Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 Introduction 1
2 Defining Democracy 15
3 Defining Autocracy 36
Glossary 303
References 313
Subject Index 353
Author Index 357
Detailed Contents
1 Introduction 1
Threats to democracy 2
The bright spots 6
Overview of the book 7
Key definitions and caveats 9
2 Defining Democracy 15
Why define democracy 16
Conceptualizing democracy 17
Models of democracy 29
Conclusion 34
Key Questions 35
Further Reading 35
3 Defining Autocracy 36
Totalitarian regimes 37
Contemporary approaches to disaggregating autocracy 40
Blended regimes and changes over time 48
Conclusion 49
Key Questions 50
Further Reading 50
Conclusion 271
Key Questions 271
Further Reading 272
Glossary 303
References 313
Subject Index 353
Author Index 357
List of Abbreviations
AD Acción Democrática (Venezuela)
AI Artificial intelligence
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Turkey)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
Brexit British exit (from the EU)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COPEI Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Venezuela)
DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU European Union
FSB Federal Security Service (Russia)
FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua)
GDP Gross domestic product
ICT Information communication technology
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPA-CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States
KANU Kenya African National Union
KMT Koumintang of China (Taiwan)
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MB Muslim Brotherhood
NCA National Constituent Assembly (Tunisia)
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NPC National People’s Congress (China)
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAN Partido Acción Nacional (Mexico)
PAP People’s Action Party (Singapore)
PARM Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana
PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba (Cuba)
PDP People’s Democratic Party (Nigeria)
xiv LIS T OF ABBRE VIATIONS
Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes is the only introduction to cover the full
spectrum of political systems, from democracy to dictatorship and the growing
number of systems that fall between, equipping readers to think critically about
democracy’s future trajectory.
This book features a number of engaging learning features to help you navigate the
text and contextualize and reinforce your understanding:
Boxes
Box 6.2: Authoritarian tactics
The absence of a viable alternative to the incumbent regime is a key source of authoritarian In-chapter boxes feature a diverse range of case studies,
durability. If elites and citizens cannot envision a future under different leadership, they have little
choice but to acquiesce to the current regime. Autocrats frequently use the following tactics to
pre-emptively weaken challengers from the elite, opposition, and public to prevent the emer-
helping you to apply key concepts in the context of
gence of an alternative and maintain their control:
contemporary cases, including hybrid regimes such as
Divide and rule
252 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Authoritarian regimes seek to use fissures within society—including inter-ethnic or geographic
Malaysia, the impact of corruption in Nigeria, and the
divisions—to create opposing factions they play off one another. Such ‘divide and rule’ strate-
gies make it difficult for opponents to coordinate, which prevents the emergence of a unified or personalization of power in the Chinese Communist
in the West
cohesive are altering
challenge the international
to the regime. Many leaders, suchscene. In today’s
as Libya’ s Muammar geopolitical
Qaddafi andenvironment,
Kenya’s the
toolsKenyatta
Jomo and mechanisms
and Daniel Arapthat
Moilong favoured
pitted democracy
tribal groups against oneare nowtofunctioning
another Party. They also highlight key terms to ensure relevant
maintain theirin reverse:
diffusion
power (Black,is2000;
working in ways
Fox, 1996). that reinforce
In addition autocracy,
to exacerbating China
existing and
fissures, Putin’s model
authoritarian lead- of autoc-
ers alsoare
racy seekinspiring
to manufacture them. Asnew
emulation, we discuss
norms later
arein creating
this chapter, autocrats enable
conditions moresomeconducive toterminology and research is translated in a clear,
opposition groups to participate in elections while banning others from participation. Because
authoritarianism, and autocracies are establishing linkages that dilute Western leverage.
members of the opposition cannot be certain who receives support from the regime, this divide
andAsrulewe discussed
strategy createsin this chapter,
suspicion authoritarians
and distrust have adapted
among the opposition to changes
and prevents
engaging format.
in their external
their forma-
environment.
tion Democracies, therefore, cannot afford to be complacent. To remain dominant,
of a unified front.
they must engage in the same process of learning and adaptation as their autocratic peers.
