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System Impact Study

Q191
74.5 MW Solar Project
(Steady State)

March 2020

i
This document, and any attachments hereto (Document), is made available by
Duke Energy Florida, LLC (DEF) upon and subject to the express understanding
that: (a) neither DEF, nor any of its officers, directors, affiliates, agents, or
employees make any warranty, assurance, guarantee, or representation with
respect to the contents of the Document or the accuracy or completeness of the
information contained or referenced in the Document; and (b) DEF, its officers,
directors, affiliates, agents, and employees shall not have any liability or
responsibility for inaccuracies, errors, or omissions in, or any business or policy
decisions made by any direct or indirect recipient in reliance on, this Document
or the information contained or referenced therein; all such liability is expressly
disclaimed.

ii
Table of Contents
1. Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. 1
1. Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 2
2. Point of Interconnection (POI) ............................................................................................................. 2
3. Model Development ............................................................................................................................ 4
3.1. Power Flow Models....................................................................................................................... 4
3.2. Interface Models ........................................................................................................................... 4
3.3. Short Circuit Models ..................................................................................................................... 4
3.4. Generator Interconnection Queue Considerations ...................................................................... 4
3.5. Transmission Service Request Priority List Considerations .......................................................... 4
4. Analyses Performed ............................................................................................................................. 5
4.1. Power Flow Analyses .................................................................................................................... 5
4.2. Short Circuit Analyses ................................................................................................................... 5
5. Screening Criteria ................................................................................................................................. 5
6. Study Results ........................................................................................................................................ 6
6.1. Thermal Results............................................................................................................................. 6
6.2. Voltage .......................................................................................................................................... 6
6.3. Short Circuit .................................................................................................................................. 6
6.4. Third-party Impacts....................................................................................................................... 7
6.5. NERC TPL Category P2-2, P2-3, P4, P5, P6 and P7 Contingencies................................................. 7
6.6. Costs .............................................................................................................................................. 7

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1. Executive Summary
The Q191 Interconnection Customer has submitted an Interconnection Request on DEF’s FERC queue for
a Solar station, capable of 74.5 MW AC net output. The proposed Generating Facility will be located in
Osceola County, Florida, connecting to a new 230 kV breakered terminal at the existing Holopaw 230 kV
substation, via a 2.5 mile Interconnection Customer-owned generator tie line.
The Interconnection Customer has requested that this Generating Facility be evaluated for Network
Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS) with a requested Commercial Operating Date (COD) of December
31, 2020, but In-Service Dates for required facilities may move this date out substantially.
Cost estimates in this report are based on the facilities that are identified as being directly impacted by
the generator under study, and do not take into account results that may indicate unrelated existing
issues. Additional detailed studies may result in changes to scope and cost. The estimates from this study
are high level and may change significantly due to additional information determined from a more
detailed Facilities Study to follow.
Potential Third Party thermal impacts were identified in this study. The short circuit analysis did not reveal
increases over 3% in the fault current. No DEF devices were identified at this time as impacted by this
increase. Additional in-depth analysis for third-party impacts will be performed in a future FRCC
Transmission Technical Subcommittee evaluation if the Interconnection Customer moves Q191 to a
Facilities Study.
This System Impact Study did not identify any additional Network Upgrades to DEF’s Transmission System
being needed in order to accommodate the full capacity (74.5 MW) of the Q191 Solar Project (see Table
6.1.1) and no Contingent Facilities are associated with Q191 (see Table 6.1.2). The estimated cost required
for interconnection of Q191 Solar Project is $3,513,000. In addition, the Interconnection Customer would
be responsible for all aspects associated with the construction, ownership, and maintenance of the
generator tie line.

2. Point of Interconnection (POI)


Per DEF’s Large Generator Interconnection Procedures, one POI is studied during System Impact Study.
For Q191, the following POI was discussed with and agreed to by the Interconnection Customer:
• A new 230 kV breakered terminal at the existing Holopaw 230 kV substation, via a 2.5 mile
Customer-owned generator tie line.

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Figure 1: Diagram of Q191 Interconnection

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3. Model Development
3.1. Power Flow Models
Power flow models were built using the Siemens PSS/E power system simulation program and were
based on the FRCC 2019 series cases, which were the most recent models available at the time of the
study. Two model years were studied for power flow impacts: summer 2021 and summer 2024. For
this models, peak demand scenarios were studied considering simultaneous delivery (generation in
Avon Park, Intercession City, Vandolah, Hines, Tiger Bay, and Osprey on). The study case models
utilized the adjusted base models with the addition of the Q191 Solar Project generation and the
required basic interconnection facilities.
3.2. Interface Models
No interface analyses were performed as part of this evaluation.
3.3. Short Circuit Models
Short circuit analyses utilized the FRCC 2019 short circuit model (y19_21sRls1_SC1_V34.sav). The
model year studied for the short circuit analysis was 2021.
3.4. Generator Interconnection Queue Considerations
Prior-queued generator Interconnection Requests in the FRCC coordinated queue were reviewed.
Several prior-queued generator Interconnection Requests that are currently undergoing the study
process, and directly impact DEF’s Transmission System, were identified (DEF-Q135, Q137, DEF-
Q144A, DEF-Q148, DEF-Q149, DEF-Q151, DEF-Q152, DEF-Q153, DEF-Q154, DEF-Q155B, DEF-Q158,
DEF-Q159B, DEF-Q160, DEF-Q165, DEF-Q166, DEF-Q169, DEF-Q171, DEF-Q173, DEF-Q174, DEF-
Q180C, DEF-Q181, DEF-Q182, DEF-Q184, DEF-Q187, DEF-Q190A, FPL-Q183, FPL-Q200, FPL-Q201, FPL-
Q202, FPL-Q251, FPL-Q256, FPL-Q258, FPL-Q260, FPL-Q261, FPL-Q262, FPL-Q264, FPL-Q266, FPL-
Q269, FPL-Q271, FPL-Q277, FPL-Q281, FPL-Q282, FPL-Q285, FPL-Q286, FPL-Q287, FPL-Q288, FPL-
Q289, FPL-Q291, FPL-Q292, FPL-Q297, FPL-Q300, FPL-Q301, FPL-Q302, FPL-Q306, FPL-Q307, TEC-
Q001, TEC-Q002, TEC-Q011, TEC-Q012, TEC-Q017, TEC-Q020, TEC-Q031).
Generator Interconnection Studies for prior queued generator Interconnection Requests, in the form
of Feasibility and System Impact Studies, are currently conducted in accordance with FERC rules and
are prioritized by their queue positions to determine the assignment of required Interconnection
Facilities and transmission Network Upgrades to accommodate their requested interconnections. In
the instances where these studies are not yet complete, the facilities and upgrades required for these
earlier queued requests were not included in the base cases used in this study. To the extent that
one or more of these requests are modified or withdrawn, the results presented in this analysis may
no longer be valid and/or may change materially. DEF will advise the Interconnection Customer of
any changes associated with the preceding Interconnection Requests that may require a re-study of
this System Impact Study.
3.5. Transmission Service Request Priority List Considerations
A review of Transmission Service Requests (TSR) in the FRCC coordinated priority list was performed,
and it was determined that there are no relevant TSRs in the study area that were not already built
into the FRCC cases.

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4. Analyses Performed
4.1. Power Flow Analyses
Power flow analyses of the cases were performed using the PowerGEM TARA software (TARA) to
determine the impact of interconnecting the queued generation to the transmission system in the
area. The base and interconnection study cases were compared to determine if the interconnection
option created thermal overloads or voltage violations or exacerbated existing thermal overloads or
voltage violations. All 69 kV and above branch flows and bus voltages in the FRCC region were
monitored.
The following contingencies were observed in this study:
• Selected Category P1, P2, P4, P5, P6 and P7 contingencies within the FRCC region as previously
defined by FRCC transmission owners. Selection variations include:
o All single element contingencies (69 kV and above) in the Duke Area.

4.2. Short Circuit Analyses


Short circuit analyses were performed using PSS/E activity ASCC. All local generators were online for
the analysis. Activity FLAT was used to set up the network conditions corresponding to classical fault
analysis assumptions. Three phase and single line-to-ground faults were applied at all buses within
FRCC and were analyzed using a 3% cutoff criterion. Devices that are installed to interrupt fault
current (breakers, circuit switchers, etc.) that are connected to buses identified in the screened results
will need to be evaluated to determine whether their fault current interrupting capabilities are
exceeded. This evaluation of the impact of increased fault current on DEF devices will be performed
during the subsequent Facilities Study, and the evaluation of the impact on third party devices will be
performed separately during the FRCC process. The final results represent all buses within FRCC with
a difference between the base case and study case greater than 3%, in addition to the next bus out in
the affected area to capture the total impact.

5. Screening Criteria
The following criteria were used for screening thermal results:
• Unrelated GSU transformers were excluded from results.
• Transmission system elements operated at less than 69 kV nominal voltage were excluded.
• System-intact overloads must be greater than 100% of rate A.
• Post-contingency overloads must be greater than 100% of the applicable rating.
• Post-contingency overloads that are improved by the interconnection were excluded.

The following criteria were used for screening voltage results:


• Buses in DEF and SECI were monitored for values outside of the range 0.9-1.05 p.u.
• FPL 69, 115, 138, and 230 kV buses were monitored for values outside the range 0.95-1.07 p.u.
• FPL 500 kV buses were monitored for values outside the range 0.95-1.10 p.u.
• TECO 69 kV buses were monitored for values outside the range 0.925-1.05 p.u.
• TECO 138 and 230 kV buses were monitored for values outside the range 0.95-1.06 p.u.
• Turkey Point bus voltage was monitored for values outside the range of 1.01-1.06 p.u.
• St. Lucie bus voltage was monitored for values outside the range of 1.00-1.06 p.u.
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• All other monitored areas were monitored for values outside of the range 0.95-1.05 p.u.
• Generator buses and buses with nominal voltage below 69 kV were excluded from consideration.
• Absolute change in bus voltage between base case and the interconnection case must have been
greater than 0.02 p.u.

The following screening criteria were used for screening the ASCC short circuit results:
• Three phase and single line-to-ground fault current on the DEF system had to exceed the
interrupting rating of the breaker.
• Three phase and single line-to-ground fault current results are provided to third parties close to
this area for their acceptance or rejection of the results based on their own breaker rating criteria.
• The table in Appendix B ‐ Short Circuit Analysis Results reflects increases in fault current greater
than 3%, in addition to the next bus out to represent the total impact.

6. Study Results
6.1. Thermal Results
The evaluation did not identify any additional network upgrades to DEF’s transmission system in order to
accommodate the full capacity (74.5 MW) of the Q191 Solar Project.
Table 6.1.1

Impacted Facilities Assigned to Q191 for Network Upgrades Miles


None ---

Changes to the queue will likely necessitate additional study (or restudy) prior to final determination of
additional facilities that may be required for this request to be granted firm transmission service. The
additional study(ies) may be in the form of GISR restudy and/or a final TSR study.
Table 6.1.2

Contingent Impacted Facilities Assigned Miles


None ---

The thermal results are tabulated in Appendix A in separate Excel file.


6.2. Voltage
There were no identified voltage violations that were attributable to the interconnection of the Q191
Solar project.
6.3. Short Circuit
Short circuit analysis was performed and the results were evaluated against the interrupting capability
of potentially impacted devices in DEF’s system. No devices were identified that would likely exceed
their interrupting capability.
The short circuit results are tabulated in Appendix B in separate Excel file.

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6.4. Third-party Impacts
The thermal analysis revealed some potential third-party impacted facilities in the FRCC system. The
short circuit analysis did not reveal increases in the fault current. The ultimate short-circuit results to
determine third party impact will be performed separately during the FRCC process.
Additional in-depth analysis for third-party impacts will be performed in a future FRCC Transmission
Technical Subcommittee evaluation, if the customer moves to a Facilities Study.
6.5. NERC TPL Category P2-2, P2-3, P4, P5, P6 and P7 Contingencies
The study identified a number of impacted facilities under the aforementioned contingency
categories, for which the NERC TPL standards allow for the curtailment of firm transactions, so long
as the facility’s Rate C is not exceeded. It is assumed that the Customer accepts that their generator
may be curtailed under these conditions, so that interconnection service may be granted without the
required upgrade of the impacted facilities for these specific contingencies. It should be noted that
not requiring these network upgrades for Interconnection Service may impact facilities required for
granting specific Transmission Service as requested.
6.6. Costs
The following are planning estimates only. Details specific to this project that may be discovered in
the subsequent design engineering (Facilities Study) phase of this request’s study process, may
significantly affect these estimates and projected in-service dates.
Required upgrades for basic physical interconnection: Est. Costs
A new 230 kV breakered terminal at the Holopaw 230 kV substation $3,513,000
2.5 miles Customer-owned Gen Tie line (not included in Total Estimated Cost)
Total Estimated Cost: $3,513,000

From a planning perspective, a reasonable projected in-service date for a new breakered terminal
at the existing 230 kV substation would be 1 to 2 years after project commitment. Details specific
to this project that may be discovered in the subsequent design engineering phase (Facilities
Study) of this request’s study process may significantly affect these estimates and projected In-
Service Date.

