The Routledge International Handbook of Legal and ... - (Chapter 3 True and False Memories in Forensic Contexts)

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TRUE AND FALSE MEMORIES

IN FORENSIC CONTEXTS
Iris Blandón-Gitlin, Elise Fenn, and Kendra Paquette
Introduction
“What is unique about the forensic context is the potential for memory to be corrupted during the fact
finding process itself” (C.J. Brainerd, in Booker, 2011). This conclusion is based on a wealth of
research findings in psychological science. This research has demonstrated that witness memory
in forensic contexts can indeed be easily corrupted. This chapter reviews key processes and fac-
tors that can lead to memory errors that undermine the reliability of witnesses’ accounts. It will
also describe protocols to safeguard against inducing errors in the investigative process itself.
Finally, methods to discriminate between accounts of true and false events will be introduced.
In taking this review approach, we hope to inform the reader that applied memory science is
not all “doom and gloom,” as a judge recently suggested to a colleague testifying in court (S.J.
Frenda, personal communication, May 25, 2018). Instead, memory science provides research-
based solutions to investigative and legal professionals, but for these solutions to be useful, such
professionals should have an understanding of what, when, how, and why things can go wrong
with memory evidence.
Witness memory: Constructed and reconstructed

Research has demonstrated that a significant proportion of lay people hold multiple misconcep-
Copyright © 2019. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.
tions about how memory works (Simons & Chabris, 2011). For example, in a survey of nearly
2,000 US citizens, it was found that nearly 2 of 3 jury-eligible individuals believed that memory
works like a video camera. Moreover, 55% believed memory could be enhanced through hyp-
nosis, 48% believed memory is permanent, and 37% believed the testimony of a confident wit-
ness should be enough to convict a defendant. These misconceptions significantly deviate from
what it is known from scientific findings and most memory experts’ opinions (Kassin et al.,
2001; Simons & Chabris, 2011).
More than a century of scientific memory research, and decades of witness memory research
specifically, has shown that memory does not work like a recording device.The human memory
system does not simply take a picture or a movie of the event and keep a veridical record of that
experience. Psychologists actually view memory as a constructive and reconstructive process
(Conway & Loveday, 2015).
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Bull, R., & Blandón-Gitlin, I. (Eds.). (2019). The routledge international handbook of legal and investigative psychology. Taylor & Francis Group.
Created from buscsp on 2024-04-09 09:56:54.
Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, and Paquette
When a person experiences a complex event, such as a crime, he or she will typically only
acquire pieces of the information from the environment. These pieces become part of the
building material that gets combined to form a memory of the event. Because the pieces of
information are not enough to form a fully complete representation, information from other
sources is used to form the memory. These other sources can be information stored in memory
(e.g., schemas), information from external sources (e.g., other witnesses, interview questions),
and information generated from thinking about the event afterward (e.g., making inferences
from details encountered). The result is a memory constructed of combined fragments—some
experienced, some assumed, and some acquired afterward, including from suggestions. The gist
of the information in memory (e.g., I was attacked by a man in my house) might be stable and
reliable, but the verbatim (actual) details to form a highly accurate representation of the event
might not be stored or will fade quickly (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
Memories are not “set in concrete”; they are fluid and can change over time. At the time of
retrieval, such as when witnesses think about the event or answer interview questions, the event
is reconstructed. Events are not simply replayed in the mind as they originally occurred. The
reconstruction process can take many forms, including witnesses trying to fit old or new infor-
mation into a coherent story. If something they recall does not fit with the current story, that
piece will be removed, and new information might be integrated to make sense of the event.
This can result in a memory that is fundamentally different from the original event.
The degree of reliability of that memory will depend on factors that operate at the time of
the event and those operating afterward. While investigators and legal professionals have little
control over the factors operating at the time of the event (e.g., stress), the decisions they make
about how to process the memory evidence (e.g., choice of interview approaches) can have a
profound effect in the preservation of that evidence.
Memory for traumatic events

A question always arises about whether there are special cognitive mechanisms by which we
acquire and store significant, consequential, highly emotional and/or traumatic memories.
Psychologists know that such special memories will be most likely recalled, and that, depend-
ing on multiple factors, the accuracy of details (especially gist and central details) can be more
reliable than memories for everyday events (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). But like all memories,
special event memories involve similar basic cognitive processes of construction and reconstruc-
tion (Howe, Courage, & Peterson, 1996; Pezdek & Taylor, 2002). Moreover, special event memo-
ries are also malleable, prone to distortion, and affected by the processes of forgetting (Loftus &
Burns, 1982; Talarico & Rubin, 2017).
Misinformation effects and false memories

