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TCWD Prelims

The Contemporary World (Our Lady of Fatima University)

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The term globalization is not new in the modern context. Many researches, debates and discussions were
made as to the meaning of the word. Cutu rela (2012) cited a published work, Towards New Education , which used
the term “globalization” in 1930. Globalization means to designate an overview of the human experience in
education. On the other hand, Inosemtsev (2008) distinguished globalization as one of the most known social
studies, but is still a hollow terminology. However, after the Cold War the term was already used to define an
interdependent world when it comes to its economical and informational dimensions. As it is defined by Webster,
globalization is the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked by free trade, free flow of
capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets.

Robertson (1992), in his article,Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, defined globalization
as the “understanding of the world and the increased perception of the world as a whole.”Therefore, the term
has a rich concept that people need to have deliberate grasp in order to fully understand the term. In fact, Albrow and
King (1990) defined globalization as “all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated
into a single world society. This only means that peoples around the globe live in a borderless community.It is,
however, significant to say that globalization has exerted a tremendously serious impact on each sovereign state.
The transnational spread of capital and the formation of the global markets have replaced the disintegrated
economies of various countries.

The work of Giddens (1991) has supported this claim when he highlighted in his definition that
globalization is the process of intensifying social relationships among countries around the world connecting
separate localities in a manner in which local events are formed as a result of happenings that have
occurred from afar. There is a rapid interconnection worldwide that links among people in the local, national and
even in regional context. This interconnectedness is created because of social and economic relationships
and networks which are relevant in the global interactions.
Steger (2005) cited Freeden (2003) who pointed out that globalization denotes not an ideology, but ‘a range
of processes nesting under one rather unwieldy epithet. He furthered that global flows occur in different physical and
mental dimensions.Steger (2005), on the other hand, opined that globalization should be confined to a set of
complex,social processes that are changing out current social condition derived from the modern independence of
nation-states.He furthered that key concepts of globalization have been defined such as multidimensional
set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensity worldwide social interdependencies and exchange
while making people aware of connections between the local and the distant.The term globalization should be
confined to a set of complex, sometimes contradictory, social processes that are changing our current social
condition based on the modern system of independent nation states. Indeed, most scholars of globalization have
defined their key concept along those lines as a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multi
ply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time
fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2000)identified some overviews of various areas of globalization.
Globalization ‘offers extensive opportunities for truly worldwide development, but it is not
progressing evenly’. IMF conveyed that there are some countries that have been able to integrate into the global
market rapidly, yet there are also some that have not yet integrated. Those countries that were able to integrate in
the global market are growing fast and are able to reduce problems of poverty. To reiterate, globalization is not a
recent phenomenon and there is nothing mystifying about it. In the 1980’s, the term “globalization” has become
a common word manifesting advances in modern technologies that have made international transactions, in both
trade and finances, convenient, accessible, and easy. IMF (2000) noted that globalization refers to an extension
beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human
economic activity which includes village markets, urban industries, or financial centers.Conversely,Hutton &
Giddens, as cited by Cuturela (2009) emphasized that globalization is the interplay of extraordinary technological
innovation mixed with influence of the world that gives today’s changing its complexity. They expressed that the
balance between science or knowledge and resources has changed in such a way that science and knowledge have
become perhaps the most significant factor in the determination of the country/s standard of living. Truly, the
countries with the most advanced economies are the countries with the most modern technology based on

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science and knowledge.

THE FIVE CORE CLAIMS OF MARKET GLOBALISM

Steger (2014) pointed out that in the mid 1990’s, more population in the global north and south had accepted
globalism’s core claims, thus internalizing large parts of its overarching neo-liberal framework that advocated the d
eregulation of markets, the liberalization of trade, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and , after 9/11,
the qualified support of the global ‘War on Terror’ under US leadership.

