Professional Documents
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MRJ No:w-05 (M) - 46-01/2017
MRJ No:w-05 (M) - 46-01/2017
ANTARA
DAN
Antara
Pendakwa Raya
Lawan
KORUM:
MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH, HMR
IDRUS HARUN, HMR
KAMARDIN HASHIM, HMR
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ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN
Pendahuluan
[1] Ini ialah rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman mati yang
“Bahawa kamu pada 13 Julai 2015, jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam di
rumah beralamat C-8-6, Mutiara Apartment, Jalan Klang Lama, Taman
Pasir Permata, di dalam Daerah Brickfields, di dalam Wilayah
Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya
iaitu Cannabis seberat 3,139 gram. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan
kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952
dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”
[3] Kami telah mendengar rayuan Perayu pada 25.8.2017 dan dengan
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Kes Pendakwaan
[4] Bertindak atas maklumat, pada 13.7.2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00
malam, Inspektor Mohamad Sukri bin Hat (SP6) bersama satu pasukan
gril hadapan premis tersebut dalam keadaan sedikit terbuka dan pintu
ialah orang yang sama yang SP6 lihat menaiki lif sebelum serbuan
itu dilakukan.
pemeriksaan dalam tiga buah bilik dalam premis tersebut. Dalam bilik
ketiga, SP6 telah menemui dan merampas sebuah beg berwarna biru
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[6] Pada jam lebih kurang 11.30 malam dan semasa SP6 dan
wanita itu untuk masuk ke dalam bilik tidur utama bersama dengan
kemudiannya dikenali sebagai Nor Azura binti Jumri (SP1) dan kanak-
[7] Tiga (3) ketulan mampat daun-daun kering (P14A, P14B, dan
P14C) telah dihantar kepada ahli kimia, Dr. Vanita a/p Kunalan (SP3),
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Akta.
seberat 3,139 gram dan tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Akta sebagai
[9] Mengenai elemen kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah
beg yang mengandungi dadah ke dalam premis yang disewa oleh SP1
pada sehari sebelum kejadian dan disimpan dalam bilik ketiga. Hakim
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yang terlibat melebihi had berat minima 200 gram yang ditetapkan di
Pembelaan Perayu
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(c) Selepas bercerai, ada pernah sekali (satu hari sebelum kejadian)
jumpa dengan anak di Apartment kerana Azura (SP1) suruh
datang;
(d) Kakak Azura (SP5), Azizan anak Azura (SP4), Azura (SP1) dan
Tertuduh ada mempunyai kunci apartment tersebut;
(g) Tertuduh telah menalipon Azura (SP1) bahawa dia telah tiba di
depan rumah. Azura telah membuka pintu dan menyuruh
Tertuduh masuk tetapi Tertuduh tidak masuk ke dalam
Apartment;
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(l) Pada esok harinya (13 Julai 2015), Azura (SP1) telah
mengejutkan Tertuduh untuk keluar dari Apartment tersebut
kerana Azura hendak pergi kerja;
(m) Tertuduh telah keluar dahulu dari rumah tersebut dan apabila
keluar, Tertuduh tiada kunci kepada Apartment;
(o) Tertuduh tidak minta semula kunci apartment pada FIZI GEMUK
kerana hendak bercerai dan telah duduk di Seremban;
(p) Anak Tertuduh ada menyatakan bahawa ada Uncle datang dan
setelah pengesahan dibuat kepada Azizan juga mengesahkan
bahawa Alan Cina ada pernah datang ke Apartment tersebut;
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akhir Penghakiman beliau di m/s 112 – 113 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1 seperti
berikut:
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dapat mengaitkan Perayu dengan dadah yang dirampas dari bilik ketiga
Perayu mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap premis dan beg yang
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dan penghuni rumah itu mengakui SP1 adalah saksi yang mempunyai
keterangan sokongan.
yang dibuat oleh Hakim bicara tersebut telah menimbulkan prejudis dan
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jari Perayu pada beg dan juga pada barang kes dadah yang dirampas.
berkenaan.
keterangan SP1 secara bulat-bulat dan atas nilai muka (“face value”)
dalam kes di hadapan kami, tidak syak lagi bahawa SP1 adalah seorang
Perayu oleh Hakim bicara menjadi satu dapatan dan keputusan yang
berikut:
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(b) SP1 sendiri mengakui bahawa beliau adalah seorang saksi yang
mempunyai kepentingan dan mengakui keterangan yang beliau
berikan bertujuan untuk melindungi dirinya sendiri;
(e) fakta yang tidak disangkal bahawa telah berlaku salah faham
antara bapa kepada SP1 dengan Perayu mengenai hak lawatan
Perayu yang sebelum ini dipersetujui di rumah bapa SP1, bekas
bapa mertua kepada Perayu;
(f) Perayu telah berpisah dengan SP1 akibat tidak sefahaman dan
SP1 telah mempunyai teman lelaki atau kekasih yang baru;
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[24] Keterangan SP1 berikut yang dirakamkan oleh Hakim bicara, pada
saksi ini. Perkara terpenting dalam kes ini ialah berkaitan dengan hal
t.t.