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System Impact Study for the
Q191
74.5 MW Summer
PV Solar Plant
Transient Stability Report

March 2020

Bulk Transmission Planning, Florida

i
This document, and any attachments hereto (Document), is made available
by Duke Energy Florida, LLC (DEF) upon and subject to the express
understanding that: (a) neither DEF nor any of its officers, directors,
affiliates, agents, or employees make any warranty, assurance, guarantee,
or representation with respect to the contents of the Document or the
accuracy or completeness of the information contained or referenced in the
Document; and (b) DEF, its officers, directors, affiliates, agents, and
employees shall not have any liability or responsibility for inaccuracies,
errors, or omissions in, or any business or policy decisions made by any
direct or indirect recipient in reliance on, this Document or the information
contained or referenced therein; all such liability is expressly disclaimed.
The results of this analysis are based on the data provided by the
Interconnection Customer; assumptions made at the time of the study by
DEF are FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY to the
Interconnection Customer. If any of the data and/or assumptions change,
the results provided in this document may no longer apply.

ii
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... 3
2. Point Of Interconnection (POI) ............................................................................................................. 6
3. System Representation ......................................................................................................................... 6
3.1. Base Case Load Flows.................................................................................................................... 6
3.2. System Reinforcements made to the Base Case .......................................................................... 7
3.3. Dynamic Modeling ........................................................................................................................ 7
3.4. Generator control settings ............................................................................................................ 7
3.5. SCR Calculation ............................................................................................................................. 8
4. Assumptions .......................................................................................................................................... 8
4.1. Protective Relaying Assumptions.................................................................................................. 8
4.2. Simulations.................................................................................................................................... 9
4.2.1. Contingencies Considered..................................................................................................... 9
4.3. Single Line to Ground Faults ....................................................................................................... 10
4.4. Performance Criteria................................................................................................................... 10
4.4.1. Transient Voltage Response Criteria ................................................................................... 11
4.4.2. Power Oscillation Damping Requirement ........................................................................... 11
4.4.3. Cascading ............................................................................................................................ 12
4.5. Network Monitoring ................................................................................................................... 12
5. Discussion of Study Results ................................................................................................................. 12
5.1. Dynamic Modeling ...................................................................................................................... 12
5.1.1. Data Modifications to User-Written Model ........................................................................ 12
5.1.2. General Findings Regarding the User-Written Model ........................................................ 12
5.1.3. PSS/E Generic model validation .......................................................................................... 13
5.2. Summary Results......................................................................................................................... 17
5.3. SCR Calculation ........................................................................................................................... 23
6. Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................................... 24
Appendix A – Load flow Summaries ........................................................................................................... 26
50% case.................................................................................................................................................. 26
Peak case – Firm Import.......................................................................................................................... 29
Appendix B – Dynamic Data ........................................................................................................................ 33
B1. User-Written Model.......................................................................................................................... 33
B2. Description of the control system .................................................................................................... 37
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B3. Generic Model .................................................................................................................................. 38
Appendix C- Dynamic Model-Issues Identified ........................................................................................... 40
Appendix D- Plots ........................................................................................................................................ 45

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1. Executive Summary
The Q191 Interconnection Customer has submitted an Interconnection Request on Duke Energy
Florida’s (DEF) FERC queue for a new photovoltaic solar plant, capable of 74.5 MW summer and
winter. The Generating Facility will be located in Osceola County, Florida, connecting to a new 230 kV
breakered terminal at the Holopaw 230 kV substation with a 2.5 mile generator tie line from the
Interconnection Customer’s site. Figure 1 shows a general diagram to describe the Point of
Interconnection (POI) for Q191.

Figure 1. Breaker Diagram Q191 Interconnection

The Interconnection Customer has requested that this generation facility be evaluated for Network
Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS) and Electrical Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) with a
requested Commercial Operating Date (COD) of December 31st, 2020.
The transient stability study did not show any potential upgrades to DEF transmission network to
accommodate the full capacity of Q191. There are no potential third party impacts identified. All the
analyses were developed for year 2020 to evaluate the interconnection of Q191.
The results of the transient stability analysis indicate that the addition of the Project Q191 will have no
significant impact on the transient stability response of the bulk transmission system. No protection
systems upgrades will be required by the Project to interconnect to the DEF transmission system. Key
findings and requirements of the Project are listed below.
Key Findings:
• Based on the results of the simulations, the Q191 Generating Facility will not negatively impact
the transient stability response of the bulk electric system. However, the Interconnection
Customer should address the deficiencies in the models provided before moving forward with the
Project.
• The protective relays included in the model were found enabled. These protections, which
comply with the PRC-024-2 requirements, were used for the simulations.
• The user-written model does not include reactive droop settings. They should be implemented
in order to avoid the saturation of the reactive power controller at PCC.

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• Q191 remains interconnected for all simulated SLG faults.
• A compatibility problem was found in simulations when the user-written model and FRCC dsusr.dll
were included. The Interconnection Customer should add logic to set NUMTRM to a negative
quantity in their code to consider TMEIC-3360 model as a conventional unit although is
renewable.
• Q191 dynamic analysis was performed with the user-written model provided by the
Interconnection Customer. A set of observations is shown below, specific model issues are
described in Appendix C:
o When the generator is disconnected as a result of a trip of the connection line, the model
exhibits high voltage at its terminals.
o Voltages exhibit high peaks at the inverter terminals, near 1.8 p.u. when a fault is cleared. If
this response represents the real inverters behavior, the protection relays could disconnect
the plant and not satisfy the PRC-024-2. On the other hand, if the high voltage magnitudes
do not reflect real inverter response, the model must be updated. It was assumed that this
response does not represent the actual behavior.
o Active and reactive power excursions can be seen during and after the fault has been cleared
for some contingencies. It was assumed that this response does not represent the actual
behavior of the power plant model, however, it should be revised to avoid this.
o The reactive power limits of the user and generic models were found at values which do not
comply with a power factor of 0.95 required by DEF in steady state. In order to comply with
this requirement, these values must be changed to 0.2973.
o The PSS/E generic dynamic models were benchmarked against the user-written dynamic
models to verify the correlation of the response. The outputs for the parameter provided did
not correlate well for the simulations considered. Fine tuning of the generic models should
be done after correcting the user-defined model.
The Q191 facility should adhere to the following requirements:
o The reactive power control strategy should be set to regulate bus voltage at the POI and
provide dynamic reactive power support for voltage excursions. This was observed for the
dynamics data provided.
o The plant should not go into momentary cessation at any time inside the “No Trip Zone” of
NERC PRC-024-2.
o The inverter protective trip settings for frequency and voltage should be based on the
equipment capability if it exceeds the curves in the NERC PRC-024-2 standard so to minimize
undesired tripping of the inverters that may not be necessary.
o Implement the necessary adjustments/changes to the user-written model in order to provide
adequate response as shown in this report.
o Implement appropriate modifications to the PSS/E generic models to provide stable response
during faults and similar system response to the one provided by the user written model.
o The solar plant should be designed for reliable operation and its control systems should be
fine-tuned for the range of short circuit ratios identified in this report.
o The PSCAD EMT model for the proposed inverters should be provided.
o Follow NERC Standard PRC-024-2 for frequency and voltage relay settings.
o Follow NERC Standard PRC-006-3 frequency and over fluxing requirements.
o Follow IEEE Standard 519 on harmonic content at the POI.
o Install a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) at the POI, according to Duke Energy Florida Facility
Connection Requirements.

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The Southern-Florida Interface is an established transmission interface (path). This interface is partially
constrained by voltage stability limits which may be adversely impacted by the addition of new generation
or transactions. Any Generator Interconnection Service Request (GISR) or Transmission Service Request
(TSR) suspected of having a potential negative (limiting) impact on this interface will require PV Analysis
to determine and quantify this impact. Any request found to have a significant negative impact (>5% of
requested MWs) on this interface may potentially be responsible for all or some portion of the
remediation of this impact as a condition of their Interconnection. The remediation, if any, will be
determined during periodic cumulative study.
This report documents the assumptions of the study, the simulated sequence of events and the simulation
results. If any of the data and/or assumptions change, the results provided in this document may not
apply. Assumptions made on the Interconnection Customer’s models at the time of the study by DEF
are FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY to the Interconnection Customer.

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1. Point Of Interconnection (POI)
Interconnection of a new 230 kV breakered terminal at the Holopaw 230 kV substation with 2.5 mile gen
tie line to Interconnection Customer site.

Figure 2. One line diagram Q191.

2. System Representation

2.1. Base Case Load Flows


Stability cases were developed with the 2018 Revision 3 FRCC dynamic library. 2020 Summer peak load
(100%) and light load (50%) cases were used in this study. Prior-queued projects Q135, Q149, Q165,
Q180C and Q181 in DEF’s area were added to the base case, as well as their associated identified
upgrades.
The FRCC system peak load was 49,682 MW and the light load was 24,966 MW. The peak high import (HI)
and light (LL) load base cases maximized available generation in the study area.

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Table 1 shows the dispatch of major units in the study. Firm transactions in the area of the Project were
modeled in this study.
Table 1. Dispatch of relevant plants
LL PK-FI
Generator
(MW) (MW)
Q191 74.5 74.5
Prior Q & IA 1374 1374
Crystal River G4 & G5 0 1534
Citrus CT & ST 0 850
Tigerbay CG1 & CG2 208.5 208.5
Vandolah P1-P4 512 512
Bartow CT4 & ST4 182 1100
Hines CT & ST 1516.5 2114.5
SOCO – FLA interface 1122 1298

A detailed summary of generation dispatch, interface transfers, and voltage conditions is included in
Appendix A for each of the load flows listed in Table 1.

2.2. System Reinforcements made to the Base Case


No thermal upgrades were added to the stability base cases. All the analyses were developed for year
2020 to evaluate the interconnection of Q191.

2.3. Dynamic Modeling


The dynamic model for this study was taken from
dy18r3_2020s_50%.sav
dy18r3_2020s_LL.snp
dy18r3_2020s.sav
dy18r3_2020s_PK.snp
Additional models were added to the snapshot as required to model the Q191 converters, and additional
protective relays where required. Data for the Q191 converters and additional protective relay models
are listed in Appendix B.
This study includes detailed models of the out-of-step Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) and automatic
under frequency load shedding schemes (UFLS) in Florida as provided in the FRCC dynamics library.

2.4. Generator control settings


Project Q191 has proposed the following facilities:
• Inverter model: TMEIC 3360 Solarware Samurai
• Dynamic model version for inverter: ITMEIC 3360 Rev E
• Dynamic model version for PPC: STMEIC 3360 Rev E
• Number of inverters: 25
• Inverter capacity (@50°C): 3024 kW, 3360 kVA (each inverter), 75.6 MW / 84 MVA (whole plant)
• PF capability: 0.95 leading … 0.95 lagging (according to provided datasheet)

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For all simulations conducted, a user-provided model of the generating plant was used. This model
consists of a generator/electric control model and a plant-controller model.
The generator control as provided from the Interconnection Customer had the following settings:
Table 2. Generation control settings
Component Settings

Generator

Electric control • Voltage monitored at local bus (inverter terminals)


• Q has priority in current limiting
• Active power control: command from plant controller
• Reactive power control: command from plant controller
Plant controller • Reactive control mode: monitored-branch Q control. Changed
to Voltage control at POI.
• Active power limiting during over frequency events: enabled
• Kdroop loop was not found for the user-written model.
However, it is recommended to implement this loop to avoid
reactive saturation.
Protective relaying • The model received had its protective functions enabled
• Frequency and voltage are monitored at POI
• The voltage and frequency protection settings of the generator
comply with the PRC-024-2 requirements

2.5. SCR Calculation


The short circuit ratio (SCR) was calculated on both ends of the transformer connecting the plant to the
POI (i.e. the 34.5/230 kV transformer) using the same assumptions made for the short circuit calculation
in the steady state study (i.e. tap ratios at 1.0 p.u., all voltages set at 1.0 p.u., everything else left
unchanged from the load flow). The case used included all relevant prior-queued projects and Q191.
3. Assumptions
3.1. Protective Relaying Assumptions
The following relaying assumptions were used for this project:
• Pilot relaying was assumed on all lines at the POI and adjacent stations.
a. 69 kV
- Normal clearing: 4.5 cycles at both ends
- Stuck breaker: 21 cycles (local), 35 cycles (remote)
- Pilot system failure (P5): Z1: 4.5 cycles, Z2: 35 cycles
b. 115 kV
- Normal clearing: 4.0 cycles (local), 4.5 cycles (remote)
- Stuck breaker: 18 cycles (local), 33 cycles (remote)
- Pilot system failure (P5): Z1: 4.5 cycles, Z2: 33 cycles
c. 230 kV
- Normal clearing: 4.0 cycles (local), 4.5 cycles (remote)
- Stuck breaker: 16 cycles (local), 29 cycles (remote)
- Pilot system failure (P5): Z1: 4.5 cycles, Z2: 29 cycles

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• No high speed reclosing (less than one second).