The five core claims of market globalism are as follows:

First claim is that, Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of market. This is absolutely
anchored in the neo-liberal ideal of self regulating market as the normative basis for a future global order. This
perspective explains the relevant functions of free market-its rationality and efficiency, as well as its alleged ability to
bring about greater social integration and material progress-can only be realized in a democratic society that values
and protects individual freedom.
● Neo liberal ideology - concept of classical theories, in favor to capitalist, gives much freedom to capitalist to
control everything where outgrowth of inequality is seen. Most businesses are run by the private sector.
● Self regulating market-one where voluntary exchange and the laws of supply and demand provide the sole basis for the
economic system, without government intervention
● Karl Marx - Father of Economy , “The bureaucratic style exist bust you should know your rights, th
government must see to it the the people know their rights”
The second claim is that, Globalization is inevitable and irreversible. The market-globalist perspective
sees globalization as the spread of irreversible market forces driven by technological innovations that make
the global integration of national economies inevitable. As a matter of fact, market globalism is always interlaced with
a belief that markets have the capacity to use new technologies to solve social problems.

Nobody is in charge of globalization is the third claim. This claim highlights the semantic link between
‘globalization-market’ and the adjacent idea of ‘leaderlessness’. Robert Hormats (1998) opined that ‘The great
beauty of globalization is that no one is in control.’ This only means that no individual, no government or no institution
has the control over globalization. Similarly, Thomas Friedman (1999:112-3) emphasized that the most basic truth
about globalization is this: ‘No one is in charge...But the global marketplace today is an Electronic Herd of often
anonymous stock, bond, and currency traders and multinational investors, connected by screens and networks.’

The next claim is that, Globalization benefits everyone.This lies at the heart of market globalism and represents
a ‘good’ phenomenon. AT the 19986 G-7 Summit in Lyons, France, the heads of state and government of the world’s
seven most powerful industrialized nations issued a joint Economic Communique (1996) that exemplifies the
principal meaning of this claim:Economic growth and progress in today’s interdependent world is bound up with
the process of globalization. Globalization provides great opportunities for the future, not only for our countries, but
for all others, too. Its many positive aspects include an unprecedented expansion of investment and trade; the
opening up to international trade of the world’s most populous regions and opportunities for more
developing countries to improve their standards of living; the increasingly rapid dissemination of
information,technological innovation, and the proliferation of skilled jobs.

The fifth and the last claim is that,Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world. Francis
Fukuyama (2000) stressed that there exists a ‘clear correlation’ between the country’s level of economic
development and successful democracy. While globalization and capital development do not automatically
produce democracies, ‘the level of economic development resulting from globalization is conducive to the creation of
complex civil societies with a powerful middle class. It is this class and societal structure that facilitates democracy’.
The former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton (1999) praised the Eastern Europe’s economic transition towards
capitalism by saying, “The emergence of new businesses and shopping centers in former communist coun

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tries should be seen as the ‘backbone of democracy.’

VIDEO:WHAT’S HAPPENING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

MATT GOODMAN - Senior Vice President; Simon Chair in Political Economy & Senior Adviser for Asian Economics
Spring meeting - meetings in the global economic world, about global economy and economical growth outlook
- TOP FIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH: US, China,Japan,Germany,Britain all have problems
- US growth will be slower in 2019 than in 2018 because the fiscal stimulus is gonna be fading and there is
uncertainty about trade policy
STEPHANIE SEGAL- Deputy Director and Senior Fellow,Simon Chair in Political Economy
- Near term risk relates to uncertainty around what is happening in Europe in BREXIT (UK leaves the United
Union)
- Theresa May (UK prime minister)- committed to the BREXIT
- Meetings in the spring meets seekd if the britain will leave the european union or if there will be negotiation
MATT GOODMAN
- For Japan- will lose ⅓ of its population in the 1st half of this century, has a demographic crisis due to old
population. 1% of growth per year is already a strong growth
- Germany- biggest economy in Europe, they narrowly missed a recession at the end of 2018 when AUTO
PRODUCTION HAS BEEN DOWN, export sector has been hit by the slower growth in China and US trade
friction.
STEPHANIE SEGAL
- Concern over US-China trade outcomes, Chines made announcements that some of the structural reforms
that US insisted upon are part of China’s own reform plan (GOOD SIGN), but it has been also reported that
the final decision maker on both side will at be the very top. It is up to President Trump, and president Xi if
they will have agreed on a deal.
MATT GOODMAN
- Anxiety on Global economic growth,trade,finacial strains around the world. Atmosphere will be dsyhaped by
those issue. Not as happy as he was a year or two ago.

