Kweez

iJoseph,
MAY19/
BCS/
004U

ARTI
FICI
ALI
NTELLI
GENCETEST2

Quest
ion1

Di
scusst
het
erm Gamet
heor
y

Gametheoryi
stheprocessofmodel
ingt
hest
rat
egi
cint
eract
ionbet
weent
woormor
epl
ayer
s
i
nasit
uationcont
aini
ngsetrul
esandout
comes.

Quest
ion2

Descr
ibet
hedi
ff
erentt
ypesofgamet
heor
y.

*Cooper
ati
ve:

Cooperati
vegamesar et
heonei nwhichplay
ersareconvincedtoadoptapart
icul
arst
rategy
thr
oughnegot i
ati
onsandagreementsbetweenplayer
s.Exampl ecit
edinpr
isoner’
sdi
lemmat o
under
standtheconceptofcooperat
ivegames.Incase,JohnandMachadbeenabl et
ocontact
eachother,t
hentheymusthavedecidedtoremainsil
ent.Theref
ore,t
hei
rnegoti
ati
onwould
havehelpedinsolvi
ngoutt
heproblem.

*Non-
cooper
ati
vegames;

Ref ertothegamesinwhi chtheplayersdeci

deonthei
rownst r
ategyt
omaximizethei
rprof
it
.
Thebestexampl eofanon- cooper
ativegameispri
soner’
sdil
emma.Non-cooperat
ivegames
provideaccurat
eresul
ts.Thisisbecauseinnon-
cooperat
ivegames,aver
ydeepanalysi
sofa
problem t
akesplace.

*Nor
mal
for
m games

Refertothedescript
ionofgamei nt heform ofmatri
x.Inot herwords,
whenthepay offand
str
ategi
esofagamear er epresent
edi nat abul
arform,itistermedasnormalform games.
Normalform gameshel pinidentif
yingthedomi natedstrategiesandNashequi
libri
um.I n
normalform games,themat rixdemonst ratest
hest r
ategiesadoptedbythedi
fferentplayer
sof
thegameandt hei
rpossibleoutcomes.

*Ext
ensi
vef
orm games

Aretheonesinwhichthedescr i
pti
onofgamei sdoneintheform ofadecisi
ont
ree.Extensi
ve
for
m gameshelpintherepresentat
ionofevent
sthatcanoccurbychance.Thesegames
consi
stofatr
ee-l
i
kestructureinwhichthenamesofplayersarerepresent
edondif
ferentnodes.

*Si
mul
taneousgames

Ar
et heonesinwhichthemov eoft
wopl ayers(
thest
rat
egyadoptedbyt
woplay
ers)is
si
mul t
aneous.I
nsimultaneousmove,
playersdonothaveknowl
edgeaboutt
hemov eofot
her
pl
ayers.Onthecontr
ary,
 Kweez
iJoseph,
MAY19/
BCS/
004U

*Sequent
ial
games;

Aretheonesi nwhichpl
ayersareawareaboutthemovesofplayer
swhohav ealr
eadyadopted
astr
ategy.Forexample,
aplayerhasknowledgethatt
heotherpl
ayerwouldnotuseasingl
e
st
rat
egy,buthe/sheisnotsureaboutt
henumberofst r
ategi
estheotherpl
ayermayuse.

*Const
antsum game;

I
stheonei
nwhichthesum ofout
comeofal
lthepl
ayer
sremai
nsconst
antev
eni
fthe
out
comesaredi
ff
erent
.

*Zer
osum game;

I
sat ypeofconst
antsum gameinwhichthesum ofoutcomesofallpl
ayersiszero.I
nzer
o
sum game,thestr
ategi
esofdi
ff
erentpl
ayerscannotaf
fecttheav
ail
ableresources.

*Anon-
zer
osum game

Anon-zerosum gamecanbet ransformedtozerosum gamebyaddingonedummypl ay

er.The
l
ossesofdummypl ay
erareov erri
ddenbyt henetearni
ngsofpl
ayer
s.Examplesofzerosum
gamesar echessandgambl i
ng.Int hesegames,thegainofonepl
ayerr
esul
tsinthelossofthe
otherpl
ayer.However
,cooperativegamesar etheexampleofnon-
zerogames.Thisi
sbecause
i
ncooper at
ivegames,ei
thereverypl ayerwi
nsorloses.