Elite rotation AuthoritAriAn ins tAbilit y And bre Akdown 141
Authoritarian leaders may also regularly shuffle high-level government officials to ensure that
no one individual is able to establish a personal following or base of support (Migdal, 1988).
Key Questions Key Questions
Key Questions
This practice also enables leaders to breed loyalty among their inner circle. By creating a system
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability, public officials come to realize they depend on
1. are
How do autocracies collaborate? Provide andexamples from ofcurrent events.
and indebted to the leader for their selection maintenance power. This
1. Why is the difference between ‘authoritarian breakdown’ and ‘democratization’ significant?
was a favoured
tactic of Zaire’s Mobutu. A New york Times correspondent wrote in 1988, ‘Every six months or so,
Each chapter features a set of carefully devised questions
2. Levitsky and Way argued that Western efforts to establish linkages with other countries could
2.Mr.How
Mobutudoesshuffles
economic crisis affect
the Cabinet, an authoritarian
with some regime’s
ministers moving risk of
up, others putbreakdown?
on the street and a
encourage and sustain democracy. Why do such linkages work? What is the potential for this
few put in jail on graft or nepotism charges . . . the shuffling makes it hard for anyone to become to help you assess your comprehension of core concepts
dynamic
3.a recognized
What are thetoprimary
rival work
to theinPresident.’
reverse—for
external greater
3factors that
Similarly, authoritarian
affect
Acemoglu linkages
authoritarian
et al. wrote to promote
regime
that autocracy?
stability?
Zairian In your opin-
government
ion, should
officials
3. Should were theoutside actors
‘constantly
United
ever seek
reminded
States of andtheto destabilize authoritarian
precariousness
other Westernofdemocratic
regimes?
tenure by the What
frequency
countries of factors
office did
intervene
you
in non- and facilitate critical reflection on key arguments.
consider
rotation, in developing
which simultaneously your response?
fuels the hopes of those Zairians anxiously waiting just outside
democracies to support human rights and democracy?
the portals of power’ (2004, p. 168).
4. What were the most significant causes of the Arab Spring? Which other regimes or regions
4. How might Russia and China undermine democracy? Even if they do not intend to export
are most based
Promoting vulnerableloyalty,
to a wave of protests? Why?
their models on weeding
of authoritarianism, out
whatcompetence
are the different pathways that their actions could
5.Authoritarian leaders
affectfactors
What levels often promote
of democracy
or conditions regimethe
globally?
increase officials based on
likelihood thatloyalty
elite rather thanwill
divisions competence
occur? When are
andelite divisions likely to lead to regime change? the emergence of skilful and/or ambi-
may sideline their most capable advisors to prevent
tious challengers. Georgy Egorov and Constantin Soninefforts
5. How can we distinguish between Russian to interferethat,
(2011) underscore in ‘while
democratic
incompe- societies and
6.tent Western
Pick
ministers efforts
a current
are not to supportunusual
autocracy—such
completely democracy
as in
Russia,abroad?
China,
democratic Zimbabwe,
countries, most or North and
historians Korea—and
political discuss
how the
scientists regime
would agreecould break down.
that dictatorships arePosit a scenario,
especially marredor byaincompetence’
series of events, that could result in
(p. 904).
Such
political
preferencebreakdown
authoritarian
parties
cate that
for loyalty is in
theorcountry
militariesyou
most
thepronounced
thatselected
country you
can incorporate
in personalist
selected. What
and harness
was becoming
dictatorships,
lessskilled
stable?
whichyou
signs would lacklook
strong
bureaucrats in a manner less Further Reading
for to indi-
Further Reading
threatening to the regime. In the personalist dictatorship under Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican
Diamond, L. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the Reading lists support you to broaden your understanding
Further ReadingSteven Greenhouse, New York Times, 24 May 1988.