(YA DATO’ HAJI MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HAJI ABU
SAMAH)
2.30 petang Kes Sambung Bicara pihak-pihak yang
sama.
DPP : Pohon untuk memanggil semula saksi (SP1)
Mahkamah: Saksi (SP1) dipanggil semula. Saksi diingatkan atas
ikrar sumpah terdahulu.
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kepada SP1 melalui “Fizi Gemuk”. Keterangan ini juga langsung tidak
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kami sekali lagi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Hakim bicara tersebut.
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Re-Examination of SP7
“Q : Sepatutnya Azura adalah suspek?
A : Dia adalah penghuni rumah dan ada kawalan dan jagaan.
Q : Kenapa Azura selepas siasatan tidak dinamakan sebagai
suspek?
A : Hasil siasatan apabila statement penghuni diambil, dia
memberitahu bahawa OKT sudah tidak tinggal bersama
dengan Azura dan pada saya sendiri Azura ini sepatutnya
dituduh bersama-sama.
[28] Dalam keadaan kes ini, Hakim bicara tidak sewajarnya menerima
mengambil peringatan yang telah diberikan oleh Edgar Joseph Jr. HMP
berikut:
But, assuming that the ppellant has lied when he denied ownership of
the brown bag, that does not necessarily conclude the case against
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him, for the question remains: was the recovery of the rolls of cannabis
and the Bank Simpanan Nasional Savings Book from the brown bag,
only consistent with the appellant’s guilt? What if the rolls of cannabis
had been planted there by someone else? There was ample time and
opportunity for this for the brown bag lay unattended in the pondok and
later in the driver’s cabin for quite a while. These was no suggestion
that either the brown bag or the compartment in the driver’s cabin from
which it was recovered was locked.
According to Insp Ismail bin Dan, the police party which consisted of
five men, had proceeded to the factory in two vehicles – Insp Ismail in
his own car accompanied by Det/Cpl Amir while Insp Wan Rashid, Det
Murad and Det Saad, travelled in a police van.
On arrival at the factory, the police party did not proceed straightaway to
the lorry; instead, Insp Ismail accompanied by Insp Wan Rashid,
proceeded to the office near the factory to seek the permission of its
manager to conduct a search of the lorry but before doing so, Insp
Ismail had instructed his three men above- named to keep the lorry and
those on it under observation. However, none of his three men were
called to say that they had in fact carried out that instruction and, if so,
what was the result of their observation. It was only after making that
detour at the office that the police party approached the lorry. By which
time, whoever the culprit was – the appellant or Kabir – would have had
early warning of an amminent police strike, for how could they have
missed noticing the arrival of the police van.
There was no suggestion that the behavior of the appellant was in any
way abnormal at or about the time of his arrest.
This was a case where there were at least three persons on the scene,
namely, the appellant, the security guard Ravi Shankar and the driver
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Kabir. Of the trio, the appellant was the youngest and the most
vulnerable, being a lad of just 18 years, while Ravi Shankar and Kabir
were mature men aged 23 and 38 years respectively. And although
Ravi Shankar and the appellant were perfect strangers, the former did
know Kabir.
[29] Begitu juga dalam kes Gooi Loo Seng v. PP [1993] 2 MLJ 137,
pandangan dan peringatan yang sama agar Hakim bicara tidak melihat
(“Nelsonian approach”). Di muka surat 141 – 142 kes itu, Edgar Joseph
“We note also that the trial judge accepted at full face value the
testimony of Tan Ah Kwai that although she had a seto of keys to the
bedroom she never ever entered it when the appellant was not in. In
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thus accepting the testimony of Tan Ah Kwai, the trial judge does not
seem to have recognized that Tan Ah Kwai might have had every
possible to suppress the truth and to lie, if necessary, at the expence ot
the appellant, bearing in mind that she was an obvious suspect. In any
event, we consider that Tan Ah Kwai’s testimony on this point was, to
put it mildly, and improbable story. The fact of the matter was that she
could have had access to the bedroom, and if necessary, with her
friends, without attracting the attention of the appellant, if she so
wished. The trial judge however adopted a Nelsonian approach to Tan
Ah Kwai’s testimony, and as a result, rejected the crucial part of the
defence case which was that the heroin was concealed in his bedroom
without his knowledge.