Classic psychological research has shown that witnesses can be misled by suggestive forces (e.g.,
misleading questions, inviting speculation, and imagination) to report false details of experienced
events (Loftus, 1975).This misinformation effect has been extensively documented in numerous
laboratory and real-world studies (Loftus, 2005). Psychologists understand a great deal about the
conditions under which misinformation can fundamentally alter an original memory, including
memories for traumatic events (Paz-Alonzo & Goodman, 2008). Various real-life studies have
shown that people will claim to remember non-existent films of highly publicized events. For
example, Crombag, Wagoner, and VanKoppen (1996) reported that 55% of 193 people they
surveyed about an airplane disaster in the Netherlands, falsely recalled having seen a film on
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True/false memories in forensic contexts
TV of the moment the airplane hit an apartment building. The film did not exist, yet partici-
pants recalled it and showed further distortion by reporting that they had seen the fire started
right away. The “recollection” of such detail suggests that their false memories were schema-
consistent, as common sense would suggest that airplane crashes involve fires. Following that
research, Ost and colleagues (2002) showed that 44% of their participants reported having seen
a non-existent film of the actual crash in which Diana, Princess of Wales, was killed. Moreover,
Southwick and colleagues (1997) surveyed a group of veterans from Operation Desert Storm on
their memory for details of traumatic events. A large proportion of the soldiers misremembered
one or more events, changing their accounts over time from “it did not happen to me” to “it
did happen to me.”
In the last three decades, researchers have considered the question of whether people can
recall entire autobiographical (personal) events that never occurred, including those of a trau-
matic nature. At this time there are many studies demonstrating that adults can develop entire
false autobiographical memories of events such as being lost in a mall and experiencing fear
(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), spilling punch at a wedding (Hyman & Pentland, 1996), being attacked
by an animal (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999), and being reprimanded for a bad act toward
a school teacher (Lindsay et al., 2004). In studies with children, the false events recalled by a
significant proportion of children include having been hospitalized for an injury (Ceci et al.,
1994; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995), being lost in a mall (Pezdek & Hodge, 1999), having had tea
with a member of the English royal family (Strange, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006), riding a hot-
air balloon (Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 2007), and being accused of cheating (Otgaar, Candel, &
Merckelbach, 2008).
Recently, Shaw and Porter (2015) demonstrated that entire false memories about perpetrat-
ing a crime can be developed as well. Following a procedure commonly used in false memory
research, the authors recruited university students to participate in a memory study.The authors
obtained permission to survey the participants’ family members regarding events participants
experienced in adolescence. Based on those responses, personalized narratives about true events
participants had experienced were created. A narrative of a false event about perpetrating a
crime was also created. This crime narrative was the same for all participants, except that a few
true details relevant to individual participants were added to increase the likelihood that par-
ticipants would believe they had been involved. Over three interviews, during multiple weeks,
participants were presented with these events and asked to recall more. After strong suggestive
interview procedures (e.g., imagination exercises) and social pressure to recall, the majority of
participants developed a false memory for committing the criminal act suggested (for a con-
servative estimate of these findings see Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2018). Summarizing the results
of eight studies in this domain, Scorobia and colleagues (2016) reported that between 25% and
30% of participants developed false memories for entire personal events and that suggestive
techniques increase this rate to around 46%.
What these false autobiographical memory studies show is that under strong suggestive con-
ditions—relevant to forensic contexts—people can develop false memories of events in which
they now believe they are victims and perpetrators. These false memories can be detailed, can
have a great deal of emotion, and can be confidently held, leading psychologists to refer to them
as “rich” false memories (Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). However, it is important to emphasize these
rich false memories occur under some specific highly suggestive conditions in which interview-
ers repeatedly use cognitive and social persuasion tactics that risk the planting of these false
memories. Thus, there are constraints as to when these memories can occur, and it is believed
that distorting a memory is relatively easier than planting a new memory or erasing a memory
(Pezdek & Roe, 1997; Pezdek & Blandón-Gitlin, 2008).
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It is also important to note that once a rich false memory has developed, it is difficult
for observers to identify it as false. As will be elaborated in subsequent sections, many studies
have attempted to use memory characteristics (e.g., vividness, level of details) or use established
approaches to determine if people can discriminate between accounts based on true versus false
memories (e.g., Blandón-Gitlin, Pezdek, Lindsay, & Hagen, 2009). This research has shown that
discriminating between true and false accounts is a difficult task.
Factors in memory distortion and false memories

