1. GR No.

94986

Hatima C. Yasin, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Hadji Hasan S. Centi, petitioner,

Vs.
The Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court Third Shari’a Judicial District, Zamboanga City

The case of Hatima C. Yasin, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Hadji Hasan S. Centi,
versus the Honorable Judge of the Shari'a District Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District,
Zamboanga City, revolves around the petition to resume the use of the petitioner's maiden
name.

Facts:
Hatima C. Yasin filed a petition in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City to resume
the use of her maiden name, Hatima Centi y Saul, after her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin was
dissolved through divorce according to Muslim rites. She sought this petition based on her right
under Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, in relation to Article 371(2) of the
New Civil Code. However, the respondent court ordered her to amend her petition to comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, pertaining to the change of
name.
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that her petition did not fall under Rule
103, but was simply a request to resume her maiden name after divorce. The motion was
denied by the respondent court, prompting Hatima to file a petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Hatima, after her divorce and the subsequent marriage of her former
husband to another woman, was required to file a petition for change of name and comply with
the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to resume her maiden name.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hatima. It held that the petition to resume the use of
a maiden name after divorce did not fall under the purview of Rule 103. The Court emphasized
that the only name that may be changed through judicial authority is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register.

Furthermore, the Court underscored that under Muslim law and even the Civil Code, the
use of the husband's surname during marriage is permissive and not obligatory, except in cases
of legal separation. Thus, after the dissolution of marriage, a woman may choose to continue
using her former husband's surname or revert to her maiden name without the need for judicial
authorization.

In conclusion, the Court granted Hatima's petition to resume her maiden name and
surname, setting aside the orders of the respondent court. It emphasized that the onerous
requirements of Rule 103 should not be applied to cases like Hatima's, where sufficient facts
supported by competent proof were presented. The Supreme Court's decision affirms the right
of individuals, particularly women, to choose and use their names in accordance with their civil
status and personal preferences, without unnecessary legal hurdles.

2. GR No. 201614
Sheryl M. Mendez, Petitioner
Vs.
Shari’a District Court, 5th Shari’a District, Cotabato City, Rasad G. Balindong (Acting
Presiding Judge); 1st Shari’a Circuit Court, 5th Shari’a District, Cotabato City, Montano
K. Kalimpo (Presiding Judge); and DR. John O. Maliga, Respondents.

Digest:

FACTS:
Sheryl and John entered into marriage under Muslim rites. Following their marriage, their
relationship deteriorated, leading Sheryl to file a petition for talaq (divorce) with the Sharia
Circuit Court (ShCC). Subsequently, John filed a motion seeking temporary custody of their
minor child, citing Sheryl's apostasy as grounds for his claim to custody. The ShCC, despite
lacking direct jurisdiction over custody matters, granted John's motion, awarding him custody
and limiting Sheryl to visitation rights. The decision was affirmed by the Sharia District Court
(ShDC), prompting Sheryl to appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the ShCC has jurisdiction over custody matters arising from divorce.
2. Whether the custody award to John was proper.

RULINGS:
1. The ShCC possesses ancillary jurisdiction to resolve custody issues related to divorce.
Although Article 54 of the Muslim Code does not explicitly confer custody jurisdiction to the
ShCC, Article 155 grants it exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions involving disputes relating to
divorce. Since custody is inherently connected to divorce proceedings, the ShCC is deemed to
have the authority to adjudicate custody matters arising from divorce petitions.

2. The custody award to John was improper due to procedural irregularities and lack of
evidentiary basis. The decision was made without conducting a hearing and lacked the required
notice of hearing, violating due process rights. Additionally, the court failed to provide specific
legal and factual grounds for its ruling, as mandated by constitutional requirements. The custody
decision did not demonstrate Sheryl's unfitness as a parent, rendering it unjustified.

CONCLUSION:
While the ShCC has jurisdiction over custody matters as ancillary to divorce proceedings, the
custody decision in this case was flawed due to procedural deficiencies and lack of evidentiary
support. The case is remanded for reconsideration in light of due process requirements and
proper consideration of the parties' parental fitness.

