-?

' l"(i'tLtv
+I lL
hft"
/
I J'
,-/ THE I.IAR-PRONEN
vV
--t"'*'

N{/
'x/
L,
Y)/
)J

more recent emP

si"tuation. In one ,
t17
9\ more attthoritaria
\\ /').,
,.t1,/

L/', \.' censorship - aPP

al "freer" nations,
\b
L-/ ,r (1968) uncovered
between internal
and foreign-confli
In a less acadet
ican business jour
The War-Proneness of Democratic ysis that allegedll
examined the re1
proneness and cll
Regtmes, 1816-1965. the belief in the '
wars have been ft
elective governm(
elective governmi
Melvin Small and J. David Singer forty-three in 19:
tions is tirat "elet
for peace" (pp. 5,
INTRODUCTION Such a conclu
Political theorists as disparate as Mac.hiavelli and Woodrow Wilson have who have growll
contended that democracies are less belligerent than autocracies' lndeed, it is so st
Whether the allegedly pacific nature of such polities is I result of bu- those searching f
reaucratic sluggishness or of a more fundamental humaneness on the contemporarY int
part of the masses (as opposed to the moral insensitivity of dictatorial
suggested as mu
leaders), the relative peace-proneness of democratic states is still ac- 1,000 letters and
cepted as axiomatic in many circles. Even after their nations have pattici'
To be sure, t-he ,
pated in, or even initiated, long and bloody wars, citizens of democratic
demonstrated th
regimes often cling to this cherished belief.
\ The historical evidence for such a proposition, however, is not en-
' Though he uses \
tirely convincing. For example, in his monumental Stud1, 6f War "no one has ever mo
'(1942),
Quincy Wright concluded that the statistics did not show "that peace" (p. 55).
3 The concluding
democracies have been less often involved in war than autocractes P
maior stimulus ,o wa
(p. 8a1). Although he concurred that democracies were potentially more peace, he urges that v
peaceful than autocracies, the historical record did not support the policies of free nationr
proposition up through the completion of his study in 1941.1 Nor does thb rest of the world"
o There is also an i
* Special thanks are due fuc Stoli who helped with our statisticai analyses. The Correlates of accuracy of Montesqu:
War Project is supported by the National Science Foundation under grant GS-28476X1. smaller and weaker st
t For a summary ones are clearly the n
of the literature, see Wright (pp. 839-48). states will be less wa
Montesquieu and acce
50 The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4, Summ er 1976 credence to the F-renci
 THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC
REGIMES 5l

more recent empirical investigation support or even clarify

-
situation. In one analysis, East and Cregg (1961)found - the
that states with
more authoritarian regimes
- as reflecied in their practices of press
lt^".oThip - appeared to exhibit more foreign-conflict behavior than
"freer" nations. But working with the same basic data, wilkenfeld
(1968) uncovered a more complex pattern
reflecting the relationship
between internal and foreign ctnnict
as well as between regime type
and foreign-conflict behavior.
In a less academic enterprise, a recent issue of the influential Amer-
ican business journal Induitrlal Research prominently featured an
rnocratic ysis that allegedly ends the debate
forever. In this study, Babst lgjZ)
(
anal-

examined the relationship between

type of political regime and war-
proneness and claimed to
) demonstrate two principles associated with
the belief in the peaceful nature of
democra.lrr., Th. first is that,.no
wars.have been fought lsince l]89)
elective governments-" The second
between independent nations with
is that the number of nations with
4 -t--
l',iu
elective governments has risen from t.1
Singer one (the United States) in 1800 to
forty-three in 1950. The conclusion emerging from these two proposi- 'h.r'
t' ,l

tions is that "elective government . . . becomes a relentless social force +r +J

for peace" (pp. 55, 5g).3
1,,
* 2\'

Jrow Wilson have

han autocracies.
is a result of bu-
maneness on the
'ity of dictatorial contemporary international relations.
The editor of IncJustrial Research
suggested as much when he reported that his journal received over
states is still ac-
:ions have partici- letters and 3,000 opinion questionnaires concerning this subject.
1,000
ns of democratic
To be sure, the Babst presentation was impressive, especially when he
demonstrated that it was most unlikeiy,
in a probabilistic sense, for
wever, is not en-
? Though
I Stud1, of l,lar he uses Wright's data and cites the
"no one has ever mounted Study of lilar, Babstnevertheless claims that
i not show "that peace" (p. 55).
a major research project
designed to examine ways ol waging
ran aut0cracies" .3
The concluding paragraph of Babst's
article could, paradoxically enough, turn out to be a
potentially more major stimulus io wat. That is, .ft", *ugg.rting tlhat elective governments were a force for
peace' he urges that we discover
not support the policies of free nations can be
how sucl"goueinments came into being so that the "foreign
formulat"a **" .ii""tively to assist the gradual conversion of
1941.1 Nor does the rest of the world,, (p. 5g).
a There
is also an interesting logical argument
in favor of this proposition, if one grants the
'ses. The Correlates of of Montesquieu's assertion that republics
1""Yluty can only flourish in small states. That is, r/
GS-28476X1. smalier and weaker states are more
likely to be democratic, and since the larger and stronger
ones are clearly the most war-prone (Singer
and Small 19,12), it follows that the democratic
states will be less war-prone.
Of course, ever sin." Thomas Jelferson decided to abandon
rYrontesquleu and accept
the landfall of the Louisiana purchase in 1803, few have given much
t. 4, Summer i976 credence to the French political -
philosopher,s ,fr.J.
 52 MELVIN SMALL AND I. DAVID.SINGER THE WAR.PRONENESS OF DEML

democracies to compile such a peaceful record by chance

aione. Never- how much of the variance in
theless, given wright's findings as weri as the invisibility each protagonist, the Problem '
of' some of
Babst's coding rules, we decided to conduct a modest investigation Since we sought onlY to ide
7 of
our own into the relationship between democratic regimes and their saivo or crossed an undisPuted
ii war-proneness.
\ a strong historical consensus ar
one peculiar case, the one-daY
GENERATING THE DATA patterl was so sYmmetric that
In order to examine the superficiarly credible proposition, we had to In one other case the designa
generate two sets of data. The first of these reflected
the incidence of Indians clearlY Provoked the
the nations' war experiences and the second differentiated between areas in 1962, acaotding to ot
"regimes with freely elected governments,, and those
of a less demo_ initiated hostilities when theY
cratic cast.
ln the extrasYstemic' as o1
wars, we did not designate tht
Measuring Llar Experiences in that part of our analYsis c
ment and war initiation' We e
are all imPerial or colonial wa
bers, usuallY EuroPean, are al
the colonials maY have fired
ation, the imPerialist Power \
when it first forced itself uPor