Psychologists have identified factors that can lead to distorted memories of witnessed events and
false memories of autobiographical events.This research has also revealed the cognitive processes
by which these distorted/false memories occur. We outline some of the most relevant factors
and processes below.
Post-event information
As noted previously, information encountered after an event can influence subsequent remem-
bering. External information can easily integrate into a witness’s memory, especially if the
event was poorly encoded or the memory representation is from a distant event where time
and forgetting have degraded the original memory. With reduced information available in
memory to verify the validity of post-event misinformation, it is less likely that this new
information will be rejected. Instead, it may be integrated as part of the original experience,
especially when the misinformation fits the witness’s current thinking and can be used to cre-
ate a story that makes sense to him or her. This process can be explicit (i.e., the witness knows
it is happening), but it is often unconscious. That is, the witness might find himself or herself
thinking about the event differently without awareness. Over time, the witness may not even
know the source of information that led to the (new) memory. Sources of misinformation in
forensic contexts can be encountered anywhere, from discussions with other witnesses to social
media searches to multiple interviews with investigators or other legal professionals, and even
in court.
Co-witness influence. Witnesses hearing each other’s testimony, or discussing their memories
with each other, sometimes results in a positive effect on memory by strengthening the mem-
ory trace for the experienced event. However, these same activities can introduce information
that contaminates witnesses’ memories. This is especially the case when the original memory
strength is weak and when witnesses had different viewpoints of the event. There are many
studies investigating the degree to which people remembering in pairs or in groups mutually
influence each other (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2012) which show that most people in such situations
do discuss with other witnesses. For example, a survey of students who had witnessed a seri-
ous event revealed that when there was a co-witness present, most students discussed the event
with the co-witness (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). In another survey of sixty witnesses participat-
ing in a police investigation, 88% reported having witnessed the crime with one or multiple
co-witnesses (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008), with the average being four. A significant propor-
tion (58%) of those witnesses who experienced the event with a co-witness reported having
discussed the crime details with at least one co-witness (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). This
research demonstrates that witnesses do have opportunities to influence each other, whether
accurate or not. When witnesses discuss events, their memories and accounts of the witnessed
event can become similar over time. This is referred to as “memory conformity” (Gabbert
et al., 2012).
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Importantly, people who know each other (e.g., friends, romantic partners) are more likely to
report information obtained from their co-witnesses as if it were from their own memory than
witnesses not previously acquainted (Hope et al., 2008). This tendency may be due to witnesses
being more inclined to accept close co-witnesses’ judgments and opinions. In real-world situa-
tions, the difference between acquaintances’ and strangers’ influence on co-witnesses is likely to
be even larger because acquaintances are more likely to be in close communication in the days
after experiencing a crime.
The degree to which social media plays a role in these co-witness discussions has not been
systematically and empirically assessed, but based on what is shown in the news media, as well as
police reports, it appears that witnesses, even those not present at the event, discuss events with
each other via social media. They are likely to search for information and share it with each
other.They then report details to the police.These are uncontrolled environments that, based on
what we know from psychological science, we can predict are breeding grounds for significant
misinformation.
Questioning witnesses. A large body of psychological research has demonstrated that the
method of questioning a witness (including question type) affects the accuracy and complete-
ness of reports and subsequent memory for the events. Subtle changes in one word in the ques-
tion can have a tremendous influence on the witness’s reports. For example, in a famous study,
one group of witnesses was asked how fast the cars were going when they “bumped” into each
other, and the other group was asked the same question but with the verb “smashed” replacing
the word “bumped” (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Each group gave different estimates of speed, one
that corresponded with the schema activated by the target verb in the question. And in spite of
the fact that both groups saw the same events and from a similar vantage point, the “smashed”
group reported having seen broken glass, a feature that was not in the original scene but was
consistent with a “cars-smashed-into-each-other” schema. The effect of schema-consistent false
memories is not confined to just peripheral details of a scene; the effect also extends to cen-
tral details. For example, in a study by Hope and colleagues (2015), one-fifth of police officers
responding to a scene simulating a scenario involving an armed perpetrator reported having
seen the perpetrator pointing the weapon at them. However, the weapon was never out of the
perpetrator’s waistband throughout the scenario. Thus, the schema-consistent effects (which
can be induced by the framing questions) can powerfully influence witnesses’ reports and the
outcomes of criminal cases.
Also, repeatedly asking witnesses the same question despite having received an answer sug-
gests to the witness that the answer already given is not what the interviewer is looking for or
that the witness is wrong.The repetition can cause the witness to keep trying to remember until
they produce the “correct memory.” When a witness reports no memory of a detail or cannot
retrieve the detail (because it was not encoded or it did not exist), repeating a question may lead
the witness to go beyond what he or she actually remembers and feel pressure to speculate or
even fabricate information about the detail. Research on the “forced confabulation effect” has dem-
onstrated that people can develop subsequent false memories of such explicitly fabricated details
in response to “unanswerable” repeated questions and are likely to later report those details as if
they were true (e.g., Pezdek, Sperry, & Owens, 2007; Pezdek, Lam, & Sperry, 2009; see Zaragoza,
Hyman, & Chrobak, 2019 for a review). Thus, there is a danger in repeating the same question,
especially about details the witness explicitly said she or he did not see or cannot recall.
Visuals. Visuals such as photographs and videos can easily trigger memories for past events
that have been forgotten or are otherwise unavailable via conscious recollection. Even visuals
that do not depict the target event but have some relation to it (e.g., such as a generic picture
of a window when recalling a time when one broke a window) can have a beneficial effect in
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activating details of true memories. But photographs can also have a negative effect on memory
(Garry & Gerrie, 2005). In recent years, memory researchers have been interested in the effect
photographs and videos may have on developing false memories of entire events, including
autobiographical events (Garry & Gerrie, 2005; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009). This research has
been conducted partly based on the real-world concern that people are increasingly exposed to
visuals in the context of investigative interviewing. Research shows that photographs combined
with other suggestive techniques can contribute to the creation of false memories of entire
events. For example, Lindsay and colleagues (2004) reported that false memories of a childhood
event significantly increased when participants viewed a related photograph as part of memory
retrieval exercises. Using the family member survey procedure discussed previously, Lindsay and
colleagues repeatedly suggested to 45 participants a false event of having played a prank on a
first-grade teacher. Half of the participants were presented with a genuine class photograph that
included the participant as a child, classmates, and the teacher; the other half did not see such
photograph. The findings were that whereas 65% of the participants in the photo group were
judged to have developed a false memory for the pseudoevent, only 27% of the participants in
the no-photo group were judged to have done so. That is a very powerful effect for a photo-
graph not depicting specifics of the target event.
Visuals invariably elicit in witnesses a mental representation that could suggestively shape
their memory of the actual event, especially if repeated questions or other suggestive techniques
are used. In one real-world case that the first author evaluated, witnesses driving a car during a
rainy evening saw the murder of two police officers. The witnesses were repeatedly interviewed
about some details they could not recall. In the face of repeated questions the witnesses only
speculated about those details. The police then had an artist draw the scene from various per-
spectives and included details the witnesses clearly said they did not see (and were unlikely to
have seen given the conditions of observations, e.g., complete license plate number of the sus-
pect’s car). During various pre-trial proceedings at which witnesses were present, the prosecutor
introduced these visuals as “demonstratives,” suggesting that there were not real depictions of
the events by a particular witness but just represented visually a summary of what it was believed
happened. However, these “demonstratives” subsequently had a powerful effect on the witnesses’
memories. By the time the jurors heard the witnesses testify at trial, the witnesses were sure of
having seen the details depicted in those “demonstratives,” even though they had reported no
memories multiple times before.Thus, it is critically important to judiciously use visuals, capital-
izing on their benefits while reducing the potential negative effects.
Retention interval
The longer the interval between an event and the time witnesses have to provide an account
the more likely the account will have significant distortions, especially when various additional
memory factors operate.This is because the natural process of forgetting will result in a memory
that is at best incomplete and at worst significantly degraded. To be sure, some proportion of
core knowledge can remain available even 50 years later (Bahrick, 1984), especially for well-
learned material (e.g., the name of school friends). However, forensically relevant events are typ-
ically not overlearned and many do not involve rehearsal or repeated experiences. In these cases,
even gist memories, which can be stable in some cases, are subject to significant distortion when
the retention interval is long. The effect of the passage of time on memory is well documented
in laboratory, field, and archival studies, as well as in case studies (Read & Connolly, 2007).
What is important to keep in mind when considering memory accounts is that while the
retention interval in itself is important, so is the nature of the recollection context—such as
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whether the event was experienced one time or repeatedly, whether the event was recalled a
single time or repeatedly, and whether the event was experienced in childhood or adulthood
(see Read & Connolly, 2007, for a review). Nonetheless, across the board, when there is a delay,
the effects of suggestibility are more powerful. It is easier to misinform or plant false memo-
ries for distant events than recent events (Sporer & Sharman, 2006; Strange, Wade, & Hayne,
2008), partly because distant events are typically less vivid, less detailed, and less accessible than
memories of recent events (Johnson et al., 1988). It is possible that in the recollection process,
participants have less information available from distant real experiences for them to make an
accurate judgment of the validity of the misinformation or false information, thereby impairing
their ability to reject suggested events. This lack of details from distant memories also makes it
easier to adopt false information in the constructive process.
Imagination/visualization
When people imagine non-experienced events or scenarios either by themselves or in the
context of conversations with others, it is possible that a process of “imagination inflation” will
result and lead to false memories (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). That is, a person’s
confidence that the imagined event occurred will be amplified by simply imagining the event
itself, and this can lead to false beliefs. Repeatedly visualizing, thinking, and speculating about
an event can lead to detailed imagery that enhances false beliefs. These false beliefs are the basis
for developing false memories of events.There is now a substantial literature on the imagination
inflation effect and its relation to various types of events (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003), including
everyday inconsequential events, autobiographical events (e.g., spilling punch at a wedding), and
more consequential events (e.g., remembering being the victim of satanic ritual abuse). These
studies reveal that imagination (and its related constructs) is one of the most important factors
in memory distortion, including memories for traumatic events (Strange & Takarangi, 2015).
Event plausibility
Another important factor in false memory creation is event plausibility. This construct relates to
the type of prior knowledge the witness has about suggested events. Having general knowledge
about how an event occurs, and possessing schema-relevant information in memory, makes it
more plausible to implant information about the occurrence of such an event. When the event
is unlikely to have occurred, and the person has less schematic information for the event, then
the event is less likely to be implanted in memory (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997; Pezdek
& Hodge, 1999). What is plausible to particular individuals depends on their knowledge base.
However, manipulations that suggest to witnesses that an event occurred (even unlikely and
unusual events, such as having tea with a member of the royal family or receiving a rectal enema)
will increase the false beliefs that the event occurred. Imagination increases the likelihood of
developing a false memory of an event that is believed to be plausible (Pezdek, Blandón-Gitlin,
& Gabbay, 2005; Pezdek et al., 2006).
Inconsistency within and across interviews