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY DURING COVID 19

Kansas at new york -prohibited from seating diners.JAke Dyl 3rd generation owner has 200 workers. Alfredo
Fernandez worked here for 14 years.
Global economy enters an unprecedented shutdown. Major leagues sports left the field, factories/shopping malls
shut down, theaters shut down,
Theaters were shut down, MAGNET has 50 employees but a lot was affected. Joseph Stiglet - won Nobel Price in
Economics 2001, a professor in Columbia Univ, he says that this crisi is nerve wracking , it is totally diff cuz we shut
down econ to protect our health. Before COVID we are already exposed at the end(BAD thing), businesses have
been foolish , has debt , 50-70% have only 500-1000 dollars at the bank, We pushed idea of efficiency in a narrow m
indeed set too far. We developed a system without resilience, large number of americans become extremely
vulnerable
In the US the FEDERAL RESRVE has cut interest rates to near 0 to help consumer and business access cheaper
loans. The trump admin and congress nears an agreement to make half a trillion dollar available to help large
corporation and small business and another half a trillion for households amounting to 1000-3000 dolars per family
depending on the size. Stiglet says this is a start. For stiglet- we need to give americans reassurance that for as log
as this pandemic last they have ayuda. Concern on spending money now: NO, because we must do it. And the US
can afford it.
Michael Goodman - president of Wealthstream Adbisers, a finan cial planning and investment management firm.
Clients are anxious to put money. Stocks have plunged more than 30% over the past 5 weeks,ending the longest bull
market on record.Despite this goodman says, that even if u plan on retiring u should not panic.Avergae recovery is
around 24 months. Now should be the time to take stock of financial situations.
MAGNET theater gives performances online

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ADVANCING

An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis

of the Mid-twentieth Century

By Mark Mazower

(International Affairs 82, 3 (2006) 553–566, © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006)

On 7 March 1934, an unusual event took place at Madison Square Garden in New York. Twenty thousand people

attended a meeting there to hear speeches marking the Nazis’ first year in power and denouncing the regime. The

rally was organized as a mock trial and was advertised in the press as the ‘Case of civilization against Hitler’, with

indictment, witnesses and, eventually, a judgment delivered by a Minister of the Community Church of New York

City. ‘Hitlerism denounced as a crime against civilization,’ ran the headline in the New York Times the following day.

Organized principally by the American Jewish Congress, the meeting anticipated Nuremberg in its consciousness of

the power of what the scholar Louis Anthes calls ‘publicly deliberative drama’. It looked forward, too, to the Cold

War in its evocation of a joint Judeo-Christian civilization ranged against the threat of totalitarianism. But in its

emphasis on that common ‘civilization’ it looked backwards, to the concept that lay at the heart of the claim to world

leadership that Europeans had been advancing since at least the early nineteenth century.

It was really after the defeat of Napoleon that the concept of a European civilization became fundamental to new

understandings of international order and new techniques of international rule. In France, Guizot abandoned the

Enlightenment project of fitting Europe into a scheme of universal history for the [Herderian] task of tracing the

continent’s own cultural roots. As he put it in his History of civilization in Europe: ‘civilization is a sort of ocean,

constituting the wealth of a people, and on whose bosom all the elements of the life of that people, all the powers

supporting its existence, assemble and unite’. It was just possible, thought Guizot, to locate among the various

civilizations of the world a specifically European variant: ‘It is evident,’ he wrote, ‘that there is a European

civilization; that a certain unity pervades the civilization of the various European states...’

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In Britain, John Stuart Mill suggested by contrast that there was but a single model of civilization; but this too—in

his 1836 essay on ‘Civilization’—he located in Europe since ‘all [the elements of civilization]

exist in modern Europe, and especially in Great Britain, in a more eminent degree… than at any other place or

time. Whether one believed like Mill that civilization was singular and hierarchical, or plural and historically relative

—and as time went on Mill would win out over Guizot—what came to be seen as self-evident was civilization’s

location in Europe.

