Title: Process Isolation Philosophy

Frames Ref.: INTERNAL

Frames doc. : MANUAL-PC-MIP-Isolation philosophy

Checked
Rev. Date Description Prepared Approved
Process FIN Process FNL

O 07/07/2020 Issued for Information SVD

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 General......................................................................................................................................................................... 3

• Introduction........................................................................................................................................................3

• PURPOSE AND SCOPE...................................................................................................................................3

2 Abbreviations...............................................................................................................................................................4

3 Spec review..................................................................................................................................................................5

4 SYSTEM REQUIREMEMTS.....................................................................................................................................6

5 Isolation........................................................................................................................................................................ 7
1 General

• Introduction

This document contains the analysis and conclusion of the required process isolation for the sweet gas TEG
units. The intent is to have the proper isolation in place to minimise the risk to people, environment and

assets from exposure to hazardous substances during maintenance, through correct and effective isolation.

• PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This philosophy describes the methods to be used in making provision to completely isolate equipment or
sections of plant to permit safe operation and to provide access for maintenance and inspection. Process
sections shall also be isolated for leak testing during commissioning. This philosophy is applicable to process
and utility systems, including packaged equipment. In general, it shall be possible to isolate all equipment
separately or commonly within a process system, except those systems in non-hydrocarbon (non-HC) service
where it has been established that a hazardous condition will not exist.

Isolation shall be accomplished using block valves and/or the insertion of spectacle blinds or spades, or the
removal of spool pieces and the installation of blind flanges. Location of isolation to enable maintenance and
inspection is generally dependent on the toxicity and hazardous nature of the contained fluids, the size and
pressure rating of the piping system and the potential for damage to personnel or plant/vessel.

This philosophy does not cover electrical isolation.

The objectives of this philosophy are:

• To define safe isolation methods, draining, purging and venting provisions for on-line plant containing
process and utility liquids and gases, so that operation, maintenance and inspection can take place with
minimum plant shutdown.

• To ensure necessary facilities are incorporated in the design.

2 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are applicable:

ALARP As Low As Reasonable Possible

DBB Double Block and Bleed

DS Downstream

N/A Not Applicable

PFD Process Flow Diagram

P&ID Piping & Instrumentation Diagram

RF Risk Factor

SBB Single Block and Bleed

3 Spec review

The isolation philosophy has been followed in preparation of the Process P&IDs. Below a short summary of the most
important paragraphs from the document:

3.1 Isolation method hierarchy

1. Remove equipment from Hazards (Note: Creating an air gap should not result in a full bore opening
downstream of a single block valve (irrespective of time period))
2. Blind/Spade rated for purpose of installation or proper air gap installed with an initial DBB valve isolation
3. Blind/Spade rated for purpose of installation or proper air gap installed with an initial single valve isolation
4. Double Block and Bleed
5. Double Block
6. Single Valve with DS bleed
7. Single Valve (No DS bleed or pressure gauge)

Check valves, control valves and pressure relief valves should not be used as isolation valves.
4 SYSTEM REQUIREMEMTS

All equipment shall be provided with means of operational and positive isolation. The following sections
clarify specific systems requirements. Operational and positive isolations shall be located as close as
practicable to the equipment which they are isolating.

Operational Isolation Valves

The selection of valve types for isolation shall comply with Valve Selection Specification

Manual valves

An integral DB&B valve shall have a bleed fitted with a valve. A plug instead of a valve is not acceptable.
Threaded valves are not permitted for such bleed valves, except on the outlet side of the bleed valve.
Expanding plugs or inflatable bladders shall not be regarded as providing any form of isolation and shall not
be considered for facilities design.

Actuated valves

Actuated valves shall be fail-safe type.

The actuator shall be positively disabled for the duration of the operation for which the equipment or system
is isolated. Software locking shall not be used. With the exception of critical valves such as top of-riser
isolation valves (ESDV between facilities and subsea pipelines), pressurization bypasses are permitted. In
that case, the bypass shall also be fitted with a fail-closed SDV, providing the same level of isolation as the
main SDV. Fail-open actuated valve (e.g. a BDV) shall not be utilized for isolation purposes.
5 Isolation

There are three main types of isolation:

1) Positive Isolation

2) Proved Isolation

3) Non-proved Isolation

5.1 Positive Isolation

Positive isolation is defined as a method of guaranteeing 100 % physical segregation of a hazard or

contamination source from personnel and/or product inventory. Valved isolation of an appropriate standard
is required during the installation of the positive isolation. Appropriate operational/valve isolation shall be
provided to ensure that the section of line is free from pressure and fluids before breaking containment.