Classiff it
While generating the war datz
coding, classification, quanti{
manageable. There is a fair cc
tutes a sovereign state, a war I

the predictor variable - regir

came appreciablY more com
accepted' tyPologY of natior
preferences in this regard w
nationalitY, generation, Polit
there were a widelY accePte
equally delicate matter of' d'
gories during which Years' G
loosed upon us bY Politic
In addition,
we needed to determine one other characteristic
of each students of comParative got
war - the identity of the nation (or coalition) that initiated tunate, but also somewhat sr
hostilities.
y's can be imagined, this was not always a simpre or crear-cut matter.
though we.were not, at this eariy juncture, trying to u Latet on in the Project, we hoPe
/:::" identify the
\aggressor or those parties that were most to blame, nor to estimate general question of aggression, but to
reflecting the moves and countermo'
s For a complete research strategy and priorities of the
discussion of our procedures, see Singer and Small.
' A first-rate survey of recent atter
J, DAVID SINGI.R THE PRO,,VdI/CSS OF DE]VIOCRATIC REGIMES 53
'I)AR
ance alone. Never- how much of the variance in the onset of war was accounted for bv
bility of some of each protagonist, the problem was a troublesome one.6
st investigatioit ol Since we sought only to identify the nation that either fired the first
regimes and their salvo or crossed an undisputed bor,rndary in force, we were able to find
a strong historical consensus around most of the fifty interstate wars. In
one peculiar case, the one-day naval war of Navarino Bay of 1g27, the
,,Tpattern was so symmetric that we were unable to designate an initiator.
rsition, we hac'l to In one other case the designation was far from obvious: arthough the
I the ir-rcidence of Indians clearly provoked the chinese by moving into disputed border
entiated betlveen areas in 7962, acaording to our criteria we deemed the chinese to have
e of a less demo- initiated hostilities when they began shooting.
In the extrasystemic, as opposed to the intrasystemic (interstate),
wars, we did not designate the initiator and thus did not include them
in that part of our analysis distingr-rishing between mere war involve- i
r build upon the ment and war initiation. we excluded them because extrasystemic wars i
Wright. Beginning are all imperial or colonial wars and, by definition, the interstate mem- \ -.
,rious wars for-rght bers, usually European, are always the initiators. That is, even though \'--
n the Congress of the colonials may have fired the first shot in a specific war for liber- \ -
Lt it led to at least ation, the imperialist power was deemed to have initiated the conilis!---'
rsonnel we as- when it first forced itself upon them.
rnset and termin-
rtes of its partici-
. participant. The wlrire gerierating the ':::'l:,il"1:':*y:,:":#::rrise, the prohrems_sr_ : /
ur entire volLrme, .coding, classification, quantification and enumeration *"r. .rr"nti"rrr- ,. / I
vars in the period manageable. There is a fair conseniui arnong sffiGrsls--To=.what consti- 'J
:ign state on each tutes a sovereign srate, a war and a battle death. But when we turned [o j^
h state was pitted the predictor variable regime type the classification problems be- L-;'d*\
emic war'). These came appreciably more complex. First of all, there is no generally
accepted'typology of national regimes or governmental types; one's iru^."t1"'*- \
. ,l--o
;onnected deatlts
se data, one cirn preferences in this regard will be-parti-arivlo-rlargely) a function of
nces ol the states nationality, generation, political ideology and so forth.T And even if
6-196-5. EquallY there vvere a widely accepted typology, there would stil remain the
rir-re which states equally delicate nrattei of deciding wt-licti states fell into which cate-
w long, aud with gories during which years. Given the torrent of verbiage that has been
loosed Ltpon Lis by political philosophers, lawyers, historians and
acteristic of each students of comparative government, this lacuna is not oniy unfor-
tiated hostilities. tunate, but also somewhat surprising. we have our suspicions as to the
clear-cut matter.
u
rg to identilY the Later on in the project, we hope to arrive at evidence that sheds some light on the more
general question of aggression, but to do so we must hrst generate and then analyze those data
, nor to estimate reflecting the moves and countermoves oi nations engaged in prervar conflicts. The overall
research strategy and priorities of the Correlates of War Project are discussed in Singer (1972).
' A first-rate survey of recent attempts in this area is May (1973).
 54 MELVIN SMALL AND J. DAI/ID SINGER THE WA,R.PRONENPSS A

epistemological and methodological (as well as psychological) roots ol the amonnt of freedor
the impasse, but need not venture into that particular thicket here. states. No type of regin:
Rather. let us proceed to describe the scheme we used and the rationale stupidity, incompetence
that lies behind it. Considering these car
After a careful perusal of some representative ellorts to classify pol- geois democracies all tI
itical regimes around the world rn the past two centuries, we linally periodrcally scheduled e
settled for the limited objective of differentraturg between the type ol to run as government 1

"democratic" regime that most believers in democratic peacefulness the adr-rlt populatiou w
seemed to have in mind, and all others. That is, we limited ourselves to lor (c) a parliament thi
.14 l a rather crude dichotomy. Among th_q1_riteria often invoked under such executive br:inch of gor
l ab e l s as " d e m o c r at i c, " " re p re s e n t a t ive' -oT-@iliarn e-nta ry, " w e fin d a reditary rulers with circ
\:l legislative body that is latfairly representative of rnosl classes:(bldoh- irxample - were includ,
inant over or at least equal to tire executive'(O cb-Itposed of candida.tes ular1y elected parliamer
1; put forward by two or more parties or lactions, each of which is fairly lree Germany of the turn o
to criticize the other(s) and contest in d elections; only the most limited ar
and (d) eleetedby-A fal{_l.e.ttq1 o! tle t{rt!!_population. -some Several states met th
modificat'ion-{described beiow)_, rve u_sed these cifteria,an_d_!i-be1ed'-those trage isstte: England un
natious that satislied them as "bourgeois' dcinb.rlcies." its electoral reform ol
There are. of colrrse. liabilities associated with this label, just as there 1887. During the peri
are with such 1abe1s as "parliantentary," "constitutional," "freely failed to meet our reial
elected," "pluralistic," "1ibera1," "polycentric," etc. For some, the obvior.ts, but reasonable
term "bourgeois" is highly pejorative; we use it in the literal - attd 1919 and Israel in 194
historical - sense to indicate that social class to which this form of war before elections co
democracy was originally (and perhaps still is) attractive or acceptable. on the eve of their wars
More particr.tlarly, it was the bourgeoisie wllo were most successful itt We reiterate that we
overturning the more autocratic regimes in Europe, the Far East and those states that do n
the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth and early twentietlt Whether these others
centuries. Further, we introduced this adjective to distinguish between syncretic, oligarchlc. fa
that historical type of regime and the more contemporary "socialistic - to sllggest some of
democracies" or "peopie's democracies." While the latter ofterr have exercise. We are addres
regular elections as rvell as a wider franchise than their boLtrgeois the rvar experietrce of
counterparts, they usually do not feature organized opposition parties states that have Partici
or executives subordinate to a parliamentary body. Neediess to say, ive The basic data gent
are not suggesting that opposition-party states always assure a wide or J'ables 1 and 2 wirere n
clear electoral choice, or that "responsible executives" always serre cal order, together witl
under the effective authority of the legislature. Nor are we discussiirg pants tliat maintained
italicized. Wars 1 throu
s Babst lists his criteria for a freell, elected government (a) legislation and finances con- tliose fought betweeu '
- bI
trolled by a legislature chosen in periodic elections, (b) administrative control of government national system. Wars
leaders elected by citizens, (c) present hts ltstoL
secret ballot and civil liberties - but does not systemic wars - those
as h:
sources. Further, he seems not to have been concerned with the size of the electorate'
i83l lnd system and a political
does mention that Engtand after 1832 was a freely elected government. Between
1867, only three percent of the electorate was eligible to participate in British elections' latter category include