But, of equal importance, was the point that the trial judge failed to
recognize the significance of the contents of the search list; in particular,
as we have already remarked, that it told a materially different story to
that deposed to by Insp. Nordin regarding the circumstances under
which the heroin was recovered, and as a result, he inferred that the
appellant had custody and control of the heroin and knew of its nature.
The search list, prepared by Insp. Nordin himself, virtually on the spot,
was entirely consistent with the appellant’s version that it was not he but
Insp. Nordin who had found the heroin at the bottom of the plastic
cupboard, and so flatly contradicted Insp. Nordin’s version that it was
the appellant who had prevented Wahid from conducting a search of the
plastic cupboard, and had then obligingly recovered the heroin from the
bottom of the cupboard and handed it over to Insp. Nordin. And Wahid,
though available, was not called by the prosecution.
Had the trial judge approached the prosecution case in the manner we
have indicated, we cannot confidently say that he would or must
inevitably have rejected the appellant’s version that he had no
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We need hardly add, that even if the appellant had known of the
presence of the heroin in his bedroom, that by itself would not have
been sufficient to establish that he was in possession or in control of it
given the fact that others too, and certainly his girlfriend Tan Ah Kwai,
had access to the bedroom and could have concealed the heroin there.
At the end of the day, this was a case of the proverbial cap which might
have fitted not just the head of the appellant but that of others as well.
Clearly, therefore, the trial judge, was bound to, but did not view the
whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result
that the appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of
being acquitted. On this point, we consider that non-direction amonts to
a misdirection, for in the words of Pickford J in R v Bundy: ‘…the trial
was not satisfactory, and the case was not put to the jury in a way to
ensure their due appreciation of the value of the evidence’.
We must treat the failure of a trial judge sitting alone, to direct himself
correctly in the same way as a failure to direct a jury correctly. In these
circumstances, a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred.
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kes Shahrizal bin Said dan satu lagi Lwn. PR [2013] 5 MLJ 464 di m/s
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[19] Pada hemat kami, hakim bicara telah gagal mengarahkan diri
beliau dengan betul kerana tidak melihat keseluruhan keterangan
secara objektif dan dari segala sudut, di mana berkesudahan dengan
kedua-dua perayu telah kehilangan peluang yang terbuka kepada
mereka untuk dibebaskan dan dilepaskan. Pada hemat kami,
ketidakarahan ini terjumlah kepada kesalaharahan dan dalam hal ini,
suatu salah laksana keadilan mungkin telah berlaku. Dalam hubungan
ini, Edgar Joseph Jr HMS dalam kes Gooi Loo Seng v Public
Prosecutor itu telah berkata:
Clearly, therefore, the trial judge, was bound to, but did not view the
whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result
that the appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of
being acquitted. On this point, we consider that non-direction amounts
to a misdirection, for, in the words of Pickford J in R v Bundy 5 Cr App
R 270:
the trial was not satisfactory, and the case was not put to the jury in a
way to ensure their due appreciation of the value of the evidence.
We must treat the failure of a trial Judge sitting alone, to direct himself
correctly in the same was a failure to direct a jury correctly. In these
circumstances, a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred.”.
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[2013] 5 MLJ 66, Mahkamah ini telah menekankan akan peri pentingnya
“[10] In the instant case SP8 the brother of accused was an interested
witness and he did participate in the fight. His evidence ought to be
treated with caution and was not done so in the instant case. We have
dealt with this area of jurisprudence in great detail in Public Prosecutor
v Thenegaran a/l Murugan [2013] 3 MLJ 328, we do not wish to repeat
the same. In Magendran a/l Mohan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 6
MLJ 1; [2011] 1 CLJ 805 the Federal Court had this to say:
[11] In our considered view the failure by the trial judge to follow the
directions set out in Magendran’s case in respect of caution and
corroboration makes the decision perverse and not according to law.