*Sy
mmet
ri
cgames;

Underthis,t
rategiesadoptedbyallpl
ayersaresame.Symmet r
ycanexistinshort-
ter
m games
onlybecausei nlong-
ter
m gamest henumberofopt i
onswithaplayeri
ncreases.Thedeci
sions
i
nasy mmet r i
cgamedependont hestrategi
esused,notonthepl
ayersofthegame.Ev eni
n
caseofinterchangingplay
ers,t
hedecisionsremaint
hesamei nsymmet r
icgames.Exampl eof
symmet r
icgamesi spri
soner’
sdil
emma.

*Asy
mmet
ri
cgames;

Aret heonesi nwhichstrat

egi
esadoptedbypl ayer
sar ediff
erent.Thestrategythatprovi
des
benef i
ttoonepl ay
ermaynotbeequal l
ybenefici
alfortheotherplayer.Howev er,deci
sion
maki nginasymmet ricgamesdependsont hedif
ferenttypesofst r
ategi
esanddeci si
onof
pl
ay ers.Exampleofasy mmetri
cgamei sentr
yofnewor ganizat
ioninamar ketbecause
di
fferentorganizat
ionsadoptdi
ffer
entstr
ategi
est oenterinthesamemar ket.
 Kweez
iJoseph,
MAY19/
BCS/
004U

Quest
ion3.

Wit
hrelev
antexampl
es,
descr
ibet
heal
pha-
bet
apr
uni
ngandmi
nimaxal
gor
it
hmsusedi
ngame
t
heory

Al
pha–bet
apr
uni
ng;

Isasearchalgori
thm thatseekstodecreasethenumberofnodest hatareeval
uatedbythe
mini
maxal gori
thm ini
t ssearchtr
ee.I
tisanadv ersari
alsearchalgorit
hm usedcommonl yf
or
machineplayi
ngoft wo-playergames(ti
c-t
ac-toe,chess).I
tstopsev al
uatingamov ewhenat
l
eastonepossi bi
l
ityhasbeenf oundthatprovesthemov etobewor set hanaprev
iousl
y
examinedmov e.Suchmov esneednotbeev aluat
edf urt
her.

Exampl
e

I
fthegamei
sat
ree;

ar
r[]={
13,
8,24,
-5,
23,
15,
-14,
-20}

t
henopt
imal
val
uewi
l
lbe13i
fmaxi
mizerpl
aysf
ir
st

Al
gor
it
hm woul
dbe;

1.St
artDFSt
rav
ersal
from t
her
ootofgamet
ree

2.Seti
nit
ial
val
uesofal
phaandbet
aasf
oll
ows:

a.al
pha=I
NT_
MIN(
-I
NFI
NITY)

b.bet
a=I
NT_
MAX(
+INFI
NITY)

3.Tr
averset
reei
nDFSf ashi
onwheremaxi
mizerplay
ertri
estogett
hehi
ghestscor
epossi
ble
whil
ethemini
mizerpl
ayertr
iest
ogett
helowestscorepossi
ble.

4.Whi
l
etr
aver
singupdat
etheal
pha.

Mi
nimaxal
gor
it
hm;

Isadeci si
onr ul
eusedt ominimizethewor st
-casepotenti
all
oss;inot
herwor ds,aplayer
considersall
oft hebestopponentresponsest ohisst
rategi
es,andsel
ectsthestrat
egysuch
thattheopponent '
sbeststr
ategygivesapay offaslar
geaspossi bl
e.Mini
maxal gori
thm is
usefulinanalyzi
ngthefir
stplayer'
sdecisi
onsbot hwhent hepl
ayersmov esequenti
allyand
whent heplayersmov esimult
aneously.

Exampl
eisassigni
nga" 1"t
oawi nni
ngposit
ionand"-1"toal
osingone,butasthi
sisdi
ffi
cul
tto
cal
cul
atef
orallbutthesimplestgames,i
ntermediat
eev al
uat
ions(speci
fi
cal
lychosenf
orthe
gameinquest
ion)aregenerall
ynecessar
y.