• All protections in third parties substations were configured with the operation times mention
above.

3.2. Simulations
Simulations were developed in accordance with NERC TPL-001-4. Per NERC TPL-001-4, the simulations
were designed to simulate the removal of all elements that the protection system and other automatic
controls are expected to disconnect for each contingency. Engineering judgment was used to determine
the applicability of each category event given the interconnection request studied. Refer to Table 3 for
the specific simulations of this analysis.
3.2.1. Contingencies Considered
The following contingencies were considered for this analysis:
• NERC TPL-001-4 Planning Events:
 Category P1 events for all lines at the POI station.
 Category P4 events at the POI and adjacent stations.
 Category P5 events at the POI and adjacent stations.
 Category Single Point of Failure (SPF) events at the POI and adjacent stations.
• NERC TPL-001-4 Extreme Events:
 Three phase fault with stuck breaker, relay or SPF resulting in delayed fault clearing at
adjacent stations.
The 3-phase normally cleared faults, SLG and extreme contingencies with delay cleared faults are
presented in Table 3, for the Q191 project.
Table 3. Normal, SLG and Extreme Contingencies
Contingency
Code Normal State and Contingency Definition
No Type
1 P0 P0 Run without a fault
2 P1-HOLO-01 3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV
3 P1 P1-HOLO-02 3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV
4 P1-HOLO-03 3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165
3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to Poinsett 230 kV with pilot
5 EXT-P5-HOLO-01
protection system failure.
3PH fault at 20% of the line Poinsett 230 kV to Holopaw with pilot
6 EXT-P5-HOLO-02
protection system failure.
3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV
7 EXT-P5-HOLO-03
with pilot protection system failure.
P5
3PH fault at 20% of the line City of St. Cloud East 230 kV to Holopaw
8 EXT-P5-HOLO-04
with pilot protection system failure.
3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to POI Q165 with pilot
9 EXT-P5-HOLO-05
protection system failure.
3PH fault at 20% of the line POI Q165 to Holopaw with pilot
10 EXT-P5-HOLO-06
protection system failure.
Extreme - 3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV with stuck
11 EXT-HOLO-01
Stuck Breaker breaker (breaker 5398)

9
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV with stuck
12 EXT-HOLO-02
breaker (breaker 852)
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with
13 EXT-HOLO-03
stuck breaker (breaker 5397)
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with
14 EXT-HOLO-04
stuck breaker (breaker 4867)
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker
15 EXT-HOLO-05
(breaker 4867)
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker
16 EXT-HOLO-06
(breaker 980)
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker
17 EXT-HOLO-07
(breaker 1122)
3PH fault at Poinsett 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck
18 EXT-PSET-01
breaker (breaker 8W90)
3PH fault at Poinsett 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck
19 EXT-PSET-02
breaker (breaker 8W2)
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with
20 EXT-STCE-01
stuck breaker (breaker 705)
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with
21 EXT-STCE-02
stuck breaker (breaker 707)
3PH fault at POI Q165 on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker
22 EXT-POIQ165-01
(breaker B3)
3PH fault at POI Q165 on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker
23 EXT-POIQ165-02
(breaker B2)
24 EXT-SPF-HOLO-01 3PH fault at Holopaw with protection system failure
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with protection system
25 Extreme - SPF EXT-SPF-STCE-01
failure
EXT-SPF-
26 3PH fault at POI Q165 with protection system failure
POIQ165-01
SLG fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with protection system
27 SPF SPF-STCE-01
failure

3.3. Single Line to Ground Faults


For simulations of single line to ground faults, the shunt admittance added to the faulted bus was
determined from the short circuit analysis. The shunt admittance was calculated using the Thevenin
100
equivalent impedances of the sequence networks as 𝑌𝑌 = (𝑍𝑍 +𝑍𝑍 ) (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). Refer to Appendix A for specific
2 0
admittance values used.

3.4. Performance Criteria


This study was conducted based on FERC Large Generation Interconnection Rules, NERC/FRCC Reliability
Standards, and Duke Energy Florida Interconnection Requirements. Design and extreme criteria
contingencies were tested and evaluated for cases with the Project on line. These tests were conducted
at 50% of summer peak and summer peak load levels which are the typical load levels at which FRCC
performs stability studies. For both load levels as many generators as possible were turned on in the
study area. Stability results were analyzed using the criteria in the NERC Reliability Standards and in the
Transmission Planning Guide for the Duke Energy Florida Company.
Normally cleared three phase faults and single line to ground (SLG) faults with breaker failure, and relay
failure contingencies were simulated in accordance with NERC Categories P4 and P5 contingencies,

10
respectively. In cases where two independent protection groups exist on a facility, the P4 contingency
was modeled assuming the correct operation of the faster protection group.
All extreme contingencies, involving breaker failure, were simulated in accordance with NERC Category
Extreme Event assuming correct operation of all protection groups. All extreme contingencies, involving
relay system or protective system malfunction, were simulated in accordance with NERC Category
Extreme criteria. In cases where two independent protection groups exist on a facility, the contingency
was modeled assuming the operation of the slowest protection group. For facilities with no protection
redundancy or where only one protection group exists on a facility, the fault clearing was initiated from
the remote line terminals, resulting in isolation of additional system elements beyond the faulted
element.
In general, the following performance requirements from TPL-001-4 were used to determine the
conclusions of the simulated events.
• Planning Event P1 1:
 No generating unit shall pull out of synchronism
 Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping
• Planning Events P2-P71:
 If a generator pulls out of synchronism in the simulation, the resulting apparent impedance
swings shall not result in the tripping of a transmission system element.
 Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping.
• Extreme Events1:
 If the analysis concludes there is cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an
evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
consequences of the event shall be conducted.
3.4.1. Transient Voltage Response Criteria
The following FRCC transient voltage response criteria were used.

Table 4. NERC TPL-001-4 Planning Events P1 and P2


Load bus must recover to (p.u.) At or before time after fault clearing (seconds)
0.8 2
0.9 10

Table 5. NERC TPL-001-4 Planning Events P3 – P7


Load bus must recover to (p.u.) At or before time after fault clearing (seconds)
0.8 4
0.9 10

3.4.2. Power Oscillation Damping Requirement


A damping ratio of 3% or better of power oscillations was deemed acceptable per the FRCC damping
criterion. Any mode with a magnitude of 0.5% or less of the steady state (average) magnitude was
deemed insignificant.

1
Refer to Section 8 for reference to TPL-001-4.

11
3.4.3. Cascading
For the purposes of this analysis, the cascading definition from the “FRCC Stability Criteria for transmission
Planning Performance” was used.

3.5. Network Monitoring


Model OSSCAN was used to scan the network for out of step conditions. This model flags lines as out of
step if the apparent impedance as seen from either end of a line is less than the line impedance. For the
lines flagged by this model, if power swing blocking logic is not used, the distance elements could trip.
This model was set to trip lines flagged as out of step post fault clearing. This allows the simulation to
include the tripping of transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause protection
system operation based on generic relay models.
VOLTAGE_REC routine was enabled to show alerting conditions in buses which exhibit violations in voltage
recovery criteria defined in the transient voltage response criteria.
4. Discussion of Study Results

4.1. Dynamic Modeling


4.1.1. Data Modifications to User-Written Model
No major modifications to the user-written model were needed. The minor modifications made are
described below. See further details in Appendix B.1.
Control system
As stated in section 3.4, the control mode in the plant controller was changed from Q-branch control to V
control at POI and the priority was already at reactive power Q in the current limiting logic of the electric
control model, in order to comply with DEF requirements. Furthermore, the reactive and active power
limits of the user model were found at values, which do not comply with a power factor of 0.95 required
by DEF in steady state, so these values were changed to 0.2973 in the reactive power limit. However,
serious problems during fault were found for this TMEIC user-written model (see Appendix C).
4.1.2. General Findings Regarding the User-Written Model
In this section, a description of other issues encountered with the user-provided model of the generation
plant is presented. Further details of the issues encountered can be found in Appendix C.
• Excursions of active and reactive power signals

Active and reactive power excursions can be seen during and after the fault has been cleared for some
contingencies. Immediately after fault, active and reactive power have spikes that reach values above
360 MW/-220 MW and 560 MVAr/-100 MVAr respectively. Then, for most of the contingencies after the
fault has been cleared, the generated active power rises with a constant slope to values that surpass the
power plant limit. For some contingencies where the project frequency exhibits strong negative spikes,
the active power oscillates reaching values over the power plant limit.
This behavior might suggest that the PLL included in the generator/converter model requires finer tuning.
However, all parameters should be revised to prevent this response. It was assumed that this response
does not represent the actual behavior of the power plant model. Further details can be found in
Appendix C.

12
• Transient Voltage Spikes

Although not consequential to the results of the study, it should be noted that the user-provided model
of the inverter has some issues when the line to which the PV plant is connected gets tripped while the
power output of the inverter is non zero. Following the disconnection of the line, the model shows high
voltage spikes at the inverter terminals. Appendix C shows the response from the unit Q191 when the
inverter is disconnected from the grid. In other words, the model does not seem adequate to work in a
small island with unbalanced power. In order to avoid the nuisance of these high values in the plots, for
the simulations that require tripping the connection line for fault clearing, the inverter was manually
tripped simultaneously. It is suggested to check this behavior by the model developer to avoid false
response when the unit is disconnected.
• Slow voltage stabilization at inverter level

The user–written model shows reactive power saturation and a slow voltage recovery after the fault in
some contingencies. Since the user-written model does not have a Kdroop loop, this response could not
be modified (see Appendix C). It is recommended to implement this loop in order to avoid this behavior.
4.1.3. PSS/E Generic model validation
A model of the plant using PSS/E generic modules was also provided. The response of the generic model
was compared with the response of the user-written model to assess their correlation. This comparison
was made for one worst-case scenario (EXT-SPF-POIQ165-01) and one normally cleared fault (P1-HOLO-
02). The generic model included a generator model (REGCAU1), an electric control model (REECAU1) and
a plant controller (REPCAU1). The provided generic model included protection relays. These were
readjusted to match the settings used for the user-written model. Some modifications to the parameters
of the models were made to better fit the provided user model (see following section). Further details
can be found in Appendix B.3.

13
Figure 3. P1-HOLO-02. Validation of generic model as provided. Solid lines: user-written model. Dashed
lines: generic model.

14
Figure 4. EXT-SPF-POIQ165-01. Validation of generic model as provided. Solid lines: user-written
model. Dashed lines: generic model.

As shown in the figures above, the correlation between the generic model and the user-written model is
questionable. Important differences can be seen in the behavior because of the active ramp-limiting logic
and the LVRT logic. On the one hand, while the provided documentation states that the user-written
electric model has up ramp-limiting logic for the active and reactive power command, the behavior of
both commands after fault clearing (Figure 3) suggests this limiting logic is effectively disabled. For the

15
generic model, on the contrary, the ramp limiting appears to be active, which accounts for the differences
in response in the P1-HOLO-02 contingency.
There are considerable differences in the LVRT logic between the user-written and generic models that
account for the differences observed in the contingencies P1-HOLO-02 and EXT-SPF-POIQ165-01. While
the LVRT in the generic model freezes the active current command to the pre-fault value, the user-written
model does not freeze the corresponding state and the active current command rises over the maximum
limit what exhibits an increase in the active current control error during fault condition. On the other
hand, it is necessary to enable the inverter generic model to provide reactive power support during a fault
condition if it is required (see Appendix C). The reactive current injection gain during over and under
voltage conditions is defined at a value greater than 0 since the user-written model supports low voltage
operation conditions increasing the reactive current command. After the new parameter definition, both
models support reactive power during fault conditions as presented in Figure 4.
All of this leads to significant differences between the behavior of the user-written and generic models,
both during faults and after fault clearing. In the cases studied, however, the overall outcome of the
simulations is well reproduced by both models (i.e. the generator rides through the P1 and SPF faults
returning to pre-fault values).
A finer tuning of the generic model is not within the scope of this study. It is recommended that this
tuning be done after the user model’s erroneous behavior depicted in the previous section is corrected.
Data Modifications to the Provided Generic Model

To comply with DEF requirements, studies should include modifications listed below:
• REGCAU1
Parameter Original Value New Value
N/A N/A N/A

• REECAU1
Parameter Original Value New Value
Kqv (pu), Reactive current injection gain during
0.0 2.0
over and under voltage conditions
QMax 0.4357 0.2973
QMin - 0.4357 -0.2973
PMAX 1 0.9046

• REPCAU1

Parameter Original Value New Value


Bus number for voltage control (M) 70101 2882
Monitored branch from bus for line droop compensation (M+1) 70101 60600
Monitored branch to bus for line droop compensation (M+2) 97000 2882
Kc, Reactive current compensation gain (pu) 0.1314 0.0
Qmax 0.4357 0.2973
Qmin - 0.4357 -0.2973
Pmax 1 0.9046

16
• Added protective relays VTGTPAT, according to User Model
Measuring bus: POI Q191 – HOLOPAW 230 kV (2882)

Instance VL (p.u.) VH (p.u.) TP, Relay pickup time (s)


6059701 -1.0 1.4 0.16
6059702 -1.0 1.2 1
6059703 -1.0 1.18 2
6059704 -1.0 1.16 3
6059705 -1.0 1.12 5
6059706 0.45 5 1
6059707 0.6 5 5
6059708 0.7 5 10
6059709 0.88 5 20

• Added protective relays FRTQTPAT, according to User Model


Measuring bus: POI Q191 – HOLOPAW 230 kV (2882)

Instance FL (Hz) FU (Hz) TP, Relay pickup time (s)


6059710 -100 63.25 2
6059711 -100 61.8 90
6059712 -100 60.6 660
6059713 57.0 100 10
6059714 58.5 100 100
6059715 59 100 1800

4.2. Summary Results

Table 6 shows the contingencies studied and corresponding simulation results for each scenario
considered. Any voltage violations, damping violations, unit trips and/or load shed are noted for each
simulation.