iiiiillriii
WALL AND J. DAVID SII/GER
psychological) roots of
:11 as
particular thicket here.
that
me we used and the rationale
ntative efforts to classify pol-
ast two centuries, we finallv r\
ntiaring between the type oi Y'
; in democratic peacefulnessp{'
hat is, we limited ourselves to y'
:ria often invoked under such x.,r
rr "parliamentary," we find a
Ltive of most classes; (b) dom- \
:; (c) composed of candidates
U ularly elected parliament alone was not sufficient for qualification. The
)ns, each of which is fairly free
'egularly scheduled elections;
dult population.s With some
rese criteria and labeled those
emocracies. " its electoral reform of 1882, and Holland until a comparable reform in
,d with this label, just as there
,r" "constitutional," "freely
)entric," etc. For some, the
e use it in the literal - and
class to which this form of
ili is) attractive or accepta.ble.
who were most'successlul in
in Europe, the Far East and
eteenth and earlY twentieth
iective to distinguish between
ore contemporary "socialistic
' While the latter often have
anchise than their bourgeois
r organized oPPosition Parties
.ary body. Neediess to saY, we
;tates always assure a wide or
ible executives" alwaYs serve
slature. Nor are we discussing
nent - (a) legislation and hnances con'
rdministrative control of government by
rerties - but does not present his list of
rd with the size of the electorate, as he
,lected government. Between 1832 and
: participate in British elections'
THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEM@CRATIC REGIMES 55
the amount of freedom, equality or even classic democracv in such
states. No type of regime has demonstrated a monopoly on brutisharess.
J* . ,
stupidity, incompetence or inhumanity.
C n,t *'7*,,,)*'
' considering these caveats, then, we included in the categorliof bor.- "'.jo^/.-.
geois democracies all those nations from" 1g16 to l9€jtrai (a) rreta "w- |
periodically scheduled elections in which opposition pffiiwere as free
to run as government parties, and in which (b) at least ten percent of i;
the adult population was allowed to vote either directly or indirectly
i
for (c) a parliament that either controlled or enjoyed parity with thl :
executive branch of government. constitutional monarchies having he-
reditary rulers with circumscribed powers
- England and Belgium, for
example - were included in this category. But the existence of a pop-
Germany of the turn of this century featured a parliament which held..-
only the most limited authority over the Kaiser.
/ Several states met the parliamentary criterion but failed on the suf-
.frage
issue: England until the Second Reform Bill of 1867, Italy until
1887. During the periods prior to these rerorms, all of these states
failed to meet our relatively modest ten percent suffrage criterion. Less
obvious, but reasonable and consistent, we note that Czechoslovakia in
1919 and Israel in 1948 - both "declared" repubrics participated in
-
war before elections could be held. Thus they had not met our criteria
on the eve of their wars.
we reiterate that we are not here interested in differentiating among
those states that do not fit into our bourgeois democratic category.
whether these others were juntas, cabars, military dictatorships, or
syncretic, oligarchic, fascist, communist, socialist or personalist regimes
- to suggest some of the possibilities - is irrelevant to our limited
exercise. we are addressing only the following question: what has been
the war ex-pq1igngq. .pf .hpurgp.sis__.-d,e-qro,_Era9"Lp_A"-_q-o^mp_el9d tij_-ihG offif
stateS that have parti9ipat,eQ..i13-i4t-_e-rn-ationaL w_a{ f_rgm-- iSiO
lq tg6.5?
The basic data generated to handle this question are presented in
Tables 1 and2 where we list the wars from 1816 to 1965 in chronologi-
cal order, together with their dates, participants and initiators. partici-
pants that maintained bourgeois democratic governmental systems are
italicized. wars I through 50, displayed in Table 1, are interstate wars
those fought between two or more independent members of the inter-
-
national system. wars 51 through 93, presented in Table 2, are extra-
systemic wars - those fought between one or more members of the
system and a political entity that did not qualify for membership. The
latter category includes colonies such as Algeria, engaged in war with
 THE WAR.PRONENESS OF I
MELVIN SMALL AND J. DAVID
SINGER

Date
1g62, and such independent but Name
French forces from 1g54 through English in 1845 and
unrecogniz"O as the Sikhs' who fought the
",iitl"' t2. Spanish-Moroccan 1859-6(
1 848.
preliminary and tentative probe' While our Italo-Roman
Clearly, we are engaged in a 13. 1850
and unlikeiy to command any sort of
scheme is far from operational
that it is at least adequate for the limited t4 Italo-Sicilian i 860-6
elobal assent, we teti"ve
a subsequent report' we wili develop
purposes of the inquiry at hand' In plan to 15. Franco-Mexican 1862-6'
a more *o'" topt'isticated and more operational
"o*pi"i", year' that have been active partici- Ecuadorian- i853
classify all of it'" "ei*tt' y"u'by
16.
we will be able not only to Colombian
pants in the international system' Then
bourgeois democracies to those of
compare ,f,t *u' experiences of
17. Second Schleswig' 1864
general
also to explore the more Holstein
other states that engaged in wat' but
type and the frequency' magnitude
... relationstip uti*"t'i fo'""''*"ntal by our 18. SPanish-Chilean 1865-6
,i' of *u' through the century and a half covered
and severit, 19. Austro-Prussian 1866
lt" study.

Table 1
20. Franco-Prussian 1870-
INTERSTATE WARS, 1816-1965
21. Russo-Turkish 187'7'
Initiator(s)
Name Date ParticiPants
22. Pacific r879-
France
1823 Frcnce I SPain
Franco-SPanish
23. Sino-French 1884-
/ TurkeY Unclear
t82T England, France, Russia
Navarino BaY
24. Central American 1885
Russia
t828-29 Russia / TurkeY
3. Russo-Turkish
United Srutes
25. Sino-JaPanese I894-
4. Mexican-American 1846-48 Mexico / tlnited States
Sardinia
Greco-Turkish 1897

1848-49 Austria-HungarY / Sardinia

Austro-Sardinian
Prussia
21 . Spanish-American 1898
84 8-49 Denmark / Prussia
6. First Schleswig- 1
1904-
Holstein
28. Russo-JaPanese
France
7. Roman RePublic 184 9 France, Two Sicilies, Austria- 29. Central American 1906
HungarY i Rorze (PaPal States)
30. Central American 1907
Bru:[
-52 Brazil / Argentina
8. La Plata 185 1
31. Spanish-Moroccan 1909
TurkeY et al'
3-56 TurkeY, England, France, Sardinia /
9. Crimean 18s
32. Italo-Turkish 191i
Russia

1 856-57 England / Persia

England
33. First Balkan l9l2
10. Anglo-Persian

France, Sardinia / Austria-Hungary

Austrla- 34. Second Balkan 1913
11. Italian IndePendence. 1859 Hungary
ND J. DAYID SINGER THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 57

uch independent but Name Date Participants Initiator(s)

e English in 1845 and
12. Spanish-Moroccan 1859*60 Spain / Morocco Spain
"ative probe. While our
:ommand any sort of 13. Italo-Roman 1860 Italy / Papal States Italy
quate for the limited 14. Italo-Sicilian 1 860-6 1 Italy / Two Sicilies Italy
:port, we will develop
., operational plan to 15. Franco-Mexican 1862-67 Fratce f Mexico France
re been active partici- 16. Ecuadorian- I 863 Ecuador / Colombia
be able not only to Colombian
Colombia

rocracies to those of -Second

17. Schleswig, 1 864 Prussia, Austria-Hungary f Denmark
lore the more general hussia
Holstein
frequency, magnitude
half covered by our 18. Spanish-Chilean 1 86s -66 Peru, Chile / Spain Spain