This will also attract art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution to order an
acquittal as the evidence to convict was based solely on PW8’s
evidence which is not safe and according to law. The court has no
jurisdiction to deprive the life and liberty of the subject unless the
decision is made according to law. Article 5(1) stated as follows:
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SP1 disokong oleh keterangan SP6 mengenai identiti beg P6. Dengan
SP1 yang mendakwa beg P6 tersebut telah dibawa oleh Perayu dan
diletakkan dalam bilik ketiga rumah yang disewa dan didiami oleh SP1.
Setelah meneliti Rekod Rayuan, kami tidak ada menemui walau secebis
matan tersebut.
tidak wajar yang dibuat oleh Hakim bicara yang dihujahkan sehingga
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t.t.
(YA DATO’ HAJI MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HAJI ABU SAMAH)”.
seolah-olah telah dari awal lagi menolak pembelaan Perayu. Ini dapat
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bapa SP1 (bekas bapa mertua Perayu). Hakim bicara menolak sama
berikut:
diputuskan dalam kes Lee Kwan Woh v. PP [2009] 5 MLJ 301 seperti
berikut:
“[17] …………………” Accordingly, the rule of law in all its facets and
dimensions is included in the expression ‘law’ wherever used in the
Constitution. Hence, the expression ‘law’ in art 5(1) includes written law
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and the common law of England, that is to say the rule of law and all its
integral components and in both its procedural and substantive
dimensions. For, it is now settle that the rule of law has both procedural
and substantive dimensions. See Pierson v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577, where where at p 606, Lord
Steyn said: ‘The rule of law in its wider sense has procedural and
substantive effect.’
[17] We also find support for the view we have expressed from the
judgment of Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor
[1981] 1 MLJ 64, where, when dealing with arts 9 and 12 of the
Singapore Constitution which are identical to arts 5 and 8 respectively
he said:
It is clear from this passage that the rules of natural justice, which is the
procedural aspect of the rule of law, is an integral part of arts 5(1) and
8(1). In short, procedural fairness is incorporated in these two articles.
[18] Drawing, the threads together, it is clear from the authorities that
it is a fundamental right guaranteed by art 5(1) that a person’s life (in its
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widest sense) or his or her personal liberty (in its widest sense) may not
be deprived save in accordance with state action that is fair both in point
of procedure and substance. Whether an impugned state action is
substantively or procedurally fair must depend on the fact pattern of
each case. However, when the principle is applied to a criminal case,
what it means is that an accused has a constitutionally guaranteed right
to receive a fair trial by an impartial tribunal and to have a just decision
on the afacts. If there is an infraction of any of these rights, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. Whether there has been a fail trial by
an impartial tribulan or a just decision depends on the facts of each
case. While upon the subject under discussion we would refer with
approval to the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in
Public Prosecutor v Choo Chuan Wang [1992] 2 CLJ 1242, where he
held that:
[19] We must consider the impact of what we have said thus far on
the facts of the instant case. In our judgment, the constitutionally
guaranteed right in an accused to a fair trial includes his right to make a
submission of no case at the close of the prosecution’s case. It is a
right that he or she may waive. But he or she cannot be deprived of it.
That unfortunately is what happened here. The accused accordingly
did not have a fair trial and art 5(1) was violated. Following Public
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Jenayah di Singapura dalam kes Roseli bin Amat & ors v. PP [1989] 2
On this, the learned judge, with respect, was clearly in error. We wish
to repeat what Lord Diplock said in Haw Tua Tau v PP (at p 51):
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It is true that the learned judge said that at the end of the case he
scrutinized again the evidence adduced by the prosecution and that of
the appellants. However, he ought not to have come to any definite
conclusion, which he appeared to have done, on the credibility of the
complaint – and that was purely on her own evidence – and on other
matters which we have discussed until he had heard all the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and evidence adduced by the defence.
Only then would he be in a position to assess or evaluate fair ly the
evidence before him and make findings of facts and finally arrive at a
conclusion.
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pendakwaan.
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fakta matan dalam pembelaan Perayu yang tidak disangkal oleh pihak
pendakwaan. Antaranya:
[40] Dalam kes Koo Wing Cheung v. PP [2014] 1 CLJ 46, Azahar
seperti berikut:
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[1992] 3 CLJ 1535; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 376). The learned trial judge
failed to critically and judicially appreaciate the entire evidence in favour
of the appellants. In our judgment, the failure to take into consideration
the entire evidence adduced by the defence and the failure to undertake
judicial appreciation of the defence, as we have highlighted above,
amounted in effect to a failure to consider a defence which had been
put forward. In our view, this is a serious non-direction which amounts
to a misdirection by the court below warranting appellate intervention
(see: Er Ah Kiat v. PP [1965] 1 LNS 37; [1965] 2 MLJ 238). In this
regard, Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ in Gooi Loo Seng v. PP [1993] 3 CLJ 1;
[1993] 2 MLJ 137 said:
Clearly, therefore, the trial Judge, was bound to, but did not view the
whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result
that the appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of
being acquitted. On this point, we consider that non-direction amounts
to a misdirection, for, in the words of Pick J in R v. Bundy 5 Cr App R
270:
The trial was not satisfactory, and the case was not put to the jury in a
way to ensure their due appreciation of the value of the evidence.
