Core theme sample 1

With explicit reference to the stimulus, discuss a philosophical issue related to the question of what it means
to be human.

This picture shows a robot holding a trumpet. The robot has been built to resemble a human, with for
example human-like arms and legs. The robot also looks as if it is playing a trumpet, which is an activity
usually associated with humans. The robot is presented as having many of the same features and capacities
as a human, which raises the question of what the differences between a robot and a human really are. In
particular, it raises the question of whether the robot in the picture could be said to be a person, or if not why
not, and therefore the wider question of whether personhood is a feature unique to humans. One of the things
which is often argued to differentiate humans from non-humans is that humans are regarded as being persons,
but if it is possible to have non-human persons then this clearly cannot be regarded as the defining feature of
being human.

In order to explore whether only human beings can be persons, or whether computers or machines such
as the robot in the picture could also be persons, it is important to try to define what a person is. Lacewing
created criteria of what it is to be a person, putting emphasis on the ideas of consciousness, reason, language
and self-awareness. Using these criteria it would seem that the robot in the picture is not a person, as it, for
example, does not have consciousness. Dualists claim that consciousness requires an immaterial mind as well
as material body whereas the robot is a purely material thing, so they would argue that the robot cannot be
regarded as having consciousness or as being a person. Although I am not a dualist, personally I believe that
at the present time it would not be possible for robots to be considered persons, or for there to be any artificial
intelligence at the moment, because robots such as the one in the picture are simply simulating or mimicking
human behaviours rather than actually behaving or thinking as a human does.

However there are some philosophers who disagree. Alan Turing was one philosopher who advocated that
computers had the potential to be considered persons if they passed the “Turing test”. In this test, a man would
speak to both a computer and to another man from behind a screen. The man would ask questions to the
computer and to the other man, and if at the end of the test the first man was unable to differentiate between
the second man and the computer, then the computer could be considered a person, as it would have shown
the ability to be adaptive and to use language. Therefore, we see that Turing believed that some computers
or machines could be considered persons, and so it would be possible to have virtual friendships with artificial
intelligence. In addition to Turing, functionalists also believe that there is the potential for artificial intelligence,
as they say that mental states are multiple realisable, meaning that the mental states (software) can be the
functions of many different brain states (hardware). As a result, there is the possibility for artificial intelligence
that can also be considered to be persons.

Philosophy teacher support material 1

 Core theme sample 1

However, I believe that this isn’t possible due to the fact that computers are unable to master the semantics of
language, but they only master the syntax, and so they simulate consciousness, but are not actually conscious.
This is also what Searle argued. He used the analogy of the Chinese Room to show that computers cannot ever
be considered to be persons. The analogy describes a man in a room with nothing but a Chinese dictionary.
People outside the room keep passing him messages in Chinese characters, and so he manipulates these
characters using the dictionary and then forms a reply. To the people outside of the room it seems as if the
man on the inside knows and understands how to speak Chinese, yet in reality he is simply manipulating the
characters. As a result, he is only manipulating the syntax, or the grammar of the language, but he cannot
master the semantics, i.e. what it actually means. This is the same in a computer, and so Searle argues that the
computer merely simulates the behaviour of a person, and so cannot be considered to be a person.

In addition to Searle, a big criticism of functionalism is that it leaves no room for qualia, the “what it is like-
ness” of an experience. As Nagel argues with his analogy of the bat, we are unable to have the qualia that a
bat has, and so it can be argued that a robot cannot have the qualia of being a person. As a result, computers
cannot be considered to be persons. Personally I think that qualia is an important factor in order to be a
person, and if computers don’t have qualia then they cannot be considered persons at all. Furthermore, Lynn
Rudder-Baker also argued that computers couldn’t be persons at the moment because they lack a first person
perspective on the world, which is similar to Lovelace’s idea that computers cannot be persons because they
lack self-awareness. Both argue that having beliefs and desires, and having the ability to evaluate them and
anticipate the future according to them, and so being able to respond creatively, are very important to be a
person, and computers lack this and so cannot be considered persons at the moment.

I believe that robots such as the one in the picture cannot be considered persons at the moment due to the
fact that they lack qualia, first person perspective and self-awareness, and merely simulate human behaviour.
If these criteria are seen as being too strict, then the next step would be to extend the notion of personhood
to animals which have sophisticated cognitive abilities, perhaps Koko the gorilla or dolphins. At a conference
in Helsinki in 2010 a group of academics proposed a “Declaration of Rights” for whales and dolphins, where
they argued that these mammals should be regarded as non-human persons because of their abilities relating
to language, etc. If our definition of personhood was loosened to include these non-human persons, then it
might pave the way for one day the notion being expanded to include machines with sophisticated abilities,
such as the robot in the picture. However, at the moment personhood is something which I think only applies
to humans.

In conclusion, despite having many of the features that humans have, the robot in the image is merely
simulating a human rather than actually being human. In particular, the robot cannot be regarded as being
a person, because personhood is something which requires features such as consciousness, language, first
person perspective and self awareness. It is very difficult to find a single defining feature of being human, but
personhood seems to me to be the closest we can find.

Philosophy teacher support material 2