19. Austro-Prussian I 866 Hanover, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Prussia, Italy

Wiirttemberg, Hesse Electoral, Hesse
Grand Ducal, Austria-H.ungary /
ltaly, Mecklenburg-schwerin
Prussia,

20. Franco-Prussian 187 0-7 7 Bavaria, Baden, Wiirttemberg, France

965 Prussia / France
.,il
,t'
Initiator(s) 21. Russo-Turkish t8'7 7
-7 I Russia / Turkey Russia

France 22. Pacific 1 87 9-83 Peru, Bolivia / Chile Chile

Turkey Unclear 23. Sino-French 1 884- 8s China f France France

Russia 24. CentilAmerican 1885 Salvador / Guatemala Guatemala

tl,

United States 25. Sino-Japanese 1 894-9s China / Japan China

Sardinia 26. Greco-Turkish t89'.7 Greece f Tttkey Greece

Prussia 27. Spanish-American 189 8 Spain I United States Uttited States

28. Russo-Japanese 1904-0s Russia / Japan Japan

tria- France
tates) 29. Central American 19 06 Guatemala / Honduras, Salvador Guatemala

Brazil 30. Central American 19A7 Nicaragua / Honduras, Salvador Nicaragua

Sardinia / TurkeY et al. 31. Spanish-Moroecan i909-10 Spain / Morocco Spain

32. Itaio-Turkish 19tt-t2 Italy I Tutkey Italy

Engiand
33. First Balkan 19t2-13 Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria i Turkey Greece et al.
-Hungary Austria-
HungarY
34. Second Balkan 1913 Bulgaria f Setbia, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria
Turkey
 THE 1,4)AR-PRONEAIESS OF D}
58 MELVIN SMALL AND J. DAVID ^SINGER

Name Date Participants Initiator(s)

EXTRASYSl
35. World War I 1914-18 Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany et al
Turkey / United States, England, Name
France, Belgium, Port:ugal, ItalY,
Serbia, Greece. Rumania, Russia. 1. British-Maharattan
Japan
2. Greek
36. Hungarian-Aliies i919 Hungary / Rumania, Czechoslovakia Rumania,
Czechoslovakia 3. First Anglo-Burmese

37. Greco-Turkish l9l9-22 Greece / TurkeY Greece 4. Javanese

38. Manchurian 1931-33 China / JaPan Japan 5. Russo-Persian

39. Chaco i932-35 Paraguay / Bolivia Paraguay 6. First Polish

40. Italo-Ethiopian 1935-36 Italy / Ethiopia Italy 7. First Syrian

41. Sino-JaPanese 1937 *41 China / JaPan China 8. Texan

42. Russo-Japanese 1939 Japan / Russia, Mongolia Japan 9. FirstBritish-Afghan

43. World Wat II 1939-45 Germany, Hungary. Italy, Bulgaria, Germany, 10. Second Syrian
Rumania, Finland, JaPan I United Finland et al.
States, England, Belgium, France,
Canada, Brazil, Greece, Holland, 11. Peruvian-Bolivian
Poland, Yugoslavia, Russia, ly'orwa7,
EthioPia, South Africa, Mongolia, 12. First British-Sikh
Australia, New Zealand, IlalY,
Rumania, Bulgaria, China 13. SecondBritish-Sikh

44. Russo-Finnish 1939-40 Russia / Finland Russia 14. Hungarian

i 45. Palestine 1948-49 Israel i Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Syria, Lebanon
I
Lebanon et al. 15. FirstTurco-Montenegran

46. Korean 1950-53 North Korea, Chita I United Srates, North Korea 16. Sepoy Mutiny
Ca nada, Colombia, E n gland, Holland,
Belgium, France, Greece, EthioPia, 11. SecondTurco-Montenegran
TurkeY, South Korea, Thailand,
Philipp in es, Australia 18. Second Polish

4 7. Russo-Hungarian t9s6 Russia / Hungary Russia 19. Lopez

48. Sinai 19s 6 Englond, France, [srael I EgYPt Israel, France'

England 20. Ten Years

49. Sino-Indian 1962 Cllina I India China 21. Dutch-Atchinese

50. Second Kashmir 1 96s Irtdia I Pakistan India 27. Balkan

LL AND J. DAVID S/1/GER THE OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES s9
'IAR-PRONENESS
Table 2
Initiator(s)
EXTRASYSTEMIC WARS, 18I6- 1965
ungary, Buigaria, Germany et al.
tes, England, Name Date Participants
fiuga7,Italy,
Lania, Russia, 1. British-Maharattan 1817- 1B Engiand / Maharattans

2. Greek t82t-28 Turkey / Greeks

Czechoslovakia Rumania,
Czechoslovakia 3. First Angio-Burmese 1823-26 Engiand / Burma

Greece 4. Javanese 1 825-30 Holland / Javanese

Japan 5. Russo-Persian L826-28 Russia / Persia

Paraguay 6. First Polish 18 31 Russia / Poles

Italy 7. First Syrian 1831-32 Turkey / Egyptians

China 8. Texan 1835-36 Mexico / Texans

golia Japan 9. FirstBritish-Afghan t838-42 England / Afghanistan

Italy, Bulgaria, Germany, 10. Second Syrian I 839-40 England, Turkey /

apan I united Finland et a7. Egyptians
jum, France,
ce, Holland, 11. Peruvian-Bolivian 1841 Peru / Bolivia
Russia, NorwaT,
'ca, Mongolia,
12. First British-Sikh t84s-46 England / Sikhs
md,ltily,
lhina 13. SecondBritish-Sikh 1848-49 England / Sikhs

Russia 14. Hungarian 1 84 8-49 Russia, Austria-Hungary i

Hungarians
lordan, SYia, Syria, Lebanon
et al. 15. FirstTurco-Montenegran 1 85 2-53 Turkey i Montenegrans

I United States, North Korea 16. Sepoy Mutiny 1857-59 Engiand / Indians
ingland, Holland,
eece, EthioPia, 17. SecondTurco-Montenegran 18s8-s9 Turkey / Montenegrans
a, Thailand,
18. Second Polish 1 86 3-64 Russia / Poles

Russia 19. Lopez 1864-7 0 Brazil, Argentina /

Paraguay
rcl lEgypt Israel, France'
England 20. Ten Years 1 868-7 8 Spain / Cubans

China 21. Dutch-Atchinese 1873-78 Holland / Atchinese

India 22. Balkan 1 875 -78 Turkey / Balkan peoples

60 MELVIN S]UIALL AND J. DAVID SINGI.R THE 1.4)AR.PRON'IIESS OF DE

Name Date Participants

This general question maY
limited questions: (a) do b<
23. Bosnian 187 8 Austria-Hungary / Bosnians proportionately fewer wars 1

wars shorter or less bloodY

24. SecondBritish-Afghan 1 878-80 England / Afghanistan
(d) do they fight againsl one
25. British-Zulu 1 879 England I Zulus gimes?
In order to answer these <