Sometimes witnesses provide inconsistent accounts of events. Although most people believe
that inconsistency across and within interviews indicates inaccuracy or deception on the part of
the witness, the evidence for this notion is not as straightforward as it seems (Fisher, Brewer, &
Mitchell, 2009; Fisher,Vrij, & Leins, 2013). Psychological research has shown that the accuracy
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or reliability of a detail depends on (a) the nature of the inconsistency (contradiction, addition,
or deletion), (b) the type of detail (core versus peripheral), and (c) how the detail was elicited
(same versus different interview or question type). Psychologists categorize inconsistencies as
direct contradictions (conflicting responses; i.e., different details reported at Time 1 versus Time 2),
reminisce (more recall; i.e., new detail reported at Time 2 but not reported at Time 1), and omis-
sions (forgetting; i.e., detail reported at Time 1 but not reported at Time 2). Research shows that
of these three types of inconsistencies, direct contradictions are the least accurate or reliable (see
Fisher et al., 2013). This is because memory for that detail tends to be poor. Research also sug-
gests that direct contradictions are less likely to occur for central details of an event (Masip et al.,
2016). This is because witnesses tend to remember central details of an emotional event (e.g.,
“I was attacked by a man with a weapon”) significantly more than peripheral details (e.g., “the
trash can was outside”; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Witnesses are then likely to report
those central details spontaneously or when primed by interview prompts.
Cognitive processes in memory errors and false memories