One fertile intellectual elaboration of this belief was—as we have learned from the work of Martti Koskenniemi and

Antony Anghie—the new discipline of (mostly positivist) international law. As a generalization and adaptation of the

values of the Concert of Europe, international law was designed as an aid to the preservation of order among

sovereign states, and its principles were explicitly stated as applying only to civilized states—much as Mill saw his

principles of liberty as applying solely to members of ‘a civilized community’. In 1845 the influential American

international lawyer Henry Wheaton had actually talked in terms of the ‘international law of Christianity’ versus ‘the

law used by Mohammedan Powers’; but within twenty or thirty years, such pluralism had all but vanished. According

to the late nineteenth century legal commentator, W. E. Hall, international law ‘is a product of the special civilization

of modern Europe and forms a highly artificial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood

or recognized by countries differently civilized… Such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are

inheritors of that civilization.

Thus conceived, international law faced the issue of the relationship between a civilized Christendom and the non-

civilized world. States could join the magic circle through the doctrine of international recognition, which took place

when ‘a state is brought by increasing civilization within the realm of law.’ In the 1880s James Lorimer suggested

there were three categories of humanity—civilized, barbaric and savage, and thus three corresponding grades of

recognition (plenary political; partial political; natural, or mere human). Most Victorian commentators believed that

barbaric states might be admitted gradually or in part. Westlake proposed, for instance, that: ‘Our international

society exercises the right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without necessarily admitting

them to the whole of it.’ Others disagreed: entry ‘into the circle of law-governed countries’ was a formal matter, and

‘full recognition’ all but impossible.

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The case of the Ottoman Empire exemplified this ambivalent process. Of course European states had been

making treaties with the sultans since the sixteenth century. But following the Crimean War the empire was

declared as lying within the ‘Public law of Europe’—a move which some commentators then and now saw as the

moment when international law ceased to apply only to Christian states but which is perhaps better viewed as a

warning to Russia to uphold the principles of collective consultation henceforth rather than trying to dictate

unilaterally to the Turks.

In fact, despite its internal administrative reforms, the empire was never regarded in Europe as being fully civilized,

the capitulations remained in force, and throughout the nineteenth century the chief justification of the other Powers

for supporting first autonomy and then independence for new Christian Balkan states was that removing them from

Ottoman rule was the best means of civilizing them. We can see this clearly in contemporary attitudes towards the

military occupation of Ottoman territory by European armies. After the Franco-Prussian War, international lawyers

had devised the notion of belligerent occupation—a state of affairs in which a military occupant interfered as little as

was compatible with military necessity in the internal affairs of the occupied country so as not to prejudice the rights

of the former ruler of that territory who was regarded as remaining sovereign until a peace settlement might

conclude otherwise. Belligerent occupation was, in other words, a compact between so-called civilized states not to

unilaterally challenge each other’s legitimate right to rule. In the case of Ottoman territory, the Powers felt no such

inhibitions: the Russians in Bulgaria in 1877, the Habsburgs in Bosnia the following year, and the British in Egypt in

1882 all demonstrated through their extensive rearrangement of provincial administrations, that although they would

allow the Ottoman sultan to retain a fig-leaf of formal sovereignty, in fact the theory of belligerent occupation did not

apply in his lands. Thirty years later, the Austrians [in 1908] and the British [in 1914] went further: on both occasions

they unilaterally declared Ottoman sovereignty over the territories they were occupying at an end, suggesting that

whatever had or had not been agreed at Paris in 1856, by the early twentieth century, the Ottoman empire was

regarded once again as lying outside the circle of civilization. [The fact that it was a Muslim power was certainly not

irrelevant to this. In 1915, when the French and Russians prepared a diplomatic protest at the mass murder of

Ottoman Armenians, their initial draft condemned the massacres as ‘crimes against Christendom’. Only when the

British mentioned that they were worried over the possible impact of such a formulation on Indian Muslim opinion
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was the wording changed to ‘crimes against humanity.’

If the Ottoman Empire was, as it were, semi-civilized, then sub-Saharan Africa—site of the main European land-

grab in the late nineteenth century— was savage. European and American lawyers extended the notion of the

protectorate—originally employed for new European states such as Greece—to the new colonial situation,

ostensibly as a way of shielding vulnerable non-European states from the depredations of other European Powers,

but more urgently, in order to avoid complications among the Powers which might trigger off further conflict. In the

increasingly radicalized world-view of late nineteenth century European imperialism, protectorates might be a way

of slowing down social transformation—in the interests of ‘native customs’—as much as they were of introducing it.

