Variation of Ignition Probability with pd2
Number of
pd2 Range Mean [pd2] Number of Ignition
Ignited
(bar m2) (bar m2) Incidents Probability
Incidents
0-1 0.433 78 4 0.05
1-10 3.598 77 10 0.13
10-30 17.564 44 15 0.34

30-100 48.166 29 24 0.83
Group data 1970 - 2004
Ignition Probability vs pd2
1
0.9 1996
0.8 2004
Ignition Probability
0.7 Linear (1996)

Linear (2004)
0.6
0.5
0.4 y = 0.0151x + 0.0738
0.3
y = 0.0160x + 0.0584
0.2
0.1
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
2 2
pd (barm )
Group data 1970-1996 and 1970-2004

Best fit lines and 80% confidence limits

Group Data + PHMSA Data
250
ta
All Da
Data
200
Group
No of incidents
150
Ignited
Unignited
100
Data
Data
All Data
All Data
Data
ata
Grou p
Group
D
All Data
All Data
50
Group
Group
0
0-5
5-15
15-30
30-45
45-80
2 2
pd (barm )
Variation of Ignition Probability with pd2
Number of
pd2 Range Mean [pd2] Number of Ignition
Ignited
(bar m2) (bar m2) Incidents Probability
Incidents
0-5 1.3 183 11 0.06
5-15 9.8 51 11 0.22

15-30 19.7 52 16 0.31
30-45 35.7 18 10 0.56
45-80 57.0 21 17 0.81
Group data 1970 – 2004 plus PHMSA data 2002 - 2007

Ignition Probability vs pd2 (all data)
1
0.9
0.8 All Data
0.7 Existing Correlation
0.6 Linear (All Data)
0.5
y = 0.0137x + 0.0555
0.4
0.3
0.2 y = 0.0151x + 0.0725
0.1
0
0 20 40 60 80
pd2 (barm2)
Physical Causes of Ignition

Possible Causes of Ignition
 Approach adopted so far is purely statistical

 Physical causes not well understood for gas transmission pipelines
 Large diameter, high pressure pipeline ruptures have often ignited, even in very
remote areas with no obvious ignition sources present
 Ignition likely to have been caused by the effects of the rupture event itself
Frequency by Cause (EGIG 1970- 2010)
 Typically historical failure statistics dominated by:

– External interference (third party damage)
– Material or construction defects
– Corrosion

Analysis by Causes of Failure
 Potential man-made ignition sources (e.g. excavating machinery) could be

present near interference failures
– Unlikely in all other causes
Analysis by Causes of Failure
Number of
Cause of Number of Ignition
Ignited
Failure Incidents Probability
Incidents
External
123 14 0.11
Interference
Other
105 39 0.37
Causes

Analysis by Cause of Failure
 Result suggests that presence of man-made ignition sources is not dominant for
high pressure natural gas pipelines
 External interference more common in built-up areas (where pipelines have low
pd2 values)
 Supports conclusion that ignition usually generated by effects of failure event
itself, not other factors
Ignition Project
 Considers possibility of ignition due to three elements:

– “External natural” (e.g. lightning)
– “External human” (e.g. machinery)
– “Release-generated” (e.g. impact sparks produced by debris)
 Release-generated believed to be most significant and consistent with pd2 trend
– Measure of stored energy released
– Large quantities of debris travelling at high speeds

Pipeline Rupture
 36” pipeline
 120 bar
 ~300m long
33 DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015
Release-Generated Ignition
 Possibilities include:
– Production of impact sparks by rocks and/or metal fragments
– Heating/sparks produced by tearing of pipeline steel
– Static electricity generated by rubbing between particles
 Initial research focussed on impact sparks as most likely

Schematic of Experimental Rig
Experimental Rig

Experimental Results
 Scoping experiments conducted without gas to observe when sparks produced

 Investigated effect of varying parameters:
– Impact velocity
– Roughness and slope of target
– Type of projectile and target
 Sparks observed at lower velocities with a sliding impact on sloping, roughened,
target
– No sparks when projectiles disintegrate on impact
 Ignition produced under narrow range of conditions
– Rock containing flint impacting on steel
Conclusions

Conclusions (1)
 Ignition probability correlation for below-ground high pressure gas transmission

pipeline ruptures updated and refined using reliable data:
P(ign) = 0.0555 + 0.0137pd2 ; 0  pd2  57
and
P(ign) = 0.81 ; pd2 > 57
where
P(ign) = probability of ignition
p = pipeline operating pressure (bar)
d = pipeline diameter (m)
 For puncture releases, the same correlation may be applied, but where d is the
equivalent release diameter and the coefficient of the pd2 value is halved
(reflecting the single release hole)
Updated Correlation
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
New Correlation
Existing Correlation
0.6
0.5
0.4 y = 0.0137x + 0.0555
0.3 y = 0.0151x + 0.0725

0.2
0.1
0
0 20 40 60 80
pd2 (barm2)

Conclusions (2)
 Trend consistent with ignitions dominated by the effects of failures

 Initial results suggest that impact sparks are a possible explanation
 Research ongoing into physical causes
 Improved understanding should help refine ignition models in future
Postscript
42 DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

Subsequent developments
 Further theoretical analysis indicates that static

discharge in the plume cannot be ruled out as a
possible ignition mechanism without additional
research
– Experiments to investigate further are technically
challenging and expensive
 Ignition probability correlation presented here
subsequently recommended by UKOPA and adopted in
IGEM/TD/2
– “Assessing the risks from high pressure Natural Gas
pipelines”
– 2nd Edition published 2013
Questions?
Mike Acton
michael.acton@dnvgl.com
+44 1509 282122
www.dnvgl.com
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

FABIG TM83 2 MActonMJohnson

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IGNITION OF PIPELINE RELEASES

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 13

FABIG 24TH JUNE 2015

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 14

 Natural gas transmission pipelines have a good safety record

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Belgium 2004, Rupture of 40” Natural Gas Pipeline @ 70 bar

 Majority of fatalities – emergency

 Mechanical damage caused by

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 15

 Risk generally dominated by rupture failures

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Elements of Pipeline Risk Assessment

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 16

 Fully quantified hazard and risk assessment

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

 Mathematical models validated by large and

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 17

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

FN curve (PLL, EV)

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 18

 But, natural gas is lighter-than-air, and

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

PIPESAFE Ignition Correlation

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 19

FABIG 24TH JUNE 2015

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

Original PIPESAFE Analysis

 Based on Group data 1970 – 1996

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 20

 Group data extended to 2004

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Summary of Incident Data Used

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 21

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Derivation of Ignition Probabilities

FABIG 24TH JUNE 2015

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 22

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Additional Group Data

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 23

1-10 3.598 77 10 0.13

10-30 17.564 44 15 0.34

Group data 1970 - 2004

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

Ignition Probability vs pd2

0.7 Linear (1996)

Group data 1970-1996 and 1970-2004

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015

TECHNICAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS - JUNE 2015 WWW.FABIG.COM 24

DNV GL © 2014 FABIG 24th June 2015