26. Franco-Indochinese 1 882- 84 France f Indochinese

require a considerably mor,
27. Mahdist 1 8 82-84 England / Sudanese erated. More specifically, we
regimes that have entered it
28. Serbo-Bulgarian i 885 Serbia / Bulgarians
not; tn fact, each state in tt
29. franco-Madagascan 1 894-95 France f Madagascans year. Were that complete a c
and analyze a standard 2X,
30. Cuban 1 895 -98 Spain / Cubans nation:
31. Italo-Ethiopian 1 895 -96 Italy I Ethiopia

32. First Philippine 1 896 -98 Spain / Filipinos

Nation Demo,
33. Second Philippine 1 899-1 902 {Jnited Stdtes / FlliPinos
Year Nonde
34. Boer 1 899- 1902 England f Boers

35. t9t7
Then we would be able to ar
RussianNationalities -2t Russia / Subject PeoPles
of existence in the sYstem v
36. Riffian t92t-26 France, Spain / Riffs by no war entries. Using tht
test for any deviation from
37. Druse t925-27 France f Syrians
by chance alone. In percen
38. Indonesian t945-46 England, Holland I distribution would be one i
Indonesians rndicating that, for each of
39. Indochinese 945 France I Indochinese
ber of each type), democrat
1
-54
thar-r the nondemocratic on
40. Madagascan t947 -48 France f Madagascans there were, let us say, an av
regi rnes as democratic ones
4L. First Kashmir 194'.1-48 India I Kashmiris
be 10% in each of the LlPPer
42. Algerian 1954-62 France f Algerians But as we said, to classil
system is a project we are
43. Tibetan 1 956-59 China / Tibetans
rvould be quite advantageou
prise undertaken by sPeciali
bLrt few scholars seem willi
EXAMINING THE DATA olfer here only a partial anr
Given these coding decisions and the reasoning behind them, the next
step was to bring together the resuiting data sets and begin to exarnine The Frequ
the operative question: how much more or less war-prone have tbe On the matter of mere wal
bourgeois democracies been, compared to all other regimes? comparisons. It shows, for

.*{
. o,ii,*riil,iff,
 i,.*\"
'(n ''*'L 'r '.
1r"du-f
I
MALL AND J. DAVID SII/GER THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 61

This general
"^-2
question may, in turn, be broken down into four more
I

Participants
limited questions: (a) do bourgeois democracies become involved in
Austria-Hungary / Bosnians proportionately fewer wars than nondemocratic regimes? (b) are these
wars shorter or less bloody? (c) do democracies initiate fewer wars?
England / Afghanistan
(d) do they fight against one another less frequentry than do other re-
England lZuJus gimes?
In order to answer these questions in any complete sense, we would
France f lndochinese
require a considerably more extensive data base than has been gen-
England / Sudanese erated. More specifically, we would have to classify not only all those
regimes that have entered into interstate wars, but al1 those that have
Serbia / Buigarians not; in fact, each state in the system would have to be classified each
France I Madagascans year. were that complele a data base available, we could then construct
and analyze a standard 2x2 contingency table year by year for each
Spain / Cubans nation:
Italy lEthiopia
War Entries
Spain / Filipinos Yes No
Nation Democratic
Lrnited States / Filipinos
Year Nondemocratic
England f Boers

Russia / Subject peoples Then we would be able to ascertain how many democratic nation-years
of existence in the system were marked by war entries and how many
France, Spain / Riffs by no war entries. using the chi-square or a similar statistic, we would
test for any deviation from randomness, i.e., what wourd be expected
France I Syians
by chance alone. In percentage terms, of course, a perfectry random
Engtand, Holland I distribution would be one in which each celr showed a value of 25%,
Indonesians indicating that, for each of the 150 years (if there were an equal num-
France I Indochinese ber of each type), democratic nations were neither more nor less likeiy
than the nondemocratic ones to get into or stay out of war. And if
France f Madagascans there were, let us say, an average of four times as many nondemocratic
lndra / Kashmiris
regimes as democratic ones in the typical year, then the figures would
be l0% in each of the upper cells and 40% in each of the lower ones.
France I Algerians t as we said, to classify every state for every year it was in the
system is a project we are unprepared to iaunch at the moment. It
China / Tibetans
would be quite advantageous to the social sciences were such an enter-
prise undertaken by specialists in comparative government and politics,
but few scholars seem willing to become that comparative. Thus we
DATA offer here only a partial and tentative examination of these questions.
soning behind them, the next
lata sets and begin to examine The Frequency of War Involvement
re or less war-prone have the on the matter of mere war involvement Table 3 permits some useful
all other regimes? comparisons. It shows, for the entire 150 years under review, that
 62 t"'tr"iy MELVIN SMALL AND J. DAVID S11/G!-R THE WAR.PRONENESS OF D)

/\ineteen (38%) of the fifty interstate wars included one or more demo- even less demonstrable. Hel
f cratic regimes, and forty-seven (25%) of the 191 nation entries into war tween the .bourgeois demot
/ we.e accounted for by the democracies. And if we divide the epoch and the other warring nat
/ into two periods - with 1871 marking the upsurge in new democratic severity of the different se1
/ regimes - the table shows that fifteen (50%) out of the thirty wars in that nations with a more o
I the latter period included one or more democracies and that forty-one would fight shorter and less
il \ (SZE") of the 129 war entries were by such regimes. would begin to protest as
t;

iii Korean and Vietnamese wa

l,t to massive proPortions as tl
Ii \ Table 3
authoritarian regimes with ir
it
i{l PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR principle, be able to fight 1c
BY BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACIES AND public discontent threatent
OTHER NATIONS (1955) and others have wa
convince citizens to surrenc
Number of Wars of
Number Number of geois democracies must Pai.
Numberof with Democratic Nation Democratic once the publics are convir
Type and Period Wars Participants Participants ParticiPants might become reluctant to
According to this scenario,
Interstate wars might be just as likely, if nc
1816-196s 50 19 191 47
than autocratic states.
1816-70 20 4 62 6
Table 4 compares the avt
1871-1965 30 15 r29 4l
ber of battle deaths susta
Extrasystemic wars states in international wars 1

I l8i6-196s 43 ls 48 16
l-'
, i.y' 1816-70 zo o 23
( ba'
o
-\ €v
/i 187r-196s 23 15 zs
{+t. \{/4
16
i U AVERAGE D
,/ i
t\ J" Looking to extrasystemic wars, we find a goodly number of bour- I OF WARS FOUGHT
{ .l geois democracies in that dreary catalogue of wars against the Third I
AND OTHE
)'y ,^World. Thus, fifteen (35%) of the forty-three involved democratic
I ;/ regimes, most often France and England, and sixteen (33%) of the \
Nu
/ forty-eight participants came from that group. The situation is even
- i more dramatic after 1871, when bourgeois democracies prosecuted fif- Type and Participation