World. Macmillan. 3
The Sprit of Democracy explains why democracy advances and how this process takes place. The of key academic literature and pursue areas of further
book argues
Huntington, that
S.P., many
2006. authoritarian
Political Order inregimes like Iran
Changing or China
Societies. Yalecould democratize
University Press. eventually but
the book
Political also central
Order’s highlights some
thesis of the
is that challenges
contrary to building
to previous democracy
works, economicin growth
the world andtoday, and
devel- research interest.
why there
opment doeshas
notbeen a democratic
always recession
lead to stability, butin some
may previously
actually have democratic
the oppositestates likeStates
effect. Venezuela.
that
are seeing
Knack, their ‘Does
S., 2004. institutions decaying
Foreign may face
Aid Promote growing instability
Democracy?’ during
International periods
Studies of change
Quarterly, 48(1),
and
pp.reform.
251–66.
As the article
Magaloni, indicates,
B., 2006. theAutocracy:
Voting for question of whether or
Hegemonic notSurvival
Party foreign aid
andpromotes
Its Demisedemocracy
in Mexico. is
explored. University
Cambridge The articlePress.
argues that there is no evidence that foreign aid does contribute to
democracy.
Voting for Autocracy explains how the PRI regime in Mexico was able to hold elections con-
tinuously B.,
Wejnert, during
2014.its eight decades
Diffusion in power
of Democracy: Theand still
Past and maintain
Future ofitself in power.
Global The book
Democracy. also
Cambridge
explains the factors
University Press. that impacted the PRI’s eventually fall in 2000.
Diffusion G.,
O’Donnell, of Democracy
Schmitter, explores theWhitehead,
P.C., and causes of democratic
L., 1986.diffusion
Transitionsand from
argues that networks
Authoritarian
between
Rule: democratic
Southern states1).
Europe (Vol. and authoritarian
JHU Press. regimes are more important to democratization
than
This foreign
edited aid. offers interesting case studies on how authoritarian regimes in Italy,
volume
Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Portugal transitioned from authoritarian rule. The book also offers
what prospects each case had to democratize.
Tucker, J. A. (2007). ‘Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-communist
Colored Revolutions’. Perspectives on Politics, 5(03), 535–51.
This article focuses on the post-communist Colour Revolutions and demonstrates how elec-
toral fraud can serve as a trigger to mobilize opponents of authoritarian regimes to action.
How to use the Online Resources
www.oup.com/he/kendall-taylor
For students
Updates to supplement the text ensuring you are fully informed of the latest developments in
the field.
For lecturers
Assignments to use in class help to reinforce key concepts and facilitate the development of
key skills of critical analysis and argumentation.
1
Introduction
Democracy is in crisis. By most accounts, this is the most trying period democracy has
faced since the 1930s when fascism spread over much of Europe. Even the most opti-
mistic observers posit that democracy will decline unless rich countries address vexing
challenges such as inequality, cultural and demographic shifts, and technological change.
Pessimists fear we have already crossed a critical threshold and that the democratic
dominance we have grown accustomed to has ended (Rose, 2018). A 2019 report by
Freedom House underscored the gravity of the crisis. The democracy watchdog docu-
mented that global political rights and civil liberties have declined for thirteen consecu-
tive years—the longest downward slide since the organization began measuring these
trends over forty years ago.
Some of the decline in political and civil liberties has occurred in the usual authori-
tarian suspects such as China and Russia. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Russian President Vladimir Putin have increased repression to retain control. Their
efforts to export their authoritarian tactics and models to sympathetic leaders have
also contributed to a broader ‘authoritarian hardening’ as several autocrats have tight-
ened control. But perhaps more importantly, the observed erosion in political and civil
liberties has increasingly taken place outside of the usual suspects, including in many
long-established democracies. In the last five years there has been a remarkable decline
in respect for democratic norms and practices in Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines.