Source memory errors
When people search events in memory, a representation is elicited and activated in the mind.
This process happens for experienced events, associated events, and events not experienced
but thought about or gained from outside sources. In other words, a sort of memory trace is
created, even for non-experienced events (such as an unfulfilled intention or a dream). How
people decide whether a memory representation is of an experienced event or the product of
thinking or from hearing someone else tell us is called a “source memory judgment” (Lindsay,
2008). Errors in this type of judgment occur when people become confused about the source
of the information. Confusion is more likely to occur when the memory representation of a
false/imagined event has the characteristics of true memories (e.g., vivid, detailed, contextually
embedded). The memory processes and conditions outlined above can lead to the creation of
memory representations of false events that seem real.This error in “source memory judgement”
is one of the important cognitive mechanisms that explain why distorted and false memories
occur and why people believed them to be real.
In a study by Loftus (1975), after watching a film, participants were asked: “How fast was the
white sports car going when it passed the barn while traveling along the country road?” The
others (the “control group”) were asked the same question without the barn in it. In fact, there
was no barn. Those who heard the barn in the question were more likely to report having seen
the barn than the control group. This can be explained by an error people make in assessing the
source of the memory. If the memory search yields a barn in their minds, participants assess the
memory for characteristics that signal whether the memory is from actual experience or from
their imagination. When the imagined memory, created with information from the interview
phase, is vivid and detailed, and there is no other way to reject it as false, witnesses are likely to
believe it as being the product of real experience.
To illustrate further, in a study by Henkle and Franklin (1998), participants perceived objects
such as a magnifying glass or a pair of trousers, and imagined others such as a lollipop or shirts.
It didn’t matter whether the objects were physically similar (magnifying glass and lollipop) or
were functionally similar (trousers and shirt); participants were likely to make errors in remem-
bering—whether they saw the object or they visualized it. In that study, visualizing an object’s
shape and function created a memory representation that seemed as though it came from an
actual experience, especially if a similar object was previously seen. For example, visualizing a
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hypothetical lollipop as something round with a narrow stick beneath it, after having seen a
magnifying glass with similar shape, led to misattributions of the hypothetical lollipop men-
tal representation to an actual memory. Similarly, visualizing a hypothetical shirt in terms of
its function after having seen a pair of trousers, led to misattributions of the memory for the
hypothetical shirt as being from actual experience.Visualizing objects or events in detail can be
encouraged by the content of the question being asked or the dynamics of the interview and
thinking process.
Gist and verbatim memory traces

If a witness experiences an event, for example, seeing a person yelling. An important theory of
memory, “fuzzy-trace theory,” would suggest that at a conceptual level two memory traces are
created. The verbatim (detailed actual) memory of seeing the person yell, and the gist (general
interpretation) memory of what happened, will both be created. The gist memory constitutes
the basic story the witness tells himself or herself about the experience (e.g., “He hates me”),
or the beliefs the witness has about what happened (e.g. “He is so negative because–”). Gist
memory contains much less detail than the verbatim experience of the event. These verbatim
memory traces fade much more quickly than gist memory traces. This leaves a memory that
consists primarily of gist, with less and less sensory details available as time goes on. The “fuzzy-
trace theory” suggests that when verbatim memory traces are weak, and gist memories are
strong, witnesses can develop specific types of false memories. This can be exacerbated by the
retention interval.
Thus, if a gist memory involved the notion that “He hates me” and that is what is left because
the verbatim traces of the actual episode have faded, the likelihood of developing false memories
that are specifically tied to the “He hates me” gist is greater. For example, in some “stereotype
induction” studies, children were told information that an adult is clumsy (negative stereotype
induction) or not, prior to interacting with that adult during various classroom activities (e.g., the
adult read a book). Later, the children were interviewed in a suggestive or non-suggestive man-
ner about what they saw the adult doing. If the children were provided with suggestions that the
adult had done “bad things” (i.e., the questioner used a negative stereotype like tearing a book),
they were more likely than the “control group” to later misremember details of what the adult
did. Compared to the “control group,” the negative stereotype group was more likely to incor-
porate in their reports that the adult did bad things when in fact the adult did not, for example,
tear a book (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). Thus, one explanation is that the original gist memory
was distorted with the addition of the adult “tearing a book” because (a) the verbatim memory
traces of what the visitor actually did had faded, and (b) aspects of the stereotype (that he did bad
things) was related to the original gist memory (an adult visited the classroom and did things).
Individual differences
Because of the fundamental processes of how memories are created, most people are suscep-
tible to memory errors and false memories, including people with superior autobiographical
memories (see Patihis et al., 2013). However, there are individual difference factors along devel-
opmental (e.g., age), cognitive (e.g., intelligence), personality (e.g., suggestible), and psychopa-
thology (e.g., dissociative identity disorder) dimensions that make some people more vulnerable
and susceptible to memory errors and false memories than other groups. For example, Zhu
and colleagues (2010a) used a number of cognitive measures to assess individual differences
in the misinformation effect. The results suggested that people with relatively low intelligence
45
and poor perceptual abilities are likely to be highly susceptible to misinformation (also see
Zhu et al., 2010b). Garaerts (2012) reported that people who recovered a trauma memory (of
unknown validity) through suggestive techniques (e.g., guided imagery exercises) are more
prone to develop false memories than those who report spontaneously recovering memories.
Garaerts (2012) concluded that a proneness to false memories could place some individuals at
a high risk of being influenced by suggestive techniques that result in “recollections” of non-
existent events.
Protocols to promote quality memory reports

Having discussed how human memory works and the factors that affect reliability of memory
reports in forensic contexts, we now turn to what can be done to offset these negative effects.
Based on what we know about the functions of the human memory system, psychologists
have produced a wealth of research to develop interview protocols to promote the elicitation
of quality reports from witnesses. Some of the interview protocols have been mentioned in
other chapters in this handbook and will not be discussed here. However, we do discuss relevant
aspects of the two most important protocols, the Cognitive Interview (CI; Fisher & Geiselman,
1992) and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development protocol (NICHD;
Lamb et al., 2007), as they relate to the topics of this chapter—true and false memories. These
protocols are particularly suited to reduce the likelihood of misinformation effects and false
memories because they are both information-gathering protocols, where witnesses’ memory
abilities and limitations, as well as their thoughts and emotions, are taken into account. The
application of these protocols in investigative interviewing has been welcomed by law enforce-
ment agencies worldwide (Lamb, 2007; Geiselman & Fisher, 2014; La Rooy et al., 2015).
Briefly, the CI, for interviewing witnesses of all groups, and the NICHD protocol, specifi-
cally for interviewing children, are based on the same principles from findings in psychological
science. Even though there are differences in each, the main components are similar. Both put a
strong emphasis on developing rapport and taking a witness-centered approach; both focus on
the importance of question types that promote accuracy and increase the amount of details, and
both—each to a varying degree—allow for flexibility in the use of memory retrieval techniques.
Rapport and transfer of control. In many instances, witnesses, and especially victims, must pro-
vide detailed accounts of intimate, personal, and oftentimes traumatic experiences to investiga-
tors and legal professionals who are complete strangers. The witness’s role, the nature of the
investigation, the setting, and even the authoritativeness of the investigators or legal professionals
can be distressing to witnesses and can induce a psychological barrier between the witness and
the professional. To break down psychological barriers, rapport development and maintenance
is absolutely necessary when interviewing/questioning witnesses. Rapport-building can start by