) t.., (65Eo) of twenty-three extrasystemic conflicts. Interstate wars

bourgeois democracies have participated in their share of
' , Clearly,
,i,,c" the of Vienna. finding'is of limited
democratic particiPation
/*urs Congress By itself, such a nondemocratic ParticiPation
democratic ParticiPation
f value; there are, however, other ways to approach our data in orderto (exciuding world wars)
I explore the question. nondemocratic ParticiPation
(excluding world wars)
I
The Duration and Severitl' of lilar Involvement Extrasystemic wars
When we turn from the mere frequency of war experiences to thelr democratic particiPation
nondemocratic particiPation
1 duration and severity, the peacefulness of democratic regimes becornes
|ALL AND J. DAVID SINA[.4 THE WAR.PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 63

included one or more dems-
i 91 nation entries into war
\nd if we divide the epocfi
upsurge in new democratic
/o) or,rt of the thirty wars in
locracies and that forty-one
egimes.
\TIONAL WAR
ACIES AND
even less demonstrable. Here we examine the differences, if any, be-
tween the bourgeois denrocracies that have fought in interstate wars
and the other warring nations in terms of the average duration and
severity of the different sets of wars. one might expect, for example,
that nations with a more open diplomacy and with periodic elections
: j?)'
would fight shorter and less bioody wars, since the powerful electorates ;,+i
-would begin t-o__prote&t-€s-+a.tt1e-deaths- -mstmted. During both the
Koreal an-d yigl_11q1-It9s-e--!yqfq, f!Le:5a!rple,.American discontent grew
to qqssi,ve prgportionl qs lh9-cg.n-flict-s escalated (Mueller 1973). More
.,oL-
authoritarian regimes with institutions that can repress dissent might, in i jl -
principle, tie able to fight longer wars with higher casualty levels before ';g'i,y'-cct*,"
pubiic discontent threatened their tenure. conversely, as Lippmarua )J 1
,r'

{S (1955) and others have warned, because of erections and the ne_ed to
convince citizens to surrender their second son and extra dollars, bour-
S Number of Number ol geois democracies must oaint their enemies in dark tones indeed. And :
Nation Democratic onGnfe p_q,q1cs_qre _aonviuled-Jhat,they-a{e-_gq_i[s !!_a_q+s;a;;.n-.v i
Participants Participants miglrt become reluctant to accept any outcome short of toial victory. i
According to this scenario. it wouid appear that bourgeois democracies
might be just as likely, if not more so, to figat longer and bioodier wars
191 47 ;
than autocratic states. -/
62 6
t29 4t Table 4 compares the average duration of wars and the average num-
ber of battle deaths sustained by bourgeois democracies and other
states in international wars from 1816 to 1965.
48 L6

23 0
25 16 Table 4
AVERAGE DURATION AND SEVERITY
a goodly nllmber of bour- OF WARS FOUGHT BY BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACIES
of wars against the Third AND OTHER NATIONS, 1816 1965
-three invoived democratic
and sixteen (33%') of the Average Average Battle
'oup. The situation is eveu Number of Duration Number of Deaths per
democracies prosecuted fil- Type and Participation Wars in Months Nations Nation
,nflicts.
Interstate wars
rticipated in their share of democratic participation 19 i s.8 41 91,900
, such a finding is of limited nondemocratic participation 3t 11.8 144 1 67,300
proach our data in order to democratic participation
(excluding world wars) t1 10.s 30 5,i00
nondemocratic participation
(excluding world wars) 31 1 1.8 118 38,400
ar Involvement Extrasystemic wars
rf war experiences to their democratic participation 15 J).2 16 12,200
nondemocratic participation 2B 26.8 5/.
lemocratic regimes becomes 18.400
 64 MELVIN SMALL AND T. DAVID ,SII/GER THE IUAR-PRONENESS A

Looking first at the average duration of interstate wars, we find that b; \f

wars involving democracies were longer (15.8 vs. 11.8 months) than
wars in which there were no democratic participants. Of course, if we o
o
( eliminate the long and bloody world wars, the average length of wars J
with bourgeois democratic participants drops slightly below that of o
o
\' co

other wars. In extrasystemic wars, however, the bourgeois democracies

tend to fight wars that are appreciably longer than those fought by
0 bo
others. a
\ Shifting from the duration of wars to the severity - measured in F
z I
battie-connected deaths to the nearest hundred - we find a reversal. o I

That is, the average national fatality figure was 91,900 for the interstate a
wars in which the democracies participated, compared to 167,300 per Z
*
nation in all other wars. Similarly, for extrasystemic wars, thoqe fought & u
n
,'1.'-,
by .1o,-^^rofin raaimoo
democratic regimes nrndrrnod
produced average-ef{?200
oh 4r/arofta
an nf 1? lOfl hattle-deatfis
hof+Ia riaqf-ho per
rar 'itl 6
r
.+
stu@attle deaths for those fo-ught by non- F. or
s
o
Thess--differences certainly offer food for thought. The dem- z
c
ocracies' wars (including the world wars) laslJongerlhan-.those-not F m
.\)
.involving*such regimes-hut thev turn out lo he discernibly less bloo(y. o
& o
The obvious inference is that a1t is democracies 'r)D
UA
wilffi-16 tolerate 1o";;**r,ihe unwillind-tqJGraid?smany _o
H

combat fatalities. But neither of these results can be interpreted too TU

readily. Although the differences between the respective averages =
appear to be significant in the most general sense, they are not sta' H
tistically significant. The significance (t) tests shown in Tables 5 and 6 *
reveal that such differences could have occurred by chance alone. This
F
a a
superficially surprising result obtains because the variances, which mea- .x
L CI
ul
sure the size of the dispersion of the distribution around the mean, are F I
a
s
very large. Given this important reservation to our general findings on F {o

,,' duration and severity, we cannot conclude that the wars of bourgeois o P:-

L- democracies are much different from those of the other states. Cn 8,, 6
F
..1 >O
</ The Initiation of Hostilities p -a
,"A / 7 . In add,ition to the frequency of wars and their duration or severity, the a 6)
+.]
/ i.n g
.-i- b6''.o',Yh:uestion of initiation was taken into consideration. As indicated above'
"t.^f tir* relative war-proneness of different regimes may not be reflected
might
, i- ,.," adequately by mere involvement in wars. A more valid index
' 'ou" conceivably be that of war initiation. After all, as bourgeois democratic
B
\J./ t ' mythology would have it, although peace-loving societies fight only o
oo
y.cv wnen tney have no choice, nondemocratic reginies usually enjoy that 0)
o. oo
#/ .=-
,-Y /
choice.
Let us recall that we are not trying to ascertain who is the aggtessoT
F -! ,:
SMALI, AND I. DAVID SINGER THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 6s

tf interstate wars, we find that 5; r@

\t
(15.8 vs. 11.8 months) than h;
$
+N
participants. Of course, if ,7yg o ()
rs, the average length of wars o
J 9
drops slightly below that of o
o €
o
\o \o
,er, the bourgeois democracies \, +
\o
\' a
€ s.+
q-.i
o (_)

longer than those fougtr{ fy

a
F
bo bo
a a
I the severity - measured in F ho\
-t\
z \o@o F
rundred - we find a reversal. c rNr r>
A
J
a
I