17
Table 6. Dynamic simulation results

Code Sequence of events and clearing sequence Off Peak Peak-FI

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV.


P1-HOLO-01 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 852 and 5398 - 4 cycles) and remotely at
Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 4.5 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV.
P1-HOLO-02 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 5397 and 4867 - 4 cycles) and remotely at
City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 4.5 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165.


P1-HOLO-03 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 980, 4867 and 1122 - 4 cycles) and remotely
at POI Q165 (breakers B2 and B3 - 4.5 cycles).

3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to Poinsett 230 kV with pilot protection
system failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-01 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 852 and 5398 - 4.5 cycles) and remotely at
Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at 20% of the line Poinsett 230 kV to Holopaw with pilot protection
system failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-02 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 4.5 cycles) and
remotely at Holopaw (breakers 852 and 5398 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with pilot
protection system failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-03 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 5397 and 4867 - 4.5 cycles) and remotely at
City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 29 cycles).

18
3PH fault at 20% of the line City of St. Cloud East 230 kV to Holopaw with pilot
protection system failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-04 Damped Damped
Open line locally at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 4.5 cycles)
and remotely at Holopaw (breakers 5397 and 4867 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at 20% of the line Holopaw to POI Q165 with pilot protection system
failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-05 Damped Damped
Open line locally at Holopaw (breakers 980, 4867 and 1122 - 4.5 cycles) and
remotely at POI Q165 (breakers B2 and B3 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at 20% of the line POI Q165 to Holopaw with pilot protection system
failure.
EXT-P5-HOLO-06 Damped Damped
Open line locally at POI Q165 (breakers B2 and B3 - 4.5 cycles) and remotely at
Holopaw (breakers 980, 4867 and 1122 - 29 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV with stuck breaker (breaker
5398). Q191 disconnected by clearing Q191 disconnected by clearing
sequence sequence
EXT-HOLO-01
Trip locally at Holopaw (breaker 852 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Poinsett 230 kV
(breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at Damped Damped
Holopaw and disconnect Q191 (breakers B1 and BQ191 - 16 cycles).
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to Poinsett 230 kV with stuck breaker (breaker
852).
HLOPW G1 and HLOPW G3 HLOPW G1 and HLOPW G3
Trip locally at Holopaw (breaker 5398 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Poinsett 230 kV disconnected by clearing sequence disconnected by clearing sequence
EXT-HOLO-02
(breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at
Holopaw (breakers 980 and 1120 - 16 cycles) and remotely at Osceola Plant Damped Damped
(breaker CPPA-52-03 - 29 cycles). Disconnect generators OSLA G2 and OSLA G3
(breakers BOSLAG2 and BOSLAG3 - 29 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with stuck breaker
(breaker 5397).
HLOPW G2 disconnected by HLOPW G2 disconnected by
clearing sequence clearing sequence
EXT-HOLO-03 Trip locally at Holopaw (breaker 4867 - 4 cycles) and remotely at City of St. Cloud
East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections
Damped Damped
at Holopaw (breaker B1 - 16 cycles) and remotely at Osceola Plant (breaker CPPA-
52-04 - 29 cycles). Disconnect generator OSLA G1 (breaker BOSLAG1 - 29 cycles).

19
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with stuck breaker
(breaker 4867).

EXT-HOLO-04 Trip locally at Holopaw (breaker 5397 - 4 cycles) and remotely at City of St. Cloud Damped Damped
East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections
at Holopaw (breakers 980 and 1122 - 16 cycles) and remotely at POI Q165 (breakers
B2 and B3 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker (breaker 4867).

Trip locally at Holopaw (breakers 980 and 1122 - 4 cycles) and remotely at POI Q165
EXT-HOLO-05 Damped Damped
(breakers B2 and B3 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at Holopaw
(breaker 5397 - 16 cycles) and remotely at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers
705 and 707 - 29 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker (breaker 980).
HLOPW G1 and HLOPW G3 HLOPW G1 and HLOPW G3
Trip locally at Holopaw (breakers 4867 and 1122 - 4 cycles) and remotely at POI
disconnected by clearing sequence disconnected by clearing sequence
EXT-HOLO-06 Q165 (breakers B2 and B3 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at
Holopaw (breakers 852 and 1120 - 16 cycles) and remotely at Osceola Plant
Damped Damped
(breaker CPPA-52-03 - 29 cycles). Disconnect generators OSLA G2 and OSLA G3
(breakers BOSLAG2 and BOSLAG3 - 29 cycles).

3PH fault at Holopaw on the line to POI Q165 with stuck breaker (breaker 1122).

EXT-HOLO-07 Trip locally at Holopaw (breakers 4867 and 980 - 4 cycles) and remotely at POI Q165 Damped Damped
(breakers B2 and B3 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at Holopaw
(breaker 1120 - 16 cycles).
3PH fault at Poinsett 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker (breaker
8W90).
EXT-PSET-01 Damped Damped
Trip locally at Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W2 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Holopaw
(breakers 852 and 5398 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at
Poinsett 230 kV (breakers B5, B6 and B7 - 16 cycles).
3PH fault at Poinsett 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker (breaker
8W2).

EXT-PSET-02 Trip locally at Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W90 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Holopaw Damped Damped
(breakers 852 and 5398 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at
Poinsett 230 kV (breaker 8W131 - 16 cycles) and remotely at Bithlo 230 kV
(breakers 6383 and 6386 - 29 cycles).

20
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker
(breaker 705).

EXT-STCE-01 Trip locally at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 707 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Damped Damped
Holopaw (breakers 5397 and 4867 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections
at St. Cloud East 230 kV (breaker B8 - 16 cycles) and remotely at City of St. Cloud
South 230 kV (breaker B11 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker
(breaker 707).

EXT-STCE-02 Trip locally at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 705 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Damped Damped
Holopaw (breakers 5397 and 4867 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections
at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breaker B8 - 16 cycles and breakers B9 and B10 -
16.5 cycles).

3PH fault at POI Q165 on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker (breaker B3).
DEF Q165 PV disconnected by DEF Q165 PV disconnected by
clearing sequence clearing sequence
EXT-POIQ165-01 Trip locally at POI Q165 (breakers B2 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Holopaw (breakers
980, 4867 and 1122 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at POI Q165
Damped Damped
and disconnect Q165 (breakers B4 and BQ165 - 16 cycles).

3PH fault at POI Q165 on the line to Holopaw with stuck breaker (breaker B2).
DEF Q165 PV disconnected by DEF Q165 PV disconnected by
Trip locally at POI Q165 (breakers B3 - 4 cycles) and remotely at Holopaw (breakers clearing sequence clearing sequence
EXT-POIQ165-02
980, 4867 and 1122 - 4.5 cycles). Finally, trip backup local protections at POI Q165,
disconnect Q165 (breakers B4 and BQ165 - 16 cycles) and trip remotely at West Damped Damped
Lake Wales 230 kV (breakers 1073 and 1076 - 29 cycles).
3PH fault at Holopaw with protection system failure.
HLOPW G2, HLOPW G1, HLOPW HLOPW G2, HLOPW G1, HLOPW G3
Trip remote protections at Poinsett 230 kV (breakers 8W2 and 8W90 - 120 cycles),
G3 and Q191 disconnected by and Q191 disconnected by clearing
City of St. Cloud East 230 kV (breakers 705 and 707 - 120 cycles), Osceola Plant
EXT-SPF-HOLO-01 clearing sequence sequence
(breakers CPPA-52-03 and CPPA-52-04 - 120 cycles) and POI Q165 (breakers B2 and
B3 - 120 cycles) and disconnect generators OSLA G1, OSLA G2 and OSLA G3
Damped Damped
(breakers BOSLAG1, BOSLAG2 and BOSLAG3 -120 cycles) and Q191 (BQ191 - 120
cycles)
3PH fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with protection system failure.
Q191 disconnected Q191 disconnected
EXT-SPF-STCE-01 Trip remote protections at Holopaw (breakers 4867 and 5397 - 120 cycles), City of
St. Cloud South 230 kV (breaker B11 - 120 cycles) and City of St. Cloud North 230 kV Damped Damped
(breaker B12 - 120 cycles)

21
SLG fault at City of St. Cloud East 230 kV with protection system failure.

SPF-STCE-01 Trip remote protections at Holopaw (breakers 4867 and 5397 - 120 cycles), City of Damped Damped
St. Cloud South 230 kV (breaker B11 - 120 cycles) and City of St. Cloud North 230 kV
(breaker B12 - 120 cycles)
3PH fault at POI Q165 with protection system failure.
DEF Q165 PV disconnected by DEF Q165 PV disconnected by
clearing sequence clearing sequence
EXT-SPF-POIQ165-01 Trip remote protections at Holopaw (breakers 980, 4867 and 1122 - 120 cycles) and
West Lake Wales 230 kV (breakers 1073 and 1076 - 120 cycles) and disconnect
Damped Damped
Q165 (breaker BQ165 - 120 cycles).

22
Project Q191 does not trip in any SLG contingency, complying with the DEF requirements, since the plant
under study should ride through all SLG faults.
4.3. SCR Calculation

The results of the SCR calculation are shown in the Table below.

Table 7. SCR calculation results

Case SCR - 230kV SCR - 34.5 kV


N-0 55.94 6.82
POINSETT - HOLOPAW 1 23.44 5.86
STC EAST - HOLOPAW 1 52.03 6.82
OSC REL1 - HOLOPAW 1 55.94 6.82
HOLOPAW 2 - HOLOPAW 1 42.49 6.50
W LAKE WALES - HOLOPAW 1 55.96 6.82
OSC REL2 - HOLOPAW 1 55.94 6.82

The plant should be designed to reliably operate, and the control systems should be tuned for the range
of SCR identified. Additionally, the developer should review the SCR to ensure that the models provided
for analysis in PSS/E are adequate for SCR in this range.

23
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
The result of the transient stability study indicates that the addition of the Q191 will not have significant
impact on the transient stability response of the bulk power transmission system. The proposed Project
will be interconnected to DEF system at a new 230 kV breakered terminal at the Holopaw 230 kV
substation with 2.5 mile gen tie line to Interconnection Customer site.
No protection system upgrades will be required by the Project to interconnect to the DEF transmission
system. Key findings and requirements of the Project are listed below.
Key Findings:
• Based on the results of the simulations, the Q191 facility will not negatively impact the transient
stability response of the bulk electric system. However, the Interconnection Customer should
address the deficiencies in the models provided before moving forward with the Project.
• The protective relays included in the model were found enabled. These protections, which comply
with the PRC-024-2 requirements, were used for the simulations.
• The user-written model does not include reactive droop settings. They should be implemented in
order to avoid the saturation of the reactive power controller at PCC.
• Q191 remains interconnected for all simulated SLG faults.
• A compatibility problem was found in simulations when the user-written model and FRCC dsusr.dll
were included. The Interconnection Customer should add logic to set NUMTRM to a negative
quantity in their code to consider TMEIC-3360 model as a conventional unit although is
renewable.
• Q191 dynamic analysis was performed with the user-written model provided by the
Interconnection Customer. A set of observations is shown below, specific model issues are
described in Appendix C:
o When the generator is disconnected as a result of a trip of the connection line, the model
exhibits high voltage at its terminals.
o Voltages exhibit high peaks at the inverter terminals, near 1.8 p.u. when a fault is cleared. If
this response represents the real inverters behavior, the protection relays could disconnect
the plant and not satisfy the PRC-024-2. On the other hand, if the high voltage magnitudes
do not reflect real inverter response, the model must be updated. It was assumed that this
response does not represent the actual behavior.
o Active and reactive power excursions can be seen during and after the fault has been cleared
for some contingencies. It was assumed that this response does not represent the actual
behavior of the power plant model, however, it should be revised to avoid this.
o The reactive power limits of the user and generic models were found at values which do not
comply with a power factor of 0.95 required by DEF in steady state. In order to comply with
this requirement, these values must be changed to 0.2973.
o The PSS/E generic dynamic models were benchmarked against the user-written dynamic
models to verify the correlation of the response. The outputs for the parameter provided did
not correlate well for the simulations considered. Fine tuning of the generic models should
be done after correcting the user-defined model.
The Q191 facility should adhere to the following requirements:
o The reactive power control strategy should be set to regulate bus voltage at the POI and
provide dynamic reactive power support for voltage excursions. This was observed for the
dynamics data provided.