‘Much interest attaches to legislation for protectorates, in which the touch of civilization is cautiously applied to

matters barbaric, ‘wrote a commentator in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation in 1899. Yet the

concept of civilization remained vital. The treaty that followed Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884–85, which marked

the attempt to diplomatically manage the Scramble for Africa, talked of the need ‘to initiate the indigenous

populations into the advantages of civilization.’

In this way, Victorian international law divided the world according to its standard of civilization. Inside

Europe—and in other areas of the world colonized by Europeans—there was the sphere of civilized life: this meant

—roughly—the protection of property; the rule of law on the basis—usually—of codes or constitutions; effective

administration of its territory by a state; warfare conducted by a regular army; and freedom of conscience. The

fundamental task of international law in this zone was to resolve conflicts between sovereign states in the absence

of an overarching sovereign. Outside this sphere, the task was to define terms upon which sovereignty—full or

partial—might be bestowed. It was thus in the non-European world that the enormity of the task required in

acquiring sovereignty could best be grasped. There, too, the potential costs—in terms of legalized violence—of

failing to attain the standard of civilization were most evident.

The laws of war, codified by the Great Powers at length at the end of the nineteenth century, were designed to

minimize the severity of conflicts between civilized states. But where no reciprocity of civilized

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behavior could be expected, European armies were taught they need not observe them—or indeed in some

versions—any rules at all. Britain’s General J.F.C. Fuller noted that ‘in small wars against uncivilized nations, the

form of warfare to be adopted must tone with the shade of culture existing in the land, by which I mean that,

against people possessing a low civilization, war must be more brutal in type.’ The 1914 British Manual of Military

Law, too, emphasized that ‘rules of International Law apply only to warfare between civilized nations… They do not

apply in wars with uncivilized states and tribes.’ After all, savages were impressed only by force; fanaticism could

be stopped only through an awesome demonstration of technological superiority. ‘A shell smashing into a putative

inaccessible village stronghold is an indication of the relentless energy and superior skill of the well-equipped

civilized foe. Instead of merely rousing his wrath, these acts are much more likely to make [the fanatical savage]

raise his hands in surrender.’ These were the words of Colonel Elbridge Colby, an interwar US advocate of air

power in colonial insurgencies (and father of William Colby, future director of the CIA and architect of the Advanced

Pacification Campaign in Vietnam).

Until well after the First World War, it was axiomatic that ‘international law is a product of the special civilization of

modern Europe itself.’ The United States was, by the century’s end, regarded from this point of view as a European

power, if not of the first rank. But Washington—which had stood on the sidelines during the carve-up of Africa, had

achieved a special relationship to international law following the war with Spain. Through the Roosevelt Corollary, it

toughened up its reading of the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time encouraging the pan American codification

of international law as a way of enshrining its own regional hegemony. Siam was admitted to the Hague

conferences as a mark of respect; but in China, where the Boxer Rebellion was put down with enormous violence—

on the grounds that it was ‘an outrage against the comity of nations’—the unequal treaties remained in force. It was

only the Japanese who seriously challenged the nineteenth century identification of civilization with Christendom.

Having adhered to several international conventions, and revised their civil and criminal codes, they managed to

negotiate the repeal of the unequal treaties from 1894 onwards, as well as to win back control over their tariffs, and

their victory over Russia in 1905 simply confirmed their status as a major Power. Not surprisingly, the Young Turks

— desperate to repeal the humiliating capitulations—could not hear enough of the Japanese success.

The Japanese achievement confirmed that the standard of civilization being offered by the Powers was capable of

being met by non-Christian, non-European states. But the Japanese achievement was also unique. After the

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ending of the Russo-Japanese war, the Second Hague Conference of 1907 talked of ‘the interests of humanity,

and the ever progressive needs of civilization.’ But could civilization (with a capital C) really ever be universalized,

and how far could it be extended? Many had their doubts. German and Italian jurists essentially ruled out any non-

European power receiving full recognition; the prominent Russian jurist de Martens was equally emphatic. As for

the empire-builders, in Africa, in particular, as well as in the Pacific, many liberals and Gladstonians came to terms

with imperialism at century’s end—as Saul Dubow has recently reminded us—because they thought in terms of a

kind of an imperial cosmopolitanism or commonwealth, in which individual peoples might preserve their own

distinctive cultures. Where necessary, of course, civilized powers had to rule others to ensure this.