: was 91,900 for the interstate

.ed, compared to
167,300 per z *q) U *q) O\ O1

trasystemic wars, those fought *

L-
+++
ge of 12,200 battle deaths per .E
U
n\
6$6 <1 h
CJ

(j 666
rh6
roo O\dO
+N€ .++o
lhs for those fought by non- lJ. p. \- t/ o. S \os
C (_)
r! o
od for thought. The dem- z 5Q\
lJr
(n
s) last longer than those not ts o r
F @sN rd$
to be discernibly less bloody. >(€
o
q) soo
i6 )F () U
os+
O\Od
& r! o :nN
bourgeois democracies seem D \OA
()
6)
U
unwilling to tolerate as many 0)
IJ t-.t

esults can be interpreted too r! ^+

di
Orrn C-! r
yeen the respective averages E L!
F $
.l
reral sense, they are not sta- trl H

tests shown in Tables 5 and 6 F * da1

ccurred by chance alone. This
*q)
(.) .
a ()
ii
+++
t-tl
F 6 FFi t€ r\o o
luse the variances, which mea- (n 4 .:L oo\
NT
.F
o\oo
ribution around the mean, are 14
t- \
N
o
or s a\o o
on to our general findings on *
d
89.o6 O
+O l.:
Ce that the wars of bourgeois Pj-
Ea
.n
H
(_)
O€6 o
roh
e of the other states. a 8,, \)
oo @o
eD
Y r-1 a)
c'l
r66
.i^ dt
F Hd
d!
\o
d 'ia \oo
,stilities
F.l >o !) l]] o
o
D -o .a*
their duration or severity, the
a () o
ho
13 bo

t4 o
ideration. As indicated above,
,& d
o
z O
(d
o
o
il 6
egimes may not be reflected ON
'E
d
s. A more valid index might E
o
:r all, as bourgeois democratic spe Po
F r> o
B !>E o B gtr
,ce{oving societies fight onlY o o ciEj
!e3vo u
o P5e b0 o !qrs-!>
tic regimes usually enjoy that o
o. o
;v9
tsidt 2
i; o
o
p.
aa'r9=
oo-/5
o
x
F
.Y!
;x r
F .x
F *
ts
*
ascertain who is the aggressor
 MELVIN SMALL AND J. DAVID SINGER THE WAR-PRONENESS OF Dl
(u2 '/ 66
q I!-
,V
I
t nor to identify whose policies account most for the escalation of con-
flict into war. As noted previously, we are interested in initiation as
Who
Although bgurgeois democr
I' defined by who fired the first salvo or crossed an undisputed boundary. both as particiPants and ir
{ The tabulation of the wars in Table I shows that there is indeed little 1 B 1 6, they do not seem tc
V-" + difference between regimes on this score. Of the nineteen wars in which two cases of wars betwee:
1

France attacking an ePhem

h"' they participated, bourgeois democracies initiated, or were on the sidel
ward-drifting Finnish democ
AJ of the initiator, in eleven (58%) of them: the Mexican-American War of{
'r/ |
1846-48, launched by the expansionist President Jaryss.Polk;*th.ewar
initiated by republical Fryn-cg !_g_1p-st-q1e- the P6pe t9 the city of Rome
thus the Allied Nations) in
how do we exPiain the fact
.rhe! rre_bsd_ldo_:gpy__b_ljgtl t{9$. the Sino-French wai of 1884- fight one another? One rea
8 5 f o. Fi e 4"t -e.loaiar-* qlrm@
*j- -iirl-*a"r ;f tionsLup between geograPh
"t
l&97-oier Crete; the Spanish-American War of 1898, begun by Plesi- nations going to war. in thi
dent William McKinley when the Spanis.h-re,{used to withdraw from the belligerents shared com
Cuba; the Italo-Turkish War of- 1911-12 in ffiTCti*IfrTi attacked of the remaining twelve, t
Tripoli; the First Balkan War of 1912-13 in which Greece joined with colonial holdings. Thus onl
more autocratic regimes to attack and dismember Turkey; World War nations that were not direct
II, which saw democratic Finland fighting on the side of the German Not surprisinglY, bourge
initiator after l94l (albeit only on the Russian front); the Palestinian another very frequentlY ovr
war of 1948 in which Syria and Lebanon, among others, joined in the of the 150 years since the
attack on the new state of Israel; the Sinai Campaign of 1956 in which border with Ireland, Fran
Israel, France and England invaded Egypt; and the Second Kashmir War Switzerland with France, 11
of 1965, begun when India attacked Pakistani territory. way with Sweden and Fir
In the remaining eight cases, bourgeois democracies were apparently shared borders with Denn
the defenders against autocratic aggressors; two of these were the world Austria, Belgium and Holla
wars, which appeared to be struggles between freedom-loving demo- European neighbors have a
for the period Prior to that
..cracies and tyrannies. However, the onset of these two wars
resulted
..' from the attacks of autocratie-Au"stria*orr'-dtfi6craffi3ilbii"?nd auto- buik of the wars were initi
cratic Germany on autocratic Poland, respectively. In those two bases Hemisphere, the United Stz
o".,
of carnage, it is true that bourgeois dem'ocracies weie generallf ahened , the United States and Me:
f on the same sides. But iooking at the data more carefully. we discover ;
more cases of bourgeois de
I that of all active participants on the bourgeois democratic side in World \ though there have been anY
/ Wu, I. only six qlge blessed with free governments. and one of the \ period, only Chile, Argent'
'l other five, Cziriit Rffisia"-u"as-even more "unfree" than the Kaiser's I democratic regimes most c
'
\ ' G...uny. As for World War II, only ten of the twenty-one aitire WyS the incidence of geograPhi
\ bers of the Allied Nations possessed governments that could be l76e1ed quite small. Thus if war is
ft ourgeois democracies. geois democracies have ra
/ t *; *rti., how we examine the question of initiation, then, r€\ r'.,
wiry they have rarelY fough
, I cannot support the notion that bourgeois democracies only becorne | ''
L* I I involved in war when attacked by the undemocratic predators of the I
l-y I system. Nevertheless, in our last area of analysis, we do find some I Given these findings, what
proof of the innate peacefulness of the bourgeois derno- \ geois democracies have bee
\ sunerficial first p1ace, states with su
\ cracies. )
ri-