24
o The plant should not go into momentary cessation at any time inside the “No Trip Zone” of
NERC PRC-024-2.
o The inverter protective trip settings for frequency and voltage should be based on the
equipment capability if it exceeds the curves in the NERC PRC-024-2 standard so to minimize
undesired tripping of the inverters that may not be necessary.
o Implement the necessary adjustments/changes to the user-written model in order to provide
adequate response as shown in this report.
o Implement appropriate modifications to the PSS/E generic models to provide stable response
during faults and similar system response to the one provided by the user written model.
o The solar plant should be designed for reliable operation and its control systems should be
fine-tuned for the range of short circuit ratios identified in this report.
o The PSCAD EMT model for the proposed inverters should be provided.
o Follow NERC Standard PRC-024-2 for frequency and voltage relay settings.
o Follow NERC Standard PRC-006-3 frequency and over fluxing requirements.
o Follow IEEE Standard 519 on harmonic content at the POI.
o Install a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) at the POI, according to Duke Energy Florida Facility
Connection Requirements.
All relevant plants and firm transactions in the area of the Project were modeled in this study.
The thermal and voltage analyses are provided in a power flow and short circuit report.
Any changes or modifications to the present proposal for the Project will require additional study work to
identify new impacts to the transmission system.

25
6. Appendix A – Load flow Summaries

50% case
STATION VOLTAGES
HOLOPAW 1 = 237.2 MEADOW WD S = 233.2 AIRPRODUCTTP = 70.4
PVCL-3 Q191 = 237.1 RIO PINAR = 232.6 ORANGE SW = 69.9
SKY LAKE = 233.8 ORLANDO CG = 70.4

GENERATOR QUANTITIES
GENERATOR PGEN PMAX PMIN QGEN QMAX QMIN VTARG VBUS
ANCLOTE G1 0 515 80 151.5 215 -187 21.3 21.5
ANCLOTE G2 0 525 80 151.5 187 -224.3 21.3 21.5
AVONPRK P1&2 24.5 24.5 7.2 -3 20 -3 13.9 13.9
AVONPRK P1&2 24.5 24.5 7.2 -3 20 -3 13.9 13.9
BARTOW CT4A 181.8 182 31.1 -11.2 110 -76 15.1 15.1
BARTOW CT4B 0 182 31.1 13.3 111 -75 15.1 15.2
BARTOW CT4C 0 182 31.1 1.5 88 -68 15.1 15.2
BARTOW CT4D 0 181 31.1 -5.7 96 -73 15.1 15.2
BARTOW P1&2 0 41.8 11.5 18 18 -9 13.9 14
BARTOW P1&2 0 43.9 11.5 19 19 -10 13.9 14
BARTOW P3&4 0 44.9 12.2 22 22 -5 13.9 14
BARTOW P3&4 0 49.9 12.2 22 22 -5 13.9 14
BARTOW ST4 0 467 83.8 62.8 159 -82 18.5 18.3
BAYBORO P1&3 0 44.9 11.8 14.6 17 -14 14.4 13.8
BAYBORO P1&3 0 44.9 11.8 17 17 -14 14.4 13.8
BAYBORO P2&4 0 42.9 11.8 22 22 -14 13.7 13.8
BAYBORO P2&4 0 44.9 11.8 22 22 -14 13.7 13.8
CITRUS CT1A 0 263 130 63.4 180 -90 21.2 20.5
CITRUS CT1B 0 263 130 81.9 180 -90 21.2 20.5
CITRUS CT2A 0 263 130 -2.5 180 -90 20.8 20.9
CITRUS CT2B 0 263 130 5.5 180 -90 20.7 20.9
CITRUS ST1 0 354 130 61.1 240 -120 20 19.5
CITRUS ST2 0 354 130 7.4 240 -120 19.6 19.9
CRYST RVR G1 0 396 94.8 190 190 -10 21.7 21.5
CRYST RVR G2 0 520 124.5 257 257 -33 21.7 21.5
CRYST RVR G4 0 769 182.2 132.3 310 -40 23 22.8
CRYST RVR G5 0 767 177.5 335 335 -211 23.6 23.9
DEBARY P10 0 81.4 21.2 60 60 -30 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P2 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P3 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P4 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P5 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P6 0 53 13.5 22 22 -5 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P7 0 84.4 21.2 28.1 60 -30 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P8 0 84.4 21.2 28.1 60 -30 12.9 13.1
DEBARY P9 0 82.4 21.2 50.9 60 -30 12.9 13.1
DEF Q149 PV 45 45 10 5.1 14.8 -14.8 35 35
DEF Q165 PV 74.5 74.5 10 -15.3 24.5 -24.5 35 35
DEF Q181 PV 550 550 0 30.9 360 -180 236 21.1
FCS CP&L 1 0 35.6 8.8 17 17 -3 13.2 13.4
FCS CP&L 2 0 91.4 22.5 -1.2 44 -5 13.2 13.4
HIGGINS P1&2 0 22.8 7.2 19 19 -10 13.4 13.5
HIGGINS P1&2 0 22.8 7.2 12 12 -12 13.4 13.5
HIGGINS P3&4 0 35.5 8.8 23 23 -20 13.4 13.5
HIGGINS P3&4 0 35.5 8.8 22 22 -14 13.4 13.5
HINES CT1A 160.1 170 41 -7.4 72 -84 15.7 15.7
HINES CT1B 160.1 170 41 -7.5 64 -85 15.7 15.7
HINES CT2A 181.2 192 49.6 51.3 77 -68 18.4 18.4
HINES CT2B 181.2 192 44 51.8 86 -67 18.4 18.4
HINES CT3A 0 192 41 40.2 79 -48 18.4 17.8
HINES CT3B 0 192 41 40.7 77 -47 18.4 17.8
HINES CT4A 164 172 41 49.9 92 -45 18.4 18.4
HINES CT4B 164 172 41 50.3 92 -45 18.4 18.4
HINES ST1 160.3 167 38.5 -13 71 -101 17.4 17.4
HINES ST2 181.4 189 41 54.7 81 -57 18.4 18.4
HINES ST3 0 190 40 44.9 86 -43 16.8 16.3
HINES ST4 164.1 171 40 53.8 86 -43 18.4 18.4
INTERCSN 1&2 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8
INTERCSN 1&2 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8
INTERCSN 3&4 0 47.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8

26
INTERCSN 3&4 0 47.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8
INTERCSN 5&6 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8
INTERCSN 5&6 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.5 13.8
INTERCSN P10 0 83.4 20.8 34 34 -25 13.8 13.9
INTERCSN P11 0 145.4 35.8 40 40 -46 14 14.2
INTERCSN P12 0 77.4 20 51 51 -17 13.7 13.8
INTERCSN P13 0 77.4 20 44 44 -11 13.7 13.8
INTERCSN P14 0 78.4 20 47 47 -15 13.7 13.8
INTERCSN P7 0 83.4 20.8 36 36 -26 13.8 13.9
INTERCSN P8 0 83.4 20.8 45.8 54 -13 13.4 13.6
INTERCSN P9 0 83.4 20.8 31 31 -30 13.8 13.9
LAKECOUNTYRR 12.8 12.8 3.2 -2 5 -2 13.9 13.9
MULBERRYCG1A 44.5 44.5 8.5 -10.7 21 -14 13.8 13.8
MULBERRYCG1B 72.7 72.7 19.5 -26.7 49 -32 13.6 13.6
OCCIDENTLCG2 16 16 4 0.7 8 -3 12.7 12.7
ORANGE CG1 64.9 64.9 17.2 -17.9 45 -40 13.8 13.8
ORANGE CG2 40.8 40.8 10.4 -15.4 25 -20 13.9 13.9
ORLANDO CG 115.8 115.8 28.5 2 10 0 13.6 13.6
OSPREY CT1 202.2 200 107 19.7 145 -58 15 15
OSPREY CT2 202.2 200 107 19.7 145 -58 15 15
OSPREY ST 225.5 223 136 29.9 185 -84 16 16
PASCO RR 23.4 23.4 5.8 -0.8 19 -12 13.1 13.1
PINELLAS RR1 40.6 40.6 10 7.3 23 -18 14.6 14.6
PINELLAS RR2 15 15 3.7 7.8 23 -18 14.6 14.6
Q180C_PV 74.5 74.5 10 10.2 10.2 -10.2 119 0.7
Q191 74.5 74.5 0 -15.2 24.5 -24.5 0.6 0.6
SHADY HLS P1 0 164.6 50 54.4 75 -56 17.9 17.9
SHADY HLS P2 0 164.6 50 54.4 68 -53 17.9 17.9
SHADY HLS P3 0 164.6 50 54.4 77 -60 17.9 17.9
SUWANNE P1&2 0 53 13.5 0.2 21 -22 13.5 13.8
SUWANNE P1&2 0 52 13.5 14 14 -21 13.5 13.8
SUWANNEE P3 0 53 13.5 0.2 14 -24 13.1 13.5
TIGERBAY CG1 167.8 167.8 40 -1.4 70 -66 17.6 17.6
TIGERBAY CG2 40.7 40.7 10.5 -5 33 -30 13.5 13.5
TIMBER ENRGY 14.3 14.3 3.2 -1.6 6 -2 13.6 13.6
UNIVERSTY FL 46 46 9 -18.3 20 -20 13.6 13.6
US ECOGEN 1 0 69 0 3 42 -31 14 14.1
VANDOLAH P1 128 165.2 40.6 -10.5 114 -53 18 18
VANDOLAH P2 128 165.2 40.6 -10.5 110 -53 18 18
VANDOLAH P3 128 165.2 40.6 -10.4 111 -53 18 18
VANDOLAH P4 128 165.2 40.6 -10.3 114 -53 18 18
WOODRUFF DAM 36 36 34 -13.5 15 -15 13.4 13.4

GENERATOR COMPLEX REPORT


GEN COMPLEX ON OFF MW SPRES PMAX PMIN MVAR REMVAR QMAX QMIN
AR-01-FPL 65 71 12166 2112 28758 15924 2036 6926 18100 -9532
AR-02-DEF 39 63 4459 220 14437 3741 215 2386 7417 -4156
AR-04-GVL 4 4 258 217 662 286 -23 219 323 -174
AR-06-JEA 6 11 1188 451 2915 1330 100 765 1548 -524
AR-11-FMPP 10 24 1558 164 3904 1600 267 624 1964 -779
AR-12-SEC 5 10 1547 344 2530 1247 314 620 1246 -1021
AR-15-TAL 4 8 312 210 708 294 -4 347 470 -184
AR-16-TECO 24 23 2334 630 5971 1841 762 969 3221 -1313
AR-21-TCEC 2 0 323 0 323 100 -5 231 226 -60
AR-346-SOCO 149 239 20614 7375 63325 24131 -948 17455 18403 -10408
Hines 9 3 1516 79 2169 499 284 437 963 -733
Higgins 0 4 0 0 117 32 0 0 76 -56
Q191 1 0 75 0 75 0 -15 39 24 -24
Bartow 1 8 182 0 1374 256 -11 121 645 -403
Vandolah 4 0 512 149 661 162 -42 491 449 -212
Crystal River 0 4 0 0 2452 579 0 0 1092 -294
Tigerbay 1 0 168 0 168 40 -1 71 70 -66
Bayboro 0 4 0 0 177 47 0 0 78 -56
Pinnellas 2 0 56 0 56 14 15 31 46 -36
Mulberry 2 0 117 0 117 28 -37 107 70 -46
University FL 1 0 46 0 46 9 -18 38 20 -20
Suwannee 0 3 0 0 158 41 0 0 49 -67

INTERFACE FLOW REPORT


DESCRIPTION MW MVAR
DEF - FPL -400 -114.8

27
DEF - GVL -50.9 6.5
DEF - NSB -15.4 16.1
DEF - FMPP -828 -2.8
DEF - SEC -505.8 -122
DEF - TAL -90.6 -16.9
DEF - TECO 514.9 -55.8
DEF - RCU -26.7 25
DEF - OSC 0 0
DEF - SOCO -325 66.7