simply letting the witness know that the investigator or legal professional wants to know them
better, that they should talk about their day, work, or family. There are various ways of defining
rapport, but it should involve an interest in the person, active listening, respect, and empathy (see
Bull & Baker, 2019).
Given that investigators and lawyers may be perceived as experts who have specialized
knowledge, including access to the evidence collected during the investigations, it may signal to
a witness that the professional is in control. The witness may think that his or her role is to sim-
ply answer questions posed. This could have a detrimental effect on the quantity of information
in the witness’s reports, because the witness may be less likely to elaborate on events or report
details that he or she think are unimportant. To transfer control, the professional should suggest
to the witness that he or she will be relying on the witness to play an active role in reporting
46
because he or she is the one with firsthand knowledge of the event. For children, an investigator
can prompt them to practice the active role by first having them narrate another event from the
recent past (e.g., birthday party).These steps in transferring control set the ground rules of what
is expected and allow for practice on what to report, what to avoid, and how much to report.
Question types and memory retrieval techniques. Once rapport has been accomplished and the
rules of the interview have been established, both the CI and NICHD protocols emphasize hav-
ing the witness place himself or herself in the time frame of the target event or mentally recreate
the context in which the event took place. The idea is to direct the witness’s mental “spotlight”
to that particular event memory. Once this has been established, the professional uses open-
ended questions that prompt a narrative response from the witness and allow the professional
to assess the witness’s overall representation of the event. Based on this information, the profes-
sional uses follow-up questions that elicit more responses (ideally more narrative responses)
about specific aspects mentioned by the witness. More specific questions may be asked to clarify
information the witness mentions. Forced-choice, leading, and suggestive questions that intro-
duce information (which can be misinformation) or suggest a response are avoided as much as
possible. Depending on what the professional is able to assess about the witness’s mental repre-
sentation of events (e.g., actions by the perpetrator, location of objects, etc.), he or she may ask
the witness to engage in memory retrieval techniques to elicit more details. Strategies such as
generating self-relevant cues, drawing, and providing the event in reverse chronological order, or
thinking about the event from another’s perspective are part of the CI protocol.
A large amount of the research on these protocols comes from laboratory experiments,
and less comes from real-life field studies. Despite less research from real-world contexts, the
consensus in the scientific and professional communities is that both protocols are effective
in improving the quantity of information elicited from witnesses (and cooperative suspects)
without significantly compromising quality (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010; La Rooy et al.,
2015). Importantly, errors of misinformation or false memories are reduced. It is not surprising
that rapport-building and transferring control can alleviate witnesses’ anxiety and reduce the
uncertainty or misconceptions about the interview or questioning process. This would allow
the witness to feel less pressure to guess when he or she does not know the answer and to feel
comfortable saying “I don’t know.” These encourage the witness to carefully search memory
without constraints and to base reports on the strength of the memory. The use of open-ended
questions and avoiding suggestive and leading questions can generate information that derives
exclusively from the witness, information that is highly likely to be based on a strong memory
trace that is consistent across time and detailed (i.e., more based on verbatim traces).
Moreover, engaging in multiple memory retrieval strategies can reduce the detrimental
effects on memory from the factors outlined in previous sections. For example, having the wit-
ness reinstate the context, even after exposure to misinformation, may help reduce the “remem-
bering” of that post-event information and thus the reporting of inaccurate details. By mentally
traveling to the original time and place where the event occurred, the witness is less likely to
access post-event information from multiple prior interviews or from discussing, imagining, and
thinking about the event (Milne & Bull, 2003; Geiselman & Fisher, 2014). In a study investigat-
ing whether a brief CI instruction to reinstate the context or report everything would affect
false beliefs, it was shown that the CI instructions did not induce false beliefs and importantly
that they may have protecting effects. Participants engaged in an initial memory retrieval session
where they reported on the likelihood that some childhood events happened to them. Later, in
a second session, they were interviewed about target events from the first session to see if they
had developed false beliefs about those events. In this second session, prior to reporting on those
events again, some participants received the “reinstate the context” and/or “report everything”
47
instructions. The instructions led to no changes in false beliefs compared to the no-instruction
condition. This led the authors to suggest that the CI has an “inoculation” effect in that it may
protect participants from being influenced by misleading information (Sharman & Powell, 2013).
Asking to recall more about particular pieces of information by encouraging different
retrieval strategies (e.g., reverse chronological order, others’ perspectives, drawing, etc.) allows
the investigator or lawyer to ask about the same information without simply repeating the same
question. As noted previously, repeating the same question multiple times can lead to errors
because witnesses may assume the first answer was not the correct one and they must change
their response in the face of hearing the question again. This can lead to inconsistency errors
of the worst kind (contradictions) that undermine the perceived overall reliability of reports.
Encouraging the use of various retrieval strategies without social pressure should lead to mul-
tiple searches. Multiple searches without interruption allow access to the target memory, via
multiple routes (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). This process increases the likelihood of locating
new information.
Research on the CI protocol has shown it could be used effectively with children (Saywitz,
Geiselman, & Bornstein, 1992; Milne & Bull, 2003), older adults (Mello & Fisher, 1996), and
vulnerable groups (Nield et al., 2003). The NICHD is used with children only, but within this
group there are particularly vulnerable children for whom the protocol can be especially useful
(Lamb, 2007; La Rooy et al., 2015). One issue that is concerning to practitioners is that such
protocols require extensive training of personnel and time to conduct the interview properly.
In response to this concern, psychologists have developed modified protocols (derived from
these extensive protocols) that can be more easily used in some contexts. For example, Professor
Tom Lyon developed the Ten-Step Protocol for interviewing children, which is a simple ver-
sion of the NICHD protocol designed to facilitate interviewing in the field (Lyon, 2005; also
see Hershkowitz, Lamb, & Katz, 2014). Research on this protocol is not extensive, but the
Ten-Step Protocol draws from the principles of the NICHD protocol and represents its main
components.
Professor Fiona Gabbert and colleagues developed the Self-Administered Interview (SAI©;
Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009) using core principles of the CI protocol (e.g., mental reintern-
ment, open-ended prompts) for use in real life. As the name implies, the SAI© is self-administered
by the witness on site. It consists of a booklet which prompts witnesses to recall their experience
immediately after the critical event. The tool is intended to be used in situations where there are
multiple witnesses and formal interviews with each would be difficult and likely delayed. The
goal in using such a tool is to elicit high-quality information and preserve it by strengthening
the memory trace during this initial recall attempt. Similar to the CI, the SAI© influences witness
recall not only through the elicitation of quality information but also through inoculation from
potential post-event misinformation. Indeed, research shows that witnesses who completed the
SAI© reported more accurate details than those without special recall prompts (Gabbert et al.,
2009). In later interviews—a week or a month later—witnesses who at the time of the event
completed the SAI© reported significantly more information than those who were simply asked
to recall without special prompting (Gabbert et al., 2012; Hope et al., 2014). Compared to a
control group, the SAI© witnesses recalled more without compromising accuracy. Importantly,
SAI© witnesses are resistant to the detrimental effects of misleading post-event information.
They also provide better information in subsequent interviews (Hope et al., 2014). As witnesses
are now more likely to search social media and be exposed to potential misinformation or to
others’ recollections, an immediate SAI© will become even more important. However, this type
of tool is not feasible in situations where the event occurs in private and reporting has been
delayed (e.g., sex abuse). The full CI and NICHD protocols are more appropriate in such cases.
48
Protocols to discriminate between true and false memories