The backsliding has been so severe in Turkey—a long-time model of a successful secu-
lar democracy in the Middle East—that we can no longer call it a democracy. In short,
there is a real risk that the democratic gains that have occurred since the end of the
Cold War will be rolled back, paving the way for a widespread resurgence of autocracy
across the globe.
How did we get here? After all, for the last twenty-five years, momentum had been
squarely on democracy’s side. In 1991, there were sixty-five democracies in power
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018). By 2014, this number climbed to ninety-four, such
that democracies governed a majority of the world’s countries. The end of the Cold War
and the triumph of democracy set in motion a number of changes to the international
2 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Threats to democracy
Today, we face a different reality. Although the number of democracies in the world
remains at or near historic highs, there are a number of important trends accelerat-
ing beneath the surface that threaten to reverse democracy’s progress. In particular,
democracies are facing mounting challenges from within; autocracies are evolving and
adapting their survival strategies in ways that make them a more formidable challenge
to democracy; and international developments, including the growing assertiveness of
influential countries such as China and Russia, are creating conditions conducive to the
spread of autocracy.
These dynamics provide the backdrop, or the broader context in which this book
is situated. We will delve more deeply into many of these issues throughout this text-
book, including through discussions of the contemporary challenges facing d emocracy
(Part IV) and changes in the survival strategies of today’s authoritarian regimes
(Part III). More generally, however, we intend our discussion of the challenges facing
democracy in the next section to set the stage for the chapters that follow. Each of the
following chapters will go on to provide a different lens through which to examine these
challenges. The goal of this book is to provide readers with the foundational research
and cutting-edge insights that deepen their understanding of the challenges facing
democracy and what we can do to respond.
more likely to support strong, decisive leaders they perceive as able to hold back the
forces of change and protect them from what they see as dangerous outsiders that jeop-
ardize their jobs and benefits (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
The rise in the number of citizens that are discontent with inequality, stagnating liv-
ing standards, and changing values is fuelling the political polarization so apparent in
Western democracies today. Information technologies and social media amplify these
divisions. While many authoritarian regimes are harnessing social media to tighten their
control, these same technologies are fraying the social bonds of democratic societies.
The digital technologies that promise to connect people and enable a free exchange of
ideas are increasingly being used by populists and other extreme voices to amplify their
messages. These dynamics have contributed to a decline in popular support for the
political centre and fragmented politics across Europe. Such political polarization and
fragmentation is contributing to gridlock that threatens to undermine people’s support
for democratic rule. The dysfunction that polarization and fragmentation breed also
invigorate Russian and Chinese narratives that democracy does not deliver.
These trends in Western democracies are creating fertile ground for the rise of
opulism. Once in power, many populist parties pursue policies that slowly erode
p
democracy from within. Today’s populist leaders have learned from earlier strongmen
such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, who incrementally undermined democracy. Such leaders assume power
through relatively free and fair elections and subsequently leverage societal dissatisfac-
tion to gradually undercut institutional constraints on their rule, sideline opponents,
and weaken civil society. Despite coming to power in different historical and cultural
contexts, their approach is the same: they stack key political institutions with loyal-
ists and allies (particularly in the judicial and security sectors) and muzzle the media
through legislation and censorship. Their slow and piecemeal approach makes it dif-
ficult to pinpoint when the collapse of democracy actually happens (Bermeo, 2016;
Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016).
The gradual erosion of democratic rules and norms at the hands of democratically-
elected incumbents, what scholars refer to as ‘authoritarianization’ (Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz, 2018), constitutes a major change in the ways that democratic governments
have traditionally collapsed. Until recently, coups have been the biggest threat to democ-
racy (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016). From 1946 to 1999, 64 per cent of democracies
collapsed via coups. In the last decade, however, authoritarianizations have been on
the rise. They now comprise 40 per cent of all democratic failures and equal coups in
frequency. If current trends persist, authoritarianizations will soon become the most
common route to autocracy.
today’s aspiring autocrats have learned that incremental power grabs are far more dif-
ficult to oppose. Because they are slow and subtle, there is no single action that generates
a massive backlash. And in those instances where opponents do sound the alarm bell
that democracy is under threat, populist leaders can easily frame them as unpatriotic
provocateurs who solely seek to stir trouble.