3. GR No. 221075

Case Title: Malaki and Salanatin-Malaki v. People

FACTS:
Francis D. Malaki and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin-Malaki, petitioners, were charged
with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge stemmed from their
marriage on June 18, 2005, while Francis was still legally married to Nerrian Maningo-Malaki.
Nerrian testified that she and Francis were married under Iglesia ni Cristo rites in 1988 and had
two children. Upon discovering Francis' cohabitation with Jacqueline, Nerrian learned of their
subsequent marriage in 2005, solemnized by a Municipal Trial Court judge. Francis and
Jacqueline admitted to the subsequent marriage but argued that their conversion to Islam prior
to the marriage exculpated them from criminal liability.

ISSUE:
Whether Francis D. Malaki and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin-Malaki are guilty of bigamy
despite their conversion to Islam and subsequent marriage under Muslim rites.

RULING:
The Regional Trial Court found Francis and Jacqueline guilty of bigamy beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, upholding that all
elements of bigamy were present in the case. While petitioners argued for the applicability of the
Muslim Code and their conversion to Islam, the courts ruled that their subsequent marriage,
despite their conversion, constituted bigamy. The courts reasoned that Francis failed to comply
with the formal requisites of the Muslim Code for subsequent marriage, particularly the
requirement of the wife's knowledge and consent. The courts held that Francis' failure to adhere
to these requirements invalidated his claim under Article 180 of the Muslim Code. The Supreme
Court affirmed the rulings, emphasizing the importance of upholding legal requirements and
preventing practices that circumvent laws under the guise of religious freedom.

CONCLUSION:
Francis D. Malaki and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin-Malaki were found guilty of bigamy
for contracting a subsequent marriage while Francis' previous marriage was still subsisting.
Despite their conversion to Islam, the courts held that their failure to comply with the formal
requisites of the Muslim Code rendered their subsequent marriage invalid under the law. The
Supreme Court affirmed the rulings, emphasizing the importance of upholding legal
requirements and preventing practices that circumvent laws under the guise of religious
freedom.
 4. GR No. 193719

Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. vs. Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos

FACTS:

On December 28, 1992, petitioner Pacasum and respondent Zamoranos were married.
However, petitioner found that respondent Zamoranos was previously married to a certain
Jesus De Guzman on July of 1982.

Samson R. Pacasum (Pacasum) filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Marietta

D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) for disgraceful and immoral conduct, alleging that Zamoranos
entered into a bigamous marriage. Zamoranos raised in her defense that the past marriage to
De Guzman Guzman was under Muslim rites, and a Decree of Divorce was already issued by
the Shari'a Circuit Court, dissolving their marriage.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the divorce decree dissolving Zamoranos' previous marriage is valid.
2. Whether Pacasum's administrative complaint against Zamoranos is justified.

RULING:
1. YES. The Court affirmed the validity of the divorce decree issued by a competent court under
Muslim law.
Law provides that the Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and
mixed marriages wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim Code in any part of the Philippines. At present, this is
the only law in the Philippines that allows domestic divorce which dissolved Zamoranos'
previous marriage to De Guzman. As the divorce decree is a judgment in rem, it cannot be
collaterally attacked.

2. No. Pacasum's administrative complaint against Zamoranos was dismissed due to the
conclusive validity of the divorce decree. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment was
applied, as the issue of Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman was previously adjudicated and
concluded in another case involving the same parties.

The Court upheld the validity of the divorce decree dissolving Zamoranos' previous marriage
and dismissed Pacasum's administrative complaint against Zamoranos, as the issue had been
conclusively settled in previous judicial proceedings involving the same parties.