Once a memory has been contaminated or developed to an extent that the memory is a “rich
false memory,” it can be difficult to identify it as false without strong corroborating evidence.
As noted above, these rich false memories may not always occur, as the conditions under which
they arise involve multiple converging forces. Behavioral and neuroscience research suggest that
in many instances true and false recollections show observable and discriminative characteristics
(Abe, 2012; Johnson et al., 2012). Thus, techniques that target these differences may be useful to
assess whether a report is based on a real or imagined experience.
Two commonly used veracity assessment techniques relevant to investigative and legal settings
are the “Criteria-Based Content Analysis” (CBCA; Steller, 1989) and the “Reality Monitoring
Framework” (RM; Sporer, 2004). The two techniques, although different in some respects, have
in common the use of criteria to systematically assess truthfulness in witnesses’ accounts of
events. In a typical study, trained evaluators review accounts witnesses provide about events.
These evaluators assess whether each criterion (e.g., CBCA: quantity of details, contextual
embedding; RM: vividness, sensory details) is present in the accounts; a score is then assigned
to the accounts based on the number of criteria found. Although there are no predetermined
cut-off scores to make a final assessment regarding the veracity of the accounts, it is said that
the higher the score (i.e., more criteria) the more likely the account is based on a true memory
(Sporer, 1997). A large proportion of the relevant research has focused on demonstrating that,
under some conditions, the techniques can be useful for differentiating between accounts of
events that are true and those that are deliberately fabricated (i.e., lie) (Hauch et al., 2017).
A few studies have assessed their usefulness to differentiate between accounts of events that
are true and those accounts of false events that are subjectively believed to be true (i.e., false
memories). For example, in two studies involving false autobiographical memories, Blandón-
Gitlin, Pezdek, Lindsay, and Hagen (2009) compared true and suggested reports made by adults.
Interviewers convinced participants that a fictitious event had happened, one group developed
no visual memory of it (partial memory group), whereas another group developed a full-scale
false memory for the event (full memory group). The CBCA scoring produced significant dif-
ferences between participants’ descriptions of true and suggested events in the “partial memory”
group, but this difference was not found for participants in the “full memory” group. Similarly,
Porter,Yuille, and Lehman (1999) asked adult participants to provide accounts of autobiographi-
cal events; some were based on true experiences and some were based on suggested experiences.
Evaluators analyzed the accounts with a mixed set of criteria taken from different veracity assess-
ment techniques, including a few from the CBCA. The analysis showed that suggested accounts
contained as many details but were less coherent than true accounts. Erdmann, Volbert, and
Bohm (2004) reported that a few CBCA criteria were useful for discriminating between chil-
dren’s accounts of true and suggested false events. In their study, first graders were suggested false
events over multiple interviews. Analysis of children’s accounts who assented to the suggestions
showed that six CBCA criteria discriminated between true and suggested accounts obtained
in the first interview, but only four criteria discriminated between the accounts from the final
fifth interview. Together such findings suggest that to some extent the CBCA may be sensitive
to differences between accounts of true and suggested events.
The RM is a theoretical model that seeks to explain and predict differences between memo-
ries of real and false events (Johnson et al., 2012). How people know that a memory may well
be true has to do with the characteristics of the representation in the mind. If the represen-
tation seems vivid, has sensory information such as sound and visual detail, if it is clear and
has emotions, people tend to believe that memory is based on a true experience. If there are
49
fewer of these characteristics, people tend to believe the memory representation is the prod-
uct of thoughts, imaginations, or suggestions. When there is overlap in these characteristics
between true and false memory representations, individuals might make a “source memory
error.” Psychologists have used the RM to develop a criteria-based approach for evaluation of
accounts provided by witnesses (Sporer, 2004). Research has found that successful application
of RM criteria can discriminate between accounts of true and deliberately fabricated events (e.g.,
Sporer, 1997;Vrij et al., 2004).
Research also suggests that RM criteria might be useful to discriminate between true and
suggested false events. For example, Schooler, Gerard, and Loftus (1986) trained evaluators to
identify RM criteria in participants’ descriptions of objects in a simulated traffic accident. Some
participants developed false memories for objects not present at the scene (e.g., yield sign).
Results showed the verbal descriptions of false memories had fewer sensory details and were
longer than the description of memories of actual experience. Longer descriptions of false
memories were likely because there were more verbal hedges and words indicating an inter-
nally generated idea about the nonexistent object. Similarly, Pezdek and Taylor (2002) assessed
memory characteristics in verbal descriptions of entire autobiographical events. They reported
that memories of true versus those of “planted” events (e.g., being lost in a mall) could be dis-
criminated on the basis of the length of the accounts, the number of sensory details, and the
subjective confidence in the reality of the memory.
In summary, psychological research suggests that, with the exclusion of “rich false memories,”
it is possible to identify memories of suggested false events. The CBCA and RM approaches
may be helpful in this regard, though more research is needed to fully understand the constraints
in using these techniques for detecting false memories in applied settings. At the moment there
is no systematic research on shorter and easier-to-use versions of the CBCA and RM tech-
niques. The understanding and application of the criteria require relatively extensive training.
However, one approach for legal professionals to easily determine potential suggestibility
in interviews is the Interview-Identification-Eyewitness Factors (I-I-Eye) Method (Pawlenko et al.,
2013). The I-I-Eye method guides evaluators on what to look for when assessing the reliability
of witness evidence. Although the method mainly focuses on the accuracy of eyewitness identi-
fication of a perpetrator, part of the method focuses on interview factors (e.g., the use of open-
ended questions versus closed-ended or leading questions), and memory factors that could affect
the witness’s report of events (e.g., interval between event and interview). The I-I-Eye method
has been shown to be helpful in assessing the reliability of identifications (Pawlenko et al., 2013).
Its components are also helpful in identifying potential sources of suggestibility in witnesses’
reports that may inform on the reliability of the description of events.
Summary and conclusions