The idea of trusteeship, which was—with a slightly different coloration—to become the lynchpin of the League of

Nations system of colonial rule, expressed a similar caution about the exportability of (European) civilization.

Unilaterally abrogating Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt in December 1914, the British proclaimed that they regarded

themselves as ‘trustees for the inhabitants’ of the country. Their unilateralism was only one sign of the death of the

old Concert and its values. Blazing a trail that others would follow in the wars of the coming century, they tore up

one of the fundamental axioms of the late-nineteenth century European order—that the basic legitimacy of the

sovereign ruler would always be respected—and replaced it with a new understanding in which sovereignty

inhered, not in the head of state, but in the people or nation. What Nehal Bhuta has recently—in the case of Iraq—

called the doctrine of ‘transformative occupation’ thus makes its appearance.

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2 TYPES OF MARKET INTEGRATION: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE INTEGRATION

NEHATIVE INTEGRATION EXAMPLE; DOMESTIC, GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN

POSITIVE INTEGRATION EXAMPLE: EUROPEAN UNION

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FORMS OF INTEGRATION:

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Globalization and Labor Market Integration in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Asia
Abstract This article uses new data sets to analyze labor market integration between 1882 and 1936 in an area of
Asia stretching from South India to Southeastern China and encompassing the three Southeast Asian countries of
Burma, Malaya and Thailand. We find that by the late nineteenth century, globalization, of which a principal feature
was the mass migration of Indians and Chinese to Southeast Asia, gave rise to both an integrated Asian labor market
and a period of real wage convergence. Integration did not, however, extend beyond Asia to include core industrial
countries. Asian and core areas, in contrast to globally integrated commodity markets, showed divergent trends in

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unskilled real wages.

Introduction Beginning in the late nineteenth century, globalization swept through Asia, transforming its product and
labor markets. By the 1880s steamships had largely replaced sailing vessels for transport within Asia as well as to
Western markets, and shipping fares had begun to fall sharply. Also already underway was the mass migration of
Indian and Chinese workers, principally from the labor-abundant areas of Madras in India and the provinces of
Kwangtung (Guangdong) and Fukien (Fujian) in Southeastern China, to land-abundant but labor-scarce parts of
Asia. Chief among the immigrant-receiving countries were Burma, Malaya and Thailand (Siam) in Southeast Asia.
Indian and Chinese labor inflows to these countries constituted the bulk of two of three main late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century global migration movements, the other being European immigration to the New World.
Immigration to Southeast Asia was almost entirely in response to its growing demand for workers which, in turn,
derived from rapidly expanding demand in core industrial countries for Southeast Asian exports

The article has two main aims. One is to analyze whether as part of pre-World War II globalization an integrated
Asian market for unskilled labor existed to encompass Asia’s chief emigrant-sending regions of South India and
Southeastern China and the principal Southeast Asian receiving countries for Indian and Chinese immigrants. Our
metric for integration, following both econometric work on GDP convergence and Robertson’s recent analysis of
integrated labor markets, comprises three complementary criteria: (i) that wages do not diverge from a common
trend; (ii) that over time wage dispersion does not increase; and (iii) that a correction mechanism pushes wages
towards an equilibrium relationship after shocks. It can be misleading, as Robertson (2000, p.728) warns, to rely on
price as a criterion for integration. Markets are integrated if adjustment mechanisms operate to correct deviations
from a wage differential or “gap”.