Positive isolation is normally used where no leakage can be tolerated, e.g.:

• all confined space entries

• to prevent cross-contamination of utilities with process

• to isolate a train from other hazardous process/utilities for purpose of overhaul/inspection

• hot work

• for process fluids above auto ignition temperature

Positive isolation can be achieved by either of the following methods:

• Removable spool

• Spade and spacer

• Spectacle blind

5.2 Operational isolation

Operational isolation is defined as an isolation system where the effectiveness of the isolation can be
confirmed via vents/bleeds prior to breaking into the system. There are basically two levels of proven
isolation:

• Double block and bleed (DBB)

• Single block and bleed (SBB)

As a general rule, SBB should not be used on a live plant containing hazardous substances, but there may be
circumstances where the use of SBB is justified. As a general rule, SSB in hazardous systems should only
be used where risk assessment has shown it to be acceptable.

5.3 Non-proved isolation

Non-proved isolation is basically a valved isolation (single or double valve) with no provision to confirm the
effectiveness of the isolation valve prior to breaking into the system. It is normally used on low pressure,
small diameter pipes with non-hazardous fluids such as stabilised crude, instrument air or potable water.

Under no circumstances shall check valves or non-return valves be considered as process isolation.

5.4 System Isolation Selection tool

A selection methodology for piping and equipment isolation is provided in Section 6. This tool is to be used
as a guideline in setting isolation standards. This tool shall not replace sound engineering judgment and
common sense. Other methods for isolating may be acceptable.

The methodology includes usage for:

• Confined space entries (these shall always be covered by positive isolation)

• Pipelines

• Extended periods of isolation, or for mothballing of equipment or plant.

5.5 Isolation within a Train

Isolation within a train shall be provided according to the following:

• Dedicated isolation valves will not be provided for non-spared equipment within a train except:

i) Where the equipment can be bypassed, and the process can continue in operation.

ii) To reduce system size to a reasonable value with respect to inventory vented (loss of product,
environmental considerations), and with respect to gas freeing and purging requirements.

• Equipment spared within the train shall be provided with isolation at the equipment inlet and outlet.

• Relief Valves

5.5 Flowline / Riser Isolation

Any maintenance of the top-of-riser ESDV, which would require breaking of containment, shall be
performed after full depressurisation and water flushing of the riser.

For cases where it is deemed impractical to completely hydrocarbon-free the riser, depressurisation and use
of a mechanical plug or of an ice plug may be acceptable, provided an appropriate risk assessment is
conducted.

5.6 Means of Isolation

5.6.1 Valves

Manual block valves, actuated isolation valves as well as ESD valves are acceptable for use in double block
and bleed isolation, except for fail open valves (unless the latter are provided with a mechanical "hold close"
system).

5.6.2 Positive isolation: Spectacle Blinds, Spades and Spacers

 The following table shows the limit for the use of spectacle blinds versus spade and spacer based on the size
and pressure class.

(Selections in above table are based on using spade and spacer when weight of spectacle blind exceeds 50 kg).

5.6.3 Positive Isolation: Spool Pieces

Spool pieces may be used when positive isolation is necessary for maintenance
purposes. Spool pieces shall be clearly defined on the Piping and Instrument Diagrams
(P&IDs). This type of isolation requirement may be necessary in the following areas:

• When wafer type butterfly valves are used to isolate e.g. heat exchangers, an additional flanged spool must
be provided between the valve and the spool piece to allow for spool removal without disturbing the
butterfly valve.

• For compressor maintenance, spool pieces are required on the suction and discharge nozzles to provide
positive isolation.
Piping shall be designed to permit practical removal and reinstallation of spools via provision of sufficient
pipe flexibility and appropriate mechanical handling procedures.

5.7 Securing Valve Position

Securing of valves in position is defined as a method of locking the valves to avoid inadvertent
opening/closing. Securing of valve position shall be achieved by use of proprietary key locking devices
(identified as ILO/ILC on P&IDs), "car-sealing" (identified as CSO/CSC on P&IDs), or chain and padlock
(indicated as LO/LC on P&IDs), together with written operating procedures.

Secured valves will be provided on systems where, for safe operation, valves are required to operate in either
a fixed open or closed position.

The following applications of valve position securing are proposed and shall be indicated on the P&IDs:

a) Within fire protection systems, valves on firewater distribution and local foam distribution systems shall
be CSO/CSC as appropriate.

b) Isolation valves for shutdown instruments shall be CSO.

c) Duplicated relief devices for vessels and systems installed to allow on-line maintenance shall have captive
key type interlocks on the inlet and outlet valves of the relief valve in operation, interlocked in the open
position. The spare relief valve shall have the upstream isolation valve interlocked in closed position and the
downstream isolation valve interlocked in open position. When maintenance of one of the relief valves is
required, the inlet and outlet block valves on the relief valve to be maintained will need to be interlocked
closed. Written operating procedures are required for this routine in order to avoid inadvertent valve
opening/closing leading to potentially dangerous situations.

d) Where blowdown valves are provided with block valves, theses shall be CSO.

e) Block valves downstream of single relief valves shall be CSO. No upstream block valve is allowed. A
possible exception is where a suitably sized bypass line is provided from upstream of the PSV inlet block
valve directly to the flare system. The by-pass line should include a block valve interlocked with the PSV
inlet block valve to ensure that the by-pass block valve is opened prior to closure of the PSV inlet block
valve.