We must treat the failure of a trial Judge sitting alone, to direct himself
correctly in the same as a failure to direct a jury correctly. In these
circumstances, a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred.”.
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diputuskan oleh Balia Yusof Hj. Wahi HMR (sekarang HMP) dalam kes
Prabu a/l Avadiappan (SP7) untuk membuat siasatan yang lengkap dan
keterangan lisan SP1. Aspek yang gagal disiasat oleh SP7 termasuklah
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tersebut. Juga gagal disiasat oleh SP7 ialah buku rekod keluar masuk
DNA/cap jari pada barang kes dadah. Selain itu, terdapat pakaian lelaki
dalam rumah itu yang turut gagal disiasat oleh SP7. Dalam keterangan
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[43] SP7 tidak merampas pakaian lelaki yang ditemui di dalam bilik
SP1 yang bernama ‘Alan Cinak’ turut tinggal di rumah itu bersama SP1.
[44] Dalam kes PP v. Tukiman bin Demin [2008] 4 MLJ 79, Hakim
“21.4 The drugs were not found on the acused but in the room to
which several person have equal access. The presence of SP7, SP10
and Samiun bin Mohd Dah and other bachelors (‘budak-budak bujang’)
in the house, raise some doubts as to whether it could be said
affirmatively that the drugs were in the possession of the accused or
either one of them or all of them are in joint possession of the said
drugs. Where possession is not clear, as in the present case, when the
offending drugs may be attributed to more than one individual,
possession requires some nexus, link, or other connection between the
accused and the offending drugs. In this case, there is no evidence of
additional incriminating circumstancesim-plicating the accused sucah as
finger prints, incriminating statements, efforts to avoid arrest or the
offending drugs were concealed in any portion of the room. The bare-
bones of the prosecution case is the contraband was found in the
accused’s room. Under the circumstances, the prosecution’s case is
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[45] Dalam kes PP v. Mok Kar Poh [2001] 5 CLJ 206, Hakim Zainun
berikut:
Although this concedes that the above methods in some situations are
merely procedural, it would be a wise prosecution which would do all
things necessary to bring home the charge. It is almost careless and
capricious to say that since the accused was arrested on the spot and
his identity is khown, what good would taking fingerprints and nail
clippings do?
It is this court’s view that it would be prodent for the prosecution not to
be oblivious to the obvious methods required to close the gap.
Thus it is clear from the facts and surrounding circumstances, that the
question of custody and control and by necessary implication,
possession which is in nature, is not made out by the prosecution.
Since knowledge is a vital element to impute possession and in the
absence of any evidence of actual knowledge, it therefore cannot be
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said with conviction that the circumstances clearly and irresistibly point
to the fact that the accused had knowledge of the said drugs.”.
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Perayu. Dalam kes See Kek Chuan v. PP [2013] 6 MLJ 885, Abdul
Malik Ishak HMR memutuskan atas isu yang sama seperti berikut:
[30] Right from the very start, the importance of the CCTV footage
was highlighted by the defence. PW4 was categorical when he testified
that the police had requested and was given the CCTV tape. PW9
testified that there were CCTVs focused at 32 locations at the said hotel
and also at the lobby. These CCTVs would surely verify the version of
the prosecution if tendered. Yet, not a single CCTV tape was produced
and tendered by the prosecution.
[31] The High Court judge acknowledge that the police had requested
for a copy of the CCTV and a copy was in fact given to the police. At p
246 of the appeal record at jilid 3, His Lordship said:
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In our opinion, another reason is the danger that hearsay evidence may
be concocted, fabricated and tailored to suit the witness’s testimony.
Notwithstanding this general rule certain exceptions have been
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Kami dapati tiada penjelasan lain yang telah diberikan oleh pihak
Kesimpulan
[50] Atas alasan-alasan yang telah kami huraikan di atas, kami dengan
t.t
(KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM)
Hakim
Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia
53
MRJ NO:W-05(M)-46-01/2017
Peguam cara:
54