168. Valisno v. Adriano, G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, J.

Grino-Aquino

Doctrine: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned
in the conveyance.
Facts: On June 20, 1960, Valisno file against the Adriano an action for damages. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land in
La Fuente, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendant-
appellees sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,1959. The land adjoins with the bank of the
Pampanga River, that was owned by Adriano. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the appellant
was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. The appellant filed
in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision
was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal,
the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public Works and Communications.
A reinvestigation was granted. In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent. On June 20, 1960,
Valisno filed a complaint for damages claiming that he suffered damages when he failed to plant his fields
for lack of irrigation water.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision dismissing
Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which had been granted in
1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of
the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law,
hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves. Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father's estate did not
acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass
through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River.

Issue: Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondent’s land.

Ruling: Yes.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all
rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land and the water rights and such other
improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to the appellant, the water right
was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned
in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's
land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by
grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property
right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the
appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water
from the Pampanga River.

175. Alolino v. Flores, G.R. No. 198774, April 4, 2016, J. Brion

Doctrine: On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription
counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner
from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Facts: Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen. Luna
Street, Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property
and in 1980, added a second floor. In 1994, the respondent spouses Flores constructed their house/sari
sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's
house. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously
enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. After several
complaint about the illegal construction of respondents, Alolino send them a letter, demanding the
removal of their illegally constructed structure. Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents
refused to comply. Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC. Alolino claimed that
the respondents' encroaching structure deprived him of his light and view and obstructed the air
ventilation inside his house. The respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of action against
them. The RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to remove their illegal structure
obstructing Alolino's right to light and view. The RTC found that Alolino had already previously acquired
an easement of light and view and that the respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their
construction. It held that the respondents' illegal construction was a private nuisance with respect to
Alolino because it prevented him from using the back portion of his property and obstructed his free
passage to the barrio/municipal road. The CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view.

Ruling: Yes. An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through
prescription. On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription
counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner
from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate. Alolino had not made a formal
prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an
easement of light and view through prescription. Thus, only easements created by law can burden the
respondents' property.

182. Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Co. Inc., G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, J. Sarmiento

Doctrine: A merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.

Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of
another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation. The private respondent's
title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties reserved as an easement of way. As a
consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, in which part of the alley had
been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates. The petitioner claims that ever
since, it had made use of the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in
1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use. On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo shortly
issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter
moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that the easement referred to has been extinguished by
merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from
its former owner. The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a "temporary
writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the
posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff. On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary
judgment and the court a quo ruled that it is unnecessary to try this case on the merit and hereby resolve
to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The trial court rendered judgment against the private
respondent. The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not an easement exists on the property.

Ruling: Yes.
Under Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively
belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be
alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an
easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate,
specifically, his right to use (jus utendi). As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself
stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring
estates. . ." and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount
on account of the easement. Hence, the Court reiterate that albeit the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not
acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public. The Court is
furthermore of the opinion that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the
private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires
full ownership of both estates.

189. La Vista v. CA, G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, J. Bellosillo

Doctrine: When the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made
provisions for its observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.

Facts: Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building
Corporation into a residential village known as La Vista Subdivision. The boundary between LA VISTA
and the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the
Mangyan Road. Ateneo sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land adjacent to Mangyan Road.
Maryknoll then constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway making one-half of
Mangyan Road part of its school campus. The Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently, in an amicable
settlement, Maryknoll agreed to remove the wall and restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15
meters.
On 30 January 1976 Ateneo informed La Vista of the former's intention to develop some 16
hectares of its property along Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response, LA VISTA President Manuel
J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use of Mangyan Road. La Vista President Manuel
J. Gonzales offered to buy under specified conditions the property Ateneo was intending to develop. One
of the conditions stipulated by the LA VISTA President was that "[i]t is the essence of the offer that the
mutuaI right of way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association will
be extinguished." The offer of LA VISTA to buy was not accepted by Ateneo. Instead, Ateneo offered to
sell the property to the public subject to the condition that the right to use the 15-meter roadway will be
transferred to the vendee who will negotiate with the legally involved parties regarding the use of such
right as well as the development costs for improving the access road. La Vista became one of the
bidders. However, it lost to Solid Homes, Inc., in the bidding. Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision
now known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they now claim to have an easement of right-of-way
along Mangyan Road through which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
 La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that La Vista could
not recognize the right-of-way over Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building Corporation and its
assignee Ateneo never complied with their obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their
7.5-meter portion of the road and, second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes,
Solid Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was established
exclusively for Ateneo in whose favor the right-of-way was originally constituted. Solid Homes, Inc.,
complained to La Vista but the concrete posts were not removed. On 17 December 1976, to avert
violence, Solid Homes, Inc., instituted the instant case prayed that La Vista been joined from preventing
and obstructing the use and passage of Loyola residents through Mangyan Road. Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City rendered a decision affirming and recognizing the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan
Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordering La Vista to pay damages. La Vista appealed to CA, but it
affirmed in toto the decision of trial court.

Issue: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

Ruling: Yes.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their
mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. These certainly are indubitable proofs that the
parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and,
like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of
the owner of the dominant estate. When the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one.
For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As
in the instant case, the court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties.
The argument of petitioner La Vista that there are other routes to Loyola from Mangyan Road is
likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only
legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
The predecessors-in-interest of both La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way
over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building Corporation transferred its rights and obligations to
Ateneo the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves
developed their property into what is now known as La Vista. On the other hand, Ateneo sold the hillside
portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum,
when the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions
for its observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.