To summarize, over a century of psychological research has shown that memory is construc-
tive and reconstructive. In contrast to lay notions, scientists know from extensive research that
memory does not work like a recording device. All memories, including special event memo-
ries, are mediated by similar cognitive processes. A special event may be better remembered by
witnesses in that the gist of the information, as well as some core details of the event, might
be recalled relatively well. However, special memories are malleable, subject to distortion, and
affected by the detrimental effects of forgetting, just like everyday memories are. Psychologists
have been able to identify a number of socio-cognitive factors that can negatively affect memory
and undermine its reliability. In the context of these factors, there are individual differences
that make some witnesses more susceptible to memory distortion and false memories. In many
50
cases it may not be possible to determine with certainty if a memory is accurate or not; it is the
evaluation of the psychological factors that give us a sense of whether someone’s account of an
event is reliable.
The good news is that there are research-based approaches that are useful to avoid or
reduce negative influences on witnesses’ memories and their accounts. These are established
protocols that require training and practice. At a minimum, though, professionals can be
mindful of the issues outlined in this chapter, including that over time, witnesses may not
even know the source of information that led to their memory. Sources of post-event misin-
formation in the forensic context can be encountered anywhere, from discussions with other
witnesses to social media communication/searches to multiple interviews with the police or
other legal professionals.
Finally, this chapter also described approaches that can be useful in discriminating between
true and false memories of events.There is much research to be done in this domain, but having
an understanding of the characteristics that may differentiate true and false memories in some
situations, and how those translate to details in accounts of events, should be useful to investiga-
tive and legal professionals.
Take home points

1. All memories are constructive and reconstructive. There are a number of factors relevant to
forensic contexts that can influence witnesses’ memories and the quality of their reports.
2. There are research-based approaches to avoid or reduce the negative influence of factors on
witnesses’ memories and their accounts.
3. There are also research-based methods to facilitate the assessment of accounts that are based on
true versus false memories.
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The Routledge International Handbook of Legal and ... - (Chapter 3 True and False Memories in Forensic Contexts)

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3

TRUE AND FALSE MEMORIES

Witness memory: Constructed and reconstructed

Memory for traumatic events

Misinformation effects and false memories

Factors in memory distortion and false memories

Inconsistency within and across interviews

Cognitive processes in memory errors and false memories

Gist and verbatim memory traces

Protocols to promote quality memory reports

is absolutely necessary when interviewing/questioning witnesses. Rapport-building can start by

Protocols to discriminate between true and false memories

Summary and conclusions

Take home points

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