5. GR No. 193902

Zamoranos V. People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Laguio of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court, which issued a
Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranas married anew. As she had previously done in her
first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Pacasum, her subordinate at the Bureau of
Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order
to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows
in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in
Zamoranos’ first marriage to Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with
progeny, namely: Samson, Jr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship between Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, they
arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children to Zamoranos,
with Pacasum retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled with Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal
and disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold
Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against
Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC,
rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are
Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed
by PD No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum is bigamous?

RULING:

The court first addressed the jurisdictional issue raised by Zamoranos regarding
a previous case filed by Pacasum. Although the RTC dismissed Pacasum's petition, it
should have recognized Zamoranos' Muslim status and the validity of her marriage to
De Guzman under Islamic law.
 Given Zamoranos' Muslim status and the dissolution of her previous marriage,
the court ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to try her for bigamy. The subject matter
of bigamy revolves around contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one exists,
which was not the case here. Therefore, Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman,
confirmed by Islamic authorities, validated her marriage to Pacasum, and the RTC had
no jurisdiction to try her for bigamy. The court ruled in favor of Zamoranos, affirming her
marriage to Pacasum as valid under Islamic law and dismissing the bigamy charges
against her due to lack of jurisdiction by the RTC.

6. GR 200697

Rohaina Sumagka vs. Adulgani Sumagka

FACTS:

In 1998, Abdulgani Sumagka and Rohaina Sumagka, both adherents of Islam,

entered into marriage through Islamic rites. Subsequently, in 2004, they underwent
another marriage ceremony, this time under civil rites officiated by the mayor of
Sarangani City. By 2006, marital discord arose between them, leading Abdulgani to seek
a divorce (Talaq) in accordance with PD 1083, commonly known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code). The divorce was granted by the Shari’a
Circuit Court and upheld by the Shari’a District Court. However, on appeal, Rohaina
contested the jurisdiction of the Shari’a Court, asserting that their marriage in 2004
under civil rites subjected their union to the Family Code instead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Muslim Code governs the marriage of two Muslims who
initially wed under Islamic rites but subsequently underwent civil rites?

HELD:

The Muslim Code governs. The Supreme Court referenced Justice Rasul's
opinion, stating that in cases of mixed marriages, the applicable law depends on the
type of ceremony followed. If the marriage involves both civil and Islamic rites, the law
corresponding to the first ceremony is legally binding, while the subsequent rite holds
only ceremonial significance. Thus, the second marriage does not alter the nature of the
first marriage, which establishes the marital bonds between the parties.
Furthermore, the Muslim Code applies even when only the male party is Muslim, and the
marriage was conducted under Islamic rites. Conversely, if the male is Muslim, and the
marriage is performed under civil rites, the Family Code governs.

7. GR No. 119064

NENG ‘KAGUI KADIGUIA” MALANG, petitioner,

Vs.
HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Shari’a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI
MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA
MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and
MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.

FACTS:
On December 18, 1993, Hadji Abdulah, while residing with the petitioner in Cotabato
City, passed away without leaving a will. Petitioner filed a petition for the settlement of his estate
with the Shari'a District Court, claiming to be his wife. She requested letters of administration to
be issued in favor of her niece, Marhata Daban. However, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang,
the eldest son of Hadji Abdulah, opposed the petition, asserting his right to administer the estate
along with his brother. He argued that since they had assisted their father in his business, they
were more competent to handle his affairs.

ISSUE:
Whether the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship
of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Civil Code governs the property relations of marriages
contracted before the enactment of the Muslim Code. The marriages in question were
solemnized during the effectiveness of the Civil Code, which recognized the right of Muslims to
marry according to their customs and rites. Although the Civil Code primarily contemplates
monogamous marriages, subsequent marriages while the first one subsists are considered void.
Therefore, the property relations of the marriages in this case are determined by the Civil Code,
as it was the prevailing law at the time of their celebration. Additionally, the Family Code may
apply to property acquired after August 3, 1988, when substantial amendments to the Civil
Code's provisions on property relations were made. The determination of which law governs
depends on various factors such as the date of marriage, cohabitation, and the acquisition of
the subject properties.