. ,f,t*ffi
LL AND l. DAVID SII/GER
for the escalation of con-
interested in initiation 3s
1 an undisputed boundary.
that there is indeed lrttle
the nineteen wars in which
.iated, or were on the side
Mexican-American War of
ident James Polk; the war
Pope to the city of Rome
Sino-French war of 1884-
the Greco-Turkish War of
' of 1898, begun by Presi-
'efused to withdraw from
in which Italy attacked
which Greece joined with
ember Turkey; World War
rn the side of the German
rian front); the Palestinian
nong others, joined in the
lampaign of 1956 in which
d the Second Kashmir War
territory.
mocracies were apparently
yo of these were the world
:en freedom{oving demo-
f these two wars resulted
utocratic Serbia and auto-
:tively. In those two cases
cies were generally aligned
rore carefully, we discover
s democratic side in World
:rnments, and one of the
unfree" than the Kaiser's
re twenty-one active mem-
rents that could be labeled
n of initiation, then, we
Jemocracies oniy become
mocratic predators of the
nalysis, we do find some
; of the bourgeois demo-
THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 67
Who Fights Against tt/hom?
Although bourgeois democracies are represented in significant numbers
pth as participants and initjators in major international wars since
they do not seem to fight against one anorher. we found only
1816,
cases of wars between such states
/two
attacking an
- an ephemeral republican
/France ephemeral republican Rome in lg49 and a right-
I
ward-drifting Finnish democracy joining Germany to attack Russia (and
\thus the Allied Nations) in 1941. Since these are marginal exceptions. \p
do we explain the fact that bourgeois oem6irh6iffi-
lhow
lfight one another? one reasonable eiplanation may involve the lela- ;
Itionship between geographical proiimity and the likelihood of two
nations going to war. In thirty-eight (76vfi of our fifty interstate wars.
''3-
-_ u:1_**_
the belligerents shared common land boundaries; in five (anoLher l0zo) -*--,
of the remaining twelve, they were neighbors through the proxy of "*
colonial holdings. Thus only seven (r4%) of the fifty were foughtbv #& ;:;""
/ Not surprisingly, bourgeois democracies do not border upon one
another very frequently over much of the period since lgl6. For some --. {y :
e*t -
of
of the
the 150 vears fhe (-nnorcc"
years since the nf vienna,
congress of \/i---^ E--l^-,r has
England L^- shared
^L^-^i u [ LNA-r
^ lr'!k
border with Ireland, France with Belgium, Belgium with Holland, I
Switzerland with France, Italy with France and Switzerland, and Nor- l./&* -
way with sweden and Finland. During the 1920s weimar Germanv U t ,t /-\
shared borders with Denmark, czechosiovakia, France, Switzerlani -***1 )
Austria, Belgium and Hoiland. In the period since world war II, many
European neighbors have adopted bourgeois democratic systems, but
for the period prior to that time, few such states in Europe (where the
bulk of the wars were initiated) bounded one another. In the western
Hemisphere, the United states and canada for much of the period, and
the United states and Mexico for the more recent decades, are two
more cases of bourgeois democratic neighbors. In south America, even
to trleltv states over the
period, ':T:
3:,:-^t iff"'"::j:Tl":: l'?l
only chiie, Argentina and uruguayl""enoperated under bourgeois .r- .n- ;
r
demnnrotin radi-^" *^.+
democratic regimes most of +L^ +:*^
^a the time. As^ ---^ -
^ we can see from this listins.i
! -'/ - j
the incidence of geographic contiguity between democratic nations Is \ u/
quite small. Thus if war is most likely between neighbors, and if bour-
geois democracies have rarely been neighbors, this may well explain
y they have rarely fought against one another.
o.,rf ,u-
uytt'a-\
CONCLUSION
Given these findings, what can we now say about tfr6 notion that bour-
geois democracies have been or might become forces for peace? In the
first place, states with such governments have not been noticeably
 MELVIN SMALL AND J, DAVID SII/GER THE WAR'PRONENESS O

peace-prone or unaggressive over our historical period' More important

perhaps, even if citiz-ens in bourgeois democraci"' u'* reluctant to take
SXiil##;Jf
rt, Maurice A., and Greg
"ffE:t,
*p urrrt against other states, they have rarely had a completely free and conflict in the internatio
honest choice on that it."q. 9:q {-4.-lqore-d+IllatP "uY,':1,}*,ti- \n . ;;\,
r): 244-69.
-iean-hislory, for .1urnprg' *;S,$ffi,i-c'-4n--American War of
had \['0'
^1846-,48'
6(harrc i.in rrnifnrrn" nann. Waiter. 1955. Es
public *ui r 1 1^ r-^1:^-,^ that
t*a to belieG +l^^+ +L^;*
their "bovs uniform'-.1i1 l\
Wbeil the 1),*f
y'. rrauy, lor,r, D. 1913. of th
Gn ruthlessly attacked by the Mexicans. Despite thevaliant ettortsof I t tr- N.wJ.rsey, GeneralLea
such "dovesu'as CongressrnaR Abraham.Lincoln to demonstlate llat ll*,)#tMueller, John. t973.war, i
Preguk"-.nt Pslk had-set ttro. sexieaqs up; the +-tl'":'.1::*1^T:Tl Richardson, t:y':l^"99:
."jA nOt hearhim or would not listen. Similarly, more than a century 1-
\n*r, Singer, J. David. 1972.The
later they turned a deaf ear to inf911n4ti9o and propaganda^from oppo- World Politics 21 (.Iin:i
a \Y
sition leaders and--str?porte-d-tfie-brutal war in Vietnam for nearlY
govern- \\
-- : *9 !.*'11,. Ytl']'
i1-th9 t'lZOs di{ people doubt their handbook' New York: Jr
1 idecade-, Only !h9 }rmg1ican
of,,q,meiican national security as well as the h/'Uil'lkenleld' Jonathan' 196
/ 4 ment,s distorted version in Southeast Asia. \'/*' Journalof Peace Researt
L- nature of the struggles for liberation r^- +1r^+ L^,,.canic demncrncies are are Wright,Quincy' 1942'Asn
Even if we were to accept the idea that bourgeois democracles
potentiallymorepeacefulthanotherstates,especiallyiftheyhave
access to all relevant information, we would have to view pessimistically
theeventsofthepastdecadeorso.Thatis,whilebourgeoisdemo-
cracies seem to have grown at a rapid r@on.
of
this century, they have experig.l-t-"4-b*ol
portant perhaps relative- d-ecline in recelr Vears In tne, tv?Yl3H
, early 1970s, ,.u.rul ;i tiie SO"uIgpffi)riroffiier
I ;;; ";;;;", mosr or rrr".
in Soutn
I military regj mes, and even Arnerica's"-l'free world" friends
'ti,i"l.'sffi'vt"rnam jettisoned 6-f-
/ and the Philippines ttre trapprngs
force tor
Uor.n.ois democratic government' If guc!-r govqlnments are a
I
t\ ;;i;;"*, iir" decline in their uueurs ill foi the future' --
" "*hti. either the
ih;;.unro, agree with optimistic Conciusions abou-t
relationship between bourgeois democracies and war or the
continutng

J,
-,1
a-"#a-t.arre ;fa; I
X
|';il H*:,::H#jffi:n"i" nfticf-Benerat*r9f@
r\

4 '\^r"n[l
r- .)perties
i"rties of the
system in which we all must live'

Lro" 'r// University of Michigan

MALL AND J. DAVID SINGgR THE WAR-PRONENESS OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 69

rrical period. More important REFERENCES

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Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Statistics of deaclly quarrels. Chicago: euadrangle.
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rtes, especially if they have
t have to view pessimistically
rt is, while bourgeois demo-
e during the first portion of
an absolute and - more im-
:nt years. In the i960s and
mocracies in Latin America
of Africa and Asia adopted
"ee world" friends in South
s jettisoned the trappings of
governments are a force for
Lgurs ill for the future.
conclusions about either the
:s and war or the continuing
-re that freely elected govern-
ut they did become involved
;fenseless victims of a dicta-
t freely elected have no mo-
s. Yet such a finding should
gnition that all governments,
re to war will turn our atten-
the conflict-generating pro-
ive.

Wayne State UniversitY

University of Michigan