But it is not just the tactics that autocrats use to seize power that have evolved.
Autocracies are also adapting their survival strategies in ways that make them a more
formidable challenge to democracy. In the face of what seemed to be an inevitable
extinction in the 1990s and early 2000s, dictators changed their strategies and grew
more resilient. As an indicator of this, research shows that today’s authoritarian
regimes are more long-lasting than their predecessors. From 1946 to 1989, the typical
autocracy lasted fourteen years in power. This number has nearly doubled since the
end of the Cold War to an average of twenty years. As authoritarian regimes become
more durable and savvier, global democracy is likely to suffer (Kendall-Taylor and
Frantz, 2015).
One of the most notable changes in contemporary authoritarian regimes is the extent
to which they have learned to mimic democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, there
has been a substantial rise in the number of countries that combine democratic charac-
teristics with authoritarian tendencies. These ‘hybrid’ regimes—the broad label used to
describe countries that mix democratic and authoritarian elements—have proliferated
to such an extent that scholars contend they are now ‘the modal type of political regime
in the developing world’ (Schedler, 2006, p. 3; Brownlee, 2007). Hybrid systems adjust
their survival tactics and pursue a softer, subtler form of authoritarian rule. Whereas
autocracies of the past relied heavily on overtly repressive methods of control and were
more likely to ban political activities, censor opponents, and limit public demonstra-
tions of dissent to maintain power, today’s autocrats often embrace seemingly demo-
cratic institutions and rule of law, but manipulate these institutions to serve their own
self-interests.
Authoritarian regimes have similarly adapted to manage the threats initially
posed by social media. In the early 2000s, there was widespread optimism that
social media would serve as a great democratizing force. Such optimism was most
pronounced in the early days of the Arab Spring, as political activists harnessed
social media in their efforts to topple four long-lasting dictators in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen. Over time, however, authoritarian regimes have co-opted these
technologies to deepen their grip internally, curb basic human rights, spread illib-
eral practices beyond their borders, and undermine public trust in open societies.
New advances in facial recognition and artificial intelligence will only intensify
and accelerate these practices. China, for example, is developing new methods of
political control, including mass surveillance and a data-driven ‘social credit’ sys-
tem. These dystopian approaches raise serious concerns, including their potential
to spread to other parts of the developing world. In sum, since the end of the Cold
War, dictators have evolved to withstand and even flourish amid a changing global
landscape.
Introduction 5
International developments
In addition to changes taking place within democracies and authoritarian regimes, there
have also been changes in the international environment that are conducive to the spread
of autocracy. As Western democracies are increasingly distracted with their own domestic
challenges, authoritarian regimes—especially Russia and China—have grown more asser-
tive on the global stage. Russia and China are convinced of the threat of Western-backed
revolutions and have responded by adapting their survival tactics and exporting their
best practices for guarding against the ‘threat’ of engagement with the democratic West.
Russian and Chinese efforts to counter democracy promotion are not new. But they have
changed in scope and intensity. Since 2014, Russia in particular has gone on the offensive
with its efforts to undermine Western democracies. Because Moscow and Beijing gauge
their power in relation to the United States, they view weakening Western democracy as a
means of enhancing their own standing (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2018).
Shifts in geopolitical power are increasing the potency of Russian and Chinese actions.