SHUNT REPORT
SHNT NAME SHACT SHTOT FT MEADE 22.4 21.5 ATWATER CAP -0.0 41.7
(-ind, +cap) FT GREEN 1 -0.0 25.0 FT WHT S CAP 80.1 74.3
APOPKA S CAP 14.4 13.8 HAINES CITY 17.0 16.2 ADAMS -0.0 10.7
EATONVL CAP -0.0 13.8 LK WALES -0.0 16.8 BROOKSVILLE 17.8 16.8
CLARCONA 12.8 12.3 FT GREEN 10 14.2 14.4 COLEMAN CAP1 -0.0 7.2
MT DORA 24.9 23.4 N BARTOW CAP 28.2 27.0 WEBSTER CAP 12.8 12.0
PIEDM69 CAP -0.0 27.6 FROSTPRF CAP -0.0 19.9 DUNNELLONTWN 11.5 10.8
UMATILLA CAP -0.0 24.0 LK PLACD CAP -0.0 19.9 FLORAL CITY -0.0 11.0
LOCKHART 78.0 75.0 NORTHRIDGE 27.2 25.2 GAINESVILLE 16.9 16.2
PIEDM230 CAP -0.0 150.0 SUN N LAKES -0.0 22.0 COLEMAN CAP2 -0.0 13.8
BAY HILL 19.2 36.4 W DAVENPORT 17.8 16.8 HULL ROAD -0.0 23.4
CAMP LAKE -0.0 23.4 WHIDDEN CRK1 -0.0 26.0 INGLIS -0.0 25.2
CLERMONT EST -0.0 24.5 HORSE CREEK 37.2 40.0 LADY LK 14.6 13.8
OCOEE 14.3 13.8 PEACOCK 19.0 20.0 LEESBURG E 17.1 16.2
MONTVERD CAP -0.0 21.6 KATHLEEN-TER -74.1 0.0 LK WEIR -0.0 27.0
WINDERMERE 82.3 78.3 MICOSUKE CAP -0.0 22.4 LYNNE CAP 13.0 12.0
4 CORNERS 11.2 10.7 BELL CAP -0.0 8.1 SILVRSP SHRS -0.0 13.8
LKTARPN-TER1 -0.0 0.0 LURAVLLE CAP -0.0 10.0 WILLISTON 13.4 12.6
LKTARPN-TER2 -0.0 0.0 ALACHUA 7.4 7.0 REDDICK CAP -0.0 10.8
DELAND -0.0 18.4 CRAWFORDVLLE -0.0 12.7 BRKRDG1-TER -0.0 0.0
DELAND WEST -0.0 16.8 CROSS CITY -0.0 10.0 CFLA-TER2 -0.0 0.0
TURNER PLANT 17.6 16.8 GA PACIFIC -0.0 7.2 CFLA-TER5 -0.0 0.0
DELAND EAST 23.4 22.3 GE ALACHUA -0.0 16.8 40 STREET A -0.0 75.0
CASSELBY CAP -0.0 13.8 HIGH SPRINGS -0.0 16.8 TAMPA DN CAP -0.0 23.4
ALTAMONT CAP 22.6 21.6 MONTICELLO -0.0 8.0 ZEPHYRHL CAP -0.0 21.5
ALAFAYA CAP 17.5 16.8 PERRY NORTH 11.5 10.8 LANDOLKS CAP 21.3 20.4
FGT EAST -0.0 25.2 QUINCY -0.0 16.2 HUDSON B 44.3 41.7
NARCOOSSEE 17.7 16.8 TALLAHASSE A -0.0 15.3 7SPG A CAP -0.0 41.7
OVIEDO 16.1 15.3 TRENTON -0.0 15.3 LARGO A 80.1 75.6
SKY LAKE 17.6 16.8 LIBERTY -0.0 23.4 SEMINOLE -0.0 32.4
WINTER PARK 14.4 13.8 JASPER SOUTH -0.0 25.0 WALSINGHAM 34.5 32.4
WINTER SPRGS -0.0 29.0 BRADFV W CAP -0.0 41.7 ULMERTON CAP 79.8 74.3
N LONGWD CAP -0.0 13.8 DRIFTON 32.2 30.0 USH-CHF2 -0.0 5.4
MAITLAND CAP 14.5 13.8 HANSON -0.0 25.0 HOWEY -0.0 14.4
AVON PARK -0.0 16.2 HAVANA -0.0 26.8 LINADALE -0.0 10.8
AVON PARK NO -0.0 21.5 JASPER SOUTH 44.0 41.7 FEDERAL 12.7 12.0
E LK WLS CAP 18.0 16.8 OCCIDENTAL1 27.3 27.0 HILRDVL -0.0 13.8
DESOTO CITY -0.0 20.0 PERRY -0.0 66.7 ZEPHYRHL -0.0 20.4
DUNDEE -0.0 11.0 SUW TRANSM 38.0 144.0

AREA REPORT
LOAD LOAD
LOAD LOAD LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS GEN GEN INT INT
NUM NAME MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR
1 FPL 12707 4238 12881 7162 174 2924 12166 2036 -738 305
2 DEF 6073 1607 6168 2845 95 1238 4459 215 -1728 -198
3 FTP 56 6 56 8 0 2 0 0 -56 13
4 GVL 278 48 279 68 1 20 258 -23 -21 -2
5 HST 57 14 57 18 0 4 1 3 -56 6
6 JEA 1377 395 1388 603 11 208 1188 100 -200 -20
7 KEY 68 11 69 22 1 11 0 3 -69 9
9 LWU 51 13 51 16 0 3 0 0 -51 -15
10 NSB 50 12 50 12 0 0 0 0 -50 -12
11 FMPP 1303 235 1320 519 17 284 1558 267 238 -22
12 SEC 291 96 302 352 11 256 1547 314 1243 89
15 TAL 310 27 312 52 2 25 312 -4 0 27
16 TECO 2189 552 2275 1317 86 765 2334 762 59 158
17 VER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 NUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 RCU 96 35 97 48 1 13 91 9 -6 -27

28
21 TCEC 8 5 9 34 1 29 323 -5 314 -39
26 OSC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 OLEANDER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 CALPINE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 IPP-REL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 24914 7294 25314 13076 400 5782 24237 3677 -1121 272

Peak case – Firm Import


STATION VOLTAGES
HOLOPAW 1 = 235.8 MEADOW WD S = 228.9 AIRPRODUCTTP = 69.7
PVCL-3 Q191 = 235.7 SKY LAKE = 225.8 ORLANDO CG = 69.6
RIO PINAR = 232.7 ORANGE SW = 70.8

GENERATOR QUANTITIES
GENERATOR PGEN PMAX PMIN QGEN QMAX QMIN VTARG VBUS
ANCLOTE G1 515 515 80 145.9 215 -187 22.2 22.2
ANCLOTE G2 525 525 80 146 187 -224.3 22.2 22.2
AVONPRK P1&2 24.5 24.5 7.2 -0.8 20 -3 14.2 14.2
AVONPRK P1&2 24.5 24.5 7.2 -0.8 20 -3 14.2 14.2
BARTOW CT4A 167.7 182 31.1 41.3 110 -76 15.5 15.5
BARTOW CT4B 167.7 182 31.1 41.3 111 -75 15.5 15.5
BARTOW CT4C 167.7 182 31.1 41.3 88 -68 15.5 15.5
BARTOW CT4D 166.8 181 31.1 41.3 96 -73 15.5 15.5
BARTOW P1&2 0 41.8 11.5 18 18 -9 13.9 14
BARTOW P1&2 0 43.9 11.5 19 19 -10 13.9 14
BARTOW P3&4 0 44.9 12.2 22 22 -5 13.9 14
BARTOW P3&4 0 49.9 12.2 22 22 -5 13.9 14
BARTOW ST4 430.2 467 83.8 121.6 159 -82 18.7 18.7
BAYBORO P1&3 0 44.9 11.8 17 17 -14 14.4 13.7
BAYBORO P1&3 0 44.9 11.8 17 17 -14 14.4 13.7
BAYBORO P2&4 0 42.9 11.8 22 22 -14 13.8 13.7
BAYBORO P2&4 0 44.9 11.8 22 22 -14 13.8 13.7
CITRUS CT1A 254.1 263 130 131 180 -90 21.8 21.8
CITRUS CT1B 254.1 263 130 131 180 -90 21.8 21.8
CITRUS CT2A 0 263 130 0.3 180 -90 20.9 21
CITRUS CT2B 0 263 130 7 180 -90 20.9 21
CITRUS ST1 342 354 130 130.6 240 -120 20.5 20.5
CITRUS ST2 0 354 130 3.7 240 -120 19.8 20
CRYST RVR G1 0 396 94.8 190 190 -10 21.9 21.9
CRYST RVR G2 0 520 124.5 257 257 -33 21.9 21.9
CRYST RVR G4 769 769 182.2 129.1 310 -40 23.4 23.4
CRYST RVR G5 765.4 767 177.5 278.2 335 -211 24.7 24.7
DEBARY P10 0 81.4 21.2 60 60 -30 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P2 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P3 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P4 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P5 0 52 13.5 22 22 -5 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P6 0 53 13.5 22 22 -5 13.3 13.3
DEBARY P7 80.4 84.4 21.2 27.6 60 -30 13.8 13.8
DEBARY P8 79.4 84.4 21.2 27.6 60 -30 13.8 13.8
DEBARY P9 81.4 82.4 21.2 50.3 60 -30 14.2 14.2
DEF Q149 PV 45 45 10 5.7 14.8 -14.8 35 35
DEF Q165 PV 74.5 74.5 10 -5.8 24.5 -24.5 35 35
DEF Q181 PV 550 550 0 60.6 360 -180 236 21.2
FCS CP&L 1 0 35.6 8.8 17 17 -3 13.3 13.3
FCS CP&L 2 0 91.4 22.5 -1.2 44 -5 13.3 13.3
HIGGINS P1&2 0 22.8 7.2 19 19 -10 13.4 13.4
HIGGINS P1&2 0 22.8 7.2 12 12 -12 13.4 13.4
HIGGINS P3&4 0 35.5 8.8 23 23 -20 13.4 13.4
HIGGINS P3&4 0 35.5 8.8 22 22 -14 13.4 13.4
HINES CT1A 164.1 170 41 49.2 72 -84 16.4 16.4
HINES CT1B 164.1 170 41 49.1 64 -85 16.4 16.4
HINES CT2A 185.7 192 49.6 50.6 77 -68 18.5 18.5
HINES CT2B 185.7 192 44 50.5 86 -67 18.4 18.4
HINES CT3A 186.7 192 41 50.8 79 -48 18.5 18.5
HINES CT3B 186.7 192 41 50.8 77 -47 18.5 18.5
HINES CT4A 168.1 172 41 49.2 92 -45 18.5 18.5
HINES CT4B 168.1 172 41 49.1 92 -45 18.4 18.4

29
HINES ST1 164.2 167 38.5 47.3 71 -101 17.9 17.9
HINES ST2 185.9 189 41 50.8 81 -57 18.4 18.4
HINES ST3 186.9 190 40 51 86 -43 16.9 16.9
HINES ST4 168.2 171 40 49.3 86 -43 18.4 18.4
INTERCSN 1&2 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN 1&2 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN 3&4 0 47.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN 3&4 0 47.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN 5&6 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN 5&6 0 48.9 11.8 22 22 -6 13.8 13.8
INTERCSN P10 0 83.4 20.8 34 34 -25 13.6 13.6
INTERCSN P11 0 145.4 35.8 40 40 -46 13.9 13.9
INTERCSN P12 74.4 77.4 20 50 51 -17 14.5 14.5
INTERCSN P13 76.4 77.4 20 43 44 -11 14.3 14.3
INTERCSN P14 63.6 78.4 20 46 47 -15 14.4 14.4
INTERCSN P7 20.8 83.4 20.8 35 36 -26 14.3 14.3
INTERCSN P8 0 83.4 20.8 45.8 54 -13 13.3 13.3
INTERCSN P9 0 83.4 20.8 31 31 -30 13.6 13.6
LAKECOUNTYRR 0 12.8 3.2 -2 5 -2 13.8 14
MULBERRYCG1A 0 44.5 8.5 -14 21 -14 13.7 14.2
MULBERRYCG1B 0 72.7 19.5 -28.2 49 -32 13.6 14.2
OCCIDENTLCG2 0 16 4 2.7 8 -3 12.7 12.5
ORANGE CG1 0 64.9 17.2 -11.9 45 -40 13.9 14.2
ORANGE CG2 0 40.8 10.4 -11.9 25 -20 13.9 14.2
ORLANDO CG 0 115.8 28.5 1.5 10 0 13.5 13.4
OSPREY CT1 202.2 200 107 34.5 145 -58 15 15
OSPREY CT2 202.2 200 107 34.5 145 -58 15 15
OSPREY ST 225.5 223 136 46.9 185 -84 16 16
PASCO RR 0 23.4 5.8 18.8 19 -12 14.2 13.1
PINELLAS RR1 0 40.6 10 8.2 23 -18 14.6 14.3
PINELLAS RR2 0 15 3.7 8.2 23 -18 14.6 14
Q180C_PV 74.5 74.5 10 10.2 10.2 -10.2 119 0.7
Q191 74.5 74.5 0 -12.7 24.5 -24.5 0.6 0.6
SHADY HLS P1 162.6 164.6 50 53.1 75 -56 18.6 18.6
SHADY HLS P2 162.6 164.6 50 53.1 68 -53 18.6 18.6
SHADY HLS P3 162.6 164.6 50 53.1 77 -60 18.6 18.6
SUWANNE P1&2 0 53 13.5 0.2 21 -22 13.9 13.9
SUWANNE P1&2 0 52 13.5 14 14 -21 13.9 13.9
SUWANNEE P3 0 53 13.5 0.2 14 -24 13.5 13.6
TIGERBAY CG1 167.8 167.8 40 65.8 70 -66 18.7 18.7
TIGERBAY CG2 40.7 40.7 10.5 30.6 33 -30 14.3 14.3
TIMBER ENRGY 0 14.3 3.2 -1.9 6 -2 13.5 13.3
UNIVERSTY FL 0 46 9 4.2 20 -20 14 13.8
US ECOGEN 1 69 69 0 -1.4 42 -31 14.2 14.2
VANDOLAH P1 128 165.2 40.6 34.1 114 -53 18.6 18.6
VANDOLAH P2 128 165.2 40.6 34.1 110 -53 18.6 18.6
VANDOLAH P3 128 165.2 40.6 34.1 111 -53 18.6 18.6
VANDOLAH P4 128 165.2 40.6 34.1 114 -53 18.6 18.6
WOODRUFF DAM 0 36 34 10.3 15 -15 14 13.6