Second, the article aims to compare wage trends in the area of Asia from South India to South China and including
Burma, Malaya and Thailand with an industrial core of the global economy, defined as the United Kingdom, United
States, Germany and France. Were unskilled labor markets in Asia and the industrial core similarly affected by
globalization such that in these two parts of the world wages followed a common 2 trend? Or, in contrast to
commodity markets, was globalization in Asia and the industrial core associated with a drifting apart of real unskilled
wages?
Southeast Asian growth and Indian and Chinese immigration There was a fundamental difference between the
Southeast Asian worlds of 1860 and of the 1880s. The earlier period pre-dated a global transport and
communications revolution and the opening of the Suez Canal. Nor was there as yet the great demand for Southeast
Asia primary commodities that soon materialized in the West as part of its rapid industrialization and urbanization
(see Huff, 2007). In the 1870s Malaya was still sparsely populated, largely unmapped and “land was so abundant
and readily available that it had no value” (Gullick, 1985, p. 59)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHfhiBHnk9A
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ilT7vnxu2cg

Although in Burma after the mid-nineteenth century a growing output of rice was evident, the big increases in planted
acreage and production began only in the 1870s (Cheng, 1968, pp. 237, 241). The Thai rice frontier was reminiscent
of the United States' wild west but lay geographically to the south where “in every direction the land was cleared of
the heavy jungle grass which afforded shelter to wild elephants” (Johnston, 1981, p. 111). Clearance occurred mainly
in the 1890s and 1900s when Thailand’s rice industry first boomed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAnfj8v5acM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xrnu_7dRrY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewu-v36szlE

The main export regions in Burma, Malaya and Thailand were not initially resource-rich areas. They became so
because for them by the 1880s globalization had altered the definition of resource abundance. A relevant comparison
is North America where, as Harley (1980, p. 218; see also Wright, 1990) points out, globalization transformed a
previously “uneconomic ‘desert’” of prairie into a region of rich natural resources. The same was true of the jungles

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and swamps of Southeast Asia, including almost all of Burma’s best rice land originally regarded as uninhabitable
because of the risk of disease or because it was under the sea at high tide.

By the mid-1880s Burma and Malaya, including the Straits ports of Singapore and Penang, were effectively under
British colonial rule. Thailand, nominally independent, had quasi-colonial arrangements and a British financial
advisor. From the late nineteenth century onwards, growth in Burma, Malaya and Thailand stemmed predominantly
from an abundance of land. Rapid export expansion depended on the settlement of a moving frontier. For Southeast
Asia, international trade provided a “vent” or outlet to utilize surplus land in the production of primary commodities
which, unless exported, would not have been worth the effort of producing. Exports from Burma, Malaya and
Thailand, expressed in 1913 US dollars, increased from $104.0 4 million in 1880/82 to $639.6 million in 1936/38,
equivalent to 3.4 percent annual average growth. Rice was Burma’s and Thailand’s staple export while Malaya’s
staple exports were tin and, by World War I, rubber.

Vent-for-surplus growth in the three countries required substantial inwards migration. A traditional, or non-export,
sector provided part of the labor to plant previously uncultivated acreage with export crops (Feeny, 1982, pp. 42-43;
Adas, 1974, pp. 41-57). Insofar as labor from the traditional sectors of the region's dual economies was unavailable
in sufficient quantities or unwilling to join in export production, immigration from India and China supplied workers.
Colonial authorities in Malaya and Burma and the government in Thailand advocated mass immigration to assist
trade expansion. Burma, Malaya and Thailand, all of which, apart from a few brief periods, allowed unrestricted
migration until the 1930s, were by no means the sole world outlets for emigration from India and China. But they
attracted a large and increasing proportion of all emigrants from India and China and were the dominant outlet for
both streams of emigration (Table 1). Burma received chiefly Indian immigrants and Thailand mainly Chinese.
Malaya, about equidistant between China and India, was the destination for large numbers of both Chinese and
Indians.

From 1881 to 1939 Burma, Malaya and Thailand received over 15 million Chinese and Indian immigrants, more than
the three countries' 1881 population (Table 2). During this period, Malaya averaged immigrant inflows per decade of
826 persons per 1,000 resident population. I
The Rise of the Global Corporation
Part 1 The historic rise of the global corporation three periods
The approach of the study of globalization “historical globalization”
-Trade and exchange
Patterns of interactive engagement and subsequent dominant technologies
Functional
Organize

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Many of the characteristics of the global corporation that examine from the period (pattern of equity ownership and
management of subsidiaries, the relationship of the central organizational functions to supply and distribution chains
as attributes of corporate structures in the most prosperous and globally engaged nations (largely through colonial
and imperialist relationship)As the world emerged from the vast destructon of WW2 economic recovery and
expansion were led by overwhelming by America corporations which for a period from the end of the war until the re-
entry of Japanese and European corporations on the global scene (MNC)