China’s rise and Russia’s assertiveness provide other leaders with examples of viable alter-
natives to the West and alter perceptions about what constitutes a legitimate regime. For
the past few decades, China in particular has sought to portray itself as a compelling
alternative to democracy. According to the World Bank, China’s GDP growth has aver-
aged nearly 10 per cent a year—the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in
history—and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty. Many now view
China as demonstrating that the road to prosperity no longer needs to run through liberal
democracy. Even without a deliberate strategy to export his model of governance, Putin
has also offered one that others seek to emulate. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for example, seem to admire Putin’s strong-
man tactics and have adopted elements of his repertoire to enhance their control.
Beyond demonstration effects, a shift in the balance of economic and military power
away from the democratic West is increasing the potency of the threat that countries
such as Russia and China pose to democracy. For decades, established democracies
such as the United Kingdom and the United States made up the bulk of global GDP. But
now, for the first time in over a hundred years, democracies’ share of global GDP has
fallen below half (Mounk and Foa, 2018). According to forecasts by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), it will slump to a third within the next decade. Moreover, U.S.
President Trump is scaling back U.S. global leadership and disrupting the cohesion of
the democratic alliance system.
These geopolitical changes amplify the effects of long-standing Russian and Chinese
actions by enabling these countries to engage with a broader spectrum of states. China’s
rising power and Russia’s assertiveness allow them to increase political, economic, and
military ties with many states at once—as the United States did in the aftermath of
the Cold War—creating greater opportunities to encourage authoritarian tendencies.
But even beyond buttressing like-minded autocrats, Russia’s and China’s international
activism may also work to weaken democracies. Research shows that extensive linkages
with the West (through aid, trade, and social networks) encouraged democracy and its
6 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
consolidation after the Cold War (Levitsky and Way, 2005). Although neither Russia nor
China seek to export their authoritarian models, their growing ties now raise the risk of
a growing global tide of authoritarianism.
These trends highlight some of the critical challenges we face today in preserving the
democratic gains that have accrued since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, democra-
cies are facing internal threats that are shaking the very foundations of these systems.
Autocracies are adapting and evolving their tactics in ways that make them a more for-
midable threat to democracy. And international developments, including the growing
assertiveness of influential countries like China and Russia, are trending in ways that
are increasingly conducive to the spread of autocracy.
I can hardly tell the reason, but the fact seems to be, that the ass,
an honest and somewhat stupid animal, seems to have given rise to
more fables than any other beast, except the fox. I have already told
some fables in which this long-eared personage is made to utter a
great many wise things. I am now going to tell another fable, in which
the creature is represented as talking rather foolishly.
A man was once going along the road with an ass, whom he
treated somewhat roughly, upon which the beast first whisked his
long tail, and then groaned, and finally spoke outright. “It seems to
me, sir,” said the honest creature, “that you use me very ill,
particularly as I belong to a race of great antiquity, and one that has
been honored above all four-footed beasts!”
“Why, how’s that?” said the man.
“How’s that? indeed!” said the ass. “If you had read the Bible as
much as you should, you would remember that it was one of my
ancestors which conversed with a prophet, and stood in the
presence of an angel on a certain occasion. This is an honor which
belongs exclusively to the ass family, of which I am one, and
therefore it seems meet that you should treat me with proper
respect.”
“Well done!” said the countryman; “well done! poor brute. This is
ever the way. It seems to be with asses as with men: when one has
no merit of his own, he always boasts the dignity of his family, or the
virtues of his ancestors. For my part, I know of nothing that sinks a
beast or a man lower, than to see him attempt to cover up his own
vices, or weakness, or folly, by showing off the dignity of his
pedigree, or the respectability of his connections.” Then, giving the
ass a somewhat contemptuous kick, the man passed on.
Travelling Beehives.—In Switzerland, the traveller often sees a
man trudging up the mountains with a hive of bees on his back. The
people move the bees, because they know how good change of
place is for them. This, too, is done almost everywhere in Scotland.
In France, they put their hives into a boat, some hundreds together,
which floats down the stream by night, and stops by day. The bees
go out in the morning, return in the evening, and when they are all at
home, and quiet, the boat floats on.
Architecture of Birds.