GENERATOR COMPLEX REPORT


GEN COMPLEX ON OFF MW SPRES PMAX PMIN MVAR REMVAR QMAX QMIN
AR-01-FPL 111 25 24891 1929 28758 15924 6979 10116 18100 -9532
AR-02-DEF 51 51 9890 419 14437 3741 2819 2476 7417 -4156
AR-04-GVL 5 3 483 72 662 286 51 173 323 -174
AR-06-JEA 13 4 2562 139 2915 1330 209 1213 1548 -524
AR-11-FMPP 19 15 3367 30 3904 1600 966 772 1964 -779
AR-12-SEC 15 0 2458 72 2530 1247 416 830 1246 -1021
AR-15-TAL 11 1 629 33 708 294 60 384 470 -184
AR-16-TECO 34 13 4524 315 5971 1841 1111 1628 3221 -1313
AR-21-TCEC 2 0 323 0 323 100 115 111 226 -60
AR-346-SOCO 256 137 46821 3256 63643 24131 7023 20851 29769 -16637
Hines 12 0 2114 55 2169 499 597 366 963 -733
Higgins 0 4 0 0 117 32 0 0 76 -56
Q191 1 0 75 0 75 0 -13 37 24 -24
Bartow 5 4 1100 94 1374 256 287 277 645 -403
Vandolah 4 0 512 149 661 162 136 313 449 -212
Crystal River 2 2 1534 2 2452 579 407 238 1092 -294
Tigerbay 1 0 168 0 168 40 66 4 70 -66
Bayboro 0 4 0 0 177 47 0 0 78 -56
Pinnellas 0 2 0 0 56 14 0 0 46 -36

30
Mulberry 0 2 0 0 117 28 0 0 70 -46
University FL 0 1 0 0 46 9 0 0 20 -20
Suwannee 0 3 0 0 158 41 0 0 49 -67

INTERFACE FLOW REPORT


DESCRIPTION MW MVAR
DEF - FPL -744.1 -483
DEF - GVL -35.1 -19
DEF - NSB 37 -10.4
DEF - FMPP -1021.5 -141
DEF - SEC -749.5 -97.1
DEF - TAL -195.3 -4.5
DEF - TECO 408.2 51
DEF - RCU 29.4 -11
DEF - OSC 0 0
DEF - SOCO -396.3 69.3

SHUNT REPORT
SHNT NAME SHACT SHTOT FT MEADE 22.7 21.5 ATWATER CAP -0.0 41.7
(-ind, +cap) FT GREEN 1 -0.0 25.0 FT WHT S CAP 77.6 74.3
APOPKA S CAP 13.8 13.8 HAINES CITY 16.9 16.2 ADAMS -0.0 10.7
EATONVL CAP -0.0 13.8 LK WALES 17.6 16.8 BROOKSVILLE 17.8 16.8
CLARCONA 12.2 12.3 FT GREEN 10 14.3 14.4 COLEMAN CAP1 -0.0 7.2
MT DORA 24.4 23.4 N BARTOW CAP 28.7 27.0 WEBSTER CAP 12.2 12.0
PIEDM69 CAP 29.2 27.6 FROSTPRF CAP -0.0 19.9 DUNNELLONTWN 11.2 10.8
UMATILLA CAP -0.0 24.0 LK PLACD CAP -0.0 19.9 FLORAL CITY -0.0 11.0
LOCKHART 75.0 75.0 NORTHRIDGE 26.5 25.2 GAINESVILLE 16.7 16.2
PIEDM230 CAP 152.3 150.0 SUN N LAKES -0.0 22.0 COLEMAN CAP2 14.5 13.8
BAY HILL 18.8 36.4 W DAVENPORT 17.3 16.8 HULL ROAD -0.0 23.4
CAMP LAKE 24.6 23.4 WHIDDEN CRK1 -0.0 26.0 INGLIS -0.0 25.2
CLERMONT EST 25.8 24.5 HORSE CREEK 37.4 40.0 LADY LK 14.4 13.8
OCOEE 13.8 13.8 PEACOCK 19.0 20.0 LEESBURG E 17.0 16.2
MONTVERD CAP 22.6 21.6 KATHLEEN-TER -0.0 0.0 LK WEIR -0.0 27.0
WINDERMERE 82.2 78.3 MICOSUKE CAP 23.4 22.4 LYNNE CAP 12.2 12.0
4 CORNERS 11.1 10.7 BELL CAP -0.0 8.1 SILVRSP SHRS -0.0 13.8
LKTARPN-TER1 -0.0 0.0 LURAVLLE CAP 10.4 10.0 WILLISTON 13.1 12.6
LKTARPN-TER2 -0.0 0.0 ALACHUA -0.0 7.0 REDDICK CAP -0.0 10.8
DELAND 19.4 18.4 CRAWFORDVLLE 13.3 12.7 BRKRDG1-TER -0.0 0.0
DELAND WEST 17.7 16.8 CROSS CITY -0.0 10.0 CFLA-TER2 -0.0 0.0
TURNER PLANT 17.8 16.8 GA PACIFIC -0.0 7.2 CFLA-TER5 -0.0 0.0
DELAND EAST 23.7 22.3 GE ALACHUA 17.9 16.8 40 STREET A 79.1 75.0
CASSELBY CAP -0.0 13.8 HIGH SPRINGS -0.0 16.8 TAMPA DN CAP 24.4 23.4
ALTAMONT CAP 22.5 21.6 MONTICELLO -0.0 8.0 ZEPHYRHL CAP -0.0 21.5
ALAFAYA CAP 17.1 16.8 PERRY NORTH 11.3 10.8 LANDOLKS CAP 20.6 20.4
FGT EAST -0.0 25.2 QUINCY -0.0 16.2 HUDSON B 43.7 41.7
NARCOOSSEE 17.5 16.8 TALLAHASSE A -0.0 15.3 7SPG A CAP -0.0 41.7
OVIEDO 15.7 15.3 TRENTON -0.0 15.3 LARGO A 79.6 75.6
SKY LAKE 17.7 16.8 LIBERTY -0.0 23.4 SEMINOLE 34.0 32.4
WINTER PARK 14.1 13.8 JASPER SOUTH 15.7 25.0 WALSINGHAM 33.7 32.4
WINTER SPRGS -0.0 29.0 BRADFV W CAP -0.0 41.7 ULMERTON CAP -0.0 74.3
N LONGWD CAP -0.0 13.8 DRIFTON 31.5 30.0 USH-CHF2 5.7 5.4
MAITLAND CAP 14.2 13.8 HANSON -0.0 25.0 HOWEY 15.0 14.4
AVON PARK -0.0 16.2 HAVANA -0.0 26.8 LINADALE 11.5 10.8
AVON PARK NO -0.0 21.5 JASPER SOUTH 43.0 41.7 FEDERAL 12.7 12.0
E LK WLS CAP 17.2 16.8 OCCIDENTAL1 26.5 27.0 HILRDVL -0.0 13.8
DESOTO CITY -0.0 20.0 PERRY 71.5 66.7 ZEPHYRHL 21.2 20.4
DUNDEE 11.6 11.0 SUW TRANSM 76.7 144.0

AREA REPORT
LOAD LOAD
LOAD LOAD LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS GEN GEN INT INT
NUM NAME MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR
1 FPL 25242 8197 25709 15467 467 7270 24891 6979 -840 802
2 DEF 12305 3128 12539 6570 234 3442 9890 2819 -2667 -646
3 FTP 112 13 112 21 0 8 0 0 -112 1
4 GVL 494 71 499 126 5 55 483 51 -16 10
5 HST 113 28 114 41 1 13 3 4 -111 -1
6 JEA 2737 779 2762 1265 25 486 2562 209 -200 42
7 KEY 130 22 136 68 6 46 0 76 -136 36
9 LWU 101 25 102 41 1 16 30 14 -72 -27
10 NSB 99 25 99 26 0 1 15 14 -84 -11

31
11 FMPP 2634 469 2677 1197 43 728 3367 966 690 133
12 SEC 512 139 535 633 23 494 2458 416 1921 -89
15 TAL 620 49 629 138 9 89 629 60 0 26
16 TECO 4357 1071 4465 2390 108 1319 4524 1111 58 -158
17 VER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 NUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 RCU 193 70 194 85 1 15 91 15 -103 22
21 TCEC 8 5 9 35 1 30 323 115 314 79
26 OSC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 OLEANDER 0 0 0 4 0 4 61 61 61 57
28 CALPINE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 IPP-REL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 49657 14091 50581 28107 924 14016 49327 12910 -1297 276

Shunt Admittance
AREA BUS NAME BUS NO SLG-MVA
2 [POINSETT 230.00] 467 1485.3 -9405.9
2 [HOLOPAW 1 230.00] 2882 355.10 -3024.5
2 [STC EAST 230.00] 7431 211.50 -1216.7
2 [OSC REL1 230.00] 9554 296.60 -2523.3
2 [OSC REL2 230.00] 9557 313.60 -2858.9
2 [Q165 TP 230.00] 53037 399.80 -1639.4

32
7. Appendix B – Dynamic Data

B1. User-Written Model


Parameter values of the model used for all simulations are given in this section. The user-written model
does not provide a DOCU in PSS/E, so the model information (ITMEIC and STMEIC) is shown in the
following tables.

• Generator Model (ITMEIC)

PSS®E Internal
CONS/ICONS Description Values
Variable Name
CON(J) ACTIVE POWER FEEDBACK FILTER TPF 0.02
CON(J+1) REACTIVE POWER FEEDBACK FILTER TQF 0.02
CON(J+2) ACTIVE POWER REGULATOR INTEGRAL GAIN KIP 25
INVERTER AC THERMAL CURRENT LIMIT, PU ON
CON(J+3) ILIM 1.0
PLANT BASE
CON(J+4) REACTIVE CURRENT PRIORITY (1) QPRTY 1
CON(J+5) PINVMAX PINVMAX 0.9046
CON(J+6) Q REGULATOR PROPORTIONAL GAIN KPQ 0.25
CON(J+7) Q REGULATOR INTEGRAL GAIN KIQ 5.0
CON(J+8) TERMINAL VOLTAGE FILTER TIME CONSTANT (SEC) TV 0.0333
ACTIVE CURRENT COMMAND FILTER TIME
CON(J+9) CONSTANT TP 0.0133

CON(J+10) LVRT THRESHOLD VOLTAGE (PU) VDIP 0.850


CON(J+11) LVRT RESET VOLTAGE (PU) VRES 0.860
REACTIVE CURRENT COMMAND FILTER TIME
CON(J+12) TQ 0.020
CONSTANT (SEC)
CON(J+13) PLL PROPORTIONAL GAIN KPPLL 70.0
CON(J+14) PLL INTEGRAL GAIN KIPLL 300.0
CON(J+15) INVERTER MAXIMUM REACTIVE POWER INJECTION QINVMAX 0.2973
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE VOLTAGE SET POINT (V1)
CON(J+16) V1SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE VOLTAGE SET POINT (V2)
CON(J+17) V2SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE VOLTAGE SET POINT (V3)
CON(J+18) V3SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE VOLTAGE SET POINT (V4)
CON(J+19) V4SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE Q SET POINT (DELTA Q1)
CON(J+20) DQ1SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE Q SET POINT (DELTA Q2)
CON(J+21) DQ2SP 0.0
(PU)