U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson unveiled a package of sanctions on Russia Tuesday morning. U.S. President Joe
Biden will impose new sanctions on trade and financing in the two territories recognized by Putin, CNN reported.
Some very large multinational companies with noticeable exposure to Russia could see their sales walloped as the
country moves to the brink of war with Ukraine, and the world responds with penalizing sanctions.
That's according to JPMorgan strategist Dubravko Lakos-Bukas who crunched the numbers. Seven companies
standout from a list of 25 names compiled from the strategist as at risk to pressure given at least 4% of their sales
come from Russia and Ukraine.
The notables include:
Sylvamo Corporation (SLVM): 16.6% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
Kinross Gold Corporation (KGC): 14% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
Arconic Corporation (ARNC): 9.4% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
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Philip-Morris International (PM): 8% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine

PepsiCo (PEP): 4.4% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
Mohawk Industries (MHK): 4.3% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
McDonald's (MCD): 4.2% of sales come from Russia and Ukraine
The U.S. Presidents Day holiday — along which came closed markets for trading Monday — brought several
negative developments on the Ukraine-Russia front.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the deployment of Russian troops to two breakaway regions of Ukraine.
The move — seen by the West as a provocation — came after Putin recognized their independence.

Part 2: How do global corporations function? What constitutes a global corporation?

The contemporary global corporation is simultaneously and commonly referred to either as multinational corporation,
Transnational corporation and international company
Transnational companies are importers and exporters
-Without investment outside of their home country

Multinational Companies
Have investment in other countries but do not have product offerings in each individual local market
Global Companies
Invested in and are present in many countries
THE GLOBAL CITY
STUDENTS ARE EXPECTED TO:
Identify the attribute of a global city
Analyze how cities served as engines of Globalization
CONFIGURING
Given the global competition between cities, the Global Power City Index evaluates and ranks the major cities of the
world according to their magnetism on their comprehensive power to attract creative people and business
enterprises from around the world.
Considering that the comprehensive power south by each city fluctuates in accordance with economic and social
changes, the GPCI has continually strived to improve its findings by revising its indicators and methods of data
collection.
The GPCI- 2017 has endeavored to obtain more reliable and highly objective data for a number of indicators, while
adding new data that suitably reflect current conditions such as the advancement of the women in society, ICT
infrastructure, and risk to mental health.
The breath of the GPCI has also been expanded this year to encompass 44 cities-the new cities being Dubai,the
center of trade and commerce in the Middle East and Buenos Aires, one of the major cities in South America.
ADVANCING
What is a Global City?
Acoording to Sassen (1991) global cities are characterized by occupational and income polarization, with the highly
paid professional class on the one end and providers of low-paid services on the other.
The lifestyle and needs of the well-off professional classes bring into the global city an army of low-paid workers who
deliver personal and labor intensive services like cleaning, child-care, delivery, restaurants and eateries, catering
maintence, transport, hotels domestic help and retail.
Sassen (2005) introduces global cities as global command centers of the world economy

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Cosmopolitanism

It is the phenomenon most readily associated with the global city. Large, diverse cities attract people, material and

cultural products from all over the world.

The idea of cosmopolitanism invokes pleasant images of travel, exploration, and worldly pursuits enjoyed by those

who have benefited from globalization.

Everyday life is significantly shaped by commercial culture, retail and shopping as well as cross cultural variety of

food, fashion, entertainment and various other consumables and artifacts.

Consumption is costly in resources

Networks and groups rely on geographic proximity

Global Cities are livable cities because:

They provide jobs that pay an adequate wage

They provide basic services, including safe water and adequate sanitation

They are void of discriminatory practices

People have access to educational opportunities and health care

People are not at risk of forced eviction

People enjoy security of tenure in affordable housing

People live in communities that are safe and environment that are clean

The cities are governed through inclusive local democratic processes.

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Japanese Mori Foundation’s Global Power City Index

It measures the global power of cities using the combination of six criteria

-Economy

-Research and Development

-Cultural Interaction

-Livability

-Environment

-Accessibility

Key Findings of the GPCI-2017

2017 comprehensive ranking

Sydney-climbs four spots this year to edge its way into the top for the first time in seven years.

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