5.8 Pig Launcher/Receiver

Pig launchers and receiver main valves, kickers, drain valves, vent valves and purge valves will be
interlocked as proposed under section 7.5. Detailed operating procedures must be prepared to define how
launching and retrieval of the pig should be done safely. The doors on Pig launchers and receivers will be
fitted with a mechanical safety device to prevent the door being opened when under pressure.

Single Block and Bleed valves shall be provided for instrument connections on Pig Launchers / Receivers
irrespective of the system maximum pressure (maintenance performed under depressurized condition).

5.9 Pumps
Removable spool pieces shall be provided on the suction and discharge nozzles of each pump. This is not
required for pumps in marine systems, located in confined Vessel spaces.

5.10 Compressors and Compression Trains

Removable spool pieces shall be fitted on the suction and discharge nozzles of all compressor stages. Each
individual compression train shall be provided with equipment isolations at package battery limits only,
unless equipment items within the train are spared, in which case individual equipment isolations shall be
provided.

The package battery limit isolations typically comprise of the following:

· Gas inlet to train; typically, the inlet SDV and its bypass SDV should form part of this battery limit
isolation.

· Gas outlet from train; typically, the outlet SDV and its bypass SDV should form part of this battery limit
isolation.

· Condensate lines from individual scrubbers; typically, the liquid outlet SDV from each scrubber should
form part of the battery limit isolations.

Hydrocarbon seal gas supply line (if provided, i.e. sometimes there is no external seal gas supply); typically,
the supply line SDV should form part of the battery limit isolation.

Flare header; only one isolation valve is required on the common flare header from each compression train
instead of individual isolation valves on the outlets of each relief device and pressure control valve (PCV)
routing gas to flare. This isolation valve shall be Car Sealed Open (CSO) in normal operation. A blowdown
valve (BDV) shall have a fully rated downstream isolation valve.

Common cooling medium supply line; only one isolation valve is required on the common cooling medium
supply line to a compression train, rather than individual isolations at each cooler. Common cooling medium
return line; only one isolation valve is required on the common cooling medium return line to a compression
train, rather than individual isolations at each cooler.

5.11 Heat Exchangers

To facilitate the removal of the tube bundle of a shell and tube heat exchanger or a plate and frame heat
exchanger for inspection and cleaning, removable spool pieces shall be provided as required.

5.12 Vessel and Tanks

Positive isolation of process (pressure) vessels and small atmospheric storage tanks shall be by spectacle
blind or removable spool considering the following:
· All the nozzles that feed into and out of the vessel or tank shall be positively isolated with the exceptions of
atmospheric vents and atmospheric drains.

· Positive isolation means shall be as close to the vessel/tank as possible.

· Positive isolation in flare/relief lines shall be by means of a removable spool-piece.

For internally lined vessels, removable spools rather than spectacle blinds or spacers shall be used to allow
for nozzle inspection and maintenance.

5.13 Vessel Vents

Manual maintenance vent connections for equipment routed to the flare header shall be provided as needed
(special attention to be given to the backpressure of Flare System). It is not necessary to provide a manual
maintenance vent connection to each vessel as the philosophy is in general to isolate an entire train or a
section of a train and not the individual equipment. Thus, a manual vent connection shall be provided for
sections of each train based on due consideration of where it is strictly necessary.

The vent connections shall consist of an isolation valve followed by a globe valve with the exit pipe
discharging into the HP flare header.

Vent and drain valves discharging to atmosphere shall be isolated with a blind flange.

5.14 Vessel and Piping Drainage in Hazardous Areas

Vessels in process hydrocarbon service shall be provided with (a) drain connection(s).

Restriction orifices or reduced bore valves may be used to reduce drainage rates where necessary to avoid
over-pressuring and overloading the drainage system in case of gas blowby.

5.15 Equipment Vents and Drains

Vents and drains from equipment other than vessels will be assessed on an individual basis. Vents and drains
from equipment such as filters, pumps and tanks will generally follow the philosophy outlined for vessels.
Small items of equipment and heat exchangers may be vented and drained as part of the piping system.

5.16 Vents and Drains for freeing hydrocarbons

• All vessels to be provided with vent and drain connections.

• These connections are required to free the residual gases inside the vessel after isolation by filling with
water several times and draining prior to personnel entry and/or other maintenance work.

• Typically, each vessel will have nozzle sizes in accordance with Vessel Specification

• Drain connection for the columns and vertical vessels with skirts will be provided on the outlet nozzle pipe
from bottom of the equipment, upstream of the blind and physically located outside the skirt.

• Drain and Vent connections will be provided on shell or channel of the shell & tube heat exchangers
handling HC glycol or amine.

• For plate & frame and compact (printed circuit) type heat exchangers, the drains and vents will be provided
on the piping.

• A standard nitrogen purge connection (smart plug, block valve and check valve) will be provided to allow
purging of maintainable items of equipment.

• Vent and drain valves discharging to atmosphere shall be isolated with a blind flange.