33
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE Q SET POINT (DELTA Q3)
CON(J+22) DQ3SP 0.0
(PU)
VOLTAGE SUPPORT CURVE Q SET POINT (DELTA Q4)
CON(J+23) DQ4SP 0.0
(PU)
CON(J+24) ACTIVE POWER VS FREQUENCY SLOPE PFSLP -3.3333
CON(J+25) FREQUENCY SET POINT, HZ (999 TO DISABLE) HZSET 70.0
CON(J+26) FREQUENCY RESET POINT, (HZ) HZRST 70.0
CON(J+27) TERMINAL FREQUENCY FILTER TIME CONSTANT TF 0.02
CON(J+28) ACTIVE CURRENT RAMP UP RATE LIMIT, PU/SEC IXRATE 6.0
REACTIVE CURRENT RAMP UP RATE LIMIT,
CON(J+29) IYRATE 6.0
PERCENTAGE OF ILIM/SEC (999 TO DISABLE)
CON(J+30) LVRT VOLTAGE SET POINT 1 LVV1 0.85
CON(J+31) LVRT VOLTAGE SET POINT 2 LVV2 0.75
CON(J+32) LVRT VOLTAGE SET POINT 3 LVV3 0.20
CON(J+33) LVRT CURRENT LIMIT 1 (P.U.) LVILIM1 0.85
CON(J+34) LVRT CURRENT LIMIT 2 (P.U.) LVILIM2 0.23
CON(J+35) LVRT CURRENT LIMIT 3 (P.U.) LVILIM3 0.0
CON(J+36) DVC GAIN DVCGAIN 1.35
LVRT SWITCH (LVE),
ICON(M) LVE 1
0=DISABLED, 1=ENABLED (1)
DVC ENABLE, 0=DISABLED,
ICON(M+1) DVC 1
1=ENABLED (0)
GENERATOR TRIP FLAG, 0=NOT
ICON(M+2) TRIP 0
TRIPPED (0, DO NOT CHANGE)
GENERATOR STATUS FLAG,
ICON(M+3) STATUS 0
0=ON (0, DO NOT CHANGE)
COUNTER FOR PLL PHASE
PLL 0
ICON(M+4) UNWRAPPING (0, DO NOT CHANGE)

LVRT FLAG, 0=DEACTIVATED,


LVRT 0
ICON(M+5) 1=ACTIVATED (0, DO NOT CHANGE)

POST-LVRT FLAG, 1=IN POST-


POST LVRT 0
ICON(M+6) LVRT, 0= NOT (0, DO NOT CHANGE)

ACTIVE PWR MGMT FLAG,1=ACTIVATED, 0=NOT (0,


ICON(M+7) APM 0
DO NOT CHANGE)

ICON(M+8) OPMODE FOR REACTIVE CURRENT CONTROL OPMODE 1

• Plant Controller Model (STMEIC)

34
PSS®E Internal
CONS\ICONS Description Value
Variable Name
CON(J) VOLTAGE DEADBAND VDB 0
CON(J+1) VOLTAGE TRANSDUCER TIME DELAY, SEC TMV 0.02
CON(J+2) REACTIVE POWER CONTROL MAX DEADBAND QDBMAX -0.001
CON(J+3) REACTIVE POWER CONTROL MIN DEADBAND QDBMIN 0.001
CON(J+4) FREQUENCY TRANSDUCER TIME DELAY, SEC TF 0.02
CON(J+5) MINIMUM ACTIVE POWER ERROR PERRMIN -1.0
CON(J+6) MAXIMUM ACTIVE POWER ERROR PERRMAX 1.0
CON(J+7) COMMUNICATION TIME DELAY, SEC TCOM 0.1
CON(J+8) MAXIMUM ACTIVE POWER COMMAND RAMP RATE DPMAX 0.333
CON(J+9) MINIMUM ACTIVE POWER COMMAND RAMP RATE DPMIN 0.333
CON(J+10) P TRANSDUCER TIME DELAY, SEC TMP 0.02
CON(J+11) MINIMUM ACTIVE POWER COMMAND PMINCMD 0
CON(J+12) MAXIMUM ACTIVE POWER COMMAND PMAXCMD 0.9046
CON(J+13) VOLTAGE REGULATOR PI'S PROPORTIONAL GAIN KPV 0.5
CON(J+14) VOLTAGE REGULATOR PI'S INTEGRAL GAIN KIV 7.5
CON(J+15) ACTIVE POWER REGULATOR PROPORTIONAL GAIN KPP 0.1
CON(J+16) ACTIVE POWER REGULATOR INTEGRAL GAIN KIP 4.0
CON(J+17) ACTIVE POWER VS FREQUENCY DOWN SLOPE DDN 20.0
CON(J+18) ACTIVE POWER VS FREQUENCY UP SLOPE DUP 20.0
CON(J+19) FREQUENY DEADBAND (DOWN) (P.U.) FDBDN -0.0005
CON(J+20) FREQUENY DEADBAND (UP) (P.U.) FDBUP 0.0005
CON(J+21) REACTIVE POWER REGULATOR PROPORTIONAL GAIN KPQ 0.1
CON(J+22) REACTIVE POWER REGULATOR INTEGRAL GAIN KIQ 5.0
CON(J+23) Q TRANSDUCER TIME DELAY TMQ 0.02
CON(J+24) MINIMUM REACTIVE POWER COMMAND QMINCMD -0.2973
CON(J+25) MAXIMUM REACTIVE POWER COMMAND QMAXCMD 0.2973
CON(J+26) MAXIMUM REACTIVE POWER COMMAND RAMP RATE DQMAX 0.333
CON(J+27) MINIMUM REACTIVE POWER COMMAND RAMP RATE DQMIN 0.333
BUS NUMBER OF THE
2882
ICON(M) REMOTELY REGULATED BUS RBUS
BUS NUMBER OF THE FROM
60600
BUS OF THE REGULATED BRANCH
ICON(M+1) FBUS
BUS NUMBER OF THE TO BUS
2882
ICON(M+2) OF THE REGULATED BRANCH TBUS

35
CIRCUIT ID OF THE REGULATED BRANCH 1
ICON(M+3) CKT
FREQUENCY SUPPORT ENABLE FLAG 1
ICON(M+4) FSEF
REACTIVE POWER MOD
1
ICON(M+5) EENABLE FLAG RPMF
STARTING VAR INDEX FOR
0
INVERTER MODEL (0, DO NOT CHANGE)
ICON(M+6) SVAR

36
B2. Description of the control system
The diagram of the plant and converter controllers are shown in Figure B1 and Figure B2.

Figure B1. Block diagram of user-written plant controller model (STMEIC).

Figure B2. Block diagram of user-written converter controller model (ITMEIC).

37
B3. Generic Model
The generic model used consists of a generator model (REGCAU1), an electric control model (REECAU1)
and a plant controller (REPCAU1). All parameters used are listed below.

WIND MODELS

REPORT FOR ALL MODELS BUS 60597 [Q191 0.6300] MODELS

Model REGCAU1 Bus 60597 [Q191 0.6300] Machine "1 " :

I C O N C O N S S T A T E S V A R S
49620 205346-205359 69161-69163 89825-89828

Tg Rrpwr Brkpt Zerox Lvpl1


0.2000 1.0000 0.7500 0.0000 0.2300

Volim Lvpnt1 Lvpnt0 Iolim


2.0000 0.1000 0.0000 -0.4357

Tfltr Khv Iqrmax Iqrmin Accel


0.0200 0.0000 10.0000 -10.0000 0.1000

LVPL Switch flag: 1

Model REECAU1 Bus 60597 [Q191 0.6300] Machine "1 " :

I C O N S C O N S S T A T E S V A R S
49621-49626 205360-205404 69164-69169 89829-89837

Vdip Vup Trv dbd1 dbd2 Kqv Iqhl


0.8000 1.5000 0.0200 -0.1000 0.1000 2.0000 0.4357

Iqll Vref0 Iqfrz Thld Thld2 Tp QMAX


-0.4357 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.2973

QMIN VMAX VMIN Kqp Kqi Kvp Kvi


-0.2973 1.1000 0.9000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Vbias Tiq dPMax dPMin Pmax Pmin


0.0000 0.0200 2.0000 -2.0000 0.9046 0.0000

Imax Tpord VQ1 IQ1 VQ2 IQ2 VQ3


1.0000 0.0200 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 0.0000

IQ3 VQ4 IQ4 VP1 IP1 VP2 IP2


0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000

VP3 IP3 VP4 IP4


0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

PfFLAG: 0
VFLAG: 0
QFLAG: 0
PFLAG: 0
PQFLAG: 0

Model REPCAU1 Bus 60597 [Q191 0.6300] Machine "1 " :

38
I C O N S C O N S S T A T E S V A R S
49627-49633 205405-205431 69170-69176 89838-89846

Tfltr Kp Ki Tft Tfv Vfrz Rc


0.0200 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 0.8000 0.0000

Xc Kc emax emin dbd1 dbd2 QMAX


0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 -1.0000 -0.0010 0.0010 0.2973

QMIN Kpg Kig tp fdbd1 fdbd2 femax


-0.2973 1.0000 1.0000 0.0200 -0.0006 0.0006 999.0000

femin Pmax Pmin Tg Ddn Dup


-999.0000 0.9046 0.0000 0.0200 20.0000 20.0000

Bus Number for Voltage Control (if 0 local control): 2882


Branch FROM bus number: 60600
Branch TO bus number: 2882
Branch circuit ID: 1
VCFlag: 0
RefFlag: 1
Fflag: 1

39
8. Appendix C- Dynamic Model-Issues Identified

In this appendix, the issues encountered in the generic and user-written models are presented.

Generic model

• Absence of reactive power support during fault conditions

During fault condition, the inverter does not provide reactive power support. The inverter LVRT logic
freezes the reactive current command state but does not increment its value since the reactive current
injection gain during voltage dip is 0 for the generic model. Figures C-1 and C-2 exhibit the frozen state for
the reactive current command without reactive power support. This gain should be different from 0 to
provide dynamic reactive power support for voltage excursions.

Figure C-1. Active and reactive power injection of the generator for the contingency P1-HOLO-02

Figure C-2. Active and reactive current commands of the generator for the contingency EXT-SPF-
POIQ165-01

40
User-written model

• Post-switching high voltage at inverter terminals

After fault clearing, voltage at the inverter terminals reaches values above 1.8 pu. It should be revised
whether this actually depicts the real inverter behavior.

Figure C-3. Overvoltage at inverter terminals after fault clearing for P1-HOLO-03 contingency.

In case there is no error in the model, it should be checked whether the equipment could support these
values without getting disconnected, since such a trip would violate PRC-024-2 requirements.

• Islanding mode issues

Below, a figure can be seen showing the voltage at the inverter terminals after a disconnection of the line
that links the generating plant to the POI at t=367ms without manual trip. As can be seen, the behavior
of the model seems unrealistic. The model should be revised to avoid this sort of behavior, so that a
manual trip of the machine is not necessary.

Figure C-4. Voltage at inverter terminals after line connection trip

41
• Active and reactive power excursions

Active and reactive power excursions can be seen during and after the fault has been cleared for some
contingencies. As can be seen for the contingency P1-HOLO-03 (Figure C-5), immediately after fault, active
and reactive power have spikes that reach values above 360 MW/-220 MW and 560 MVAr/-100 MVAr
respectively.

Figure C-5. Active and reactive power generated by the power plant under P1-HOLO-03 contingency

For most of the contingencies after the fault has been cleared, the generated active power rises with a
constant slope to values that surpass the power plant limit (Figures C-6 and C-7). For some contingencies
where the project frequency exhibits strong negative spikes, the active power oscillates reaching values
over the power plant limit (Figures C-8 and C-9).

This behavior might suggest that the PLL included in the generator/converter model requires finer tuning.
However, all parameters should be revised to avoid this. It was assumed that this response does not
represent the actual behavior of the power plant model.

Figure C-6. Active and reactive power generated by the power plant under EXT-HOLO-07 contingency

42
Figure C-7. Power plant frequency under EXT-HOLO-07 contingency

Figure C-8. Active and reactive power generated by the power plant under EXT-HOLO-02 contingency

43
Figure C-9. Power plant frequency under EXT-HOLO-02 contingency

• Slow voltage stabilization at inverter levels

The user–written model shows reactive power saturation and a slow voltage recovery after the fault in
some contingencies. Since the user-written model does not have a Kdroop loop, this response could not
be modified. This behavior is shown in figures C-10 and C-11. It is recommended to implement this loop
to avoid this behavior.

Figure C-10. Voltage at inverter terminals for the contingency EXT-P5-HOLO-05

Figure C-11. Active and reactive power generated by the power plant under EXT-P5-HOLO-05
contingency

44
9. Appendix D- Plots

THIS APPENDIX
IS
AVAILABLE IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT
AND IT IS
PROVIDED UPON REQUEST

45

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